1. Having referred during the course of the final hearing to their desire to also recover from one or more of the respondents their costs incurred in respect of the proceeding; the orders made by the Tribunal on 18 August 2025 also provided that:

(a) by 8 September 2025, the applicants were to lodge with the Tribunal and give to the respondents any outline of submissions in respect of any costs application by them in respect of these proceedings, setting out the basis for any costs order and the quantum of costs being claimed;

(b) by 29 September 2025, the respondents were to lodge with the Tribunal and give to the applicants any outline of submissions in opposition to the costs order sought by the applicants; and

(c) unless otherwise ordered by the Tribunal, any application for costs shall be determined on the documents.

1. The following documents were subsequently lodged with the Tribunal:

(a) on 8 September 2025, the applicants' submissions on costs which also expressly refer to and rely upon the applicants' written submissions lodged on 16 April 2025;

(b) on 15 September 2025, a short affidavit sworn by Mr Vozza on 12 September 2025, to which was annexed copies of a number of invoices issued to the applicants by the legal practice MGD Law;

(c) on 29 September 2025, the third respondent lodged submissions as to costs on behalf of the second, third and fourth respondents; and

(d) also on 29 September 2025, the third respondent lodged a bundle of documents comprising 321 pages of material and with the file name of the document describing it as 'Attachment B to Costs Submissions'.

1. The fourth respondent did not lodge any submissions in opposition to the costs order sought by the applicants.

Principles applicable to costs of building disputes in the Tribunal

1. The general starting position in Tribunal proceedings that each party bears their own costs, and the power of the Tribunal to make an order for the payment of costs where it considers appropriate, are set out in s 87(1) and s 87(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act) respectively.
2. For this proceeding, comprising both building service complaints and HBWC complaints, s 49(1) of the BSCRA Act states:

(1) Subject to this section, the Building Commissioner or the State Administrative Tribunal may make such orders for costs as they think fit in relation to proceedings arising from a building service complaint or a HBWC complaint.

1. The engagement between these provisions of the SAT Act and the BSCRA Act in relation to costs has been considered previously by the Tribunal[2] and was well summarised by the Tribunal in Deshmukh and Distinctive Building Services Pty Ltd [2024] WASAT 62 (Deshmukh) as follows:
   1. ... Thus, in considering a claim for costs made pursuant to s 49(1) of the BSCRA Act, the Tribunal is not required to start from the position that each party is to bear its own costs. However, as is well understood, costs do not 'follow the event' in Tribunal proceedings and the broad discretion conferred on the Tribunal is to be properly exercised by taking into account relevant considerations.
   2. In Hippydayze (S) at [11] the Tribunal referred to the guidance given to the Tribunal in relation to the exercise of its discretion to award costs by the Court of Appeal in Western Australian Planning Commission v Questdale Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 32 (Questdale) in which the following principles were found to apply:

(1) The discretionary power is to be exercised judicially; that is not arbitrarily, capriciously, or so as to frustrate the legislative intent;

(2) The power to award costs is to be exercised if it is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case to do so;

(3) The onus is on the party seeking an order in its favour to establish that a favourable order ought to be made;

(4) Every party to proceedings before the Tribunal is taken to be cognisant of the objectives of the Tribunal as expressly provided for in s 9 of the SAT Act. It is therefore necessary for the applicant to establish that the respondent's conduct has impaired the attainment of the Tribunal's objectives to have the proceedings determined fairly and in accordance with the substantial merits, with as little formality and technicality as possible and in a way which minimises the costs to the parties; and

(5) The mere fact that a party ultimately fails on a contention advanced during the course of the hearing does not, in itself, signify that the party has acted inconsistently with the objectives set out in s 9 of the SAT Act.

1. In Hippydayze (S) at [12] the Tribunal noted that if it exercises its discretion to award costs, it is to approach the task of fixing costs in a broad and relatively robust fashion, referring to the decisions of the Tribunal in Perth Central Holdings Pty Ltd and Doric Constructions Pty Ltd [2008] WASAT 302 at [67] and Marvelle Investments Pty Ltd and Argyle Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] WASAT 125 (S) at [49]. However, although fixing costs involves a relatively broad-brush approach, the Tribunal must nevertheless be satisfied that the costs claimed are reasonable and not excessive in nature.

1. In their written submissions lodged on 16 April 2025, the applicants, in respect of their claim to recover legal costs of the proceeding submit, in effect, that:

(a) they were legally represented in the proceeding from its commencement in the Tribunal in November 2023 through to 30 December 2024;

(b) from 30 December 2024, the applicants chose to be self-represented due to the financial burden of legal costs;

(c) as at the date of those submissions, the applicants' legal costs were approximately $64,090.30 including both GST and also including work in progress at that date;

(d) the Tribunal ought to make a costs order in favour of the applicants, including as a result of the following conduct of the respondents:

(i) the proceedings having been delayed and drawn out as a result of substantial material having been filed by the respondents containing irrelevant content and unfounded allegations against the applicants;

(ii) directions hearings being substantially longer than ought to have been necessary as a result of the conduct of the respondents at those hearings;

(iii) the approach of the respondents in respect of their association with each other requiring the applicants to apply for disclosure of documents by the respondents; and

(iv) the respondents maintaining positions that were ultimately untenable in light of the evidence before the Tribunal including, in some cases, the evidence of the respondents themselves.

1. In their costs submissions lodged on 8 September 2025, the applicants submit that a costs order ought to be made against the respondents for the further reasons, in effect, as follows:

(a) throughout the proceeding, including throughout the final hearing, the respondents maintained positions in respect of the primary contractual documents that were ultimately found by the Tribunal to not be credible;

(b) that the respondents tailored their evidence to suit their position, rather than conceding obvious points;

(c) that Mr Forte only made a belated concession regarding the correct signing date of the $118,000 lump sum contract in his written closing submissions, lodged after the final hearing, and that HDG has never made such a concession and it's maintained position was found by the Tribunal to not be credible;

(d) that the respondents maintained throughout the proceeding their positions as to Mr Forte's limited role in the project and there being no commercial or business association between the respondents, which necessitated the applicants, through the lawyers then acting for them, having to seek from the Tribunal orders requiring the production of documents by the respondents

(e) despite the order for production of documents, and the documents that were ultimately before the Tribunal, the respondents continued to deny and conceal the true nature of their association;

(f) the Tribunal ultimately found that Mr Forte was an undisclosed principal under the $295,000 lump sum contract and that Mr Forte and HDG had devised a scheme to jointly construct the applicants' home on terms they had agreed between themselves but not disclosed to the applicants;

(g) that, in the applicants' submission, the respondents maintained the façade of their position that they had no business or commercial association vexatiously and deliberately; and

(h) the conduct of the respondents amplified the costs, time and resources consumed in the proceedings to the detriment of the applicants and contrary to the objections of s 9 of the SAT Act.

1. While the applicants' 16 April 2025 submissions referred to costs having been incurred, at that time, in the total sum of $64,090.30, the 8 September 2025 submissions do not refer to any specific amount of costs being sought and instead state that the applicants will file with, or shortly following those submissions, affidavit evidence of the legal costs incurred.
2. In his affidavit sworn on 12 September 2025, Mr Vozza states, in effect, that:

(a) the affidavit is made in support of the applicants' application for costs; and

(b) the annexure to the affidavit comprises true copies of invoices for legal costs incurred by the applicants in relation to these proceedings totalling the sum of $44,729.20.

1. In turn, annexure 'CV1' to the affidavit comprises the following invoices from the firm that represented the applicants in this proceeding from November 2023 to 30 December 2024:

(a) invoice dated 4 March 2024 in the sum of $9,259.00 (including GST and disbursements) for work undertaken in the period from 20 November 2023 to 1 March 2024;

(b) invoice dated 24 November 2024 in the sum of $11,954.40 (including GST and disbursements) for work undertaken in the period from 8 March 2024 to 13 June 2024; and

(c) invoice dated 6 July 2025 in the sum of $23,515.80 (including GST) for work undertaken in the period from 26 July 2024 to 15 April 2025.

1. The Tribunal understands from the submissions of the applicants that:

(a) the total sum of these invoices, in the amount of $44,729.20, is the full amount of costs now claimed by the applicants in this proceeding; and

(b) while the last of the above invoices includes work for a number of months after the applicants' former legal representatives lodged with the Tribunal their notice of ceasing to act on 30 December 2024, it is the applicants' position that those legal representatives continued to undertake work to assist the applicants in progressing their application.

The second, third and fourth respondents' submissions in opposition to the applicants' application for costs

1. As noted above, the first respondent has filed no submissions in respect of the applicants' application for costs.
2. In the submissions lodged on 29 September 2025 by the third respondent, the position of the second, third and fourth respondents in respect of the applicants' application for costs is, in effect, as follows:

(a) the findings on liability made by the Tribunal in the substantive decision are currently under appeal to the Supreme Court and the Tribunal ought to defer making any determination as to costs pending the outcome of the appeal;

(b) the conduct of the proceeding by these respondents was not inconsistent with the Tribunal's objectives;

(c) given the complexity of the matter and the background to the proceedings, including the positions of the parties in respect of the PMA (as defined in the substantive decision), the position taken by these respondents in the proceeding was reasonable and, for the purpose of costs, was reasonably arguable;

(d) that the position of these respondents was reasonably arguable is supported by the findings of a differently constituted Tribunal in Leach and Ha-DecGroup Pty. Ltd [2025] WASAT 78 that, this Tribunal understands, may have involved similar contracting arrangements including a project management agreement between Mr Forte and the relevant homeowners in that matter; and

(e) alternatively, to the above matters, that in respect of the costs incurred by the applicants:

(i) a significant amount related equally to proceedings in the Magistrates Court involving some of the same parties;

(ii) a significant amount related equally to the first respondent, HDG;

(iii) some amount related solely to the first respondent; and

(iv) some of the costs are excessive, extraneous or unproven in connection to this proceeding.

1. The submissions lodged by the third respondent also include copies of the schedules of itemised work included in the invoices from the applicants former legal representatives, as annexed to the affidavit of Mr Vozza, in which the third respondent has sought to highlight specific tasks in different colours for the purposes of his submissions regarding much of the work relating to multiple parties and/or multiple legal proceedings, or otherwise being excessive, extraneous or unproven.
2. The other lodgement by the third respondent on 29 September 2025 is a 321-page bundle of documents, apparently from Magistrates Court proceedings between Building Renewals Pty Ltd, the fourth respondent in this proceeding, and the applicants. Again, this material is in support of the submission by the third respondent that much of the work undertaken by the applicants' former legal representatives also related to the Magistrates Court proceedings.

1. As addressed in significant detail in the substantive decision, the contractual arrangements between the parties to this matter, and the manner in which those arrangements were put in place, was unusually complex and, in some critical respects, ultimately disputed between the parties.
2. For the reasons given in the substantive decision, the Tribunal determined that Mr Forte and HDG entered into a scheme to jointly construct the applicants' home on terms they had agreed between themselves, but which were not disclosed to or agreed by the owners.[3] The impact of this scheme upon the applicants was that they were ultimately charged significantly more for the construction of their home than what had been required under the $295,000 lump sum contract. They were also left in the invidious position of having significant work undertaken on their home, beyond the $118,000 worth of work covered by the relevant home indemnity insurance and building permit taken out for the work.[4]
3. Throughout the proceeding, including throughout all of their evidence at the final hearing, the respondents maintained a position to the effect that the applicants, for their own reasons, had sought to terminate the $295,00 lump sum contract and instead replace this with the $118,000 lump sum contract, which provided for the construction only of the shell of their proposed home. In support of this position, the respondents maintained throughout the proceeding, including throughout the final hearing, that the date of the $295,000 lump sum contract was 24 November 2020 and that the $118,000 lump sum contract was signed on or about 9 December 2020. While these dates would have supported the respondents' scheme, including the additional documents entered into between them in support of that scheme, the Tribunal ultimately determined in the substantive decision that the respondents' position as to the date of the respective contracts was simply not credible.[5]
4. The evidence at the final hearing of both Mr Forte and, on behalf of HDG, Mr Ayad, was most strident that their timeline of events was correct, despite significant evidence to the contrary. To this end, the respondents were given an opportunity to adduce further documentary evidence to support their position as to the timeline, no such further evidence was sought to be adduced. As noted in the substantive decision, Mr Forte in closing submissions after the final hearing, and in the absence of any further evidence to support the respondents' position, belatedly conceded in respect of the $118,000 lump sum contract, that it was signed by the applicants around the middle of March 2021. However, despite this being entirely contrary to other critical aspects of the respondents' timeline, Mr Forte continued to maintain his position in opposition to all of the relief sought by the applicants.
5. Throughout this proceeding, the task for the applicants to pursue their complaint items required significant work to compile and prepare both their own extensive documentation and also to require the respondents to produce further documentation in relation to the contracting arrangements between the parties and, in particular, documents in relation to the arrangements between the respondents.
6. The Tribunal also considers that the conduct of the respondents throughout the proceeding, including the final hearing, was such that:

(a) the respondents maintained positions in respect of their contended version of the contractual arrangements that were not supported by any credible evidence;

(b) it delayed the progress and timely resolution of the proceeding; and

(c) it was contrary to the objective of the Tribunal to act as speedily as is practicable and to minimise the costs to the parties.

1. Given the approach taken by the respondents, and the need to address the complex contracting arrangements and timeline of relevant events, it was reasonable for the applicants to seek the assistance of legal representatives. Indeed, given the complexity of the matter and the approach taken by the respondents, we consider that both the applicants and the Tribunal were assisted by the work undertaken by those legal representatives in identifying relevant documents and assisting the applicants to prepare and present their case.
2. Given the significant level of success achieved by the applicants in the substantive decision, their application for a costs order to be made in their favour is compelling.
3. Turning to the position of the second, third and fourth respondents, the first submission made on their behalf by the third respondent is that the Tribunal ought to defer making any determination as to costs pending the outcome of the appeal to the Supreme Court. In response to this submission, the Tribunal does not consider that there to be any reason, in light of the matters raised by the third respondent, to defer the determination of the applicants' costs application. The Tribunal is not aware of any stay having been applied for in respect of the orders arising from the substantive decision and the institution of an appeal in the circumstances of this matter should not otherwise preclude the applicants from having a decision in respect of costs. Further, determining the costs application without further delay is consistent with the objectives of the Tribunal.
4. In his submissions lodged on 29 September 2025, the third respondent contends that, given the complexity of the matter and the background to the proceedings, including the positions of the parties in respect of the PMA, the position taken by these respondents in the proceeding was reasonable and, for the purpose of costs, was reasonably arguable.
5. However, the Tribunal considers that a great deal of the complexity in this matter arose from the scheme entered into by the respondents for the construction of the applicants' home, including the documents prepared and signed by the relevant respondents in furtherance of that scheme. The complexity continued throughout the proceeding, at least in part due to the respondents continuing to disclose or deny the existence of any commercial or business arrangement between them and maintaining a version of the contracting arrangements and timeframe that was ultimately found not to be valid by the Tribunal.
6. Further, the reference to a separate proceeding before a differently constituted Tribunal does not assist. The Tribunal as constituted in this matter is not aware, nor should it be, of the circumstances of that other proceeding. In the substantive decision, the Tribunal found that:

(a) the respondents had devised a scheme to jointly construct the applicants' home on terms they had agreed between themselves but not disclosed to the applicants;

(b) the true contractual arrangements, as supported by the documentary evidence, was quite contrary to the position advanced jointly by the respondents; and

(c) the respondents' position in respect of, in particular, their jointly contended timeline for the contractual arrangements was not supported by any credible evidence.

1. The Tribunal does not accept that the approach by the respondents in this proceeding was reasonable, or was otherwise such that it should excuse them from having to contribute to costs that were reasonably incurred by the applicants in prosecuting their claim against steadfast opposition by the respondents.

1. As noted above, the effect of the submissions lodged by the applicants, as properly understood by the Tribunal, is that they seek recovery of the full amount of costs in the sum of $44,729.20 (inclusive of GST and some relatively minor disbursements) as invoiced in the accounts from their former legal representatives annexed to Mr Vozza's affidavit.
2. The applicants' submissions do not propose any discount to those costs, nor do they specify the respondent or respondents from whom those costs are sought to be recovered.
3. The Tribunal observes that the relevant accounts from the former legal representatives are all headed with the number of this proceeding and, on the face of it, the work included in the narrative to each account all appears related to this proceeding. The accounts do not disclose the name or names of the practitioners who have undertaken each item of work and all work appears to have been undertaken at a rate of $462 per hour (inclusive of GST).
4. In the applicants' submissions, they refer to this hourly rate being:

(a) for the period before 1 July 2024, only marginally higher than the relevant scale costs of $429 (inclusive of GST);[6]

(b) from 1 July 2024, less than the relevant scale rate of $484 (inclusive of GST).[7]

1. The Tribunal notes that the figures above are those applicable to a senior practitioner under the relevant determinations, with lower rates applicable to junior practitioners, restricted practitioners and paralegals.
2. While the accounts do not make this clear, the Tribunal understand that the legal representatives previously engaged by the applicants, and whose fees are sought to be recovered, is an incorporated legal practice through which work was undertaken for the applicants by the senior practitioner who is the practice director of that legal practice.
3. The Tribunal considers that the rate under the applicable determination for a senior practitioner would generally be the appropriate hourly rate to utilise for the purposes of assessing work properly undertaken in this proceeding by a senior practitioner. However, in considering that accounts annexed to Mr Vozza's affidavit, the Tribunal notes that there are a significant range of tasks included, many of which could properly have been undertaken by a less experienced practitioner, or indeed a clerk or paralegal.
4. The accounts also include a number of entries which, in normal circumstances, would constitute solicitor-client costs and may not ordinarily be recoverable from the other party or parties. This includes items in respect of taking instructions and the provision of legal advice and for undertaking research.
5. In respect of the contention by the third respondent that the costs involve significant overlap with a Magistrates Court proceeding, there is little before the Tribunal to suggest that is indeed the case and, if it is, the extent to which any work may be duplicated. At the outset, the Tribunal notes that the basis upon which the third respondent has sought to lodge in this Tribunal material from a proceeding in the Magistrates Court is unclear. As a consequence, it is unclear whether any issue arises in respect of the disclosure or utilisation of documents contrary to the Harman undertaking.
6. In any event, it is not for this Tribunal to review those documents in an effort to identify some commonality between this matter and a proceeding in another court, in respect of which this Tribunal otherwise has no context or background.
7. To the extent the third respondent has endeavoured to colour code line items in the legal representatives' invoices that he considers related equally to the Magistrates Court proceedings, we are not satisfied that is sufficient in itself to suggest those costs have not been properly incurred and invoiced for the purposes of this proceeding.
8. In respect of the third respondent's submission that much of the costs claimed in the invoices relate equally to the first respondent, the Tribunal does not consider that to be a matter that assists. As the findings of the Tribunal in the substantive decision resulted in orders being made as against the first and third respondents, on a joint and several basis, it considers that any costs should also be ordered to be paid by them on the same joint and several basis.
9. As to the figure that should be awarded to the applicants, the Tribunal considers that there should be a significant discount to the total amount claimed by the applicants by reason of the following:

(a) the Tribunal does not start from a position that the successful party ought to be awarded costs and instead the applicant for costs bears the onus of establishing that a costs order should be made;

(b) while the proceeding was complex and the position taken by the respondents served to prolong the proceedings, it was also incumbent upon the applicants to seek to progress their application in the most efficient manner and the record of this proceeding, including the seeking of extensions of time from all parties to comply with orders and the protracted process of the parties' documentary evidence being finalised is indicative of a degree of inefficiency on the part of the applicants;

(c) the invoices relied upon by the applicants include a variety of items that should properly be regarded as solicitor-client costs and not recoverable against any of the respondents, even in the circumstances determined in the substantive decision;

(d) no discounting is proposed in respect of the total amounts of the invoices from the applicants' former legal representatives, including to take account of work that could properly have been undertaken at a lower rate, work that is properly considered to be solicitor-client related tasks and the potential that at least some amount of the work could have related to issues outside that necessary to be progressed as part of the Tribunal proceeding;

(e) at least for some of the period covered by the invoices, the hourly rate charged was in excess of that applicable to a senior practitioner under the relevant determination; and

(f) while the applicants were substantially successful in the substantive decision, they did not succeed in all respects, particular with regard to the compensation sought by them.

1. Taking into account all of the matters set out above, and applying an appropriately robust and broadbrush approach, the Tribunal finds that the costs awarded to the applicants are to be fixed in the sum of $15,000 and that this amount is to be payable jointly and severally by the first and third respondents.

1. Pursuant to s 49(1) of the Building Services (Complaint Resolution and Administration) Act 2011 (WA) and s 87(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), the first respondent and the third respondent must pay to the applicants, by 10 February 2026, the amount of $15,000 in respect of the applicants' costs of the proceeding, on the basis that those respondents are jointly and severally liable for that amount.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.

[1] These supplementary reasons should be read with the substantive decision and terms defined in the substantive decision are used in these reasons.

[2] See in particular Hippydayze Pty Ltd and Mener Group Pty Ltd [2019] WASAT 92 (S) (Hippydayze (S)) at [4] to [12] and Gileno and Riviera Homes (WA) Pty Ltd [2018] WASAT 48 (S) (Gileno).

[3] See in particular the substantive decision at [97].

[4] Substantive decision at [186] to [194].

[5] Substantive decision at [63], [88], [91].

[6] Based upon the Legal Profession (State Administrative Tribunal) Determination 2022 (WA).

[7] Based upon the Legal Profession (State Administrative Tribunal) Determination 2024 (WA).