Upham v Kent Sydney Pty Ltd

(1) Terminate the tenancy for non-payment of rent.

(2) Suspend the date of vacant possession under s 114 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) (RT Act) to 3 October 2025.

(3) The whole of the bond to be paid to the landlord and credited against the money order for rent arrears.

(4) The tenant pay the landlord the sum of $15,000 immediately in respect of rent arrears.

(5) The Tribunal also made a notation that the amount of rent arrears was "well above $20,000 (agent states no rent paid since January and $26,000)" and the landlord's agent had agreed to send to the tenant a copy of the rent ledger "in the next week".

1. The tenant filed a Notice of Appeal and Application for a Stay on 12 September 2025.
2. On 8 October 2025, the landlord filed a Reply to Appeal.
3. On 10 October 2025, the Appeal Panel made procedural directions setting the appeal down for hearing. The orders included a consent Stay application until the date of the appeal on the condition that the tenant pay a weekly occupation fee.
4. On 14 November 2025, the tenant filed documents and submissions in the appeal, in addition to documents that had been filed with the Stay application and attached to the Notice of Appeal. Although those documents and submissions were beyond the timetable obligation imposed in the orders of 10 October 2025, the Appeal Panel granted leave to the tenant to rely on those documents and submissions in circumstances where there was no unfairness or prejudice to the landlord, as the landlord had a reasonable opportunity prior to the appeal hearing to respond to those documents and submissions.
5. On 17 November 2025, the landlord filed and served documents and submissions.
6. On 17 November 2025, the tenant filed and served a further bundle of documents. Most of those documents were medical reports or certificates. The Appeal Panel ruled that they could not be relied upon in the appeal, due to (a) their lack of relevance to the issues in dispute in the appeal; and (b) the lateness of them being filed and served, which created unfairness to the landlord.
7. The appeal hearing proceeded on 18 November 2025. The tenant appeared and made submissions. The landlord was represented by two licensed agents, who were employed by the agency that manages the residential premises on behalf of the landlord.
8. The Appeal Panel reserved its decision, and indicated to the parties a decision would be published in short compass.

1. The tenant's grounds of appeal are summarised as follows:

(1) The Notice to Terminate for non-payment of rent was not properly served by the landlord. The tenant asserts that it was placed underneath his door after the landlord had filed Tribunal proceedings.

(2) The tenant was not served the Notice to Terminate by email.

(3) The rent ledger was not served prior to the hearing or provided at the hearing. The agent sent the ledger the following week. The ledger did not comply with the requirements under the RT Act.

(4) The tenant also seeks leave to appeal under Sch. 4 Cl. 12 of the NCAT Act.

1. The tenant did not raise in the appeal any defects in the Notice to Terminate or termination information statement (s 85(1) of the RT Act and Regulation 23A of the Residential Tenancies Regulation 2019 (NSW)).
2. The tenant's submissions make clear that he has no current financial capacity to pay the rent, and acknowledge that he has a large amount of rent and occupation fee arrears. The tenant does not identify a figure for rent arrears, but provides no documents or information to dispute the landlord's figure. The tenant asserts his weekly income is $160 less than the weekly rent. He asserts that because of medical conditions he is unfit for work. The tenant asserts he may be able to access a "total and permanent disability claim", but no specific details are provided as to when that would occur. The tenant states he has "approached" Homes NSW for assistance.

1. Internal appeals may be made as of right on a question of law, and otherwise with leave (that is, the permission) of the Appeal Panel: s 80 (2) of the NCAT Act.
2. An appeal is not simply an opportunity for a dissatisfied or aggrieved party to re-argue the case they put at first instance: Ryan v BKB Motor Vehicle Repairs Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCATAP 39 at [10].
3. In Prendergast v Western Murray Irrigation Ltd [2014] NSWCATAP 69 ('Prendergast') the Appeal Panel set out at [13] a non-exclusive list of questions of law. What is an error on a question of law was further extensively discussed by the Appeal Panel in Unique Commercial Property Group Limited v Cusumano [2024] NSWCATAP 204 (Cusumano) at [25]-[40]. An error on a question of law is an appeal as of right (if established) and does not require leave. A mixed error of fact and law (if established) requires leave to appeal.
4. In Cusumano at [33], the Appeal Panel stated the categories of questions of law are "not closed"; and at [37] stated:

What constitutes a question of law is vexed and context dependent in the sense that the distinction between matters of fact and of law may turn on the circumstances in which the question arises: Targeted Property Investments Pty Ltd v Look Up Technologies Pty Ltd (No 2) [2023] NSWSC 416 at [33(4)], citing Thomas and Naaz [2023] NSWCA 40 at [52] and Da Costa v The Queen [1968] HCA 51; (1968) 118 CLR 186 at 194; [1968] HCA 51.

1. It is unnecessary for the purpose of this decision to set out all of the examples of an error on a question of law that were discussed in Cusumano.
2. However, a question of law may arise in the circumstances including the following:

(1) Failure to provide procedural fairness at the hearing (Donohoe v Alburario [2025] NSWSC 9 at [36]- [39]).

(2) A constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction, in the sense of a failure to consider a "substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts" that was within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to determine (see e.g. Alexandria Landfill Pty Ltd v Transport for NSW (2020) 103 NSWLR 479; [2020] NSWCA 165 at [8]- [12] and [413]; Resource Pacific Pty Ltd v Wilkinson [2013] NSWCA 33 at [1] and [9]).

(3) Applying the wrong legal principle (in isolation to the factual findings) which materially affected the outcome (Bimson, Roads & Maritime Services v Damorange Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 734 at [38]- [53]). However, the wrong application of the correct legal principles to the facts is an error of mixed fact and law for which leave to appeal is required under s 80(2)(b) of the NCAT Act (TNT Building Trades Pty Ltd v Baker [2023] NSWCATAP 178 at [42]- [43] and the authorities cited therein).

1. The circumstances in which the Appeal Panel may grant leave to appeal from decisions made in the Consumer and Commercial Division are limited to those set out in Cl. 12(1) of Sch. 4 of the NCAT Act. In such cases, the Appeal Panel must be satisfied that the appellant may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice on the basis that:

(a) The decision of the Tribunal under appeal was not fair and equitable; or

(b) The decision of the Tribunal under appeal was against the weight of evidence; or

(c) Significant new evidence has arisen (being evidence that was not reasonably available at the time the proceedings under appeal were being dealt with).

1. In Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17 (Collins v Urban), the Appeal Panel stated at [76] that a substantial miscarriage of justice for the purposes of Cl. 12(1) of Sch. 4 may have been suffered where:

... there was a "significant possibility" or a "chance which was fairly open" that a different and more favourable result would have been achieved for the appellant had the relevant circumstance in para (a) or (b) not occurred or if the fresh evidence under para (c) had been before the Tribunal at first instance.

1. Even if the appellant establishes that it may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice in the sense explained above, the Appeal Panel retains discretion whether to grant leave under s 80(2) of the NCAT Act. The appellant must demonstrate something more than the Tribunal was arguably wrong (Pholi v Wearne [2014] NSWCATAP 78 at [32]).
2. Ordinarily it is only appropriate to grant leave in matters involving issues of principle or questions of public importance which might have general application, an injustice which is reasonably clear, in the sense of going beyond merely what is arguable, or an error that is plain and readily apparent which is central to the Tribunal's decision (Collins v Urban at [84]).
3. In respect of a self-represented non-legally trained appellant, grounds of appeal should be considered generally (subject to procedural fairness considerations) to determine whether a question of law has been raised (Prendergast at [12]; Cominos v Di Rico [2016] NSWCATAP 5 at [13]).

1. The tenant's documents in the appeal contained a partial copy of the written agreement dated 10 April 2024. It did not contain the last few pages. The tenant asserted that those pages did not contain a clause agreeing to be served by email by the landlord.
2. The landlord asserts that there is a clause that allows service by email.
3. When questioned by the Appeal Panel as to why the tenant did not provide a full copy of the residential tenancy agreement, the tenant did not provide a clear explanation.
4. The tenant's documents also contained a written transcript of the Tribunal hearing on 29 August 2025. The tenant also provided a sound recording of the hearing. The Appeal Panel has listened to the sound recording to understand what occurred at the hearing on 29 August 2025, and the reasons of the Tribunal.
5. The landlord's documents in the appeal did not contain a copy of the residential tenancy agreement dated 10 April 2024. The landlord's documents in the appeal did not contain a copy of the Notice to Terminate. The landlord's documents did contain a rent ledger and a document "Tribunal Report" prepared by the landlord's agent.
6. The "Tribunal Report" document was in evidence before the Tribunal. That document contains, in a table form, "communications history". That document contains an entry to the effect that a Termination Notice for non-payment of rent was emailed to the tenant on 7 July 2025 at 4.58 pm, and "opened" by the tenant at 5.52 pm.
7. When questioned as to why the landlord's documents in the appeal did not contain the Notice to Terminate; the email serving the Notice; and a full copy of the residential tenancy agreement, the agents of the landlord stated that such documents had been provided to the Tribunal, and they did not believe it was necessary to provide them again in the appeal.
8. The procedural directions of the Appeal Panel at the Call Over of the appeal make clear that parties have to provide to the Appeal Panel and send to the other party fresh copies of all the documents that were provided to the Tribunal and relied upon as evidence at the Tribunal hearing, as well as any new documents that were not provided to the Tribunal that the party seeks leave to rely upon. The landlord misunderstood the procedural directions of the Appeal Panel made by Blake PM dated 10 October 2025.
9. At the hearing before the Tribunal, and at the appeal hearing, the tenant denied that he had received an email on 7 July 2025 serving the Notice to Terminate. The tenant asserted that he had first received the Notice to Terminate when it has been placed under his door in the evening of 10 July 2025, and this had occurred after the landlord had filed proceedings in the Tribunal at 4.50 pm on 10 July 2025.
10. The landlord's agent Ms Sincic informed the Tribunal, and repeated at the appeal hearing, that the Notice to Terminate had been emailed to the tenant on 7 July 2025, before the proceedings were filed on 10 July 2025. On 10 July 2025 she had placed an additional copy of the Notice under the door of the tenant.

Service of the Notice to Terminate and Jurisdiction of the Tribunal to Make the Termination Order

1. This is the critical issue in the appeal. An order of the Tribunal made without the jurisdictional power to make the order is an error on a question of law.
2. The tenant asserts the Tribunal proceedings were not validly commenced because they were commenced before the Notice to Terminate was served.
3. There is no dispute that there is a residential tenancy agreement between the parties. The very significant amount of rent arrears, in circumstances where the tenant's own evidence to the Tribunal was that he had not made a rent payment since January 2025 was compelling evidence that the breach was sufficient, in all the circumstances of the matter, to terminate the residential tenancy.
4. However, the Tribunal cannot terminate a residential tenancy agreement if it had no jurisdiction to do so, irrespective of the merits of the dispute.
5. Under s 81(1) and (3) of the RT Act, a tenancy only terminates in the circumstances set out in the Act; and those circumstances include the Tribunal making an order to terminate the tenancy.
6. Section 82 of the RT Act states as follows:

82 Termination notices

(1) A termination notice must set out the following matters -

(a) the residential premises concerned,

(b) the day on which the residential tenancy agreement is terminated and by which vacant possession of the premises is to be given,

(c) the ground for the notice, unless the notice is given under section 96 or 97,

(d) any other matters prescribed by the regulations.

(2) A termination notice must be in writing and be signed by the party giving the notice or the party's agent.

(3) A termination notice for a periodic agreement may specify a day other than the last day of a period for the payment of rent as the termination date.

83 Termination orders

(1) If the Tribunal makes an order terminating a residential tenancy agreement under this Act, it must also make an order for possession of the residential premises specifying the day on which the order takes or took effect.

(2) An application to the Tribunal by a landlord for a termination order -

(a) must be made after the termination date specified in the relevant termination notice and within the period prescribed by the regulations, and

(b) must be made only if vacant possession of the premises is not given as required by the notice.

87C Breach of tenancy agreement

(1) A landlord may give a termination notice on the ground the tenant has breached the residential tenancy agreement.

(2) The termination date must be at least 14 days after the termination notice is given.

Note -

The termination date may be before the end of the fixed term for a fixed term tenancy agreement.

(3) The Tribunal may, on application by the landlord, make a termination order in relation to a termination notice given under this section if the Tribunal is satisfied -

(a) the tenant has breached the residential tenancy agreement, and

(b) the breach is, in the circumstances of the case, sufficient to justify termination of the agreement, and

(c) the termination notice was given in accordance with this section, and

(d) the tenant has not vacated the premises as required by the notice.

(4) In considering the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal may consider the following -

(a) the nature of the breach,

(b) previous breaches,

(c) steps taken by the tenant to remedy the breach,

(d) steps taken by the landlord about the breach,

(e) the previous history of the tenancy,

(f) another matter the Tribunal considers relevant.

(5) The Tribunal may refuse to make a termination order if it is satisfied that the tenant has remedied the breach.

(6) Section 89(2) and 89A do not apply to a termination notice given under this section.

Note -

Section 154E sets out additional matters to be considered if the residential tenancy agreement is a social housing tenancy agreement.

88 Termination notices for non-payment of rent or charges

(1) A termination notice given by a landlord on the ground of a breach of the residential tenancy agreement arising solely from a failure to pay -

(a) rent, or

(b) water usage charges, or

(c) charges for the supply of electricity, gas or oil (utility charges),

payable by the tenant (a non-payment termination notice) has no effect unless the rent has, or the water usage charges or utility charges have, remained unpaid in breach of the agreement for not less than 14 days before the non-payment termination notice is given.

(2) A non-payment termination notice is not ineffective merely because of any failure of the landlord or the landlord's agent to make a prior formal demand for payment of the rent, water usage charges or utility charges.

(3) A non-payment termination notice must inform the tenant that the tenant is not required to vacate the residential premises if the tenant pays all the rent, water usage charges or utility charges owing or enters into, and fully complies with, a repayment plan agreed with the landlord, unless the Tribunal makes a termination order on the basis that the tenant has frequently failed to pay rent, water usage charges or utility charges on time.

(4) Despite any other provision of this Part, a landlord may apply to the Tribunal for a termination order before the termination date specified in a non-payment termination notice. The Tribunal must not consider any such application until after the termination date.

89 Repayment of rent and charges owing following issue of non-payment termination notice

(1) This section applies if a landlord gives a tenant a non-payment termination notice.

(2) The Tribunal must not make a termination order on the ground set out in the notice if the tenant pays all the rent, water usage charges or charges for the supply of electricity, gas or oil (utility charges) owing or enters into, and fully complies with, a repayment plan agreed with the landlord.

(3) A termination of the residential tenancy agreement solely on the ground of non-payment of rent, water usage charges or utility charges, and any warrant for possession issued as a result of any order for possession, cease to have effect if the tenant pays all the rent, water usage charges or utility charges owing or enters into, and fully complies with, a repayment plan agreed with the landlord and the tenant has not vacated the residential premises.

(4) If a tenant repays all the rent, water usage charges or utility charges owing or enters into, and fully complies with, a repayment plan agreed with the landlord, the landlord must notify -

(a) the Tribunal, if the landlord has applied to the Tribunal for a termination order on the ground of non-payment of rent, water usage charges or utility charges and the application has not been finally dealt with, or

(b) the Sheriff, if a termination order has been made and a warrant for possession of the residential premises has been issued but has not been enforced by the Sheriff.

Maximum penalty - 20 penalty units.

(5) The Tribunal may, on application by a landlord, make a termination order despite subsection (2) or (3) if it is satisfied that the tenant has frequently failed to pay either or both of the following amounts owing to the landlord for the residential premises -

(a) rent, on or before the day set out in the residential tenancy agreement,

(b) water usage charges in accordance with section 39.

(5A) The Tribunal may make a termination order under subsection (5) on the grounds set out in subsection (5)(b) only if the landlord has, on each relevant occasion, requested payment from the tenant within 3 months of the issue of the bill for those charges by the water supply authority.

(6) If the Tribunal makes a termination order as referred to in subsection (5), a warrant for possession may be issued as a result of that order, even if the tenant has paid all rent, water usage charges or utility charges owing or complied with a repayment plan.

1. In respect of service of notices under the RT Act by a landlord, Section 223 of the RT Act states as follows:

223 Service of notices and other documents

(1) A notice or other document that is authorised or required by this Act or the regulations or a residential tenancy agreement to be given to or served on any person may be given or served by -

(i) delivering it to the person personally, or

(ii) delivering it personally to a person apparently of or above the age of 16 years at the person's residential or business address, or

(iii) delivering it in an envelope addressed to the person and leaving it in a mailbox at the person's residential or business address, or

(iv) sending it by post to the address specified by the person for the giving or service of documents or, if no such address is specified, the residential or business address of the person last known to the person giving or serving the document, or

(v) sending it to an email address specified by the person for the service of documents of that kind, or

(va) sending it by other electronic means to an address or location specified by the person for the service of documents of that kind, or

(vi) any other method authorised by the regulations for the service of documents of that kind, or

(i) leaving it with a person apparently of or above the age of 16 years at, or by sending it by post to, the head office, a registered office or a principal office of the corporation or to an address specified by the corporation for the giving or service of documents, or

(ii) sending it to an email address specified by the corporation for the service of documents of that kind, or

(iia) sending it by other electronic means to an address or location specified by the corporation for the service of documents of that kind, or

(iii) any other method authorised by the regulations for the service of documents of that kind, or

(i) leaving it at, or sending it by post to, any office of the agency addressed to the agency head, or

(ii) sending it to an email address specified by the agency for the service of documents of that kind, or

(iia) sending it by other electronic means to an address or location specified by the agency for the service of documents of that kind, or

(iii) any other method authorised by the regulations for the service of documents of that kind.

(2) Nothing in this section affects the operation of any provision of a law or of the rules of a court authorising a document to be served on a person in any other manner.

(3) If there is more than one landlord or tenant under a residential tenancy agreement, a notice required to be served on a tenant or landlord under the agreement is taken to be served on all the tenants or landlords under the agreement if it is served on one of the tenants or landlords.

113 Defects in termination notices

The Tribunal may make a termination order for a residential tenancy agreement or any other order even though there is a defect in the relevant termination notice or the manner of service of the notice if -

(a) it thinks it appropriate to do so in the circumstances of the case, and

(b) it is satisfied that the person to whom the notice was given has not suffered any disadvantage because of the defect in the notice or service or that any disadvantage has been overcome by the order and any associated order.

1. The operation of s 113 of the RT Act does not arise as an issue in this appeal, as there was no concession before the Tribunal that the landlord had not served the Notice to Terminate prior to commencing Tribunal proceedings. In any event, there are limits to the operation of s 113 of the RT Act, and it cannot be invoked to cure certain types of fundamental defects in the notice or manner of service: Dannoun v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2024] NSWCATAP 120 at [62]- [92].
2. In the appeal documents, the tenant provided email correspondence with the landlord which he asserted supported his position that the Notice to Terminate had not been emailed to him, and he had only been served the document when it was placed under his door. The Appeal Panel grants leave to rely on this fresh evidence in the appeal as it is significant to the consideration of whether there is an error on a question of law established: Yuen v Thom [2016] NSWCATAP 242 at [17]- [22].
3. The landlord's agent sent an email to the tenant on 17 July 2025 at 5.00 pm that relevantly stated as follows:

"I have not heard from you regarding the termination notice sent via email in addition to the notice I left under your door earlier this week.

You have also been given notice of the upcoming tribunal (sic) hearing.

..."

1. The tenant responded to that email on 21 July 2025 at 2.19 pm. The response relevantly stated:

"I apologise for the difficulties you have had contacting me recently.

I received the termination notice you hand delivered to my unit last Monday. I've had significant health effects...I am now recovered enough to get a job and will move to a new place and being to repay the rent arrears as soon as I am able.

I have also received the hearing notice.

..."

1. The email exchange does not contain an denial that the tenant was emailed the Notice to Terminate before it was placed under his door. It does not state that he only received the Notice to Terminate when it was placed under his door. At best, the response by the tenant is ambiguous. It is not conclusive contemporaneous evidence that the Notice to Terminate was not emailed on 7 July 2025, as the landlord's agent asserted at the Tribunal hearing and was documented in the business records of the landlord's agent that were provided as evidence at the Tribunal hearing.
2. The manner of service of documents is set out in s 223 of the RT Act. Serving a Notice by placing it under a door is not a method of service under s 223(1)(a)-(vi) of the RT Act.
3. However, a valid method of service on an natural person is "sending it to an email address specified by the person specified by the person for the service of documents of that kind" under s 223 (a)(v) of the RT Act.
4. If the parties had specified in the residential tenancy agreement that the tenant agreed to service by email, and the Notice to Terminate was emailed on 7 July 2025, the proceedings would have been commenced after the Notice to Terminate was served, and thus comply with s 88(4) of the RT Act.
5. As discussed previously, at the Appeal Panel neither party provided a full copy of the written residential tenancy agreement. The tenant asserted that he did not believe that the full written residential tenancy agreement contained a clause that the tenant agreed to service by email. The landlord's agents asserted that the written residential tenancy agreement contained a clause where the tenant agreed to service by email.
6. Having read the transcript and listed to the hearing recording, the Appeal Panel is satisfied that at the Tribunal hearing, the Member had "hearing notes" and documents filed by the landlord that included the Notice to Terminate; the business record of the landlord evidencing service of the Notice to Terminate by email on 7 July 2025; the rent ledger; and the residential tenancy agreement.
7. At the Tribunal hearing, the tenant disputed that the Notice to Terminate had been served by email on 7 July 2025. The landlord's agent (Ms Sincic) responded that it had. The Member's comments support an interpretation that he considered whether the written residential tenancy agreement had a clause regarding service by email; and that the tenant had accepted service by email pursuant to the terms of the lease. The Member was satisfied that the Notice to Terminate had been emailed on 7 July 2025. It follows that the Tribunal proceedings were validly commenced under s 88(4) of the RT Act.
8. The reasons and findings of the Member could have been expressed with greater clarity. The hearing could have been conducted in a more organised way.
9. However, there is sufficient information in the oral reasons for the Appeal Panel to be satisfied the Member considered the critical matters that the landlord needed to establish to give the Tribunal jurisdiction to terminate the residential tenancy agreement and made necessary findings. Considering the large amount of rent arrears, there was clearly a basis to find that the breach of the agreement by the tenant was sufficiently serious in all the circumstances to terminate the residential tenancy agreement.
10. In this appeal, the onus is upon the tenant to establish that there was an error on a question of law in the decision or the manner in which the hearing was conducted: Whear v Kids on Hayes Street Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCATAP 123 at [28] and [43]. The Appeal Panel is not satisfied an error on a question law has been established in respect of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to terminate the residential tenancy agreement.

1. The second purported error on a question of law is the tenancy ledger. The landlord did not provide a copy of the ledger to the tenant at the hearing. However, the landlord provided a copy of the ledger to the Tribunal Member, which the Tribunal Member considered as evidence to establish that the tenant was significantly in rent arrears. The landlord agreed to send the tenant a copy of the ledger after the Tribunal hearing, and did so.
2. The tenant asserts that the ledger was difficult to understand and that he was not in a position to challenge the ledger at the hearing. The obligation of the landlord to keep and maintain rent records (i.e. a rent ledger) is set out in s 37 of the RT Act. The tenant has not established any failure to comply with s 37 of the RT Act.
3. The failure of the landlord to provide a copy of the ledger at, or before, the Tribunal hearing was not a denial of procedural fairness in the circumstances of this matter. There was no practical injustice to the tenant, in circumstances where he conceded that he had not paid any rent since January 2025.

1. No error on a question of law is established. In respect of leave to appeal, no basis has been established to grant leave to appeal, pursuant to the principles identified in Collins v Urban.

1. The appeal fails, for reasons previously expressed. However, by reason of the appeal process, the landlord may not be able to obtain and enforce a warrant within the time period under s 121(2) of the RT Act. If a warrant cannot be obtained, the landlord, unless the Appeal Panel varies the date of possession, will need to take fresh Tribunal proceedings to obtain an extension of the time period to obtain a warrant.
2. However, it is open to the Appeal Panel, in a residential tenancy appeal that has been dismissed, to use its powers under s 81(1)(b) of the NCAT Act to vary the date of possession: Hughes v Hume Community Housing Association Co Ltd [2023] NSWCATAP 109 at [136]- [137]; Westwell v Kitson [2018] NSWCATAP 121 at [48].
3. The Appeal Panel raised the potential operation of s 81(1)(b) of the NCAT Act with the parties at the hearing, and both parties made submissions.
4. The tenant submitted that due to heath and financial hardship issues, if the appeal was dismissed he should have until early January 2026 to vacate the property.
5. The landlord submitted that the Tribunal had given the tenant a very significant period to vacate the property when he has raised such issues at the Tribunal hearing; the rent (and occupation fee) arrears were now over $30,000; and there was no reasonable prospect the tenant would pay any rent arrears or occupation fee based upon the history of the tenancy. The landlord submitted that nothing more than a suspension of the date of possession for two weeks from the date of the Appeal Panel hearing would be appropriate.
6. The Appeal Panel accepts that the tenant has difficult personal and financial circumstances. However, the extent of the rent (and occupation fee) arrears weighs heavily against any lengthy further suspension of the date of vacant possession.
7. The Appeal Panel varies the suspension of the date of vacant possession in the orders of the Tribunal to 10 December 2025.
8. The tenant is strongly encouraged to take immediate measures to obtain support to vacate the premises and obtain alternative accommodation, in circumstances where the landlord can apply to the Tribunal for a warrant from 11 December 2025 onwards and then book the Sherrif to enforce the warrant. The Appeal Panel notes the tenant stated that he had been in contact with Homes NSW in regard to obtaining social housing. The tenant may also seek assistance from charity organisations.
9. Further, by reason of the Tribunal not making a finding under s 89(5) of the RT Act, the provisions of s 89(3) and (4) of the RT Act apply, if the parties enter into a mutually agreed repayment plan or the tenant pays all rent arrears prior to eviction.

(3) Order 3 of the Tribunal, dated 29 August 2025 in Case Number 2025/00265388, is varied to suspend the date of vacant possession under s 114 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) to 10 December 2025.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.

28 November 2025 - Decision under appeal details, added.