Truong v R [2004] HCA 10;

Truong v R [2004] HCA 10; - HCA 2004 case summary — Zoe

[18]

In September 1997, pursuant to s 40 of the Act, a request was made by Australia, under the authority of the Commonwealth Attorney-General, to the Secretary of State for Home Affairs of the United Kingdom, for the surrender of the appellant. The request was not in evidence in the present proceedings, but Ormiston JA noted that "there seems little doubt that the subject offences were expressed in terms of State or Commonwealth (the drug offences) law". That must be so. Section 40 refers to a request by Australia for the surrender of a person from a country "in relation to an offence against a law of Australia of which the person is accused". This led the Secretary of State for Home Affairs of the United Kingdom to issue an authority to proceed directed to the Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate sitting at Bow Street, which described the subject matter of the inquiry to be conducted as "conduct in the jurisdiction of the Government of Australia which appears to the Secretary of State to be conduct which, had it occurred in the United Kingdom, would have constituted offences of murder, false imprisonment, conspiracy to commit murder, conspiracy to commit blackmail, kidnap, conspiracy to kidnap, threats to kill, conspiracy to be knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of the prohibition on the importation of a controlled drug, namely heroin".
The relevant provisions of the United Kingdom legislation relating to extradition are set out in the joint reasons for judgment of Gummow and Callinan JJ ("the joint reasons"). We will not repeat them. Reference is also made in the joint reasons to the course of proceedings before the Bow Street Magistrate, who was initially informed by counsel for Australia that the appellant was wanted by the Government of Australia for murder, kidnapping, conspiracy to commit murder, conspiracy to kidnap, blackmail, extortion with threat to kill, conspiracy to import a prohibited drug, namely heroin, and knowing involvement in the importation of heroin. Once again, that is plainly a reference to offences against Australian law. The Government of Australia would not be wanting a person for offences against some other country's law.
It is convenient to refer at this point to a matter that is ordinarily of concern in extradition proceedings, but is not directly relevant in the present appeal. That is the matter of double criminality. In Riley v The Commonwealth[6], it was pointed out that this is a general principle of extradition law which is ordinarily reflected in statutes governing extradition, and applies according to the terms of the relevant statute. The general principle was identified by reference to a passage in Oppenheim's International Law[7]:

[20]

That principle is reflected in the United Kingdom legislation, and explains a potential ambiguity in the concept of "offences". As the joint reasons point out, that ambiguity appears to have given rise to confusion in some of the documents in the extradition proceedings.
The material before the Magistrate included a lengthy affidavit of Detective Senior Constable Tragardh of the Victoria Police Force. That affidavit set out the results of the investigation into the kidnapping and death of Le Anh Tuan, and explained the nature of the evidence against the appellant. In terms of s 10(2) of the Act, it is the document that sets out the acts or omissions by virtue of which the offences alleged against the appellant had been committed. There was no material difference between the evidence that was led against the appellant at his trial and the facts outlined in the Tragardh affidavit. Three important aspects of those facts should be noted. First, the case against the appellant was circumstantial. Secondly, so far as the alleged offences of conspiracy to murder and conspiracy to kidnap were concerned, the overt acts from which the existence of the conspiracies was to be inferred included the actual kidnapping and murder. There is nothing unusual about this. Criminal conspiracies are commonly proved by overt acts; and the overt acts often include the substantive crimes which are the object of the conspiracy. A legally informed reader of the Tragardh affidavit would clearly have understood that the overt acts of kidnapping and murder were important, perhaps critical, aspects of the cases of conspiracy which Australia, at that stage, intended to present against the appellant at his trial. They constituted the most significant parts of the evidence upon which those cases depended. Furthermore, the conspiracies in which the appellant participated were alleged to be continuing conspiracies which remained on foot up to and including the time of the kidnapping and the murder. There was no suggestion in the affidavit that the prosecution would, or could, seek to make out cases of conspiracy which involved an unperformed agreement to commit crimes. It is apparent from the material in the affidavit that the acts of performance of the agreement were relied on heavily, both in proof of the agreement, and in defining the extent of the agreement. Thirdly, the allegation was that the appellant was "the most senior member of a network of Vietnamese criminals" based in Hong Kong and that Mrs Van and the two men who entered Australia from the United States, and who allegedly committed the acts of kidnapping and murder, were assisting, and acting at the direction of, the appellant. In other words, the allegation was that, and the material outlined in the Tragardh affidavit supported the inference that, the appellant organised and directed the kidnapping and murder. Thus, the conduct of the appellant alleged to make the appellant liable as a principal for kidnapping and murder (procuring the two men from the United States to kidnap and, if necessary, kill the victim) was the same as the conduct alleged to make him a party to a conspiracy to kidnap and murder. He was not said to be guilty of kidnapping or murder because he himself kidnapped or killed the victim. His liability was based on the procuring. But that was also the act by virtue of which he was allegedly a party to the conspiracy to kidnap and murder.
The Tragardh affidavit concluded with a statement of the charges against the appellant that had been filed in Melbourne. They were, of course, expressed in terms of offences against Australian law. They were murder, kidnapping, conspiracy to murder, conspiracy to kidnap, demanding money with menaces (blackmail), demanding money with a threat to kill, conspiracy to import heroin, and being knowingly concerned in the importation of heroin.
For a reason that is unknown, counsel for Australia, when identifying the "draft charges upon which extradition is sought", included the conspiracy charges, but omitted the charges of murder and kidnapping. In the course of argument in this Court, there was some speculation as to why that might have occurred. In the light of the decision of the House of Lords in Director of Public Prosecutions v Doot[8] it can hardly have been because of some apprehension that the principles of territoriality which affect procuring the commission of a crime might be different from those which affect conspiracy. Whatever the reason, one thing is clear. Having regard to the contents of the Tragardh affidavit, neither the speciality provisions of the United Kingdom statute, nor the terms of the speciality agreement that was entered into by Australia, would have been inconsistent with a prosecution of the appellant in Australia for murder and kidnapping, even if he were only surrendered in respect of the offences of conspiracy to murder and conspiracy to kidnap. The reasons for that will be explained below. Counsel would have been aware of that. Accordingly, we do not accept that the narrowing of the charges in respect of which surrender was sought involved any express or implied undertaking not to try the appellant for the substantive offences. On the contrary, the terms of the speciality agreement entered into by Australia for the purpose of the extradition left that possibility open.
The Metropolitan Magistrate, pursuant to s 9(9) of the Extradition Act 1989 (UK), certified that the conduct alleged within the jurisdiction of the Government of Australia would amount to certain offences against the law of the United Kingdom, namely conspiracy to commit murder, conspiracy to kidnap, conspiracy to commit blackmail and conspiracy to be knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of the prohibition on the importation of a controlled drug, namely heroin. On receipt of that certificate, the Secretary of State signed a surrender warrant ordering the appellant to be returned to Australia in respect of the offences for which he was committed to custody by the Magistrate. The warrant, erroneously, identified the offences of which the appellant was accused in terms of United Kingdom offences. This is evident because one of them, "conspiracy to be knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of the prohibition on the importation of a controlled drug, namely heroin", is an offence known to the law of the United Kingdom, but not to Australian law. The offences included conspiracy to murder and conspiracy to kidnap, but not murder or kidnapping.
Those were the circumstances in which the appellant was surrendered to Australia where, in due course, he was tried for the substantive offences of murder and kidnapping.

[29]

The reference to the acts or omissions by virtue of which an offence is alleged to have been committed is of central importance in this appeal. It directs attention to the concrete, rather than the abstract. The offences of which s 42, interpreted in accordance with s 10(2), speaks are not theoretical offences, to be described by reference to the contents of a text book. They are specific offences, alleged to have been committed by a particular individual, by virtue of particular conduct. This is of special importance when dealing with such a protean offence as conspiracy.
Section 42 reflects a general principle of extradition law which has been formulated in varying ways, and which has found somewhat different forms of statutory expression. The reasons of Ormiston JA contain a detailed examination of those variations and differences[9]. Some caution is necessary in adopting general statements of the principle which may have been made in a context in which it was unnecessary to advert to questions of its detailed application. It is the language of the particular statutory provision reflecting the principle that matters, although the resolution of uncertainty about the meaning of that language may be assisted by an understanding of broader issues, and of the legislative history.
The Extradition Act 1870 (UK) was the precursor of both the current Australian legislation and the current United Kingdom legislation, although there was intermediate legislation. Section 19 of the Act of 1870 provided that where, in pursuance of any arrangement with a foreign state, any person accused of a crime is surrendered by that foreign state, "such person shall not, until he has been restored or had an opportunity of returning to such foreign state, be triable or tried for any offence ... other than such of the said crimes as may be proved by the facts on which the surrender is grounded".
The reference to "the facts on which the surrender is grounded" relates to a significant practical consideration in connection with extradition. By hypothesis, the person surrendered to the United Kingdom or Australia is wanted for trial for an offence or offences against the law of the country where the trial is to occur. But the criminal law of the foreign country surrendering the person will almost certainly be different in some respects, and will often be different in many respects, from that of the country of trial. The administrative or judicial officers dealing with extradition are not experts in foreign law. It happens, in the present case, that the law of the United Kingdom in relation to the appellant's alleged conduct is not very different from Australian law. That should not obscure the fact that extradition legislation is designed to operate as between countries whose laws may be quite different. Hence the operation of the speciality, in the Act of 1870, by reference to the facts on which the surrender by the foreign country was grounded rather than, for example, the offences against the law of the foreign country disclosed by those facts. There may have been no such offence known to the law of the United Kingdom, or Australia, as the case may be. Even if there were similar offences, they may not correspond precisely in their elements. There is a discussion of this problem in Riley v The Commonwealth[10].
The current United Kingdom legislation, pursuant to which the appellant was surrendered, in s 6(4) provides that a person shall not be returned from the United Kingdom unless provision is made by an arrangement with the country seeking return for securing that the person shall not, unless he has first had the opportunity to leave such country, be dealt with for any offence committed before his return to it other than the offence in respect of which his return is ordered, an offence "which is disclosed by the facts in respect of which his return was ordered", or any other offence being an extradition crime in respect of which the Secretary of State may consent to his being dealt with. In accordance with that requirement, the Secretary of State certified that an arrangement had been made with the Government of Australia that the appellant, unless he had first had an opportunity to leave Australia, would not be dealt with in Australia for any offence committed before his return other than the offences in respect of which his return was ordered, or another offence "which is disclosed by the facts in respect of which his return was ordered" or any other offence being an extradition crime in respect of which the Secretary of State may consent to his being dealt with.
Having regard to the contents of the Tragardh affidavit it is clear that the substantive offences of kidnapping and murder were offences disclosed by the facts in respect of which the return of the appellant was ordered. It cannot be, and is not, claimed that Australia was in breach of the speciality agreement it made with the United Kingdom by reason of the appellant's trial for kidnapping and murder. However, the appellant contends that the constraint imposed by s 42 of the Act is more stringent than the speciality principle as reflected in the United Kingdom statute, and in the speciality agreement made in the present case. According to the argument, the Australian legislation imposes a tighter regime of speciality, and one with which the trial of the appellant did not comply.
The first point to be made about s 42(a) is that the offences to which it refers are offences against an Australian law. The provision is about trying people for offences in Australia. That can only be a reference to offences against Australian law. People are not tried in Australia for offences against foreign law. The word "offence" has the same meaning throughout s 42(a). Thus, "offence" in s 42(a)(i) means "offence against the law of Australia".
Having regard to the course of the extradition proceedings in London, we accept that the offences in respect of which the appellant was surrendered included conspiracy to kidnap and conspiracy to murder, and did not include kidnapping and murder.
The question then is whether kidnapping and murder, in the circumstances of the present case, were offences of which the appellant could be convicted on proof of the conduct constituting the offences in respect of which he was surrendered. (At the relevant time no problem existed by reason of the words in parenthesis in s 42(a)(i).) In that respect, in consequence of s 10(2), the reference to the conduct constituting the offences in respect of which he was surrendered is a reference to the acts or omissions by virtue of which those offences had, or were alleged to have, been committed. The acts or omissions by virtue of which the offences of conspiracy to kidnap and conspiracy to murder were, or were alleged to have been, committed are to be identified by reference to the Tragardh affidavit, understood in the light of the criminal law of conspiracy as it applies in Australia.
The question, in our view, is not to be answered merely by a comparison of the elements of the (Australian) offences in respect of which the person has been surrendered and the (Australian) offences in respect of which he is to be, or was, tried, although an understanding of those elements is material. The acts or omissions, that is, the conduct, by virtue of which an offence has been, or is alleged to have been, committed, lie at a level of abstraction between a formal statement of the elements of the offence, on the one hand, and an account of the evidence relied on to prove the relevant conduct, on the other. Nor is the relevant comparison between the bare minimum that would be necessary to make out offences of the kind under consideration. The exercise required by the statute is concrete, not abstract, and is to proceed by reference to the actual conduct alleged against the person in question. In the present case, it is also important to bear in mind that the substantive offences for which the appellant was ultimately tried were offences in respect of which his liability as a principal was based upon a statutory provision to the effect that a person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an indictable offence may be tried, indicted or presented and punished as a principal offender[11].
While the concept of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring may extend beyond cases in which there is an agreement between the principal offender and the secondary participant[12], the term procure has a narrower meaning. In Attorney-General's Reference (No 1 of 1975)[13], Lord Widgery CJ said:

[37]

It is not to the point in the present case to say that the appellant could have been convicted of conspiracy even if the plan had been intercepted by the police before the victim was kidnapped or killed. We are not concerned with the theoretical question of what various crimes the appellant might have committed. We are concerned with the particular conspiracy into which he allegedly entered, and in which he participated.
The conduct by virtue of which this particular conspiracy, in this particular case, was alleged to have been committed included the continuing performance of the agreement up to and including the killing of the victim. Savvas is authority for the proposition that, if the appellant had been tried for, and convicted of, conspiracy rather than the substantive offences, the kidnapping and the killing would have been matters for the sentencing judge to take into account, being aspects of "the degree of criminality involved in the appellant's participation in the conspiracy"[16].
Reference was made in argument to McAuliffe v The Queen[17] in support of a suggestion that the murder charge against the appellant involved materially different conduct from that involved in the conspiracy to murder charge. Once again, the point is purely theoretical. It involves making the wrong comparison. It is unrelated to the circumstances of this particular case. That is made plain by the remarks on sentence of the trial judge quoted above, which, in turn, reflect the way the jury was directed. The allegation, in relation to procuring, at trial, was that the appellant was in command. He "directed all that took place in relation to the kidnapping", including the threat of killing and the ultimate execution of the victim. There was never any suggestion that the two thugs who were engaged by the appellant to carry out the kidnapping might have acted with excessive force, or behaved in some other way contrary to his instructions. If they had done so, their own life expectations may have been considerably shortened. The appellant's liability was based on procuring. He was not left exposed as some unfortunate secondary participant caught up in events that escalated beyond what was planned. He was the person in charge. That was the way the conspiracy cases were put against him. And that is the basis on which he was convicted of the substantive offences.

[57]

It is convenient now to say something more of the facts. That task is assisted by the circumstance that the appellant has been tried, convicted and sentenced and that the record in this Court includes the evidence which the jury may be taken to have accepted and the remarks on sentence of the trial judge. But it should be emphasised that the complaints made by the appellant focus upon an earlier stage in the proceedings and the identification of the offences in respect of which he was surrendered by the United Kingdom and those offences of which, looking at the matter before trial, he could have been convicted on proof of the conduct constituting the offences in respect of which he was surrendered. That process of identification is not to be performed with the hindsight now available.
In his remarks on sentence, Vincent J said that the appellant had travelled across the world using false travel documents, was obviously involved in criminal activity, handled large sums representing the proceeds of crime and had the capacity to recruit assistance in Hong Kong, the United States and Australia. All the principal actors were persons of Vietnamese national origin. The appellant was a member of a Chinese ethnic minority in Vietnam. At the time of trial, he was approximately 40 years of age. The sister of the appellant, Mrs Van, lived in Melbourne. The victim, Le Anh Tuan, was the 21‑year‑old son of Mrs Ha. She was an importer and exporter of clothing and footwear and a person of wealth. On 16 March 1996, the appellant, who had arrived from Hong Kong, met Mrs Ha in Melbourne. He endeavoured to enlist her assistance in the importation of heroin. At a later meeting, the appellant threatened Mrs Ha with unfortunate consequences for herself and her family should she not agree to take part. Mrs Van also put pressure on Mrs Ha. The appellant returned to Hong Kong and later went to London, but he continued in telephone conversations to put pressure on Mrs Ha, including demands for payment of $400,000 "protection money".
On 29 April 1996, Mrs Ha's son was kidnapped. His body was found on 7 June 1996. The cause of death was a single gunshot wound in the head. The prosecution alleged that the killing was carried out by two Vietnamese identified as the Biu brothers, at the instigation of the appellant. The trial judge, in accordance with authorities in this Court including McAuliffe v The Queen[21], directed the jury that, in order to convict the appellant of murder, the jury need only find beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant, having been a party to the kidnapping of the victim, knew or was aware that a realistic possible consequence of such was that the victim would be murdered.

[58]

Against that background, the first issue is the identification of those offences against the law in force in Victoria for which the appellant was surrendered by the United Kingdom. More specifically, did those offences include those for which the appellant was tried and convicted?
In attempting to answer that question, all parties, including the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth who intervened, looked to the UK Act and the steps taken by the authorities in that country in response to the Request. That puts the Court in the necessary but somewhat invidious position of considering the efficacy under British law of the steps taken in the United Kingdom. There was no evidence before the Court of Appeal upon any matters of foreign law and therefore none is before this Court. However, no other course is immediately apparent if the Court is to determine the consequential issues of Australian law upon which the appeal turns.
The UK Act applies in respect of the extradition of persons at large after conviction of an extradition crime in the requesting State, and also in respect of those such as the appellant who are accused in that State of an extradition crime. Section 1(2) provides for the arrest and return to certain Commonwealth countries, including Australia[22], in accordance with extradition procedures under Pt III of the statute, of certain persons in the United Kingdom. They are persons accused of an extradition crime in Australia or alleged to be unlawfully at large after conviction of such an offence in Australia. The expression "extradition crime" is so defined in s 2 to distinguish between "conduct in the territory of", relevantly, Australia (s 2(1)(a)), and "an extra-territorial offence against the law of [Australia]" (s 2(1)(b)) where the Australian jurisdiction is based on the nationality of the offender (s 2(3)(a)), or where the "equivalent conduct" would constitute an extra-territorial offence against United Kingdom law (s 2(2)). This requirement of "double criminality" is assessed at the time of commission of the alleged offence[23].
It should be noted that the extradition proceedings with which this case is concerned were conducted on the basis that, notwithstanding the identification in the Request of offences (iii) and (iv) by reference to the special provisions of s 321A of the Crimes Act (the text of which has been set out above), Australia did not rely upon extra-territorial offences within the meaning of s 2(1)(b).
Part II of the UK Act, which comprises s 6, is headed "RESTRICTIONS ON RETURN". Section 6(4) implements in the United Kingdom that rule of international practice known as "the speciality rule". The sub‑section provides that a person shall not be returned, or committed or kept in custody for the purposes of such return, unless, among other things, provision is made by an arrangement with the relevant Commonwealth country for securing that the person:

[80]

The proceedings before the magistrate continued over at least two days, and there was a long adjournment, apparently at the request of the appellant. Representations were made to the magistrate by counsel for Australia and the appellant. The court was empowered by s 9(8) of the UK Act to commit the appellant to custody or on bail, to await the decision of the Secretary of State as to his return to Australia and, if the Secretary so decided, to await his return to Australia. The exercise of that power was conditioned by s 9(8) upon (i) the issue of an authority to proceed, a condition that had been met in the present case; and (ii) the satisfaction of the court that (a) the offences to which the authority to proceed related were extradition crimes within the meaning of s 2 of the UK Act, and (b) the evidence before the court "would be sufficient to make a case requiring an answer by [the appellant] if the proceedings were the summary trial of an information against him" (s 9(8)(a)).
The term "extradition crime", used in s 9(8), is concerned here with conduct in Australia; the authority to proceed had, in accordance with s 7(5), specified offences under the law of the United Kingdom which would be constituted by equivalent conduct in the United Kingdom.
The course of proceedings before the magistrate was determined by the submissions put by Australia's counsel. In a four page opening note, it was stated that the appellant was "wanted by the Government of Australia for murder; kidnapping; conspiracy to commit murder; conspiracy to kidnap; blackmail; extortion with threat to kill; conspiracy to import a prohibited drug, namely heroin; and knowing involvement in the importation of heroin". That statement tracked the identification of offences (i)‑(viii) in the Request and was speaking of the law in force in Victoria, not putative offences against United Kingdom law.
However, the opening note went on to list five offences which were described as "the draft charges upon which extradition is sought". Four of these are conspiracy counts, none of them murder or kidnapping, and from the last of them it appears it is United Kingdom offences which are identified. The last charge repeats from the authority to proceed the words "to be knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of the prohibition on the importation of a controlled drug, namely heroin". Thus, it appears that the statement in the opening note should be understood as if it had stated that what was set out were the draft charges under the law of the United Kingdom in respect of which the evidence would be sufficient to make a case requiring an answer by the appellant if the proceedings were the summary trial of an information against him (s 9(8)(a)).
The magistrate gave reasons dated 30 September 1998. The issues which may arise in committal proceedings include the authentication of the documents supporting the request, the identity of the person whose extradition is sought, the limitations imposed by the authority to proceed, the identification of what answers the description of an "extradition crime", and the sufficiency of the evidence to make out a case to answer were the proceedings a summary trial of an information[26]. In the present case, the magistrate stated that the only factual issue he had to decide was whether the man in the dock was the person identified in the evidence. The magistrate continued:

[118]

The reference in s 42 to cases "where the person was surrendered to Australia for a limited period" directs attention to s 44. Surrender to Australia may be obtained upon an undertaking by the Attorney-General respecting trial in Australia for a particular offence or offences, return thereafter to the surrendering country and custody of the person while travelling to and from, and while in, Australia (s 44(1)). In such cases, the person "shall not be tried in Australia" for other offences, and shall not under federal, State or Territory law "be subject to any detention that would prevent the person being returned to the country pursuant to the undertaking" (s 44(1)).
Nothing in this case turns directly upon s 44, but the phrase "shall not be tried" appears there and in s 42. However, the text in s 42 differs, stating "shall not ... be detained or tried" (emphasis added). The reason for the additional words in s 42 is found in the scope of the two sections. Section 44 is limited to surrenders for trial, whilst s 42 applies also to surrenders of those already convicted, for the purpose of their detention in Australia. The present case concerns a surrender for trial.
It is par (a)(i) of s 42 which is of central importance for the present case. That provision deals distinctly with the offence for which there was surrender and "any other offence ... of which the person could be convicted on proof of the conduct constituting any such offence". It is not suggested that par (a)(ii) applied. The United Kingdom had not consented to the appellant being tried in respect of any offence not otherwise identified in par (a)(i)[33]. The phrase in par (a)(i) "the conduct constituting any such offence" is to be read as referring to the acts or omissions, or both, by virtue of which the offence is alleged to have been committed (s 10).
The heading to s 42 is "Speciality". The heading is not part of the statute (Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 13(3)) but, as s 15AB(2)(a) of that statute provides, it may be considered in ascertaining the meaning of s 42 (s 15AB(1)(b)). Paragraph (a)(i) of s 42 is inaptly drawn to protect the observance of the speciality arrangement with respect to the Request for the extradition of the appellant from the United Kingdom. The relevant clause in that arrangement speaks of offences "disclosed by the facts in respect of which [the appellant's] return was ordered". On the other hand, par (a)(i) fixes, more narrowly, upon the identification of murder and kidnapping as offences on which the appellant could be convicted on proof of the conduct constituting the conspiracy offences in the Request in respect of which the appellant was surrendered by the United Kingdom.
However, as was indicated in argument with respect to murder and conspiracy to murder, (a) it was easier to secure a conviction of murder on the McAuliffe basis because that involved contemplation of the possibility of intentional killing by the kidnappers, whilst the conspiracy would require proof of an agreement that the victim be killed, and, on the other hand, (b) the conspiracy charges did not require proving the death of the proposed victim. So, in one respect, the murder charge on which the appellant was convicted was less serious in terms of subjective criminality, but more serious in that it involved the death of the victim. Murder could not be an "other offence" within the second limb of s 42(a)(i) when put beside the offence of conspiracy to murder for which the appellant was returned. Similar reasoning applied to the charges of kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap.
The second limb of s 42(a)(i) is to be read with the statutory requirement, of which it is part, that the appellant was only to be tried in Australia for certain offences alleged to have been committed before his surrender. It may be that, in the events that happened at trial, the jury must be taken to have convicted the appellant of conspiracies, where the agreements were fully performed. But the question posed by the second limb of s 42(a)(i) was addressed to the making by the accused of the plea upon arraignment, to which we will refer in a later section of these reasons. Hence the question was necessarily prospective and not to be answered in retrospect after the conduct of the trial. The question asked whether the appellant could be convicted of murder and kidnapping on proof of the conduct constituting the alleged conspiracies. In that setting, the reasoning in Savvas v The Queen[34] respecting the significance for sentencing of events relating to the implementation of a conspiracy is of no assistance. Nor are cases such as R v Hoar[35] disapproving the charging of conspiracy where it is alleged that the substantive offence has been committed.
For tactical or other reasons which do not appear, the issue under the UK Act respecting "double criminality", which is a distinct matter under that statute from limitations of speciality, was so restricted in the committal proceedings as to limit the offences stipulated in the Request in response to which the appellant was surrendered.
To conclude that the appellant was not to be tried in Australia for the offences of murder and kidnapping by reason of the terms of s 42(a)(i) of the Act does not give effect to the evident purpose of that provision. That is the protection of the speciality[36]. Nevertheless, the language in which par (a)(i) is expressed is sufficiently intractable to gainsay the submissions for the respondent and the Attorney-General that (i) the offences of murder and kidnapping fell outside its terms and thus (ii) the prohibition imposed by s 42(a)(i) was not attracted in this case. As was emphasised in Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane[37], in such a case the function of the Court must be to give effect to the will of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute.

[120]

None of these further issues necessarily would arise for decision if the alternative ground of abuse of process were made out. That ground accepts the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to try and convict the appellant. But the argument is that in the exercise of that jurisdiction the prosecution should have been stayed, albeit, apparently, in the absence of any such application. The result of that failure is said to have been a miscarriage of justice with which the Court of Appeal should have dealt. These submissions, as indicated, have curious aspects. But there is a short answer.
The power to stay prosecutions after extradition was recognised in this country in Levinge[39], in New Zealand in R v Hartley[40] and in the United Kingdom in R v Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court; Ex parte Bennett[41]. However, in the present case, it was for the appellant to make a case that there was a deliberate disregard by the Australian authorities and by the respondent prosecutor of the statutory requirements of s 42 or a knowing circumvention thereof[42]. The appellant did not attempt when he first raised the subject of abuse of process in the Court of Appeal to present any such case of deliberate misuse of authority. This ground must fail.
It should be added that it was not suggested in Levinge that there had been any breach of the conditions necessary for a valid extradition from the United States. Rather, as McHugh JA emphasised, the United States courts had held that Levinge could lawfully be extradited to Australia[43]. The unsuccessful complaint was that his forcible abduction from Mexico to the United States rendered the subsequent proceedings in New South Wales an abuse of process in the New South Wales courts. There was no evidence that the Australian police were involved in or connived at the expulsion of Levinge from Mexico[44].
In R v Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court; Ex parte Bennett[45], the House of Lords was dealing with a situation where there was no extradition treaty between the United Kingdom and South Africa and no arrangements made under the special provisions of s 15 of the UK Act. The defendant claimed he had been kidnapped in South Africa and returned to England as a result of collusion between the two police forces. The House rejected the holding of the Divisional Court that it had no power to inquire into the circumstances under which the defendant had been brought into the jurisdiction. The factual issues had not yet been tried and the case was remitted for further consideration.
We turn to consider the outstanding issues. These were the subject of additional written and oral submissions and attracted intervention by several Attorneys-General.

[121]

The use of the passive voice ("be tried") presents difficulty in identifying those to whom the command is directed and those for whose benefit the command is made. Various possibilities were suggested in argument. One was that the only "rights" involved are those of the country which has rendered up to Australia the individual concerned. Another was that the command is directed to the State courts respecting the exercise of their jurisdiction and that the appellant can assert that absence of jurisdiction and consequent nullity of his convictions. The third, which should be accepted, is that there is no attempted withdrawal of jurisdiction; rather, the federal law founds a special plea to the arraignment which in this case was not made by the appellant.
The expression appears in s 44 as well as in s 42, as has been remarked. It appears also in s 22(4). Section 22 (which is in Pt II, dealing with extradition from Australia) requires determination by the Attorney-General of whether a person who has been committed to prison by order of a magistrate is to be surrendered by Australia in relation to a qualifying extradition offence. There may be no such surrender unless a "speciality assurance" has been given by the extradition country, a phrase expounded in s 22(4). The assurance is deemed to be given if the person in question will not be tried for any other offence and this result is by virtue of a provision of the law of that country, a treaty provision or an undertaking given to Australia.
The various contexts in the Act in which the prohibition on trial appears may suggest that the Act reflects the general practice of international relations whereby the "rights" generated by a speciality undertaking vest in the state receiving that undertaking[46]. That conclusion is supported by the provision in par (a)(ii) of s 42 for the giving of consent by the extraditing country to a relaxation of the prohibition in par (a)(i) of s 42.
However, the phrase "shall not be tried" suggests a command with effect in municipal law and upon the conduct of the trial for an offence other than those indicated in sub‑pars (i) and (ii) of s 42(a). Does this lead to the conclusion that in such circumstances the court in question is deprived of what otherwise would be its authority to try the extradited person? The answer must be in the negative.
It has been emphasised in recent decisions of this Court[47] that it is to be expected that the Parliament will state clearly its will where there is a redefinition of the jurisdiction of a federal court by withdrawing rights and liabilities from what otherwise would be the engagement of Ch III of the Constitution. Reasoning of at least the same strength applies in the present case. The State courts are an essential branch of the government of the States[48]. Here the jurisdiction is non‑federal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Victoria and federal law is said to create rights and liabilities, the giving effect to which involves the withdrawal of subject-matter from that Court.
In Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan[49], Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ[50] explained that a federal law which denied the imposition of criminal liability, otherwise justiciable in the non‑federal jurisdiction of the courts of a State, "upon defence members or defence civilians" might, depending upon its terms, be supported by s 51(vi) and s 51(xxxix) of the Constitution. Such a law would prevail, by operation of s 109, over relevant State laws founding the jurisdiction of the State courts. In that way there would be effective "interference" with the exercise by the State courts of their general criminal jurisdiction. However, their Honours held that the federal law in question in Tracey was not supported by s 51 of the Constitution and so s 109 of the Constitution was not engaged.
In the present case, it is not necessary to determine whether any paragraph or paragraphs of s 51 would support a law which in terms ousted or displaced what otherwise was the general criminal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Victoria to try the appellant. It would need to be borne in mind that, without the extradition effected necessarily under federal law, the appellant would not have been present in the State and so liable to be put on trial there. However that may be, the elliptical method of drafting adopted by s 42 of the Act falls well short of a clear statement by the Parliament of such legislative will to oust or displace jurisdiction. The submissions respecting denial of jurisdiction should not be accepted.
However, that does not conclude all aspects of the matter adversely to the interests of the appellant. Counterpoised to the principles of construction just considered is another important general principle. It is exemplified in Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane[51] and is to the effect that a person constrained by the exercise of executive authority which is not supported by statutory mandate may challenge that constraint by access to the judicial power. When s 41 of the Act speaks of the bringing of the extradited person into Australia and delivery to the appropriate authorities "to be dealt with according to law", it accommodates that principle. The custody of the appellant after arrival in Australia was part of the lawful processes attending his readiness for trial in the Supreme Court.
Did the injunction in s 42 of the federal law that, upon the hypotheses accepted earlier in these reasons, he was not to be tried give to him, quite apart from repercussions in the relations between the two nations, rights enforceable by curial procedures? The answer is that such rights did arise but they were in the nature of an immunity of a specific nature. At any time before trial on both counts, the United Kingdom might have given its consent to that course. If it had done so, then sub‑par (ii) of s 42(a) would have operated to remove the prohibition imposed by that section upon his trial and the appellant would have retained no cause for curial complaint. The United Kingdom did not take that step.
That left the appellant in the position that, upon arraignment, he was entitled under the appropriate procedures of the Supreme Court of Victoria to plead that he was not required to put himself upon the country for trial. It may be accepted, consistently with the reasoning in Felton v Mulligan[52], that such a plea, based in a federal law, s 42 of the Act, if made would thereupon have attracted the exercise of federal jurisdiction by the Supreme Court. But this plea was not made.
It was with the arraignment that, in ordinary usage, the trial may be said to have commenced[53]. Reference is made in the second paragraph of these reasons to s 390A and s 391 of the Crimes Act. It is not useful to use the term "waiver" in this context. The reasons why the point was not taken do not appear in the record. But there is no suggestion that the appellant was the victim of any malpractice in this regard. In the absence of such a plea and in the face of the pleading of the general issue by the plea of not guilty, the appellant's personal right derived from s 42 was spent.

[134]

On the first two issues arising in the appeal, I am in broad agreement with the reasons of Gummow and Callinan JJ.
Thus, I agree in the construction of s 42(a)(i) of the Act which their Honours prefer. In the circumstances disclosed, it is the construction that accords with the language of the Act as it applies to this case. It also accords with the principle of the international law of extradition known as speciality, which is reflected in s 42 of the Act, as its heading ("Speciality") indicates[68]. Likewise, the construction reflects the imperative terms in which s 42 is expressed ("shall not … be … tried"). It is consonant with the long-standing common law principle that no person is to be sent out of the jurisdiction for trial elsewhere except with the express authority of law enacted by Parliament or incorporated in a treaty made within the powers of the executive[69]. And, if there be any doubt, it is the construction of s 42(a)(i) of the Act which, in the circumstances of this case, most closely ensures that the Australian federal law, applicable following the appellant's extradition from the United Kingdom to Australia, conforms to the rule of speciality in international law[70]. It upholds the comity of nations.
Consistently with such comity, particular care and attention has usually been taken by the final courts of civilised nations to ensure that the rule of speciality is scrupulously observed according to statute and treaty. Allowance must be made, as the Act permits, for occasional discordance between the expression of offences in the law of the receiving nation and the way the most proximate and relevant offence, suggested by the alleged conduct of the accused, is defined in the law of the surrendering nation. Thus, as between a country such as Poland and a country such as Australia, with a different language and legal tradition, precise equivalence between certain offences may sometimes be missing, making the interpretation of the provisions of the Act ("offence in respect of which the person was surrendered") and the application of the rule of speciality there stated more difficult and contestable[71].
Such potential difficulties of correspondence between offences do not so often arise as between the criminal laws of the United Kingdom and Australia, given the common language and the shared legal history. Least of all do they arise in relation to the specification of common, generic and well-known offences such as "conspiracy", "murder" and "kidnapping". Such offences are all "offences" long established in the criminal law of both nations. There could be no reasonable doubt about them or about their essential legal incidents.
The rule of speciality is an important one[72]. We obey it not only because the Act so provides and expressly deals with exceptions[73], but because so much is required by Australia's self-respect and national honour[74] in dealing with other nations with which it has extradition arrangements. Compliance with the rule of speciality is reinforced by Australia's expectation of reciprocity in the treatment of its own citizens and persons within its territory, surrendered to other nations. Such compliance is a contribution to the success of the international system of extradition of criminals in contemporary circumstances of easy access to international transport by fugitives, fleeing from criminal justice[75].
The price of the international extradition system that has been created in the past century and more includes strict observance of the rule of speciality, as provided by law. The construction of s 42(a)(i) of the Act urged by the respondent would debase that notion as upheld in Australian law. Effectively, it would read the notion out of the Act in what is otherwise a very clear case. In my view, the rule of speciality, expressed in s 42(a)(i), should be scrupulously observed. It should be upheld by the courts. It must apply, and be applied, in a consistent way in many countries with legal systems distinct from those of the United Kingdom and Australia. There can be no different approach or rule. These are reasons for a measure of strictness in the interpretation of the requirements of the rule as stated in the Act. They apply to the present case.
Further, the principle of speciality protects inter alia the interests of the surrendering country, primarily from abuses of its processes. It was originally devised to ensure that an alleged offender was not extradited to face completely different allegations. A concern was that the person would be charged with a political offence not disclosed upon the extradition application. This is not a contention in the present case. Nevertheless, it was upon the United Kingdom's authority that that country granted the extradition request for the offences of conspiracy to kidnap and conspiracy to murder, despite Australia's requesting extradition for a range of other offences including the substantive offences of kidnapping and murder. Respecting this authority is paramount. Australia's extradition arrangements with the United Kingdom (and other nations) depend upon it. It is only a strict approach to the principle, and the language of the Act, that respects this authority.
Here the appellant was surrendered for trial in Australia for conspiracy to murder and conspiracy to kidnap. He was not surrendered to be tried for the substantive offences of murder and kidnapping. The offences concerned are not the same, either in law or fact. The legally tutored would not regard them as the same "offences" in the United Kingdom. None of the exceptions stated in the Act applies[76]. The substantive offence of murder, in particular, which in Victoria carries a possible sentence of life imprisonment upon conviction[77], is the most grave offence provided for in the criminal law. A conviction of murder still carries special punishment and opprobrium. It is always treated as a crime of particular seriousness[78].
It may be accepted that detailed evidence was fully disclosed to the United Kingdom authorities, sufficient to establish the substantive offences of murder and kidnapping[79]. However, the Act requires a comparison between the offence "in respect of which the person was surrendered" and the offence with which that person is charged. The appellant was surrendered for the offences of conspiracy to kidnap and conspiracy to murder. He was subsequently charged, tried and convicted of kidnapping and murder. Under the Act, it is the offence in respect of which the person was surrendered that is important, not what was disclosed in the form of evidence to the surrendering authorities. Were it otherwise, any country could call much evidence and then turn around and argue that the "other offence" was disclosed to the relevant authorities. The requesting country has the burden of establishing the relevant offences. It may attempt to establish as many offences as it can. However, it is the surrendering country that ultimately decides which offences the person shall be extradited for. The requesting country cannot simply ignore or dismiss this selection[80] and charge, or try, the person for another offence and argue that such offence was "disclosed" to the authorities. The offences for which the surrendering country grants extradition are the critical considerations, even where it is suggested that the surrendering country mistakenly omitted other offences[81].
Conformably with the international rule of speciality and its own law of extradition, if Australia wished, or intended, to put the appellant on trial for the substantive offence of murder, it was obliged to endeavour to secure the appellant's surrender by the United Kingdom for trial for that offence. Likewise with the offence of kidnapping. If this was not done initially, it was the obligation of Australia to endeavour to argue for an enlargement of the specified offences or to seek the consent of the United Kingdom to try the appellant for such offences[82]. None of these things was done. With respect, there appears to have been a lack of attention to detail in the extradition procedures and documentation in the United Kingdom. The defects seem not to have been noticed by anyone until after the trial and conviction of the appellant[83].
In all other respects I agree with what Gummow and Callinan JJ have written on this issue. I agree that the language of s 42(a)(i) of the Act is sufficiently intractable to answer the contentions of the respondent and of the Attorney-General[84]. That conclusion is not altered by the language of s 10(2) of the Act when ss 42 and 10(2) are read against the background of the important principles that I have mentioned.
The appellant therefore succeeds on the first issue. In conducting the trial, contrary to s 42(a)(i) of the Act, the command stated in that provision of the Act was breached. What follows?

[135]

I agree with Gummow and Callinan JJ, substantially for the reasons they give, that the circumstances of the case did not enliven the Court of Appeal's power to grant the appellant a permanent stay of proceedings on his convictions on the basis that, for the prosecutor to endeavour to enforce those convictions, in the light of the established breach of s 42(a)(i) of the Act, would constitute an abuse of process which the Court would prevent.
The authority of a court, under the common law, to stay proceedings as an abuse of process is an exceptional one[85]. It is exercised with due regard for society's strong interest in having the jurisdiction of the courts invoked to put on trial persons lawfully accused of criminal offences[86]. The precise conceptual foundation of the jurisdiction with respect to abuse of process is not yet certain. Thus, it is not entirely clear whether, in Australia, it arises from postulates of the Constitution, whether it represents an aspect of the courts' defending the integrity of their process (the "temples of justice" view) or whether it rests upon a notion akin to estoppel, so that those who have failed to comply with the law are not permitted to gain the benefit of their unlawful conduct[87].
Because I incline to the former explanations of the basis of the jurisdiction, rather than exclusively to the last[88], the foundation for the provision of a stay is not, in my view, confined solely to a case where the party against whom the stay for abuse of process is sought has acted deliberately in the misuse of that party's authority or power[89]. This view is consistent with the authorities that suggest that a stay for abuse of process will be available in a proper case otherwise involving a waste of judicial resources, particularly in litigation unrelated to a determination of a genuine dispute[90].
Nevertheless, I accept that the prevention of deliberate misuse of a party's authority and power is the language in which the provision of a stay has been explained in many cases. Thus McHugh JA, in Levinge v Director of Custodial Services[91], wrote of whether the prosecutor had "knowingly circumvented" the law. This notwithstanding, the relief is not confined to cases of deliberate and knowing misconduct, although that may be sufficient to enliven the jurisdiction. It extends to serious cases where, whatever the initial motivation or purpose of the offending party, and whether deliberate, reckless or seriously negligent, the result is one which the courts, exercising the judicial power, cannot tolerate or be part of.
Whatever the prerequisites to the exercise of the power to stay proceedings for abuse of process, it is clearly established by the cases that it is not available to cure some "venial irregularity"[92]. Thus, where a "technical" breach of extradition law and procedure is later found to have occurred, in circumstances where the relevant officials were determined to have held the affirmative belief that they were acting appropriately, a stay has been refused, rightly in my view[93]. At the very least, therefore, the departure complained of must be very serious, such that in the circumstances, for the court to continue with the proceedings would offend the very integrity and functions of the court, as such.
In the present case the element of deliberate misuse of authority is missing. Nor is the case otherwise one that attracts the stay power on the basis that enforcement of the conviction would reward recklessness on the part of the authorities or would offend the manifest integrity of the courts or of the judges and officers required to enforce the court's orders. The appellant may have remedies derived from the Act itself and from the powers of a court of criminal appeal. But his contention that there had been an abuse of process requiring, or warranting, exceptionally, a permanent stay of proceedings was not made out. No error is shown in the Court of Appeal's failure to afford such relief.

[137]

The foregoing brings me to the point where I part company from Gummow and Callinan JJ. Their Honours conclude that, despite the language of s 42(a)(i) of the Act, and the events that have occurred, the Supreme Court of Victoria was not deprived of what would otherwise have been its authority under Victorian law to try the appellant once he was extradited to Victoria upon the offences alleged in the presentment[94]. Their Honours decide that the appellant enjoyed rights to object to the conduct of the trial in breach of s 42(a)(i) of the Act; but that such rights existed only at the time before and up to the commencement of the appellant's trial[95]. They accept that, had the appellant raised his objection to the trial then, it would have enlivened the power of the respondent to seek the consent of the United Kingdom to the trial of the appellant on offences different from those for which he was surrendered to Australia[96]. According to their Honours, the time for objection, and the only time, was before or upon the appellant's plea to the arraignment[97]. Having failed to object then, at least in circumstances, as here, where there was no suggested malpractice or deliberate wrongdoing on the part of the respondent, the appellant forever lost the right to complain about the point. That point was "spent"[98].
I accept, with their Honours[99], that s 42(a)(i) of the Act implies a personal right in the appellant to object to a trial for an "offence" other than those upon which he had been surrendered for trial in Australia. There are occasional judicial observations, prompted by the expression of provisions such as s 42(a)(i) in the passive voice, that suggest that such provisions are addressed solely to national polities and not to the rights of individuals[100]. However, properly, in my view, the prosecutor did not argue that this was the true meaning of s 42(a)(i) of the Act. I agree that it is not.
The provisions of s 42 may appear as providing a duty of imperfect obligation, addressed principally at the executive government of the receiving nation concerned in the trial of the surrendered person. However, the language and purpose of the provision, and the serious consequences for accused persons of its breach, support the conclusion that such accused have a sufficiently relevant personal interest in the observance of s 42 as to warrant the conclusion that the Parliament meant them to be able to enlist the jurisdiction of the courts to secure obedience to its terms.
The point of disagreement, between myself and Gummow and Callinan JJ, concerns whether that entitlement is lost forever after the plea has been taken without raising the objection and once the trial has commenced. In my opinion it is not. I shall express the main reasons that persuade me to the conclusion opposite to that adopted by Gummow and Callinan JJ in this regard.
First, the language of s 42 is stated in extremely strong terms. It is expressed in the imperative mood ("shall not … be … tried"). The section appears in a federal statute of the Parliament of the Australian Commonwealth. If it is a valid law it is, by covering cl 5 of the Constitution, "binding on the courts, judges, and people of every State and of every part of the Commonwealth, notwithstanding anything in the laws of any State". This means that the command in s 42 was binding on the Supreme Court of Victoria, on the trial judge, on the prosecutor and on all who are required to carry out the orders of the courts. It is not a pious aspiration. Its content and expression, its purpose and history indicate clearly that s 42 expresses a rule that the Parliament intended to be obeyed by all persons with a relevant power and responsibility to do so.
Secondly, the language of s 42 may have been stated in the passive voice for a particular reason. The officials and other persons who are engaged in the complex process of detention and trial of persons surrendered by another country to Australia are many and varied. They are different in the various States and Territories, where the procedures and the role of these office holders engaged in extradition arrangements, custodial detention, and prosecutions also differ.
The extent of a "trial" can itself be a matter of controversy[101]. Even if a trial did not include the appellate process[102], it would presumably include a retrial. A trial may nowadays be conducted in stages that differ as between the several States and Territories[103]. Given the mandatory expression of s 42 and its protective purposes - both for the accused and for the entire extradition process - that section should be interpreted with these considerations in mind. The applicable meaning should be chosen to ensure, so far as the words permit, the fulfilment of the purpose of the Parliament[104]. On the face of things, that purpose would not be fulfilled if the obedience to the command of the Parliament depended exclusively on decisions made by governmental authorities or on the vigilance and knowledge of those representing the appellant at his trial so that they advised him to raise at the arraignment an objection based on the Act's provisions concerning speciality.
Thirdly, there is nothing in the Act, including s 42, that suggests that any objection to non-compliance with the instruction of the Act concerning the conduct of a trial must be taken on a plea to the arraignment or forever lost. In accordance with the Act, most prisoners surrendered to Australia would be tried in State or Territory courts. The procedures governing such trials differ from State to State and also in federal courts and in the Territories. Given the language of s 42, there is a strong federal interest in ensuring compliance by authorities and courts (federal, State and Territory) with the speciality provisions there stated. It would therefore take very clear words to allow the effective importation into its terms of a procedure enacted in one State, to override, or thereafter to neutralise, the mandatory instruction of federal law.
Section 42 of the Act speaks to courts, prosecutors and other officials throughout Australia. The terms of s 42 contradict, and certainly do not provide for or support, a temporal limitation or operation which the Federal Parliament has not seen fit to enact. By the terms of s 42, if a "trial" contrary to the section has been had, that disobedience to the law remains a fact, for whatever legal consequences may follow. It does so notwithstanding the failure of the judge or prosecutor to notice the point or the omission of those representing the accused to rely upon it.
Fourthly, the larger purposes of the rule of speciality expressed in s 42 of the Act reinforce this conclusion. Those purposes[105] include the compliance of Australia with reciprocal treaty obligations, the principles of international law and the comity of nations and the achievement of successful arrangements of extradition of criminal fugitives between countries of many kinds with many different legal systems. These considerations remain applicable in the State of Victoria once the time for a plea to the arraignment has passed in the accused's trial. They exist, at the very least, during the whole time that the case is before the judicature of the nation that has secured the surrender of the accused for trial upon offences of a limited and defined kind. This was the approach taken in AB v The Queen[106], where the point relying on the rule of speciality was not even taken (as here) in the intermediate court but was raised for the first time in this Court[107]. This fact notwithstanding, the majority of the Court gave legal effect to the rule.
To interpret s 42 in this respect by reference only to the interests and duties of the accused involves serious error. Whilst those interests are obviously involved, they are not the only ones at stake. In many ways, the national concerns[108] represent a more important interest that the courts must vindicate. If Australian courts fail to do so, in respect of persons surrendered to Australia, Australians can scarcely be surprised if the courts of foreign nations fail to observe the rule of speciality in respect of persons, including Australian citizens, that Australia has surrendered to them. If this indifference to speciality in offences were to become common, the international system of extradition would be fractured. This Court should adopt a construction of the Act that avoids such consequences. This suggests that the allegedly rigid procedural precondition favoured by Gummow and Callinan JJ, although not expressed in the Act or extradition law, should be rejected.
Fifthly, the fact that the Act imposes the duty of compliance with the rule of speciality in s 42 upon governmental authorities, in the context of the accusatorial criminal trial conducted in this country, means that the primary duty of ensuring that the requirements of s 42 are obeyed rests upon those authorities. It does not primarily rest upon the accused. In the nature of things the accused will normally be detained awaiting trial. Virtually without exception, he or she will be dependent upon legal representatives to recognise, and take, legal points on his or her behalf. It is normally for the prosecution authorities to make sure that proper documentation is prepared, in terms sufficiently broad to include all "offences" for which the trial of the accused may properly be conducted. This is not the duty of the accused or the accused's representatives.
If, subsequently, as the case against the accused is prepared for trial, a disparity is discovered between the offence(s) in respect of which the accused was surrendered and the offence(s) for which it is wished to try the accused, the prosecuting authorities are not without remedy. They may seek the consent of the surrendering country to the course they propose[109]. To suggest that the onus lies on the accused to detect and take the point at the plea to the arraignment or forever lose it, is to reverse the ordinary obligations that rest on the prosecution for criminal process in this country. If, with their legal obligations and significant resources, public officials cannot ensure that the extradition and its consequences comply with the Act, it is an unreasonable construction of s 42 to hold the rights and liberty of the accused hostage to having legal points recognised and taken, on the accused's behalf, before or on the arraignment[110].
Sixthly, Australian courts have in recent times taken a more realistic view concerning the operation of procedural rules and the need for a measure of flexibility defensive of substantive justice. This approach reflects a recognition of the imperfections of legal process, the variability of professional skills and the need to defend the substantive merits of cases rather than adherence to rules for their own sake[111]. This is especially so in the case of criminal trials, where what is, or may be, at stake is the liberty of the accused. In the present case, this Court needs to remind itself that the appellant, on the conviction in the trial that he challenges, was sentenced to life imprisonment: the highest punishment known to our law.
I would not readily come to a conclusion that this consequence was lawful, although the trial of the appellant was contrary to s 42 of the Act and breached a command of the Federal Parliament, solely because his counsel failed to advise him to take the present point on his plea. It was not suggested that the appellant's failure in this respect was a deliberate, strategic decision. I would not infer that it was. It was always in the interests of the appellant to confine the offences on which he was tried to those for which he was surrendered to Australia. The notion that, on the arraignment, it would have been open to the respondent, in answer to a plea, to obtain promptly, or at all, the consent of the United Kingdom to the trial of the appellant for different and more serious offences is not established, either as a matter of fact or as a matter of law. Given the precise character of extradition arrangements and the cumbersome nature of its procedure, this suggestion seems intuitively unlikely.
Seventhly, whilst a case is still being considered by the judicature in Australia, and in criminal appeals in particular, courts have often permitted late amendments to raise new points that need to be considered to avoid a substantial miscarriage of justice[112]. In part, this approach, which has been upheld by this Court despite the limited nature of the appeals it hears under the Constitution, reflects the contemporary attitude of the law: generally preferring substance over form. In part, it also follows the language of criminal appeal statutes with their typical emphasis on the avoidance of injustice, which includes legal injustice.
In the present case it is difficult to believe that, if the appellant could make good his objection to the lawfulness of his trial, he would lose the opportunity to be heard on that issue simply because of a delay in raising it. Much less substantial grounds of objection to less serious convictions carrying much shorter sentences have been permitted by this Court, notwithstanding a failure of the prisoner to raise the objection at trial. Here, the appellant submitted that the conduct of any trial at all, on the offences in the presentment, was contrary to the express command of federal law. If this was so, it is arguable that the "proviso"[113] is inapplicable, being designed to defend a lawful trial which was flawed in its conduct, not one which explicit federal legislation said should not be conducted at all[114].
Eighthly, to the argument that the Supreme Court of Victoria had jurisdiction over the appellant because he was physically present at his trial, and in that sense within the power of that Court, the appellant raised no contest. However, it is commonplace that in the law, the word "jurisdiction" has many meanings[115]. The appellant's point, correct in my view, is that it remained to be determined what that Court was obliged to do in the discharge of that jurisdiction. By the terms of s 42 of the Act, it was instructed not to try the appellant for any offence other than those upon which he had been surrendered to Australia.
The terms of s 42 are not conditional upon an objection being raised by the accused or anyone else. This fact tends to confirm that, in the case of a prisoner who has been surrendered by another country for trial in Australia, it is the duty of the prosecutor to ensure that s 42 has been complied with. If it has not been, and that fact is discovered whilst the case is still before the judicature of Australia, in my view it remains open to the appellate court to allow the accused to rely upon the unlawfulness of the trial and hence of its outcome. Any other interpretation of the Act renders the accused hostage to the conduct of public officials and to the knowledge and vigilance of the accused's legal advisers in a way that is either arbitrary, capricious or both.
Ninthly, the reasons of Gummow and Callinan JJ accept, as I do, that it is difficult to treat the omission of the appellant to raise the point under the Act, at the stage of his plea to the arraignment, as constituting a legal "waiver" that would prevent him from advancing a challenge to the lawfulness of the trial later, as he has now done[116].
There are at least two reasons why waiver does not apply[117]. There is no evidence that the appellant's failure to raise an objection based on s 42 of the Act at that stage constituted an informed or deliberate decision by the appellant. All indications are to the contrary. In any case, it is arguable that it was not competent for the appellant to waive the requirements in s 42 of the Act. Those requirements are addressed to many people apart from an accused. On the face of things, the accused cannot waive the obligations of those other people[118]. He cannot waive the interests of others in due compliance with the section. Those others include (1) the people of the Commonwealth, who have an interest in the conformity of courts and officials with the law stated by the Federal Parliament; (2) the Commonwealth itself, which has an interest in the compliance of trials before Australian courts following extradition of the accused with the rule of speciality upon which the international regime of extradition depends; and (3) the governments of surrendering countries (in this case the United Kingdom), which, by international law, have expectations under treaties and other instruments that Australia will adhere to its obligations, acknowledged in s 42 of the Act, not to try a person surrendered to it for an "offence" other than the "offence" for which the person was surrendered[119].
I do not have to resolve this last-mentioned argument finally. It is sufficient to say that I agree with Gummow and Callinan JJ that waiver is not relevant in this case.
Tenthly, a decision in this appeal favourable to the appellant would certainly be a forensic misfortune in his case. Considerable costs of the appellant's first trial would be thrown away. The decision would doubtless present new and different legal problems if attempts were made to retry the appellant, possibly upon the conspiracy offences for which he was originally extradited; possibly upon the offences of murder and kidnapping after fresh extradition proceedings; or possibly following attempts to secure the consent of the United Kingdom to the enlargement of the triable "offences", if that is legally permissible.
However, the appellant would meantime be subject to an order for his lawful custody. He could not ultimately escape a retrial for any offences for which he could be lawfully tried. He is entitled to invoke the law of this country, as he has. In a real sense, what is at stake in the appeal is an interest much larger than that of the appellant. It concerns obedience of an Australian court to the imperative language of the Federal Parliament in s 42 of the Act and faithful compliance by Australia and its institutions with the reciprocal rule of speciality expressed in international law, in extradition treaties and in Australia's own statute.
It follows that, subject to the succeeding remarks, I would uphold the appellant's right to rely in the appeal upon the objection that he raises to the lawfulness of his trial. Because that trial upon the offences in the presentment was conducted contrary to the command of the Federal Parliament, the convictions and sentences that ensued must be quashed in accordance with the powers of the Court of Appeal in criminal appeals. They are the formal consequences of a "trial" that could not lawfully take place in the way that it did.

[139]

The parties' submissions: In the event that this Court reached such a conclusion, the respondent, and governmental interveners, urged various propositions to dissuade the Court from giving effect to it. They argued that the trial had taken place in the Supreme Court exercising State jurisdiction and that the Supreme Court was not bound, in the way the trial had been conducted, to determine any issue arising under the Act. The outcome of the trial thus stood as valid. No basis was shown to disturb the appellant's conviction on appeal. The appellant submitted, to the contrary, that his trial had involved the exercise by the Supreme Court of federal jurisdiction and that, in exercising such jurisdiction, that Court was bound to comply with the Act, whether or not any party relied on it.
The exercise of federal jurisdiction: Federal jurisdiction is "the authority to adjudicate derived from the Commonwealth Constitution and laws"[120]. Subject to the Constitution, federal law may confer the power to adjudicate particular matters upon courts, federal, State and Territory. Within the ambit of its legislative powers, and subject to other provisions or implications of the Constitution[121], the Federal Parliament may, expressly or by necessary implication, forbid the exercise of the authority to adjudicate specific matters if valid preconditions are complied with. Or it may regulate, in particular respects, the ways in which that exercise is to be performed.
It is open to argument that, in conducting the appellant's trial, the Supreme Court was exercising federal jurisdiction, although unaware of that fact. According to this argument, the opposite of the authority to conduct a trial is a valid withdrawal of authority. By s 42 of the Act, assuming it to be valid (as I will hold), the Federal Parliament withdrew the authority to conduct the trial of the appellant otherwise enjoyed by the Supreme Court of Victoria pursuant to s 85 of the Constitution Act 1975 (Vic). In proceeding to conduct the trial, notwithstanding such federal withdrawal of State authority, the Supreme Court was not merely failing to exercise State jurisdiction in accordance with relevant federal regulation. It was effectively, and in law, asserting State statutory authority to ignore an applicable command of federal law. By doing so, even if unconsciously, the Supreme Court was resolving a clash between applicable federal and State legal authority. It was doing so by upholding the latter and thereby resolving a constitutional question. In doing this it was, however unconsciously, exercising federal jurisdiction. It could not resolve the question, as it did, exercising purely State jurisdiction.
It is not at all uncommon for Australian courts to proceed without noticing a governing federal law and resolve an issue that such federal law presents for the outcome of a case[122]. Upon the appellant's argument, to do so the court needs (and exercises) federal jurisdiction.
The exercise of State jurisdiction: Although this is a possible view of the jurisdiction question, it is not the only one. The alternative view is that the appellant's trial was a matter within State jurisdiction and that this was so notwithstanding the appellant's surrender to Australia by another country pursuant to federal action and despite the command of s 42 of the Act, a federal law, which regulated one aspect of the trial in the exercise of State jurisdiction.
In the appellant's case, the primary authority of the Supreme Court to adjudicate upon his trial was clearly derived from s 85 of the Constitution Act. According to the second view, the federal Act regulated his trial. However, it did not grant the authority for the trial. The State jurisdiction of a court is not changed to federal jurisdiction as a consequence of the court's giving, or not giving, effect to rights arising under federal legislation. Jurisdiction is determined by authority.
Federal jurisdiction on appeal: In the view that I take, it is not necessary to resolve the foregoing controversy concerning the jurisdiction that the Supreme Court of Victoria exercised in the trial of the appellant. This is because, whatever label is placed upon the jurisdiction at trial, the Supreme Court was bound to obey applicable federal law. When the Court of Appeal was called upon to adjudicate the speciality issue, it was clearly exercising federal jurisdiction. This was because it was determining an issue that arose directly under the Act, a federal law[123]. To determine it, the Court of Appeal exercised federal jurisdiction. Only federal jurisdiction would confer the authority on the State court to do so.
Subject to the issue of the suggested invalidity of the federal law under the Constitution, no provision of State law could override, qualify or negate the obligations stated in s 42 of the Act. Thus the provisions of the State Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), expressing in general terms the procedures ordinarily to be followed in a plea to the arraignment in a trial conducted in the Supreme Court, could not override the explicit instruction contained in s 42 of the Act. Indeed, the State Act does not purport to do so. Any attempt to do so would fail for constitutional reasons. The federal law would prevail in accordance with s 109 of the Constitution - so long as it was valid.
Conclusion: federal law prevails: The Act obliged the Supreme Court, its judges and other relevant public officials not to conduct a trial of the appellant whilst the "offences" named in the presentment did not conform to the "offences" in respect of which the appellant had been surrendered to Australia by the United Kingdom. The Act's requirements were clear. It addressed successively the prosecutor, the Supreme Court of Victoria, the trial judge and the Court of Appeal. There was no relevant exception. Its terms were not obeyed. Specifically, they were not obeyed in the appeal when the Court of Appeal was undoubtedly exercising federal jurisdiction and had the power, after trial, to ensure that the federal law was given effect to prevent any miscarriage of justice that was demonstrated. A miscarriage of justice may be of a legal, as well as of a factual (or merits) kind. There could be no greater legal miscarriage of justice than the conduct of a trial upon counts of a presentment that, in terms, contradicted the express command of federal law. It constitutes a fundamental error in the proceeding[124]. The Court of Appeal failed to correct this miscarriage of justice. This Court, also exercising federal jurisdiction, must ensure that applicable federal law is obeyed. It is not too late. The matter is still within the judicature.

[141]

It is difficult to take seriously the constitutional issues propounded in final resistance to this outcome. The notion that the Federal Parliament did not have the power to enact s 42 of the Act in the terms there appearing, either because of a lack of the relevant legislative power in s 51 of the Constitution, or because of supposed limitations expressed or implied elsewhere in the Constitution, borders on the fanciful.
The enactment of a law with respect to extradition of alleged offenders and, relevantly, the surrender of offenders by other countries to Australia for trial in this country, clearly falls within s 51(xxix) of the Constitution ("external affairs"). Amongst other things, it is a subject designed to give effect to extradition treaties. Such treaties were an established feature of the external affairs of nations long before the creation of the Commonwealth[126]. Other heads of federal legislative power specified in the Constitution are also relevant, including s 51(xxviii) ("the influx of criminals") and s 51(xxxix) ("the execution of any power"). Together these are sufficient to sustain the general validity of the Act.
The particular provision in s 42 of the Act, with regard to the international rule of speciality in extradition as there defined, is a valid law. It is a law upon an attribute of all national laws on the subject of extradition of which I am aware. Such a provision was included in the Extradition Act 1870 (UK). That Act was in force when the Australian Constitution was written and adopted. Similar provisions have been a feature of extradition laws and treaties ever since.
The argument that the attempt by s 42 of the Act to impose restrictions on State criminal trials is contrary to s 106 of the Constitution, as amounting to an invalid endeavour to control the conduct of such trials in a State Supreme Court, is equally meritless. It was based on a misunderstanding of the decision of this Court in Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan[127]. Whatever that decision exactly stands for, it cannot cast doubt on the enactment by the Federal Parliament of a specific requirement of federal law designed to safeguard and enforce a clear federal, indeed national and international, interest. Specifically, this is the interest of Australia in securing the reciprocal surrender of fugitive offenders and others found overseas who are accused of offences against the laws of Australia. To defend that interest and to obtain the trial of such persons it is clearly within the power of the Federal Parliament to enact a law controlling the circumstances of the trial and commanding when such trials take place and when they shall not take place, conformably with the applicable treaties and other arrangements with foreign nations.
Here the Federal Parliament did not purport to interfere in the conduct of a trial by a State court. It simply regulated when such a trial could, and could not, occur. It did so in accordance with a well-established and international principle inherent in the comity of nations[128]. There was not, therefore, any disturbance of the arrangements of the Constitution concerning the government or a court of a State contrary to s 106 of the Constitution. It was no more than the enactment of a valid federal law in a matter of unquestionable federal concern regulating a trial in order to give effect to a principle of legitimate federal concern.
But for the Act and the system of international agreements to which it gives effect - including on the basis of the stated rule of speciality - there could normally be no trial of persons, such as the appellant, who are accused of offences in one country, but who are present in another. Unless such persons could be snatched or otherwise secured by trickery or force they would remain beyond the jurisdiction of Australian courts and prosecutors - federal, State and Territory alike. It is the Act that makes it possible for those courts and prosecutors - including in the Supreme Court of Victoria - to secure and exercise jurisdiction over the surrendered prisoner. But such jurisdiction is afforded upon conditions regulated by federal law. Important amongst these is the series of conditions, defensive of the rule of speciality, set out in s 42 of the Act. They are valid. They must be obeyed by all those to whom they are addressed - relevantly the prosecutor and the judges of the Supreme Court of Victoria at trial and on appeal.

[142]

The appellant has therefore made good his complaint that the rule of speciality, stated in s 42 of the Act, was breached by his trial. In the circumstances, he is not entitled to relief by way of a stay for abuse of process. He is, however, entitled to rely on his personal rights to which s 42 of the Act gives rise. Those rights are not "spent" merely because they were not raised in his plea at his trial. That would be an unacceptably artificial view of the applicable federal law, its language and its purpose.
The Supreme Court of Victoria, in conducting the trial of the appellant, was obliged to conform to the applicable federal law. This included s 42 of the Act. Its failure to do so in this case renders the resulting orders of that Court invalid and of no legal effect. Those orders must be quashed. The objections to the constitutional validity of s 42 of the Act are without merit. They should be rejected.
The appeal should be allowed. The orders of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Court of Appeal) should be set aside. In place of those orders, it should be ordered that leave to appeal be granted and the appeal to that Court be allowed and the appellant's convictions and sentences quashed. Any new trial must conform with the Act.
HAYNE J. As the reasons of other members of the Court show, there are two questions in this appeal. First, were the offences of kidnapping and murder, for which the appellant was tried and convicted in the Supreme Court of Victoria, offences of which the appellant "could be convicted on proof of the conduct constituting"[129] an offence in respect of which he was surrendered to Australia? Secondly, if the offences of kidnapping and murder were not offences meeting that description, what consequence does that have for his conviction? I would answer the first question, "Yes", and the second question, "In the circumstances of this case, it would have had no consequence for his conviction".
The facts and circumstances which give rise to the appeal are set out in other reasons. The relevant provisions of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) ("the Act") are also set out in those other reasons. I need not repeat any of that material except to the extent necessary to explain my reasons.

[143]

The first question concerns what the Act calls "speciality". It may or may not be possible to discern some principles about speciality which find general acceptance internationally or find acceptance in a number of other jurisdictions[130]. The first question argued in this Court does not require the identification of principles of that kind. Nor does it require the construction or application of the law of the surrendering country. It requires the construction and application of the relevant provisions of Australian law - the Act.
As the reasons of Gummow and Callinan JJ demonstrate, it is possible to determine whether the appellant's trial for kidnapping and murder contravened the particular arrangements made with the United Kingdom for his surrender to Australia. For the reasons given by Gummow and Callinan JJ, the appellant's trial for those offences did not contravene those arrangements. But the question which the appellant agitated in the Court of Appeal, and in this Court, does not depend upon any internationally accepted principles about speciality. It does not depend upon the particular arrangements which were made between the governments of Australia and the United Kingdom. The question which the appellant agitated is a question about the construction and application of the Act and, in particular, s 42.
The specific question which arises concerns the application of that part of s 42(a)(i) which provides that, unless certain conditions are met, a person who is surrendered to Australia, by a country other than New Zealand, shall not be tried in Australia for any offence that is alleged to have been committed before the surrender other than, first, any offence in respect of which the person was surrendered, or, second, any other offence (for which the penalty is the same or a shorter maximum period of imprisonment) "of which the person could be convicted on proof of the conduct constituting any such offence" (emphasis added).
The reference to any "such" offence is a reference back to "any offence in respect of which the person was surrendered". The offences for which the appellant was surrendered included conspiracy to kidnap and conspiracy to murder. They did not include the offences of kidnapping or murder. Could the appellant be convicted of kidnapping and murder on proof of the conduct constituting the offences in respect of which he was surrendered, namely, conspiracy to kidnap and conspiracy to murder?
In deciding that question it is necessary to take account of the provisions of s 10(2) of the Act that:

[146]

Where two offenders agree to commit an offence, and that offence is later committed, it is possible to describe the criminality of their conduct both as the offence of conspiracy and the substantive offence committed. And where two offenders act in concert in pursuit of a common criminal design each may be found guilty of the offence that has been committed even if it is shown that each participated in its commission in some different way[131]. And again, persons may be guilty of an offence as an accessory before the fact or as a principal in the second degree who, being present at the scene of a crime, aids or abets its commission.
The establishment of each of these different forms of criminal responsibility will require proof of the particular elements which go to establish that responsibility. The elements of a charge of conspiracy differ from the elements to be established in proving joint criminal enterprise. The elements of each of those offences differ from what must be established to make out a case that an accused person was an accessory before the fact or a principal in the second degree.
In the case of conspiracy, because the offence is complete upon the conspirators reaching an agreement to commit the crime, the charge may be proved without showing that the intended crime was committed. By contrast, doctrines of complicity or common purpose only apply where the substantive offence has been committed. In such a case a person will be held responsible for a crime, the commission of which was contemplated by the parties sharing a common purpose[132], even if there is no specific agreement that that crime be committed. Doctrines of complicity or common purpose apply only where the crime is committed, but apply even if there is no positive agreement to commit that crime.
In considering the application of s 42 of the Act, must attention be confined to those facts which sufficed to establish the offence for which the appellant was extradited (the two charges of conspiracy)? That is, must attention be confined to those facts which, if proved, would have demonstrated the making of an agreement to kidnap and an agreement to kill, or may account be taken of the fact that at the time of extradition it was alleged that those agreements had been carried into effect?
In proving a case of conspiracy to commit an offence, it is open to the prosecution to prove, as one step in demonstrating the existence of the agreement, that the offence was in fact committed. That is why there are many cases in which it would be open to charge both conspiracy to commit an offence and the substantive offence itself. The courts have said that prosecutors should charge the substantive offence, where it is alleged that the offence was committed, rather than the offence of conspiracy[133] in order to avoid, among other things, the engagement of those evidentiary rules that attend the trial of a charge of conspiracy[134] and what is sometimes said to be the consequent advantages to the prosecution[135]. But the point of present relevance is that there are many cases where the criminality of a person's conduct may properly be reflected in a number of different charges.
Is s 42 to be understood as directing attention only to that evidence which would suffice to establish the elements of the offence for which an accused was surrendered? Reading the section in that way would, of course, still give it useful work to do. It would permit prosecution for an offence wholly included in the offence for which a person was surrendered. But so to read the section does not appear to me to give full weight to the requirement of s 10(2) to consider the acts or omissions (of the particular accused in question) by virtue of which it is alleged that that person (the accused) committed the offence for which he or she was surrendered.
When the extradition of the appellant was sought, the material advanced in support of the request for extradition not only alleged that the appellant conspired with others that the victim should be kidnapped and murdered, but also alleged that the conspiracy had been carried into effect. In those circumstances, the acts and omissions of the appellant, by virtue of which the offences of conspiracy to kidnap and conspiracy to murder were alleged to have been committed, included the acts of murder and kidnapping which it was alleged that the appellant had instigated. That he could be shown to be party to a joint criminal enterprise to commit those crimes, by demonstrating that he not only contemplated the possibility that the other party to the joint criminal enterprise would carry out the agreement[136], but actively sought that end, required the proof of no other act or omission than, in the circumstances of this case, it was alleged that, if proved, would demonstrate his guilt of conspiracy to kidnap and conspiracy to murder.
I agree with Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ that the trial of the appellant on charges of kidnapping and murder did not contravene s 42(a)(i).
Although that conclusion is sufficient to require the dismissal of the appeal, it is desirable to deal with the second question because, if the appellant's submissions about that second question were correct, further, constitutional questions would arise. For the reasons given by Gummow and Callinan JJ, the appellant's contention that his trial constituted an abuse of process of the court, if the offences of murder and kidnapping were not offences of which he could be convicted on proof of the conduct constituting an offence in respect of which he was surrendered, is a contention that should be rejected. The appellant entering a plea of not guilty, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to try the issues which thus were joined, even if, contrary to my view, s 42 of the Act applied in the way now alleged by the appellant. And once the appellant, on being arraigned, pleaded not guilty he could not later, having been convicted, say that he should not have been tried. On arraignment he could have entered, as a special plea[137], the plea that his trial would contravene s 42 of the Act. Not having done so, even if the premise for this second contention had been made out, there would have been no miscarriage of justice warranting the intervention of the Court of Appeal[138]. Otherwise, in respect of this second question, I agree in the reasons of Gummow and Callinan JJ.
The appeal should be dismissed.

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