The King v Gumbuli [2026] NTCCA 5

Appellant: Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions

Respondent: North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency

The King v Gumbuli [2026] NTCCA 5

[1] This is a Crown appeal against sentence on the single ground that the sentence imposed on the respondent was manifestly inadequate. On 13 November 2025, the Supreme Court sentenced the respondent to imprisonment for four years for the offence of intending to cause serious harm and in fact causing serious harm contrary to s 177(a) of the Criminal Code 1983 (NT) which was charged in Count 2 of the indictment. The respondent was also sentenced to imprisonment for eight months for an aggravated assault (Count 1) with six months' cumulation. The total sentence was imprisonment for four years and six months. A non-parole period of two years and three months was fixed.

Objective seriousness and subjective circumstances

[2] The respondent was 49 years old at the time he committed the offence in Count 2 of intentionally inflicting serious harm on the victim. The victim was a 49-year-old female. The respondent and the victim had been in an intimate partner relationship for approximately two years prior to the infliction of the serious harm on the victim, and the relationship was blighted by domestic violence committed by the respondent against the victim over that period.

[3] The offence in Count 2, with which this appeal is concerned, was committed on 16 September 2024. The offence of aggravated assault in Count 1 was committed almost 15 months earlier, on 24 June 2023. That first offence in time was constituted by the respondent grabbing the victim by the hair as she tried to walk away from him, marching her to a location where they could not be seen and punching the victim to the back of the head causing her to fall to the ground. The respondent was intoxicated by alcohol at the time he committed the offence. The respondent was arrested by police and subsequently granted bail on the same day on conditions that included that he not possess or consume alcohol. It would appear that a domestic violence order was also issued naming the victim as a protected person and restraining the respondent from being in the victim's company while under the influence of alcohol.

[4] The respondent was required under the terms of his bail to appear before the Local Court on 11 July 2023. The respondent failed to appear at that time and a warrant was issued for his arrest. The respondent was not apprehended by police until 22 June 2024 when he came to attention for a breach of the domestic violence order by being in the victim's company while intoxicated. The respondent was arrested and granted fresh bail the following day on 23 June 2024. The respondent was required under the terms of that bail undertaking to appear in the Local Court on 13 July 2024. The respondent again failed to appear at that time and was arrested and once more granted bail on 17 July 2024.

[5] A little less than two months later, on the afternoon of 16 September 2024, the respondent and the victim were drinking together at licensed premises in Katherine. The respondent remained on bail at that time for the aggravated assault and the two breaches of bail which remained pending before the Local Court. While at the licensed premises the respondent became jealous because the victim had spoken with his brother. The respondent had previously told the victim that she was forbidden from doing so. A tussle ensued as the respondent and victim were leaving the licensed premises, during which the respondent twice attempted to punch the victim in the head.

[6] After leaving the licensed premises the respondent and the victim walked back to the bush camp where they were staying. A short time later the victim told the respondent she was going to the vicinity of the Woolworths shopping centre to ask family for cigarettes. The respondent told the victim not to do so, but the victim walked away in the direction of the shopping centre. The respondent armed himself with a knife and began to follow the victim. The respondent joined the victim outside the shopping centre and began arguing with her. The victim pushed the offender away and began walking backwards into the shopping centre while facing the respondent. The respondent pulled the knife out of his pants and ran towards the victim holding the knife in his right hand and making stabbing motions. The victim attempted variously to run away from the offender and to grab the knife to defend herself. As she did so she was screaming at the respondent to stop his attack and to throw the knife away. The respondent continued to pursue the victim making stabbing motions until she was backed up against a wall.

[7] The respondent made a total of five stabbing motions at the victim during the course of the attack. The attack was captured on high-definition closed circuit television. The victim was stabbed to the left chest near the armpit, the right chest and the left wrist. After he had stabbed the victim the respondent left the shopping centre and went back to the bush camp. Once at the bush camp the offender changed his shirt and went to the bus depot. In the meantime, the victim went out of the shopping centre, sought assistance from people there and lay on the ground at the front of the building. The police and ambulance services were called and the victim was taken to the Katherine District Hospital.

[8] After being assessed and stabilised at the Katherine District Hospital the victim was medically evacuated to the Royal Darwin Hospital by air. The victim's most serious injuries were a laceration to the heart with active bleeding and an accumulation of blood within the pericardial sac surrounding the heart and in the chest cavity area between the lungs. That accumulation of blood also caused the victim's left lung to collapse. The victim also had superficial stab wounds to the right chest and left wrist.

[9] The victim arrived at the Royal Darwin Hospital just after midnight on 17 September 2024. She was stable on arrival but then lapsed into a life-threatening crisis requiring specialised resuscitation. After the victim had been stabilised, the treating medical practitioners entered the victim's chest cavity through an anterolateral incision between the victim's ribs and repaired the laceration to the lower left chamber of the heart. Had the laceration been left untreated it is more likely than not to have caused the victim's death. The victim remained in the Intensive Care Unit until her discharge from hospital on 26 September 2024.

[10] Shortly after stabbing the victim the respondent was located and arrested by police at the bus depot. He made admissions to following the victim while armed with the knife and to stabbing the victim. He said that he was very angry at the time but thought he had only stabbed the victim twice. He also told police that the knife found in his backpack at the time he was arrested was the weapon he had used to stab the victim. The knife was just short of 30 cm long with a plastic handle and a sharpened steel blade approximately 16 cm long. The respondent admitted to changing shirts at the bush camp because he knew police would be seeking to apprehend him. The respondent was remanded in custody from the time of his arrest on 16 September 2024 until he entered guilty pleas in the Supreme Court to the offence of intentionally inflicting serious harm and the aggravated assault which had been previously committed on 24 June 2023.

[11] So far as the respondent's criminal history was concerned, he had a long series of convictions dating back to 1993, but a relatively modest history of violent offending. That criminal history included one conviction for aggravated assault on a defenceless female which was committed in July 2007, five convictions for committing or attempting unlawful entry, six convictions for stealing, five convictions for property damage, two convictions for unlawful use of a motor vehicle, one conviction for disorderly behaviour in a public place, multiple convictions for possessing or consuming liquor in a restricted area, and multiple convictions for miscellaneous motor vehicle-related offending, some of it serious in nature. The respondent also had five recorded breaches of bail and one recorded breach of an order suspending sentence.

[12] In addition to those convictions which formed part of the respondent's prior criminal history, on 22 January 2025 he was dealt with in the Local Court for the breach of the domestic violence order and the two breaches of bail which he had committed over the course of 2023 and 2024. He was sentenced to an aggregate period of imprisonment for one week for those offences. That sentence commenced on the date the convictions were recorded on 22 January 2025. The sentence imposed by the Supreme Court on 13 November 2025 was backdated to commence to the time of the respondent's arrest on 16 September 2024. As a consequence, the sentence imposed for the breaches of the domestic violence order and bail were served wholly concurrently with the sentences which are the subject of this appeal.

[13] The respondent had previously served several periods of imprisonment referable to his prior offending. As part of a sentence imposed in relation to one of those episodes of offending the respondent undertook a residential rehabilitation program for a period of three months. There is no other detail in relation to that program, or whether the respondent successfully completed it, but it is apparent from the present circumstances that this attempt at rehabilitation was unsuccessful.

[14] So far as his other personal circumstances were concerned, the Supreme Court found that the respondent was born in Ngukurr and completed his secondary schooling at Kormilda College in Darwin. He had some difficulty adjusting to boarding school and was not academically successful. After leaving school he joined the Australian Army in 1994 and served as a private for approximately 14 years, presumably as part of Norforce. He commenced drinking alcohol at the age of 18 and that consumption increased after he left the Army. It should be noted in that respect that alcohol was clearly problematic for the respondent during his Army service because he committed offences with some regularity during parts of that service, and the type and pattern of offending strongly suggests that alcohol abuse was the principal criminogenic factor. During the period of his Army service the respondent entered into a long-term relationship which produced three children. That relationship broke down and at some later point in time the respondent commenced a relationship with the victim of the subject offending.

[15] There was no suggestion during the sentencing proceedings that the respondent had suffered from deprivation during his formative years to implicate the Bugmy[1] principle, and no suggestion that the respondent suffered from any condition which would attract the Verdins[2] principle. The only genuinely mitigating factors were the pleas of guilty, together with the respondent's cooperation with police and expression of remorse, such as they were. The sentencing judge allowed a 25% reduction in the sentence for those factors.

[16] The principles relevant to Crown appeals against sentence on the ground of manifest inadequacy are well established. Such appeals should be brought only to establish some matter of principle and to afford the Court of Criminal Appeal an opportunity to lay down principles for the guidance of courts in sentencing offenders.[3] When relying upon the ground of manifest inadequacy, it is incumbent upon the appellant to show that the sentence was clearly and obviously, and not just arguably, inadequate. It must be shown that the sentence is so disproportionate to the seriousness of the offending as to shock the public conscience and demonstrate error in principle.[4]

[17] Where manifest inadequacy is found, the appellate court retains a residual discretion as to whether the appeal should be allowed and the respondent resentenced. In the exercise of the residual discretion the Court must not take into account any element of double jeopardy in making the decision whether to allow the appeal or impose another sentence.[5]

[18] Section 177 of the Criminal Code creates a range of offences of committing an act with intention: (1) to disfigure or disable any person; (2) to cause serious harm to any person; or (3) to resist or prevent the lawful arrest or detention of any person. The offence is completed where the material intention is accompanied by the relevant physical element. That physical element may be constituted by conduct or the result of conduct.

[19] The relevant physical elements for the range of offences created by s 177(a) of the Criminal Code include: (a) the causing of harm or serious harm; (b) attempting to strike a person with a projectile; (c) causing an explosive substance to explode; (d) sending or delivering an explosive substance or other dangerous or noxious thing to a person; (e) causing an explosive substance or other dangerous or noxious thing to be taken or received by a person; (f) putting a corrosive fluid or a destructive or explosive substance in any place; or (g) throwing or applying a corrosive fluid or destructive or explosive substance at or on a person. This provision was designed to deal with the most serious forms of assault falling short of murder or manslaughter, which extend beyond the intentional infliction of harm to include such matters as poisoning, letter bombs, noxious packages and acid attacks. That application and design is reflected in the fact that the maximum penalty for the offence however configured is life imprisonment.

[20] The respondent was convicted of the offence of intending to cause serious harm with the physical element of causing serious harm contrary to s 177(a) of the Criminal Code. The mental element of the offence in this case was the respondent's specific purpose or design to inflict serious harm on the victim. The term 'serious harm' means any harm that endangers or is likely to endanger the victim's life, or that is likely to be significant and long-standing. The harm does not need to be long-standing to satisfy this element, and the infliction of long-standing harm will not necessarily be more objectively serious than the infliction of harm which endangers the victim's life. It is not the case that a life-threatening knife wound to the heart requiring an emergency resuscitation and surgical repair must necessarily be less objectively serious than an injury causing some form of permanent deficit.

[21] The respondent submits that because there was no evidence of the victim suffering long-standing sequelae this Court should find in his favour that she did not. That submission is necessarily subject to the observation in the paragraph immediately above. Leaving that aside, while it is no doubt correct that findings of fact made by a sentencing judge to an offender's detriment must be arrived at beyond reasonable doubt,[6] there is no general requirement that an accused must be sentenced on the most favourable basis.[7] The situation in this case was that the victim's medical condition following discharge in the period leading up to the entry of the guilty pleas could not be ascertained. The appellant cannot and does not assert that the victim suffered any permanent physical disability. In circumstances where the prosecution fails to prove a fact or circumstance adverse to an offender beyond reasonable doubt, the sentencing court is not thereby bound to find that the obverse has been established in the offender's favour. The court may sentence on the basis that neither of the competing possibilities is known.[8] For example, it would not be appropriate for this Court to proceed on the positive basis that the victim has not sustained any continuing psychological impact as a result of this incident. Moreover, the absence of an aggravating feature of the offending does not operate in mitigation.

[22] The physical element of the offence in this case was the respondent's infliction of serious harm on the victim as proscribed by s 177(a) of the Criminal Code. Section 177(a) also creates the offence of intending to cause serious harm and causing harm, as opposed to serious harm. The term 'harm' means any physical or mental harm, whether temporary or permanent. It extends to any physical contact with a person that the person might reasonably object to in the circumstances. In the respondent's submission, because both offences created by s 177(a) of the Criminal Code attract the maximum penalty of life imprisonment, they should be approached on the prima facie basis that each involves the same level of objective seriousness and moral culpability. That submission cannot be accepted. The offence of intentionally causing serious harm will almost invariably be assessed as a more objectively serious offence which carries a higher degree of moral culpability. That is because the level of harm inflicted is a key gravamen of each offence. While the nature of the injury cannot be allowed to displace all other considerations, it is highly relevant to the assessment of moral culpability and objective seriousness.

[23] By way of comparison with the lesser offence of unlawfully causing serious harm, in The Queen v Mamarika[9] this Court indicated that a starting point of somewhere between five and six years' imprisonment was ordinarily indicated in the case of an offence of unlawfully causing serious harm in the mid‑range of seriousness. Of course, that is not more than an indicative range for that offence, and, as always, the ultimate sentence must depend upon the circumstances of the case. The relevance of the comparison for this purpose is that sentences for the greater offence of intentionally causing serious harm in the mid-range of seriousness will be higher, and the sentences which have been imposed for the lesser offence provide no indication of the sentencing range for the greater offence. So much follows from the different maximum penalties which apply to each offence.

[24] During the course of sentencing submissions, both parties provided comparative sentences for the crime of intentionally causing serious harm. As this Court has frequently observed, there is limited utility in searching for points of similarity or distinction between the subject case and another case in which a sentence has been fixed for the same statutory offence but in relation to a different offender and a different episode of offending. While it may be accepted that the purpose in referring to those comparative sentences was to provide some indication of a general range for the offence of intentionally causing serious harm, the more useful guidance is to be found in the decisions of this Court on appeal which examine the sentencing considerations.

[25] The Queen v Haji-Noor[10] also involved the intentional infliction of serious harm in the context of a domestic relationship which had previously been blighted by threatening behaviours and violence of a foul kind. However, the victim of the index offence was the fiancé of the offender's former partner. The offender gained entry to the victims' residence in the early hours of the morning, armed himself with a baseball bat and struck the male victim repeatedly to the head with the baseball bat using all his force.

[26] The victim was placed on life support and put into a drug-induced coma. He required extensive rehabilitation, including speech therapy, occupational therapy and physiotherapy. At the time of sentencing he still had no feeling on the right side of his skull and only partial movement in the right side of his face. It was anticipated that his recovery would take two years, and that he might never regain full function of his left hand. It was unclear whether he would recover sufficiently to resume his prior employment as a member of the armed forces. As in this case, there were no mitigating factors beyond the plea of guilty. The offender was sentenced by the Supreme Court to imprisonment for seven years and six months for the offence of intentionally causing 'grievous harm' (now restyled as 'serious harm').

[27] The appeal was brought on a number of grounds, but the leading judgment on the issue of manifest inadequacy was delivered by Angel J. It stated relevantly:

In my opinion the sentence of seven years and six months imprisonment with respect to the intentionally causing grievous harm charge was manifestly inadequate, particularly given the maximum penalty for that offence is life imprisonment; cf Markarian v R (2005) 79 ALJR 1048 at 1056 [30][31]. The attack upon the male victim was unprovoked, premeditated, protracted, cowardly and vicious. It was carried out with great deliberation and ferocity and in the dead of night with a baseball bat upon an unarmed victim. ... The offending was unmitigated by any extenuating circumstances. ... It is only by great good fortune that the victim did not die.

By any measure this was a very serious offence. General deterrence, public condemnation and stern punishment were significant sentencing requirements. There was nothing in the circumstances of the offence or the offender to suggest, let alone justify, any exercise of clemency. In my opinion although no specific error is alleged or shown the sentence of seven years and six months for that offending is unreasonable and plainly unjust and therefore manifestly inadequate: Markarian v R, supra, at 1055 [25].[11]

[28] It may be accepted for these purposes that the attack in that case involved a greater degree of savagery than in the present case, the injury sustained by the victim was more serious, and the offender had a more serious history of violent offending than the respondent. On the other hand, it was accepted that the offender came from a background of profound deprivation. However, in resentencing the offender Angel J adopted a sentence of 15 years' imprisonment (presumably after discount for the guilty plea) which was reduced to 12 years to take into account the principle of double jeopardy. That penalty was adopted by the other members of the Court. In doing so, Riley J made the following observations:

The submission on behalf of the appellant was that the sentence of imprisonment of seven years and six months in respect of the offence of causing grievous harm to the male victim was so obviously inadequate as to be unreasonable or plainly unjust. It was submitted that, when considered in light of the maximum penalty of life imprisonment, a head sentence of seven and a half years did not properly reflect the seriousness of the offending: Markarian v The Queen (2005) 79 ALJR 1048.

In support of this ground the appellant emphasised matters that had been placed before the learned sentencing judge and which were mentioned by him in the course of his sentencing remarks and which were taken into account by him. It was pointed out that the offending occurred just two weeks after the respondent had been released on a 15-month suspended sentence imposed upon him for violent conduct towards the female victim. The offending occurred in breach of a domestic violence order which, it was correctly submitted, was a significant aggravating factor requiring not only general but personal deterrence and denunciation by the court. The appellant emphasised that this was a planned attack and did not reflect a momentary loss of control. The consequences were intended. ... The attack upon the male victim was described as "extremely savage" and the seriousness of the injuries suffered by him, and the ongoing consequences for him, were restated. All of those matters reflected observations made by the learned sentencing judge in the course of his sentencing remarks. It could not be said that they were matters that he had overlooked. However it was submitted that in light of those matters the sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate.

The starting point adopted by the learned sentencing judge in respect of the charge of causing grievous harm with intent to cause grievous harm to the male victim was a sentence of imprisonment for nine years. His Honour made allowance for the plea of guilty entered on behalf of the respondent and reduced the sentence to seven years and six months. That is an allowance of approximately 17%. There is no challenge by either party to the appropriateness of that level of discount for the plea of guilty in the circumstances of this case. The issue therefore is whether the starting point of nine years reflected a sentence which was, in all circumstances, manifestly inadequate.

In my opinion the sentence was manifestly inadequate. It was so low as to be "unreasonable or plainly unjust": Markarian v The Queen (supra at 1055). It was so disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime as to shock the public conscience. I would allow the appeal on this ground.[12]

[29] On the ground of manifest inadequacy, Southwood J stated relevantly:

In my opinion the sentence of seven years and six months imprisonment imposed on the respondent for the crime of with intent to cause grievous harm, caused grievous harm to [the male victim] was manifestly inadequate: Markarian v The Queen (2005) 79 ALJR 1048 at 1055; The Queen v Stephen Day [2004] NTCCA 2 at par [54] per Mildren J; Cranssen v The King [1936] HCA 42; (1936) 55 CLR 509; R v Osenkowski (1982) 30 SASR 212 at 213 per King CJ. I would allow the appeal on this ground.

I have formed my opinion having considered that the offence was committed against the background of the break-up of the relationship between the respondent and [the female victim], and the respondent's dysfunctional and violent upbringing. The objective facts of the offending were extremely serious. The maximum penalty for the crime that the offender committed against [the male victim] is imprisonment for life. The respondent committed the crime against [the male victim] less than three weeks after the Court of Summary Jurisdiction had sentenced him to a wholly suspended sentence of 15 months imprisonment for crimes of violence. ... A deliberate choice was made to use violence. The respondent was not out of control and unable to manage himself. He engaged in violence because of its functional value to him, to dominate, coerce and control other people. ... The attack upon the victim was premeditated, horrendously violent and sustained. ... The victim sustained dreadful injuries to his head and he remains permanently and significantly disabled.

The offender's crime against [the male victim] was committed in a domestic context. Domestic violence is a leading contributor to death, disability and illness in the community. Such violence affects the whole community. Medical and hospital treatment for the victims of domestic violence is extremely costly and imposes a considerable strain on the health system and those who work in it.[13]

[30] Even allowing for the distinguishing features which have been described above, many of the features which presented in that matter were also present in this case. What is clear from the judgments is that it is incumbent on the sentencing court to pay due regard to the fact that the legislature has seen fit to fix a maximum penalty of life imprisonment for this offence, and that the sentence imposed must properly reflect all of the aggravating factors, including the nature of the attack, the domestic context, the consequences for the victim and whether the conduct was in breach of previous orders made by a court to grant the offender conditional liberty or to protect the victim.

[31] In the case of The Queen v Nadich[14] this Court also considered an appeal on the ground of manifest inadequacy for a sentence imposed for the intentional infliction of serious harm. The offender was 22 years of age with a relatively deprived upbringing, substance abuse issues, cognitive difficulties and psychological problems in the form of an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depression, antisocial personality disorder and borderline personality disorder. At the time he committed the offence, the offender was subject to an operational period for a sentence previously imposed for unrelated drug offending.

[32] The circumstances of the offending were that the offender and the victim were unknown to each other. They first met at a waterhole outside Alice Springs immediately prior to the commission of the offence. One of the offender's party made an inappropriate comment to the victim which led to a heated discussion. The offender's associate apologised and the victim began walking back to his motor vehicle. As he was walking back, the offender fired a shotgun at him causing extensive injuries to the victim's chest and upper left arm. The victim was evacuated to the Royal Adelaide Hospital where he underwent open chest surgery to remove the shotgun pellets and several reconstructive surgeries. He suffered from a continuing limitation of movement in his left wrist, thumb and fingers, and anxiety, stress and depression as a result of the incident. He was unable to continue working as a diesel mechanic. The Supreme Court sentenced the offender to imprisonment for six years after discount for his plea of guilty.

[33] This Court determined that the sentence was manifestly inadequate. In doing so, Southwood J (with whom the other members of the Court agreed) stated:

In my opinion, the sentence imposed on the respondent for the crime of intentionally cause serious harm is so inadequate as to manifest error. The sentence is so disproportionate to the objective seriousness of the offending as to shock the public conscience.

The sentencing Judge in the Court below found that the moral culpability for the offending was very high and that the respondent had not accepted full responsibility for his crime. He told elaborate lies to the police and the offender displayed a complete and utter lack of empathy for a fellow human being.

In my opinion, the offending is very much towards the top of the range of such offences. As the sentencing Judge found, it was pure blind luck that the victim did not die. The sentencing objects of punishment and deterrence are the primary sentencing objects. The crime was a very dangerous crime which was committed by a person who was leading the life of a criminal and the respondent showed an absolute disregard for the Court orders that had been imposed on him.[15]

[34] In resentencing the offender, this Court adopted a starting point of imprisonment for 12 years which was reduced to nine years and six months to take account of the guilty plea. After the restoration of the sentence to imprisonment held in suspense for the earlier drug offending with some concurrency, the total period of imprisonment was 10 years. A non-parole period of seven years was fixed.

[35] Shortly after that decision, this Court delivered reasons in Tritton v The Queen; Birchall v The Queen.[16] This case involved two offender appeals on the ground of manifest excess against sentences imposed for the intentional infliction of serious harm. The offenders and the victim all had a history of mental illness. In the early hours of the morning in question, the offenders armed themselves with a knife and a club hammer and told the victim they were going for a drive. They drove to a remote location outside Alice Springs and walked down into a dry riverbed. The first offender came up behind the victim and struck him behind the ear and to the hand with the hammer. The offenders then pulled the victim onto his back and the second offender cut the victim across the throat and stabbed him in the right side of his chest. Those injuries caused the victim to lose consciousness. The offenders then drove away leaving the victim at the scene.

[36] As a result of the assault the victim suffered a fractured skull, a subdural haematoma, a long open cut to the left side of his throat, a penetrating chest wound causing a punctured lung and complex facial fractures. He was evacuated to the Royal Adelaide Hospital for treatment. The victim required two operations to repair the skull fracture and had a metal plate surgically inserted into his skull. At the time of sentencing he was still suffering constant pain, flashbacks and nightmares.

[37] The Supreme Court sentenced the first offender to imprisonment for 16 years with a non-parole period of nine years. He had a background of deprivation, homelessness, substance abuse and suicide attempts. He had no convictions for violent offending. The Supreme Court sentenced the second offender to imprisonment for 16 years with a non-parole period of 12 years. He had a profoundly deprived childhood and had suffered significant physical, mental and sexual abuse. He had several diagnosed mental conditions but no previous convictions for violent offending. However, he did have convictions for dishonesty.

[38] On appeal, this Court observed that the head sentences of imprisonment for 16 years reflected a starting point of imprisonment for 20 years before any reduction to take account of the guilty pleas. That starting point was manifestly excessive, and in accordance with the guidance on range afforded by the decisions in Haji-Noor and Nadich the sentences were reduced to imprisonment for 14 years after discount with non-parole periods of eight years.

[39] The more recent decision of this Court in The Queen v Roberts[17] also involved the intentional infliction of serious harm in the context of a domestic relationship. The offender and the victim had been in an intimate partner relationship over an extended period which had subsequently broken down. The offender followed the victim to a house where she was visiting someone and waited outside. As the victim was leaving, the offender stabbed her twice in the neck, in the shoulder and in the chest. The victim ran into a different house and the offender followed her forcing the victim to take refuge behind one of the occupants of the house. The victim required surgery to repair her injuries. The offender had stabbed the victim 11 times, but it was a stab wound to the chest which constituted the serious harm. The medical opinion was that the victim would probably have died as a result of a progressive collapsed lung if that injury had been left untreated.

[40] The Supreme Court had imposed a sentence of imprisonment for seven years and six months after discount. In dealing with the ground of manifest inadequacy, this Court stated:

In our opinion, and notwithstanding the matters put forward by counsel for the respondent, the offending was so serious that general deterrence, public condemnation and stern punishment were the relevant sentencing requirements. Having regard to those sentencing objectives, we consider that the sentence imposed was unjustly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offending as found by her Honour.

We consider that the level of offending was in the mid- to upper-range of seriousness. We note that the maximum penalty for an offence charged contrary to section 177(a) of the Criminal Code is imprisonment for life. There is no tariff for the offence any more than for manslaughter as the circumstances of both the offence and the offender vary almost infinitely.

The decisions of this court in R v Haji-Noor [2007] NTCCA 7; (2007) 21 NTLR 127, R v Nadich [2012] NTCCA 4 and Tritton v R; Birchall v R [2012] NTCCA 12 provide some limited guidance as to the range for an appropriate sentence in the present case. Having regard to the relative seriousness of the offending and the consequences to the victims in those cases and in the case under consideration in this appeal, the injuries and immediate consequences to the victim in this case were severe.

It may be assumed in favour of the respondent that the victim made a satisfactory recovery medically although nine months after the event she was having difficulty sleeping, she was reliving the assault over and over, and she was constantly feeling sad, angry and traumatised. We note that that outcome is not as serious as the outcome suffered by the victim in Haji-Noor. However, for the level of violence the offending in the present case was comparable to that described in Tritton v R.

In our judgment the sentence of 7 years and 6 months was manifestly inadequate. There has been some misapplication of principle even where and how is not apparent from the remarks of the sentencing judge. The appeal is allowed.[18]

[41] The Court resentenced the offender to imprisonment for nine years and nine months after discount and fixed a non-parole period of six years. The circumstances of that offending correlate closely with the matter under consideration in this appeal. The sentencing purposes are also the same in terms of significance and weighting, in that the principal objectives will be punishment, denunciation and deterrence.

[42] There will, of course, be circumstances in which the nature of the offender will bear significantly on the penalty properly imposed, most notably when the courts are dealing with offenders who are youths and/or products of profound deprivation and/or of diminished capacity and/or of unblemished character with no prior criminal history. For the reasons already given, none of those considerations present in this case. Against that background, it is necessary to consider the features of this offending which bear on the assessment of its objective seriousness.

[43] As already described, at the time the serious harm was inflicted the respondent and the victim were in a spousal relationship which had already been blighted by domestic violence. The Sentencing Act has recently been amended to provide in s 6A(1)(fa) that it is an aggravating factor if the offender and the victim were in a domestic relationship and the offence included, amongst other features, domestic violence in the nature of conduct that is physically abusive or the offence involved coercive control of the victim. That section was enacted by the Justice Legislation Amendment (Domestic and Family Violence) Act 2023 (NT), which contained a suite of provisions recognising that domestic violence is a fundamental violation of human rights; that domestic violence is unacceptable in any form and in any community or culture; and that coercive control is almost always an underpinning dynamic of domestic violence.

[44] A sentencing court must give effect to the statutory stipulation that physical abuse and coercive control in the domestic context aggravates the seriousness of the offending. An offender who repeatedly stabs his or her intimate partner is quite obviously subjecting the victim to a very high level of physical abuse. This offending also involved the respondent attempting to stop the victim from exercising her free will in terms of the people she spoke to and the places she went and resorting to extreme violence to enforce that control. The legislative amendments reflect a contemporary recognition and understanding of the highly detrimental effects of domestic violence on victims, families and the wider community. The seriousness of the offending is elevated accordingly.

[45] That is a consideration which distinguishes this sentencing exercise from sentences imposed for this category of offence involving physical abuse and coercive control in the domestic context which were committed prior to the commencement of the amending legislation on 25 March 2024. As the High Court observed in The Queen v Kilic, 'current sentencing practices for offences involving domestic violence [may] depart from past sentencing practices for this category of offence because of changes in societal attitudes to domestic relationships'.[19]

[46] Turning then to the other features of the offending which operated in aggravation and fix its seriousness, the injury inflicted by the respondent on the victim was grave and life-threatening as already described. The respondent was armed with a wickedly dangerous weapon when committing the offence and used that weapon to inflict the injury. The conduct obviously involved a high level of actual violence. There was a degree of planning involved in the sense that the respondent forearmed himself with an inherently dangerous weapon, followed the victim back into town and through the shopping centre, and ignored her pleas to desist. It is clear from the respondent's conduct that he targeted the victim's chest area with a knife, and he may be assumed to have known that was a vulnerable part of the body. The savagery and ferocity of the attack was accompanied by a callous disregard for the victim's welfare in the aftermath. The respondent demonstrated no concern at all for the victim, and his impulse was only to escape the scene and attempt to conceal his involvement in the offending.

[47] There are several other features of this offending which are relevant to the sentencing exercise, even if not strictly aggravating in the sense of elevating the objective seriousness of the offending. First, the offence in question was committed while the respondent was on bail on charges which included a prior brutal attack on the victim. To treat those circumstances as aggravating is not to penalise an offender for an offence other than that for which the sentence is imposed. It is to recognise that the gravity of the offending is increased by the fact the offender has repeated the type of offence previously charged while entrusted to remain in the community. Second, the offending was committed in daylight hours in a public place and in the public gaze. In fact, it was committed in the environs of the town's major supermarket and shopping centre. The commission of a crime of this nature in that context is highly corrosive of the community's well-being. Third, to say that this general type of offending is prevalent inadequately describes the epidemic of serious domestic violence in the Northern Territory community.

[48] Having regard to the sentencing considerations we have described and the features of this offending, the sentence imposed in respect of Count 2 was manifestly inadequate. The Crown does not make any complaint about the penalty imposed in respect of Count 1, the six months' cumulation which was ordered between that sentence and the sentence imposed in respect of Count 2 or the 25% reduction in the sentences which was allowed by the sentencing judge.

1. The conclusion that the sentencing judge erred in imposing the sentence gives rise to a consideration of whether this Court should intervene to re-sentence the respondent or decline to do so in the exercise of its residual discretion. This Court has recently dealt with the considerations which govern the exercise of the residual discretion in The King v Singar[20], and we largely adopt what was said there. Even where manifest inadequacy is found the appellate court retains a residual discretion as to whether the appeal should be allowed and the respondent resentenced. The Crown bears the onus of negating any reason why the residual discretion not to interfere should be exercised.[21] That determination is made having regard to the limiting purpose of Crown appeals, which extends to correcting sentences so disproportionate to the seriousness of the offending as to constitute an error in point of principle.[22]

[50] This is not a case in which there was any delay by the Crown in lodging the appeal or in which the Crown has conducted the case on appeal on any different basis from that pursued at first instance. The sentence imposed on the respondent at first instance was custodial rather than non-custodial. The non-parole period has not expired and nor is the respondent's release on parole imminent in an objective sense. There is nothing concerning the respondent's health or other subjective circumstances which attract the exercise of the discretion. Moreover, this is a case in which there is a substantial disparity between the sentence which was imposed and the sentence which should properly be imposed, particularly having regard to the nature of the attack, the seriousness of the injury, the relationship between the respondent and the victim and the recent legislative amendments which we have described.

[51] The sole basis on which the respondent says that the residual discretion should be exercised in his favour is that under the terms of the current sentence he would become eligible for parole in mid-December 2026, and any extension of the non-parole period would operate cruelly on his expectations. The submission put is effectively that although the non-parole period fixed under the current sentence does not expire for another eight months, it is imminent in the respondent's perception. Even if there was evidence establishing that subjective state of mind, and even if that evidence were to be accepted, that consideration would not militate in favour of the exercise of the discretion.

1. The appeal is allowed and the sentence imposed by the Supreme Court on 13 November 2025, as corrected on 25 March 2026, is quashed.
2. On Count 1, the respondent is sentenced to imprisonment for eight months which is to commence on 16 September 2024.
3. On Count 2, the respondent is sentenced to imprisonment for nine years which is to commence after the service of six months on Count 1.
4. The total sentence is imprisonment for nine years and six months.
5. A non-parole period of four years and nine months is fixed.

[1] Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571.

[2] The Queen v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269.

[3] The Queen v Mossman (2017) 40 NTLR 144 at [8] et seq; The Queen v Roe [2017] NTCCA 7; (2017) 40 NTLR 187 at [11]- [20]; Griffiths v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 293 at 310; and Everett v The Queen [1994] HCA 49; (1994) 181 CLR 295 at 300.

[4] The Queen v Kahu-Leedie [2022] NTCCA 4 at [21].

[6] R v Olbrich [1999] HCA 54; (1999) 199 CLR 270 at [27].

[7] Cheung v The Queen [2001] HCA 67; (2001) 209 CLR 1 at [14].

[8] Filippou v The Queen [2015] HCA 29; (2015) 256 CLR 47 at [64].

[9] The Queen v Mamarika [2019] NTCCA 24.

[10] The Queen v Haji-Noor (2007) NTCCA 7; (2007) 21 NTLR 127.

[11] The Queen v Haji-Noor [2007] NTCCA 7; (2007) 21 NTLR 127 at [32]- [33].

[12] The Queen v Haji-Noor [2007] NTCCA 7; (2007) 21 NTLR 127 at [117]- [120].

[13] The Queen v Haji-Noor [2007] NTCCA 7; (2007) 21 NTLR 127 at [181]- [183].

[14] The Queen v Nadich [2012] NTCCA 4.

[15] The Queen v Nadich [2012] NTCCA 4 at [28]- [31].

[16] Tritton v The Queen; Birchall v The Queen [2012] NTCCA 12.

[17] The Queen v Roberts (unreported, Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal, 3 September 2021, SCC 22020389).

[18] The Queen v Roberts (unreported, Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal, 3 September 2021, SCC 22020389), Transcript of Proceedings, p 43.

[19] The Queen v Kilic [2016] HCA 48; (2016) 259 CLR 256 at [21].

[20] The King v Singar [2025] NTCCA 1 at [59]- [68].

1. [21] CMB v Attorney General for NSW [2015] HCA 9; (2015) 256 CLR 346 at [54] citing Everett v The Queen [1994] HCA 49; (1994) 181 CLR 295 at 299-300 and R v Hernando [2002] NSWCCA 489 at [12].

[22] Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) [2011] HCA 10; (2011) 242 CLR 573 at [16]; Everett v The Queen [1994] HCA 49; (1994) 181 CLR 295 at 300; Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321 at [61]- [62]; The Queen v Kahu-Leedie [2022] NTCCA 4 at [21].