"Lateness", "expecting or intending" certain consequences
368 The allegation as pleaded in [44(b)] of the 3FASOC is that a Short-notice Rebid was "timed" in such a way that certain consequences were "expected or intended". The allegation is that the rebids were timed deliberately late such that it was expected or intended that other Generators: would be unable or unlikely to submit a responsive Rebid; were unlikely to be able to place themselves in a position to substitute the full volume withheld by the "late" rebid - so as to thwart a price spike; or, alternatively, if they were able to provide substitution, it would be at a price that would cause the dispatch price to be higher.
369 As the Respondents submitted, the objective features of the NEM tend to undermine Stillwater's characterisation of the strategy. The following factors are particularly telling against the existence of such a strategy.
370 First, it was an agreed fact, and the evidence of Stanwell's traders established, that Generators made, and could only make, rebids for TIs, not DIs (SAF at [168]). Dr Ledgerwood himself undermined the premise of his theory that traders were targeting particular DIs when he said,
I think that, in most cases, you would look at these and say the rebid was put into the market and it took time for the spike to develop. The fact is that it takes time then to ramp through what is in the existing bid stack given the bids that are there plus time to overcome any other rebids that might be made that add additional capacity to the stack.
371 Secondly, several of the impugned rebids in the Sample Intervals were structured to take effect across more than one TI. That factor is inconsistent with the pleaded conduct. For reasons that have been explained earlier, it was not possible for traders to predict whether or not their rebids would have an immediate, or indeed any effect at all, in causing a price spike. It is a long bow to draw that, absent any knowledge of the success or otherwise of a rebid, a trader would nevertheless expect or intend that his rebid would prevent or deter another Generator from responding - and from responding in the particular manner pleaded. It is also difficult to understand how, in the circumstances of the blind auction that is the NEM, Generators would not already be reacting in some way to the same market signals that have been available to all Generators across the Trading Day, such that a rebidding trader is simply "chancing his luck" that a price spike will occur, rather than being focussed on the response of others. It is uncontroversial that market participants did not receive any notice of any rebids made by other Generators at the time when those rebids were made. All market participants had available to them in "real time" pre-dispatch prices published to the market, and each Generator's own private pre-dispatch targets, however unreliable that information may have been (2RoseR [4.36]-[4.38]).
372 Thirdly, as has already been explained, the NER permitted rebidding up until approximately 67 seconds before the end of a DI. In its determination relating to the 1 July 2016 amendments to the NER, the AEMC stated (AEMC, Final Rule Determination National Electricity Amendment (Bidding in Good Faith) Rule 2015, 10 December 2015, at ii):
Rebidding by participants, including rebids made very close to the time of dispatch, is a necessary component of the market … The dynamic process of participants learning and reacting to the actions of their competitors, and to the inherent volatility of the system, is an important part of a well-functioning market.
However, problems arise when deliberately late rebids are systematically used by some participants to withhold information from the market. Systematic distortions to price outcomes will decrease confidence in the forward information provided to the market.
(Emphasis added.)
373 The AEMC expressed the view that the "current rules do not set adequate boundaries on the ability of some participants to influence price outcomes to the detriment of others" but continued (at v):
However, the Commission also recognises that the issues have not manifested until recently or at all in some regions of the NEM, and that the resulting price outcomes may be a function of market structure … While it is not guaranteed that the changes will put an immediate stop to the conduct of concern, they area proportionate response to the issue, and ought to make it easier for the AER compared to the current arrangements to take enforcement action in respect of deliberately late rebidding. At the same time, they should not prevent rebidding in legitimate pursuit of commercial interests.
(Emphasis added.)
374 Consequently, despite Dr Ledgerwood's strongly held opinions about the illegitimate character of the impugned conduct, on its face, the conduct was not different from that which had been considered at some length in 2015 and which was recognised by the AEMC as being important to the way the NEM operates as a matter both of commercial reality and necessity. It is Stillwater's position, however, that the impugned conduct transgressed the limit of legitimately pursuing commercial interests.
375 Establishing where the line was crossed between "deliberately late rebidding" and "rebidding in legitimate pursuit of commercial interests" proved somewhat elusive. At one point in his oral evidence, Dr Ledgerwood put it this way:
The trader just learned about this new information. Is that something that you would, you know, create a valid reason for the rebid, and that's really what the analysis is designed to do in my discussion - is to try to look around when the rebid was made and say, "All right. Let's put it all in context to see whether this is something that, indeed, was something that was just a last minute thing when they said, 'Yes, there's new information', or was it something that was part of a longer-term understanding of the opportunity to do this at the last minute so that it becomes more likely to create a spike[?]"
376 Nevertheless, when asked by Senior Counsel for CS Energy:
MR HODGE: … Do you think that the respondents in any of the sample intervals would have lacked the commercial incentive to make one of these withholding rebids if they were making it 15 minutes earlier than they actually did so?
DR LEDGERWOOD: … I can't hypothesise about that.
377 At other points in his evidence Dr Ledgerwood appeared to suggest that all other Generators ought to have been given up to 15 minutes notice of Stanwell or CS Energy's intention to make a withholding rebid to allow other Generators to "mount a competitive response". Dr Ledgerwood appeared to have arrived at this conclusion on the basis that there were more no-notice rebids than D-10 rebids, and then still fewer D-15 rebids picked up by his screens. In cross-examination, Dr Ledgerwood was unable to identify anywhere in his various reports where he had stated that he had arrived at his opinion based on his observation of the pattern of D-5, D-10, and D-15 rebids. His explanation was unenlightening:
Counsel, I'm just stating that - the fact is I talk about this in multiple places from the standpoint of both the economics of how this works, the information economics of how this works, as well as the game theory of how this would work from the standpoint of the first mover-advantage. So, as part of that, you would expect that there would be more no-notice rebids that would be successful than short-notice 10 and than short-notice 15. It is just a natural fact and, indeed, we see that in the data.
378 Stillwater's case is predicated on there being relevant delay in placing a rebid if it was not made very shortly after a change in material conditions and circumstances relevant to the rebid. A rebid was taken to have been made in good faith (cl 3.8.22A) if a Scheduled Generator "has a genuine intention to honour that offer, bid or rebid if the material conditions and circumstances upon which the offer, bid or rebid were based remained unchanged until the relevant dispatch interval" (emphasis added). Having made a rebid, a Generator was required to provide AEMO a "brief, verifiable and specific" reason (limited to 64 characters) for the rebid and the time at which the event or occurrence cited as the reason for the rebid took place. This summarises the regulatory framework that applied to 12 of the 13 Sample Intervals (excluding ATI#12).
379 Again, as has already been discussed earlier in this judgment, during the Conduct Period, the Bidding in Good Faith Rule was changed on and from 1 July 2016 to proscribe the making of an offer, bid or rebid that was false or misleading (cl 3.8.22A). An offer, bid or rebid was deemed to be a representation that the offer, bid or rebid would not be changed unless the Generator becomes aware of a change in the material conditions and circumstances upon which the offer, bid or rebid were based (cl s.8.22A(a1)). A rebid was required to be made as soon as practicable after the Generator becomes aware of the change in material conditions and circumstances which leads it to vary its prior offer or bid (cl s.8.22A(d)). Any Generator who made a rebid in the "late rebidding period", being 15 minutes before the end of TI, was required to keep a contemporaneous record of the reasons for the rebid. In considering any breach of the clause, for the purposes of civil penalty proceedings, a court is directed to have regard to: the market design principle in cl 3.1.4(a)(2) and the importance of rebids being made, where possible, in sufficient time to allow a reasonable opportunity for other market participants to respond prior to the commencement of the TI to which the rebid relates or the commencement of any DI within that TI. The new regulatory framework applied only to one SI, ATI#12.
380 The NER of course require that a rebid be made as soon as practicable after traders become aware of a material change. However, the evidence was that, whilst sometimes it was possible for rebidding decisions to be made very quickly, that was not always the case (2PriceR at [52(b)]; Branson Affidavit at [68], [69], [74]; Jenkins Affidavit at [36], [41]). The evidence given by Mr Branson and Mr Jenkins was that once a change in material conditions was detected, a trader must then consider whether to rebid, and if so, how. Traders make rebidding decisions by reference to an array of "real time", and regularly changing, market data across the entire NEM. This includes data in relation to demand, generation availability and interregional electricity flows. Other information unique to each Generator - such as technical and operational characteristics of plant, contract positions and other commercial considerations - also weigh on rebidding decisions (2PriceR [49]-[63]; Brandon Affidavit at [75]; Jenkins Affidavit at [43]). As CS Energy submitted, the fact that Generators often required time to make rebidding decisions is a point central to Dr Ledgerwood's thesis about Short-notice Rebidding. As he explained, "the more information that they have, the longer in time they have to consider the potential ramifications of rebidding the better able they are to make that decision". Mr Price explained (2PriceR at [52(b)]):
Participants often leave rebidding until just before the dispatch interval. This is the moment in time that participants have the best available information about market conditions and the state of their own plant and so can make the best assessment of the most profitable bid for them. This highly iterative process in the NEM allows participants to observe price and dispatch outcomes and also each other's behaviour over time. After a dispatch interval, participants can adjust their position to optimise their position over time.
381 Whilst accepting that the more information a participant has, the better able they are to make a decision in response to a rebid, Dr Ledgerwood nevertheless speculated that traders were "looking around during the day for the right moment to try to spring that trap". He could not explain, however, how, on the one hand, his thesis required market participants to be given up to 15 minutes "notice" of a rebid by Stanwell or CS Energy such that market participants had enough information to make a competitive response, whilst on the other hand, an assessment of evolving market conditions over a similar period of time by Stanwell's and CS Energy's traders in the Sample Intervals was an illegitimate delay. This was yet another of the several instances of illogicality that attended Dr Ledgerwood's theory on which Stillwater's case was predicated.
382 I accept Mr Price's opinion that a Generator's legitimate pursuit of its commercial interests may necessarily result in some delay to the making of a rebid, which is caused by the time taken to assess all of the circumstances known at the time and to construct the rebid. That does not mean, however, that the delay is "deliberate" in the sense alleged by Stillwater.
What is meant by a "responsive Rebid"?
383 The allegation against the Respondents is, in essence, that by deliberately rebidding late, they could thwart a responsive Rebid. The term "responsive Rebid" is defined to mean "a rebid [made] in sufficient time after the Short-notice Rebid to affect the dispatch price in the TDI" (3FASOC at [44(b)(i)]). By "affect the dispatch price" it is clear from [52] of the 3FASOC, and the evidence at the Initial Trial, that what was being referred to was an abatement of any price spike likely to be caused by the Short-notice Rebid. In other words, a rebid that increased, or reinforced an increase to, the dispatch price is not contemplated by the pleading to be a responsive Rebid.
384 In that context, the alleged strategy is predicated on there being only two possible competitive responses to a withholding rebid, both with the object of mitigating the price spike: the first, to rebid capacity from higher price bands into lower price bands; the second, to rebid fast start generating units to move them from FSIP mode into normal mode (with or without also rebidding their capacity into lower price bands). Dr Ledgerwood said that he thought of "other suppliers wanting to get online and increase their output to take advantage of the price spike as being a competitive response".
385 There was, however, no evidence that competing Generators did, or were likely to, respond in either of those two ways. As was made plain, Generators could respond to being made aware of an upcoming forecast increase in dispatch price in other ways. For example, Generators could rebid to support or reinforce the price spike by moving capacity themselves from lower price bands to higher price bands.
386 Whilst Dr Ledgerwood conceded that was so, he described such as an "anti-competitive" response. Dr Ledgerwood's opinion was that any withholding bid was anti-competitive, and that the pro-competitive response was to add supply to the market.
387 It was put to Dr Ledgerwood in cross-examination that there was nothing to support his theory that, with more time, it was more likely that competitors would make rebids to introduce additional supply; rather, the converse was in fact true - competitors were more likely to make their own withholding bids. Dr Ledgerwood was not prepared to accept that proposition, even when presented with the analysis of what had in fact happened in various ATIs, in particular in ATI##1, 6, 7, and 10 (JtEcER, Mr Holt at [351]). Rather, he said that "by looking at the ATIs and by looking at ADIs specifically, what we are seeing are examples of where there was an insufficient competitive response" (emphasis added). It is important to appreciate from that evidence that Dr Ledgerwood was focussed on what constituted a competitive response in one ADI (that is, a 5-minute interval). This exceptionally confined view of when a competitive response ought to be expected was criticised by all other members of both the Economic Conclave and the Electricity Market Conclave.
388 Alternatively, Generators could choose to do nothing in advance of an anticipated price spike, being content to benefit from the likely increase to the Spot Price in the Trading Interval, with or without responding further by submitting "pile-in" rebids after the price spike has occurred). As Stanwell submitted, such a response is unaffected by the timing of the impugned rebids. Every Generator puts in a daily bid, allocating its capacity across a range of prices which reflect its own decisions about what is in its own best commercial interests. Having made those bids (and/or any rebids), they will be taken into account by the NEMDE and so provide a "response" that is available to all capacity repricing rebids, regardless of the period of "notice" given for any particular rebid. The nature and extent of the response depends on where other generating units offered their capacity relative to Stanwell or CS Energy. The response could involve online generating units ramping up, or offline units coming online and ramping up.
389 Dr Rose and Mr Price gave evidence as to what happened in practice. Dr Rose said:
Earlier on when we were talking about - or there was discussion about rebidding to defeat the price spike, I had never heard of that. No-one who was acting commercially ever wants to defeat a price spike. They will rebid in such a way as to try to avoid defeating a price spike and that means being very cautious about rebidding at all.
…
The other point I would make is that if a generator - we have talked a lot about the ramp up rates, if generators wanted to, they could invoke their high ramp rates but they don't want to do that because that will also cause - defeat the price spike. So there is a lot of commercial interest involved which cause generators to be cautious about plunging in and defeating the price spike.
390 Similarly, Mr Price said:
If they really wanted to take account of a price spike and defeat it, well, they would bid a high ramp rate and a low price. But that's not what you see. That's because that is the day on which they make money.
391 Tellingly, Dr Ledgerwood was unable to say with any certainty that competitive responses were in fact prevented, at least by D-10 and D-15 rebids. As he said, "[i]t is impossible to prove something that didn't happen". At its highest, Dr Ledgerwood's evidence was that "a competitive response becomes more likely the more time that is - the more notice that is given" (emphasis added). Dr Ledgerwood's screens did not purport to test for whether a rebid prevented a competitive response.
392 Mr Holt was asked in cross-examination whether, if given more notice of an upcoming price spike, competing Generators would rebid their capacity into lower price bands. Mr Holt's evidence was that, although such a response was at least possible, it was merely one of three alternative responses that rival Generators might provide - the two other possible responses, as discussed above, were to make a reinforcing rebid or to choose not to react.
393 It was also put to Mr Holt in cross-examination that competing Generators, who are assumed to be profit maximising, have "nothing to gain by not responding to the forecast spike in dispatch price and, ultimately, spot price for the trading interval". Mr Holt disagreed. He explained that it is reasonable to expect that, by the time a withholding bid was made, a rival Generator would have already formed its own view as to the price at which it was willing to dispatch its capacity. As CS Energy submitted, this assessment would be reflected in the rival Generator's existing bid. In that context, notice of an elevated dispatch price which was higher than earlier forecasts, but still lower than the price at which the rival Generator had bid its capacity, would not necessarily cause the rival Generator to change the price at which it was prepared to offer its output. Rather, the extent to which notice of a future elevated dispatch price would cause a rival Generator to reprice its own capacity would depend upon that Generator's own commercial and operational considerations, including plant characteristics, fuel availability, and start up and marginal costs. Mr Holt also observed that whether a pre-dispatch price signal would in fact translate into an actual price spike was a matter on which there is "a lot of uncertainty" and in such circumstances, it was possible that a rival Generator might choose to "stand firm" and not react to a forecast elevated dispatch price. Alternatively, Mr Morton suggested, "[t]hey may perceive an opportunity to drive the price still higher again because they know that one of their competitors is not going to exert a competitive constraint that they perceived before that commitment".
394 Similarly, Mr Price (with whom Dr Rose agreed), said:
Dr Ledgerwood often talks about the so-called first mover advantage. In fact, in many ways it is a first mover disadvantage because they are the ones who are taking the heat on output. And that's why you get the pile-in. It is 100 per cent certain that you are going to get that price if you get dispatched and so that's really kind of what they're looking for as well. Because what it will do, as Dr Ledgerwood has said, it will elevate the whole trading interval price. So even if the dispatch interval price following the pile in reduces they still get the benefit of the elevation trading interval price. So it is much more certain for them as compared to trying to defeat the price which makes no commercial sense.
395 I am unable to accept that the only competitive response from participants in the NEM was to rebid in an attempt to mitigate or abate a price spike.
Inferring expectation or intention
396 Stillwater alleged that Stanwell and CS Energy rebid in the manner they did, according to the alleged trading strategy, with the "expectation or intention" that there would be three consequences: first, other Generators would be unable or unlikely to submit a responsive Rebid; secondly, other Generators would be unable or unlikely to offer sufficient substitution in sufficient time to thwart a price spike, or thirdly, if other Generators were able to offer substituted supply, that substitution would of itself elevate the dispatch price.
397 As to the first two consequences, Stillwater pleaded (3FASOC at [44]) that Stanwell's and CS Energy's "expectation" could be inferred from: their familiarity with the operation of the NER; their experience operating within the NEM; their familiarity with and experience of the operation of the NEMDE; their access to information available to Generators from AEMO; their access to the information made publicly available by AEMO; and that they timed their Short-notice Rebids for periods when it was likely that either interconnector binding would occur, the Short-notice Rebids would cause the interconnectors to bind, or the interconnectors were already bound (emphasis added).
398 It should be observed that all these factors apply equally to all other Generators operating within the NEM. It was not contended that Stanwell and/or CS Energy had any special advantage with respect to their knowledge, access to information, or experience.
399 It was uncontroversial that, at the time of placing a rebid, a trader does not know if the rebid will lead to any price spike at all, let alone whether a price spike will occur in a particular DI. So much was accepted by Dr Ledgerwood in cross-examination. Moreover, the objective features of the NEM discussed above, coupled with the various responses available to a competing Generator on becoming aware of a rebid tell against there being any expectation on the part of Stanwell or CS Energy that they would prevent or deter a responsive Rebid.
400 Stillwater pleaded that Stanwell's and CS Energy's "intention" could be inferred from the nature, frequency and effect of the Short-notice Rebidding. This plea was particularised (3FASOC at [52(b)]) as follows:
The consequences referred to in 44(b)(i) and (ii) above were particularly pronounced on occasions when the Short-notice Rebid was made within approximately 5 minutes before the commencement of a TDI (No-notice Rebid). On such occasions, other Generators had no opportunity to submit a responsive Rebid prior to the commencement of the relevant TDI.
As to the frequency of the Short-notice Rebidding, the Applicant refers to the First Expert Report of Dr Shaun Ledgerwood dated 4 November 2022 (First Ledgerwood Report) and the Second Ledgerwood Report.
As to the effect of the Short-notice Rebidding, the Applicant refers to Sections H.7 and H.8 below.
401 The pleading therefore directs particular attention to the D-5 or "no-notice" rebids as those that best describe the nature of the rebids. That is despite the fact that the alleged trading strategy is said to include D-15 and D-10 rebids as leading to the same consequences - the inability or unlikelihood of a responsive Rebid, or the unlikelihood of an offer of full substitution (3FASOC at [44(b)(i) and (ii)]). If the number of ATIs attributed to Stanwell and CS Energy was reduced by omitting any D-10 or D-15 rebids, the percentage of DIs in the Conduct Period affected by the impugned conduct becomes even less significant.
402 As was submitted by CS Energy, Stillwater has not attempted to prove the frequency with which the alleged trading strategy was implemented. All that has been established is the number of occasions on which rebids made by Stanwell and/or CS Energy "passed" each of Dr Ledgerwood's screens. It is therefore not possible to draw any conclusion as to how frequently the alleged strategy was implemented.
403 Similarly, as CS Energy submitted, no evidence has been adduced of the effect, or likely effect, of the impugned rebids.
404 Dr Ledgerwood referred to three matters in support of his view that more time prior to a rebid's taking effect would likely lead to fewer or lower price spikes.
405 First, he pointed to the fact that his screens identified a pattern of fewer D-15 rebids, and still fewer D-10 rebids, and fewer again D-5 rebids. Dr Ledgerwood could not explain what factors, other than timing, might have played in the formation of this pattern. For example, it could not be known what particular role, if any, the "pile-in" phenomenon played in its formation, nor the role of ramping constraints in the existing bid-stack, or myriad other factors.
406 Secondly, he placed emphasis on what he saw as the "first mover advantage". Dr Ledgerwood described a rebidding market participant as having "an inherent advantage over other market participants because other participants will not know of the rebids' existence until after they are processed by AEMO and results are published" (2LedgerwoodR at [1071]). The difficulty with this so-called advantage, however, is that a participant can never be sure that it is the first-mover as the only rebidding generator; others may have already made a withholding bid. As has already been referred to, it was Mr Price's opinion that this can be a significant disadvantage "because they are the ones taking the [hit] on output". In any event, the simple fact that someone has "moved first" says nothing about how other market participants will respond.
407 Thirdly, in the context of Dr Ledgerwood's view of economic theory, and as is discussed below, the response by market participants said to be prevented or deterred by "deliberately late" rebidding, that of a rebid to abate or mitigate a price spike, is not necessarily one that is hindered by shortness of time. Contrary to Dr Ledgerwood's view, it cannot be assumed that an economically rational competitor of Stanwell and/or CS Energy would rebid in such a manner.
408 Dr Ledgerwood said that he did not, for any interval, analyse whether the timing of the rebid caused the price spike which was observed. Nor did Dr Ledgerwood analyse whether, if the impugned rebids had been made earlier, competing Generators would, or were likely to, have responded in a way which would have prevented or abated an elevated dispatch price. In particular, he conceded that he did not consider the counterfactual dispatch prices which would have been observed if the impugned rebids had been made earlier. He looked only at circumstances in which the impugned rebids were not made at all (2LedgerwoodR at IX). Dr Ledgerwood said (2LedgerwoodR at [1295]):
In particular, I have not analysed the possibility that the Respondents might have submitted withholding rebids that did not constitute Short-notice Rebidding. I have not done so because … I consider that the constituent elements of Short-notice Rebidding I have addressed in this report were essential to the effect that the Short-notice Rebidding had on dispatch prices in the Sample Intervals. Without those elements, the Respondents either would not have been able to cause elevated dispatch prices, or would have lacked the commercial incentive to do so.
409 A further difficulty which emerged in cross-examination was that, in comparing the number of D-15, D-10, and no-notice rebids, Dr Ledgerwood's attention was confined to the TI in which the rebid was made. He did not take into account rebids that took effect in the following TI. He agreed that, logically, most of the no-notice rebids picked up by his screens were within the ATI, because they took effect immediately, and were therefore categorically "proximate in time to a price spike". There was no evidence of whether, having been given 15 minutes notice of the withholding rebids in the Sample Intervals, other Generators considered, but chose not to, mount a responsive Rebid.
410 Of course, traders did not in fact receive notice of rebids at the time when they were made. The only "real time" information available to them which was capable of signalling that a rebid had been made was the pre-dispatch prices published to the market and each Generator's own pre-dispatch targets which were issued privately to each Generator. It was notorious that a pre-dispatch price could not be regarded as a reliable predictor of the actual dispatch price. This was particularly so, "in times of low available supply relative to demand, usually at or near high demand periods" (2RoseR at [2.74], [2.76]).
411 Absent the reasons why Generators did not respond to a D-15 or D-10 rebid, it is impossible to draw any conclusion as to whether the timing of the rebid was the factor that prevented the competitive response. Dr Ledgerwood was himself unable to draw such a conclusion. When asked in cross-examination:
MR HODGE: … Do you agree this with me: that you have no idea, for any of the sample intervals, whether the elevated dispatch prices would have been caused if the impugned rebids had been made 15 minutes earlier that they were?
DR LEDGERWOOD: I do not have that information, no.
412 For these reasons alone, it is difficult to place any reliance on Dr Ledgerwood's opinion to the extent that it was based on the comparative numbers of no-notice, D-10 and D-15 rebids.
413 Further, Dr Ledgerwood was unable to articulate an economic or legal principle as to why 15 minutes was the critical "notice", period other than to assert it was "just the economic theory of the longer that traders have to respond the more able they will be to mount an effective response". That explanation, however, does not ground the particular 15 minute notice period in economic theory - indeed, if a rebid had been made 16 minutes before gate-closure, it would not have been impugned by Stillwater. In his oral evidence, Dr Ledgerwood appeared ultimately to agree that when a rebid was made, it was intended to take effect immediately, but may or may not do so depending on the existing bids in the bid stack. Having therefore accepted that a D-15 rebid would not necessarily take effect in the next DI, it was impossible for him to explain why a D-15 rebid should be impugned, but not a D-20, or earlier, rebid.
414 As to the third possible consequence expected or intended by the Respondents' alleged trading strategies - being that, if competing Generators were able to switch on, synchronise or ramp up in sufficient time or at sufficient volume to offer substituted full volume of withheld capacity, their offer of substituted supply would increase the dispatch price - no evidence was led to support such an inference.
415 For these reasons, there is no basis for inferring that Stanwell or CS Energy traders expected or intended that, by delaying their rebids, other Generators would be unable or unlikely to respond in what Stillwater alleges is the only competitive manner.