Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, s.30

Acts Interpretation Act 1901, s.21

Foreign Take-overs Act 1975, s.26

Society of Medical Officers of Health v Hope (1960) AC 551; (1960) 1 All ER 317

Re Callaghan and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority (1978) 1 ALD 227

Re Woods and Collector of Customs (NSW) (A84/195, 27 June 1985)

Re Hitek Holdings Pty Ltd and Export Development Grants Board (V84/259, 2 July 1985)

Ex Parte Iskra; Ex Parte Mercantile Transport Co Pty Limited (1963) 5 FLR 221

Jumbunna Coal Mine, No Liability & Anor v Victorian Coal Miners' Association (1908) 6 CLR 309

Morgan v White [1912] HCA 50; (1912) 15 CLR 1

Jeffreys v Boosey (1854) 4 HLC; 10 ER 681

Meyer Heine Pty Limited v China Navigation Co Limited [1966] HCA 11; (1966) 115 CLR 10

Colquohoun v Heddon (1890) 24 QBD 491

Re Dulles Settlement (1951) Ch 265; (1950) 2 All ER 1013

Macleod v Attorney-General for NSW (1891) AC 455

Jackson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1920] HCA 27; (1920) 27 CLR 503

Birmingham University and Epsom College v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1938] HCA 57; (1938) 60 CLR 572

Davidsson v Hill (1901) 2 KB 606

Tomalin v Pearson (1909) 2 KB 61

Grannall v Kellaway & Sons Pty Limited [1955] HCA 5; (1954) 93 CLR 36

Wanganui-Rangitikei Electric Power Board v Australian Mutual Provident Society [1934] HCA 3; (1933) 50 CLR 581

Vicars v Commissioner for Stamp Duties (NSW) [1945] HCA 24; (1945) 71 CLR 309

Re Brennan and the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory (1984) 6 ALD 428

Southern Centre of Theosophy Inc v South Australia [1979] HCA 59; (1979) 145 CLR 246; (1979) 27 ALR 59

Neal-Cooper Grain Company v Kissinger 385 F. Supp. 769 (1974)

Stone v Export-Import Bank of United States 552 F. 2d. 132 (1977)

Re Ward and Department of Industry and Commerce (1983) 5 ALN N338

Re Chandra and Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1984] AATA 437; (1984) 6 ALN N257

Secretary, Department of Housing and Construction v Wildman (TG3 of 1984, 23 November 1984)

Re O'Grady and Australian Federal Police (1983) 5 ALN N420

The Tribunal rules that the abovenamed applicant has a legally enforceable right to obtain access to documents in accordance with and subject to the provisions of s.11 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982. The application for review will be set down for further hearing accordingly.

In this application for review both the abovenamed applicant, Lordsvale Finance Limited ("Lordsvale"), and Transcover Pty Limited ("Transcover") are companies incorporated in the United Kingdom and not registered in Australia as foreign companies. In 1982 Neville and Company, a firm of solicitors in Melbourne, applied to the Foreign Investment Review Board ("the FIRB") on behalf of Transcover to take over several Australian companies which were manufacturing Nutt & Muddle poker machines. After some nine months, Transcover was advised that approval would not be granted for that takeover.

2. In a letter dated 27 February 1984 and bearing the letterhead of Lordsvale, Mr W.R. Ruffler, a director of both Lordsvale and Transcover, wrote to Mr P. Cullen, a Parliamentary consultant, in the following terms:

issued share capital of Nutt & Muddle Limited from

Cope Allman International, which is a wholly-owned

subsidiary of Cope Allman in the UK. I made an

application to the FIRB in Canberra and spent a

very considerable amount of time and money in order

to achieve this.

I was very disappointed that my application was

refused, as I feel that I had impeccable

references, being licenced by the Bank of England

in this country and the Gaming Board of

Great Britain, and bearing in mind that I was

purchasing this from an English company, I do feel

aggrieved at the decision, particularly as no

reason (or no logical reason) was given to me in

the refusal.

I understand that you have a 'Freedom of

Information Act' and could I therefore formally ask

you to act for me to try and establish why my

application was refused and who was responsible in

this decision."

3. On 17 May 1984 Mr Cullen made an application to the Department of the Treasury under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 ("the FOI Act") in which it was stated that he was acting on behalf of Lordsvale and one of its directors, Mr W.R. Ruffler. At a Directions hearing held in the matter, Mr Cullen said that the application was made at the request of Mr Ruffler who was a director of both Transcover and Lordsvale. The application sought access to documents in the possession of the Treasury, including the FIRB, relating to:

"1. A request by my principals for approval of

their proposal of 1983 to acquire the issued

share capital of Nutt and Muddle Ltd from Cope

Allman International, through, I understand, a

company called Transcover Ltd.

2. Any inquiries undertaken by officers of the

Board, or of Treasury, relating to the proposal

or a decision on the proposal, including any

correspondence with the Trade Practices

Commission and other bodies.

3. Any findings of fact, recommendations or advice

given in relation to the request, and

4. Reasons for any decisions or actions taken by

the Board or the Treasury in relation to the

request."

4. On 31 May 1984 the respondent wrote to Mr Cullen informing him that they would be seeking confirmation from Lordsvale and Mr Ruffler that he was authorized to act on their behalf. On 6 June Mr Ruffler replied to the Treasury enquiry in a letter bearing the letterhead of Lordsvale. Omitting the formal parts, the letter read:

"In reply to your letter of 1 June, I would like to

confirm that I have authorised Mr Peter Cullen to

act on my behalf in relation to some information we

are seeking under the Freedom of Information Act.

I would also confirm that this relates to an

investment proposal I made in the earlier part of

last year and in connection with which I made a

personal visit to the Treasury in Canberra. My

application to them was refused and I must say that

I was extremely disappointed, particularly bearing

in mind I was making the purchase of a company

based in Australia, which was a subsidiary of an

English company.

I trust the above is satisfactory for your needs

and I look forward to hearing the outcome in due

course."

5. On 20 July 1984 the respondent wrote to Mr Cullen refusing access to documents which it said were either confidential submissions to the FIRB or internal working documents. Access to other documents was granted subject to the payment of a fee of $27.50.

6. On 29 November 1984 Mr Cullen, acting for Lordsvale, lodged an application with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for the review of the Treasury decision. In the application, Lordsvale is described as the owner of Transcover. In a letter to the Tribunal dated 12 February 1985 Mr Cullen again referred to himself as acting on behalf of Lordsvale.

7. On 19 March 1985 the respondent's solicitor had a conversation with Mr Cullen in which Mr Cullen stated that the applicant was in fact Transcover and that he was acting for them. The conversation was confirmed by the respondent's solicitor in a letter dated 19 March 1985 to Mr Cullen. The letter asserted:

"(a) the Applicant is Transcover Ltd;

(b) Transcover Ltd is a company incorporated in

the United Kingdom;

(c) Transcover Ltd is not registered as a foreign

company in Australia;

(d) Transcover Ltd is not a subsidiary of

Lordsvale Finance Ltd;

(e) the directors of Transcover Ltd are Messrs

W.R. Ruffler Snr and W.R. Ruffler Jnr;

(f) Messrs Ruffler are both citizens of the United

Kingdom and not residents of Australia."

At the Directions hearing Mr Cullen confirmed that he believed that all of the statements made in the letter were true and that he was happy for the Tribunal to proceed on the basis of those statements being correct. Mr Cullen made formal concessions that (i) Lordsvale is a company incorporated in the United Kingdom; (ii) it is not registered as a foreign company carrying on business in Australia; and (iii) it is in fact not carrying on business in Australia.

8. When he appeared at the Directions hearing on 11 April 1985, Mr Cullen said that he was acting for Transcover. The change, he said, resulted from the Treasury raising the question as to whom he represented. In response to their query, he telexed Mr Ruffler at Lordsvale. Mr Ruffler telexed in reply that although he was a director of Lordsvale, the application to the FIRB was made by Transcover, a company owned by Mr Ruffler and his family, and that he wished Mr Cullen to act on behalf of Transcover. Mr Cullen said it was merely a matter of his having made the application on behalf of Lordsvale when he should have made it on behalf of Transcover.

9. Counsel for the respondent, Miss Kenny, maintained that the identity of the applicant would affect the way the respondent treated the application for access to documents, in particular in relation to s.43(1)(c) and s.45 of the FOI Act, so that had the respondent known that Mr Cullen was representing Transcover they may have responded differently. Miss Kenny submitted that the proper applicant pursuant to ss.15 and 55 of the Act was Mr W.R. Ruffler and possibly Lordsvale. She further submitted that it would be appropriate if the applicant made an application for the joinder of Transcover under s.30(1A) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 although, if this were done, Transcover could not argue that it had any greater right to access than had the original party.

10. It was suggested by the Tribunal that the solution to this lay in a new request for access being lodged by Mr Cullen on behalf of Transcover. Miss Kenny submitted that this would still leave standing the difficulty that s.11 of the FOI Act, according to her contention, does not confer a right to obtain access upon either Transcover or Lordsvale and that neither are competent to receive access to documents under the Act. It is this question of the right of non-resident foreign persons to obtain access to documents which the Tribunal must decide before it can deal with the substantive matters involved in the application.

11. As I said at the Directions hearing, I find it impossible to conclude that Transcover is a party to this application for review. None of the documentation suggests that it is an applicant in the matter. In response to what I said at the hearing, Mr Cullen said that he would immediately make a request under the FOI Act on behalf of Transcover. Whether he has done so and the outcome of any such application is, of course, irrelevant to the determination of the matter in hand.

12. An issue which was raised at the Directions hearing was whether the respondent was estopped from denying the availability of the FOI Act to the applicant by virtue of it having already released some documents to the applicant under that Act. Counsel for the respondent gave three reasons why the raising of such an estoppel should be denied. First, the acts of the respondent could not in any way modify the meaning of words in a statute. Secondly, it could not be said that the applicant had in any way acted to his detriment. Thirdly, there is nothing to suggest that such access as was given was given in pursuance of a duty imposed upon the respondent by the Act, as opposed to a voluntary provision of access such as is contemplated by s.14. The existence of the conclusive certificate did not in any way alter this because, like all conclusive certificates, it is not directed to the applicant in particular but stands against any person who may request access to the documents. Again, I am in agreement with counsel for the respondent on this point. I do not see that the doctrine of estoppel has any operation in circumstances such as the present, the general rule being that there is no estoppel against a statute: Society of Medical Officers of Health v Hope (1960) AC 551 at 568, Re Callaghan and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority (1978) 1 ALD 227 at 231; Re Woods and Collector of Customs (NSW) (No.A84/195, 27 June 1985); Re Hitek Holdings Pty Ltd and Export Development Grants Board (No.V84/259, 2 July 1985).

Applicability of FOI Act to persons neither resident in nor citizens of Australia

13. Counsel for the respondent submitted that s.11 does not confer any right of access on a person who is neither an Australian citizen nor is resident in Australia at the time at which his request is made. In relation to companies, it was said that the section does not confer a right of access on a company which is not incorporated in Australia, is not registered as a foreign company carrying on business in Australia and is not carrying on business in Australia. Rather, s.11 was said to confer a right only upon those persons for whose benefit Parliament ordinarily exercises its jurisdiction; in the present context, either an Australian citizen or a person resident in the jurisdiction or their corporate equivalents.

14. Before considering the question of whether the FOI Act can apply extraterritorially, it is first necessary to consider whether in fact a request made or access given in circumstances such as the present involves an extraterritorial application of the legislation. Counsel for the respondent argued that an extraterritorial operation arose from the giving of a right to a non-citizen residing outside the jurisdiction. The presumption against extraterritoriality, she said, operates so that where an Act of Parliament confers a right, it only confers it on those persons who are within the jurisdiction or who are citizens of the country bestowing that right. In this case the presumption limited the right of access given by s.11 of the FOI Act to persons who are either citizens or residents of Australia.

15. I am by no means satisfied that a construction in favour of permitting an overseas applicant to enjoy the rights conferred by the FOI Act does amount to an extraterritorial application of the legislation. There is in my opinion a strong case for contending that the principle of territoriality is not offended by legislation which operates upon the possession of a document by an Australian agency, the making in Australia (by reception therein) of a request for access, the notification to the applicant at an address provided in Australia (see s.19(1)(b)) of the result of the request and the subsequent administration of the request in Australia. On the other hand, although all the activities necessary for the enjoyment of the rights and for the performance of the duties imposed by the Act are carried on within Australia, what is sought by the applicant is for a right given by statute to be extended to persons who are neither resident in nor citizens of Australia. There is thus at least an argument that to give such persons this statutory right amounts to an extraterritorial operation of the Act, and I shall proceed to consider the matter both on that footing and on the footing that no extraterritorial operation of the Act would be involved in the grant of a right of access to a "non-citizen".

16. In summary, counsel for the respondent offered three reasons for the non-applicability of the FOI Act to the applicant. First, in interpreting s.11 of the Act it was said that the common law presumption against extraterritoriality must be applied with, it was said, the effect that only persons who are resident in or are citizens of Australia are within the scope of the Act. Secondly, s.21(b) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 was said to be applicable, having the same result as the common law presumption. Thirdly, under the terms of the FOI Act, in particular s.3 with its reference to the right of the Australian community to access to official information in the possession of the Government of the Commonwealth, the reference in s.11 to "every person" was intended to be restricted to those persons who are members of the Australian community. While the common law doctrine and that raised by s.21(b) are both rebuttable presumptions where the legislation clearly evinces such an intention, it was said that not only is there no such clear intention but that, on the contrary, there is a clear intention apparent in the Act that the expression "every person" be limited in the way suggested. I turn now to consider the problem in detail.

The Common-Law Presumption Against Extraterritoriality

17. In support of her argument Miss Kenny referred the Tribunal to the case of Ex Parte Iskra; Ex Parte Mercantile Transport Co Pty Limited (1963) 5 FLR 221. In that case the appellant, a Victorian carrying on business as a road haulier, failed to comply with the provisions of the Road Maintenance (Contribution) Act 1958 (NSW) which required persons who drove vehicles in excess of 4 tons (as they then were) on New South Wales roads to submit a daily record of all journeys made in that State. Among the issues considered by the Court was whether the Act imposed an obligation to submit a daily record on persons neither present, resident or carrying on business in New South Wales at the relevant time. In the course of his decision Brereton J said at 237:

"To determine whether the Road Maintenance

(Contribution) Act, 1958, is within power,

therefore, we must study and construe the Act

itself; and in construing it we are not initially

constrained by the consideration that the

legislature cannot by any means create an

extra-territorial offence and must be deemed not to

have intended to do so. The first inquiry is

whether it is an enactment of such a kind as may

legitimately be given the precise extra-territorial

operation which is sought to be given to it. The

next inquiry is whether from the object or subject-

matter or history of the enactment an intention so

to do clearly appears so as to rebut the

presumption raised by the common law canon of

construction, and the third inquiry is whether

under s.17 of the Interpretation Act (1897 (NSW)) a

'contrary intention appears'. I am prepared to

assume that for the purposes of this third inquiry

it is not permissible to look beyond the language

of the Road Maintenance (Contribution) Act."

18. The Tribunal was also referred to the judgments of O'Connor J in The Jumbunna Coal Mine, No Liability & Anor v Victorian Coal Miners' Association (1908) 6 CLR 309 at 363, and of Isaacs J in Morgan v White [1912] HCA 50; (1912) 15 CLR 1. In the latter, Isaacs J said at 13:

"Another relevant consideration, having an

important bearing on the situation is the

well-known doctrine that legislation is primarily

territorial as Lord Halsbury LC said in Cooke v

Charles A. Vogeler Co (1901) AC 102. The meaning

of the doctrine is that unless the language of a

Statute by express words or necessary implication

indicates the contrary, the persons, property, and

events in respect of which Parliament has

legislated are presumed to be limited to those in

the territory over which it has jurisdiction and

for the welfare of which it exercises that

jurisdiction. Now, the jurisdiction of the Imperial

Parliament in the eye of a British Court extends to

all persons on British territory whether foreigners

or not, and to all British subjects whoever they

may be; and in a British Court the meaning of an

Imperial Act will be understood accordingly:"

19. Counsel for the respondent also relied upon a number of cases where the courts have had to deal with the question of the extraterritorial application of legislation giving rights to "persons". The first of these was Jeffreys v Boosey [1854] EngR 816; (1854) 4 HLC 815, 10 ER 681, where the House of Lords held that the rights given by United Kingdom copyright legislation to the author of any book did not extend to foreigners resident in their own country:

"It is clear that the Legislature has no power over

any persons except its own subjects, that is,

persons natural-born subjects, or resident, or

whilst they are within the limits of the Kingdom.

The Legislature can impose no duties except on

them; and when legislating for the benefit of

persons, must, prima facie, be considered to mean

the benefit of those who owe obedience to our laws,

and whose interests the Legislature is under a

correlative obligation to protect." (10 ER at 725)

20. The second was Meyer Heine Pty Limited v China Navigation Co Limited [1966] HCA 11; (1966) 115 CLR 10. This involved the Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906, s.4 of which made it an offence to enter into a contract which was restrictive of trade or which was injurious to Australian industry by means of unfair competition. Section 11 entitled a plaintiff to recover treble the amount of damages which it had suffered as a result of a restrictive or unfair contract. The plaintiff, an Australian company, sought damages from a foreign company for a contract made outside Australia. Section 9 of the Act provided:

"Whoever aids, abets, counsels or procures, or by

act or omission is in any way, directly or

indirectly, knowingly concerned in or privy to -

(a) the commission of any offence against this

Part of this Act; or

(b) the doing of any act outside Australia which

would, if done within Australia, be an offence

against this Part of this Act,

shall be deemed to have committed the offence."

21. The majority of the High Court (Menzies J dissenting) decided that, having regard to s.9 of the Act, there was an implicit intention that s.4 was not intended to apply to contracts made outside Australia. The case however does not provide, either on its facts or by indications in the judgments, much support for the counsel's argument, being concerned as it is with a penal provision.

22. The third authority was Colquhoun v Heddon (1890) 24 QBD 491. That case was concerned with a provision in the Income Tax Act (UK) which allowed for the deduction of a premium on life insurance. The benefit extended to any person who made insurance on his life "in or with any insurance company existing on November 1, 1844, or in or with any insurance company registered pursuant to 7 and 8 Vict. c.110". It was held that a person could not claim the deduction where the insurance contract was with a foreign company. I do not see the case as an example of the compass of a legislative right being restricted by the application of the presumption, as the foreigner in that case was not the person to whom the benefit, if it can be called such, was given but the person the legally recognized existence of whom was determinative of the granting of a benefit to another person. In relation to the presumption, Pollock B said at 497:

"It is clear that Parliament contemplated the

passing of some Act dealing with the registration

of companies. But, apart from that, I am convinced

that when in an English Act of Parliament the words

'any insurance company' are used, those words mean

a company within the United Kingdom and within the

cognizance of English law and legislation. In the

first place the word 'company' in itself denotes -

not a mere firm of persons which in a mercantile

sense might be the same in whatever part of the

world it was established - but an entity, and a

legal entity the validity and effect of which must

depend upon the laws of the country within which

that company is established. Therefore upon all

ordinary principles, it seems to me sufficient to

say that the words 'insurance company' in this

English Act of Parliament mean an insurance company

within the purview of the English legislature, and

therefore within England."

23. From these passages Miss Kenny drew the proposition that there is a presumption that in the absence of a clearly expressed intention to the contrary, general words in a statute, which taken literally would apply to the whole world, are to be read as restricted in their operation to those persons within the territory over which Parliament has jurisdiction and for the welfare of whom it exercises jurisdiction. In the case of a person who is a body corporate the presumption operates to limit the jurisdiction of Parliament to companies within Australia and within the cognizance of Australian law: that is, to a company incorporated pursuant to laws of a State or Territory of the Commonwealth or lawfully carrying on business within the jurisdiction. Where, as in the FOI Act, Parliament creates a right, it is presumed that it has been created only for its own citizens or for persons resident within the jurisdiction and not for a foreigner living in a foreign country.

24. The argument for the applicant gave the presumption a more limited operation and said that in respect of the FOI Act it operates merely to limit its scope to documents held by Australian agencies. Thus it cannot be relied upon by an Australian, even less a foreigner, to obtain access to documents held by agencies in foreign countries. Alternatively, Mr Cullen said, the words "every person" in s.11, taken in the context of the Act, displace the presumption.

25. On my reading of the cited and other cases involving the application of the common law presumption, a difference in approach is taken in those cases where the legislation imposes a duty from the approach taken in those cases where it grants a right. Where legislation imposes a duty, the presumption requires clear words in order for it to be displaced, whereas if legislation confers a right, the presumption may be more easily displaced. Thus Lord Brougham said in Jefferys v Boosey [1854] EngR 816; (1854) 4 HLC 815 at 970:

"Generally we must assume that the legislature

confines its enactments to its own subjects, over

whom it has authority, and to whom it owes a duty

in return for their obedience. Nothing is more

clear than that it may also extend its provisions

to foreigners in certain cases, and may, without

express words, make it appear that such is the

intendment of those provisions. But the

presumption is rather against the extension."

This difference in the force of the presumption extends to other types of legislation. Thus, the presumption will be most difficult to displace in relation to criminal statutes and statutes affecting real and personal property. (e.g. Re Dulles Settlement (1951) Ch 265 at 274; Macleod v Attorney-General for NSW (1891) AC 455). In order to determine whether the presumption has been displaced, one must look to the language and subject-matter of the statute, the nature of the right given and the existence or non-existence of any territorial limitations elsewhere in the statute: Jackson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1920] HCA 27; (1920) 27 CLR 503; Birmingham University and Epsom College v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1938] HCA 57; (1938) 60 CLR 572; Jeffreys v Boosey (infra); Davidsson v Hill (1901) 2 KB 606; Tomalin v Pearson (1909) 2 KB 61; Routledge v Low (1868) LR 3 HC 100.

The statutory presumption against extraterritoriality - Section 21(b) Acts Interpretation Act 1901

26. Section 21(b) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 provides:

"21. In any Act, unless the contrary intention

appears -

(a) ....; and

(b) references to localities jurisdictions and

other matters and things shall be construed as

references to such localities jurisdictions

and other matters and things in and of the

Commonwealth."

27. Miss Kenny submitted that the effect of this section was to reinforce the common law presumption against the extra- territorial operation of Commonwealth statutes. She said that, in the absence of any clear intention to the contrary, s.21(b) applied so that the right of which s.11 of the FOI Act speaks is a right which must be in and of the Commonwealth and there must be an "identification" of the matter, in this case the legal right, with the Commonwealth. In the present case there was said to be no such identification between the right sought for the applicant and the Commonwealth. In support of her contention, Miss Kenny referred me to the decisions of the High Court in Grannall v Kellaway and Sons Pty Limited [1955] HCA 5; (1954) 93 CLR 36 at 52, and Wanganui-Rangitikei Electric Power Board v Australian Mutual Provident Society [1934] HCA 3; (1933) 50 CLR 581 at 607-8 and 612-3.

28. Mr Cullen submitted that s.21(b) is not concerned with imposing geographic limitations upon the conferral of rights but with limitations upon their exercise. Provided that a right is exercised within Australia, the section is not concerned with how widely it otherwise goes. It is significant, he said, that the section refers to localities, jurisdictions and other matters and things, but not to persons. By application of the ejusdem generis rule, he concluded that "persons" are not within the scope of the section.

29. Miss Kenny, in reply, submitted that "a matter or thing" includes a legal duty or right. The present case was said to be analogous to Wanganui v Australian Mutual Provident Society (above) where the High Court held that an "obligation to pay interest", being a matter or thing within the NSW statutory equivalent of s.21(b), was not a matter or thing in or of New South Wales merely because the obligation was to be performed in New South Wales. In this case the right of access does not become a matter or thing in or of the Commonwealth simply because the obligation is to be performed in Australia. Rather, the application of s.21(b) to s.11 leads to the conclusion that s.11 was not intended to confer a right upon foreigners outside the jurisdiction because such a right would not be a matter or thing "in and of the Commonwealth".

30. Section 21(b) of the Acts Interpretation Act appears to me to be no more than a statement of the common law presumption, rather than an imposition of an additional requirement, and the matters to which regard must be had in order to determine whether it has been displaced are the same as for the common law presumption: Vicars v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (New South Wales [1945] HCA 24; (1945) 71 CLR 309 at 345; Grannall v Kellaway and Sons Pty Ltd (above) at 52; Wanganui-Rangitikei Electric Power Board v Australian Mutual Provident Society (above) at 600; Jackson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (above) at 510.

31. Thus, the question whether the common-law statutory presumptions against extraterritoriality have been displaced must ultimately depend upon the terms of the FOI Act themselves. If neither presumption in fact applies, then it is of course those terms, properly construed, that are crucial in any event, and to them I now turn.

The terms of the Freedom of Information Act

32. . Counsel for the respondent contended that it is apparent from the terms of the FOI Act itself that Parliament did not intend to confer a right of access under s.11 upon foreign nationals resident abroad. Reference was made to s.3 of the Act which reads:

"3(1) The object of this Act is to extend as far

as possible the right of the Australian community

to access to information in the possession of the

Government of the Commonwealth by -

(a) making available to the public information

about the operations of departments and public

authorities and, in particular, ensuring that

rules and practices affecting members of the

public in their dealings with departments and

public authorities are readily available to

persons affected by those rules and practices;

and

(b) creating a general right of access to

information in documentary form in the

possession of Ministers, departments and

public authorities, limited only by exceptions

and exemptions necessary for the protection of

essential public interests and the private and

business affairs of persons in respect of whom

information is collected and held by

departments and public authorities.

(2) It is the intention of the Parliament that

the provisions of this Act shall be interpreted so

as to further the object set out in sub-section (1)

and that any discretions conferred by this Act

shall be exercised as far as possible so as to

facilitate and promote, promptly and at the lowest

reasonable cost, the disclosure of information."

33. It was said that on no view could foreign nationals resident abroad be regarded as part of the Australian community and that, moreover, the applicants in the present case had no interest in the Australian community. Section 3 makes clear the object of the Act and s.11 was intended to carry out that object. Miss Kenny submitted that in order to avoid any potential conflict between ss.3 and 11, s.11 had to be read down and confined to residents within the jurisdiction and to Australian citizens. Such a limitation would, it was said, be consistent with the procedural requirements found in ss.19 and 28 of the Act, the relevant parts of which provide:

"19(1) If a request for access to a document that

is made to an agency or Minister -

(a) is made in writing and is expressed to be

made in pursuance of this Act;

(b) specifies an address in Australia at which

notices under this Act may be sent to the

person making the request; and

(c) is sent by post to the agency or Minister,

or delivered to an officer of the agency or

a member of the staff of the Minister, at

the appropriate address in relation to the

agency or the Minister,

the agency or Minister shall take all reasonable

steps to enable the applicant to be notified that

the request has been received, as soon as

practicable but in any case not later than 14 days

after the day on which the request is received by

or on behalf of the agency or Minister, and of a

decision on the request (including a decision under

section 21 to defer the provision of access to a

document) as soon as practicable but in any case

not later than the expiration of the relevant

period after the day on which the request is

received by or on behalf of the agency or

Minister."

"The Minister administering this Act shall cause to

be published, as soon as practicable after the date

of commencement of this Part, but not later than 12

months after that date, a statement setting out the

addresses of such offices of the Government of the

Commonwealth, throughout Australia, as are to be

Information Access Offices for the purposes of this

section."

34. Miss Kenny submitted that the nature of the right given by the Act depends upon the correlative duty imposed upon the agency. Since the duty arises in Australia, applies only to Australian Ministers and agencies, is enforceable only within Australia, and is one in accordance with which access is granted only in Australia, it followed that Parliament intended to confer the benefit of the legislation only upon persons who are Australian citizens or residents. I confess to some difficulty with this last line of argument. It does not seem to me to be sound to determine the types of person who have been given a right by reference to the identity of the bodies upon whom the correlative duty is imposed or to the manner in which, or to the place where, that duty is to be performed.

35. For the applicant, it was said that the only territorial limitation in the Act as properly construed is the requirement that the request for access be received at the appropriate address within Australia and that it specify an address in Australia at which notices under the Act could be sent to the person who made the request. If these requirements are not met there is no duty imposed on the agency to decide whether or not to grant access - see s.19. In other words, the only jurisdictional requirement involved in the FOI Act is that the right be invoked in Australia. This is, Mr Cullen submitted, a matter which goes to the practicability of the exercise of a right rather than to its existence. In reply, Miss Kenny submitted that this itself is indicative of an intention to impose a territorial limit. Mr Cullen submitted that there is nothing in the Act to suggest that its operation is intended to be limited as the respondent claims. Rather, the legislative history and the language of the Act suggest the opposite and he relied upon the following matters to support this contention.

36. First, he said that the US FOI Act, from which the Australian Act drew its inspiration, operates to confer rights on any person no matter where he lives provided a proper request is received within the USA by the appropriate agency. Had it been intended to limit the Australian Act, one would have expected such a limitation to have been placed within s.11 rather than in a general exhortatory statement within s.3. Moreover, a study of the legislative history of s.3 shows no evidence that the use of the words "of the Australian community" was intended to limit the operation of the Act to Australians - rather, s.3 was designed as an exhortation that the Act be construed as liberally as possible. Mr Cullen also pointed out that there had been attempts (see Freedom of Information Report by the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs on FOI Bill 1978, Canberra 1979, p.98 paragraphs 8.4, 8.5) to insert in earlier proposals for an FOI Act a limitation upon the right of access so as to exclude illegal immigrants and temporary residents. Although such persons are not part of "the Australian community", ("the taxpaying Australian community", as the Senate Report understandably referred to it), Parliament had chosen not to accept the proposed limitations, thereby indicating an intention not to place any residential restrictions on the right of access.

37. Secondly, a comparison between ss.11, 15 and 19 was said to show the drawing of a distinction between the creation of the right to obtain access and the invocation of that right. Of these sections, only s.19 introduces a geographic limitation in requiring that a request specify an address in Australia at which notices may be sent. Mr Cullen said that the failure to have similarly placed a geographic restriction in respect of the right in s.11 suggests that no such restriction was intended.

38. Thirdly, he said that s.3 of the Act could not be used to restrict the ordinary meaning of words used elsewhere in the Act. Mr Cullen supported his proposition with the following passage from the decision of Deputy President A.N. Hall in Re Brennan and the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory (1984) 6 ALD 428 at 437-8:

"33. In my view, the applicant is correct in his

submission that the definition of 'prescribed

authority' must be construed according to its

terms. That definition gives substance, for the

purposes of the Freedom of Information Act, to the

less precise expression 'public authorities' used

in s.3(1) of the Act. There is, in my view, no

justification for constraining the construction of

the definition of 'prescribed authority' by any

preconceptions as to what the words 'public

authorities' may have meant if that expression,

undefined, had been used throughout the Act. The

words of the definition must be interpreted

according to their natural meaning, albeit so as to

further the object set out in s.3(1) of the Act.

If, so construed, the words of the definition

encompass bodies that may fall outside the ordinary

ambit of the expression 'public authorities', the

words of the definition must nevertheless be given

their full effect."

In reply, counsel for the respondent submitted that the issue there was whether a specific definition in the Act should operate according to its terms, not, as here, whether or not the Act expresses an intention that a common law presumption or that of s.21(b) of the Acts Interpretation Act should not apply.

39. It was finally submitted for the applicant that Parliament did not intend such a restriction because it realized that it could easily be frustrated by the use of an agent. Mr Cullen noted that one of the hallmarks of the FOI Act is that it does not require a person requesting documents to demonstrate that he has any interest in the matter to which the documents relate or that he has any reason for making the request. The right of access of one individual is the same as that of any other individual, although a person's identity may be relevant in deciding whether a document may be exempt (e.g. ss.41 and 43) or in assessing the balance of the public interest in relation to disclosure. Consequently, where an agent makes a request for documents on behalf of his principal, an agent's individual right of access to those documents is the same as that of a principal, irrespective of whether the department or authority is aware of the arrangement. Assuming that an alien has no right of access under the Act, the independent right of an Australian citizen of access to documents is not lost because there happens to be a relationship of principal and agent between the two. Mr Cullen concluded from this that the imposition of a citizenship or residency requirement in the FOI Act could easily be circumvented by the request being made by an Australian agent.

40. On this last point, Miss Kenny submitted that when an agent makes an application under the Act as agent for a foreign principal abroad, he is not exercising his individual right of access but that of his principal. Since an agent can have no greater right than his principal when he is acting as agent for that principal, it follows that if the principal has no right to obtain access then neither does his agent while he is acting on behalf of his principal. On this point I find myself in agreement with counsel for the respondent and, given the form of the application made in this matter, the access given to Mr Cullen must be dependent upon the right of access of the applicant. However, as I understand Mr Cullen's submission, that is not the whole point. His submission is that an agent may make a request for access qua individual, albeit on an understanding between the agent and principal that whatever is received by the agent be later passed on to the principal. Under such an arrangement, of which the agency or Minister may know nothing, the right of the agent to obtain access is not in any way dependent upon the principal's right to obtain access. As he points out, such use of an agent would effectively overcome any deficiencies in a person's right to obtain access. Although, as Miss Kenny in turn pointed out, the possibility of agency cannot create a right for the foreigner, this failure to prevent an obvious means of circumvention of a putative restriction on the right of access adds doubt as to whether any such restriction was intended.

41. The Act is divided into eight parts. Part III deals with access to documents and it is the first section of that Part, s.11, which gives the right to obtain access:

"11. Subject to this Act, every person has a

legally enforceable right to obtain access in

accordance with this Act to -

(a) a document of an agency, other than an exempt

document; or

(b) an official document of a Minister, other than

an exempt document."

Part IV deals with exempt documents and has 16 sections creating categories of exemption. Part V is entitled Amendment of Personal Records and the first section of that Part, s.48, provides for the making of an application for the amendment of a record of information contained in a document:

"48. Where a person (in this section referred to

as the 'claimant') who is an Australian citizen, or

whose continued presence in Australia is not

subject to any limitation as to time imposed by

law, claims that a document of an agency or an

official document of a Minister to which access has

been provided to the claimant under this Act

contains information relating to his personal

affairs -

(a) that is incomplete, incorrect, out of date or

misleading; and

(b) that has been used, is being used or is

available for use by the agency or Minister

for an administrative purpose,

he may request the agency or Minister to amend the

record of that information kept by the agency or

Minister."

42. Section 48, like s.11, creates a right, namely the right to request that a record of information contained in a document be amended. A claimant having made that request in accordance with the formal requirements of s.49, the relevant agency or Minister has a duty to take all reasonable steps to enable the claimant to be notified of a decision on the request as soon as practicable but in any case not later than 30 days after the day on which the request is received (s.50(3)). In the event of the claimant's request being refused, the relevant agency or Minister is required to give a statement of reasons (ss.50(5) and 26) and the claimant is given rights of review in respect of that decision (s.51 and Part VI). The fundamental difference, however, between the right given by s.11 and that given by s.48, is that the latter is specified to be limited to persons who are Australian citizens or whose continued presence in Australia is not subject to any limitation as to time imposed by law. The legislature has thus drawn a clear distinction in this regard between the right given by s.11 and that given by s.48. It is, I feel, legitimate to infer from the distinction thus drawn in the legislation that a territorial limitation should not be found to have been intended in respect of the right given by s.11, and I place heavy reliance on this in the overall conclusion to which I have come. Section 48 is expressed so as to delimit quite precisely the persons to whom it applies, whereas s.11, the basic dispositive provision in the Act, refers to "every person" etc, a very widely expressed provision.

43. I do not accept Miss Kenny's submission that such an interpretation offends s.3 of the Act, the "Objects" section. I do not read that section as a prescription of the limits of the right of access to documents but rather as a general statement of the object of the Act. In this respect it bears a resemblance to the preamble of an Act and, although preambles are no longer in vogue, the principles which were developed in relation to their use are, I think, not without application to provisions such as s.3. In Southern Centre of Theosophy Inc. v South Australia [1979] HCA 59; (1979) 145 CLR 246 the respondent argued that the purpose of the Judicial Committee Act 1844 (UK), as stated in the preamble, limited the operation of the substantive provisions of the statute. Gibbs J (with whom Barwick CJ, Stephen, Mason, Aickin and Wilson JJ agreed) said, at 258:

"... although a preamble to a statute may be an aid

to interpretation in the event of ambiguity, it

cannot be used to cut down the meaning of enacting

words which are plain and unambiguous."

Moreover, it cannot, I think, be said that disclosure to non-resident foreigners of documents in circumstances such as the present is devoid of benefit to the Australian community. While the immediate object of the FOI Act is that stated in s.3, there are resultant benefits flowing to the Australian community from the attainment of that object. Not the least of these is greater openness, accountability and responsibility, and consequential improvement in the decision-making process. This is a benefit which extends beyond the individual who has made a request to obtain access to documents and one which would appear to have been in mind during the developmental stages of the Act. (See the Senate Report (above) pp.21ff.) Other points to be made about s.3 are that the only words in it capable of being in any way viewed as restrictive in their operation are the words "the Australian community", and that s.3 is essentially a provision aimed at extending rights and not limiting them. An "objects" section of this kind was referred to in the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Secretary, Department of Housing and Construction v Wildman (No.TG3 of 1984, 23 November 1984), where the "objects" section was referred to for the purpose of deciding the ambit of the discretion conferred upon the Secretary to determine the date of a contract having regard, the Court found, to all relevant facts and the object of the Act. In the present case no exercise of discretion is involved, and whereas in that case the objects clause was invoked so as to broaden the natural scope of the legislation, here the respondent's argument involves using one phrase falling within the "objects" section to limit the otherwise expansive effect of that section and also the naturally broad expression of the legislation as found in s.11.

44. Given the nature of s.3 of the FOI Act, I do not think that the principle, relied upon by the respondent, that provisions of general application give way to specific provisions when they are in conflict, has any application in relation to ss.3 and 11.

45. Nor can I accept Miss Kenny's submission that the limitation sought to be placed on s.11 would be consistent with ss.19 and 28. If anything, s.19(1)(b) contemplates that persons not resident in Australia may be making requests under the FOI Act. It may be that this paragraph was inserted for administrative convenience, but I do not think that it can be said to have been intended to limit, or to reflect a limitation, on the persons who could apply under the FOI Act. Indeed, were it so intended, it would exclude, or reflect the exclusion of, Australian citizens not resident within Australia from relying upon the Act, a restriction which the respondent disavowed.

46. In reaching my conclusion on the scope of s.11, I have borne in mind a number of other considerations which, although not determinative in themselves, are consistent with and lend support to the conclusion which I have reached.

47. The first of these considerations is the position in the United States under its Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC SS552. It provides:

"(a) Each agency shall make available to the

public information as follows:

(1) ....

(2) ....

(3) Except with respect to the records made

available under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this

subsection, each agency, upon any request for

records which (A) reasonably describes such

records and (B) is made in accordance with

published rules stating the time, place, fees

(if any), and procedures to be followed, shall

make the records promptly available to any

person."

48. In Neal-Cooper Grain Company v Kissinger 385 F. Supp. 769 (1974), a "reverse FOI" case, the plaintiff sought to prevent the defendant from releasing further documents to the Mexican Government. Although the initial disclosure had been made pursuant to an informal information-exchange agreement made between the Customs Services of the United States and of Mexico, the Court found that the Mexican Government could properly apply under the FOI Act:

"The Court must now decide whether the request

herein, made by or on behalf of the Mexican

Government, may be a request within the purview of

the FOIA. The Act states, in relevant part:

Each agency, on request ... shall make the

records promptly available to any person.

A person is:

An individual, partnership, corporation,

association, or public or private organization

other than an agency. (5 USC SS551(2))

A foreign government or an instrumentality thereof

would appear to be a 'public or private

organization' within the terms of the Act." at p776

Similarly, in Stone v Export-Import Bank of United States [1977] USCA5 917; 552 F.2d 132 (1977) the Court said at 136:

"Nothing in this definition of 'person' suggests an

intention to limit its plain terms to American

individuals and 'public or private'

organization(s)".

In that case it was held that the Bank for Foreign Trade, an agency of the Soviet Union, was a "person" within the meaning of the exemption from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act of the United States relating to commercial or financial information obtained from a person. The case concerned an action to compel the Export-Import Bank of the US to disclose the portion of a consolidated loan agreement setting forth terms of a loan by the Export-Import Bank to the Bank for Foreign Trade. Although the interpretation given to the American FOI Act by the Courts of the United States is not in any way binding upon any Australian court or tribunal, the extensive reference made to the US Act prior to the enactment of the Australian Act and the apparent adoption of a similarly unrestricted right suggests no dissatisfaction by the Australian draftsman with the American approach on this point.

49. The second consideration concerns the "reverse-FOI" provisions of the Australian FOI Act. Section 27 provides:

"27(1) Where -

(a) a request is received by an agency or Minister

in respect of a document containing

information concerning a person in respect of

his business or professional affairs or

concerning the business, commercial or

financial affairs of an organization or

undertaking; and

(b) it appears to the officer or Minister dealing

with the request, or to a person reviewing

under section 54 a decision refusing the

request, that the person or organization, or

the proprietor of the undertaking, referred to

in paragraph (a) might reasonably wish to

contend that the document is an exempt

document under section 43,

a decision to grant access under this Act to the

document, so far as it contains the information

referred to in paragraph (a), shall not be made

unless, where it is reasonably practicable to do so

having regard to all the circumstances, including

the application of section 19 -

(c) the agency or Minister has given to that

person or organization or the proprietor of

that undertaking a reasonable opportunity of

making submissions in support of a contention

that the document is an exempt document under

section 43; and

(d) the person making the decision has had regard

to any submissions so made."

Like s.11, s.27 gives a right, albeit not so far-ranging, to "a person". It is an elementary rule of statutory interpretation that where the same word has been employed more than once in a statute it is intended to have the same meaning throughout unless there is something to suggest otherwise. Were the interpretation submitted by counsel for the respondent in relation to s.11 adopted the application of this rule of statutory interpretation would result in the right given by s.27 not being available to non-resident foreigners. Whether or not this was the intention of the legislature raises the same questions as arise in relation to s.11, but the granting of this right to foreigners is not something which strikes me as inherently objectionable: See Stone v Export-Import Bank (above).

50. The third consideration is the agency argument raised by Mr Cullen. While Miss Kenny's submissions in respect of an agent's rights under the FOI Act are quite correct, it remains true that there is nothing to prevent an agent applying under the Act qua individual and passing on the information received to a non-resident foreigner. Unlike most legislation bestowing rights upon an individual, the benefit so received by the non-resident foreigner would differ little from the benefit that would be received were the agent to exercise that right himself. The failure of Parliament to prevent this circuitous means of enjoying the right suggests that it was not intended to exclude these persons from direct reliance upon the Act.

51. Finally, I have borne in mind two decisions of the Tribunal that have raised questions of the status of an applicant. In one it was held that an applicant, who was a prohibited immigrant and against whom a deportation order had been made, was entitled to request access to documents under the Act: Re Chandra and Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1984] AATA 437; (1984) 6 ALN N257. In the other it was held that s.11 was "without qualification" and a convicted felon still serving his sentence was entitled to apply: Re Ward and Department of Industry and Commerce (No.V83/261, 16 December 1983, unreported). See also Re O'Grady and Australian Federal Police (1983) 5 ALN N420 at N421. It is, in my opinion, but a small step from the approach adopted in those cases to the acceptance of the applicant's primary contention.

The connection between the applicant and the jurisdiction - An Alternative?

52. I made the suggestion at the Directions hearing that there might be an alternative to the approaches pressed upon me by each of the parties. The alternative, suggested by a principle well-known in Private International Law, is that a person may be regarded as a member of the Australian community within s.3 of the FOI Act, and thus entitled to a right to obtain access under the Act, where that person can show a real and substantial connection with Australia. Such a connection would be established by Australian citizenship or residence, but could also be established in other ways. I put it to the parties' representatives that where, as here, a contract had been made for the acquisition of shares and that contract required government approval which eventually proved not to be forthcoming, the disappointed purchaser could be seen as having a real and substantial connection with property in Australia or, alternatively, his business activity gave him an adequate relationship with the Australian community for the purposes of making a request.

53. Counsel for the respondent sought to reject this concept on two grounds. First, she said that the applicant had no special connection with Australia which might entitle it to rely upon the rights given by an Australian statute. All that the applicant had done was to comply with the foreign investment policy of the Government by meeting the requirements of Part II of the Foreign Take-overs Act 1975. Section 26 of that Act requires a person who wishes to acquire shares in an Australian corporation that would result in, increase, or alter, the ownership of a substantial interest in a corporation to notify the Foreign Investment Review Board of that proposal in order that the Board may examine the proposal with a view to granting or not granting approval. It was said that no interest of an applicant is affected by examination of a proposal because it never reaches a point at which it can be said that investment or any other step has been taken which would afford the company an interest in anything happening within the jurisdiction. In short, a submission to the Board is no more than a statement of intent to carry on business within the jurisdiction or to obtain an interest and cannot of itself confer a substantial or sufficient connection between the jurisdiction and the applicant. Secondly, she said that notions of sufficient connection are inapplicable in construing legislation.

54. The applicant's representative submitted that if it were necessary to show that a non-resident alien had a real and substantial connection with the jurisdiction in order to have a right to obtain access, then the applicant met this requirement. The connection arose because the documents concerned the applicant's business and because they involved an application to the Foreign Investment Review Board for permission to do something within Australia.

55. I have come to the conclusion that the test suggested by me is not well-founded. It is based on the proposition that a non-resident alien may, by conduct, be brought within the meaning of the phrase "the Australian community", but that others may not be so brought. Whatever be the precise meaning of that expression, it is not in my opinion of itself wide enough to include such a person. Interestingly enough the expression "the Australian community" has been used in some 15 other Commonwealth legislative provisions, which are listed in a Schedule to these reasons. The context in which each is found appears to make it clear that in none is the phrase used so as to include persons outside Australia. Here, of course, I have concluded that while in the FOI it may well have such a meaning, its presence in s.3 nevertheless does not have the effect of confining the operation of s.11 of the Act.

56. I may add that the following appears on page 18 of "Guidelines to Freedom of Information Act" (1982) published by the Australian Government Publishing Service for the Attorney-General's Department:

"Who May Exercise the Right to Obtain Access

8. The right of access given by section 11 of the

Act is expressed to extend to 'every person'. This

term is, however, to be interpreted in the light of

general presumptions of the law and the statement

of the objects of the Act in section 3 of the Act.

That section provides that it is the object of the

Act 'to extend ... the right of the Australian

community to access to information ...'. The term

'Australian community' is interpreted to include

all persons ordinarily resident in Australia and

Australian citizens resident abroad. Thus,

'person' in the context of section 11 of the Act is

to be understood -

. to include all persons ordinarily resident in

Australia, whether Australian citizens or aliens

and whether or not entitled to permanent

residence in Australia, as well as Australian

citizens resident abroad;

. to include a body corporate, such as a company,

incorporated or registered in Australia;

. to exclude aliens ordinarily resident outside

Australia."

This statement has of course no legislative effect. The difficulty with it is that it spells out in quite specific terms what might quite easily have been, but was not, included in s.11 of the FOI Act. Such specific provision was made in s.48, a fact which I have emphasised in these Reasons.

57. The conclusion to which I have come is in many respects not a comfortable one. Why should Australia confer such benefits on non-resident alien persons or companies? In fact, of course, under the new Regulations it is likely that any such persons will have to pay for the exercise of the right, so that cost alone is not an objection to the conclusion: See Freedom of Information (Charges) Regulations (Amendment) SR 1985 No.113. If the conclusion is however thought to be objectionable in principle, it seems to me that only amendment of the FOI Act will suffice to restrict the scope of s.11, perhaps along the lines of s.48 but including a reference to companies and organisations. The Guidelines cited in paragraph 56 are one model for an amendment. But I have to emphasise that in my opinion it is not possible to evolve a series of criteria such as those in the Guidelines by a process of statutory interpretation. For instance, s.48, which might have been drawn so as to allow an application based on mere existence of a document, in fact accepts lawful presence in Australia as conferring status to apply for amendment of a record. The Guidelines on the other hand suppose for the purposes of s.11 a need for an individual applicant to be ordinarily resident or an Australian citizen. It is one thing to choose between alternative meanings of an ambiguous word or phrase by the use of old and new aids to interpretation. It is quite another matter to redraw a statutory provision, selecting and formulating criteria, any of which might have been included in it but were not.

58. Bearing all of the above in mind, I find that s.11 of the FOI Act provides the applicant in this case with a legally enforceable right to obtain access in accordance with the FOI Act subject to the other provisions of the Act. The application for review will be set down for further hearing accordingly.

SCHEDULE

Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904, s.7

Hospitals and Health Services Commission Act 1973, s.5 (repealed)

Structural Adjustment (Loan Guarantees) Act No.155 of 1974, ss.3, 4

Children's Commission Act No.51 of 1975, s.5

Advisory Council for Inter-Government Relations Act No.106 of 1976, s.8

Commonwealth Employment Service Act No.102 of 1978, s.6

Science and Industry Research Amendment Act No.143 of 1978, ss.6, 7

Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act No.113 of 1979, s.5

Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs Act No.154 of 1979, ss.5, 6

States Grants (Tertiary Education Assistance) Act No.167 of 1981, s.38

Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act No.6 of 1983, ss.6, 11