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[2022] VSCA 267
Court of Appeal (Vic)
2022-12-09
Mr P, Niall JA, Sifris JA, MacAulay JA
Original judgment source is linked above.
SMASH ENTERPRISES PTY LTD (ACN 091 134 708) & ORS (according to the attached Schedule)
[2022] VSCA 267
CONTRACT - Exclusive distributorship agreement - Repudiation - Acceptance - Loss of profit on sale of stock - Leave to appeal refused.
CONTRACT - Exclusive distributorship agreement - Repudiation - Acceptance - Loss of bargain damages - Distributor willing and able to perform but for breaches and repudiatory conduct - Leave to cross-appeal granted - Cross-appeal allowed.
CONSUMER LAW - Unconscionable conduct - Conduct involving dishonesty, bad faith, sharp practice and disregard for contractual terms against conscience and in breach of s 21(1) of the Australian Consumer Law - Leave to appeal granted - Appeal dismissed.
CONSUMER LAW - Unconscionable conduct - Causation and loss - Whether conduct caused loss - Loss directly attributable to conduct - Loss established - Leave to appeal granted - Appeal dismissed.
CONSUMER LAW - Unconscionable conduct - Whether individuals involved in relevant conduct - Individuals involved in conduct and accordingly liable - Leave to appeal granted - Appeal dismissed.
(i) to use its best efforts and diligence to promote the sale and use of, and to stimulate interest in, the Products in the Region; > > (ii) to conduct business in a manner that reflects favourably at all times on the Products and the good name, goodwill and reputation of [Smash]; > > (iii) to avoid deceptive, misleading or unethical practices detrimental to [Smash] or the Products, including, but not limited to, disparagement of [Smash] or the Products;
...
(ix) at all times to maintain an inventory of the Products adequate to serve the needs of customers and potential customers in the Region on a timely basis;
...
During the term of this Agreement, [Euromark] shall not, directly or indirectly, use, import, distribute, sell or manufacture in the Region any product that is identical with or so similar to any of the Products that they could be confused with any of the Products. [Smash] and [Euromark] shall not directly or indirectly employ any employee of the other for a period of up to 24 months after the expiry or termination of this agreement, unless agreed in writing by [Smash] and [Euromark]
1 November 2012 meeting between Smash and Tesco
(a) the objective of the meeting was '[t]o present Smash for BTS ranging 2013, discuss Euromark handover, etc'; > > (b) Tesco stated that 'we [Smash] basically need to sort things out with Euromark, doesn't want to know about it except to be sure she will get supplied'; > > (c) Tesco was 'going to work out how to get us [Smash] set up as a supplier' which could take up to three months and Tesco needed to place orders in the meantime: orders need to be raised now against an existing supplier; > > (d) it was '[u]p to us [Smash] to ensure she is supplied and in the meantime we present and follow up for future business and our own supplier number ... we need to ensure they are supplied up until we have a supplier number and have stock. This will be over the next 2-3 months'; > > (e) Smash would submit its offer for lunch bags, Nude Food Movers and drink bottles for the next year and recommend a range by bestsellers, shapes and age group; > > (f) Smash would send through the whole catalogue but needed to ensure Smash highlighted the best items to make Tesco's decision easy; and > > (g) Smash would print out a presentation and hand them to the buyer by 7 November 2012.8F[9]
(a) '[w]e prefer [EKM] to hold off until we have gone back to the buyer with solutions overnight on stock'; and > > (b) Ms Hill 'said she was confused on who to go to, so now she is likely to give me the supplier forms this week and I have advised her she can talk to me on everything, no need to talk to Euromark now'.13F[14]
(a) Tesco had called that day (in oral evidence, Mr Malone said it was Ms Hill); > > (b) Euromark had refused to supply Tesco with Smash products and had presented alternative items; > > (c) Tesco wanted 1,500 Smash cat bags and 1,500 '3D Ladybird' in the UK by mid-December; > > (d) 'Catch is i [sic] believe we would also need to have the company set up and the EORI number registered in order to bring goods in. According to the accountants this could take 2-4 weeks'; > > (e) Ms Hill was keen on Smash for 'SS13 and BTS'; > > (f) Mr Malone would meet Ms Hill next week to discuss the presentations sent 'yesterday'; and > > (g) the new supplier forms were being sent to Smash ASAP 'which is great news'.15F[16]
20 November 2012 meeting between Smash and Tesco
21 and 28 November 2012 presentations by Smash to Tesco
Even if I am wrong in my view that Tesco's decision had been made and that Smash had been informed of it in unequivocal terms prior to the December 2012 letters, I am satisfied that, at the very least, Smash firmly believed that Tesco would be unwilling to conduct business with Euromark other than in the interim term, and there was no real prospect that Tesco would change its mind.39F[40]
(a) in 2012, without informing Euromark, planning to supply Smash products to retailers in the UK from late 2012, either directly or through a Smash branch to be established in the UK, and taking active steps to develop and implement that plan (the 'Planning Conduct'); > > (b) wrongfully purporting to terminate the Agreement in October 2012; and > > (c) the Solicitation Conduct.
(a) on or about 3 December 2012, Smash represented to Euromark that Smash was performing and intended to be bound by the Agreement, including by a letter from Smash's solicitors to Euromark dated 3 December 2012; and > > (b) on or about 11 December 2012, Smash represented to Euromark that Smash was performing and intended to be bound by the Agreement, including by a letter from Smash's solicitors to Euromark dated 11 December 2012,
(a) That Smash was liable for loss of profits in relation to the Tesco stock. Proposed grounds of appeal (a) and (b) relate to and challenge this finding. > > (b) That Smash was liable for loss of profits in relation to the Wilkinsons stock. Proposed grounds of appeal (c) and (d) relate to and challenge this finding.
(a) That the conduct engaged in by Smash and Mr Harbinson was unconscionable. Proposed grounds of appeal (e), (f), (g) and (h) relate to and challenge this finding.40F[41] > > (b) That the unconscionable conduct caused loss. Proposed grounds of appeal (k), (l) and (m) relate to and challenge this finding. > > (c) That the evidence, including expert evidence, established such loss in the sum of £640,000. Proposed grounds of appeal (n) and (o) relate to and challenge this finding. > > (d) That Mr Malone was a person involved in such conduct. Proposed grounds of appeal (i) and (j) relate to and challenge this finding.
(a) That the withdrawal on 3 December 2012 of the purported termination constituted an affirmation of the Agreement (grounds 1‑-5). > > (b) That the Zoom products promoted by Euromark were: (i) confusingly similar to Smash products so as to constitute a breach of cl 11 of the Agreement (grounds 5-12); and (ii) not offered because of uncertainty associated with Smash supply of such products (grounds 15-16). > > (c) That the obligations on the part of Euromark were not dispensed with prior to 3 December 2012 (grounds 13-14).
The approach by an appellate court to the appeal
(a) Overstating Smash's motivation, conduct and strategy. > > (b) Failure to take into account relevant aspects of Smash's motivation and conduct. > > (c) Failure to take into account Euromark's conduct. > > (d) Failure to take into account the uncertain landscape during December and in particular from 10 December 2012, especially in relation to Tesco.
A court of appeal conducting an appeal by way of rehearing is bound to conduct a 'real review' of the evidence given at first instance and of the judge's reasons for judgment to determine whether the judge has erred in fact or law. If the court of appeal concludes that the judge has erred in fact, it is required to make its own findings of fact and to formulate its own reasoning based on those findings. But a court of appeal should not interfere with a judge's findings of fact unless they are demonstrated to be wrong by 'incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony', or they are 'glaringly improbable' or 'contrary to compelling inferences'.44F[45]
A court of appeal is bound to conduct a 'real review' of the evidence given at first instance and of the judge's reasons for judgment to determine whether the trial judge has erred in fact or law. Appellate restraint with respect to interference with a trial judge's findings unless they are 'glaringly improbable' or 'contrary to compelling inferences' is as to factual findings which are likely to have been affected by impressions about the credibility and reliability of witnesses formed by the trial judge as a result of seeing and hearing them give their evidence. It includes findings of secondary facts which are based on a combination of these impressions and other inferences from primary facts. Thereafter, 'in general an appellate court is in as good a position as the trial judge to decide on the proper inference to be drawn from facts which are undisputed or which, having been disputed, are established by the findings of the trial judge'.45F[46]
In determining an appeal from a decision involving an evaluative process such as the present, an appellate court should be careful to distinguish between findings of error and disagreements in evaluation. As noted by Perram J in Aldi Foods Pty Ltd v Moroccanoil Israel Ltd [2018] FCAFC 93; 261 FCR 301 (Allsop CJ and Markovic J agreeing):
- ...[The court] must be guided not by whether it disagrees with the finding (which would be decisive were a question of law involved) but by whether it detects error in the finding. On the one hand, error may appear syllogistically where it is apparent that the conclusion which has been reached has involved some false step; for example, where some relevant matter has been overlooked or some extraneous consideration taken into account which ought not to have been. But error, on the other hand, may also appear without any such explicitly erroneous reasoning. The result may be such as simply to bespeak error. Allsop J said in such cases an error may be manifest where the appellate court has a sufficiently clear difference of opinion: Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424; [2001] FCA 1833 at [29].
- There may seem an element of circularity in this, but the sufficiently clear difference of opinion bespeaks not merely that the appellate court has a different view to the trial judge but that the trial judge's view is wrong even having regard to the advantages enjoyed by the trial judge and even given the subject matter: Branir at [24].
There was limited oral evidence about this claim from Mr Harrison, in particular, he did not give evidence as to the reason why Tesco would not agree to accept delivery of all of the stock which had been ordered. However, based on the documentary evidence referred to in section 12.2 above and, in particular, at [738], and the time at which Tesco's unwillingness to agree to accept delivery took place in light of the dealings between Smash, Euromark and Tesco, I infer that Tesco's unwillingness to take part of the stock it had ordered was a result of Smash's purported termination of the Agreement and/or its failure to guarantee ongoing supply of Smash products, i.e. to provide the requested undertakings. Both were clear breaches of the Agreement.49F[50]
On the evidence before me, I am satisfied that Wilkinsons cancelled an order for Smash products from Euromark in late October 2012 in light of Smash's purported termination of the Agreement and consequent failure to guarantee ongoing supply of Smash products, i.e. to provide the requested undertakings. I refer to my findings at [484]-[486] above. Both were clear breaches of the Agreement.51F[52]
In light of my conclusions in respect of Issues 1 to 15, it is not necessary for me to determine Issue 26. I do not intend to do so.53F[54]
I have formed the view that the obligation to comply with each of cl 11 and cl 7.2(i) were dependent upon and concurrent with Smash's obligations under the Agreement, in particular, to supply Smash products to Euromark in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. This conclusion is easy to reach in the case of cl 7.2(i). Euromark's obligation under cl 7.2(i) to use its best endeavours to promote the sale of Smash products in the Region was clearly dependent upon Smash's obligation and willingness to supply Smash products to Euromark in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. For the avoidance of doubt, I consider that Euromark was dispensed from its obligation to use its best efforts to sell Smash products during the period between 26 October 2012 and 3 December 2012, when Smash maintained that the Agreement had been terminated and refused to undertake to accept orders received from Euromark and supply Smash products.
As to cl 11, on balance, I have also formed the view that Euromark's obligation to comply with this clause was also dependent upon Smash's obligation to supply Smash products to Euromark in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. I am conscious that the obligation in cl 11 is different from the best efforts obligation in cl 7.2(i). However, cl 11 restricts Euromark's ability, relevantly, to offer for sale or sell products which could be confusingly similar with Smash Products during the term of the Agreement. However, that obligation was granted in return for, and in my view an integral part of, Smash's obligation to supply Smash products to Euromark under the Agreement. As a result, I have concluded that Euromark's obligations under cl 11 were dependent upon and concurrent with Smash's obligation to supply Smash products to Euromark in accordance with the terms of the Agreement.
Further, on the evidence before me, I have concluded that Euromark's conduct from 26 October 2012 to 3 December 2012 in seeking to offer alternative products to Tesco and Wilkinsons, was made in reliance upon Smash's purported termination of the Agreement and failure to give the requested undertakings. In this regard, I accept the evidence of Mr Harrison that the products offered to these UK retailers were offered as alternative products, given that Euromark had no assurance of the continued supply of Smash products in light of the purported termination. I refer to my findings at [541] above.
As a consequence, I have concluded that the conduct of Smash during the period 26 October to 3 December 2012 results in Euromark being dispensed of any requirement to comply with cls 11 and 7.2(i) of the Agreement. Further, and as a consequence, I have concluded that the time at which Euromark's readiness and willingness is to be assessed, is from the period 3 December 2012 (when Smash withdrew its purported termination and advised of its intention to comply with its obligations under the Agreement) until 23 December 2012 (when Euromark terminated the Agreement).
As a result of this conclusion, it is not necessary to determine whether Euromark breached cl 11 or cl 7.2(i) of the Agreement between 26 October 2012 and 3 December 2012. However, in the event that I am wrong that Euromark's obligations under cl 11 were dependent upon and concurrent with Smash's obligation to supply Smash products to Euromark in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, for the reasons set out in sections 18.5 and 18.6 above, I do not consider that Euromark has breached cl 11 of the Agreement in its dealings with Tesco and Wilkinsons between 26 October 2012 and 3 December 2012.
It is now necessary to consider whether Euromark breached cl 11 and/or cl 7.2(i) between 3 December 2012 and 23 December 2012, when Euromark terminated the Agreement.
...
As is evident from section 11.6 above, Euromark took a number of steps after 3 December 2012 in order to secure orders of Euromark products to Wilkinsons as alternatives to Smash products. This included:
(1) the receipt of the Proforma Invoice dated 13 December 2012;
(2) the email exchange between Euromark and J&P dated 17 December 2012, attaching images of the Panda bag, the Tiger bag, the New Owl bag and the Butterfly bag. It also attached the image of a cat[']s face for a Cat bag; and
(3) the email from Ms Menezes to Wilkinsons dated 18 December 2012, which recorded that red seal samples were due to arrive 'yesterday' but would not now be expected until 19 December 2012.
...
For the reasons set out in section 18.6 above, I am not satisfied on the basis of the evidence before me that the products attached to the 17 December 2012 email were so similar to Smash [p]roducts so as to meet the similarity requirement in cl 11.
However, it is significant that there is no evidence before me that Euromark attempted to sell any Smash products to Wilkinsons during this period from 3 December to 23 December 2012, when it was still seeking to secure orders from Wilkinsons by designing Euromark products and offering those products to Wilkinsons. In my view, that is a breach of Euromark's obligation in cl 7.2(i) to use its best efforts and diligence to promote the sale of Smash products in the Region. As set out at [1120] above, while I consider that Euromark is at liberty to offer for sale products which may seem similar to Smash products but which do not contravene cl 11, cl 7.2(i) provides that nevertheless Euromark must use its best efforts to facilitate the sale of Smash products.
Given that I have formed the view that cl 7.2(i) is an essential term, I have therefore concluded that, at the time of Euromark's termination of the Agreement on 23 December 2012, Euromark was not ready, willing and able to perform its obligations under the Agreement.
It might be thought that this conclusion is odd or perverse given the apparent breakdown of the relationship between Euromark and Smash by this time, and my finding that the 3 December 2012 letter did not operate as a full retraction of Smash's breaches of the Agreement to that time. However, by the 3 December 2012 letter, Smash withdrew any intimation that it would not comply with the Agreement by refusing to guarantee supply. To the contrary, Smash stated its intention that it would comply with the terms of the Agreement, including to supply goods to Euromark. Euromark did not terminate the Agreement at that time. Rather, it waited until 23 December 2012. In this context, I have concluded that Smash's breaches of the Agreement after 3 December 2012 which I have found are not relevant to this issue. That is to say, they do not constitute a relevant intimation of non-performance relied upon by Euromark, which might give rise to a dispensation of the willingness requirement in respect of Euromark's obligation under cl 7.2(i) to promote Smash products relevantly to Wilkinsons.
As a result, in my view, during this period between 3 December and 23 December 2012 while the Agreement remained on foot, Euromark was obliged to comply with the essential terms of the Agreement, including cl 7.2(i). It did not do so. In these circumstances, I am compelled to the conclusion that it was not ready, willing and able to comply with its obligations under the Agreement at the time of termination on 23 December 2012. The consequence is that Euromark is not entitled to make a claim for contractual damages for expectation loss or loss of bargain.56F[57]
(a) On the same day that EKM sent Euromark the 3 December 2012 letter withdrawing the Termination letter, Mr Malone emailed a logistics supplier to set up direct supply to Tesco - at this point, as the judge found, Smash's professed intention to be bound by the Agreement was untrue and, in fact, it intended to continue to pursue Euromark's customers;59F[60] > > (b) EKM did not send the 10 December 2012 letters to retailers until 12 December 2012 when Euromark reported that Tesco had not received one, reasonably confirming existing cynicism and suspicion about Smash's true intentions;60F[61] > > (c) After EKM's 11 December 2012 letter to Euromark confirming the withdrawal of the Termination letter, Smash (through Mr Malone) in fact continued to deal directly with Tesco and Sainsbury's about pricing, took steps to set up facilities to enable direct supply to Tesco and drafted an email for Tesco to inform Euromark it would deal directly with Smash; > > (d) As of 12 December 2012, Euromark knew that EKM's letters changed nothing so far as Tesco was concerned, and it took the view that Smash 'materially and repeatedly abused the terms of that [A]greement, and it continues to do so', whilst still stating to Smash that it would continue to comply with the terms of the Agreement 'so long as it remained in force';61F[62] > > (e) Smash proposed to pay Euromark a percentage of sales Smash made directly with retailers, in substitution for Euromark making the sales itself; and > > (f) Smash continued to fail to supply product which Euromark had previously ordered.
(a) First, as found by the judge, there was no restriction on Euromark promoting similar products provided they were not confusingly so. > > (b) Second, as found by the judge, the Zoom products were not confusingly similar. Having compared the products for ourselves, we are not persuaded that the judge was in error. > > (c) Third, from 26 October 2012, the date of the Termination letter, supply by Smash could not be guaranteed and Euromark was entitled to endeavour to keep its retailers satisfied by promoting its own - not confusingly similar - range. The judge said: > > * I have difficulty accepting all his evidence about these issues. I have concluded that Euromark was seeking to sell Zoom bags at this time or bags based on the work done in respect of the development of the Zoom products set out in section 8. However, I have formed the view that the reason why Euromark offered these products to Tesco at this time was because of Smash'[s] purported termination and Smash's failure to give the requested undertakings, in particular, for future supply for new orders. As a result, I generally accept the evidence of Mr Harrison that these products were being offered as an alternative to Smash products.62F[63] > > (d) Fourth, Euromark's position was not affected by the withdrawal of the Termination letter, for the reasons set out. > > (e) Fifth, the promotion by Euromark of its Zoom range earlier in 2012 does not affect the position.
A person must not, in trade or commerce, in connection with:
(a) the supply or possible supply of goods or services to a person; or
(b) the acquisition or possible acquisition of goods or services from a person;
engage in conduct that is, in all the circumstances, unconscionable.
Without limiting the matters to which the court may have regard for the purpose of determining whether a person (the supplier) has contravened section 21 in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods or services to a person (the customer), the court may have regard to:
(a) the relative strengths of the bargaining positions of the supplier and the customer; and
(b) whether, as a result of conduct engaged in by the supplier, the customer was required to comply with conditions that were not reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of the supplier; and
(c) whether the customer was able to understand any documents relating to the supply or possible supply of the goods or services; and
(d) whether any undue influence or pressure was exerted on, or any unfair tactics were used against, the customer or a person acting on behalf of the customer by the supplier or a person acting on behalf of the supplier in relation to the supply or possible supply of the goods or services; and
(e) the amount for which, and the circumstances under which, the customer could have acquired identical or equivalent goods or services from a person other than the supplier; and
(f) the extent to which the supplier's conduct towards the customer was consistent with the supplier's conduct in similar transactions between the supplier and other like customers; and
(g) the requirements of any applicable industry code; and
(h) the requirements of any other industry code, if the customer acted on the reasonable belief that the supplier would comply with that code; and
(i) the extent to which the supplier unreasonably failed to disclose to the customer:
(i) any intended conduct of the supplier that might affect the interests of the customer; and
(ii) any risks to the customer arising from the supplier's intended conduct (being risks that the supplier should have foreseen would not be apparent to the customer); and
(j) if there is a contract between the supplier and the customer for the supply of the goods or services:
(i) the extent to which the supplier was willing to negotiate the terms and conditions of the contract with the customer; and
(ii) the terms and conditions of the contract; and
(iii) the conduct of the supplier and the customer in complying with the terms and conditions of the contract; and
(iv) any conduct that the supplier or the customer engaged in, in connection with their commercial relationship, after they entered into the contract; and
(k) without limiting paragraph (j), whether the supplier has a contractual right to vary unilaterally a term or condition of a contract between the supplier and the customer for the supply of the goods or services; and
(l) the extent to which the supplier and the customer acted in good faith.
The working through of what a modern Australian commercial, business or trade conscience contains and requires, in both consumer and business contexts, will take its inspiration and formative direction from the nation's legal heritage in Equity and the common law, and from modern social and commercial legal values identified by Australian Parliaments and courts. The evaluation of conduct will be made by the judicial technique referred to in Jenyns. It does not involve personal intuitive assertion. It is an evaluation which must be reasoned and enunciated by reference to the values and norms recognised by the text, structure and context of the legislation, and made against an assessment of all connected circumstances. The evaluation includes a recognition of the deep and abiding requirement of honesty in behaviour; a rejection of trickery or sharp practice; fairness when dealing with consumers; the central importance of the faithful performance of bargains and promises freely made; the protection of those whose vulnerability as to the protection of their own interests places them in a position that calls for a just legal system to respond for their protection, especially from those who would victimise, predate or take advantage; a recognition that inequality of bargaining power can (but not always) be used in a way that is contrary to fair dealing or conscience; the importance of a reasonable degree of certainty in commercial transactions; the reversibility of enrichments unjustly received; the importance of behaviour in a business and consumer context that exhibits good faith and fair dealing; and the conduct of an equitable and certain judicial system that is not a harbour for idiosyncratic or personal moral judgment and exercise of power and discretion based thereon.
...
In any given case, the conclusion as to what is, or is not, against conscience may be contestable. That is inevitable given that the standard is based on a broad expression of values and norms. Thus, any agonised search for definition, for distilled epitomes or for shorthands of broad social norms and general principles will lead to disappointment, to a sense of futility, and to the likelihood of error. The evaluation is not a process of deductive reasoning predicated upon the presence or absence of fixed elements or fixed rules. It is an evaluation of business behaviour (conduct in trade or commerce) as to whether it warrants the characterisation of unconscionable, in the light of the values and norms recognised by the statute.64F[65]
Predation on vulnerability, taking advantage of disability or disadvantage and victimisation may be found in business, as in other fields of human life. Such behaviour does not, however, exhaust the meaning of against conscience. The kinds of consideration in s 22 and the kinds of circumstance to which the Chief Justice referred in Paciocco 236 FCR 199 at [296]-[298] are apt to inform evaluations about business standards that the courts are required by Parliament to make. They may be contestable judgments; they may be by reference to a standard that is not definable; but they are evaluative judgments that Parliament commands be made. That they are the subject of a civil penalty requires that the boundary of impugned conduct be reasonably known to the subject. This last factor reinforces the proposition that it is no light matter, indeed it is a serious matter, to have one's conduct impugned as against or as offending conscience. Business people understand such things, as do ordinary people. They need no definition to assist them. 'Unconscionable' is the language of business morality and unconscionable conduct is referable to considerations expressed and recognised by the statute. The word is not limited to one kind of conduct that is against or offends conscience. Surely to predate on vulnerable consumers or small business people is unconscionable. But why is it not also unconscionable to act in a way that is systematically dishonest, entirely in bad faith in undermining a bargain, involving misrepresentation, commercial bullying or pressure and sharp practice, using a superior bargaining position, behaving contrary to an industry code, using significant market power in a way to extract an undisclosed benefit that will harm others who are commercially related to the counterparty? The proposition that such conduct (not all of which might be seen to be present here) is not unconscionable by an Australian statutory business standard of conscience because the counterparty to the business transaction suffered from no relevant pre-existing disadvantage, disability or vulnerability (other than, perhaps, having a decent degree of trust and faith in its business counterparty's honesty and good faith) is difficult to accept, unless one posits a narrow defined meaning of 'unconscionable' that remains hinged in some way to the structural form of the equitable doctrine as expressed in cases such as Kakavas [2013] HCA 25; 250 CLR 392 at [161]. The history, text and structure of the Act is contrary to such a conclusion. It is not to be derived from the meaning of the word 'unconscionable'.65F[66]
In the present case, it is necessary to apply these principles in respect of my findings in these reasons. Relevantly, I have concluded that:
(1) Smash engaged in the Solicitation Conduct until 3 December 2012 without informing Euromark;
(2) after 3 December 2012, Smash continued to take steps to distribute Smash products to Tesco and Sainsbury's by seeking to secure the direct supply of Smash products to them without informing or consulting Euromark, including by soliciting or encouraging them to place orders for direct supply; and
(3) Smash made the Affirmation Representations by sending the December 2012 letters, which were false and misleading.
There are a number of factors to take into account in relation to these findings relevant to the determination of Issue 24.
First, I have concluded that Smash decided to unilaterally terminate the Agreement from about mid-October 2012. It knew on 22 October 2012 that Euromark did not agree to a mutual termination of the Agreement. It nevertheless sent the 26 October 2012 letter purporting to terminate the Agreement unilaterally. I refer to my comments at [446]-[449] above. In these circumstances, I have concluded that Smash purported to terminate the Agreement without regard to Euromark's contractual rights.
Second, and related to the first point, Smash's purported termination was not withdrawn until 3 December 2012. While the 11 December 2012 letter stated that Smash believed that it was 'legally able to terminate the Agreement' in October 2012, the basis for that belief was not made plain in that letter or in the evidence before me. Further, as set out at [450]-[451] above, I have concluded that a motivating factor in Smash's purported termination was that Smash thought it could make more money from its own direct sales of Smash products in the UK.
Third, and as a consequence of the purported termination, Smash asserted to Euromark's customers from late October 2012 that its Agreement and relationship with Euromark was at end. This gave Smash the opportunity to encourage or procure them to deal directly with Smash, i.e. to engage in the Solicitation Conduct. Smash continued to do so at least until the 3 December 2012 letter. Smash did so notwithstanding the requested undertakings until at least 3 December 2012.
Fourth, there is the nature and extent of the direct contact with Euromark's UK customers. That contact was extensive. I refer to sections 10.2, 10.4, 10.6, 10.9 and 15.2.1 above. As summarised in section 15.2.1, Smash contacted many UK customers of Euromark during the period to 3 December 2012, including Tesco, ASDA, Sainsbury's, Wilkinsons, Morrisons and others, asserting that the relationship with Euromark was at an end and took steps to secure direct supply from them.
In particular, Smash pursued Tesco. Tesco was, to Smash's knowledge, the major customer at the time of both Euromark and of Smash products in the UK. Indeed, the significance of the Tesco account to Smash is evident from the number and nature of the communications between Smash and Tesco in late October and November 2012. I refer by way of example to the preparation and provision of the three November 2012 presentations provided by Smash to Tesco in November 2012. This is quite apart from the internal Smash communications during this period seeking to secure the supply of products directly to Tesco. In addition, there was the desire of Smash to obtain the new supplier form details from Tesco and related information to become a direct supplier to Tesco.
Fifth, Smash did inform Euromark in late October 2012 that it would be 'taking steps to make our own appointments with customers' in light of its purported termination. Indeed, in his 29 October 2012 email referred to at [457]-[458] above, Mr Harbinson made plain that, regardless how the Agreement was to be terminated, Smash would be contacting customers direct and that 'Euromark can no longer sell the Smash or related Brands'.
However, Smash did not disclose the nature and extent of its direct contacts to Euromark in November 2012, or at the time of the December 2012 letters when it withdrew its purported termination of the Agreement (including its dealings at that time with Tesco and Sainsbury's as set out at [893]-[894]). Further, as set out in section 15.2.2, I have formed the viewed that, as a result of the dealings between Smash and Tesco in November 2012, Smash was informed of Tesco's decision before the December 2012 letters were sent, and most likely by mid-November 2012. Indeed, as set out at [906] above, I have formed the view that Smash's withdrawal of its purported termination was likely to have been a result of Tesco's decision. On the evidence before me, the failure to disclose the nature and extent of these contacts was a deliberate and conscious decision on the part of Smash. I refer to my comments at [1049] and [1053] above.
Sixth, and related to the fifth point, by the December 2012 letters, Smash conveyed that it was performing and intended to be bound by the Agreement. For the reasons set out at [1287], to the knowledge of Smash that was false. Further, by the 11 December 2012 letter, Smash enclosed the 10 December 2012 customer letters (including to Tesco) and noted, consistent with the Affirmation Representations, that the 10 December 2012 customer letters 'confirms that Euromark remains the exclusive UK distributor of Smash products' and that those customers were directed 'to ensure that future orders of Smash products are placed directly with Euromark'. I have concluded that these statements, relevantly in the context of the 10 December 2012 customer letter to Tesco, conveyed that Tesco would continue to place orders with Euromark. To Smash's knowledge, based on Tesco's decision, that was not true or at the very least was deliberately misleading.
Even if Smash was not informed of Tesco's decision in unequivocal terms by this time, Smash firmly believed before sending the December 2012 letters that Tesco would be unwilling to conduct business with Euromark and there was no real prospect that Tesco would change its mind. Nevertheless, Smash sent the December 2012 letters without disclosing this belief or the full nature and extent of its direct contacts with Euromark's customers (including Tesco and Sainsbury's) up to the time those letters were sent.
Seventh, Smash was aware of the consequence and impact of Smash making direct approaches to UK retail accounts and, in particular, Euromark customers. As Mr Harbinson conceded, Smash's conduct put Euromark in an impossible situation where it could not arrange Smash sales for the 2013 BTS season. Further, he conceded that direct approaches would have the effect of cementing Smash's relationship with UK retailers so that there was no way for Euromark to recover. I refer to [459]-[460] and [958]-[959] above. Indeed, I have concluded that this result was the intended consequence of Smash's conduct. Further, and in any event, it was a foreseeable consequence of that conduct.
Of course, the intended consequence in fact materialised, at least in the case of Tesco and Sainsbury's.
The conduct of Smash that I have referred to in this section in contacting customers directly from late October to 3 December 2012, and after 3 December 2012 in the case of Tesco, is also conduct which constituted a breach of cl 3.1 and/or the good faith obligation in cl 8.2 of the Agreement. I refer to section 16.3 above.
In all these circumstances, I have formed the view that Smash engaged in unconscionable conduct within s 21 of the ACL. In short, I consider the conduct of Smash was against conscience: it was 'far outside societal norms of acceptable commercial behaviour as to warrant condemnation as conduct that is offensive to conscience'.
This is because both the purported termination and the plan for direct contact by means of the Solicitation Conduct was undertaken intentionally and without regard to Euromark's rights. This conduct was undertaken with the intended consequence that the customers Smash had contacted directly would not return to Euromark. It was deliberately not disclosed by Smash to Euromark at the time.
Further, when Smash withdrew its purported termination, it failed to disclose the full nature and extent of its direct dealings with Euromark's customers, in particular Tesco's decision. I have concluded that it did so deliberately, consistent with its attitude since late October 2012. Further, and in this context, Smash sent the 11 December 2012 letter attaching the 10 December 2012 customer letters which, at least in the case of Tesco, conveyed that Tesco would continue to place orders with Euromark. To Smash's knowledge, based on Tesco's decision, that was not true or at the very least was deliberately misleading.
I wish to emphasise the significant disadvantage under which Euromark was labouring during this period because Smash did not disclose the full nature and extent of Smash's dealing with its customers, coupled with representations that Smash would perform its obligations under the Agreement and that it was directing Euromark's customers to order direct from Smash. I acknowledge that it is not generally unconscionable for a party not to disclose the full extent of its breaches of contract. However, it is a different matter when there is non-disclosure of key matters and positive statements are made regarding present or future conduct under the contract which are knowingly false or deliberately misleading. In this case, Smash's conduct deliberately affected Euromark's ability to make informed decisions about its contractual rights.
In my view, this conduct was not consistent with the requirements of honest and fair dealing: it was unethical and fell outside societal norms of acceptable commercial behaviour.
Further, I have concluded that Smash's conduct after the 11 December 2012 letter was sent, in failing to disclose the full nature and extent of its continued dealings with Tesco and Sainsbury's, was also not consistent with the requirements of honest and fair dealing. For the reasons set out at [1288], I consider it is appropriate to have regard to Smash's dealings with Sainsbury's in my consideration of whether Smash contravened s 21 of the ACL notwithstanding that I have found this conduct not to be in breach of the Agreement. In this regard, I have concluded that Smash continued to contact Tesco and Sainsbury's, taking steps to secure orders for Smash products directly from Smash without informing Euromark, including by offering an indemnity to each of Tesco and Sainsbury's. I refer to my comments in section 15.2.2 above, in particular at [893]-[894]. This conduct is particularly egregious in light of the Affirmation Representations in the December 2012 letters.66F[67]
Guys, unless you disagree with any of the above, we need to launch.
Mr Kursidim replied b[y] email stating only '100% agree'. Mr Harbinson gave evidence that each of the Smash directors endorsed this strategy and by this time Smash no longer planned to use Euromark in the UK and planned to meet retailers to establish direct supply relationships.
By contrast, Mr Harrington gave evidence that it was not his intention that Smash would contact retailers directly at this time in breach of the Agreement. I do not accept that evidence. It is inconsistent with the evidence of Mr Harbinson. In my view, at this time Smash had determined upon a strategy that Dale Harbinson and Mr Malone would meet UK retailers directly to arrange direct supply. This is evident from Mr Harrington's 12 October 2012 email set out above. Mr Harrington said he could not recall if it was not part of his three point plan to inform Euromark of the approaches to customers set out in the first two points of his plan. As I set out below, the details of Smash's direct contacts with UK retailers was not made known to Euromark. In my view, Mr Harrington's 12 October 2012 email and the strategy agreed upon by the Smash directors is consistent with a plan within Smash at this time to cease using Euromark as its distributor in the UK, and to meet retailers to establish direct supply relationships without informing Euromark.
Mr Malone replied by email dated 15 October 2012. He stated that he was in complete agreement with Mr Harrington's email. He requested details of Dale Harbinson's dates in order to try and lock in meetings. He stated 'I think it is best for us to deal directly with the retailers now. There are not that many carrying Smash now anyway, so the changeover should not be a huge process, we just need them to agree'. He concluded:
- Regardless of this BTS size, doing this means no turning back.
- I'm ready to hit the phones as soon as you guys give the green light!67F[68]
Mr Malone gave evidence that he did not tell Euromark that he was contacting retailers. Mr Harbinson said that it was agreed at about this time to no longer use Euromark and that Mr Malone would meet directly with UK retailers. He said that Mr Malone would try and get their business but it was up to each customer. It was put to him that the customer would choose Smash because it is cheaper for a customer to deal directly with the supplier rather than though a middle man like a distributor. Mr Harbinson did not agree: it depended on whether the price offered by Smash matched the landed cost.
Mr Harbinson gave evidence that the decision to no longer use Euromark and for Mr Malone to contact UK retailers direct was deliberately not disclosed to Euromark at the time. He gave evidence that he only wanted to inform Euromark after the direct approaches had been made to UK retailers 'to get the information we needed'. In my view, the purpose of the approaches was to secure direct contracts with UK retailers then Smash would present that to Euromark as a fait accompli.
By contrast, Mr Harrington gave evidence that it was not Smash's intention to contact retailers directly in breach of the Agreement at this time. He also denied that Smash was making preparations to supply goods directly to customers at this time, notwithstanding Smash's requests for retailers standard form documentation for domestic supply. He said it might be necessary if Smash wanted to go through another distributor. I found this evidence implausible and I do not accept it.68F[69]
(a) he would not call Mr Harrison that night as Mr Harrington was out, but he would call Mr Harrison on Monday night 22 October 2012 Australian time; > > (b) two orders had been placed by Euromark due for shipment on 30 November 2012, and if Mr Harrington's conversation with Mr Harrison did not go well 'we may need to think about taking delivery of these shipments ourselves'; > > (c) he had re-checked the Agreement and was confident Smash had fulfilled its obligations. However, if Mr Harrison 'wants to play hard ball and does not agree to terminating by mutual consent, we can give him immediate notice as per [cl 14] ... referring to when he contacted one of our factories'; > > (d) he could also refer to Euromark 'offering customers his "generic" alternatives of Smash products as being a breach of the non-competition requirements' in cl 11 of the Agreement; and > > (e) he had checked the Agreement to confirm that it was subject to Australian law and Euromark would need Australian lawyers and Mr Harrington was 'confident that he will not go down this path'.69F[70]
Each of Mr Kursidim and Mr Malone replied and agreed with this proposal. Mr Harrington gave evidence that he was not referring to the termination of the Agreement in this email. Once again, I consider that the purpose of his call was to discuss termination by mutual agreement. Regardless of any consent of Euromark, I formed the clear view that Smash had decided by this time to end the Agreement in any event.70F[71]
(a) Mr Harrison is 'desperate to fix things and keep working together ... He believes that going separate ways is actually not an option, not possible, even if we wanted to'; > > (b) Mr Malone told him that 'the business has made the decision, and that if he wants to meet to talk about it then I can be available'; > > (c) Mr Malone advised Mr Harrison that he should also phone Mr Harrington 'to talk through what he is doing in order to fix it however the business has made a decision and we are moving on so he would want to be quick'; and > > (d) Mr Malone suggested that the letter to Euromark be sent as soon as possible. He continued '[i]f we give him time he will mess everything up for us. Right now we are in the box seat with nearly 10 meetings booked and he hasn't planned for his meetings without Smash. I feel the official letter needs to be issued before our meetings. And then we are in the meetings and moving on'.72F[73]
In his evidence Mr Malone said that the 10 meetings were scheduled for late October and early November. He said that the meetings were to present Smash's products for BTS 2013 and he believed Smash was in a good position because no presentations for Smash BTS products had yet been made. He said that these meetings were arranged without Mr Harrison's knowledge. He accepted that he did not tell Euromark of these meetings so that they would have no time to interfere with Smash's arrangements for direct supply. He agreed that these meetings were able to take place without a Smash UK company being established, without registering for VAT, without hiring sales personnel in the UK and without arranging third-party logistics.73F[74]
In my view, Mr Malone's evidence about this email and about the rights of Smash to contact customers directly under the Agreement was unsatisfactory. His initial evidence about this direct approach not being completely contrary to the Agreement is an example of Mr Malone giving evidence which he considered supported his case rather than honestly answering the question. In my view, his subsequent concession reflected his true opinion.74F[75]
Further to your telephone conversation on 22nd October with Stephen Harrington, General Manager we confirm that we have reviewed the existing arrangements between Smash and Euromark and we have come to the conclusion that it is best for both parties that we no longer continue these arrangements.
Whilst we are appreciative of the efforts that you and the Euromark team have made to date, we have not heard from you since the conversation offering any solution to the issues raised in the phone conversation. Accordingly we take this to indicate your agreement that Euromark and Smash should mutually end our arrangement.
While we are somewhat disappointed that it has become necessary to make this decision, we feel that it is in the long term interest of both parties so as to provide Smash with every opportunity to gain a significant foothold with the major retailers. Currently too many opportunities are lost due to the layers of pricing involved, further making it unviable to continue.
I personally want to wish you all the best for the future success of the Euromark business. Our agreement will lapse effective from 22nd November being 30 days notice from the conversation with Stephen Harrington. I will ask David Malone to contact you to arrange for an orderly transition and handover so as to not disadvantage any of the existing retail customers.
I note in passing that Mr Harbinson denied that the real reason Smash wanted to end the Agreement was that it no longer suited Smash commercially and Smash was concerned about its profit margin. In my view, however, this was a significant factor in Smash's decision to terminate the Agreement. This is consistent with the terms of the 26 October 2012 letter which refer to 'too many opportunities are lost due to the layers of pricing involved, further making it unviable to continue'.
I have formed the view that by mid-October 2012 Smash had determined to end its relationship with Euromark and a motivating factor was that Euromark did not suit Smash commercially: Smash thought it could do a better job itself and thus make more money from sales in the UK.77F[78]
(a) Not only did Smash fail to give any of the undertakings requested by Euromark - directed to compliance with the Agreement - but it rejected any breach and proceeded on the basis that the termination was valid. Retailers were contacted directly and to the exclusion and for the most part lack of knowledge of Euromark. Many were Euromark's customers and introduced by Euromark. > > (b) The retailers were told or assumed that the Agreement between Smash and Euromark was at an end and that they were free to deal with Smash, which they did. > > (c) This enabled Smash to penetrate the market without the need for a middleman and potentially make more money, consistent with its aim and strategy. It was a bold strategy in blatant disregard of the contractual rights of Euromark.78F[79] > > (d) Euromark offered its Zoom products as a contingency because it could not rely on continuity of supply by Smash.
Mark,
Can I start by saying that our initial termination letter of our agreement was an attempt to work thru [sic] this separation in an amicable and orderly fashion, that gives each of us and our customers a way forward.
If you are now insisting on some plane that you don't want this method of separation, that you would prefer us to list all of your discretions causing angst and hostility then I am happy to do so albeit I still believe that by moving away with mutual consent makes better business sense.
We will be taking steps to make our own appointments with customers so can I reiterate as per our our [sic] initial letter that Euromark is no longer our Smash distributor and Euromark can no longer sell the Smash or related Brands.
We are more than happy in the current mutual environment to work thru [sic] either current orders or current Smash stock holdings to ensure Euromark is not inconvenienced.
Can you please contact David with regard to these outstanding orders so we can plan in advance how they are to be processed.
This email is significant. Regardless of how the Agreement was to be terminated, Smash expressly stated that Smash will be making its own appointments with customers and that 'Euromark is no longer our Smash distributor and Euromark can no longer sell the Smash or related Brands'. It was statements to this effect which Mr Harrison wanted withdrawn in light of the fact that they were then in the middle of the SS 2013 and 2013 BTS seasons.
In cross-examination, Mr Harbinson accepted that this left Euromark in an impossible situation where it could not arrange Smash sales for that BTS season. He acknowledged that at this time it was Smash that was preventing Euromark from doing so. He agreed that he did not subsequently retract the statement in the email that Euromark is no longer Smash's distributor until the letters to customers on 10 December 2012. Further, in cross-examination, Mr Harbinson agreed that in his email he was only suggesting that Smash would continue working with Euromark in the short term. He also agreed that in the meantime Smash would cement its relationships with all retailers and that there would be no way for Euromark ever to recover its exclusive distributorship which he acknowledged was Euromark's prized asset.
He also conceded that he knew at the time the prices that Smash was able to offer retailers directly could never be realistically matched by Euromark. He agreed that once retailers saw an opportunity to purchase directly from Smash there was no way that they would ever want to go back to dealing via a distributor such as Euromark or any other intermediary. He agreed that assisting Euromark to get rid of existing stock would not assist Euromark in terms of retaining its exclusive distribution rights.79F[80]
As set out above, I have formed the view that Mr Harbinson's intention at this time was to seek to obtain a commercial advantage over Euromark, including by threatening doubtful claims for breaches of IP rights.81F[82]
We have been instructed that our client withdraws all statements made by it in the above correspondence purporting to terminate, or otherwise bring to an end, the [Agreement].
Our client confirms its intention to be bound by the Agreement, and, accordingly, looks forward to an ongoing relationship with your company with both parties complying with their respective obligations under the Agreement.
Mr Harbinson denied that the last paragraph of the 3 December 2012 letter did not reflect his intentions at the time. However, he did agree that he did not intend to stop making arrangements for direct supply with retailers and that arrangements for the direct supply to UK retailers were being made at the very time this letter was being sent to Euromark by Mr Malone under Mr Harbinson's direction. In my view, this evidence is inconsistent with the statements contained in the last paragraph of the 3 December 2012 letter.
He also gave evidence that he did not deliberately conceal the arrangements that were being made for direct supply between retailers and Smash from Euromark from 3 December 2012. I do not accept this evidence. Euromark was not informed at this time of the nature and extent of Smash's dealing with Tesco up to this time including that on 3 December 2012 Smash was taking steps to obtain EDI details for the purpose of supplying products to Tesco directly at this time. I note in passing that there is little correspondence of the dealings between Smash and Tesco between late November 2012 and 14 December 2012.82F[83]
Euromark:
Latest strategy
Letter sent to Euromark saying all is forgotten we are back together. Sent tonight.
Whether he says yes or no the more likely no, we still go with the following:
1. We still push for the 'like' products to be handed over to us or we are to be paid a commission
2. Even together we have some customers including Tesco that want to deal direct. Put it back on him.
No matter where negotiations take us, paying Euromark a commission is still a reality as long as we have orders from the customers!
I will make telephone contact with Mark tomorrow night if possible to at least get some healthy discussions either way and to avoid any further costs.
If he pushes back and says no deal (which EKM says he can't) then we push forward with option B, direct supply with Euromark the offenders in breaking the deal.
...
David aware of Euromark strategy and like us not happy but also like us will do it for Smash and understands probably best outcome.
David is to push forward with Smash Global set up as we will require account in any case for the direct customers and having an operation helps with his expenses as well as future plans for UK.
Mr Harbinson was questioned about this email. Both the email and his evidence about it were far from clear. He said he was trying to reach an agreement with Mr Harrison (option A), but that if no agreement could be reached he would proceed with supplying UK retailers directly (option B). I am unsure what the nature of the agreement was to be. This was not explained in oral evidence.
The email notes that '[n]o matter where negotiations take us, paying Euromark is still a reality as long as we have orders from customers.' This appears to suggest that Smash was going to supply Euromark's customers directly and pay a commission to Euromark even without consultation with Euromark. Mr Harbinson gave evidence that 'we were going to work out a commercial outcome regardless of Option A or B'. When it was put to him this was inconsistent with the exclusive distributorship rights of Euromark under the Agreement, he agreed but stated 'if that's what the customers wanted, that's what we would have to supply'.
...
It was suggested to Mr Harbinson that, in light of his evidence, neither option provided for Euromark to continue as the exclusive distributor of Smash products in the UK. He did not agree. However, it seems clear that Smash intended to supply some of Euromark's customers and, in particular Tesco, directly at this time. This is in a context where Mr Harbinson acknowledged that he was aware by this stage that Mr Malone had meetings with about 10 retailers who had been offered direct supply and that he received reports of those meetings from Mr Malone. Further, the email refers to the fact that Tesco 'want to deal with us direct'. It also refers to setting up Smash Global 'as we will require an account in any case for the direct customers'.83F[84]
(a) Smash's withdrawal of all statements purporting to terminate the Agreement was not an admission of any liability to Euromark in respect of claims made by Euromark for loss and damage; > > (b) Smash believed at the time of making the statements that it was 'legally able to terminate the Agreement' and that Smash only sought advice from lawyers after the statements were made; > > (c) Smash now understood it was not legally able to terminate the Agreement in the manner attempted; and > > (d) Smash had 'today [on 11 December 2012] sent letters to a number of UK retailers' confirming that Euromark remains the exclusive UK distributor of Smash products and that future orders of Smash products are to be placed directly with Euromark. The letters were attached bearing the date 10 December 2012 (collectively the '10 December 2012 customer letters' or individually the '10 December 2012 customer letter').84F[85]
In cross-examination, counsel for Euromark contended that this letter did not express the honest intention of Smash at the time. This was denied by Mr Harbinson. When asked whether he intended that Smash would supply directly to UK retailers at this time, he replied that this was 'an option we had that would work in conjunction with Euromark, yes, correct'. When it was put to him that he had no intention of Euromark continuing as the exclusive distributor of Smash in the UK, he said he 'had every intention of Euromark continuing as a distributor in [the] UK for Smash'. I found this evidence disingenuous. He could not agree that Euromark would continue as the exclusive distributor as he knew at this time that customers, including Tesco, wanted to deal directly with Smash.85F[86]
(a) the customer was told by Mr Malone or Mr Dale Harbinson that the relationship with Euromark was 'strained and experiencing difficulties' and that it was likely that if not resolved both companies would part ways; and > > (b) Smash confirmed that Euromark remained its exclusive UK distributor of Smash products and all orders should be placed directly with Euromark.86F[87]
we wrote to Tesco on 10 December 2012 confirming that Euromark is our UK distributor and requesting that Tesco deal directly with you. Tesco, has, however, made it clear to us that it wants to deal directly with Smash in relation to the supply of our products. There was no collusion with Smash in making this decision - it was made by Tesco on its own.
That being the case, clause 3.1 of our Distribution Agreement applies to our ongoing relationship with Tesco. Smash and Euromark now have to discuss what percentage of our sales to Tesco we will pay for the duration of the Distribution Agreement.
The 21 December 2012 Harbinson email is significant. On the evidence before me, it is the first occasion upon which Smash advised Euromark that Tesco wanted to deal directly with Smash in relation to the future supply of Smash products, and sought to engage cl 3.1 of the Agreement.
Both Mr Harbinson and Mr Malone were cross-examined on the 21 December 2012 Harbinson email. Mr Harbinson denied that the decision to supply Tesco directly was made unilaterally by Smash without consulting Euromark. However, Mr Harbinson acknowledged that he was aware at this time that Smash had had multiple direct contacts with Tesco since October 2012. Further, he ultimately agreed that he was aware at this time that Euromark had been insisting that Smash must not supply its customers directly and that it had written to Tesco to this effect. However, he reiterated that it was not Smash's decision: it was the customer's decision. He said that Tesco had made the decision 'unilaterally'. I do not accept that this decision was made by Tesco 'unilaterally' as characterised by Mr Harbinson. It was made in a context where Smash had been seeking to encourage or persuade Tesco to make such a decision since late October 2012, including the 20 December 2012 Tesco email where Smash offered to indemnify Tesco for any loss they may suffer as a result. Further, I have concluded that Mr Harbinson knew that Tesco's decision had not been made 'unilaterally' when he gave this evidence. It is of Mr Harbinson being prepared to lie to obtain what he perceived to be a better outcome for Smash.88F[89]
In these circumstances, had the contravention I have found not occurred, I am satisfied that Euromark's long standing major customer, Tesco, would have continued to deal with, and purchase products from, Euromark. Further, I am satisfied that, had the unconscionable conduct not occurred, the business of Euromark would not have ceased.
As a result, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that:
(1) Euromark would have terminated the Agreement if it had been informed of the unconscionable conduct in contravention of s 21 the ACL;
(2) it would not have been realistically possible for Euromark to have done anything different for FY 2013 if it had been informed of the unconscionable conduct in early to mid-December 2012; and
(3) as a result of the unconscionable conduct, including the loss of its major customer Tesco, the business of Euromark ceased.91F[92]
In all these circumstances, I am satisfied that Mr Harbinson engaged in unconscionable conduct. For completeness, in all these circumstances, I have formed the view that his conduct was against conscience: it was 'far outside societal norms of acceptable commercial behaviour as to warrant condemnation as conduct that is offensive to conscience'. Further, I am satisfied that Mr Harbinson was also relevantly involved in Smash's unconscionable conduct in section 22.3 above.92F[93]
(a) Mr Harbinson was one of the controlling minds of Smash and was responsible for Smash's decision to unilaterally terminate the Agreement, without regard to Euromark's contractual rights. > > (b) Mr Harbinson was aware that Smash's purported termination was not withdrawn until 3 December 2012 and he was aware that there was no basis to terminate the Agreement. > > (c) Mr Harbinson was aware that as a consequence of the termination, Smash asserted to Euromark customers from late October 2012 that the Agreement with Euromark was at an end and that supply should be obtained directly from Smash. He was directly involved in planning and implementing the Solicitation Conduct at a very early stage. > > (d) Mr Harbinson was aware of the nature and extent of the direct contact made by Smash to Euromark's UK customers after 26 October 2012 and in particular Tesco. He was aware that Tesco was a major customer of Euromark at the time. He gave evidence to such effect. He was copied into relevant emails and was integral to the Solicitation Conduct. > > (e) Mr Harbinson was aware that Smash did not disclose the nature and extent of its direct dealings with Euromark's customers and in particular Tesco. > > (f) By the December 2012 letters, Smash conveyed that it was performing and intended to be bound by the Agreement. The judge concluded that, to the knowledge of Mr Harbinson, that was false. Further, the judge concluded that the statements in the 11 December 2012 letter, relevantly in the context of the 10 December 2012 customer letter to Tesco, conveyed that Tesco would continue to place orders with Euromark. To Mr Harbinson's knowledge, in light of his knowledge of Tesco's decision, that was not true or at the very least was deliberately misleading.93F[94] > > (g) Mr Harbinson was aware of the consequences of Smash making direct approaches to the UK retail customers of Euromark. Despite this knowledge he intended that further direct contact take place.
In considering any liability of Mr Malone on the basis that he either engaged in unconscionable conduct under s 21 of the ACL or was relevantly involved in Smash's unconscionable conduct, I am conscious that he was not a director of Smash and did not hold a senior executive position like Mr Harbinson or Mr Kursidim. As a result, he was not in a position to make decisions relating to Euromark or Smash's presence in the UK market. However, I am also conscious that he was a senior employee in his role as Smash's International Sales and Marketing Manager. As a consequence, he had some input in relation to the decisions of Smash and was involved in his capacity as an employee in their implementation.
...
In summary, I have concluded that Mr Malone has not himself engaged in conduct that was, in all the circumstances, unconscionable under s 21 of the ACL. This is due primarily to the fact that he himself did not engage in each element of the relevant conduct which I have identified in section 22.3 as unconscionable. However, I have concluded that he was relevantly involved in Smash's unconscionable conduct. This is because he engaged in many elements of Smash's unconscionable conduct, and had actual knowledge of all elements of Smash's unconscionable conduct.96F[97]
(a) First, there is the decision of Smash to unilaterally terminate the Agreement from about mid-October 2012. This decision was a decision of the controlling minds of Smash at the time. It was not Mr Malone's decision. However, Mr Malone was aware of this decision and had input in relation to it. For example, he was copied in on the 12 October 2012 email from Mr Harrington, and responded on 15 October 2012 stating that he was in complete agreement with it. In addition, in his email to Mr Harbinson dated 16 October 2012, he said he would 'hit the phones' on 17 October 2012 as part of the plan to contact Euromark's customers directly.97F[98] > > (b) Second, there is the fact that Smash's purported termination was not withdrawn until 3 December 2012. The decision not to withdraw the purported termination until that time was a decision made by the controlling minds of Smash, who were also responsible for engaging EKM to advise Smash in relation to these issues. However, it is clear that Mr Malone was aware that Smash's purported termination was not withdrawn until 3 December 2012.98F[99] > > (c) Third, there is the Solicitation Conduct from late October 2012. Once again, the decision to engage in the Solicitation Conduct from late October 2012 was a decision made by the controlling minds of Smash. However, it is clear that Mr Malone was aware of the Solicitation Conduct and the continuing direct approaches to Euromark's customers between 3 and 11 December 2012. Indeed, he was the person within Smash who engaged in the direct dealings with Euromark customers and made the statements which constitute the Solicitation Conduct.99F[100] > > (d) Fourth, and as a consequence of the third point, Mr Malone was aware of the full nature and extent of Smash's direct contacts with Euromark's UK customers during this period. In addition, he was aware that Tesco was the major customer at the time of both Smash products and Euromark in the UK. For example, in his email dated 11 October 2012 to Mr Kursidim, he estimated that Tesco would be '80%' of Euromark's business. Further, he received Mr Harbinson's email dated 22 August 2012 noting that Tesco was still 'the key and it pays [Euromark's] bills'.100F[101] > > (e) Fifth, Smash did not disclose the nature and extent of the direct contact with Euromark's UK customers to Euromark in October or November 2012, or at the time that the December 2012 letters were sent. Once again, that was a decision for the controlling minds of Smash. As a result, Mr Malone was not responsible for that decision. In this regard the judge accepted that Mr Malone was told not to contact Euromark in October and November 2012, but rather to focus on his dealings with UK retailers (ie the Solicitation Conduct).101F[102] > > (f) Sixth and related to the fifth point, Mr Malone was aware of the December 2012 letters at the time they were sent and that they conveyed that Smash was performing and intended to be bound by the Agreement. The judge concluded that, to the knowledge of Mr Malone, that was false.102F[103] > > (g) Seventh and related to the sixth point, in all these circumstances, the judge had concluded that Mr Malone was aware of the consequence and impact of Smash making direct approaches to UK retail accounts and, in particular, Euromark's customers. Indeed, this was the intended consequence and impact of such approaches.103F[104]
In all these circumstances, I have concluded that he participated in some elements of Smash's unconscionable conduct and was aware of all the elements of it, with the result that he was involved in Smash's contravention for the purpose of s 236(1) of the [ACL].
Further, as noted at [1350], I have also concluded that Smash also contravened s 21 of the ACL after the 11 December 2012 letter was sent by failing to disclose the full nature and extent of its continued dealings with Tesco and Sainsbury's. As a result, it is necessary to consider whether Mr Malone was also involved in this contravention.104F[105]
I found that, in giving his evidence, Mr Malone seemed to have clearer recollection of events that were helpful to Smash's defence, but could not recall matters that may have been detrimental to Smash. Further, Mr Malone often proffered answers which he considered advanced his case, rather than responding to the questions asked or, at times, telling the truth. I have taken all these matters into account in considering his evidence.105F[106]
(a) Mr Malone was very bullish about 'torching' the Agreement from an early stage. Closer to 26 October 2012, he actively urged the Smash directors not to change their minds now that they were 'in the box seat' as a result of his direct negotiations with the retailers. Mr Malone was front and centre of setting up direct supply and he was most familiar with the Agreement terms having negotiated them. > > (b) As December 2012 approached, Mr Malone, as UK representative, negotiator with retailers and the person setting up the UK company, well appreciated that Smash would need continuity of supply to retailers through to January 2013, during which time Smash itself would not have the UK company yet set up, and thus would need Euromark's distribution channel for an 'interim' period to be able to placate retailers' concerns. This formed the background to the sham withdrawal of the Termination letter on 3 December 2012. > > (c) Again, Mr Malone was in the thick of things in the period after 3 December 2012, with sufficient knowledge of the relevant acts and legal context for him to be 'involved'. Part of the his conduct consisted of misrepresenting cl 3.1 of the Agreement to Sainsbury's as a basis for it to 'legitimately' deal directly with Smash.
I am satisfied that there is a proper basis for this conservative increase, notwithstanding that Mr Harrison did not give detailed evidence of the steps Euromark would have taken to achieve the projected increases. I am prepared to infer that steps would have been taken by Euromark to re-focus its business, which would result in a projected increase of at least 10%.107F[108]
In light of the projected sales revenue, projected gross profit margins and projected adjusted costs for FY 2103 and FY 2104, Mr Blashki calculated the adjusted [earnings before income tax] for the base case as £379,000 for FY 2013 and £451,000 for FY 2014.110F[111]
[1] Mr Harbinson's brother, Mr Dale Harbinson, was a director of Smash at relevant times, and was its chief executive officer until his employment was terminated on 28 November 2012. Dale was a defendant to the proceeding below.
[2] Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2.
[3] It is also submitted that the claim was not adequately pleaded.
[4] An agreed list of 28 issues was submitted to the judge for determination.
[5] Much of the background is taken from the agreed summary.
[6] Euromark Ltd v Smash Enterprises Pty Ltd [2021] VSC 97, [509]‑-[510] ('Reasons').
[41] The proposed grounds include grounds to the effect that the findings were not based on the pleaded case (proposed grounds (e) and (f)).
[42] Other than an irrelevant factual finding based on an internal email dated 3 December 2012.
[43] Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd [2003] HCA 18; (2003) 214 CLR 51, 111 [167] (Callinan J), 85-6 [81]-[82] (Kirby J); [2003] HCA 18 (citations omitted) ('ACCC v Berbatis').
[44] Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22; Lee v Lee [2019] HCA 28; (2019) 266 CLR 129, 148-49 [55] (Bell, Gageler, Nettle and Edelman JJ); [2019] HCA 28 (citations omitted).
[45] [2016] HCA 22; (2016) 331 ALR 550, 558-59 [43] (French CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ); [2016] HCA 22 (citations omitted).
[46] [2019] HCA 28; (2019) 266 CLR 129, 148-49 [55] (Bell, Gageler, Nettle and Edelman JJ); [2019] HCA 28 (citations omitted).
[47] Templeton v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2015] FCAFC 137; (2015) 108 ACSR 545, 551-52 [23] (Besanko, Middleton and Beach JJ); [2015] FCAFC 137.
[48] [2020] FCAFC 235; (2020) 385 ALR 514, 517 [8] (Nicholas, Yates and Burley JJ); [2020] FCAFC 235.
[49] ACCC v Berbatis (2003) 214 CLR 51; [2003] HCA 18.
[51] Of particular relevance is the correspondence and conduct referred to at [53], [55], [57], [88]-[93] above.
[53] Of particular relevance is the correspondence and conduct referred to at [35], [46], [59] above.
[55] Ibid [1083]-[1086], citing Foran v Wight (1989) 168 CLR 385; [1989] HCA 51 ('Foran').
[56] Foran [1989] HCA 51; (1989) 168 CLR 385, 426-27, 430-31 (Brennan J).
[57] Reasons, [1199]-[1204], [1206], [1208]-[1212].
[59] Above at [49]-[58], [88]-[94].
[60] Reasons, [621], [627], [628].
[62] Euromark's letter to Smash, referred to in the Reasons at [644].
[64] Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Quantum Housing Group Pty Ltd (2021) 285 FCR 133; [2021] FCAFC 40 ('ACCC v Quantum Housing'); Good Living Company Pty Ltd v Kingsmede Pty Ltd (2021) 284 FCR 424; [2021] FCAFC 33.
[65] (2015) 236 FCR 199, 274-75 [296], 276 [304] (Besanko J agreeing at 289 [371], Middleton J agreeing at 295 [398]); [2015] FCAFC 50. This passage was approved by Kiefel CJ and Bell J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Kobelt (2019) 267 CLR 1, 17 [14]; [2019] HCA 18 ('ASIC v Kobelt').
[66] [2021] FCAFC 40; (2021) 285 FCR 133, 155 [91]; [2021] FCAFC 40.
[69] Ibid [407]-[409] (citations omitted).
[70] As summarised by the judge in the Reasons at [411].
[72] This was denied by Mr Harrington but the judge held it was said.
[73] As summarised by the judge in the Reasons at [431].
[76] The four factors were: (1) Mr Malone being excluded from initial meetings with retailer target accounts; (2) Euromark offering retailer target accounts private label or generic products as an alternative to Smash branded products; (3) lack of confidence in Euromark's commitment to promoting Smash in the UK to the extent and in the manner necessary to achieve the market position expected; and (4) contact made by Euromark with one of the factories used by Smash for the manufacture of products sold to Euromark.
[79] It was only on 30 October 2012 that Smash alleged for the first time that Euromark was in breach of the Agreement.
[84] Ibid [613]-[614], [616] (citations omitted).
[85] As summarised by the judge in the Reasons at [624].
[86] Reasons, [627] (citations omitted).
[90] ASIC v Kobelt (2019) 267 CLR 1, 40 [92] (Gageler J); [2019] HCA 18.
[91] We refer in particular to ss 22(1)(d), (j), (k), (l) of the ACL.
Smash Enterprises Pty Ltd
Euromark Limited [2022] VSCA 267
(2003) 214 CLR 118
(2020) 385 ALR 514
(2001) 117 FCR 424
(2003) 214 CLR 51
(2019) 266 CLR 129
(2016) 331 ALR 550
(1989) 168 CLR 385
(2021) 285 FCR 133
(2021) 284 FCR 424
(2015) 236 FCR 199
(2019) 267 CLR 1