Singleton v Direct Personnel Services Pty Ltd & Anor [2025] QSC 259

TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - Particular defendants - employers - where the plaintiff alleges he was injured in a workplace accident - where the plaintiff worked for a labour hire company - where the plaintiff was injured in the workplace of the host employer - whether each of the defendants breached the duty of care owed to the plaintiff - extent of the duty of care owed - whether plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence - whether the employer liable or whether the host employer liable - the degree of contribution as between the defendants

DAMAGES - whether the plaintiff sustained a back injury and consequent psychiatric injury - whether the plaintiff exaggerated the effect of the injury on his functional capacity - whether aggravation of pre-existing condition - quantum of damages

Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld) ss 6, 7

Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld) s 19

Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ss 305B, 305C, 305D, 305E, 306N, 306O, 306P

Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Regulation 2014 (Qld) schedule 14

Astley v AusTrust Ltd [1999] HCA 6; (1999) 197 CLR 1, cited

Bankstown Foundary Pty Ltd v Braistina [1986] HCA 20;

(1986) 160 CLR 301, applied

Cameron v Foster [2010] QSC 372, cited

Chapman v Hearse [1961] HCA 46; (1961) 106 CLR 112, cited

Czatyrtko v Edith Cowan University [2005] HCA 14; (2005)

Fox v Wood [1981] HCA 41; (1981) 148 CLR 438, applied

Griffith v State of Queensland [2011] QCA 57; [2012] 2 Qd R

Hays Specialist Recruitment (Australia) Pty Ltd v Carey-

Schofield [2025] QCA 161, applied

Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298, cited

Kerle v BM Alliance Coal Operations Pty Ltd [2016] QSC 304; (2016) 262 IR 381, considered

Kondis v State Transport Authority [1984] HCA 61; (1984) 154 CLR 672, applied

Liftronic Pty Ltd v Unver [2001] HCA 24; (2001) 75 ALJR 867, applied

Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd [1990] HCA 20; (1990) 169 CLR 638, applied

March v E & M H Stramare Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 12; (1991) 171 CLR 506, applied

Marketform Managing Agency Ltd v Ashcroft Super IGA

Orange Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 36, considered

Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission [1995]

HCA 5; [1995] HCA 5; (1995) 182 CLR 1, applied

Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil [2000]

HCA 61; [2000] HCA 61; (2000) 205 CLR 254, applied

McLean v Tedman [1984] HCA 60; (1984) 155 CLR 306,

McLean's Roylen Cruises Pty Ltd v McEwan [1984] HCA 43;

(1984) 58 ALJR 42, considered

Parry v Woolworths [2009] QCA 26; [2010] 1 Qd R 1, cited

Peebles v WorkCover Queensland [2021] QCA 21, applied

Prasad v Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd [2016] QCA 147, cited

Purkess v Crittenden [1965] HCA 34; (1965) 114 CLR 164, cited

Qantas Airways Ltd v Fisher [2014] QCA 329, applied

Robinson v Fig Tree Pocket Equestrian Club Inc [2005] QCA 271, applied

Sawyer v Steeplechase Pty Ltd [2024] QSC 142, considered

Spencer v Downie and Anor [2019] QSC 98, considered

Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 1;

(1986) 160 CLR 16, applied

Stewart v Metro North Hospital and Health Service [2025]

HCA 34; [2025] HCA 34; (2025) 99 ALJR 1348, applied

Strong v Woolworths Ltd [2012] HCA 5; (2012) 246 CLR 182,

Super Pty Ltd v SJP Formwork (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 29

Swain v Waverley MC [2005] HCA 4; (2005) 220 CLR 517, applied

Tabet v Gett [2010] HCA 12; (2010) 240 CLR 537, cited

Tapp v Australian Bushman's Campdraft & Rodeo Association Limited [2022] HCA 11; (2022) 273 CLR 454, applied

Thompson v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 19; (2005) 221 CLR 234, applied

TNT Australia Pty Ltd v Christie [2003] NSWCA 47; (2003) 65 NSWLR 1, applied

Todorovic v Waller [1981] HCA 72; (1981) 150 CLR 402, applied

Vozza v Tooth & Co Ltd [1964] HCA 29; (1964) 112 CLR 316, applied

Wallace v Kam [2013] HCA 19; (2013) 250 CLR 375, applied

Watts v Rake [1960] HCA 58; (1960) 108 CLR 158, applied

Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon [2003] HCA 48; (2003) 200 ALR 447, applied

Wyong Shire Council v Shirt [1980] HCA 12; (1980) 146 CLR 40, applied

Mr B Charrington KC with Dr K Roche for the plaintiff

Mr M Hickey OAM KC with Ms A Crawford for the second defendant

• [1] This is a claim by the plaintiff for $1,274,209.13 for damages for negligence and/or breach of contract arising from injuries he sustained in a workplace accident. At the time of the accident, he was removing a fibreglass spiral (used for mineral separation in mining) from a mould.[1] The spiral was resting on a rail. The spiral came off the rail and the plaintiff flexed forward, thereby suffering an L4/5disc protrusion. He later underwent surgery. It is common ground between the expert witnesses that the plaintiff has a whole person impairment attributable to the accident of about 10 per cent.
• [2] For the reasons which follow, I find that the plaintiff has proved each of the defendants to have been negligent and the first defendant to have also breached the contract of employment.
• [3] I have however found the plaintiff has exaggerated the effect of the injury on his functional capacity and I have found that he has a residual working capacity. On these questions I preferred the defence expert witnesses to those called by the plaintiff.
• [4] I have assessed the plaintiff's damages as against his employer, the first defendant, in the sum of $433,056.28 (inclusive of the WorkCover refund of $81,276.60).
• [5] I have assessed the plaintiff's damages as against his host employer, the second defendant, in the sum of $490,429.05 (inclusive of the WorkCover refund of $81,276.60).
• [6] I find that the first defendant is 25 per cent responsible for the plaintiff's injuries and the second defendant 75 per cent responsible.

• [7] The plaintiff, a 40-year-old man, was injured at work on 11 July 2019. At the time, he was employed by the first defendant (DPS), a labour hire company, and he was working at the factory of the second defendant (MT).
• [8] In his amended statement of claim, the plaintiff alleges that he was tasked with separating a fibreglass spiral from a mould (or pattern). This task involved two workers, the plaintiff and a co-worker. The plaintiff alleges that while he was doing this task, the spiral fell to the floor which jolted him forwards. The plaintiff and the co-worker lifted the spiral back onto the rail. It is alleged the accident caused immediate pain to his back. It is alleged the plaintiff reported the injury to his supervisor but was told to go back to work. He continued working with the spirals, and shortly thereafter another falling and jolting accident occurred. He was then instructed to go back to work, but in a different role. The plaintiff alleges that the pain in his back and shoulders increased, and he was then told to use Deep Heat and see a GP.
• [9] The plaintiff alleged that he suffered the following injuries:

(a) a left L4/5 disc protrusion and/or disc prolapse on the left side with an L5 nerve root compression requiring surgery;

(b) scarring;

(c) adjustment disorder; and

(d) mixed depression and anxious mood and/or major depressive disorder.

• [10] The plaintiff alleged that his employer, DPS, was negligent as:

(a) It failed to provide and maintain an adequately safe system of work by allowing them to lift the pattern when it was unstable and an excessive weight.

(b) It failed to install appropriate plant and equipment, namely rails that were separated by a distance which would prevent the pattern falling.

(c) It failed to adequately inspect and identify a system which would identify the hazard.

(d) It failed to conduct an adequate risk assessment.

(e) It failed to provide adequate instruction.

(f) It failed to provide an adequate warning as to the risk.

(g) It failed to comply with the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld) (WHSA) and associated codes and regulations by failing to ensure the health and safety of the plaintiff at work.

• [11] Alternatively, it is alleged that the injury was caused by a breach of contract-namely a breach of the implied term to provide the plaintiff with a safe workplace and system of work.
• [12] The plaintiff also alleged that his host employer, MT, was negligent for similar reasons. He says that the second defendant is vicariously liable for the actions of the co-worker and the supervisor.
• [13] The plaintiff alleged that his injuries were caused by breach of contract and/or negligence and claims $1,274,209.13 in damages.

• [14] In its defence, the first defendant admits it was the employer of the plaintiff. It also admits that it provided the plaintiff's services to the second defendant and admits that this commenced on 9 June 2019. It denies the allegations of negligence and/or breach of contract, stating it did not owe the obligations the plaintiff has pleaded and was not the insurer of the plaintiff's safety. It also denies that it was negligent.

• [15] In its amended defence, the second defendant admits that Downer EDA Services Pty Ltd (Downer), including the second defendant, entered into a labour hire service agreement (LHA) with the first defendant, commencing 1 March 2015. It says that the first defendant was the plaintiff's employer, not the second defendant, and it was a term of the LHA that the first defendant was engaged to provide services as an independent contractor and was responsible for the plaintiff's safety. It says the plaintiff was working at the second defendant's premises pursuant to the LHA. It says the first defendant had the primary responsibility for the day-to-day management of the plaintiff. It admits the first defendant owed the plaintiff a non-delegable duty of care, but the second defendant did not, as it was not the plaintiff's employer.
• [16] As to the allegations of negligence, it is admitted the plaintiff was undertaking duties at the second defendant's premises in Carrara on 11 July 2019, but denies the allegations made by the plaintiff as to the mechanism of the accident, referring to alleged previous inconsistent versions.
• [17] It is also alleged that the plaintiff had pre-existing injuries. The second defendant denies the allegations of negligence and said the plaintiff did receive training as to the relevant procedures and it was the first defendant's responsibility to carry out work site visits to ensure safety compliance. It alleges it did have a safe and appropriate system of work and the task engaged in by the plaintiff was not unsafe. It is further alleged the plaintiff was responsible for his own injuries.

• [18] I have had the opportunity of observing the witnesses and that has assisted me in reaching my decision. I also record that just because I do not believe a witness about one thing, does not mean I reject all of their evidence.
• [19] I will make some observations as I examine the evidence of the witnesses in this matter. When I make such observations, I have had regard to all of the evidence and the submissions made.

• [20] The plaintiff was born on 29 June 1985 and is presently 40 years of age. He left school halfway through year nine and claims he is not good at reading and writing.
• [21] He started work as a factory hand and then completed a four year apprenticeship as a fabricating engineer. He has had a number of personal relationships and has three children.
• [22] Prior to the incident he suffered an injury to his left wrist and thumb in 2010 and had about four to five months off work. After getting his strength back this did not pose a problem.
• [23] He has a reasonable work history. He worked for Astrill for four years; Tyco Water for two years;[2] Ascot Foundry;[3] Esco Foundry;[4] Weir Engineering;[5] Qalcast Gold Coast;[6] Superlock as an assembler[7] and then he started at MT in 2019.
• [24] The plaintiff found the job through Seek employment and was employed by DPS but was contracted out to work at MT at Carrara. He started the job in May 2019. He didn't recall any training given to him at DPS. At MT, there was a training movie and a walk through before he started. As regards to the task in question, someone showed him what to do for a day and then he took over.
• [25] The task Mr Singleton was doing at the time of the injury involved assembling a spiral. The purpose of the spiral is to separate sand from minerals. Fibreglass is sprayed onto a mould/pattern, and once the fibreglass has hardened it is necessary to separate this pattern from each spiral. Each item weighs about 100 kilograms. One man holds it still while the other man twists the spiral off the pattern. They do eight each morning. The end of the spiral (depicted in Exhibit 2) was resting on a rail. The PVC pipe at the end sat on the rail and was about 200 millimetres long.

Exhibit 28A example photograph of a worker with a spiral on a rail

• [26] On 11 July 2019, Mr Singleton started work at 5am and was engaged in separating the spiral from the patterns. The incident happened around 5.30am. He was working with a new co-worker who had started on the Monday. The co-worker was holding the other end of the spiral and the plaintiff was separating the spiral from the mould. The spiral fell off the side of the railing because it was not being held straight by the co-worker. If it is not held straight the overhang is less and it does not easily stay on the rails.[8]
• [27] It fell off with great force and the plaintiff went with it as it fell, and he immediately felt extreme pain in his lower back.[9] He held onto it. It happened very quickly. The item fell just under a metre, from waist level to the floor. He was jolted when he held onto it.
• [28] He had seen this happen about a half a dozen times previously in the six week period.[10] They lifted it back onto the rail. He did this with extreme difficulty and felt extreme pain in his lower back.
• [29] He did not recall if the spiral was damaged. He felt extreme pain.[11] He did not recall any instructions being given as to how to avoid this risk or what to do after it had fallen off.[12]
• [30] He told his supervisor Paul what happened. Paul simply told him to be careful and to continue working.[13] He went back to doing the same task and it happened again. On this occasion, he went with it to start with but did not go entirely with it after it fell. He let go of it and it hit the floor.[14]
• [31] He told Paul again but does not recall what Paul said. He then started doing another task by putting washers on bolts.[15] He continued in pain and told Paul this and he couldn't continue. He was told to stand in the sun and Paul put some deep heat on his back.[16] However, the pain did not improve, and Paul took him to a general practitioner in Southport at about 9am.[17] He was examined and he was given a certificate for absence from work for three days.[18] At this stage, he was in extreme pain and the pain was in his lower back and his left leg.

• [54] In cross-examination by the first defendant, Mr Singleton agreed that there was an induction when he arrived at MT.[49] He was shown exhibit C for identification but did not recall the modules referred to therein. He was also shown Exhibit 5 which was the Safe Work procedure (SWP) log and admitted signing that. He said training was given by MT. He was given a buddy who showed him how to do the demoulding task. He also agreed that he attended toolbox talks first thing in the mornings and he could raise issues there. This is where he met the co-worker who was with him at the time of the injury.[50]
• [55] He agreed that it was the managers of MT who ran these meetings.[51] Shane Hay was a manager. Butch and Paul would also run the toolbox meetings.[52]
• [56] Mr Singleton agreed that he reported the injury to Paul who told him to keep working even though he was still in pain.[53] He then was placed on the task of placing screws on washers. He was then taken to a doctor. Paul drove his car home because he could not drive.[54]
• [57] He admitted that prior to the injury he had seen a psychologist for relationship issues.[55] He said he had played a lot of AFL which he stopped in 2014. He admitted during his apprenticeship he went to TAFE and did assignments and reading. Prior to working at MT, he had worked driving a forklift with overhead cranes and he had started a WHS course but did not finish this. He agreed this involved a lot of reading. He stopped it because his reading was poor.[56]
• [58] As regard to post injury, he did an investigation course. The majority of this was online. He paid $2,000 for the course. He thought he would be able to do work chasing cheating spouses, for example by taking photographic evidence and getting written statements. He accepted he could also search online, search for documents and search people's social media accounts. He agreed that the completion time was a two-year window. All of the assignments were written. He had to, for example, do an essay on the computer.[57]
• [59] He said he did not apply for any work after he did the course because he did not think he was qualified enough or could sit for long periods of time. He also had poor concentration levels. He was shown Exhibit 6 which shows that he completed a number of modules for the course, and he admitted completing the course in four months. He said he was able to do it so quickly because he had plenty of time on his hands. He did the course because he didn't think he could return to physical work.

• [68] Mr Singleton agreed that he played a lot of chess and at one stage played eight games over a two-week period. He had plenty of time to do this.[71]
• [69] He said he would like to be a sound technician. He told Dr Foxcroft he was interested in this in 2021 but has not looked into what course is needed to qualify in this area. Instead, he enrolled in a certificate four in private investigation.[72]
• [70] He denied cancelling the ABN registration (Exhibit 12).

• [71] It was put to him that he left Australia for Denpasar on 11 August 2022 and returned to Brisbane on 4 September 2022. He claimed he went to Bali (Kuta) by himself and stayed in a hotel. He went there to relax and sat around the pool getting sun. There was no particular reason he went there. He also saw a Balinese man called Ketut whom he knew from word of mouth. Ketut massaged him. He has seen Ketut multiple times. His friends, a security officer and a housekeeper told him about Ketut because they were aware of his spinal surgery. These friends would speak to Ketut for him because Ketut has very poor English. He paid Ketut in cash. Mr Singleton said it was not akin to a massage, but a type of rubbing with lotions. These rubbings took between 30 minutes and an hour. Ketut's qualifications did not concern him. He felt what Ketut did was helpful because he had his own technique. You wouldn't be able to find Ketut online because he's about 100 years old and has no social media.[73]
• [72] Mr Singleton accepted the flight to Denpasar was six hours and 20 minutes and he had to sit for take-off and landing. He said that he stretched, walked and slept during the flight. On the flight home it took five to six hours, and he took a train or was picked up from Brisbane to go home. He takes a backpack as carry on which is less than seven kilos on the flight.[74]
• [73] He could not recall another trip he did to Bali for 10 days on 28 February 2023. If he did, he did not know why he went back. He claimed that he had a few friends in Bali whom he had made through his travels. He did not dispute that he took another trip to Bali on 2 May 2023, and returned to Brisbane on 19 May 2023 after being in Bali for 17 days. He claimed he was in Bali alone. He accepted he could negotiate airports and do air travel unassisted. He would get a driver there. He didn't need a companion when he did these Bali trips. He could also carry his backpack. It was not more than seven kilos because Jetstar would not allow more than this.[75]
• [74] Mr Singleton then accepted that eight days later, on 27 May 2023 he travelled to Vancouver on a 14-hour flight. He was overseas for 21 days on this occasion. He then flew to Portland, Oregon (a one to two hour flight). He claimed he stayed with friends Steve and Megan, although did not know their surnames. He said he met them through a friend. He spent a week in Portland. They went to bars and restaurants. He then went to New York with his friend Susan Sluiter who comes from Sydney. He claimed not to have her phone number. He claimed he deleted it. They had met at the Casino. She allegedly works for Bupa. They stayed in New York for a week in an Airbnb which was arranged by Susan, and he did a lot of sight-seeing there and he was on his feet a fair bit. He also went to a wedding of a friend of Susan's. They then went to Hawaii for four to five days on the way home. He did go into the water but did not actually swim. He walked there but he couldn't surf or ride horseback. They then returned to Sydney on 17 June 2023 after a ten-hour flight. He spent some time in the airport, then boarded a second flight to the Gold Coast.

• [119] Mr Campbell KC in cross-examination established that the plaintiff gave DPS his resumé which was tendered as Exhibit 14. This showed that he had experience as a fabricator/moulder. He said he was not familiar with the task he was given at MT.[130] He admitted having an interview at DPS and then he was sent to MT for a second interview. MT arranged the medical and offered him the job. He was paid by DPS. It was MT staff who directed him in his tasks and not DPS. The training was done by MT. There was a concern at MT that the manufacturing process could be copied.[131] All visitors had to report to the front office and could not pass a yellow line and boom gate.

• [120] In re-examination the plaintiff said that he had the MRI scan which showed the injury on 2 August 2019, the month before he engaged lawyers. He was told of the results.[132]
• [121] With respect to the SWP document (Exhibit 5), he probably did not read each of the documents provided.[133] Regarding the certificate three in private investigations, this was all done online. With regard to the chiropractor's notes[134] he said he did not admit being on the DSP because he was embarrassed. He also had little to do with his children and he did not put down the medication because he could not spell it. [135]
• [122] As regards to the LinkedIn page, he never worked it as a private investigator, and he did this to impress a woman.[136]
• [123] With respect to his travel, he was able to fund this because he inherited a substantial sum of money from his father. The travel was good for his mental health. He described how he would stand up, medicate himself and stretch on flights. He was knocked around after the flights.[137]
• [124] After the back injury in 2011 he had no time off work. He had produced the email concerning his ABN.[138]

• [125] Mark Ferguson gave evidence that he bought the company (DPS) from his mother, and he became the director.[139] He said that MT was owned by Downer. MT produced mineral separation equipment for mines. DPS provided the staff. DPS is a labour hire company. He used to visit MT's premises at Carrara.[140] He knew that there was a moulding section, a fibreglass section etc.[141] They had supplied staff to MT for some 25 years. The process would be that he would receive an order for staff, and he would advertise, receive resumés, and identify that best of the resumés. He then would interview the applicant and then refer the applicant to the client. He said the DPS entered into the contract with Downer (Exhibit 34). He supplied employees to MT. He said that he had gone to Sydney and met the contracts department at Downer concerning a proposal for labour hire services (Exhibit 39). His mother Jennifer Kennedy dealt with this. He also used Neil Fanning to do a workplace health and safety report with respect to this proposal. Mr Fanning visited MT's site. He couldn't really recall why he did this.[142]
• [126] He was shown the schedule to Exhibit 34 which showed that the initial contract was from 1 March 2015 until 28 February 2017. Exhibit 35 was an extension until 30 September 2018. He agreed that Mr Singleton's services were supplied to MT in 2019. He recalled receiving the plaintiff's resumé and employed him (Exhibit 14).[143] He said that he did a referee check. He interviewed Mr Singleton and then contacted Shane Hays or Butch at MT and referred him there.[144] He sent over the resumé. They wanted to interview him at Carrara and Mr Singleton was to be shown the job. He had a medical done through Downer. His job description was as a factory hand.[145] Mr Ferguson said he would receive a purchase order (Exhibit 25). The terms and conditions were later tendered.[146] He would then send an invoice[147] for the supply of services which was paid.
• [127] He visited the MT factory often. The purpose of this was to catch up generally with the managers and he also saw his staff members there. He would organise a meeting with a manager.

• [139] Mr Keough is the factory manager at MT.[178] In July 2019 he was a production technician and a health and safety representative. He worked in the assembly area. He said that he knew the plaintiff's name, but I thought he was not confident with his answer and seemed hesitant.[179]
• [140] He said the plaintiff was injured on 11 July 2019. Mr Keough's role was to assemble the spirals. He was also there for health and safety.[180] The spirals were built from troughs. He was not in the assembly area where the plaintiff was working at the time of the accident but was close by.[181]
• [141] Mr Keough claimed that as the Health and Safety representative, if there was a safety concern "it was my job to look out for everyone" but then he denied being their supervisor.[182] He then said that he was a conduit with management "to make sure that the workplace was safe."[183] I might say, I found these answers inconsistent and I did not accept he was not the supervisor.
• [142] He then said that Shane Hayes was the supervisor on the floor at the time.[184] Yet in the space of 3 transcript pages, said that he did not know if Shane Hayes was there that morning.[185] I find his memory of this day was somewhat limited.
• [143] He said that Mr Singleton was there "maybe days"[186] which to my mind highlights the importance of supervision of the plaintiff.
• [144] With respect to the plaintiff, he did not recall if he had been the plaintiff's buddy.[187] He said he had done the plaintiff's job before.[188] He said that in respect of new staff, there was an induction, and they then buddy up with someone on the floor to show them the manual techniques of the job.[189]
• [145] Mr Keough said that another staff member told him that the plaintiff had been injured.[190] He didn't recall who told him about the accident.[191] After he was told about the accident he had a "chat" with the plaintiff in the assembly area.[192] He guessed that in the whole area there were about half a dozen people.

• [168] Jessica Spaic gave evidence that she is a senior administrator at MT and has been for 25 years. She looks after the reception area in the main building in the factory at Carrara. She said that when one visits the factory, you go to the main building and sign in which is part of the site rules. A person will then come and get them. There has been an electronic system since COVID and a carbon paper book before this.[240] She knows Mark Ferguson. He visited the site regularly a couple of times a year. He would see people such as Shane Hayes and Butch Watt at the factory. Mr Ferguson was never excluded from the site.
• [169] In cross-examination, she conceded that the policy was that a person could only enter the factory with another member of staff. This was for safety reasons. She was not aware that there was an issue regarding secrecy as to manufacturing techniques. The site rules meant that no photos could be taken on the factory floor. She said that Mr Ferguson used to see her personally.

• [170] Mr de Andrade worked for MT as a technical manager, operations manager and then general manager. He was general manager at MT between 2020 and 2023 and before this from August 2013 he was the operations manager.[241]
• [171] He knows Mark Ferguson from DPS. Exhibit 25 is a purchase order from MT to DPS with regard to direct labour hire between March 2019 and December 2019. The total order was $200,020.[242]
• [172] He was also shown Exhibit 26 which he said was an induction document concerning the plaintiff. This was proof of training.[243] Exhibit 5 was the register signed by the production manager to show that the plaintiff had read and understood safe working procedures. Exhibit 27 is a standard work practice concerning the spiral trolley. Exhibit 28 is the safe work procedure concerning demoulding troughs.
• [173] Exhibit 29 is the incident report. This shows that the plaintiff did sustain an injury whilst attempting to prevent the spiral falling from the rack. It was said to be a shoulder strain, but I think this is just simply an error in translation bearing in mind we know that the plaintiff sustained a definite disc protrusion and complained to Mr Keough about back pain.[244]
• [174] Exhibit 30 is a standard work practice of preparing a mould for production. Exhibit 31 is the standard work practice regarding the jib crane. Exhibit 32 is the standard work practice regarding spiral preassembly. Exhibit 33 is the general manual handling SWP. Exhibit 34 is the labour hire agreement between Downer and DPS.
• [175] Mr de Andrade said that he met Mr Ferguson in March 2015, and a contract was agreed upon between the parties.
• [176] Exhibit 35 is a letter of variation which extended the contract from 1 March 2018 until 30 September 2018. Exhibit 36 is an email from Mr Ferguson to Mr de Andrade. Mr Ferguson on 10 February 2017 said "I just wanted to say thank you for extending our contract at Downers for another year. We look forward to doing more business together in 2017."
• [177] Mr de Andrade understood that Mr Ferguson was the owner of DPS. He used to meet Mr Ferguson twice a month and once a month he would see the production manager. On those occasions, Mr Ferguson would go to reception and he would be collected because he couldn't go into the factory unaccompanied. He would pass through the factory to get to the office. He would pass the area where the incident took place and got within one to two meters of it. He could ask for access to the work area but never asked for this. Mr de Andrade would not have refused permission.

"QUESTION: Were you aware that prior to this incident occurring to Mr Singleton on 11 July 2019 that there had been previous occasions when patterns resting on the rails where they were situated for separation of the spirals and the pattern had fallen off the rails.

ANSWER: Yeah they often come off at the end of the rail yep."[282]

• [197] But he then said that they could not fall off the mould. He said that the first turns of the Helicoil were about five kilograms of fibre glass, and it could not fall to the ground because it was still held by the rest of the mould.
• [198] He said that when workers were separating the fibreglass spiral from the mould, they don't have to rest it on the rails; it comes down from a monorail with a jig that rests on the rail, so they don't have to ever handle the weight of the mould. The mould comes down on a chain to the trestles and they just have to wind the helicoil off.[283]
• [199] He said there was no PVC column, it was on a steel jig. He said that the end of the mould is attached to a fixed end- namely a 90-degree bracket so that the mould can never fall off the rail.[284]
• [200] Mr de Andrade said that the column could not be PVC as the moulds go through a heating process which PVC wouldn't handle. This is partly why the column must be steel, but also, they must be certified by an engineer as a lifting beam, and this must be steel on steel. He said that if workers were separating the fibreglass from the mould and it was a PVC column resting on the two steel rails then there was a major error.[285]
• [201] He said that after the demoulding it was then reassembled onto the plastic PVC pipe. He said that if Mr Singleton was separating the fibreglass spiral from the mould, then the column should have been fixed by a pivot hinge to prevent it from failing off the rails.[286]
• [202] He said that once this spiral was in a horizontal position at the demoulding section, it could not fall off because it was secured at one end and the column of the mould was longer than the gap between the stillages.[287] It was after that point that the trough goes through for trimming and then assembly onto the PVC column.[288] He said there were two mechanisms to prevent a mould from falling to the ground.[289]
• [203] He was asked:

"QUESTION: So if the mould did fall to the ground and it wasn't secured by a mechanical pivot device on one of the rails after it had been lowered to the horizontal that would a system contrary to the safe one which ought to have operated is that correct?

ANSWER: That is correct. On condition, the PVC pipe is also shorter than the distance between the rails..."[290]

• [204] Mr de Andrade said that there were two mechanisms preventing the spiral from falling off the rail namely the hinge and the length of the pipe.[291] But he agreed that if the pipe was angled at about 30 to 40 degrees and it was not on the hinge, then it would fall.[292] This was the reason for the buddy system.[293] The buddy has to try and make sure that the PVC is kept perpendicular, and the angle is not allowed to get such that it would fall.[294]
• [205] He claimed he had never seen a mould fall off in the demoulding station in 40 years.[295] I find this evidence contrary to the evidence of Mr Keough and Mr Singleton.
• [206] He was never informed by Mr Keough of previous occasions of a mould falling off the rails.[296] He accepted Mr Keough was the health and safety representative.[297] He agreed that with respect to the system, some slack practices had developed. They would just tick and flick that they had read the documents. MT had this problem in the past.[298]
• [207] He said that there had been a three-year period with zero lost time injuries (LTIs). He said that Mr Singleton did not break the streak of LTI's as there were others before him. He agreed there was no revision of the SWP533 between revision two and revision three arising out of the incident involving Mr Singleton. He said that this was because the injury was a lower rating.[299]
• [208] An independent safety manager wrote the report. The matter did not go higher than Shane Hayes because of the outcome. He said the report indicated a light strain to the shoulder and the plaintiff had taken time off work to see the doctor. He said they probably didn't even get information back from the doctors.[300] I find it quite surprising that he admitted that no further enquiries were made by MT of the doctor or Mr Singleton about his condition after the doctor's consultation.[301]
• [209] He alleged that no one from Downer got back to him about the fact that Mr Singleton had spinal surgery and that they needed to review the system of the task he was doing.

• [214] Dr Don Todman, a neurologist, has provided a number of reports.
• [215] In his first report dated 2 July 2020,[308] he noted that the incident occurred on 11 July 2019. The plaintiff said that when another worker and he had to separate the fibreglass from the pattern, the spiral started to fall off the edge of a bench; he tried to hold the spiral but jerked forward, and as he did so, felt immediate low back pain. The spiral weighed up to 100 kilograms. He was forced to continue to work. Later that day, he went to a general practitioner with an increase in low back pain. He was off work after this, and symptoms were slow to recover. An MRI scan of the lumbar spine show a left L4/5 disc protrusion. He continued to experience high level back pain and surgery was recommended. He had L4/5 microdiscectomy surgery in October 2019. He has continued to experience low back symptoms.
• [216] As at the date of the report, he was still suffering symptoms relating to the accident. There has been pain with bending, lifting and home maintenance jobs. He had difficulty getting out of bed and putting shoes on, and there was pain with driving. He had stopped surfing.
• [217] The doctor concluded the plaintiff sustained injuries in the work accident. This caused trauma to the lumbar spine. All symptoms were related directly to the accident at MT. The symptoms precluded him from returning to previous employment. He determined a 13 per cent whole person impairment, which is the upper end of the range, considering the significant post-operative symptoms and restrictions. There was no pre-existing condition. The symptoms would continue to affect him in day-to-day activities and employment, and he was precluded from working in a factory or physical job. Future work would be limited to lighter, sedentary roles, but he would still be restricted by his pain. At home, he requires assistance for heavier, domestic tasks and home maintenance of up to four hours per week.
• [218] In Dr Todman's second report dated 4 August 2020[309], he noted that the plaintiff had an MRI scan of the lumbar spine. The MRI scan did not demonstrate any major structural abnormality other than post-surgical changes. He suggested weekly physiotherapy and exercise physiology.
• [219] In a third report dated 13 May 2021, Dr Todman noted the plaintiff was still suffering from symptoms relating to the accident which were persistent. The symptoms increased with prolonged sitting, standing and lifting, and there was still some pain at night with poor sleep. He had continued with physiotherapy and an exercise program. He was still experiencing a lot of pain in his low back associated with bending, lifting and home jobs. It was noted the plaintiff had no success in re-entering the workforce. He had mainly worked in physical roles, and this has not been possible since. He was looking into training and study.

• [222] In evidence in chief Dr Todman said that he had been made aware of the plaintiff's travels. He alleged that the travel was not inconsistent with his claimed conditions.[312] I do not accept this evidence. I consider the significant travel engaged in by the plaintiff is inconsistent with his claims of an inability to work.
• [223] He also said that his opinion did not change because of the gym arrangement.[313] I do not accept this evidence. I consider the gym evidence is also inconsistent with the plaintiff's claims of an inability to work.
• [224] In cross-examination the Dr Todman accepted that the plaintiff had told him that he was considering a career in surveillance. He didn't realise that he had actually obtained the qualification.[314]
• [225] The plaintiff also told the doctor at one point that he was looking at the possibility of training in sound production. When he saw him again in April 2025 he did not ask him about the sound production. In his 2025 report he stated, "Mr Singleton has not been successful in re-entering the workplace despite his efforts."[315] He was asked to give evidence about what these efforts were but he could not really give any examples of any "efforts."[316] To my mind he was not able to because no effort has actually been made by the plaintiff to re-enter the workforce.
• [226] He said he conducted physical examinations on both 13 May 2021 and 9 April 2025. He found there was reduced forward flexion and lateral flexion, 30 per cent on each side.[317]
• [227] He said in the 2021 report "The current level of symptoms will preclude Mr Singleton from returning to heavy physical work. He may manage light sedentary roles with the flexibility to be able to move around and stretch. Nonetheless he will require retraining and his chronic back condition will be prejudicial in any applications for future employment."[318]
• [228] By April of 2025, his opinion changed. He said that "In my opinion there is little prospect of any return to work either in a light sedentary of any role are least for the foreseeable future."[319] He accepted that he did not put any reason for the change in his reports.

• [247] Dr Malcolm Foxcroft, psychiatrist, in his report dated 22 July 2020[361] gives a history of the matter. He diagnosed an adjustment disorder with mixed depressed and anxious mood following the injury. There was no evidence of pre-existing psychiatric disorder, mood disorder or psychiatric impairment. The plaintiff began to develop symptoms of a depressed and anxious mood shortly after the injury due to the restrictions in lifestyle and then his relationship deteriorated rapidly. The plaintiff has withdrawn from most of his recreational pursuits and has become despondent and depressed and has intimated suicidal ideation. He continues to experience low back pain. His psychological injuries have some mild impact on his motivation to engage in self-care and personal hygiene activities and other domestic tasks. He has difficulty with motivation, concentration and focus. His psychological injuries are causing a partial incapacity for work. He would have difficulties with retraining. He would have difficulty in engaging in usual activities and working efficiently. He is likely to be disadvantaged on the open labour market due to his physical injuries and his psychological injuries impair his ability to obtain work. He has partial incapacity for work arising from his injuries. He should continue seeing a psychologist for counselling for at least 15 sessions at a cost of $240 per session. He has impairment in his ability to undertake domestic living chores. He has a whole person impairment according to the PIRS Scale of six per cent. His prognosis is guarded. It correlates with the outcome of his physical injuries. His overall prognosis is poor.
• [248] In his report dated 14 May 2025,[362] Dr Foxcroft notes he re-examined the plaintiff. Since the last report, the plaintiff had continued to experience ongoing and severe pain in his lower back. His lifestyle was extremely limited. He confirmed the diagnosis of chronic adjustment disorder with depressed and anxious mood. This followed the injuries. Due to the combined physical and psychiatric injuries he has been unable to engage in any remunerative work since the accident. He remains totally incapacitated for work due to the combined injuries. He would have difficulty undertaking employment activities due to impaired concentration, depressed mood, pessimistic thinking and suicidal ideation in addition to the pain. Combined with his physical injuries he is unable to return to the workforce. He is unlikely to engage in retraining because of impaired ability to focus and concentrate. He is disadvantaged on the open labour market. He should have 15 sessions of psychological counselling at $260 per session and should be prescribed anti-depressants for a five-year period which is a cost of $30 per month under the PBS scheme. A PIRS rating of seven per cent was given with no allocation to a pre-existing condition. He has long term incapacity for work and his overall prognosis is poor.

• [249] Dr Foxcroft gave evidence that he had seen a transcript of the plaintiff's evidence concerning his overseas travel. He found that this evidence has impacted on his opinion.[363] He struggled to understand how the plaintiff could be that depressed but could travel so extensively and he was surprised by this.[364]
• [250] In cross-examination Dr Foxcroft said that he took a history from the plaintiff in May 2025. The plaintiff did not disclose to him the extensive travel. He said he would have asked questions which would have elicited this.[365] He asked the plaintiff whether he would go to places on his own or to new places. The plaintiff said he only went to local places.[366] He was taken to page 10 item two of the PIRS ratings[367] and said he was not told by the plaintiff that sometimes he spent his time out drinking as much as 30 drinks in a session.[368] This evidence was a surprise. From what he read; this evidence was deeply at odds with his presentation.[369] The gym regime also was not consistent with a person who simply used the gym for mental health improvement. It was an extensive gym workout.[370] The doctor's understanding was that his pain had led to the depressive disorder. He was surprised and shocked to read the transcript. He would have to revisit his diagnosis of a depressive disorder. It was hard to see that any depression impeded any working capacity.[371] He could no longer rely on the plaintiff's history. There was also the issue of his completing the private investigator course in only four months. The plaintiff told him that it took 18 months. He said he would have to revisit the whole process. He could not endorse the assessment he had made at the end of his report. He also said the court would need to place a complete caveat on his assessment.[372]
• [251] At page 5,[373] the plaintiff said he could not afford to fund psychiatric treatment. He didn't disclose the inheritance.[374] Also at page 5, he talked about his alcohol and drug use but there was no disclosure about the cocaine use.[375] With respect to the cognitive testing, at page 6 he agreed that if there was a dishonest historian; that would call these tests into doubt. At page 6.9 he referred to the adjustment disorder and he could not be satisfied this was true in light of the further evidence. Also, his assessment of ongoing incapacity for work could not be certain.

• [252] Mrs Helen Coles, occupational therapist, has provided a report dated 10 June 2022.[378] She examined the plaintiff's medical history. In terms of functional capacity, she noted that he had difficulty fully utilising his upper limb function due to his difficulty maintaining an ongoing posture. He had difficulty mobilising on uneven or unstable ground due to pain. He had difficulty negotiating hills or inclines. He rests on his bed for most of the day. He avoids standing and sitting on a soft lounge chair. He experienced difficulties with his personal care. These were described in the report including yard maintenance, cleaning, grocery shopping, meal preparation, garbage removal, bed-making, laundry, ironing and childcare. Mrs Coles formed the opinion the plaintiff was incapable of resuming his former existing occupation because of functional intolerance. He has not been successfully rehabilitated into work. In her view, he is substantially disadvantaged on the open labour market. All of the roles in which he engaged pre-injury are ruled out. He is at a distinct disadvantage seeking work in competition with able-bodied and suitably qualified applicants. He has required assistance with his personal and domestic activities of daily living related to the accident. She estimates that the care, personal and domestic, was approximately two to three hours per day until surgery and then approximately two hours per day whilst living with his uncle, and then two and a-half hours per day for 14 months with his second partner, and then perhaps five hours per week on average. He also requires some basic bathing aids, such as an adjustable height shower seat. As to the cost of weekday daytime care, this is approximately $50 per hour.
• [253] In her supplementary report[379] dated 21 April 2025, Mrs Coles noted that the plaintiff had continued to undergo physiotherapy. He said that he had suffered a hematoma from an adductor tear on the right thigh which occurred as a result of an overly strenuous exercise routine directed by a physiotherapist. He still had lower back pain symptoms, his neck pain had worsened, and his right shoulder clunked. His mood had changed post incident. There was no significant overall change to the gross body function. He had not worked since the incident. Mrs Coles noted there was a consensus of opinion that the plaintiff was incapable of returning to a substantive role at work. He has poor literacy skills. He had previously worked as a labourer or assembler. He had been assessed as totally and permanently disabled. He was appropriately in receipt of the DSP. He was not commercially employable and unlikely to engage in any realistic remunerative endeavour imminently or in the future. He has had the benefit of a housemate doing tasks which he isn't able to do. The hourly average rate is about $70 per hour.

1. Mrs Coles gave evidence that she had read the plaintiff's evidence concerning his travels and was surprised as to the extent of it. He told her only that he had gone to Tasmania for the first report[380] and to Sydney for the second report[381] and thus she was surprised at the amount of overseas travel. She would be interested in knowing how much more medication he took and what he did on this travel before expressing a concluded view. If he was taking a lot more medication the travel might be reasonable.[382]

• [255] She was also taken to his evidence concerning his five to six days a week at the gym. She said that she had not been told this by the plaintiff. In the first report he told her that he had been given a medically imposed 10kg lifting limit, and he had difficulty if such lifting was away from the body.[383] In the second report he said that he attended the gym and did "light upper body weight exercises with his back supported." He usually attends three times per week for about 45 minutes but works within the 10kg limit."[384] She did not understand he was bench pressing as described in the evidence.[385] She agreed the evidence revealed more exercise than she was told.[386] I find this to be a significant omission by the plaintiff in the information he gave to Mrs Coles. She did say that the exercise was good for his mental health and to his credit.[387]
• [256] In cross-examination she said that she did a home visit for her first report of June 2022.[388] She carried out a physical assessment on him but did not get him to do any physical lifting.[389]
• [257] She said that when she does a review she reads back the relevant parts of the report to the client to get them to confirm or update it.[390] If he had told her that he experienced depression prior to the injury she would have noted this.[391] She agreed the plaintiff did not tell her he had experienced depression and had been to see a psychologist shortly before the incident.[392]
• [258] He did tell her he had done a private investigators course. He didn't tell her he was quite bright.[393] He didn't tell her about future study plans.[394] He had difficulties showering because the bathroom was so small.[395]
• [259] She said that she was surprised to find out that in August 2022 he flew to Bali and stayed there on his own for about a month. The duration of the travel is quite surprising.[396] The only travel he mentioned to her as at February 2025 was that he had gone for a trip to Sydney. She always asks the client whether there is anything she has not asked which "you think is relevant." He didn't tell her about the 11 international trips he had taken since he had last seen her when he consulted with her on 21 April 2025. She is fairly meticulous in her questioning. If she had found out about this overseas travel she would have asked many questions about the trips. She agreed that this evidence is relevant to his functionality, and she has missed the opportunity of asking her own questions. Mrs Coles said that had she known about this, she would have asked specific questions as to his functioning when travelling, such as does he put his own bag in the overhead compartment on the plane or does he seek assistance with this. It may or may not have changed her ultimate opinion.

• [272] Dr Robert Labrom, an orthopaedic surgeon, in his report dated 18 January 2021[431] states that he had reviewed previous reports. He also saw a photograph of a spiral fibreglass object similar to the one lifted by the plaintiff. He was also shown various social media platforms from August 2019 showing photography of the plaintiff travelling to Bali, which showed him standing with locals, sitting with them, rotating a roasting pig and demonstrating various poses. As to his current symptoms, the plaintiff complained of lower back pain, which most concerned him. He denied previous lower back pain. He was born in Sydney, finished school at a young age and started work as a fabricating engineer in a local foundry. Since the injury on 11 July 2019, he was not able to return to work. He has remained off work since but has done a course in private investigating. Dr Labrom said that his injury appears consistent with the allegations. He found the plaintiff more likely than not sustained an acute L4/5 disc protrusion with a left sided L5 nerve root compression. He has ongoing back pain which may relate to multi-segment spondylosis and physical deconditioning in the meantime. There have been other psychological stressors. The plaintiff's injuries are consistent with the described mechanism. He does have back ache which corresponds to the likelihood of some underlying pre-existing multi-sequence spondylosis as well as physical deconditioning. He appears inconsistent with his physical examination and level of described pain. His prognosis remains good from a physical perspective. He was concerned there were other psychological factors confounding his progress. Using the AMA 5 Guide, the plaintiff has an 11 per cent impairment of the whole person measurable. One per cent would relate to the underlying multi-segment facet arthropod, which continues to bother him. The person's ongoing treatment remains symptomatic with management using algesia and anti-inflammatories. His physical condition has decreased significantly, and he should do exercise. His current injury and current capacity would potentially be able to see his return to work as a moulder and fabricator. He thought he could work at a desk and, if needed, drive a vehicle. He was concerned the plaintiff had some psychological barriers. He could work until his retirement age.

• [273] A file note was tendered as Exhibit 24. In the file note, Dr Labrom said that he had looked at the plaintiff's MRI of 30 March 2021 and noted there was evidence of a small residual bulge, but it is non-neural compressive and there is no evidence of nerve root impingement. These findings are not significant. There is no evidence of a recurrent disc bulge. He agrees with Dr Tuffley's findings. It is remarkably unusual the plaintiff says he cannot return to work in any form.
• [274] He had been given details of the plaintiff's evidence concerning his travel and gym activities. This evidence crystallised Dr Labrom's opinion. The travel and gym evidence was remarkable which showed the plaintiff was a very busy person with a very active lifestyle and was very functionally able.[432]
• [275] In cross-examination by Mr Hickey, Dr Labrom gave evidence about the so-called failed back syndrome. He says the term is a loose term used mainly in United States literature and it's a blanket explanation if the outcome is one which someone doesn't like. The term has been pretty much abandoned.[433]
• [276] He said that he had regard to Dr Schwindack's letter that the disc surgery was fully successful. He believed there were "non-organic" factors here in the plaintiff's case. Any residual symptoms may more relate to a psychological or "non-organic" condition.[434]
• [277] He had read Dr Todman's reports. He explained there can be different reasons for low back pain.[435] He said that the pain experienced by the plaintiff was in consequence of paraspinal musculature.[436] In this case, after the operation there was no evidence of radiculopathy. On his examination, the plaintiff was walking freely and his straight leg raising was normal. The scar had healed. There was no muscle wasting and he had normal bladder, bowel, and sexual functions. There was no ongoing neural deficit which was shown by the MRI scan dated 30 March 2021. There was no ongoing disc prolapse. He accepted though that the plaintiff had suffered a disc prolapse. He said that things should be going a lot better than the plaintiff claims.[437]
• [278] With respect to his 11 international trips and his gym, these "feats" are commensurate with what he expected. He would expect this level of function. A person who had a problem with their spine could not achieve such things.

• [288] Dr Tuffley, an orthopaedic surgeon, has provided a report dated 14 February 2023.[456] He found that the plaintiff had aggravated pre-existing degenerative change in his lower lumbar spine being the development of a left sided L5-S1 disc protrusion. It was treated surgically on 10 October 2019 with excellent resolution. He should be capable of returning to employment which is light to medium in nature until normal retirement age. In order to return to the workplace, he needs retraining and guidance. His ongoing back pain relates to both the injury of 11 July 2019 and the pre-existing degenerative change in his lumbar spine. The spine injury has resulted in a partial and permanent impairment. Of the currently assessed 11 per cent permanent impairment, 20 per cent of this relates to his pre-existing disease and 80 per cent relates to the accident on 11 July 2019. He has a 9 per cent partial and permanent impairment of the whole person as a direct result of the accident on 11 July 2019.
• [289] With respect to the plaintiff's version, Dr Tuffley noted that although there were some inconsistencies in the versions of events given to various practitioners, there was overall a general consistency in that he attempted to prevent a heavy object falling to the ground which caused him to have a loaded flexion force applied to his back. This led to a disc protrusion. His history did not indicate a past history of lumbar spine issues. There was some neck pain which was investigated in 2015. His thoracic spine pain in 2009 was merely musculo-ligamentous in nature.
• [290] The MRI on 2 August 2019, three weeks post-surgery, demonstrates degenerative change at L4/5 and L5/S1. For a disc protrusion to occur there must be degenerative change which causes weakness. Had the accident of 11 July 2019 not have occurred, there was a significant likelihood he would have suffered a disc protrusion due to the exigencies of normal life. This would have occurred within five to ten years of July 2019. He accepted that the plaintiff's current systems related to the aggravation of degenerative disease at L4/5 consequent on the incident on 11 July 2019. The plaintiff has ongoing impairment due to his low back pain and it was likely this would be experienced throughout his life. The plaintiff should be able to complete light or medium work in the future and returning to the workforce would be of psychological benefit. It was reasonable for the plaintiff to be assessed vocationally and retrained. He was capable of light to medium manual handling. Over time his physical limitations will relate more to the progression of the pre-existing disease than the injury of 11 July 2019.

• [293] Dr Tuffley in his evidence in chief said that he had reviewed the transcript of the evidence of the gym activities and travelling activities of the plaintiff. He formed the view the plaintiff had spent a lot of time travelling in a short space of time. The plaintiff never told him of the overseas travel. He said that the evidence reinforced in his mind the plaintiff could work as a private investigator.[458]
• [294] In cross-examination by Mr Charrington, it was put to him that the plaintiff took Valium before the travel and rose from his seat, stretched, and stood up during the trips. Dr Tuffley agreed that the plaintiff told him that he could not sit for long periods.[459] He said that stretching would help with the back pain.[460]
• [295] He was taken to his report dated 14 February 2023.[461] He said that the plaintiff should be able to return to light to medium employment.[462] He said that this was not a major operation. He said the back pain is subjective and he relies on objective findings.[463] He accepted that anyone who has been off work for over two years, even if their back was normal, is unlikely to return to employment.[464]
• [296] He noted that the general practitioner in January 2020 said the plaintiff had got back to normal functioning.[465] As regards to employment, Dr Tuffley did not dispute that an employer would need to offer the plaintiff employment. With respect to light to medium tasks that would allow him to alter his posture frequently, he believed that some assembly jobs would allow for this such as assembling phones at a desk. Ideally he needs to have a job where his posture can be modified.[466]
• [297] He was taken to paragraph five of page seven of Exhibit 42A where he noted that the plaintiff's ongoing back pain relates to both the injury of 11 July 2019 and the presence of pre-existing degenerative change in his lumbar spine, particularly at L4/5 and L5/S1. He said that over time his back pain will relate more to the progression of degenerative change rather than the injury. He agreed that degenerative change doesn't necessarily produce symptoms. He said it was more likely there would be more symptoms the greater the degeneration. This is not speculative. He agreed that heavy physical work would be more likely to produce symptoms. He said that the plaintiff's back pain was caused by both degenerative disease and the injury. The leg pain had resolved. He did have a pre-existing degenerative condition which rendered him susceptible to the protrusion. Part of the ongoing problems are attributable to the pre-existing disease but most to the injury.

• [312] Dr John Chalk, psychiatrist, has provided a report dated 21 July 2025.[490] The plaintiff was single with three children. He was living with a housemate. He had little contact with his children. He was on a DSP. He completed school partway through year nine and left school at 15. He worked as an apprentice moulder for four years which was the longest continuous period of employment. He continued to experience discomfort. He has quite an active social life. Dr Chalk noted it appeared the plaintiff developed significant psychiatric difficulties in the aftermath of the failure of this injury to resolve and he had developed symptoms of the mixed anxiety and depressive illness. It would appear he had significant difficulties previously in the settings of a difficult relationship. One would expect an adjustment disorder to resolve once the underlying cause of the condition has been remediated. He believed the plaintiff had capacity for work and would be able to undertake some form of employment within his physical limitations initially on a part time basis. There was a degree of permanent impairment which he assessed at one per cent. He did not believe the plaintiff required any psychiatric or psychological treatment.

• [313] In evidence, Dr Chalk said he had read a transcript of the plaintiff's evidence as to his travels and gym activity. He said that he maintained his opinion.[491] He agreed that the plaintiff told him that he went to the gym five days a week.[492] He noted that the plaintiff travelled to Bali.[493] This was from the material he had read.[494]
• [314] He said that the plaintiff had developed symptoms of mixed anxiety and a depressive illness. He noted that the plaintiff did have difficulties previously. As to the present condition, he said that this disorder would resolve once the underlying cause of the condition had resolve. It may not resolve.[495]
• [315] The pre-existing conditions related to relationship issues and they might have resolved. The ongoing psychological symptoms relate to the physical injury.

• [316] The plaintiff points out that it is admitted that a supervisor assigned the plaintiff to the task of manually separating the fibreglass spirals from moulds with a co-worker and that he was performing this task when he was injured. It is submitted it is indisputable that the plaintiff suffered a back injury as a consequence of the incident as he reported it to Mr Keough. He was then driven by Mr Keough to Sonic Health where Dr Simonds recorded "acute onset of lower back and proximal leg pain."
• [317] As a consequence of the incident, the plaintiff was diagnosed by an MRI scan as having suffered an L4/5 disc protrusion with L5 nerve root compression which required surgery which occurred on 2 October 2019. It is submitted he also developed an adjustment disorder. It is submitted he has been unable to return to work since the incident; being on a DSP and having successfully claimed for TDP with his superannuation fund.
• [318] The plaintiff points out that at the time of the incident, he was 34 years of age and had been employed with the second defendant for about six weeks. He had limited literacy skills and left school without completing year nine. Prior to the incident he had suffered no work-related back injury. He had served about 18 years of manual work. He was very fit prior to the incident. There was a left wrist and thumb injury in 2010 and he was off work for four to five months and returned to work with no further left-hand difficulties.
• [319] In 2018 and 2019, prior to the incident, he had some anxiety and depression symptoms. Since the incident he has been unable to return to many of his sporting activities and no longer participates in surfing, tennis or team sports. For the period after undergoing the back surgery, he has sought ongoing treatment including prescription and over the counter medication, physiotherapy, heat packs, rehabilitation etc.

• [320] It is submitted the plaintiff's evidence would be accepted. On 11 July 2019 at about 5.30am, he was assigned the task with an unnamed and unidentified coworker of separating the fibreglass spirals from the mould. Whilst he was doing this task he manoeuvred the spiral along the rail, but the coworker did not move his end of the spiral to enable it to remain perpendicular. As a result, the spiral fell off the rail pulling the plaintiff forward and jolting him. They were both required to lift the fallen end back onto the rail. By reason of this activity, the plaintiff suffered immediate pain to his back. He reported the incident to his supervisor Paul who instructed him to return to his duties. He suffered further pain and told Paul and was then put in a lighter role/position. The pain continued and ultimately he was driven to the doctor.
• [321] Mr Keough's evidence would not be accepted where he denied being a supervisor. Both the plaintiff and Mr de Andrade gave that evidence. Also, Mr Keough denied the plaintiff complained about his back, but the fact is he suffered an acute disc protrusion and Mr Keough's evidence is unlikely and unreliable.

• [322] As regards the employer DPS (the first defendant), the employer owes a non-delegable duty of care towards its employees.[496] A host employer owes a duty of care which is also nondelegable.[497] It is submitted that both defendants owed the plaintiff a duty to take reasonable care to avoid the risk of foreseeable harm to the plaintiff. With respect to the breach of duty, the plaintiff relied on the decision of Wyong Shire Council v Shirt.[498] Section 305B of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) (WCRA) applies with respect to the first defendant.
• [323] As regards MT (the second defendant), it is submitted the plaintiff was required to undertake with the co-worker what was a difficult manual handling task involving manually rolling a heavy long fibreglass spiral weighing between 50 to 100kgsalong rails. Mr de Andrade gave evidence there ought to have been a hinge or pivot mechanism connecting and locking one end of the pattern to one of the rails upon which the pattern rested. This would have prevented the pattern from falling. Alternatively, the end of the column ought to have been covered with a collar which would have reduced the risk of the end of the pattern falling off rails. The description of the event shows that the pattern was not so fixed or protected. The plaintiff also gave evidence of six previous occasions when this had occurred. It can be inferred the system described by Mr de Andrade was not in place over the period in which the plaintiff was at the second defendant's premises. It is submitted that despite the risk of the heavy pattern and spiral falling, the measures referred to by Mr de Andrade were not in place and further there was no documented SWP dealing with the risk associated with this process or any instructions as to the process nor any warning of the risks. The only written items relating to the task were Items 15 and 16 of Exhibit 28B, which did not include any instructions as to the task. The only other instructions given to workers were given orally or by way of a buddy. The general handling manual SWP did not deal with such a task. There were no written instructions as to how to perform the task of separating the heavy fibreglass spirals from the pattern. The buddy responsible for training the plaintiff was not called. There was nothing in the SWPs or other documents providing instruction.

• [329] With respect to the second defendant on the issue of causation, the principles in March v Stramare[500] apply. As regards the first defendant, s 305D of the WCRA applies which requires the proof of factual causation and the fact it is appropriate to extend liability.
• [330] In this particular case the plaintiff's injury occurred when his body was moved in a rapid forward flexion movement when the pattern he was holding onto for the purpose of separating the spiral from the pattern fell. Had it been affixed to the rail or collar it is likely the fall would not have occurred, and the injury would not have happened. Had the co-worker made sure the PVC column was kept reasonably perpendicular to the steel rails, it was unlikely the pattern would have fallen. Had the plaintiff been warned of the risk of injury, the injury was unlikely to have occurred. It is submitted that causation been established.
• [331] As regards foreseeability in respect of the first defendant, s 305B of the WCRA applies. As regards to the second defendant, the common law test applies. The risk of the pattern falling was presumably within the knowledge of the second defendant as there was a system in place to prevent this described by Mr de Andrade. The risk was also known to Mr Keough who had seen this happen a number of times. This risk was not insignificant and was not far-fetched or fanciful.

• [332] With respect to contributory negligence, the plaintiff submits that it is well established that contributory negligence will not apply where the accident can be characterised as mere inadvertence or inattention or misjudgement.[501] The plaintiff relies on a number of cases in this regard. Of course, each case depends on its own facts. It is submitted that no indicia of contributory negligence has been established. The general manual handling training did not address the specific risk here and he was performing the subject task in the usual way.

• [333] The plaintiff refers to the medical evidence. As to the issue of pre-existing degeneration of the spine, the plaintiff's evidence was that he had not suffered any significant lower back pain previously. Any pre-existing degeneration in the spine was asymptomatic at the time. It is submitted that it is not appropriate for an expert to opine as to when an asymptomatic pre-existing condition would become significant and to what extent.[502] It is therefore submitted that no or little weight should be attached to Dr Tuffley's report that it is likely there would be the development of a disc protrusion within five to ten years of 11 July 2019. This should be disregarded but can be taken into account when discounting damages.
• [334] Generally with respect to the gym evidence, it is submitted that the plaintiff had been very fit and active before the incident. He had built up post-surgery to attending the gym five to six days a week. It was submitted that the gym evidence should not undermine his credibility. It was also beneficial for his mental health. It should also be borne in mind that Dr Labrom recommended that he do some gym work.
• [335] It was accepted that the plaintiff was less than forthcoming as regards his overseas travel. He did give evidence though that he used it to escape his current circumstances and to improve his mental health. He could afford to do it after he inherited money. The plaintiff points out there are a number of measures he took in order to reduce back pain and discomfort. It is submitted that the travel was made possible by these measures. Mrs Coles thought they were reasonable.
• [336] It is submitted the opinions of the experts were tainted to a degree because of the questions concerning the use of the motor scooter which was inconsistent with the actual evidence.
• [337] As regards the alleged false LinkedIn posts, these were done to impress a woman. It would be accepted that many people sell themselves on sites such as this and in this case, this is what has happened. Mrs Coles would not change her assessment about the plaintiff's capacity.
• [338] As regards the plaintiff undertaking the certificates in investigative services, there is a difference between completing a course and actually doing the work.
• [339] As regards his return-to-work prospects, Dr Todman's evidence should be accepted. It was supported by Mrs Coles' evidence. It should be concluded that the plaintiff will not be able to return to work.

• [365] The plaintiff has significant credibility issues. It is submitted that the plaintiff has given inconsistent statements to medical professionals and inconsistent evidence. He withheld relevant information from the court as to his extensive international travel and activities and his time in the gym when he was giving evidence in chief and did not tell the medical experts about this. He told health professionals his occupation was that of a private investigator as well as creating a LinkedIn page declaring skills, expertise and qualifications he has obtained. His failure to be candid is relevant to his allegations of pain and the opinions of the experts who have relied on the plaintiff's self-reporting.

• [366] It is submitted that the record of Sonic Health is not consistent with the plaintiff's evidence. It is submitted that the plaintiff's evidence as to how the incident occurred should not be accepted. It is however accepted that the contemporaneous evidence does support and is consistent with the plaintiff's version of events.[512]
• [367] As to Mr Ferguson's evidence, it is submitted that Mr Ferguson on behalf of the first defendant provided the staff to the Carrara factory. He obtained a report from Mr Fanning, a workplace health and safety person, to check over the worksites including this one. Mr Ferguson had attended the factory many times over the years. He regularly spoke with the managers and prior to the installation of barriers, was able to walk more freely around the factory. He would raise concerns with the second defendant if any of his employees raised them. He knew that the second defendant would have treated concerns seriously.
• [368] As to Mr Keough's evidence, he was working close by to the plaintiff when the incident occurred. It is submitted that it was put to the plaintiff by the second defendant's senior counsel that after the incident occurred, the plaintiff went to Mr Keough and told him the mould had fallen onto the floor and he had strained his shoulder. Mr Keough's evidence was different to that. He said he was told that someone had a pinched nerve in the neck. Mr Keough then went and had a chat with the plaintiff and asked him whether he was okay, and the plaintiff said he was okay to continue. He later had a chat with the plaintiff about 10 minutes later and the plaintiff said he was not doing well, and his shoulder was sore. The plaintiff then received first aid. He later spoke to the plaintiff outside of the staff room and then drove the plaintiff home because he didn't want to wait around for the doctor. Mr Keough gave some evidence about the system of induction. Mr Keough was later told that a spiral had left the railing which was consistent with what the plaintiff had said. He also gave evidence that spirals had come off rails previously and was not aware of any instruction or warning to a worker about patterns falling off the rail.
• [369] As to Mr de Andrade's evidence, he gave evidence about the SWPs and the log. He also talked about the buddy system in place and people such as Paul Keough would be a supervisor for the spirals. He gave evidence the moulds were on steel centre columns and the end of the mould where the worker was would be attached by pivots such they could never fall off the rail.

• [374] If the court finds that each of the first and second defendants breached their respective duties of care, an apportionment of 25 per cent against the first defendant and 75 per cent against the second defendant is agreed.

• [375] It is submitted the issues with the plaintiff's credibility relate particularly to quantum. The medical opinions rely to a significant degree upon the self-reporting by the plaintiff. The plaintiff has given inconsistent evidence of or has not told the medical experts about the following matters:

(a) His international travel.

(b) His attendance at the gym and the extent of his gym activities.

(c) The extent of his medication.

(d) The plaintiff's completion of qualifications in private investigations (including the time taken to complete those investigations) and the obtaining of a licence as a private investigator.

(e) His reporting of his occupation as a private investigator including on a LinkedIn page as compared to his being on the disability pension.

(f) The extent of the plaintiff's social activities including socialising with friends and alcohol consumption.

(g) The plaintiff's recreational drug use.

• [376] As regards the international travel, the first defendant points out that the plaintiff undertook 11 international trips between 11 August 2022 and 4 March 2025. He failed to disclose these trips to Mrs Coles who would have made further enquiries if he had. There was no mention to Dr Tuffley about an upcoming trip in 2023 and didn't tell Dr Todman about the trips when he saw him in April 2025. He didn't inform Dr Foxcroft about his travel when he saw him in May 2025.
• [377] It is submitted the failure of the plaintiff to inform the medical experts about any of these trips is a serious and significant withholding of relevant information.
• [378] With regard to his gym activities, it was pointed out that the plaintiff conceded he lied to Mrs Coles about these. There are multiple inconsistencies in his evidence concerning this.
• [379] There is also inconsistency about the extent of his medication. He informed the Gold Coast Hospital on 23 July 2025 that he was not taking medications which is similar to what he told the chiropractic surgery on 12 February 2025. As compared to that, he told other doctors that he was taking medication. It is submitted that the PBS history does not assist the plaintiff, particularly his allegation that he took Endone for flights.[513]
• [380] As regards his qualifications as a private investigator and obtaining a licence, he did not tell all the medical experts as to his qualifications. He did not tell Mrs Coles that he completed the second certificate of private investigation and lied to Dr Foxcroft stating it took him 18 months to do the course, when in fact it took only four months. Dr Foxcroft said that he could not rely on the self-reported history because of this.
• [381] It is also submitted that Mr Singleton has reported on three different occasions that his occupation was that of a private investigator namely at the Gold Coast Hospital on 23 July 2025; to the chiropractor clinic on 12 February 2025 and in the LinkedIn page. He also lied in the LinkedIn page about having a bachelor's degree in engineering from Bond University. It would not be accepted that he did this simply to impress a woman. Also, he lied about his drug use and claimed that he did not use cocaine on 10 February 2022. This is inconsistent with the Tweed Valley Hospital records. It is also inconsistent with a note made by Mr Murphy a psychologist on 16 February 2022. He did not tell the medical experts as to the extent of his socialising with friends and his alcohol consumption.

• [404] The second defendant submits that the plaintiff is unreliable. It is submitted that in evidence in chief he told Mr Charrington that his normal day involved watching tv, watching social media, playing chess, going for a walk, having a sit down and a relax, going to the gym and then going home. He said there was a difference in his enjoyment of travel now and he can't do the things that he once did, for example surfing and going on hikes up volcanoes.
• [405] In cross examination, the plaintiff conceded that he had gone to Manila in October and November of 2024 and described a number of very active pursuits in Manila, Cebu City, Moalboal and El Nino. It is submitted this is entirely inconsistent with the plaintiff's evidence in chief. It is further submitted that the plaintiff was not forthright to doctors whom he saw, namely Dr Scott Thompson when he was attempting to get support for his NDIS application. He attended Dr Thompson on 29 October 2024, two days before he left for Manila and made no disclosure about the forthcoming trip.
• [406] It would not be accepted that the plaintiff "dosed up" and stretched on the flight when one considers that there was no mention by the plaintiff to Dr Thompson of the eight international trips he had already undertaken; the fact he was shortly going to go to Manila; of the problems with flying and the need for medication for that purpose.
• [407] Despite the Manila trip and the 10 other international holidays, he told Dr Foxcroft that his lifestyle was extremely limited and spent it managing pain and minimising exacerbations. Dr Foxcroft asked the plaintiff where he was able to go and what he could do on his own and the plaintiff did not tell Dr Foxcroft of the travel. He told Mrs Coles that he had no focus on his life and just lay on the bed a lot. He told her about a recent trip to Sydney but did not mention the overseas travel.
• [408] It is also submitted that his gym regimen elicited in cross examination was at odds with what he had told the doctors. He was going to the gym five to six days a week since late 2021 and described a very active gym regimen. By contrast, he told Mrs Coles that he only did light upper body weight exercise with his back supported, within a 10kg limit which was medically imposed. It was submitted that even during his evidence, the plaintiff sat for prolonged periods rarely shifting from his posture or standing up, which was inconsistent with his evidence that he could not sit in the same spot without having to move and get up and down.

• [413] With respect to the accident itself, the plaintiff has alleged he was separating the fibreglass spiral skewered by a PVC pole from the mould (the trough) which was attached to the mould. One end of the object fell to the floor, but the other end did not. It is submitted that Exhibit 15 is the Exhibit which shows the demoulding process the plaintiff was undertaking at the time of the alleged incident. This is inconsistent with his evidence that the photographs in Exhibit 2 showed the process. As to the weight of the object, it is submitted that there is no evidence upon which the court can rely about the weight. He gave evidence it was up to 100kgs, but he was only informed of this by speaking to co-workers. It was put to the plaintiff at one point it was 30kgsand at another point 52kgs and he had no opinion on this. It was ultimately accepted by the parties that a finding could be made that the weight was somewhere between 52 and 100kgs.
• [414] It is submitted that if the court accepts the object did fall of the rail, only one half of it did. In those circumstances the court cannot make a finding that the weight of the end of the object that fell to the floor was more than 26kgs.
• [415] It is submitted that the note of Dr Simonds indicates the plaintiff initially injured his shoulder whilst attempting to stop the object from falling. After it was lifted back to the rail, he then suffered an acute onset of lower back and proximal left leg pain. It is submitted that significant weight should be given to note of Dr Simonds and the court should find:

(a) The object fell off the rail and, in the process, pulled the plaintiff forward and jolted the plaintiff as it hit the floor; and

(b) The plaintiff and his co-worker lifted the fallen end of the object back onto the rail.

• [416] The plaintiff alleges that his supervisor directed him to return to the task on which he was working, and a similar incident happened. He gave evidence that Mr Keough was his supervisor. Despite the evidence given by Mr de Andrade the court would find that Mr Keough was not the supervisor of the plaintiff. It should be found that Mr Keough did not direct the plaintiff with respect to the performance of his work. It should also be found that Mr Keough was reliable and truthful, and he did not direct the plaintiff to continue work as alleged.
• [417] As to the second incident, it is submitted that there is no medical evidence supporting a finding that the condition worsened due to the second incident.

• [418] On the question of liability, it is accepted that the second defendant assumed a duty to the plaintiff to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable risk of harm and this duty extended to taking reasonable care that the system of work in the factory did not expose workers to unreasonable risk of physical injury.[522]
• [419] In reliance on Wyong Shire Council v Shirt,[523] it is submitted that the plaintiff has not proved his claim as he has not led evidence to address:

(a) The cost and difficultly of taking any proposed precautions; and

(b) Any conflicting responsibilities the second defendant may have needed to consider.

• [420] With respect to the issue of foreseeability, it is submitted that the circumstances of the incident have not been put to the experts. The second defendant relies on the evidence of Dr Tuffley as regards to the risk of suffering disc protrusion. It is submitted that his opinion cannot support the proposition that the task gave rise to a risk that was reasonably foreseeable.
• [421] As to causation, the second defendant relies on Prasad v Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd.[524] It is submitted the medical evidence led at the trial does not assist the court to decide whether but for his being pulled forward or his having to lift the fallen end, he probably would not have suffered the injury to his lumbar spine.
• [422] With respect to the allegation of breach of duty and causation, it is submitted that it cannot be proved that the object was of an excessive weight. In any event, it is submitted that the plaintiff did not lead evidence to the effect that lifting a weight of 26 kilograms gave rise to any foreseeable risk. With respect to Dr Tuffley's evidence that a rapid forward flexion movement whilst holding an object weighing above 50 kilograms would be likely to produce a protrusion, this should not be accepted.
• [423] To prove there was an unsafe system, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove the second defendant ought to have known the risk of harm. It is submitted that even if the weight of the object was excessive or the system of work unsafe, there was no evidence led of reasonable steps available to mitigate the risk. It is submitted that there were plenty of other people around who the plaintiff could have asked for assistance. It is submitted it is not open to the court to find that the second defendant breached its duty of care as to the maintenance and creation of the system of work. It is also submitted that the plaintiff has not proved that any alternative action to mitigate the risk would have affected the outcome.
• [424] With respect to the allegation of failing to provide plant and equipment, it is submitted that the actual distance between the rails at the time of the incident was not explored. Even if the incident did occur as alleged, it may be the rails were of the minimum possible distance to accommodate the pattern. The plaintiff has not particularised what different plant or equipment he alleged ought to have been provided to him aside from collars on the poles.

• [434] As regards contributory negligence, the second defendant's claim is brought under s 10 of the Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld). It relies on Astley v AusTrust Ltd.[526] It is submitted that the plaintiff suffered the injury wholly or partly as a result of his own negligence, mainly by:

(a) Catching or grabbing the spiral.

(b) Failing to comply with his manual handling training and lifting the spiral.

(c) Failing to obtain or request appropriate assistance from the second defendant in the performance of the work.

(d) The second defendant relies on the plaintiff's evidence as to his work history.

• [435] It is submitted that Mr Keough's evidence was that there were a number of people in the factory who could have been asked for assistance. In those circumstances, a finding of contributory negligence is open.

• [436] With respect to quantum, it is submitted that the plaintiff seeks damages on the basis that he continues to suffer significant spinal symptoms and a related psychiatric injury but this position is inconsistent with the factual evidence.
• [437] The second defendant relies on the evidence of Dr Labrom and Dr Tuffley. It further submits the court cannot rely on the conclusions of Dr Foxcroft. It is submitted that Dr Todman's evidence would not be accepted. As to Mrs Coles, her opinion was based entirely on the plaintiff's self-reporting and she was not told of the 11 overseas trips or of the gym activities.
• [438] Ultimately, the second defendant accepts that the plaintiff suffered a disc protrusion at L4/5 on 11 July 2019 and as a result, there was surgery. It is submitted the general damages should be in the order of $35,000. As to the past economic loss, it is submitted that he should have returned to work by January 2020. Calculating his rate of pay at $800 per week for the 42-week period, this amounts to $34,057.14. In oral argument, Mr Hickey conceded that a global sum of $40,000 to $50,000 should be awarded thereafter until the present date, bearing in mind the evidence that there was impairment of earning capacity.
• [439] With respect to future economic loss, it was submitted a global award of $25,000 is appropriate. There was no disagreement about the Fox v Wood[527] component.
• [440] As to special damages, it is submitted that the plaintiff has not proved the Medicare payments relate to the incident. Only a minimal amount would be allowed for future special damages.
• [441] It is submitted that no damages for care should be awarded, particularly bearing in mind that witnesses were not called on this question in support of the plaintiff.
• [442] In summary total damages would be between $220,622.18 and $230,622.18.
• [443] In oral submissions Mr Hickey said it would be accepted that the plaintiff sustained an injury to his back, but the second defendant is not liable. It would be accepted that for a period of time his life was disrupted, but not to the extent the plaintiff claims. It should be borne in mind that pain is based on the plaintiff's self-reporting.
• [444] Mr Hickey submitted that the plaintiff lied in a number of respects to the chiropractor and on the LinkedIn page. He was unfaithful. As to the travel activity, he gave no evidence about this in chief and it can be inferred that he did not tell his lawyer. He also lied in evidence in chief. The fact is he attends the gym six days a week, this is a heavy gym attendance, and I would have doubts about him only exercising for 30 to 40 minutes. It was submitted he has a capacity to work, bearing in mind the gym routine, which are heavy workouts. It was submitted he was not frank with the court and this information was concealed.

• [452] Any findings I make are on the balance of probabilities. It is for the plaintiff to prove his case.
• [453] I also note that it has been said previously that a judge is not required to mention every fact or argument relied on by a losing party as relevant to an issue.[529] It has been said this is unsustainable.[530]
• [454] Where the evidence of Mr Keough and the plaintiff conflict, I prefer the evidence of the plaintiff. I thought the plaintiff had a better memory of the events than Mr Keough.
• [455] I first turn to the plaintiff. I have carefully scrutinised his evidence and take into account my findings (that I discuss below) as to his exaggeration of the effect of the injury on his functional capacity and other alleged lies he has told.
• [456] Despite these criticisms of the plaintiff, I accept his version on how the injury occurred.
• [457] There are a number of reasons for this:

(a) There is no doubt he suffered a disc protrusion at L4/5. As Mr Charrington submitted, this is a serious injury. It has left the plaintiff with about a 10 per cent whole person impairment. The MRI scans done soon after 11 July 2019 show there is a definite injury at L4/5. He underwent surgery soon thereafter. The incident report (Exhibit 29) notes that the plaintiff suffered an injury attempting to prevent the spiral mould from falling. Whilst there is reference to the shoulder I think that is only an error in translation. Generally, this near contemporaneous document supports the plaintiff's version. Mr Keough accepts he was told about the back at one point.

(b) There was a specific complaint of back pain to Dr Simmons soon after the event. I accept Mr Charrington's submission that the notes are not written in prose. It is a summary. I do not think the mention of the acute back pain is necessarily linked to the second incident rather than the first.

(c) I also bear in mind that the plaintiff would have been in considerable pain when speaking to Mr Keough and to the Doctor.

(d) Dr Todman specifically said that the MRI supported the plaintiff's description of the injury.[531] I accept this aspect of his evidence. I also accepted Dr Todman's evidence that what is relevant is the degree of force and positioning.

(e) Dr Labrom and Dr Tuffley agree that the injury is consistent with the plaintiff's explanation.[532] Indeed Dr Tuffley says that the cause of the disc protrusion was the heavy loading of the plaintiff's spine on 11 July 2019.[533]

• [458] As to Mr Keough I have already made some observations as to his evidence. I thought that his recall was poor. I also thought it relevant that he first put in writing his memory of the events sometime after the events in question. I consider the plaintiff did tell him that his back was sore. The fact is the plaintiff had a back injury observable on the MRI results. I find that Mr Keough did drive him to the Doctors. I also find that the plaintiff's version is correct when he said that Mr Keough told him to go back to work. I also accept that the same thing occurred, and that the plaintiff was put on the task of putting washers on bolts. I accept the plaintiff's evidence that he was told to stand in the sun and that Mr Keough put deep heat on his back.
• [459] I also preferred the evidence of Mr de Andrade that Mr Keough was in fact the supervisor on the day of the incident. I did not accept Mr Keough's denials of this. Mr de Andrade's evidence is consistent with the plaintiff on this point.
• [460] I also accept the plaintiff's evidence that his training at MT was limited to a one-day program. I accept that on the day of the incident he was working with an inexperienced co-worker and there was no ongoing supervision. I accept that the plaintiff was stripping off the mould with the end of the spiral (at least 26 kgs) sitting on the rail. I accept the co-worker did not keep it straight and it fell off and the plaintiff was jolted forward, causing the injury.
• [461] I accept the submission made by Mr Charrington that the SWPs did not deal with the risks involved when working with the spirals and demoulding. The only direct reference to the procedure was at items 15 and 16 of Exhibit 28B which did not advise of any risk or of any measures to avoid such a risk.
• [462] I also find that there was no warning given as to the risk of the spiral falling and the dangers of this in any of the documents tendered. I also consider it was unlikely there was any such instruction. No witness was called by either defendant to say that there was, and the plaintiff did not recall such instruction being given.
• [463] I also find that the SWPs did not deal with any measures to avoid the risk of the spiral falling.
• [464] I also accept Mr de Andrade's evidence that the spiral should not have fallen off because when demoulding, the end of the spiral skewer should have been affixed to the rail by a locking device or a collar. Also, the co-worker should have held it perpendicular to reduce the risk of it falling. I also find there was no system of warning the workers of the importance of keeping the spiral perpendicular if it was not secured to the rail.

(a) Dr Tuffley noted the GP thought the plaintiff could return to employment by mid-2020.[538] He also noted that the plaintiff did not have experience in doing light to medium work.[539] To my mind, this supports the contention that six months retraining would have been appropriate.

(b) The WorkCover benefits ceased in July 2020.[540]

(c) Dr Labrom thought that the plaintiff was able to return to work by 2020.[541]

(d) Dr Tuffley accepted that the plaintiff would need some retraining and guidance.[542]

(e) Also, Dr Todman in his 2020 report thought that the plaintiff could do lighter sedentary roles in the future.

• [481] To my mind, the plaintiff was capable of doing some type of work in 2021-2022 and on, for the following reasons:

(a) As at October 2021, he was regularly catching up with people and he had a social life revolving around alcohol.[543]

(b) By late 2021 on the plaintiff's own evidence, he had started back at the gym culminating in heavy gym activity.[544]

(c) His LinkedIn page[545] noted that "Health and Wellbeing" career break finished in December 2021 and his "career transition" started in January 2022.

(d) He was out drinking and taking cocaine in early 2022.[546] He was found heavily intoxicated on a beach and brought into the emergency department.

(e) He was able to hike up to the Minyon falls in early 2022.[547]

(f) He started travelling again in August 2022 and undertook considerable amounts of travel after that.

(g) By mid-2022, he was using an e-scooter and fell off it.[548]

• [482] Allowing for a period for retraining, I consider that January 2021 is when the plaintiff was likely to be able to return to some form of employment. This is an important date when it comes to the assessment of damages in this case.
• [483] I do accept though that the plaintiff has an impaired capacity for work in the jobs which he originally held. Dr Tuffley and Dr Todman agree on this, as does Mrs Coles.
• [484] On the issue of Dr Tuffley's estimate on when he would have developed symptoms anyway, I place limited weight on this as it is ultimately a guess. In Spencer v Downie,[549] Crow J made the observation that it is difficult to accept how an expert can offer a reliable opinion about when an asymptomatic pre-existing condition would have become significant. I think the evidence is, at most, relevant to the discounting exercise factors in this case.
• [485] In the circumstances, I find on the balance of probabilities that:

(a) The plaintiff suffered an injury at his place of work on 11 July 2019. This led to a L4/5 disc protrusion.

(b) He had asymptomatic degenerative change at the L4/5 and L5/S1 levels and thus the injury was the aggravation of pre-existing degenerative change in his lower lumbar spine.[550]

(c) He was treated surgically on 2 October 2019 with excellent resolution of his left L5 sciatica.

(d) It would have taken time for the plaintiff to recover from the injury and to engage in retraining. I find he was capable of doing the lighter work described by Dr Labrom and Dr Tuffley by January 2021.

(e) I do find though that he cannot return to the occupation which he previously held. In this regard, I prefer Dr Tuffley's view to Dr Labrom's. In any event, Dr Labrom only expresses it as a possibility.[551]

(f) The Plaintiff is capable of returning to work of a light to medium nature which allows him to vary his posture.[552] He does need some retraining.

(g) I find has a whole person permanent impairment of about 10 per cent relating to the injury.[553]

(h) He is capable of self-managing his lumbar spine discomfort and does not need domestic care.

(i) It may have been that non-incident related conditions would have compromised his capacity for work as a factory worker.

(j) He could work as a powder coater, private investigator with Uber Eats or in a similar job. He could also work at a factory bench, provided he can alter his position.

• [486] I note objection was taken to Mr Hickey's cross examination of Dr Labrom. I ruled that he could. However, even if I was wrong with this ruling, I would have preferred Dr Tuffley to Dr Todman in any event.
• [487] Dr Foxcroft gave evidence to the effect that in light of the plaintiff's evidence, his opinion could not really be relied upon. I therefore accept the evidence of Dr Chalk.
• [488] I also accept Dr Chalk's evidence that:

(a) The plaintiff has a mixed anxiety and depressive illness.

(b) He did have difficulties previously.[554]

(c) The adjustment disorder will resolve once the underlying cause has resolved.

(d) He is capable of performing work within his physical limitations, at least initially on a part time basis.

(e) He does not require ongoing psychiatric or psychological treatment.

(f) His final WPI is 1 per cent.

• [489] Subject to any statutory modifications in an action for negligence, the plaintiff must usually prove the following elements on the balance of probabilities[555]:

(a) That a duty of care was owed by the defendant to the plaintiff i.e. was the risk of injury reasonably foreseeable.

(b) That the defendant breached the duty of care i.e. it failed to employ measures to obviate the risk of injury.

(c) That injury (damage) was caused by the defendant's breach.

• [490] I propose to discuss the second defendant's position first.

• [491] The authorities provide that a host employer owes a duty to take reasonable care to a worker which is analogous to what the actual employer owes. [556] Indeed in Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd,[557] the High Court held that employment is not the only circumstance giving rise to a duty to provide a safe system of work.
• [492] Such principles are apt in this case as the second defendant had control over the tasks allocated to the plaintiff and of the system of work employed. The second defendant was also responsible for the training of the plaintiff.
• [493] Indeed, with reference to Thompson v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd,[558] the second defendant accepts that it owed a duty of care which extended the taking reasonable care that the system of work did not expose the workers to unreasonable risk of injury.
• [494] In Wyong Shire Council v Shirt_[559]_ Mason J said that a duty of care arises as between a plaintiff and a defendant where there exists a sufficient relationship of proximity such that a reasonable man in the defendant's position would foresee that carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the plaintiff. The test is an "undemanding" one and injury may be foreseeable even if unlikely or a remote possibility.
• [495] An employer owes a non-delegable duty to devise, institute and enforce a safe place of work and safe system of work so as to avoid exposing workers to unnecessary and unreasonable risks. [560] It is the duty of the modern employer to take measures to prevent workplace accidents. It must establish a safe system of work, maintain it and enforce it.[561]
• [496] In Czatyrko v Edith Cowan University[562] it was said:

"An employer owes a non-delegable duty of care to its employees to take reasonable care to avoid exposing them to unnecessary risks of injury. If there is a real risk of an injury to an employee in the performance of a task in a workplace, the employer must take reasonable care to avoid the risk by devising a method of operation for the performance of the task that eliminates the risk, or by the provision of adequate safeguards. The employer must take into account the possibility of thoughtlessness, or inadvertence, or carelessness, particularly in a case of repetitive work."

• [497] The proper assessment of any alleged breach of duty depends on the identification of the relevant risk of injury because it is only then that an assessment can take place of what a reasonable response to that risk is.[563] However, it is not necessary for a plaintiff to show that the precise manner in which the injury was sustained was reasonably foreseeable.[564] The risk is the "general causal mechanism" of the injury sustained.[565]
• [498] In terms of the standard of care, in Swain v Waverley MC_[566]_ it was said:

"... the standard of conduct necessary to discharge the duty is usually expressed in terms of what would be expected of a reasonable person, both as to foresight of the possibility of harm and as to taking precautions against such harm."

• [499] The plaintiff must prove there were reasonable means of obviating the risk of injury.[567]
• [500] On the question of causation, a commonsense test is to be applied.[568] In other words, the plaintiff must establish on the balance of probabilities that the measures the defendant failed to adopt would have prevented or minimised the injuries.[569]
• [501] I first turn to the risk. I find that the method of demoulding the spiral used on this occasion was an unsafe one. It seems to me fraught with difficulty; balancing one end of the spiral (at least 26kg and awkward) on the rail (without it being secured) and relying on a new co-worker (or indeed any co-worker) to hold the other end straight.
• [502] Mr Keough accepted that the spiral had fallen off previously. I accept this. I also accept the plaintiff's evidence that it had happened a number of times in the short period he was there. It is understandable that a worker would go forward with the falling spiral to prevent it being damaged.
• [503] In those circumstances, I find that there was a real risk of the spiral coming off the rail/s and causing injury. It was not far-fetched or remote and was foreseeable.
• [504] There must be direct evidence or reasonable inference open from the evidence in order to conclude that an employer failed to take reasonable care.[570] It seems to me that there were reasonable means of obviating this risk.
• [505] First would have been to use a fixture on the rail which meant that the skewering pipe would not slide off. This was either a pivot locking device (as described by Mr de Andrade) or a collar.
• [506] Second would be to provide detailed training and ongoing supervision to ensure:

(a) That the demoulding did not occur without the pole being secured to the rail as described.

(b) The co-worker would hold the pole perpendicular to ensure it would not come off the rail.

• [507] Mr de Andrade gave evidence that the system of work in the demoulding area should have involved the use of pivot lock and/or the collar. If it did, it would not have been possible for the spiral to fall off the rail. I find that there was no insistence on the use of this system. As I have noted, both Mr Keough and the plaintiff referred to previous occasions when the spiral had fallen off. I note Mr Keough did not express any surprise that spirals came off the rails. This shows that Mr de Andrade's system was deficient. I therefore find that the risk was a likely one.
• [508] I find that these measures were not adopted. I find there was not a safe system of work in place and there was a failure to properly instruct, supervise and to provide adequate equipment.
• [509] I also considered that the SWP on manual handling[571] and on the demoulding procedure[572] insufficiently dealt with this issue. There were simply two photographs which did not sufficiently deal with the risk. I considered that it was negligent to fail to warn of the risk of injury and of mechanisms to avoid it.[573]
• [510] I consider that the allocation of an inexperienced co-worker in those circumstances to work with the plaintiff was fraught with difficulty.
• [511] I find that if these measures (or any one of them) had been adopted, the risk of the injury occurring would have been greatly reduced or prevented. I find there was not a great burden in adopting these measures (as most of them were already there anyhow) and a reasonable person in the position of the second defendant should have adopted them.
• [512] Also, the second defendant was conducting a business or undertaking and was using workers in carrying out activities influenced or directed by the second defendant as defined in s 19 of the WHSA. I find that it breached this section by failing to ensure as far as was reasonably practicable the health and safety of such workers.
• [513] I therefore find that the plaintiff has established the particulars of negligence pleaded in paragraph 18 (b), (f), (h), (i), (j), (k), (p) and/or (r) of the amended statement of claim.

• [515] In order to assess liability as against the first defendant, one must have regard to the following provisions of the WCRA.
• [516] Section 305B provides:

(1) A person does not breach a duty to take precautions against a risk of injury to a worker unless -

(a) the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of which the person knew or ought reasonably to have known); and

(c) in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the position of the person would have taken the precautions.

(2) In deciding whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions against a risk of injury, the court is to consider the following (among other relevant things) -

(a) the probability that the injury would occur if care were not taken;

(c) the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of injury."

In a proceeding relating to liability for a breach of duty -

(a) the burden of taking precautions to avoid a risk of injury includes the burden of taking precautions to avoid similar risks of injury for which the person may be responsible; and

(b) the fact that a risk of injury could have been avoided by doing something in a different way does not of itself give rise to or affect liability for the way in which the thing was done; and

(c) the subsequent taking of action that would (had the action been taken earlier) have avoided a risk of injury does not of itself give rise to or affect liability in relation to the risk and does not of itself constitute an admission of liability in connection with the risk."

(1) A decision that a breach of duty caused particular injury comprises the following elements -

(a) the breach of duty was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the injury (factual causation);

(b) it is appropriate for the scope of the liability of the person in breach to extend to the injury so caused (scope of liability).

(2) In deciding in an exceptional case, in accordance with established principles, whether a breach of duty - being a breach of duty that is established but which can not be established as satisfying subsection (1) (a) - should be accepted as satisfying subsection (1) (a) , the court is to consider (among other relevant things) whether or not and why responsibility for the injury should be imposed on the party in breach.

(3) If it is relevant to deciding factual causation to decide what the worker who sustained an injury would have done if the person who was in breach of the duty had not been so in breach -

(a) the matter is to be decided subjectively in the light of all relevant circumstances, subject to paragraph (b) ; and

(b) any statement made by the worker after suffering the injury about what the worker would have done is inadmissible except to the extent (if any) that the statement is against the worker's interest.

(4) For the purpose of deciding the scope of liability, the court is to consider (among other relevant things) whether or not and why responsibility for the injury should be imposed on the party who was in breach of the duty."

• [519] Section 305E of the WCRA provides that the onus of proof is on the worker to prove on the balance of probabilities any fact relevant to the issue of causation. On this issue, the High Court in Wallace v Kam[574] noted that the distinction between factual causation and scope of liability should not be obscured by judicial gloss.
• [520] I am satisfied on the evidence that DPS as the employer had a non-delegable duty of care to the plaintiff. I accept Mr de Andrade's evidence that Mr Ferguson could have asked to see the workplace. I find that Mr Ferguson could have seen whether the workplace was safe or not and recommended measures be put in place to ensure safety. I also thought that DPS acknowledged its responsibilities to its workers by saying to MT it would organise insurance and Workcover for the workers. I accept Mr de Andrade's evidence in this regard.[575]
• [521] It is true there was a workplace assessment in 2014 but I did not accept Mr Ferguson's evidence that these were ongoing. He was equivocal on this. I consider there was an ongoing duty on DPS to check that the workplace was safe for its workers by, for example, checking on them or checking with MT to ensure that it was.
• [522] An issue has been raised about whether Mr Ferguson was refused access to the area because of IP issues. On this point, I preferred the evidence lead by the second defendant. I accept the evidence of Mr de Andrade and Ms Spaic that if he wanted to, Mr Ferguson could have asked to inspect the area of work. The fact is he was able to engage his own WHS consultant in 2014. He would not have been refused access if requested. MT would have welcomed any safety suggestions. I am not satisfied Mr Ferguson was prevented from accessing the area.
• [523] I find that Mr Ferguson regularly attended the factory and had the opportunity of observing the workplace and speaking to his workers. I find there was no regular auditing by DPS of the workplace.
• [524] In summary insofar as DPS is concerned, I am satisfied as follows:

(a) The risk of injury here was foreseeable in that the DPS knew or ought reasonably to have known of the risk.[576] I have discussed this previously. There would be a risk of injury if the spiral fell off the rails. An investigation would have revealed this risk.

(b) The risk was not insignificant.[577] There was evidence that spirals had fallen off the rails a number of times previously.

(c) A reasonable person in the position of DPS would have taken precautions to avoid the risk.[578] In this regard, I consider it probable that injury would occur if the precautions were not taken.[579] Any injury would be serious, bearing in mind the weight and size of the object.[580] The burden of taking such precautions rested on the employer, at least in part, as there was a non-delegable duty of care imposed upon it[581] and the measures that could have been employed to avoid the risk do not seem overly expensive or difficult and it was not difficult to check that the system of work was safe and the level of instruction was appropriate.[582]

• [525] I find that DPS should have conducted or arranged for continuing inspections of the workplace to ensure it was safe; it should have checked that MT conducted appropriate training and supervision of its staff and it should have checked that safe and proper plant and equipment were used by MT. If it had done these things, it is likely the risk of injury could have been avoided.
• [526] I also find that DPS breached s 19 of the WHSA, that is it failed to ensure so far as reasonably practicable the health and safety of the plaintiff at work.
• [527] I therefore find that DPS breached the duty of care it owed to the plaintiff.
• [528] I find in accordance with section 305D of the WCRA that the conduct of the first defendant caused the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. I find that there is factual causation in that if the measures had been put in place by DPS then it is likely the injury would not have occurred.[583] I find it appropriate to extend liability to the first defendant as I find that responsibility at least in part should be on DPS because of the non-delegable duty of care it owed its employees to avoid the risk of harm which was acknowledged by it by saying it would organise the insurance and WorkCover for the workers.
• [529] I find that the plaintiff has proved the particulars in paragraph 15 (a), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and/or (k) of the amended statement of claim. He has also proved paragraph 16.
• [530] I find that DPS is liable in negligence and/or breach of contract to the plaintiff.

• [531] Insofar as the second defendant is concerned, in Bankstown Foundary Pty Ltd v Braistina[584] the High Court said:

"A worker will be guilty of contributory negligence if he ought reasonably to have foreseen that, if he did not act as a reasonable and prudent man, he would expose himself to risk of injury. But his conduct must be judged in the context of a finding that the employer had failed to use reasonable care to provide a safe system of work, thereby exposing him to unnecessary risks. The question will be whether, in the circumstances and under the conditions in which he was required to work, the conduct of the worker amounted to mere inadvertence, inattention or misjudgement, or to negligence rendering him responsible in part for the damage."

• [532] Insofar as the first defendant is concerned, the WCRA provides as follows:

"305F Standard of care in relation to contributory negligence

(1) The principles that are applicable in deciding whether a person has breached a duty also apply in deciding whether the worker who sustained an injury has been guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take precautions against the risk of that injury.

(a) the standard of care required of the person who sustained an injury is that of a reasonable person in the position of that person; and

(b) the matter is to be decided on the basis of what that person knew or ought reasonably to have known at the time.

In deciding the extent of a reduction in damages by reason of contributory negligence, a court may decide a reduction of 100% if the court considers it just and equitable to do so, with the result that the claim for damages is defeated.

(1) A court may make a finding of contributory negligence if the worker relevantly -

(a) failed to comply, so far as was practicable, with instructions given by the worker's employer for the health and safety of the worker or other persons; or

(b) failed at the material time to use, so far as was practicable, protective clothing and equipment provided, or provided for, by the worker's employer, in a way in which the worker had been properly instructed to use them; or

(c) failed at the material time to use, so far as was practicable, anything provided that was designed to reduce the worker's exposure to risk of injury; or

(d) inappropriately interfered with or misused something provided that was designed to reduce the worker's exposure to risk of injury; or

(e) was adversely affected by the intentional consumption of a substance that induces impairment; or

(f) undertook an activity involving obvious risk or failed, at the material time, so far as was practicable, to take account of obvious risk; or

(g) failed, without reasonable excuse, to attend safety training organised by the worker's employer that was conducted during normal working hours at which the information given would probably have enabled the worker to avoid, or minimise the effects of, the event resulting in the worker's injury.

(2) Subsection (1) does not limit the discretion of a court to make a finding of contributory negligence in any other circumstances.

(3) Without limiting subsection (2), subsection (1)(f) does not limit the discretion of a court to make a finding of contributory negligence if the worker -

(a) undertook an activity involving risk that was less than obvious; or

(b) failed, at the material time, so far as was practicable, to take account of risk that was less than obvious.

305I Meaning of obvious risk for s 305H

(1) For section 305H, an obvious risk to a worker who sustains an injury is a risk that, in the circumstances, would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the position of the worker.

(2) Obvious risks include risks that are patent or a matter of common knowledge.

(3) A risk of something occurring can be an obvious risk even though it has a low probability of occurring.

(4) A risk can be an obvious risk even if the risk (or a condition or circumstance that gives rise to the risk) is not prominent, conspicuous or physically observable.

(5) To remove any doubt, it is declared that a risk from a thing, including a living thing, is not an obvious risk if the risk is created because of a failure on the part of a person to properly operate, maintain, replace, prepare or care for the thing, unless the failure itself is an obvious risk."

• [533] The plaintiff refers to a number of cases at page 15 of his submissions. Of course, each case depends on its own facts.
• [534] In this case, I do not find the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as:

(a) He was relatively new to the position and was not overly experienced with stripping the moulds.

(b) He was allocated an inexperienced co-worker to work with.

(c) There was inadequate supervision of the plaintiff in carrying out the task and the training to my mind was inadequate.

(d) There was no insistence on the use of the pivot lock or the collar. The system was deficient.

(e) The written SWPs did not deal with the risks associated with the spiral falling off the rails.

(f) There was no verbal instruction given as to the risks or use of protective measures.

• [535] Insofar as the lifting is concerned, it is perfectly understandable that once the spiral had fallen to the ground, the plaintiff and a co-worker would lift it up to put it back on the rail. The second defendant should have factored this into the system employed at its premises and in the written material concerning the demoulding process. There should have been warnings of the risk of the spiral falling and of the need to get assistance or to take care when lifting it back on the rail.
• [536] I do not find any contributory negligence as against the plaintiff.

• [537] Sections 6(c) and 7 of the Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld) provide:

"6 Proceedings against, and contribution between, joint and several tortfeasors

Where damage is suffered by any person as a result of a tort (whether a crime or not) the following apply -

(c) any tortfeasor liable in respect of that damage may recover contribution from any other tortfeasor who is, or would if sued have been, liable in respect of the same damage, whether as a joint tortfeasor or otherwise, so, however, that no person shall be entitled to recover contribution under this section from any person entitled to be indemnified by the person in respect of the liability in respect of which the contribution is sought.

7 Amount of contribution and power of the court

In any proceedings for contribution under this division the amount of the contribution recoverable from any person shall be such as may be found by the court to be just and equitable having regard to the extent of that person's responsibility for the damage; and the court shall have power to exempt any person from liability to make contribution, or to direct that the contribution to be recovered from any person shall amount to a complete indemnity."

1. Several concurrent tortfeasors are persons who by their separate acts cause damage to the injured person.[585] Any apportionment is with reference to the extent to which the particular defendant's conduct contributed to the damage suffered by the plaintiff and their comparative culpability.[586]

• [539] For example, in Marketform Managing Agency Ltd v Ashcroft Super IGA Orange Pty Ltd[587], the New South Wales Court of Appeal upheld the apportionment of 10 per cent to the labour hire employer and 90 per cent to the host hirer company. This occurred where, despite reasonable efforts of the labour hire company to carry out inspections of the host employer's premises, the labour hire company found no evidence of the risk that eventuated, resulting in the employee's injury. Accordingly, the 10 per cent apportionment against the labour hire employer primarily arose out of the non-delegable character of the employer's duty of care.
• [540] In this case, I find that there were really no efforts by DPS to ensure the workplace was safe after 2014.
• [541] In this regard, I accept the evidence of Mr de Andrade and Ms Spaic that Mr Ferguson was not prevented from requesting access to the premises or from making safety suggestions. I did not accept Mr Ferguson's evidence that there were ongoing WHS visits to the site after Mr Fanning's report.
• [542] As against DPS, it was the employer with the non-delegable duty. As against MT, it controlled the workplace and had the system of work.
• [543] I consider that MT should bear the largest proportion of responsibility as it was in control of the workplace and had direct responsibility for the plaintiff.
• [544] I agree with the parties that MT is 75 per cent responsible and DPS is 25 per cent responsible for the plaintiff's injuries.

• [545] The general rule is that damages in tort are such that the injured party should receive compensation in a sum, which so far as money can do, will put that party in the same position as he or she would be in if the tort had not been committed.[588]

General Damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenities

• [546] Despite my findings that the plaintiff gave evidence exaggerating the effect of the injury on his functional capacity, the fact remains that the plaintiff has suffered an L4/5 disc protrusion with left L5 radiculopathy, underwent surgery and he has an approximate 10 per cent whole person impairment.
• [547] He has also suffered an adjustment disorder with mixed, depressed and anxious mood.
• [548] I find he suffered symptoms and a loss of enjoyment and amenities of life as a result.
• [549] As against the first defendant, general damages must be assessed under section 306O of the WCRA. Schedule 14 of the regulations sets out the applicable ranges of ISVs.
• [550] Contrary to the plaintiff's submissions in this case, I consider this is a moderate lumbar spine injury and item 91[589] applies. This is because I consider item 90 applies where, for example, there is a fracture involving at least a 25 per cent compression injury.
• [551] On the other hand, I consider item 91[590] more rather deals with disc prolapse.
• [552] The range is 5 to 15. I assess it at 12. I add a slight uplift of 2 for the psychiatric injury. The total is 14. This amounts to $26,100.
• [553] No interest may be awarded on past general damages.[591]
• [554] The award of damages as against MT is at common law. I have had regard to the case of Sawyer v Steeplechase Pty Ltd[592] and _Cameron v Foster,[593]_the case relied on by the second defendant in its submissions.
• [555] Cameron is some 15 years old. Sawyer involved more serious injuries.[594]
• [556] I assess general damages at $55,000. I award interest at 2 per cent per annum for 6.25 years on past general damages ($30,000) which I assess at $3,750.

• [557] Following appear to be the special damages:

The plaintiff claims the entire amount. The second defendant submits it has not been proved that each consultation relates to the claim. The first defendant accepts the claim. When analysing the medical records (Exhibits 48, 53, 54 and 55), several items do not relate to the back injury[596], although some do. Doing the best I can I allow $10,000 for this item.

The plaintiff submits that the PBS history should be relied on. The first defendant relies on the PBS history which shows that $382.24 has been spent on relevant medications. It submits that $100 is reasonable for over-the-counter medications in the absence of receipts. The second defendant makes no submission. I accept the first defendant's submission.

The plaintiff relies on Exhibit 4 claiming $3076.57. The first defendant submits that $500 for travel is reasonable. At the end of the day, I am not satisfied that all of the trips can be attributed to the back injury e.g. see consultation with Dr Paton 20 September 2022 (Exhibit 53 and Exhibit 48 page 8). I am prepared to allow $1,000.

• [558] With respect to the first defendant, I would allow interest on the total sum of $1,482.24[598] at the rate of 2.065 per cent per annum for 6.25 years, being an amount of $191.30. With respect to the second defendant interest at 5% per annum for 6.25 years is $463.20.

• [559] The plaintiff claims pain medication at $5 per week for 43 years and chiropractic treatment at $29.50 per week for a period of 5 years. Discounted on the 5 per cent tables, this is $9,778.82.
• [560] The first defendant submits that the court would award a nominal amount for future medication and travel, perhaps in the sum of $500.
• [561] The second defendant submits that no award should be made.
• [562] I note that no receipts were tendered proving expenditure on Panadol and the like. I would allow a modest amount for future medication and travel at $10 per month for 27 years (multiplier is 783). This is an amount of $1,957.50. I did not consider there was sufficient evidence justifying the necessity of ongoing chiropractic expenses.

• [563] The plaintiffs work history discloses the following:

(a) Year ended 2014 - average weekly earnings $238.23

(b) Year ended 2015 - average weekly earnings $805.33

(c) Year ended 2016 - average weekly earnings $917.38

(d) Year ended 2017 - average weekly earnings $853.40

(e) Year ended 2018 - average weekly earnings $700

(f) Year ended 2019 - average weekly earnings $536.69[599]

(g) Year ended 30 June 2020:

1. Direct Personnel $1,550
2. Centrelink $873
3. WorkCover $34,394

(h) Year ended 30 June 2021:

1. Centrelink $22,239
2. WorkCover $830

(i) Year ended 30 June 2022:

1. Centrelink $24,085
2. Cbus Insurance payout $121,690 + $52,771

(j) Year ended 30 June 2023:

1. Centrelink $22,272

(k) Year ended 30 June 2024:

1. Centrelink $25,801

(l) Year ended 30 June 2025:

1. Centrelink $23,069

• [564] The plaintiff was 34 years of age at the time of his injury and was employed on a fulltime basis by DPS. He was earning approximately $800 net per week at the time of the injury. He did of course have some Centrelink benefits paid in the 2018 and 2019 financial years, so he spent some time unemployed. His average income was about $690 net per week.[600]
• [565] Insofar as the first defendant is concerned, s 306J of the WCRA applies. This section provides:

"306J When earnings cannot be precisely calculated

(1) This section applies if a court is considering making an award of damages for loss of earnings that are unable to be precisely calculated by reference to a defined weekly loss.

(2) The court may only award damages if it is satisfied that the worker has suffered or will suffer loss having regard to the person's age, work history, actual loss of earnings, any permanent impairment and any other relevant matters.

(3) If the court awards damages, the court must state the assumptions on which the award is based and the methodology it used to arrive at the award.

(4) The limitation mentioned in section 306I(2) applies to an award of damages under this section."

• [566] The plaintiff submits that I should award past economic loss at the rate of $800 net per week for the period of 324 weeks. This amounts to $266,520.
• [567] The first defendant submits that the evidence supports the view that the plaintiff's extensive travel and gym routines tells against him being unable to work. It is submitted I should use the sum of $690 per week, which was the average he earned at the time of the injury. It is submitted that I should assess past loss up until August 2020 or February 2021, which represents a period when he was cleared to return to work and allowing six to 12 months for retraining. This amounts to a range of $37,950 to $55,890. In oral submissions it was accepted that, bearing in mind there is an ongoing incapacity for certain forms of employment, I could assess a global of $25,000[601] or the sum of $300 per week for the period say October 2020 to the present day.[602] This amounts to a range of $25,000 to $93,600. Thus, the total of $62,950 to $131,550.
• [568] The second defendant submits that by January 2020 the plaintiff was able to have returned to work and total past loss should be $800 net per week for a period of 42 weeks, a total sum of $34,057.14. In oral submissions Mr Hickey conceded that, in light of the ongoing impairment of working capacity, a global sum of $40,000 to $50,000 could be awarded for the period January 2020 until today.[603] This is a total of $74,057.14 to $84,057.14.
• [569] In assessing damages for economic loss, the High Court in Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd[604] noted:

(a) There is some degree of speculation necessary when assessing economic loss (page 639).

(b) The ascertainment of economic loss involves an evaluation of possibilities (page 639).

(c) The court assesses the degree of probability that an event would have or might occur and adjusts the measure of damages accordingly (page 643).

• [570] It must also be appreciated that the loss to be assessed is a loss of earning capacity, not a loss of earnings. The question is whether as a result of the breach the plaintiff has been rendered less capable of earning income. The court looks at the capacity for work before the employment he or she was engaged in at the time of breach.[605]
• [571] I have difficulties accepting the evidence of Mrs Coles as it relies on information given by the plaintiff which is not entirely accurate. This calls into question her report.
• [572] However, in light of the plaintiff's whole person impairment, age, work history, actual loss of earnings and his inability to do heavy factory jobs, I am satisfied the plaintiff has suffered economic loss and will continue to do so in the future.
• [573] As I have said, I accept the first defendant's submissions that the plaintiff would have been able to return to some form of employment by early 2020 but that he needed 6-12 months for retraining.[606]
• [574] I have found the plaintiff was able to return to some form of lighter employment by January 2021. I consider in the approximate 18-month period before this, this would have been difficult bearing in mind his only experience was working as a fabricator/moulder in a factory.
• [575] I accept the first defendant's submission that the loss should be assessed at $690 net per week which I consider better represents the amount of loss for that period. I assess the loss from the date of the incident until January 2021 (78 weeks) at $690 per week. This amounts to $53,820.
• [576] Thereafter, I consider the plaintiff had the capacity to work in lighter jobs (excluding the heavy factory work).
• [577] The first defendant conceded a loss of $300 per week.[607] I consider that to be a reasonable estimate of the monetary value of the effect of impairment bearing in mind his income most likely would have increased over the period.[608]
• [578] I therefore assess a loss of $300 per week for the period January 2021 until the present time (246 weeks) - a total of $73,800.
• [579] I therefore assess total loss at $127,620. There should be some discounting of this sum because of the evidence concerning the wrist injury and the degeneration. I note in _Peebles v WorkCover_it was said that the selection of the appropriate discount rate involves the discretionary judgment of the court, and the discounting of pre-trial loss is different to future loss, as the circumstances regarding past loss are known.

• [586] The plaintiff submits for a sum of $900 net per week for 27 years discounted by 50 per cent. This amounts to $352,350. Mr Charrington submits the plaintiff cannot work.
• [587] The first defendant submits that the plaintiff's claim is based on the fact he is incapable of work. If Doctors Tuffley and Labrom are accepted, then this contention is not correct, and he can work in various occupations. The first defendant relies on the fact the plaintiff obtained the private investigation qualifications quite quickly. In the circumstances, $100,000 to $130,000 is appropriate, which is based on a weekly amount of $150 to $200 discounted by 15 per cent.
• [588] The second defendant submits that on the report of Dr Labrom, it would not be open to make any award for substantial future economic loss. At best, a global award of $25,000 would be made.
• [589] In respect of future economic loss, this involves an exercise of prediction - what the future would have been if the injury had not occurred and what it is likely to be. Often such damages are at best an estimate.[612]
• [590] In this case the plaintiff is 40 years old. I consider that he can do a range of more sedentary work and is not unemployable. But I find he is more vulnerable on the open labour market and can no longer work in heavy factory occupations.
• [591] I accept the plaintiff's submission that the starting point is a salary of $900 net per week. It has been 6.25 years since the accident and salaries have increased since then. I consider the amount of $300 per week (which is the same amount I used for past economic loss) is an appropriate estimate of the monetary calculation of the impairment of earning capacity. As I have said this is some 30 % of the full sum. [613]
• [592] I therefore assess a sum of $300 per week for the period of 27 years. For a 5 per cent discount, the multiplier is 783. This equals $234,900.
• [593] I consider this amount needs to be discounted because of the vicissitudes of life, the existing degenerative condition and the effect of the wrist injury. In Peebles v WorkCover,[614] the trial judge had discounted future economic loss by 50 per cent. This was found to be excessive.
• [594] In this case when I consider the medical evidence and the possibility that the pre-existing condition may have "kicked in" in 10 years, I consider that a 20 per cent discount is appropriate. In this regard, whilst it has been said that a conventional discount is 15%, this is not always the case and depends on all the circumstances.

• [597] It is common ground that damages for gratuitous care cannot be awarded against the first defendant under Part 9 Division 3 of the WCRA. Damages for care can be awarded against the second defendant.
• [598] The plaintiff submits that the claim for past care and assistance is based on the report of Mrs Coles and there was no requirement to call the care providers. It is submitted that care from 11 July 2019 until 22 August 2022 (162 weeks) is for four hours per week at $35 per hour. For the period 22 August 2022 until today, it is two hours per week at $35 per hour. This amounts to $33,600 for past care. For future care, 1 hour per week is claimed at $35 per hour for 43 years. This amounts to $27,905.50.
• [599] The second defendant submits that the plaintiff has failed to call material witnesses to support his case. It is submitted the plaintiff's evidence cannot be relied upon.
• [600] As I have noted, I have difficulties accepting the evidence of Mrs Coles as it relies on information given by the plaintiff which is not entirely accurate. This calls into question her report. Also, the fact that care providers were not called deprives the court of the means of checking and corroborating the plaintiff's allegations.
• [601] On my findings, the plaintiff was able to return to work by January 2021. I conclude in light of his gym work and overseas travel he could well look after himself. I do not propose to order care after this point. Dr Tuffley considered there was no need for ongoing care. I accept this.
• [602] Dr Todman in his reports noted the plaintiff needed care of up to four hours a week.[616]
• [603] In all of the circumstances, I assess past care at 4 hours per week for 78 weeks i.e. July 2019 until January 2021 at $35 per hour. This amounts to $10,920.
• [604] I do not find any damages for care payable after that point. In light of the evidence of travel and of the gym work and of his functional capacity, I consider he does not require the care of anyone else regularly.

• [606] Following is the summary of damages I have assessed:

Interest on general damages 2 per cent on $20,000 for 6 years

1. I give judgment for the plaintiff against the first defendant in the sum of $433,056.28 (inclusive of the WorkCover refund of $81,276.60).
2. I give judgment for the plaintiff against the second defendant in the sum of $490,429.05 (inclusive of the WorkCover refund of $81,276.60).
3. Pursuant to section 6(c) of the Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), the first defendant recover contribution from the second defendant in the sum of $324,792.21, being 75% of the judgment against the first defendant.

1. I will hear the parties on the question of costs.

[1] Variously described as a mould, pattern or trough.

[2] This involved moulding, physical work and lifting up to 20kgs.

[3] This involved moulding and was very physical with lifting up to 50kg.

[4] This involved moulding but was lower in physicality.

[5] This was for mining equipment and involved low physicality.

[6] This was extremely physical with lifting up to 50kg.

[19] Transcript day 1 page 40.25. This is consistent with the entry in Exhibit 55 (the notes of Dr Simonds).

[21] Transcript day 1 page 41. This is consistent with the MRI 2 August 2019 - see Exhibit 54 page 16.

[32] Transcript day 1 page 51.40-52.25.

[77] Transcript day 1 page 132.45-133.1.

[91] It seems to be common ground that in fact this is August 2022.

[96] Exhibit 38B report of Dr Foxcroft dated 14 May 2025 page 3.9. Transcript day 2 page 56.

[97] Exhibit 38B report of Dr Foxcroft dated 14 May 2025 page 4.3. Transcript day 2 page 57.

[98] Exhibit 21B report of Mrs Coles dated 21 April 2025 page 5.6. Transcript day 2 page 58.

[99] Exhibit 21B report of Mrs Coles dated 21 April 2025 page 5.6. Transcript day 2 page 59.1.

[114] Transcript day 2 page 85.45. Exhibit 53 pages 3-6.

[122] Transcript day 2 pages 95-99. Exhibit 13.

[126] Transcript day 2 page 109. Exhibit 53 page 29.

[127] Transcript day 2 pages 109-110. Exhibit 53 page 9.

[128] Transcript day 2 page 110. Exhibit 53 page 49.

[129] Transcript day 2 page 111. Exhibit 55.

[149] Transcript day 4 page 71.35-72.5.

[157] Transcript day 4 page 118.25-35.

[167] Transcript day 4 page 126.10-20.

[175] Transcript day 4 page 127.25-128.

[182] Transcript day 4 page 26.20. I note that both the plaintiff and Mr de Andrade said that Mr Keough was

[194] Transcript day 4 page 28.10. This is not consistent with any other record.

[204] Transcript day 4 page 29.40- 30.5.

[211] Transcript day 4 page 32.40-33.15.

[235] Transcript day 4 page 51.10. I consider this evidence contrary to the evidence of the plaintiff, the

incident report (Exhibit 29) and Dr Simonds' notes (Exhibit 55).

[240] This has since been disposed of.

[367] Exhibit 38B "Social and recreational activities".

1. [380] Exhibit 21A page 3.9. I note the plaintiff told Mrs Coles in February 2022 that he expected to have difficulty sitting for a long time in a plane (see page 12.4).

[381] Exhibit 21B page 5.6. I note he confirmed the previous details to Mrs Coles (see page 8.6).

[409] Exhibit 21A page 12.5. Transcript day 3 page 81-82.

[411] Exhibit 21B page 5.6. Transcript day 3 page 82.25.

[419] Transcript day 3 page 87.40-88.5.

[425] Exhibit 21B page 4.6. Transcript day 3 page 93.20-32.

[434] Transcript day 3 page 110.40-111.15.

[448] Transcript day 3 page 126.40-127.10.

[449] Transcript day 3 page 127.20. This is consistent with the evidence of Dr Tuffley.

[496] Czatyrtko v Edith Cowan University [2005] HCA 14; (2005) 79 ALJR 832 at [12].

[497] Kerle v BM Alliance Coal Operations Pty Ltd [2016] QSC 304; (2016) 262 IR 381 [113]; TNT Australia Pty Ltd v Christie [2003] NSWCA 47; (2003) 65 NSWLR 1 at page 9.

[498] [1980] HCA 12; (1980) 146 CLR 40 at pages 47-48.

[500] [1991] HCA 12; (1991) 171 CLR 506. Also see Tabet v Gett [2010] HCA 12; (2010) 240 CLR 537 at [111].

[501] Bankstown Foundry Pty Ltd v Braistina [1986] HCA 20; (1986) 160 CLR 301 at p 310.

[502] Spencer v Downie and Anor [2019] QSC 98 at [88].

[503] Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Regulation 2014 (Qld).

[504] [2024] QSC 142.

[505] [1990] HCA 20; (1990) 169 CLR 638 at page 643.

[506] [2021] QCA 21.

[507] [1959] HCA 8; 101 CLR 298.

[508] [2012] 2 Qd R 532.

[509] [1986] HCA 20; (1986) 160 CLR 301.

[510] Peebles v WorkCover Queensland [2021] QCA 21.

[511] Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Regulation 2014 (Qld).

[514] Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Regulation 2014 (Qld).

[515] The ½ way point between August 2020 and February 2021.

[517] Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Regulation 2014 (Qld).

[522] Thompson v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 19; (2005) 221 CLR 234 at [27].

[523] [1980] HCA 12; (1980) 146 CLR 40.

[524] [2016] QCA 147.

[526] [1999] HCA 6 at [21]; (1999) 197 CLR 1.

[527] [1981] HCA 41; (1981) 148 CLR 438.

[528] [2009] QCA 26; [2010] 1 Qd R 1.

[529] Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon [2003] HCA 48; (2003) 200 ALR 447 at [62].

[530] Super Pty Ltd v SJP Formwork (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 29 NSWLR 549 at page 558.

[532] Dr Tuffley, Exhibit 42A page 12.7; Dr Labrom, Exhibit 23 page 7.3.

[534] I note this is how it was pleaded in paragraph 13(f) of the amended statement of claim.

[535] [2012] HCA 5; (2012) 246 CLR 182 at [18]- [20].

[536] Purkess v Crittenden [1965] HCA 34; (1965) 114 CLR 164 at page 167; Watts v Rake [1960] HCA 58; (1960) 108 CLR 158 at page 163.

[537] Submissions by the First Defendant [148].

[543] Exhibit 55 - appointment note with Mr Murphy.

[544] I note in the above note he said he was "still going to the gym" as at October 2021.

[549] [2019] QSC 98 at [88].

[550] Exhibit 42A - Dr Tuffley page 7.1.

[552] Exhibit 42A - Dr Tuffley pages 6.8- 7.3. Dr Labrom Exhibit 23 page 9.3.

[553] Exhibit 42B - Dr Tuffley 2025 report page 16. Dr Labrom Exhibit 23 page 8.5.

[554] See the notes from the Shrink clinic exhibit 53.

[555] Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil [2000] HCA 61; (2000) 205 CLR 254 at [59].

[556] TNT Australia Pty Ltd v Christie [2003] NSWCA 47; (2003) 65 NSWLR 1 at [41]. Also see Kerle v BM Alliance Coal Operations [2016] QSC 304; (2016) 262 IR 381 at [113].

[557] [1986] HCA 1; (1986) 160 CLR 16 at 30-31 and 53.

[558] [2005] HCA 19; (2005) 221 CLR 234 at [27]. Paragraph 73 of the second defendant's submissions.

[559] [1980] HCA 12; (1980) 146 CLR 40 at page 44.

[560] Liftronic Pty Ltd v Unver [2001] HCA 24; (2001) 75 ALJR 867 at [85]; Kondis v State Transport

Authority [1984] HCA 61; (1984) 154 CLR 672 at pp 679, 680, 690.

[561] McLean v Tedman [1984] HCA 60; (1984) 155 CLR 306 at 313.

[562] [2005] HCA 14; (2005) 79 ALJR 839 at [12].

[563] Tapp v Australian Bushman's Campdraft & Rodeo Association Limited [2022] HCA 11; (2022) 273 CLR 454 at [106].

[564] Tapp v Australian Bushman's Campdraft & Rodeo Association Limited [2022] HCA 11; (2022) 273 CLR 454 at [108].

[565] Tapp v Australian Bushman's Campdraft & Rodeo Association Limited [2022] HCA 11; (2022) 273 CLR 454 at [114].

[566] [2005] HCA 4; (2005) 220 CLR 517 at [5].

[567] Wyong Shire Council v Shirt [1980] HCA 12; (1980) 146 CLR 40 at page 47.

[568] March v Stramare Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 12; (1991) 171 CLR 506 at pages 515, 523.

[569] Prasad v Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd [2016] QCA 147 at [93].

[570] Vozza v Tooth & Co Ltd [1964] HCA 29; (1964) 112 CLR 316 at p 319.

[573] McLean's Roylen Cruises Pty Ltd v McEwan [1984] HCA 43; (1984) 58 ALJR 423 at p 425.

[574] [2013] HCA 19; (2013) 250 CLR 375 at [14].

[579] Section 305B(2)(a) of the WCRA. Tapp v Australian Bushman's Campdraft & Rodeo Association Limited [2022] HCA 11; (2022) 273 CLR 454 at [128]- [129].

[581] Kondis v State Transport Authority [1984] HCA 61; (1984) 154 CLR 672.

[583] Tapp v Australian Bushman's Campdraft & Rodeo Association Limited [2022] HCA 11; (2022) 273 CLR 454 at [149].

[584] [1986] HCA 20; (1986) 160 CLR 301 at p 310.

[585] Chapman v Hearse [1961] HCA 46; (1961) 106 CLR 112.

1. [586] Robinson v Fig Tree Pocket Equestrian Club Inc & Ors [2005] QCA 271 per Keane JA at [23].

[587] [2020] NSWCA 36.

[588] Stewart v Metro North Hospital and Health Service [2025] HCA 34; (2025) 99 ALJR 1348 at [24].

[589] Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Regulation 2014 (Qld).

[590] Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Regulation 2014 (Qld).

[592] [2024] QSC 142.

[593] [2010] QSC 372.

[594] The accepted Orthopaedic Surgeon assessed a 16% WPI [291], [428]. I also note in Sawyer a total ISV was assessed at 19.