Singh v Singh; Singh v RCMO Pty Limited; Singh v Sharma; Singh v Murphy; Singh v Armstrong; Singh v Tidball

Singh v Singh; Singh v RCMO Pty Limited; Singh v Sharma; Singh v Murphy; Singh v Armstrong; Singh v Tidball - [2023] NSWSC 280 - NSWSC 2023 case summary — Zoe

[8]

Background

The following is taken from the affidavits filed in the various proceedings, although it is consistent with the background set out in the judgment of Cavanagh J in Singh v Tidball [2023] NSWSC 96 at [3]−[27] ("Singh v Tidball").
On 4 May 2021, a sequestration order was made against Mr Singh. On 10 February 2022, Davies J dismissed proceedings that Mr Singh commenced seeking judicial review of a decision of the Manager, Costs Assessment on the basis that, as a bankrupt, he had no standing to bring those proceedings (Singh v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2022] NSWSC 78).
In December 2021, Ms Kaur and Ms Mehroke signed a written residential tenancy agreement in respect of premises in Elizabeth Crescent, Kingswood (the "premises"). The owners of the premises were Mr Umeshr Sharma and Mrs Krish Sharma (the "owners").
By March 2022, it appears that Ms Kaur and Ms Mehroke had ceased paying rent. However, the premises were not vacated. Thereafter, three sets of proceedings under the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) (the "RT Act") were commenced in the Civil and Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("NCAT"). On 11 April 2022, proceedings RT22/15982 were commenced seeking termination of the residential tenancy agreement by reason of the refusal to pay rent. As I understand it, the application was filed by RCMO Pty Ltd ("RCMO") on behalf of the owners. RCMO is the owners' agent. On 13 May 2022, another such application was filed, being proceedings RT22/00021195. On 3 June 2022, an application was filed in the name of Mr Singh and Ms Kaur, commencing proceedings RT22/00024873. Those proceedings sought orders under s 11 of the RT Act and an order for a reduction in the rent payable.
On 8 June 2022, the presiding member of NCAT, Member Gardner, ordered the removal of Mr Singh as a party to the proceedings and the addition of Ms Mehroke as an applicant. By his various proceedings, and in his oral submissions in this Court, Mr Singh has expressed great disgruntlement with that decision. As I understand it, he says he was a party to the residential tenancy agreement via some form of oral variation.
Although it is not entirely clear, it seems that on 15 June 2022, Member Gardner published orders which, inter alia, upheld the owners' claim and decided that the residential tenancy agreement was terminated immediately, with possession to be given to the owners. In his oral submissions in this Court, Mr Singh also expressed disgruntlement with what happened thereafter in terms of the opportunity that was given to himself, Ms Kaur and Ms Mehroke, to put on material in opposition to the various relief that was to follow from that point.
The order for possession was suspended until 8 July 2022, with a corresponding order that required the payment of a daily occupation fee until vacant possession was provided (see annexure A to Kaur v Sharma [2022] NSWCATAP 336).
On 7 July 2022, a notice of appeal was filed in the name of Mr Singh, Ms Kaur, and Ms Mehroke. On 11 July 2022, an Appeal Panel of NCAT stayed the order for possession on condition that the arrears of rent were paid.
On 13 July 2022, the Appeal Panel ordered the removal of Mr Singh as a party to the appeal but allowed him to represent Ms Kaur and Ms Mehroke. Again, in his oral submissions in this Court, Mr Singh expresses disgruntlement with this order on the basis that he contends he was a party to the residential tenancy agreement and should have been a party to the proceedings at first instance.
On 27 October 2022, the Appeal Panel dismissed the appeal and lifted the stay of the order for possession (Kaur v Sharma [2022] NSWCATAP 336). On 15 November 2022, the Appeal Panel extended the time in which the owners could apply for a warrant for possession (Kaur v Sharma (No 2) [2022] NSWCATAP 360).
As I understand the position, notwithstanding this lack of success in NCAT, Ms Kaur and Ms Mehroke continued to occupy the premises, at least for a period. Further, the affidavit material read on the various applications before me today has revealed that Mr Singh's trustee in bankruptcy has disclaimed any interest in pursuing any of the proceedings that are before the Court.
In addition, it is necessary to note that in July 2021, Mr Singh was a tenant of another property in Kingswood. In Singh v Charles [2023] NSWSC 245 at [17] ("Singh v Charles") Garling J noted the effect of a pleading by Mr Singh in that case, which was to the effect that on 23 June 2021, Mr Singh was allegedly the subject of an invalid notice of termination, which led to other proceedings in NCAT concerning those premises.

[12]

Submissions and Determination in Proceedings Number 2022/184500 and 2022/00133947

The effect of the written submissions filed on behalf of the defendants concerning both of these proceedings was threefold.
First, it was submitted that the proceedings were an abuse of process in that it was contended that, by one means or another, the relief sought seeks to improperly undermine the functions of NCAT and the Appeal Panel in determining the parties' respective rights and obligations under the RT Act.
Second, it was submitted that, consistent with the judgment of Davies J in Singh v Secretary, as a bankrupt Mr Singh had no capacity to bring the proceedings and he otherwise had no standing as he was not a party to the residential tenancy agreement or the proceedings in NCAT.
Third, it was submitted that there is no basis for the Court to entertain some freestanding attempt to make a declaration as to the fitness and propriety of a real estate agent.
Mr Singh's lengthy and detailed written submissions addressed his complaints about the approach of NCAT at first instance. His submissions were replete with allegations that in various respects NCAT lacked jurisdiction and that both the NCAT members, the agents and owners acted in bad faith. Mr Singh also contended that the NCAT decisions at first instance were void for various reasons citing Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597; [2002] HCA 11. He submitted that it was far more preferable to have one forum, namely the Supreme Court, determine all the issues that he sought to raise including those concerning the fitness and propriety of the real estate agents. He submitted that his bankruptcy did not preclude him from seeking judicial review and, as noted, contended that he was a party to the residential tenancy agreement and that NCAT wrongly refused to determine that.
During his submissions, the Court directed Mr Singh's attention to whether or not these two sets of proceedings were futile, having regard to the fact that they were filed while an appeal was pending before the Appeal Panel and that the Appeal Panel has now ruled on the appeal.
To that end, the first point made on behalf of the defendants in relation to both sets of proceedings must be upheld. Under the legislative scheme of the Residential Tenancies Act and the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (the "NCAT Act"), it is for NCAT, and NCAT on appeal, to determine the parties' respective rights and obligations under the RT Act. Generally, once the Appeal Panel for NCAT has determined the appeal, the role of this Court is to hear, with the grant of leave, an appeal on a question of law under s 83 of the NCAT Act, or, in some circumstances, to exercise its judicial review function as confirmed by s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW).
In circumstances where the decision made by NCAT at first instance has now been the subject of an appeal and affirmed on appeal, there is no utility in this Court conducting judicial review of the first instance decision of NCAT. Such an exercise would be futile because the operative position is as declared by the Appeal Panel. Otherwise, even though in parts the summonses in both proceedings use the language of judicial review, many parts of the summonses seek to reagitate the factual merits of NCAT's decision including such matters as the appropriate rental. In these circumstances, the summonses must be dismissed as futile.
For the sake of completeness, in terms of the applicant's bankruptcy, it seems likely that if Mr Singh was, as he contends, a party to the residential tenancy agreement, then his rights under that agreement in fact vested in his trustee in bankruptcy. However, whether that had the effect of precluding him from seeking judicial review of NCAT decisions is not an entirely straightforward decision. The answer to that question of law is a matter that could affect the legitimate interests of many other persons who are bankrupts and are living in residential tenancies. I do not propose to determine that question on a summary judgment application. Otherwise, it is correct that there is no basis for this Court to undertake a freestanding inquiry as the fitness and propriety of real estate agents. There is a legislative scheme for that purpose and the proper forum for its determination is not this Court.
It follows from these conclusions that both summonses will be dismissed.

[13]

Proceedings Number 2022/00196452

On 5 July 2022, a statement of claim was filed commencing proceedings 2022/00196452. It named two plaintiffs, Mr Singh and Ms Kaur. The first three defendants are the agents. The fourth and fifth defendants are the owners. The sixth defendant is Member Gardner, and the seventh defendant is the Registrar. As against the first five defendants, that is the agents and the owners, prayer 1 of the statement of claim seeks damages for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and exemplary damages as well as damages for economic and non‑economic loss. Prayer 7 of the statement of claim seeks damages from Member Gardner for economic and non‑economic loss for the tort of misfeasance in public office and intentionally inflicting emotional distress. Prayer 8 seeks damages from the Registrar for economic and non‑economic loss without specifying any cause of action. The balance of the relief sought seeks various orders in relation to the residential tenancy agreement.
The statement of claim pleads various facts in relation to the course of the residential tenancy. It also pleads various acts of Member Gardner and the Registrar in the course of dealing with the proceedings at first instance in NCAT. Two things should be noted. First, the pleadings are only verified by Mr Singh and not by Ms Kaur. Second, the pleading is clearly embarrassing. It does not come close to pleading the material facts necessary to establish the causes of action identified in the prayers for relief.
In the case of the first five defendants, the statement of claim simply pleads various facts and then makes complaints about various matters, including their refusal to provide a rent reduction and the state of the premises. The statement of claim then baldly asserts that the various acts constituted the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. There is no connection between those facts and the proper elements of that cause of action, which, I note, is otherwise controversial.
The same approach is applicable to the pleading of misfeasance in public offence against Member Gardner. I interpolate that that form of pleading is akin to fraud and one in which a strictness of approach is demanded. No cause of action is in fact pleaded against the seventh defendant ie, the Registrar.
On 8 November 2022, the agents filed a notice of motion seeking a declaration that Mr Singh had no standing to commence the proceedings, an order that he be removed as a party, and an order the proceedings be struck out. On 24 February 2022, the owners filed a notice of motion seeking that same relief, as well as an order that the proceedings be dismissed. They also sought the order I adverted to at the commencement of this judgment, namely, an injunction precluding the plaintiffs from bringing certain specified proceedings against them.
On 7 November 2022, Member Gardner and the Registrar filed a notice of motion seeking an order that proceedings against them be dismissed and, in the alternative, the statement of claim be struck out.

[14]

Member Gardner and the Registrar: Judicial Immunity

It is convenient to deal with the submissions of Member Gardner and the Registrar first. Four of their numerous points should be noted. First, they contend correctly that the Court should, if it allowed the proceedings to continue, order that they be verified by Ms Kaur. Second, they contend that Mr Singh has no standing to bring the proceedings because of his bankruptcy. Third, they contend that Member Gardner has the benefit of judicial immunity and the Registrar has derivative judicial immunity by reason of the performance of their official acts. Fourth, they contend that the various causes of action are not properly pleaded.
In addition to the points that I have previously noted, Mr Singh submitted that the judicial immunity claim was met by a claim made in the pleading that Member Gardner and the Registrar had engaged in misfeasance in public office, as well as the numerous allegations of malice and acting without jurisdiction that are made in the statement of claim. Mr Singh accepted that there were justifiable complaints to be made about the form of the pleading, but submitted he should be allowed to replead. He pointed to his absence of legal qualifications and any particular complaint by the parties about the form of the pleadings, at least prior to the filing of the notices of motion.
In relation to judicial immunity of NCAT members, sch 2, cl 4 of the NCAT Act provides: "A member has, in the exercise of functions performed as a member, the same protection and immunities as a Judge of the Supreme Court."
This provision is a complete answer to the claim against Member Gardner. That this is so was pointed out in the clearest possible terms to Mr Singh as long ago as 10 June 2022 by Garling J in summarily dismissing other proceedings he purported to bring against an NCAT member in respect of that member's decision concerning the other premises to which I referred earlier (Singh v Charles). In that decision, Garling J explained that a complaint that a superior court judge acted outside their jurisdiction does not defeat a claim for judicial immunity (Singh v Charles at [31]). Despite this, it is clear that Mr Singh simply does not accept that he cannot sue a superior court judge for the tort of misfeasance in public office arising out of the performance of their functions. It is a repeated theme of the litigation to which I refer. In the present context, all the conduct of Member Gardner that is pleaded in the statement of claim concerns the performance of the functions and powers of that member's office as a member of NCAT.
A similar principle known as derivative immunity requires the dismissal of the proceedings against the Registrar (see Wentworth v Wentworth [1999] NSWSC 317 at [43]−[44]). Again, a review of the statement of claim confirms that all the complaints about the Registrar's conduct concern the performance of her functions as the Registrar of NCAT. In any event, no cause of action is pleaded against her at all. It follows that the proceedings against Member Gardner and the Registrar must be dismissed.
So far as Mr Singh's bankruptcy is concerned, the relevant effect of ss 58 and 116 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) is that, generally, his right to bring proceedings in respect of property vests in the trustee in bankruptcy, although there is an exception if the proceedings are for damages for compensation for personal injury (see Singh v Carroll [2023] NSWSC 245 at [52]−[54]). The statement of claim contains a mixture of claims for pecuniary loss and what is said to be emotional distress. It is clear that at least significant parts of the claim are not maintainable by Mr Singh as a bankrupt. However, this only highlights the two remaining problems with the statement of claim, being its lack of verification by Ms Kaur and its form.
I will soon address Mr Singh's ability to speak on behalf of Ms Kaur and Ms Mehroke in such proceedings. At this point, is suffices to state that if such serious allegations are to be made in a pleading to which they are a party, they will need to verify them on oath with the consequence that if any allegations they make are not properly based, then they will bear the legal consequences for the making of a vexatious claim.
As I have already stated, the form of the pleading is hopeless. It fails to plead even the most basic elements of the relevant causes of action and does not plead any cause of action against the Registrar. One consequence of this is that one cannot distinguish between what aspects of the claim, if any, might remain with Mr Singh and what might vest in his trustee in bankruptcy. This has significance for the first five defendants. However, at this point, given the findings on immunity, the proceedings against Member Gardner and the Registrar must be dismissed.

[15]

The Agents and the Owners

The written submissions of the agents made four points. First, they contend that the statement of claim is embarrassing in form. Second, they contend that the proceedings are, in effect, an abuse of process in that they seek to reagitate various facts and matters already determined by NCAT, such as whether there was a breach of the residential tenancy agreement. Third, they contend that, as Mr Singh was not a party to the residential tenancy agreement or the proceedings in NCAT, he has no relevant legal interest in the matters pleaded. Fourth, they point to his status as a bankrupt. The submissions made on behalf of the owners are broadly to the same effect.
Mr Singh's submissions in response were a repetition of the points that have already been summarised. In addition, as to his asserted claim of a lack of interest, he submits that he was a party to the residential tenancy agreement, but NCAT wrongly refused to determine and that, otherwise, he has an emotional interest in the proceedings through his connection with his wife and daughter, who are written parties to the residential tenancy agreement, and that is enough.
I have already accepted that the statement of claim is bad in form and observed that that difficulty is interconnected with Mr Singh's lack of standing to bring, at least, most of the claims as well as the absence of any verification of the pleading by Ms Kaur. As I have stated, these are no mere quibbles. The statement of claim makes very serious allegations and the law insists on a strictness and precision in pleadings that make such allegations. Further, I note that the submissions pointing out these deficiencies have been placed on the record for many months. In addition, on 18 August 2022 the Crown Solicitor, acting for the defendants in the statement of claim that I will consider next, wrote to Mr Singh pointing out the deficiencies in the pleading in that case, which are very similar to the deficiencies in the pleadings in this case.
The contention that the statement of claim is per se an abuse of process because it seeks to reagitate matters decided by NCAT is problematic. There are potentially difficult questions about the scope for findings of NCAT to ground issue estoppels, which are bound up with the extent to which there is some overlap between its limited statutory jurisdiction and the tortious claims that are sought to be pleaded. Given the form in which the statement of claim currently exists, it is simply not possible to determine these issues, and I cannot summarily dismiss the case on that base.

[17]

Proceedings Number 2022/00325836

On 1 November 2022, a statement of claim was filed in this Court commencing proceedings 2022/00325836. Mr Singh is named as the only plaintiff. The first defendant is described as "Lee Armstrong". However, the balance of the pleading makes it clear that is intended to be a reference to her Honour Justice Lea Armstrong, President of NCAT and a judge of this Court. The second to fourth defendants are all members of NCAT. The fifth defendant is the Registrar (of NCAT). The sixth defendant is the Registrar of the Court of Appeal of this Court, Jerry Riznyczok. The seventh and eighth defendants are the owners. The ninth defendant is Mr Sarvjot Singh. The 10th and 11th defendants are Manoj Babu and Neil Lawyers, whom I understand are the legal practitioners who have appeared for some of the defendants at some point. The 12th defendant is the State of New South Wales.
Paragraphs [1]−[15] of the statement of claim plead various facts about decisions made by members of NCAT. Paragraphs [16]−[20] complain about various listing decisions made by the Registrar. Paragraphs [22]−[24] somehow purport to make Armstrong J liable in damages for negligence for various NCAT decisions. Paragraphs [27]−[29] complain that the owners, Mr Sarvjot Singh and Mr Babu, extorted rent from the plaintiffs for premises. Paragraph [31] complains about advice from Registrar Riznyczok in relation to an appeal from Garling J in Singh v Charles, including a complaint that the Registrar had no jurisdiction to take some step.
Leaving aside the negligence claim, the pleading alleges the defendants engaged in misfeasance of public office. The statement of claim seeks something called "intangible damages" and asserts that Mr Singh has suffered psychiatric harm.
On 16 November 2022, an amended statement of claim was filed. The amendment included the amount claimed to the sum of $3 million. It sought an order setting aside an NCAT order made on 15 November 2022, a stay of a warrant, and included various paragraphs complaining about NCAT decisions made after the original statement of claim was filed.

[18]

Application for Summary Dismissal

On 15 December 2022, a notice of motion was filed on behalf of the 1st to 6th and 12th defendants, that is, Armstrong J, the NCAT members, the Registrar, and the State of New South Wales. The notice of motion sought, inter alia, summary dismissal of the proceedings. On 24 February 2023, a notice of motion was filed on behalf of the owners and their solicitors, seeking summary dismissal and alternative forms of relief. On 14 February 2023, Mr Sarvjot Singh filed an amended notice of motion seeking, inter alia, a declaration that Mr Singh had no standing to proceedings and an order that the proceedings be struck out.
The submissions made on behalf of Armstrong J, the NCAT members, the Registrar and the State are similar to those noted in relation to proceedings 2022/00196452. Hence, it is contended that the NCAT members and the Registrar are entitled to judicial or derivative immunity in respect of decisions made by them in the course of the proceedings at NCAT. It is contended that the claim in negligence against Armstrong J is misconceived and that the various causes of action of misfeasance in public office are not properly pleaded. It is also submitted that Mr Singh has no relevant interest in the proceedings because he is a bankrupt. Lastly, it is said the proceedings are an abuse of process in that they are said to be a thinly veiled attempt to collaterally attack the various decisions of NCAT with which Mr Singh is disgruntled.
The submissions of the 7th to 11th defendants, that is, the owners and their solicitors, also contend that the proceedings are an abuse of process, that Mr Singh has no standing because he is a bankrupt and that the form of the pleading is otherwise embarrassing. On the last matter, the submissions note that the pleading does not in fact identify any cause of actions against them. Instead, it simply alleges that they sought to extort rent for premises that are uninhabitable. The submissions on behalf of the ninth defendant, that is, Mr Sarvjot Singh, contend that he was not a party to proceedings before NCAT and there is simply no basis for him to be sued.
The submissions made by Mr Singh were very much a repetition of the points noted earlier, along with an acknowledgement that the pleading may be defective but a contention that some allowance should be made on his behalf to allow a further pleading to be filed.

[20]

Proceedings Number 2022/00185767

On 26 June 2022, a statement of claim was filed in this Court commencing proceedings number 2022/00185767. Mr Singh is named as the first plaintiff and Ms Kaur is named as the second plaintiff. The pleading is verified by Mr Singh but not by Ms Kaur. The first seven defendants are New South Wales police officers. The 13th defendant is the State of New South Wales. The 14th to 21st defendants are either members of NCAT or the Registrar (of NCAT).
Prayer 1 of the statement of claim recites that it seeks from the police officers and other public office‑holders general damages, aggravated damages, exemplary damages for economic and non‑economic loss in respect of the causes of action in misfeasance in public office, false arrest, excessive and unwarranted use of force, unlawful direction to leave the property, unlawful entry into the premises under possession of the plaintiff, and conspiracy. The prayers for relief also include various declarations concerning the occupation of premises in Jamison Road, Penrith and assertion that various defendants perverted the course of justice in the course of a tenancy dispute conducted in NCAT.
As best as I can ascertain, the statement of claim appears to allege that on 25 June 2022, various police officers trespassed at premises in Jamison Road, Penrith. It seems that they were there to seek execution of some form of order for possession of the property. As I understand it, the police officers are said to be liable for their entry into the property and the NCAT members are said to be liable for the various proceedings that led to whatever order the police officers were enforcing. The statement of claim pleads the various acts of the NCAT members and the Registrar in the proceedings from August 2021 to June 2022.
The eighth defendant to the proceedings appears to be a power company. The 9th and 10th defendants appear to be the owners of that property, the 11th defendant appears to be their real estate agent and the 12th defendant appears to be their company. As I understand, it is alleged that they illegally arranged to change locks, eject the plaintiff from the property and transfer an electricity account in the days prior to the police attending.
Paragraph [53] of the statement of claim is as follows: "Plaintiffs have suffered public humiliation and emotional distress, which is medically diagnosable and significant to require medical treatment, as a direct result of a. Public misfeasance b. Civil Conspiracy c. Unlawful acts of Defendants 11 and 12 d. False Arrest e. Physical Harm f. Perverting the course of Justice g. Sacrilege of Articles of Faith is the most hurtful and unforgiveable act."
It follows from what I have already stated that the statement of claim is clearly embarrassing. There is no attempt to identify which defendants are liable for which tort and which actions of each defendant are said to make up each tort.

[21]

Summary Dismissal

On 26 August 2022, the first seven defendants, being the police officers including the Commissioner for Police, and the 13th to 21st defendants, being the NCAT members and the Registrar, filed a notice of motion seeking, amongst other things, the dismissal of the proceedings and, alternatively, the striking out of the claim, as well as the removal of the first seven defendants as parties.
The written submissions in support of this motion made various points, most of which echo what has been submitted in relation to the other proceedings. Thus, it is contended that the pleading is embarrassing, that judicial immunity and derivate immunity attach to the NCAT members and the Registrar in the performance of their functions, and that the pleading should have been, but was not, verified by Ms Kaur.
So far as the police are concerned, the submissions point to s 9B(1)−(3) of the Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW) which, it is contended, require that proceedings in respect of a "police tort claim" not be brought against the individual officers but the State of New South Wales. The allegations against the police officers in the statement of claim fall within the definition of a police tort claim.
The detailed written submissions of Mr Singh in response again echo the points that have already been made. So far as the police officers are concerned, Mr Singh contended that the effect of s 9B of the Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW) is that, unless the State affirmatively communicates that it will indemnify the police officers, then the individual police officers can be joined. This point can be dealt with at the outset. Subsections 9B(2) and (3) provide that: "(2) Except as provided by this Part, a person may not, in any legal proceedings make a police tort claim against the police officer concerned, but may instead make the claim against the Crown. (3) A person who makes such a claim against the Crown in any legal proceedings may join the police officer concerned as a party to proceedings only if the Crown denies that it would be vicariously liable for the alleged tort if it were established that the police officer concerned had committed the tort."
The operation of these provisions is relatively clear; unless the Crown communicates that it will not indemnify the police officer, then the relevant claimant is prohibited from joining the individual officer to the proceedings. There is no suggestion that such a communication has been made.
It follows from the above that the proceedings against the NCAT members and the Registrar must be dismissed on the basis that they have judicial immunity. Further, the balance of the statement of claim in its entirety, including against the other defendants, must be struck out. It is clearly embarrassing. Further, it follows from what I have just stated in relation to s 9B of the Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act that the police officer defendants must be removed as parties.
What, then, is the way forward with these proceedings? As I have said in relation to Mr Singh, it must now be necessary to consider whether a protective order will be made, requiring him to obtain leave to file a further pleading. Accordingly, he will not be given a liberty to replead.
In respect of Ms Kaur, as with proceedings number 2022/00196452, she will be given one opportunity to formulate a claim in her own right, which must be verified. Any such amended statement of claim must be formulated in a manner consistent with these reasons; that is, it cannot formulate a cause of action against the individual members of NCAT and, to the extent that the actions of police officers are the subject of complaint, the proper defendant is the State of New South Wales.

[23]

Vexatious Proceedings

The multitude of cases commenced by Mr Gurjit Singh over the last 18 month appears to have a number of vexatious qualities. At this point it suffices to note six of them.
First, a number of them either are, or appear to be, mostly manifestly hopeless.
Second, the proceedings appear to be commenced with Mr Singh having what may have been a legitimate disgruntlement with his treatment in NCAT, but they have expanded from that beyond all proportion to his original complaint.
Third, it appears that each time that Mr Singh is subject to a ruling that he disagrees with, he then commences proceedings in which he personally sues the tribunal member or judicial officer who has ruled against him.
Fourth, it appears that he takes no real cognisance of any attempt by the various judicial officers to point out the fundamental flaws in all the proceedings he commences.
Fifth, Mr Singh appears to be proceeding with impunity in that as a bankrupt he is not deterred by any costs order.
Sixth, for the reasons I have already outlined, Mr Singh appears to be attempting to carry on proceedings on behalf of others and, in effect, entangle them in the vexatious proceedings he has commenced.
These circumstances are such that the Court must now consider whether it will embark upon the process of making a vexatious proceeding order of its own motion under s 8(4) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW). Under s 8(3), the Court must not make such an order without giving the affected person the opportunity to be heard. In addition, under s 8(6), a judicial officer may make a recommendation to the Attorney General that he or she consider making an application for vexatious proceedings in relation to a specific person. The power to make the order is granted by s 8(7) and includes an order, inter alia, staying all or other part of any proceeding in New South Wales already instituted by a person, an order prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings in New South Wales or any other order the Court considers appropriate. Unless it is otherwise specified, such an order does not prohibit a person from instituting or conducting criminal proceedings.
After giving reasons dealing with the various cases that before me, I asked Mr Singh what he wished to say against the making of an interlocutory order precluding him from bringing proceedings without the leave of the Court. Understandably, Mr Singh said that he had no notice that an order to this effect might be made and that he had no ability to study the provisions of the Vexatious Proceedings Act. It is true that since February 2023 he has been on notice that at least one of the parties seeks some form of protective order against him. I equally accept that it would not be appropriate now to embark upon the hearing of whether to make a final order under the Vexatious Proceedings Act. However, as I have said, the order that I am considering is an interlocutory order that is necessary to protect the Court's own processes in the interim.
The provisions that I have just outlined relate to the final orders that the Court may make in relation to a person found to be a vexatious litigant. Two matters should be noted about that power. First, the powers to make orders prohibiting a person from instituting proceedings can, of course, be made on condition. Second, the power to make such a final order on the Court's own motion necessarily means that, when considered with the provisions of the Supreme Court Act, this Court has the power to make an interlocutory order preventing a person from initiating proceedings pending the determination of whether to make any such final order.
Such an order can operate until further order and means that the Court can, with proper consideration and having given the prospective defendant proper notice, determine whether of its own motion a final order should be made. However, before the Court would embark upon a determination of whether or not to make a final order, the Court can also call upon the Attorney General to consider its position by making a recommendation. It is generally preferable that any application for a final order be brought by the Attorney General, given that the determination of any such final order will require significant resources, including research, and that other public interests may be involved.
Accordingly, I am not considering making a final order now, but I am considering making an interlocutory order. Given the findings I have made, there is a strongly arguable case to the effect that Mr Singh is repeatedly commencing vexatious proceedings, that is, proceedings that are being instituted and pursued without reasonable grounds (Vexatious Proceedings Act, s 6(c)).
Unless an interlocutory order is made, it seems to me inevitable that Mr Singh will continue to file proceeding after proceeding against the owners, against NCAT members, against judges and all and sundry with whom he disagrees with. This would lead to the impossible position of the Court having to deal with numerous cases, including numerous cases against its own judges, when it is clear beyond any argument that a proceeding against a judge of this Court cannot be brought. It would also continue to visit upon the owners and all the other people enmeshed in the proceedings in NCAT extraordinary expense in dealing with, a residential tenancy dispute that is now well out of proportion to what was originally in issue.
The interlocutory order that I will make will operate until further order. It will preclude Mr Singh from commencing any proceedings in this Court, including a criminal proceeding, without obtaining the leave of a judge of the Court. The Registry staff will be directed to refer any attempt by Mr Singh to file a proceeding to a judge to determine whether leave will be granted. Some of the factors that will govern whether leave will be granted will be whether or not any such proceeding identifies a clearly articulated cause of action, whether it is supported by an affidavit setting out the basis for the cause of action and why it is maintainable despite Mr Singh's bankruptcy.
Consistent with what I have stated, I also recommend that the Attorney General consider making an application for a vexatious proceeding order in relation to Mr Singh.
This aspect of the proceedings will also return to the Court on 18 May 2023. On that day I expect to be advised of the Attorney General's position in terms of whether the Attorney General seek a final order. Upon being apprised of that position, the Court can decide whether to continue the interlocutory order and whether a final order of its own motion will be made. The other parties will have the opportunity, if they so fit, to make submissions on that day as to the course to take.

[25]

Orders

In proceedings No 2022/133947, I order that: (1) The proceedings be dismissed. (2) The two notices of motion filed 6 September 2022 be otherwise dismissed.
In proceedings No 2022/184500, I order that: (1) The proceedings be dismissed. (2) The two notices of motion filed 6 September 2022 be otherwise dismissed.
In proceedings No 2022/196452, I order that: (1) The proceedings against the sixth and seventh defendants be dismissed. (2) The statement of claim be struck out. (3) The first plaintiff's claim be dismissed. (4) The second plaintiff, Kiranjit Kaur, be granted liberty to serve on the first to fifth defendants a proposed amended statement of claim that only names her as a plaintiff and must not name any defendant other than the first to fifth defendants, verified by an affidavit from her, on or before 20 April 2023. (5) The notices of motion filed 7 November 2022, 8 November 2022 and 24 February 2023 be otherwise dismissed. (6) The balance of the proceedings, including the question of whether the second plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended statement of claim or whether the proceedings will be dismissed, be stood over to 18 May 2023.
In proceedings No 2022/325836, I order that: (1) The proceedings be dismissed. (2) The notices of motion and amended notices of motion filed 29 November 2022, 14 November 2022, 15 February 2023 and 24 February 2023 be otherwise dismissed.
In proceedings No 2022/185767, I order that: (1) The proceedings against the thirteenth to twenty-first defendants be dismissed. (2) The first to seventh defendants be removed as defendants. (3) The statement of claim be struck out. (4) The second plaintiff, Kiranjit Kaur, be granted liberty to serve on any of the State of New South Wales and the eighth to twelfth defendants, a proposed amended statement of claim that only names her as a plaintiff and must not name any defendant other than the State of New South Wales and the eighth to twelfth defendants, verified by an affidavit from her, on or before 20 April 2023. (5) The notice of motion filed 26 April 2022 be otherwise dismissed. (6) The balance of the proceedings, including the question of whether the second plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended statement of claim or whether the proceedings will be dismissed, is stood over to 18 May 2023.
In proceedings No 2023/69493: (1) Stand the proceedings over for directions at 9.30am on 18 May 2023.
Further, the Court: (1) Notes that the Court has recommended to the Attorney General that he or she consider making an application for a vexatious proceedings order in relation to Gurjit Singh. (2) Orders that, until further order, Gurjit Singh shall not commence or institute any further proceedings in this Court without first obtaining the leave of a Judge of the Court. (3) Directs the staff of the Registry of the Supreme Court to not accept any document sought to be filed purporting to commence proceedings in the name of Gurjit Singh but instead they must refer the application to a Judge of the Court for a determination on the papers of whether to grant leave pursuant to Order 2. (4) Pursuant to Uniform Civil Procedure Rule 7.36(1), the Court refers Kiranjit Kaur to the Registrar for referral to a barrister or solicitor on the Pro Bono Panel for legal assistance. [The parties briefly addressed on costs]

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