Attorney General for NSW v Singh [2024] NSWSC 449 | Case summary

Attorney General for NSW v Singh [2024] NSWSC 449 | Case summary | Zoe

[3]

Supreme Court proceedings 2018/278850

On 18 December 2017, Mr Singh filed two applications in the Tribunal: (a) Tribunal Proceedings COM 17/53291, on which he sought interim orders preventing Fobupu from forfeiting the lease; and (b) Tribunal Proceedings COM 17/53297, in which he sought final relief, including an order for relief against forfeiture against Fobupu.
On 23 January 2018, Senior Member Charles made orders in Tribunal Proceedings COM 17/53291 (the 23 January 2018 Interim Order) which included an order for interlocutory relief: "Provided the applicant pays an amount of $6,500.00 (inclusive of GST) on account of rent by monthly instalments commencing 1 February 2018, the respondent is restrained from attempting to terminate the retail lease the subject of this application … until the Tribunal has made a decision pursuant to the application in File No COM 17/53297."
On 28 February 2018, Fobupu lodged an application against Mr Singh in the Tribunal for back rent and a termination order in respect of a residential unit (the Kingswood residential premises) on the first floor of the Kingswood retail premises, above the restaurant (Tribunal Proceedings RT 18/10018).
On 6 March 2018, Tribunal Member Simon made timetabling orders for the preparation of Mr Singh's application for hearing in Tribunal Proceedings COM 17/53297.
On 18 April 2018, Principal Member Harrowell heard and determined an internal appeal by Mr Singh from Tribunal Member Simon's orders of 6 March 2018. Principal Member Harrowell concluded that the decision of Tribunal Member Simon was an interlocutory decision, that leave was therefore required under s 80(2)(a) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (the CAT Act) and that leave should be refused. Principal Member Harrowell said, at p 15 of his reasons: "It seems to me in those circumstances there is no basis which has been established that would warrant leave in the present case. I might add to those comments that that is particularly so having regard to the fact that the orders which have been appealed were made on 6 March 2018, and it is clear from the information that has been provided to the Appeal Panel that those orders were in fact varied to extend time on 29 March 2018 and were subject to the further review on 17 April 2018. There is no material before the Appeal Panel that would suggest that those extensions of time were inappropriate or not sufficient. More particularly, however, no appeal has been lodged in relation to those orders, and even if an appeal had been lodged, those orders seem somewhat to have been taken over by the orders on 17 April 2018 made by the Deputy President. In those circumstances the Appeal Panel is not satisfied that leave to appeal should be granted."
On 19 April 2018, Fobupu's application in Tribunal Proceedings RT 18/10018 in relation to the Kingswood residential premises was heard by General Member Levingston. Mr Singh, who alleged that he was ill, did not attend. General Member Levingston refused to adjourn the proceedings and, after hearing from the landlord, ordered Mr Singh to pay Fobupu the amount of $3,700 for back rent and ordered that the tenancy agreement was terminated on 13 May 2018: see Singh v Fobubu Pty Ltd; Singh v Khan [2018] NSWSC 1817 at [7] ("[2018] NSWSC 1817").
On 27 April 2018, Deputy President Westgarth made an order lifting the 23 January 2018 Interim Order: see Singh v Khan [2019] NSWCATAP 2 at [3].
On 25 May 2018, Principal Member Harrowell ordered Mr Singh to pay the respondents' costs of the application for leave to appeal from Tribunal Member Simon's directions of 6 March 2018: Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCATAP 127.
On 28 May 2018, Mr Singh commenced an internal appeal (Tribunal Proceedings AP 18/25082) from the order of Deputy President Westgarth lifting the 23 January 2018 Interim Order: see Singh v Khan [2019] NSWCATAP 2 at [5].
On 26 July 2018, an Appeal Panel granted Mr Singh leave to appeal from General Member Levingston's decision of 19 April 2018 in relation to the Kingswood residential premises and dismissed the appeal: Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCATAP 182.
On 17 August 2018, Mr Singh filed a summons in the Supreme Court, commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850. The summons sought leave to appeal Principal Member Harrowell's decision of 18 April 2018 to refuse leave to appeal from the timetabling orders made by Tribunal Member Simon on 6 March 2018.
On 7 November 2018, Fobupu commenced fresh proceedings in the Tribunal (Tribunal Proceedings RT 18/47679) seeking an order for possession of the Kingswood residential premises: see [2018] NSWSC 1817 at [9].
On 13 November 2018, Mr Singh filed a further summons in the Supreme Court, commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/348479: see [2018] NSWSC 1817 at [10]. The summons sought leave to appeal from the Appeal Panel's decision of 26 July 2018 in relation to the Kingswood residential premises.
On 21 November 2018, Mr Singh filed notices of motion in the Supreme Court in Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850 and 2018/348479. By his notices of motion, Mr Singh sought an interim stay of Tribunal Proceedings RT 18/47679 and COM 17/53297 and a stay of those proceedings pending determination of the Supreme Court proceedings. On 27 November 2018, Adamson J (as her Honour then was) heard and dismissed Mr Singh's applications for interim stays: [2018] NSWSC 1817. Her Honour recounted the history: "17 On 18 April 2018 Principal Member Harrowell refused leave to appeal against Senior Member Simon's decision. However, because of the time taken to have the matter brought before the Appeal Panel, Mr Singh obtained an extension to file material. Ultimately, in April 2018, Deputy President Westgarth granted a further extension for material to be filed. 18 Subsequently, the plaintiff's substantive application was heard by Senior Member Goldstein. The evidence was adduced over a period of four days: 19, 20 and 23 July and 26 October 2018. 19 On 17 August 2018, after the first three days of evidence, Mr Singh filed a summons in this Court for leave to appeal against the decision of Principal Member Harrowell refusing leave to appeal against the direction made by Senior Member Simon. 20 On 26 October 2018 the hearing resumed before Senior Member Goldstein and the evidence concluded. The matter was stood over for submissions which I understand will take place later this year or early in 2019."
Adamson J refused the application, finding, at [23]: "In my view, it would be inappropriate for this Court to grant an interim stay and thereby disrupt the orderly conduct of the proceedings before the Tribunal. It is, in my view, appropriate that the Tribunal be permitted to conclude the hearing in respect of which all the evidence has been given. I accept [the defendants' solicitor's] submission that there is no identifiable prejudice to Mr Singh and substantial prejudice to the landlord if a stay were granted."
In relation to the appeal in Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850 from Principal Member Harrowell's decision of 18 April 2018 to refuse leave to appeal from timetabling orders, her Honour noted, at [24]: "It is difficult, in any event, to see how this Court would grant leave to appeal against a decision made by Principal Member Harrowell to refuse leave to appeal against a procedural direction. The original direction would appear to have been entirely overtaken by events in circumstances where Senior Member Goldstein has spent four days hearing evidence. However, that question is a matter for another day and does not need to be determined by this Court now."
On 21 January 2019, Mr Singh sought to file a notice of motion in Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850 seeking to institute an appeal from the decision of the Appeal Panel in Tribunal Proceedings AP 18/25082 (in relation to the lifting of the 23 January 2018 Interim Order).
On 8 February 2019, Mr Singh sought to file a further notice of motion in Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850 seeking similar orders to those sought by the notice of motion of 21 January 2019.
On 12 February 2019, Registrar Bradford rejected the notices of motion of 21 January 2019 and 8 February 2019 for filing on the basis that the appeals should be commenced by way of summons: see Singh v Khan [2019] NSWSC 211 at [1] ("[2019] NSWSC 211").
On 22 February 2019, the Appeal Panel in Tribunal Proceedings AP 18/25082 ordered Mr Singh to pay the respondents' costs of the application for leave to appeal from Deputy President Westgarth's order lifting the 23 January 2018 Interim Order and delivered reasons: Singh v Khan [2019] NSWCATAP 45. In its reasons, the Appeal Panel found that there were special circumstances warranting an award of costs: "19 We accept the respondents' submission that the appellant's manifest failure to identify any sensible basis for his appeal and his failure to provide written submissions in support of his appeal do constitute special circumstances. 20 We consider that the factors referred to in s 60(3)(e) and (f) of the NCAT Act [1] are present in this case in that the appeal was misconceived and lacking in substance and the appellant failed to comply with the duty imposed by s 36(3) of the NCAT Act which, inter alia, requires parties to comply with directions of the Tribunal."
On 25 February 2019, Mr Singh filed a notice of motion in Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850 seeking a review of Registrar Bradford's decision.
On 5 March 2019, Schmidt J delivered judgment dismissing Mr Singh's notice of motion seeking to review Registrar Bradford's decision to reject notices of motion for filing: [2019] NSWSC 211. Her Honour could not "see any basis for the conclusion that the Registrar was wrong": [2019] NSWSC 211 at [2].
On 26 April 2019, in Singh v Khan; Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 485 ("[2019] NSWSC 485") Harrison AsJ delivered judgment in Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850 and 2018/348479 dismissing the balance of the two notices of motion of 21 November 2018, noting, at [18], that: "There is, in my view, no change in circumstances. The matters are still continuing and are on foot in the Tribunal. There is no utility in granting such a stay, and I refuse it in both matters. That means both notices of motion filed by the plaintiff on 21 November 2018 are dismissed."
Harrison AsJ also dismissed two other notices of motion, which sought a consolidation of proceedings and a joinder of a party, that had been filed by Mr Singh in Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850: [2019] NSWSC 485.
On 3 June 2019, Mr Singh filed a notice of motion in Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850 seeking to appeal from the orders made by Harrison AsJ on 26 April 2019.
On 8 August 2019, an order was made dismissing Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850. This appears to have been in error. The circumstances in which this came to occur were subsequently described by Adamson J in Singh v Khan [2021] NSWSC 1093: ("[2021] NSWSC 1093") "The plaintiff's notice of motion filed 3 June 2019 10 On 3 June 2019, the plaintiff filed a notice of motion, which was made returnable on 13 June 2019. In his motion, the plaintiff sought to challenge orders and directions made by Harrison AsJ on 26 April 2019. 11 The defendants did not appear on 13 June 2019 (it is not clear whether they had been served with the notice of motion). The matter was stood over for directions on 25 July 2019. On that date, the defendants appeared but the plaintiff did not. The matter was stood over to 8 August 2019. Registrar Brown noted that a letter pursuant to Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR), r 13.6, would be sent to the plaintiff informing him that his notice of motion filed on 3 June 2019 would be dismissed if there was no appearance on that occasion. The order dismissing the proceedings 12 On 8 August 2019, the matter came before the Registrar who noted that a medical certificate had been sent by the plaintiff who did not appear. An order was made dismissing the proceedings (not merely the plaintiff's notice of motion filed on 3 June 2019) pursuant to UCPR, r 13.6. The Registrar ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendants' costs. The order dismissing the proceedings would appear to have been an error since the plaintiff had been notified only that his notice of motion would be dismissed if he did not appear on 8 August 2019.…"
On 13 July 2021, Mr Singh filed a notice of motion in Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850 seeking to have the order of 8 August 2019 dismissing the proceedings set aside. The same day, he filed an affidavit in support dated 12 July 2021. The affidavit included the following allegations: (a) a lawyer who is the daughter of the defendants works in a firm which "is the choice of the most terrorists, drug importers, rapists etc"; (b) the Attorney General had attended an event hosted by the daughter and that, Mr Singh, therefore believed "that there is the likelihood that the respondents have sought influence from the Department of Justice to influence the decision of the registrar of 20 Feb 2020" and that the respondents had "political influence" over the Department of Justice; (c) Mr Singh believed there was possible corrupt conduct involved in relation to the refusal of a fee waiver application he had made; (d) Mr Singh believed that he had been targeted by the NSW Department of Communities and Justice because he belongs to a minority; and (e) Mr Singh alleged that the secretary of the NSW Department of Communities and Justice was personally responsible for his application for a waiver of filing fees being refused and made irrelevant observations concerning him.
On 23 July 2021, the defendants in Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850 filed a notice of motion seeking that the proceedings be stayed under s 60(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and, second, an order dismissing the notice of motion of 13 July 2021, on the grounds that Mr Singh did not have standing to bring the motion or continue the proceedings: [2021] NSWSC 1093 at [1].
On 29 July 2021, Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850 came before Registrar Jones for directions. Registrar Jones listed the defendants' notice of motion of 23 July 2021 before the Common Law Duty Judge on 26 August 2021.
On 12 August 2021, Mr Singh filed a further notice of motion in Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850 seeking various orders, including an order setting aside the decision to refer the notice of motion of 23 July 2021 to the Duty Judge. The notice of motion purported to name various non-parties as respondents to the motion, including: the person who had appeared as counsel for the defendants on 28 July 2021; the defendants' solicitor; the Secretary of the Department of Communities and Justice; a Registrar of this Court; and the State Crown Solicitor.
On the same date, Mr Singh filed an affidavit made by him on 9 August 2021, which contains various serious allegations, including: (a) that the Secretary of the Department of Communities and Justice was "interfering in the process of administration to Justice"; (b) that on 28 July 2021, Registrar Jones had "exercised Judicial Discretion arbitrarily" and her conduct had been "highly dishonest", that she had interrupted Mr Singh "to favour the side she prefers" and acted "in a manner that appears to be corrupt conduct"; (c) that the defendants and respondents had lied to Registrar Jones; and (d) a general allegation that "this level of dishonesty in courts, registrars, lawyers is vicious among those who take pride in the administration of justice".
On 26 August 2021, Adamson J heard the notices of motion filed by the defendant on 13 July 2021 and 12 August 2021, and by the defendants on 23 July 2021, delivering judgment on 30 August 2021. Adamson J found for the defendants, declaring that proceedings 2018/278850 were stayed by operation of s 60(2) of the Bankruptcy Act and that the plaintiff had no standing to file and move on the notices of motion of 13 July 2021 and 12 August 2021, and dismissed them: [2021] NSWSC 1093. Her Honour reviewed the history of Mr Singh's obligation to pay costs, which culminated in bankruptcy proceedings: "The assessment of costs 16 The defendants applied for the costs of the proceedings in NCAT [2] to be assessed. On 30 September 2019, the Manager, Costs Assessment, issued two certificates: a Certificate of Determination of Costs specifying the sum of $24,453.85, which was payable by the plaintiff to the defendants; and a Certificate of Determination of Manager's Assessment Costs, which certified an amount of $1,907.13, which was to be paid by the plaintiff in respect of the costs assessor's costs. 17 Pursuant to UCPR, r 36.10, a costs assessment certificate may be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction. The effect of filing such a certificate is that it is taken to be a judgment of the court (ss 70(5) and 71(3) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW)) for the amount of costs which have not yet been paid. In the present case, the defendants filed the costs certificates in the Local Court, as a result of which two judgments in the Local Court were entered, first, on 16 October 2019 for $1,591 (which related to the lump sum costs order made on 24 September 2019) and, second, on 17 October 2019 for $26,551.98 (being the sum of the two costs certificates issued by the Manager, Costs Assessment). 18 By notice of motion filed on 16 March 2020 in the Local Court, the plaintiff sought to have the judgments entered in the Local Court set aside. On 9 April 2020, his notice of motion was dismissed by Tsavdaridis LCM. 19 The plaintiff subsequently challenged the costs assessments, by application filed on 4 May 2021, to the Manager, Costs Assessment for review of the costs certificates. However, before the matter proceeded further, on 6 May 2021, a sequestration order was made against the plaintiff's estate in the Federal Circuit Court on the basis of the Local Court judgments referred to above. The bankruptcy proceedings in the Federal Court 20 On 9 December 2019, the defendants served on the plaintiff a bankruptcy notice which required him to pay the creditors the sum of $28,142.98 (being the total of the two judgments entered in the Local Court), or otherwise to make arrangements to their satisfaction for settlement of the judgment debts, in accordance with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. The plaintiff sought to challenge the bankruptcy notice in the Federal Court. His application was dismissed by Gleeson J on 25 June 2020: Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd, in the matter of Singh [2020] FCA 886. 21 On 6 July 2020, the defendants filed a creditors' petition in the Federal Court, seeking a sequestration order against the plaintiff's estate based on his non-compliance with the bankruptcy notice. 22 The plaintiff appealed against Gleeson J's decision to the Full Federal Court (Rares, Farrell and Stewart JJ), which, on 3 February 2021, dismissed the appeal: Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd, in the matter of Singh [2021] FCAFC 14. 23 The defendants' application for a sequestration order was heard by the Federal Circuit Court (Judge Street) on 6 May 2021. The Court found that the act of bankruptcy occurred on 25 June 2020. His Honour made the following orders: '1. Leave to file the application in a case dated 6 May 2021 is refused. 2. Leave is granted to the applicants to amend the Creditor's Petition in respect of the date of the act of bankruptcy, being 25 June 2020, and the Court dispenses with the need for the filing of an amended Creditor's Petition. 3. A sequestration order is made against the estate of [the plaintiff]. 4. The Petitioning Creditors' costs be paid out of the bankrupt estate in accordance with the priority to which they are entitled, in such amount as is agreed with the trustees and/or as assessed.' 24 The Court noted the following: '1. A consent to act as joint trustees has been filed by Innis Anthony Cull and Gess Michael Rambaldi. 2. The act of bankruptcy occurred on 25 June 2020.' 25 On 23 May 2021, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal in the Federal Court from the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 6 May 2021. The evidence does not disclose when that matter is to be determined. Post-bankruptcy events The application for review of the costs assessment 26 On 7 May 2021, the Manager, Costs Assessment, made directions for the progress of the plaintiff's application for review (which had been filed on 4 May 2021). On 11 May 2021, the defendants' solicitor wrote to the Manager, Costs Assessment, informing him of the plaintiff's bankruptcy and seeking that the matter be adjourned for 28 days to permit the plaintiff's trustees in bankruptcy to decide whether to prosecute the application for review. On 13 May 2021, Innis Cull, one of the plaintiff's trustees in bankruptcy, wrote to the Manager, Costs Assessment to inform him that he was considering whether to press the application for review and informed him that he would let him know of his decision by 4 June 2021. On 8 June 2021, Mr Cull wrote to the Manager, Costs Assessment, informing him that he had not made an election to continue the application, which was therefore taken to have been abandoned by him, by reason of s 60(3) of the Bankruptcy Act. 27 On 9 June 2021, the plaintiff wrote to the Manager, Costs Assessment, and to the parties disputing the effect of s 60(3), as asserted by Mr Cull. He opposed the closing of the file relating to his application filed on 4 May 2021. 28 On 10 June 2021, the Manager, Costs Assessment, wrote to the plaintiff and the other parties to the review application (as listed above) and informed them of the correspondence from the plaintiff's trustees in bankruptcy. He said, in part: 'With that in mind, it would appear that the [Manager, Costs Assessment] cannot proceed with [the plaintiff's] review application, given [the plaintiff] does not seem to have standing to pursue it himself and, as it has been abandoned under the Bankruptcy Act. Having said that, steps have been taken to close the file.' Proceedings 2021/227850 in this Court 29 By summons filed on 10 August 2021, the plaintiff commenced proceedings in this Court for judicial review, 2021/227850, seeking an order that the decision of the Manager, Costs Assessment be set aside (the 2021 proceedings). The defendants to the 2021 proceedings are the Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice (the Secretary), Anthony Dicembre (the solicitor for the defendant in these proceedings), Mr Cull and Gess Rambaldi (the plaintiff's trustees in bankruptcy); and the defendants (in these proceedings). The plaintiff's application for review of decisions of Registrars on 8 August 2019 and 20 February 2020 30 On 13 July 2021, the plaintiff filed a notice of motion (in the present proceedings) seeking an order that the following orders be set aside and that the summons be listed for further directions: (1) The order made on 8 August 2019 dismissing the proceedings; and (2) The orders made on 20 February 2020 that there be no further listings and that the matter be closed. 31 This notice of motion was made returnable on 20 July 2021. On that day, there was no appearance by the plaintiff. Mr Brown appeared for the defendants. Mr Frommer appeared for the Secretary, as a person affected. Although the plaintiff did not appear on that day, he filed written submissions at 7.39am that morning. In his submissions, he informed the Court that when he woke up, he was sneezing and had a sore throat and a cough. He said that he was available by telephone. He sought directions for the further conduct of the matter, which included that the defendants would have a week to put on further evidence and he would have a further two weeks after that to put on evidence in reply. 32 On 20 July 2021, the Registrar made directions (presumably on Mr Brown's application) that the defendants file and serve any notice of motion by 23 July 2021 to be made returnable on 28 July 2021. I apprehend that Mr Brown informed the Court of the plaintiff's bankruptcy and the effect that this would have on the whole of the proceedings. The matter was stood over to 28 July 2021. As referred to above, on 23 July 2021, the defendants filed a notice of motion for a stay of proceedings and dismissal of the plaintiff's notice of motion filed 13 June 2021 [3] on the grounds of the plaintiff's bankruptcy. The directions hearing on 28 July 2021 33 On 28 July 2021, the matter came before the Registrar for directions. The plaintiff appeared on his own behalf; Mr Brown appeared for the defendants; and Mr Frommer appeared for the Secretary. At the commencement of the directions hearing, Mr Brown informed the Registrar that the proceedings were required to be stayed because a sequestration order had been made against the plaintiff's estate pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act. Mr Brown submitted that it would be 'prudent' for the Court to determine the defendants' motion of 23 July 2021 before determining the plaintiff's motion of 13 July 2021 because of the defendants' contention that the plaintiff (by reason of his bankruptcy) did not have standing to contest the Registrars' decisions which he sought, by his motion of 13 July 2021, to challenge. Mr Frommer supported this course and submitted that the proceedings had been automatically stayed by reason of the Bankruptcy Act and that the Court "should so declare if necessary." 34 In response, the plaintiff relied on the express terms of s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act (see further below). The Registrar told him, in substance, that it was not necessary to talk about the 'legalities' since she wanted to make directions about the further conduct of the matter and the hearing of the notices of motion. The plaintiff continued to read out s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act and make submissions about the effect of ss 60(2) and (3). Once again, the Registrar informed the plaintiff that she was not going to be 'getting into the technicalities of what's going on' and 'really wanted to move the matter forward with some directions timetabling orders.' 35 The plaintiff took great exception to the circumstance that his notice of motion, which had been filed on 13 July 2021, was not to be listed for hearing, although the defendants' notice of motion, which had been filed on 23 July 2021 was to be listed for hearing. The Registrar consulted the plaintiff about a timetable for the defendants' notice of motion and made directions accordingly. The Registrar also directed the defendants to file an outline of submissions to be served on the plaintiff as to the basis of their notice of motion. Before the conclusion of the directions hearing, the plaintiff's connection to the Court was lost. The matter was stood down in the list. The plaintiff was not able to be contacted before the matter concluded. 36 At the conclusion of the directions hearing on 28 July 2021, the Registrar made the following directions (as recorded in JusticeLink): 'This matter is listed for Directions (Common Law Registrar) on 3 August 2021 9:00 AM before the Supreme Court - Civil at Supreme Court Sydney. Estimated duration: 5 Minutes This matter is listed for Duty (Common Law) on 26 August 2021 10:00 AM before the Supreme Court - Civil at Supreme Court Sydney. Estimated duration: 90 Minutes ORDERS OR DIRECTIONS 1. The Plaintiff is to file and serve all evidence in answer to the NOM [notice of motion] filed 23 July 2021, by 18 August 2021. 2. The Defendant is to file and serve an outline of written submissions by 6 August 2021. 3. The Plaintiff is to file and serve any written submissions by 20 August 2021. 4. Stood over for Directions Hearing on 3 August 2021 (in relation to the NOM filed 13 July 2021). 5. The Court is to send a Notice of Orders Made to the Plaintiff.' Notification to the plaintiff's trustees in bankruptcy 37 On 14 July 2017, the plaintiff's trustees in bankruptcy were notified of his application to reinstate these proceedings. On 28 July 2021 the plaintiff wrote to his trustees and, on 29 July 2021, received the following reply: 'I refer to your below email received at 11.02 am yesterday and your email of this morning at 12.45pm. • The proceeding that you have referred to (2018/278850) appears to have been dismissed prior to the date of your bankruptcy. • You subsequently made an application to reinstate the proceeding after the date of your bankruptcy. It is my view that you did not have standing to do so. • It is therefore my view that s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 does not apply to the proceeding. • Notwithstanding the above, I was notified of your application to reinstate the proceeding on 14 July 2021.'"
Mr Singh submitted that, although he was a bankrupt, the proceedings were not stayed by s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, because: "(1) this Court has no jurisdiction to grant, or declare, a stay since bankruptcy is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court; (2) the bankruptcy notice was invalid as the judgments in the Local Court were not final judgments and the enforcement proceedings had been brought in breach of the undertaking which the defendants gave to this Court on 26 April 2019 (referred to above); and (3) as the defendants had not proved that the trustee had been notified of the proceedings pursuant to s 60(3) of the Bankruptcy Act, no stay under s 60(2) came into operation because s 60(3) qualified s 60(2)."
Section 60(2) and (3) of the Bankruptcy Act provided: "60 Stay of legal proceedings … (2) An action commenced by a person who subsequently becomes a bankrupt is, upon his or her becoming a bankrupt, stayed until the trustee makes election, in writing, to prosecute or discontinue the action. (3) If the trustee does not make such an election within 28 days after notice of the action is served upon him or her by a defendant or other party to the action, he or she shall be deemed to have abandoned the action."
Her Honour rejected Mr Singh's grounds, stating in relation to the second ground: "51 The second basis on which the plaintiff challenged the defendants' notice of motion was his challenge to the validity of the bankruptcy notice on the basis that the judgments in the Local Court registered as a consequence of the filing of the costs certificate were not final judgments and therefore did not qualify as a basis for a bankruptcy notice under s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act (which provides that a debtor commits an act of bankruptcy if the debtor does not comply with a bankruptcy notice served on the basis of a final judgment or order). He also relied on the alleged breach by the defendants of the undertaking given to Harrison AsJ on 26 April 2019 (which breach is denied by the defendants). 52 As set out above, the plaintiff has unsuccessfully challenged the bankruptcy notice in the Federal Court (Gleeson J) and the Full Federal Court. He also challenged it in the Federal Circuit Court, when resisting the making of a sequestration order on the basis of the creditors' petition (which is subject to appeal to the Federal Court). A challenge to a bankruptcy notice plainly falls within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court as it is a matter 'in bankruptcy'. Accordingly, this Court has no jurisdiction to determine it."
Her Honour concluded: "55 The proceedings in this Court were commenced before the plaintiff became bankrupt. Thus, s 60(2) of the Act applies. By operation of s 60(2), the proceedings were stayed automatically on and from the date of the sequestration order, being 6 May 2021, unless and until the trustees elected in writing to prosecute or discontinue them. The trustees were notified of the proceedings, at the latest, on 14 July 2021. By operation of s 60(3), the trustees are deemed to have abandoned them. Accordingly, the plaintiff does not have standing to prosecute the proceedings in his own name. Thus, he has no standing to prosecute his notices of motion filed on 13 July 2021 and 12 August 2021 respectively, which ought, accordingly, be dismissed. The defendants are entitled to the relief claimed in their notice of motion filed on 23 July 2021."

[4]

The plaintiff's submissions

The plaintiff submitted that the defendant's application made on 17 August 2018 for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from Principal Member Harrowell's decision of 18 April 2018 refusing leave to appeal from timetabling orders made by Tribunal Member Simon, was a vexatious proceeding within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act, for six reasons.
First, it was pursued without reasonable grounds and lacked any utility, in circumstances where the procedural directions to which it ultimately related had been superseded by subsequent events. There was no basis for alleging appealable error on the part of Principal Member Harrowell.
Second, the attempts to institute appeals by way of notices of motion of 21 January and 8 February 2019, themselves constituted abuses of process and the institution of vexatious proceedings.
Third, the application for a review of the Registrar's decision to reject those notices of motion for filing itself lacked reasonable grounds and constituted vexatious proceedings. There was no proper ground for challenging the correctness of the Registrar's decision.
Fourth, the notice of motion seeking to appeal from the orders of Harrison AsJ on 26 April 2019 was conducted in a way that caused unreasonable delay. Mr Singh failed to prosecute the notice of motion at all.
Fifth, the affidavit filed on 13 July 2021 contained various scandalous and irrelevant allegations. In Bahonko v Nurses Board of Victoria [2008] FCAFC 29 at [10], Gyles, Stone and Buchanan JJ said: "The processes of the Court and the Court itself are brought into disrespect if unreasonable relaxation of ordinary standards is extended to litigants in person simply for the reason that they are without legal assistance. There is no basis to think that the rights of any litigant in person are infringed or diminished by the steady insistence that proceedings in this Court are not be used as a means of sullying the reputation of other parties to the proceedings or third parties who are not directly involved in the proceedings at all."
Sixth, Mr Singh sought to relitigate before Adamson J the validity of the bankruptcy notices, which was a matter already determined in the Federal Court.

[6]

Court of Appeal proceedings 2019/142353

As noted above at [29], the evidence in Mr Singh's substantive application in relation to Tribunal Proceedings COM 17/53297 was heard over three days in July and on 26 October 2018 before Senior Member Goldstein: see [2018] NSWSC 1817 at [18]. As observed in Singh v Khan (Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NSW), 20 May 2019, unrep) at [158], on 31 October 2018, Senior Member Goldstein made an order in Tribunal Proceedings COM 18/39312 (31 October 2018 Interim Order): "Provided the applicant pays an amount of $6,500 (plus GST) on account of rent per calendar month to Fobupu Pty Ltd on receipt of a rent invoice from Fobupu Pty Ltd as the trustee of the Khan Family Trust No 2 ABN 702 604 095 93 the respondents are restrained from repossessing the premises the subject of these proceedings or otherwise disturbing the applicant's quiet enjoyment of those premises until the Tribunal has made a decision in application No Com 17/53297."
On 14 November 2018, Mr Singh applied in Tribunal Proceedings COM 18/39312 for a stay of the 31 October 2018 Interim Order until further order: see Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCATAP 34 at [5]-[6] ("[2019] NSWCATAP 34"). That application was dismissed on 27 November 2018.
Mr Singh commenced an internal appeal in the Tribunal (Tribunal Proceedings AP 18/52044) against the 31 October 2018 Interim Order and the dismissal of his application of 14 November 2018: see [2019] NSWCATAP 34 at [7]. On 14 December 2018, the Appeal Panel made orders staying the 31 October 2018 Interim Orders and replacing them with an alternate interim order (14 December 2018 Orders) on condition that monies on account of rent were to be paid into the trust account of Fobupu's solicitors: [2019] NSWCATAP 34 at [12].
On 1 February 2019, the Appeal Panel, constituted by Principal Member Harrowell, made orders dissolving the 14 December 2018 Orders, which had the effect of lifting the stay of the 31 October 2018 Interim Order: [2019] NSWCATAP 34. It was common ground that Mr Singh had not paid monies on account of rent into the trust account of Fobupu's solicitors: [2019] NSWCATAP 34 at [24]. Mr Singh had raised a complaint about the form of tax invoices that had been issued which were headed "Fobupu No 2 as the trustee for the Khan Family Trust No 2 ABN 702 604 095 93": [2019] NSWCATAP 34 at [32]. Mr Singh also asserted a right of set-off in the amounts of $470,000 and $360,000: [2019] NSWCATAP 34 at [37]. The $470,000 figure was said to reflect an amount which Mr Singh ought to have withheld under taxation legislation from the $1 million he had paid to Fobupu in cash on account of rent in the absence of a valid tax invoice: [2019] NSWCATAP 34 at [37]. Principal Member Harrowell rejected Mr Singh's submissions, being the set-off submission; the submission that there was a lawful excuse for not complying with his obligation to comply with an order to pay rent; the submission that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because of the pendency of proceedings in the Supreme Court, and that the form of the invoices raised a federal matter that was outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
On 27 February 2019, Senior Member Goldstein made an order that Mr Singh surrender possession to Fobupu of two shops in the Kingswood retail premises: see Singh v Khan (Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NSW), 20 May 2019, unrep) at [159].
At 6pm on the same date, Mr Singh made an oral application to Button J as the Common Law duty judge, seeking to quash or set aside the orders made by Senior Member Goldstein that day. Button J dismissed the application: see Singh v Khan [2019] NSWCA 196 at [20].
On 1 May 2019, an Appeal Panel of the Tribunal refused Mr Singh leave to appeal from the 31 October 2018 Interim Order: Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCATAP 111.
On 11 June 2019, Mr Singh filed a summons in the Court of Appeal commencing Court of Appeal Proceedings 2019/142353 seeking leave to appeal from Button J's decision of 27 February 2019. On 22 July 2019, the Court of Appeal dismissed the summons: Singh v Khan [2019] NSWCA 196. White JA (with whom McCallum JA, as her Honour then was, agreed) said: "22 The applicants provided the primary judge with a document head 'Plaintiffs' points for hearing'. They are identified as the grounds of challenge that the orders made on 27 February 2019 disregarded Australian tax law and the law of trusts. They asserted that the orders of the Tribunal required payment of rent to the Khan Family Trust (No 2), but no evidence had been provided that the trust existed. Reliance was placed on s 23C(1)(b) of the Conveyancing Act that a declaration of trust of land must be evidenced in writing, signed by the person declaring the trust, or be made by Will. The applicants contended that: 'As a matter of law, no tax invoice from the trust can be valid and enforceable in favour of the trust until compliance with the Conveyancing Act s 23C(1)(b).' 23 For these reasons, they contended that there was no default in their not paying rent as required by the orders of the Tribunal as a condition of the orders restraining Fobupo from repossessing the land. 24 The same arguments were, in substance, advanced in the applicant's written submissions on the application for leave to appeal. The primary judge rejected the argument shortly but sufficiently. He said that s 23C of the Conveyancing Act had nothing to do with the question and the question of whether or not the respondent was a trustee was neither here nor there. Nor did tax law have anything to do with the question. 25 The primary judge was plainly correct. The applicants' submission seems to assume that a trust is a separate legal entity and they were excused from complying with the conditions of the order by which the respondent was restrained from interfering with their possession of the premises because they could not satisfy themselves that the trust referred to in the invoices existed. Neither contention is arguable. The misconception that a trust is a separate legal entity is common, but wrong. The rent was payable to Fobupo. Section 23C provides for requirements of writing when a person is dealing with or declaring a trust over interest in land. It in no way detracts from Fobupo's entitlements as legal owner of the land to recover rent in respect of it. … 27 The applicants ventilated before the primary judge the same argument as had been rejected by Principal Member Harrowell, namely, that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because of the pendency of proceedings in the Supreme Court. That submission was also plainly untenable for the reasons given by Principal Member Harrowell … 28 The application raises no question of general importance. It is not even arguable that the primary judge's order dismissing the proceedings was wrong. There is no merit in the applicants' position."

[9]

Tribunal Proceedings AP19/09967 and AP19/28114

On 27 February 2019, which was the same date as the orders made by Senior Member Goldstein and Mr Singh's oral application to Button J to quash or set aside those orders, Mr Singh commenced an internal appeal in respect of Senior Member Goldstein's orders (Tribunal Proceedings AP 19/09967): see Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCATAP 111 at [20]-[21].
On 20 May 2019, Senior Member Goldstein dismissed Mr Singh's application in Tribunal Proceedings COM 17/53297: Singh v Khan (Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NSW), 20 May 2019, unrep). Senior Member Goldstein also ordered Mr Singh to pay the respondents' costs of an application that Mr Singh had made to amend his points of claim. Senior Member Goldstein found that the lease of the Kingswood retail premises came to an end upon the deregistration of Anmol and that no further lease was entered into with Mr Singh, albeit that Mr Singh (or his companies) remained in possession of the premises.
On 17 June 2019, Mr Singh commenced an internal appeal in the Tribunal in relation to Senior Member Goldstein's decision of 20 May 2019 (Tribunal Proceedings AP 19/28114): see Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd; Singh v Khan [2020] NSWCATAP 11 at [20].
On 21 January 2020, an Appeal Panel constituted by Principal Member Harrowell and Senior Member Robertson dismissed the internal appeals from Senior Member Goldstein's decisions of 27 February 2019 and 20 May 2019 and ordered Mr Singh to pay the respondents' costs: Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd; Singh v Khan [2020] NSWCATAP 11 ("[2020] NSWCATAP 11"). The Appeal Panel did, however, find that Mr Singh was a lessee of the premises from Fobupu, pursuant to an oral agreement formed in about October 2015: [2020] NSWCATAP 11 at [119]-[131].
Mr Singh sought to challenge the 27 February 2019 decision by relitigating the issues concerning tax invoices that had been rejected by Button J and by the Court of Appeal. The Appeal Panel found that it was bound by the Court of Appeal's determination of those issues, and that Mr Singh was subject to an issue estoppel or Anshun estoppel: [2020] NSWCATAP 11 at [145]-[157]. The Appeal Panel also found that the "the grounds of appeal and the submissions made have no merit": [2020] NSWCATAP 11 at [158]-[161]. The Appeal Panel was satisfied that costs should be ordered, partly because "various issues were sought to be re-litigated despite there being decisions of the Supreme Court resolving those issues": [2020] NSWCATAP 11 at [211].

[12]

Federal Court Proceedings NSD 1916/2019, NSD 96/2020 and NSD 788/2020

On 31 October 2019, Mr Singh was served with a bankruptcy notice. On 20 November 2019, he filed an application in the Federal Court commencing Federal Court Proceedings NSD 1916/2019, naming Fobupu as the respondent, seeking orders setting aside the bankruptcy notice (BN246870) issued by an Official Receiver on 16 October 2019 on application by Fobupu as creditor.
On 29 January 2020, Mr Singh filed a further application in the Federal Court commencing Federal Court Proceedings (NSD 96/2020), naming Ghulam Khan, Samina Khan and Fobupu as respondents to the proceedings. By his application, Mr Singh sought orders setting aside a second bankruptcy notice (BN247914) issued by an Official Receiver on 9 December 2019. The background to that bankruptcy notice was canvassed by Adamson J in [16]-[20] of her Honour's judgment in [2021] NSWSC 1093 extracted at [47], above.
On 5 May 2020, Federal Court Proceedings NSD 1916/2019 and NSD 96/2020 were heard together by Gleeson J. Her Honour delivered judgment on 25 June 2020: Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd, in the matter of Singh [2020] FCA 886 ("[2020] FCA 886"). At the hearing, Fobupu elected not to pursue BN246870, with the result that Proceeding NSD1916/2019 was otiose and was dismissed: [2020] FCA 886 [5]. Mr Singh challenged the validity of BN2497914 on the basis that: (a) the Local Court judgments were not final judgments; (b) Mr Singh had a set off or counterclaim equal to or exceeding the amount of the judgment debts (being the $470,000 he alleged that he had paid in error in circumstances where it should have been withheld); (c) the Tribunal decisions were under appeal; (d) there was an issue as to the identity of the creditor; and (e) the bankruptcy notice was defective.
Gleeson J addressed and rejected each of Mr Singh's arguments, at [21]-[79]. Her Honour noted, at [71]-[73], that certain of Mr Singh's submissions repeated the misconception that had been addressed by the Court of Appeal in Singh v Khan [2019] NSWCA 196 as to a trust not being a separate legal entity. Her Honour concluded that "Mr Singh's set-off/counter-claim has no prospects of success": [2020] FCA 886 at [45].
On 20 July 2020, Mr Singh filed a notice of appeal in relation to Gleeson J's decision, commencing Federal Court Proceedings NSD 788/2020.
On 3 February 2021, the Full Court of the Federal Court heard and dismissed the appeal brought by Mr Singh from Gleeson J's decision: Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd, in the matter of Singh [2021] FCAFC 14. The Court noted, at [43], that Mr Singh had again sought to re-litigate an allegation as to Fobupu being a separate entity from a trust of which it was trustee: "Mr Singh argued that her Honour erred in not finding that the trust was a legally separate and distinct entity to Fobupu as its trustee, and that only the trust could enforce payment of the first and second judgments. The flaw with that argument was exposed by her Honour and her citation of the decision in Singh [2019] NSWCA 196 at [25]-[26]. The trust of which Fobupu is trustee has no separate legal personality from Fobupu."

[15]

Federal Court Proceedings NSD 1392/2020

On 29 December 2020, Mr Singh filed an originating application and statement of claim in the Federal Court, naming Ghulam Khan, Samina Khan and Fobupu as respondents (Federal Court Proceedings NSD 1392/2020). Mr Singh claimed the sum of $470,000, being the amount alleged to have been overpaid by Mr Singh to the respondents.
On 24 February 2021, Stewart J struck out the statement of claim: Singh v Khan [2021] FCA 140. His Honour noted, at [10], that the statement of claim did not disclose a reasonable cause of action against each respondent, and at [20] that: "It contains much irrelevant, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious material that is likely to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceeding, or material that is simply inappropriate to a pleading.".
On 29 March 2021, Mr Singh filed a further statement of claim in the same proceedings. On 3 May 2021, Mr Singh filed an outline of submissions in those proceedings, in which he referred to a submission made by the respondents' counsel that the statement of claim did not make allegations as against the first and second respondents. Mr Singh made an allegation, at [5], that counsel's submission "appeared to be a lie" and at [8], that there were "lots of instances [of lying] in NCAT and Supreme Court of NSW as far as [the counsel and the solicitor for the respondents] is Concerned".
On 5 May 2021, Stewart J made orders striking out the statement of claim filed on 29 March 2021, dismissing the proceeding as against the first and second respondents, and giving Mr Singh leave to file a new statement of claim by 31 May 2021 to plead a "money had and received" claim: Singh v Khan (No 2) [2021] FCA 463. His Honour noted, at [8], that the "set-off" cause of action pleaded was untenable and, at [9]-[12], that there was no reasonable cause of action as against the first and second respondents.
On 1 June 2021, Mr Singh filed an interlocutory application in the proceedings seeking that Stewart J disqualify himself on the grounds of actual bias and perception of bias. The submissions following the application referred to various matters that did not appear to relate to the orders sought and did not otherwise make sense.

[18]

Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/255522

On 26 July 2021, Keshvanand Lekhwar and Vinita Lekhwar commenced proceedings in the Tribunal against Mr Singh and his wife, Kiranjit Kaur (Tribunal Proceedings RT 21/32134). The proceedings related to a residential tenancy agreement which had been entered by Mr Singh and Ms Kaur as tenants on 27 July 2020 in relation to a property at Jamison Rd, Kingswood (the Jamison Rd property). Mr and Mrs Lekhwar purchased the property on 7 April 2021, with the intention of living in it upon the cessation of the tenancy. On 23 June 2021, Mr and Mrs Lekhwar served a termination notice requiring Mr Singh and Ms Kaur to give vacant possession of the premises on 26 July 2021 at the conclusion of the residential tenancy agreement. Mr Singh and Ms Kaur did not give up possession and various different proceedings were subsequently commenced in the Tribunal. The history of the various proceedings in the Tribunal is set out in Lekhwar v Singh [2022] NSWCATCD 108 at [3]-[52]. Mr Singh commenced various proceedings in this Court seeking to appeal from or review decisions of the Tribunal.
On 6 September 2021, Mr Singh filed a summons commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/255522, in which he sought to set aside a decision of 24 August 2021 of General Member Pirina not to recuse herself for apprehension of bias in Tribunal proceedings in relation to the Jamison Rd property. The summons named General Member Pirina, the Secretary of the Department of Communities and Justice and the "President of NCAT" as the third, fourth and fifth defendants.
On 14 September 2021, Beech-Jones J, as his Honour then was, made directions that the third, fourth and fifth defendants to the summons in Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/255522 be removed and replaced by the Tribunal: see Singh v State of NSW; Singh v Lekhwar [2021] NSWCA 260 at [2].
On 1 October 2021, Rothman J dismissed Mr Singh's summons in Supreme Court Proceedings NSW 2021/255522: Singh v Lekhwar (Supreme Court (NSW), 1 October 2021, unrep). His Honour noted that one of Mr Singh's complaints was that the Tribunal had allowed service by post. His Honour said, at [6]: "It is not suggested by the plaintiff in these proceedings that the plaintiff did not receive the documentation that was allowed to be served by post. As a consequence, there is no prejudice that derives from the service of the material by post."
As to the two aspects of the proceedings which were contended to disclose bias, his Honour held, at [17], that "Neither one of those aspects comes close to the proposition of an apprehension of bias and could not arguably be associated with an apprehension of bias". Mr Singh was ordered to pay the defendant's costs, if any, on an indemnity basis.

[21]

Court of Appeal Proceedings 2021/271771 and 2021/282536

On 23 September 2021, Mr Singh filed a summons in the Court of Appeal commencing Court of Appeal Proceedings 2021/271771. Mr Singh sought to set aside Beech-Jones J's decision of 14 September 2021. The grounds relied upon included "Failure to properly exercise discretion by 'acting under the dictation' of [the Secretary of the Department of Communities and Justice], [the President of NCAT], Christina Pirina". In addition to the five respondents to Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/22522, the summons named Beech-Jones J as the sixth respondent.
On 1 October 2021, Mr Singh filed a further summons in the Court of Appeal seeking to set aside Rothman J's decision of the same day, commencing Court of Appeal Proceedings 2021/282536.
On 10 October 2021, Mr Singh filed submissions in Court of Appeal Proceedings 2021/271771. Those submissions contained statements, including: "13 … On 1 Oct 2021 when Justice Rothman literally placed invisibly red tape with letters 'SHUT UP' on my mouth … … 16 … If courts fail to maintain the integrity of the case law/common law and continue to pollute the stream of justice with lies and falsehoods manufactured by none other than the Judges itself then Judges must be ready to hear another ground for disqualification and that will be 'You are liar and you lied in case number XYZ'."
On 18 October 2021, Leeming JA dismissed the summonses in Court of Appeal Proceedings 2021/271771 and 2021/282536: Singh v State of NSW; Singh v Lekhwar [2021] NSWCA 260. His Honour held, at [7], that the decisions, being decisions of judges of the Supreme Court exercising judicial functions, were not amenable to judicial review. Leeming JA noted, at [15], that Mr Singh had made unfounded allegations of bias and misfeasance: "I need to add that paragraphs 18 to 20 of Mr Singh's submissions make statements which I regard as unfounded. They suggest a predisposition by Mr Singh to perceive that the system is biased against him, and he makes serious statements concerning public misfeasance. I regard those statements to be as unfounded as similar statements that were made by Mr Singh to the tipstaff of Beech-Jones J in connection with the orders made on 14 September 2021 and also statements made from the virtual bar table concerning his suspicion that there had been some untoward communications between one of the defendants and this Court."
His Honour referred to Mr Singh's obstinacy: "18 The only question today is a pure question of law. It is whether Mr Singh by way of summons filed in the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, rather than by way of summons seeking leave to appeal, can properly bring his complaints about both of those decisions. Mr Singh has made it abundantly clear that he does not wish to have the summonses that he has filed treated as applications for leave to appeal. So be it. 19 I take the view that I have no choice in the application today. As the Registrar indicated a week ago, the decision of this Court constituted by three judges in Penson v Titan holds, in a way that binds me, that Mr Singh's processes do not validly engage this Court's jurisdiction."

[24]

Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/227850

On 16 October 2019, judgment was entered in Fairfield Local Court in favour of Fobupu, Ghulam Khan and Samina Khan against Mr Singh in the amount of $1,591.00 arising out of a lump sum costs order made on 24 September 2019: see Singh v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2022] NSWSC 78 at [1] ("[2022] NSWSC 78"). That judgment was based on a certificate issued under s 78 of the CAT Act by the then Principal Registrar of the Tribunal: see Singh v Gleeson [2023] NSWSC 629 at [11].
On 17 October 2019, judgment was entered in Fairfield Local Court in the amount of $26,551.98 in favour of Fobupu, Ghulam Khan and Samina Khan, being the sum of two costs certificates issued by the Manager, Costs Assessment under ss 70 and 71 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW): see [2021] NSWSC 1093, at [16]-[17].
On 16 March 2020, Mr Singh filed a notice of motion in the Local Court seeking to have the Local Court judgments against him set aside. On 9 April 2020, that notice of motion was dismissed: see [2021] NSWSC 1093 at [18].
On 4 May 2021, Mr Singh applied to the Manager, Costs Assessment for review of the costs certificates on which the 17 October 2019 Local Court judgment was based: see Singh v Khan [2021] NSWSC 1093 at [19].
On 11 May 2021, the solicitor for Fobupu, Ghulam Khan and Samina Khan (the landlords' solicitor) wrote to the Manager, Costs Assessment, copying in Mr Singh and Mr Singh's trustees in bankruptcy, noting the sequestration order that had been made on 6 May 2021 and the effect of s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
On 13 May 2021 (although misdated 2020), the Manager, Costs Assessment wrote to Mr Singh, the landlords' solicitor and the trustees in bankruptcy. The letter stated that: "… the issue of whether Mr Singh has standing to seek the review application has arisen through the appointment of the Joint Bankruptcy Trustees. With their appointment … Mr Singh cannot continue this cause of action, instead that decision rests with the Joint Bankruptcy Trustees." The letter requested clarification as to whether the review application was being pursued.
On 13 May 2021, one of Mr Singh's trustees in bankruptcy wrote to the Manager, Costs Assessment indicating that the application to review the costs certificates was stayed under s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act and that the trustees were considering their position in respect of the application.
On 8 June 2021, one of Mr Singh's trustees in bankruptcy wrote to the Manager, Costs Assessment to indicate that the application to review the costs certificates had been deemed to be abandoned under s 60(3) of the Bankruptcy Act.
On 10 June 2021, the Manager, Costs Assessment wrote to Mr Singh, the landlords' solicitor, and Mr Singh's trustees in bankruptcy, indicating that he could not proceed with the review application "given Mr Singh does not seem to have standing to pursue it himself and, as it has been abandoned under the Bankruptcy Act".
On 10 August 2021, Mr Singh filed a summons in this Court commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/227850. By his summons, Mr Singh sought to have the Manager, Costs Assessment's "decision" of 13 May 2021 set aside. The grounds included denial of procedural fairness, exercise of "unavailable discretion by 'acting under the dictation' of a third party", and exercise of "Judicial Power vested in Commonwealth Federal Court". The summons named seven defendants, including the Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice, the defendants' solicitor, and Mr Singh's trustees in bankruptcy.
On 5 November 2021, Mr Singh filed submissions in Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/227850. Those submissions include various allegations that the respondent's counsel and solicitor were lying.
On 10 February 2022, Davies J made orders and delivered reasons in Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/227850 declaring that Mr Singh had no standing to commence or maintain the proceedings and dismissing the proceedings with costs under r 13.4: [2022] NSWSC 78. Davies J held that, following the sequestration order, Mr Singh did not have a reasonable cause of action and his "claim for judicial review must necessarily fail": [2022] NSWSC 78 at [26]. Davies J also noted that the respondent's solicitor, the Secretary of the Department of Communities and Justice and the trustees in bankruptcy ought not to have been joined to the proceedings.
On 15 February 2022, Mr Singh filed a Notice of Appeal in the Federal Court commencing Federal Court Proceedings NSD92/2022. By his Notice of Appeal, Mr Singh sought to appeal from Davies J's judgment of 10 February 2022 in Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/227850. The grounds of appeal included that: "Respondents used the court as an instrument of injustice and Justice David Davies turned a blind eye towards manifest wrongs done by the respondents."

[27]

Federal Court Proceedings NSD 465/2021

Following the orders made by Stewart J on 5 May 2021 referred to at [91] above, on 6 May 2021, Judge Street in the Federal Circuit Court made a sequestration order against the estate of Mr Singh on the application of Ghulam Khan, Samina Khan and Fobupu as creditors: Khan v Singh [2021] FCCA 950.
On 24 May 2021, Mr Singh filed a Notice of Appeal in the Federal Court from Judge Street's sequestration order that Adamson J referred to at [23] of her Honour's judgment in [2021] NSWSC 1093 extracted at [47], above, thus commencing Federal Court Proceedings NSD 465/2021. On 4 October 2021, he filed submissions in the same proceedings, which contained various allegations, including: (a) that Ghulam Khan had knowingly made a false statement to the Tribunal with an intention to cheat Mr Singh in Tribunal Proceedings AP 18/15303; (b) that the legal representatives for the respondents had breached their professional obligations in Tribunal Proceedings AP 18/15303; (c) that Ghulam Khan, Samina Khan, their counsel and solicitor and Fobupu were party to an agreement to effect an unlawful purpose and were therefore party to a tortious conspiracy; (d) that Judge Street appeared "to be used as a tool by powerful litigants"; and (e) that, though he did "not have evidence of any wrongdoing", he had "seen judicial officers lying in their judgements".
On 11 November 2021, Mr Singh filed an interlocutory application and affidavit in Federal Court Proceedings NSD 465/2021, applying for further evidence to be received on appeal. The affidavit contains various scandalous and/or irrelevant allegations, including that: (a) Ghulam Khan had "misled the Tribunal by evidence and by false instructions so as to pervert the course of justice"; (b) that the respondents "knew that the order they are relying upon to issue bankruptcy notice is not a final order and they mislead the bench of three judges to believe it otherwise"; (c) that Mr Singh had been denied access to the Supreme Court and "strongly" believed "that this is due to the close alliance of respondents with the NSW Attorney General, Chief Justices of NSW Supreme Court and Governor-General Of NSW"; and (d) made irrelevant observations concerning the secretary of the NSW Department of Communities and Justice.
On 15 October 2021, Bromwich J conducted a case management hearing of two matters, being Mr Singh's application for leave to appeal from the decision of Stewart J and his appeal from the decision of Street J. Mr Singh appeared by telephone. It is apparent from the transcript of the hearing that Mr Singh had not complied with an order to file submissions by 1 October 2021, and instead proposed to rely upon what he had written in his original application for leave to appeal, which he described as 29 paragraphs. Bromwich J allowed Mr Singh to rely upon that document as his submissions.
On 3 February 2022, Mr Singh filed an interlocutory application in Federal Court Proceedings NSD 465/2021 seeking an order that Bromwich J disqualify himself from the matter "on the ground of actual bias". On the same day, Mr Singh filed an affidavit and written submissions. The affidavit, at (4)-(5), refers to correspondence with the Federal Court in which Mr Singh had sought an audio recording of a hearing before Bromwich J so as to demonstrate his Honour's tone of voice: "And your tone of voice was as if I am your slave and its prior to 15 Aug 1947. At those times white Judges in India used to treat Indians in a similar way by manipulating the words of their submissions or by misinforming themselves."
Mr Singh's written submissions of 3 February 2022 includes various allegations, for example: "The reasonable person might think that tone of Judge towards Gurjit Singh was if he was his slave and Judge is his master; … A reasonable person might think that Judge tried to humiliate Gurjit Singh that his submissions or arguments cannot win and very courteous to [counsel for the respondent]."
On 7 February 2022, Bromwich J dismissed Mr Singh's interlocutory application of 3 February 2022 in Federal Court Proceedings NSD 465/2021.
On 16 February 2022, Mr Singh sought to file an interlocutory application in Federal Court Proceedings NSD 465/2021 (although dated 16 Feb 2021) seeking a declaration that the respondents had not complied with s 78 of the CAT Act in relation to a costs order made in Tribunal proceedings AP 18/15303 and that Mr Singh's bankruptcy be annulled.
On 18 February 2022, Bromwich J directed that the interlocutory application not be accepted for filing on the grounds that the relief sought was original jurisdiction relief, not appellate jurisdiction relief.
On 8 and 9 April 2022, Mr Singh wrote multiple letters to Bromwich J in relation to Federal Court Proceedings NSD 465/2021. The content of the letters includes allegations of corruption and other demeaning and insulting statements, as well as a threat to commence legal action against his Honour personally.
On 20 April 2022, Mr Singh filed an application for special leave to appeal in the High Court (High Court Proceedings S54/2022). By his application, Mr Singh sought leave to appeal from Bromwich J's decision of 7 February 2022 in NSD 465/2021. The special leave application contains various allegations, including the statement: "Justice Bromwich … Bullied and threatened the self-represented litigant during the hearing on 15 Oct 2021. Justice Bromwich spoke in a sarcastic, mocking and disparaging way during the hearing. (It appeared that Justice Bromwich was under influence of some alcohol or drugs on that day.)"
On 3 February 2023, Colvin J heard Mr Singh's appeal in Federal Court Proceedings NSD 465/2021 from the sequestration order made by Judge Street. His Honour delivered judgment on 10 February 2023: Singh v Khan [2023] FCA 76. While his Honour accepted, at [49], Mr Singh's submission that Judge Street's reasons were inadequate, his Honour otherwise found, at [52], that "none of the contentions advanced by Mr Singh in the appeal have any merit" and dismissed Mr Singh's appeal. Those contentions included repeated contentions about Fobupu's status as a trustee and the set-off alleged by Mr Singh (see at [56] and [61]). Colvin J summarised Mr Singh's oral submissions, noting, at [24]: "I do not include in this list the various allegations about apprehended bias, partiality and lack of independence on the part of the primary judge, members of NCAT or other judges because there was no evidentiary basis for any such claim and no logical explanation for the general assertions advanced. It is well established that allegations of apprehended bias are 'serious matters which must be properly pleaded and substantiated': Quach v MLC Limited [2022] FCAFC 202 at [95] (Collier, Perry and Thomas JJ)."
His Honour also noted, at [43], that Mr Singh had made "general assertions about influence and impropriety and fraud" which were "not addressed because there was no recognisable basis articulated for those claims".
On 1 February 2023, Mr Singh filed written submissions in Federal Court Proceedings NSD 465/2021 which accused counsel for the respondents of knowingly making false submissions and telling "lies" about an omission from an affidavit.

[30]

Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/328613

On 18 November 2021, Mr Singh filed a statement of claim in this Court commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/328613. Mr Singh named Senior Member Charles as first defendant and Mrs and Mr Lekhwar as the second and third defendants. By his statement of claim, Mr Singh sought, among other things, damages from the Senior Member Charles for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress and "public malficence [sic]". The statement of claim, at (11), alleged that Senior Member Charles "exercised the power knowing that he was acting in excess of power with the intention to cause harm to the plaintiff".
On 14 March 2022, Mr Singh filed submissions in Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/328613 concerning directions that had been made by Registrar Jones on 3 February 2022 as to the service of submissions and listing the matter for hearing. Mr Singh's submission contained statements including, at (4), that: "Registrar Karen Jones does not have any Jurisdiction over matters relating to intentional torts, wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office. However, she used to exercise power she does not have to please Chief Justice. (She serves chief justice - right?)"
On the same date, Mr Singh sent an email to a solicitor employed in the Crown Solicitor's Office which suggested that Mr Singh may have a claim against the solicitor or her supervisor.
On 21 March 2022, Mr Singh filed further submissions in the proceedings that again contained concerning statements, including that: (a) Senior Member Charles "is the same person who is responsible for ruining my small business in 2018 and now he came back in my life to make us homeless": at (6); (b) Registrar Jones "knew she cannot involve in the case management of cases involving intentional tort or misfeasance in public office": at (7); (c) "Supreme Court registrars who serve chief justice of NSW closed doors of the Supreme Court because I did not have enough money to pay the fees": at (7); (f) That "[counsel for Senior Member Charles] exceeded her Jurisdiction by acting as the mere mouthpiece of the client or of the instructing solicitor": at (20); and (e) "most of the Supreme Court Judges act as extensions of the executive department of the State": at (21).
On 28 March 2022, Mr Singh filed a notice of motion in Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/328613. By the notice of motion, Mr Singh purported to seek summary judgment, a declaration that counsel for Senior Member Charles had breached the Bar Rules, and a declaration that a solicitor in the Crown Solicitor's Office had breached the Solicitors' Conduct Rules.
On 10 June 2022, Garling J dismissed Mr Singh's statement of claim as against Senior Member Charles in Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/328613: Singh v Charles [2022] NSWSC 743. His Honour noted, at [19], that Mr Singh made it clear that the allegations against Senior Member Charles arose from conduct in the course of a hearing before the Tribunal. Garling J concluded, at [40]-[41], that: "[B]ecause of the operation of the immunity from civil liability conferred by the common law on Supreme Court judges and extended to Members of NCAT by statute, even if the plaintiff's factual allegations were proved, there would be no arguable claim as against the first defendant, and the plaintiff's claim for damages against the first defendant must fail. The Statement of Claim discloses no reasonable cause of action, and the proceedings should be dismissed … I am satisfied to a high degree of certainty that the action must fail because the first defendant is immune from suit."
On 23 March 2023, Mr Singh sent an email to the chambers of Garling J in relation to Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/328613. The email stated that Mr Singh had lodged a Court Attendance Notice with the Local Court, which he proposed to serve on Justice Garling.
On 18 May 2023, Beech-Jones CJ at CL (as his Honour then was) dealt with several of the proceedings commenced by Mr Singh: Singh v Sharma; Singh v Energy Services Management Pty Ltd t/as Glow Power; Singh v Harrowell; Singh v Cavanagh; Singh v Tidball; Singh v Street [2023] NSWSC 551 ("[2023] NSWSC 551"). His Honour, at [12]-[16], stood over Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/328613 to 1 June 2023 for the parties to show cause as to why the proceedings should not be dismissed for want of prosecution.
On 1 June 2023, Beech-Jones CJ at CL dismissed Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/328613 on the basis that none of the parties had appeared and it was "self-evident that the proceedings have been reduced to a point where none of the remaining active parties are prepared to take any further step": Singh v Charles [2023] NSWSC 623 at [8].

[35]

Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/24794

On 28 January 2022, Mr Singh filed a statement of claim in this Court commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/24794, in which he named 17 defendants and made allegations which were substantially similar to those made in the statement of claim filed the preceding day.
On 16 June 2022, Mr Singh filed written submissions in Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/24794. The submissions included concerning statements including, at (10): "Imagine you are going to duel with your hands tied behind your back. I have been enduring this dude Mark Harrowell since 2018. I will not spare him for the damage he caused to me and my family. He and his family need to suffer the same way we have suffered."
On 25 July 2022, Mr Singh filed an affidavit in Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/24794. The affidavit contained various concerning statements, for example: "David Goldstein acted conduct was so corrupt that it require criminal punishment. He does not deserve to live in human society. This might be striked out but I think this is a fact for the betterment of the community. He was full of hypocrisy and later in his Judgement he denied storm damage claim due to lack of evidence. This is white people's so called RULE OF LAW in which you refuse evidence and then deny claim due to lack of evidence."
On 14 February 2023, Mr Singh sent long emails to this Court in relation to Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/24794. The emails contain various allegations of racial discrimination against Mr Singh on the part of Justice Colvin and counsel.
On 24 April 2023, Kunc J delivered reasons in relation to Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/24794: Singh v Harrowell & Ors [2023] NSWSC 420 ("[2023] NSWSC 420"). His Honour ordered that the proceedings be permanently stayed and recommended that the Attorney General consider an application for a vexatious proceedings order against Mr Singh. Kunc J permanently stayed the proceedings on the basis that the allegations made were hopeless, and the proceedings "vexatious and oppressive", in circumstances where: "2 … (1) Mr Singh is a bankrupt. Therefore, the right to bring the various claims for which he seeks damages is vested in the trustee of his bankrupt estate. (2) The pleadings are either or both inadequate or seek to relitigate issues already determined in previous proceedings. (3) No action is maintainable against the first to eighth defendants, who each benefit from judicial immunity."

[56]

Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/247788

On 21 August 2022, Mr Singh filed a statement of claim in this Court commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/247788. Mr Singh named Judge Street, Justice Bromwich and Registrar Bellach as defendants. The statement of claim sought exemplary damages and compensatory damages for intentional infliction of harm and misfeasance in public office. The statement of claim contained allegations including that: (a) Judge Street "gets gratification out of his conduct of exploiting the vulnerability of one party for the amusement of the opponent" being a "common personality trait shared by" Judge Street and Justice Bromwich: at (11); (b) Judge Street and Justice Bromwich had acted with malice: at (11), (23); (c) Justice Bromwich's "female associate on 23 June 2022 seemed to be actively participating in the hearing and showing secret evidence to the second defendant": at (26); (d) Justice Bromwich had been dishonest: at (31); and (e) "The Full Federal Court accepted the lies of white barrister": at (44).
On 4 October 2022, Mr Singh filed submissions in Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/247788. The submissions contain various scandalous matters, including statements that: (a) "Its an unfortunate series of events in the course of seeking Justice when elders such as Justice Davies who equates Judicial Review proceedings with Appeal … Its disappointing to see elders behave in this way without any fear of God and its curse": at (6); (b) "The executive and Judiciary works in concert to protect each other without giving any damn to rule of law, Justice or democratic values": at (8); and (c) "This is the truth as it stands now. Case law is a biggest scam on people on earth. Couple of lies, couple of half truths, few dishonest omissions and you can get a case law suitable to state or rich people": at footnote 3.
On 18 May 2023, Beech-Jones CJ at CL dismissed Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/247788 on the grounds that the first two defendants had judicial immunity, the "[t]he pleading does not properly articulate any cause of action against anyone, including the third defendant" and "[g]iven its generally vexatious nature, there is no reason whatsoever to allow liberty to re-plead": [2023] NSWSC 551 at [17]-[23].

[59]

Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/32586

On 1 November 2022, Mr Singh filed a statement of claim in this Court commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/32586. The statement of claim named 12 defendants, including the President of NCAT, various other Tribunal Members, Registrar Riznyczok, Mr and Mrs Sharma, a solicitor for the Sharmas, Neil Lawyers and the State of New South Wales. The statement of claim sought damages for misfeasance in public office, negligence and collateral abuse of process in relation to the conduct of proceedings in the Tribunal concerning the Elizabeth Cr property.
On 1 November 2022, Mr Singh sent a further threatening email addressed to Tribunal Member Thode attaching the statement of claim. The email read: "You were so dishonest in the way you deal with me at the direction hearing by claiming that I was not named in the applications in the Tribunal Below. This is simply a lie and a person who lie is nothing more than a liar. I am sure you have heard 'Once a Liar always a liar'. Bible says some really tough words for liars like you in Revelation 21 'The one who conquers will have this heritage, and I will be his God and he will be my son. But as for the cowardly, the faithless, the detestable, as for murderers, the sexually immoral, sorcerers, idolaters, and all liars, their portion will be in the lake that burns with fire and sulfur, which is the second death' I cc Crown Solicitor in this email so that they can join you in the lake with fire and sulfur. Because based on my experience with [named solicitor from the Crown Solicitor's Office], [another named solicitor from the Crown Solicitor's Office], etc the lakes need more sulfur. It won't be a good feeling for someone with integrity and honesty to Argue Judicial Immunity for liars like you but [named solicitor] is so desperate to reach the top that she will do anything for it."(emphases in original)
On 1 November 2022, Mr Singh sent an email addressed to Tribunal Members Rosser and Titterton attaching the statement of claim in Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/32586. The email is threatening in its tone and includes statements that: "In earlier days resistance to State's Unlawful policy and the procedure was met by force and now it is met by people like you have believe in Cowboy kind of Justice without the courage to have a DUEL."; and "The point is that abuse of power has consequences in some form sooner or later but right now I choose to serve a Statement of Claim in accordance with the RULE OF LAW of the land for you two who believe in cowboy kind of justice."
On 24 March 2023, Beech-Jones CJ at CL dismissed the amended statement of claim in Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/32586 as against Armstrong J, Tribunal Members, and Registrar Riznyczok on the basis that they enjoyed immunity from the claims asserted. The claim in negligence against Armstrong J was found to be "manifestly hopeless". No real case was pleaded against any of the other defendants and the proceedings against them were also dismissed: [2023] NSWSC 280 at [61]. [63].

[65]

Supreme Court Proceedings 2023/30478

On 30 January 2023, Mr Singh filed a statement of claim in this Court commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2023/30478. Mr Singh named six defendants to the proceedings, being Justice Jaqueline Gleeson, "Official Receiver Australian Financial Services Authority", Anzer Khan, Jeremy Mackenzie, Elliot Hyde, and Tribunal Registrar Szczygielski. The relief claimed included: (a) an order that Justice Gleeson pay damages for misfeasance in public office; (b) an order that the Official Receiver pay damages for misfeasance in public office; (c) a declaration that Mr Khan had asked his father to swear an affidavit in circumstances when he knew its contents were untrue; (d) a declaration that Mr McKenzie had breached the Solicitors' Conduct Rules; (e) a declaration that Mr Hyde had breached the Bar Rules; and (f) an order that Registrar Szczygielski pay damages for misfeasance in public office.
The statement of claim contains various scandalous and grossly offensive allegations including: (a) that "courts are the institution in which I suffered worst form of racial discrimination in this country after I arrived in 1997" and "This form of Racial Discrimination appears to have mastered by majority of the majority white and jewish judicial community (following the footsteps of nazis so far as discrimination is concerned)"; and (b) that Justice Gleeson "lied", acted "in bad faith" and knowingly out of jurisdiction.
On 11 February 2023, Mr Singh filed an amended statement of claim in Supreme Court Proceedings 2023/30478. By his amendments, Mr Singh sought to join Justice Colvin, Prime Minister Albanese, and former Premier Perrottet as the seventh, eighth and ninth defendants. Mr Singh sought damages from Justice Colvin for misfeasance in public office, declaratory relief concerning the constitutionality of provisions of the CAT Act and Bankruptcy Act, declaratory relief concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and damages "as a result of facing racial discrimination in Federal Court". Mr Singh alleged that Justice Colvin had acted with malice, dishonestly and an intent to harm him. For example, Mr Singh stated that his Honour: (a) applied the "wrong legal test with malicious intent of dishonesty to hurt plaintiff and appease white primary Judge and White Barrister": at (60); (b) "went on to decide the whole matter as if he is Dictator not bound by any rules and law whose only mission is to save his fellow white Judge decision from being set aside and in doing so he will favor his fellow white barrister": at (86); and (c) "blamed the delay on me [which] is another example of his racist and colonial mindset where he believes he has Authority from the God to rule over other race using centuries old model to look decent but act dishonestly": at (89).
On 18 May 2023, Garling J summarily dismissed Supreme Court Proceedings 2023/30478: Singh v Gleeson [2023] NSWSC 629 ("[2023] NSWSC 629"). His Honour held that the claims against Justices Gleeson and Colvin "cannot possibly succeed" by reason of their judicial immunity for acts done in their judicial capacity: [2023] NSWSC 629 at [34]-[35]. The claim against the Official Receiver was dismissed on the basis that it was an attempt to relitigate the validity of the bankruptcy notices (which had already been finally determined) and the proceedings were therefore "vexatious, disclose no reasonable cause of action, and constitute an abuse of the process of this Court": [2023] NSWSC 629 at [41]-[42]. The claim against the third defendant was found to be "vexatious and oppressive" as raising no cause of action known to the law: at [46]. The claims against the fourth and fifth defendants was also found to be "demonstrably hopeless": at [54]. The proceedings against the sixth defendant were "an abuse of process of the Court and could not possibly succeed": [2023] NSWSC 629 at [61]. Similar findings were made in respect of the claims against the eighth and ninth defendants: [2023] NSWSC 629 at [65].

[71]

Court of Appeal Proceedings 2023/69493

On 2 March 2023, Mr Singh filed a summons in the Court of Appeal commencing Court of Appeal Proceedings 2023/69493. The summons named 13 defendants, including the Secretary of the Department of Communities and Justice, the Sheriff of New South Wales, Mr and Mrs Sharma, the Tribunal and various Tribunal Members. The summons sought to set aside various decisions made by the Tribunal in proceedings concerning the Elizabeth Cr property. The grounds stated in the summons contained various scandalous matters, including: (a) a Tribunal Member "lied on the record of tribunal": at (2); and (b) that Tribunal Members were "motivated by racial discrimination to protect their white counterpart": at (15).
On 9 March 2023, Mr Singh sent an email in relation to Supreme Court Proceedings 2023/69493 addressed to Registrar Riznyczok, the Chief Justice, Justice Cavanagh, Registrar Jones, and a solicitor of Wotton & Kearney. The email contained serious allegations including: (a) "that the Chief Justice of NSW (decision maker), Registrar of the Court of Appeal, and Justice Cavanagh have acted dishonestly and criminally to further delay and harm me"; and (b) of "a conspiracy between Wotton Kearney, Karen Jones, [the solicitor of Wotton & Kearney], and Justice Cavanagh to engage in unlawful means (email to move court) and unlawful purposes (delay and deprive determination of relief) to delay the relief I seek".
Also on 1 June 2023, Beech-Jones CJ at CL dismissed Court of Appeal Proceedings 2023/69493 under r 13.4 of the UCPR: Singh v Tidball [2023] NSWSC 613. His Honour found that the proceedings were vexatious, stating: "9 The mere fact that someone did invoke that jurisdiction [under s 69 of the Supreme Court Act] would, of itself, not be sufficient to answer the description of the proceedings being frivolous and vexatious. However, when that is accompanied with the fact that the summons names numerous people, many of whom have no tangible connection to the proceedings, then it starts to acquire a vexatious flavour. 10 The vexatious flavour becomes much more concrete when one examines the grounds to which I have made reference. As I have noted, they are generally unintelligible and, in one respect, contain a baseless but serious allegation. 11 When one steps back from it, it is clear that Mr Singh is simply seeking to re-agitate the same dispute as was addressed in Singh v Singh via a different mechanism in circumstances where a more simple mechanism, which would only involve the truly affected parties, may have been available to a proper party to the residential tenancy agreement."

Parties

Applicant/Plaintiff:

Attorney General for NSW

Respondent/Defendant:

Singh

Legislation Cited (7)

Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008(NSW)ss 4, 6, 8

Bankruptcy Act 1966(Cth)ss 40, 60

Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013(NSW)ss 78, 80

Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983(NSW)s 9B

Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014(NSW)ss 70, 71

Property and Stock Agents Act 2002(NSW)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005(NSW)

Cases Cited (36)

Vito Zepinic v Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited; Nina Zepinic v Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited [2018] NSWCA 317 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Attorney General for the State of New South Wales (Plaintiff) Gurjit Singh (Defendant) Representation: Counsel: Mr H Atkin (Plaintiff) In person (Defendant)

Legislative provisions and principles

Section 8 of the Act relevantly provides: "8 Making of vexatious proceedings order (1) When orders may be made An authorised court may make an order under this section (a vexatious proceedings order) in relation to a person if the court is satisfied that: (a) the person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia, or … (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an authorised court may have regard to: (a) proceedings instituted or conducted in any Australian court or tribunal (including proceedings instituted or conducted before the commencement of this section), and (b) orders made by any Australian court or tribunal (including orders made before the commencement of this section), and (c) evidence of the decision, or a finding of fact, of any Australian court or tribunal hearing such proceedings or making such orders, even if that evidence would otherwise not be admissible by virtue of section 91 of the Evidence Act 1995. (3) An authorised court must not make a vexatious proceedings order in relation to a person without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity of being heard. … (7) Orders that may be made by Supreme Court The Supreme Court may make any one or more of the following vexatious proceedings orders in relation to a person: (a) an order staying all or part of any proceedings in New South Wales already instituted by the person, (b) an order prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings in New South Wales, (c) any other order that the Court considers appropriate in relation to the person.
"Proceedings" is defined broadly, in s 4 of the Act, as follows: "4 Meaning of 'proceedings' In this Act, proceedings includes: (a) any civil proceedings, criminal proceedings or proceedings before a tribunal, and (b) any cause, matter, action, suit, proceedings, trial, complaint or inquiry of any kind within the jurisdiction of any court or tribunal, and (c) any proceedings taken in connection with or incidental to proceedings pending before a court or tribunal, and (d) any interlocutory proceedings or applications, or procedural applications, taken in connection with or incidental to civil proceedings, criminal proceedings or proceedings before a tribunal, and (e) any calling into question of a decision, whether or not a final decision, of a court or tribunal, and whether by appeal, challenge, review or in another way."

Attorney General for NSW v Singh

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Catchwords

Source

Catchwords

Judgment (78 paragraphs)

Parties

Legislation Cited (7)

Cases Cited (36)