Singh v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2025] FCA 538

1. The applicant, Ms Balbir Singh, appeals from a decision of what was then the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. That decision concerned the applicant's claim for a crisis payment under the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth). The applicant made the claim after having been removed from her home by police officers and mental health nurses as the result of an involuntary mental health treatment order. Her claim was rejected by Services Australia, an agency within the portfolio of the respondent. The applicant sought review of that rejection. The rejection was affirmed by the respondent's authorised review officer. It was affirmed again by a decision of the Tribunal's Social Services and Child Support Division. It was further affirmed by a decision of the General Division of the Tribunal on 2 May 2024. That last decision is the subject of this appeal. That decision is Singh and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2024] AATA 1265 (Tribunal Decision).
2. The applicant's appeal is made under s 44(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act). Whilst an application made under s 44 is called an appeal, the application is instituted in the original jurisdiction of this Court and is properly characterised as an application for judicial review of the lawfulness of the Tribunal's decision: see Wills v Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Skills Quality Authority [2022] FCAFC 10; 289 FCR 175 at [7] (Perry J). The review examines errors of law and not the factual merits.
3. The applicant's amended notice of appeal sets out two "questions of law" as follows:

1. In assessing the grounds raised and relief sought by the applicant in her amended notice of appeal and submissions, I take into account that she is a litigant in person. I have considered the amended notice of appeal and submissions as a whole and as fairly as possible: Onassys v Comcare [2022] FCA 90 at [21] (Abraham J). I also take into account that the Court is not constrained by the questions stated in the amended notice of appeal in determining whether a question of law is sufficiently asserted in an application under s 44 of the AAT Act: Haritos v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92; 233 FCR 315 at [99] - [104] (Allsop CJ, Kenny, Besanko, Robertson and Mortimer JJ). I have endeavoured to construe the applicant's grounds as generously as possible. I have assessed the following seven grounds by which it is alleged the Tribunal committed an error of law:

1. By ground seven, the applicant asserted there was an apprehension of bias against the Tribunal member due to the Tribunal's failure to adequately consider the applicant's serious injuries or circumstances. The applicant did not make oral submissions as to this ground at the hearing, nor did she particularise this claim in her written submissions save for comments that she had been a victim of bias due to "blatant racism she has been subjected to daily in Australia [and] New Zealand, the spread of false information about her everywhere portraying her as being a bad woman and her serious injuries being actively manipulated by corrupt entities to decrease her compensation payments as a woman/doctor/citizen".
2. I find that there is no evidence before me that establishes that a fair minded lay observed might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal did not bring an impartial mind to bear on the decision: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337 at [6] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). Ground seven is dismissed.

(1997) 81 FCR 71