Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 36

...I had provided relevant information during the hearing and also had an offer for a course at the same level of my previous student visa. The only reason I was not able to provide evidence of enrolment was because of the fact that l did not hold a proper visa and the education provider could not issue me with one. However. the Member ref.. that into consideration. I have only received an oral outcome of the application and not received the full decision till date even though it has been more than a month since the decision.

I feel that procedural fairness and natural justice was not given to me as no application should be decided without considering all the information provided by the applicant. I believe that the member had the discretionary power to consider the evidence but chose not to.

As such, l feel that the AAT had made an error in their judgement and refused my application for review. Thus, I would like to challenge the decision of the AAT as I feel it was not lawful and fair. As such, I have decided to appeal the decision at the Federal Circuit Court in the hope of getting a fair and lawful outcome so that I can get my visa as planned.

1. On 15 April 2020, the Tribunal acknowledged the applicant's request for a copy of the written record of reasons but advised that, as the request was received after the prescribed period of 14 days from the date of the oral decision, written reasons would not be provided (CB 86-8).
2. On 1 May 2020, the Tribunal provided written reasons for the Decision (CB 89-94).

1. In the Decision, the Tribunal summarised the procedural history and identified the first question to be determined was 'whether or not the applicant complied with condition 8202(2)(b) of the Regulations?'.
2. The Tribunal found (CB 91 [12]) that the applicant candidly admitted that he was aware that it was a breach of his visa condition to enrol in a course that is a level 3 Australian Qualifications Framework (AQF) level course in circumstances where his visa required him to be enrolled in the Master of Professional Accounting, which is an AQF level 9 course.
3. The Tribunal considered the applicant's health issues and the difficulties that they caused (CB 91 [12]). The Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant breached condition 8202(2)(b) of the visa (CB 91 [13]). Having found the applicant to have been in breach, the Tribunal then considered discretionary reasons for not cancelling the visa under s 116 of the Act. This included the guidelines in the departmental Procedures Advice Manual (PAM3).
4. At CB 92 [22], the Tribunal found:

Based on the above, the tribunal is satisfied that the applicant has demonstrated that his primary purpose for being in Australia is for the purpose of study. The tribunal is satisfied that the applicant has demonstrated that he is a diligent student until ill-health befell him. However, it is clear that the purpose for which the visa was granted ended upon the applicant's enrolment in the Australian Qualifications Framework Level 3 Certificate. I give this consideration some minor weight in favour of cancelling the visa.

The Tribunal cannot be satisfied, based on all the evidence set out above, that the reason for the downgrading of the course, being from a Level 9 course to a Level 3 course, was occasioned by the ill-health described by the applicant in the circumstances, notwithstanding that the tribunal wholly accepts the applicant's evidence, that he suffered from the conditions that he suffered from, at the relevant time. The reason the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant's ill health caused him to breach the visa condition, is due to the fact that he enrolled in a Level 3 course and attended those classes, which establishes that his health was not so dire as to prevent the applicant from being enrolled, or studying, at all. Given that the applicant acknowledges being aware of his visa condition, the Tribunal considers that it would have been reasonable conduct on the part of the applicant to seek a deferral of his course.

1. The Tribunal was not persuaded that ill health was the cause of the applicant's breach of the conditions of the visa. The Tribunal found that the reason for the breach of the visa was not occasioned by matters that were outside of the reasonable control of the applicant (CB 93 [26]). This was given significant weight.
2. At CB 93 [36], the Tribunal found:

It is clear that the breach does not reveal any bad faith on the part of the applicant. It is clear that he has given honest, reliable and credible evidence to the tribunal throughout the course of the hearing today. However, it is also clear, based upon matters I have set out above, that the reason for the breach of the visa was not occasioned by matters that were outside of the reasonable control of the applicant.

1. In viewing the applicant's circumstances as a whole and the relevant discretionary considerations in PAM3, the Tribunal concluded that the visa should be cancelled (CB 93 [37]).

1. On 14 April 2020, the applicant took the precautionary step of commencing an application for judicial review in this Court before he had received the written reasons constituting the Decision (CB 96-100). However, because the Tribunal delivered oral reasons on 6 March 2020 and confirmed the Decision to affirm the delegate's decision in writing that day, the time within which to make an application for review under s 477(1) of the Act, had expired by 14 April 2020. The application for judicial review was filed four days out of time. Therefore, the applicant is required to seek an extension of time to make the application to this Court under s 477(2) of the Act.
2. On 14 May 2025, a registrar of the Court ordered that the hearing of the application for an extension of time be listed on a date to be fixed. The applicant was also ordered to file and serve any amended application for review with proper particulars, an outline of submissions and any further affidavit evidence upon which he intended to rely no later than 28 days before the date of the final hearing.
3. The hearing of the application for an extension of time was listed to be heard in person at Melbourne on 13 November 2025. The applicant did not file any further documents or evidence as ordered.
4. The grounds for extending time identified in the originating application for judicial review were stated as follows:

Due to coronavirus situation I was having difficulty finding legal help on time and in my budget. So I had to lodge the application myself. I had prepared the application and travelled to the court but found out that application are only accepted online. I had problems lodging the application through the internet which caused a slight delay and due to the easter break I could only lodge the application today. I sincerely request you to consider my application even though it is just outside the 35 days period.

1. In the affidavit accompanying the originating application for judicial review affirmed by the applicant on 7 April 2020, the applicant did not identify any reason or give any explanation as to why the application was not filed within the time required by s 477(1) of the Act, save that he said:

I have only received an oral outcome of the application and not received the full decision till date even though it has been more than a month since the decision.

1. That was the extent of the evidence filed in support of the application to extend time.
2. In the originating application for judicial review, the applicant identified the grounds of review as follows:

1. I was not provided procedural fairness as I was not afforded the opportunity to explain my circumstances in detail at the hearing.

2. I feel that the law was incorrectly applied as the member did not use the powers to consider the documents presented by me at the time of the hearing.

3. I also feel that Natural justice was not given to me as no application should be decided without considering all the information provided by the applicant and that the fact that I still am yet to receive a written statement in relation not the decision.

1. These particulars were not amended or supplemented by written submissions before the hearing.
2. On 13 November 2025, the applicant appeared at the hearing before this Court of the application for an extension of time. The applicant was assisted by an interpreter of the English and Punjabi languages. Ms Sassine, solicitor, appeared for the Minister.

1. At the hearing, the applicant was asked to elaborate and explain the grounds for an extension of time and the merits of his application for judicial review.
2. When asked why his application was filed late, the applicant claimed that he asked his agent to file the application, but the agent was four days late. The applicant claimed that he asked the agent if he had filed the application and was told that it had been done. The applicant said he was new to the country and did not understand the process. He relied on his agent. He also relied on his agent's advice to enrol in a diploma course instead of a Master's course. There was no affidavit evidence to this effect filed by the applicant.
3. The applicant was also asked to explain his grounds of review and why the Tribunal erred in making the Decision. He was asked to address each ground of review in the originating application. The applicant was unable to assist the Court in elaborating on these grounds. The applicant claimed his agent prepared the application and he did not understand why each of the grounds was included.
4. When the Court took the applicant to ground one and asked him to explain what he thought it meant, the applicant replied, 'I don't know why the agent has said that'. In response to the second ground, the applicant submitted that 'this was all prepared by my agent'. Regarding the third ground, the applicant stated that 'this was all written by my agent, I do not know'. The applicant submitted that he had provided the agent with all the documents including COEs and was advised by the agent to pursue his alternative course of study at a certificate and diploma level.

1. The solicitor for the Minister relied on the outline of written submissions filed with the Court on 30 October 2025. Ms Sassine also noted that there was no evidence to support the applicant's assertions that the originating application was prepared and filed by the applicant's agent or a solicitor. To the contrary, the documents filed with the Court were all said to be prepared by the applicant personally and purportedly signed by the applicant. It was submitted that the delay in making the application was not adequately explained and the substantive application for review lacked merit.
2. Ms Sassine submitted in written submissions that while the applicant's delay is minor, the delay has not been adequately explained, and the proposed substantive judicial review application fails to identify any jurisdictional error. Lack of legal assistance is not itself a sufficient excuse for failing to lodge an application in time (SZQRU v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 1234 at [24] per Katzmann J) (SZQRU). The applicant's lack of knowledge about his review rights is also not a satisfactory explanation for the delay (SZSDA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1319 at [38] per Foster J). Furthermore, the Tribunal's written notification of decision dated 6 March 2020 also informed the applicant that he had 35 days in which to make an application for judicial review (CB 80-2).
3. The Court noted that the delay of four days was not substantial and was partially explained by the absence of written reasons. Therefore, the Court asked Ms Sassine to direct submissions towards the merits of the substantive claim for judicial review.
4. Ms Sassine addressed each of the grounds of review. Ground one contends the applicant was not provided 'procedural fairness' because he was not given the 'opportunity to explain his circumstances at the hearing'. The Minister submitted that the applicant attended the Tribunal hearing and gave evidence with the assistance of a Punjabi interpreter. The Tribunal also received oral evidence from the applicant's brother (CB 90 [5]). The Tribunal complied with s 360 of the Act in providing the applicant with an opportunity to attend the hearing, present arguments and give evidence. There was nothing procedurally unfair apparent from the records of the Tribunal or the Decision, and the applicant did not identify any other reason why he was denied procedural fairness.
5. In grounds two and three, the applicant did not identify the information that the Tribunal allegedly failed to consider. There was no evidence that the applicant provided any documents to the Tribunal at the hearing or why documents were not properly considered. The Tribunal had also expressly considered the applicant's written submissions at CB 91 [16] and 93 [29].
6. With regard to the applicant's complaint that he was denied natural justice, Ms Sassine submitted that there is no apparent breach of the Tribunal's procedural fairness obligations as exhaustively defined in s 357A and Part 5 of the Act, relying on Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Lay Lat (2006) 151 FCR 214; [2006] FCAFC 61 at [60]- [70] per Heerey, Conti and Jacobson JJ.
7. On behalf of the Minister, it was submitted that the Tribunal was permitted to make an oral decision on a review under s 368D of the Act, and the Tribunal was not required to reduce the oral statement to writing unless the applicant made a written request within 14 days of the date of the oral statement per s 368D(4) of the Act. The applicant did not make a written request within 14 days of the date of the oral statement. In any event, any contention that the Tribunal failed to comply with its obligations under s 368D(4) to reduce its oral decision to writing would be irrelevant given the validity of its decision is not affected by procedural irregularities (s 368D(7)(b)).
8. It was submitted that the application for an extension of time should be dismissed with costs.

1. To obtain an order extending the time within which to file an application, the Court must be satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make an order for an extension (s 477(2)(b) of the Act). The discretionary power to extend time is broad (Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 276 CLR 579; [2022] HCA 28 at [12] per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ) (Tu'uta Katoa).
2. The factors that should be considered by the Court in determining whether to grant an extension of time include whether there is an acceptable explanation for the delay, the length of the delay, the merits of the application for review and any prejudice that may be suffered by the Minister (Tu'uta Katoa at [13]; SZQBI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1388 at [18] per Cowdroy J).
3. In considering the merits of the grounds of review for the purpose of an extension of time, the Court need only adopt an impressionistic approach (GOK18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 169 at [32] per Collier, Rangiah and Derrington JJ (GOK18); Tu'uta Katoa at [14]). The Court should consider whether the proposed grounds are 'arguable', 'reasonably arguable', 'sufficiently arguable', or have 'reasonable prospects of success' to warrant the grant of an extension of time (MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 242 FCR 585; [2015] FCA 1391 at [62]- [63] per Mortimer J and Tu'uta Katoa at [15]).
4. The Minister did not identify any prejudice suffered if an extension of time is granted, but submitted that the mere absence of prejudice is not a sufficient basis to warrant the grant of an extension of time (Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344; [1984] FCA 176 at 349 at [21] per Wilcox J; SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6]).

1. The applicant has not filed any affidavit evidence that adequately explains the delay or why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the Court to grant an extension of time as required by r 29.05(2)(c) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (Rules) (which applied at the time of the application) and s 477(2) of the Act.
2. At the hearing, the applicant submitted that he asked his agent to file the application, and it was the agent who had filed the application late. The applicant's former agent did request written reasons for the Tribunal's decision (CB 84-5) but there is no evidence in affidavit form or otherwise that the applicant was assisted by the agent to file the originating application or that the agent was the cause of the delay. To the contrary, the explanation in the application for an extension of time was to the effect that it was the applicant that experienced problems lodging the application due to problems with the portal.
3. It is understandable that a litigant in person may be unfamiliar with the procedures and time limits imposed by the Rules and under the Act. Inability to secure legal representation due to financial circumstances is not generally regarded as a satisfactory explanation of delay (GOK18 at [25]; SZQRU at [24] per Katzman J).
4. It is also understandable that because the applicant had not received written reasons from the Tribunal, the applicant may have waited until those reasons were provided but the Tribunal was not under an obligation to provide written reasons after 14 days and declined to do so on 15 April 2020 (CB 87-8). The request for reasons was not made until 7 April 2020, and no explanation was given as to why the application was not filed at that time or before that date. The letter from the Tribunal dated 6 March 2020 confirming the outcome of the review clearly identified the time within which to seek review by this Court (CB 81) and the applicant was on notice that the 'clock was ticking'.
5. Nevertheless, the delay was not substantial and is partially explained in the grounds for an extension of time in the originating application for judicial review. It is regrettable that the applicant did not seek to candidly explain his position when before this Court at the hearing as he did in the application for review, but instead sought to blame his agent without supporting evidence.
6. In the absence of any credible affidavit evidence explaining the delay, and why it is necessary and in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension, there is no persuasive reason to exercise the discretion to extend time. However, in accordance with authority, I also turn to consider prejudice and the merits of the application for judicial review.

1. The Minister has not identified any prejudice caused by the delay in filing the application for judicial review.
2. In WQRJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 736 at [41] and [42], Derrington J said:

[41] There exists a clear public interest in the prompt disposition of administrative matters and, in particular, of allegations that officers of the Commonwealth have acted in excess of their jurisdiction: MZABO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 980 [5]. In Ex parte Marks, McHugh J said in relation to proceedings in which prerogative writs were sought (at 474 [15]):

[T]he public interest requires that there be an end to litigation about the efficacy of such acts or decisions.

[42] More specifically, the Minister has a legitimate interest in the timely disposal of applications for visas and decisions concerning the cancellation of visas: Sun v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 2020 [89]; Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 929; (2001) 192 ALR 71 [62].

1. Whilst there may be no prejudice to the Minister and the delay here was short, the public interest identified by Derrington J and the High Court is a matter of some weight when exercising the broad discretion to extend time.

1. In this application, the merits of the application for review, viewed on an impressionistic basis, do not support a finding that it is necessary in the interests of justice to extend time.
2. Ground one of the grounds of review is vague and unparticularised. This alone is a sufficient reason to dismiss an application for judicial review (NWWJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 176 at [37] per Perram, Derrington and Stewart JJ).
3. The applicant does not identify any circumstances that he was denied the opportunity to explain at the hearing before the Tribunal, and the Decision reflects that the circumstances presented by the applicant were considered in some detail, including his ill health. There was no apparent denial of procedural fairness. The applicant was invited to appear and present evidence. He did so, assisted by an agent and his claims were heard and considered, including evidence from his brother. The obligation to extend procedural fairness is governed by Part 5 of the Act and the applicant has not identified any departure by the Tribunal from the obligation to act in a way that is fair and just. In his oral submissions to the Court, the applicant was unable to assist the Court with this ground or what was intended by it. There appears to be no merit in this ground of review.
4. The second and third grounds also lack particularity and could be dismissed for that reason. Again, the applicant was unable to assist in oral submissions. However, there is no evidence of any document or documents that the Tribunal omitted to consider and there is no apparent failure to apply the correct test when exercising the discretion to cancel a visa under s116 of the Act. No miscarriage of discretion is identified and the weight given to the evidence presented is a matter for the Tribunal and the Tribunal alone (Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 17 at [24]).
5. The Tribunal did provide written reasons for decision, although it was not strictly bound to do so after advising the applicant in writing of the outcome in a written statement under s 368D(2)(b) of the Act on 6 March 2020. The applicant did not request written reasons within 14 days of that notification (s 368D(4) of the Act). There was no denial of natural justice. Grounds two and three have no apparent prospects of success.
6. The Court has also scrutinised the materials before the Tribunal and the Decision to identify error, noting the Court's obligations as outlined in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392 at [58], [77], [100], [112] and [113]. The Court has been unable to identify any apparent error in the reasoning of the Decision or the conduct of the Tribunal.

1. It is not necessary in the interests of justice for the Court to grant an extension of time within which to make an application for judicial review under s 477(2) of the Act.

1. Following the passage of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No 1) Act 2024 (Cth), the name of the second respondent is to be amended to 'Administrative Review Tribunal'. An order will be made amending the name of the second respondent and the title to the proceeding.

1. Costs should follow the event. The Minister sought the costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application for an extension of time in the sum of $4,363.64, which is the scale amount for a contested application concluded at an interlocutory hearing provided for in Sch 2, Pt 3, Div 3 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).
2. The sum claimed is fair and reasonable and will be ordered to be paid by the applicant.

1. The name of the second respondent be amended to 'Administrative Review Tribunal'.
2. The applicant's application for an extension of time within which to seek judicial review is dismissed.
3. The applicant pay the first respondent's costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application for an extension of time, fixed in the sum of $4,363.64.

I certify that the preceding seventy-four (74) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Corbett.