CONSIDERATION
124 In Re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Railway Company [1891] 1 Ch 213 at 247, Fry LJ described the role of the court in applications of this type as follows:
... the Court is bound to ascertain that all the conditions required by the statute have been complied with; it is bound to be satisfied that the proposition was made in good faith; and, further, it must be satisfied that the proposal was at least so far fair and reasonable, as that an intelligent and honest man, who is a member of that class, and acting alone in respect of his interest as such a member, might approve of it. What other circumstances the Court may take into consideration I will not attempt to forecast.
(Citations omitted).
125 In Re Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd (No 2) (2009) 73 ACSR 411; [2009] FCA 864 at [8], Finkelstein J adopted the following statement from Buckley on the Companies Acts (Butterworths, 4th ed, 1981):
In exercising its power of sanction the court will see, first, that the provisions of the statute have been complied with, second, that the class was fairly represented by those who attended the meeting and that the statutory majority are acting bona fide and are not coercing the minority in order to promote interests adverse to those of the class whom they purport to represent, and thirdly, that the arrangement is such as an intelligent and honest man, a member of the class concerned and acting in respect of his interest, might reasonably approve.
The court does not sit merely to see that the majority are acting bona fide and thereupon to register the decision of the meeting, but, at the same time, the court will be slow to differ from the meeting, unless either the class has not been properly consulted, or the meeting has not considered the matter with a view to the interests of the class which it is empowered to bind, or some blot is found in the scheme.
126 The court's task is to:
(1) ensure that all statutory and procedural requirements in relation to s 411 have been observed; and
(2) determine in the exercise of its discretion whether to approve the scheme.
See Re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Railway Company (1981) 1 Ch 213; Re NRMA Ltd (No 1) (2000) 33 ACSR 595; [2000] NSWSC 82 at [41] (Santow J); Re Coles Group Ltd (No 2) (2007) 65 ACSR 494; [2007] VSC 523 at [8] (Robson J).
127 As I have explained above, the various statutory and procedural requirements dealt with at [58] above have been observed.
128 In addition, before approving a scheme, the court will ordinarily require that all conditions precedent to the scheme (other than the court's approval and the lodgement of the court's approval order with ASIC) have been satisfied or waived.
129 The only controversy to be dealt with are the matters raised by ASIC, which go to the court's discretion.
130 The following factors are commonly regarded as informing the court's discretion whether or not to approve a scheme, namely whether:
(1) the shareholders voted in good faith and not for an improper purpose;
(2) the proposal is fair and reasonable so that an intelligent and honest person who was a member of the relevant class, properly informed and acting alone in respect of his or her interest as a member, might approve it;
(3) the scheme proponent has brought to the attention of the court all matters that could be considered relevant to the exercise of the court's discretion;
(4) there has been full and fair disclosure of all information material to the decision whether to vote for or against the scheme;
(5) minority shareholders would be oppressed by the scheme; and
(6) the scheme offends public policy.
See Re Wesfarmers (No 2) [2018] WASC 357 at [14] (Vaughan J), applying Re Seven Network Ltd (No 3) (2010) 267 ALR 583; [2010] FCA 400 at [35]-[40] (Jacobson J).
131 Other than ASIC, no person or entity appeared at the second hearing to oppose the schemes.
132 As is clear from what I have said above, Lionheart and a significant proportion of security holders appeared and advanced submissions in support of the schemes.
133 At the hearing, counsel for ASIC did not suggest that there was any reason not to approve the schemes, other than those for which it contended and which are set out above.
134 Counsel for SMX submitted, and I agree, that there is nothing to suggest that the schemes were proposed other than in good faith; there is nothing to suggest that SMX's security holders voted other than in good faith; and while Mr Goldman's opinion was that the schemes were not fair and not reasonable, the security holders overwhelmingly thought otherwise.
135 I also accept that SMX has brought to the court's attention all matters that could be considered relevant to the exercise of the discretion to approve the schemes.
136 I am satisfied that the scheme booklet contained full disclosure of the potential benefits and disadvantages of the schemes.
137 Further, there is nothing to suggest that any security holder will be oppressed by the schemes.
138 That leaves the public policy and process concerns advanced by ASIC, which, include the fact that Mr Goldman's second supplementary expert report opined that both the schemes were not fair and were not reasonable. As I understand the basis of ASIC's contentions, it is to be taken to contend in effect that considerations (2), (4) and (6), taken together or separately, should weigh (fatally) against the making of orders approving the schemes.
139 As Brooking J (as he then was) said in Phosphate Co-Operative Co of Australian Pty Ltd [1989] VR 665 at 684, "generally speaking, the outcome of an application for approval of a scheme of arrangement is not to be determined by whether the judge finds the expert's report persuasive: whether the report is persuasive is a question for the members".
140 As his Honour also said, however, "if the judge takes the view that the report has a tendency to mislead or confuse, that is another matter".
141 In this case, ASIC submits that parts of the so called "Directors' critique" were "misleading", but it never explained why that was so.
142 It is true that an annexure to ASIC's written submissions purports to set out "ASIC's concerns re expert opinions", but I was not taken to the detail of it and ultimately, having read it carefully, I do not know what to make of it. I therefore put it to one side.
143 In any event, I am not satisfied that any of the material provided to the security holders would have any tendency to mislead.
144 Returning to the principles that guide the exercise of the court's discretion, as Black J said in In the matter of ResApp Health Ltd [2022] NSWSC 1353 at [23], at a second court hearing in relation to a scheme of arrangement "the Court is not bound to approve a scheme merely because it has previously made orders for the convening of meetings and the statutory majorities have been achieved, and will have regard to members' assessment of their interests as manifested in the voting at the scheme meeting, and will recognise that shareholders are generally 'the best judges of whether an arrangement is to their commercial advantage', and will therefore 'be reluctant to make decisions contrary to the views of security holders expressed at meetings'", citing Re Seven Network Ltd (No 3) (2010) 267 ALR 583; [2010] FCA 400 at [31] (Jacobson J); Re Coca-Cola Amatil Ltd [2021] NSWSC 489 at [7] (Black J); Re Vocus Group Ltd [2021] NSWSC 843 at [9] (Black J); Re Tabcorp Holdings Ltd (No 2) [2022] NSWSC 725 at [3] (Black J).
145 That said, it is also the case that the size of the majority approving a scheme is relevant to whether the court should approve it. As Hall J (as his Honour then was) said in Re Westgold Resources Ltd (No 2) [2012] WASC 395 at [41]-[42]:
There have been other cases in which the court has approved schemes of arrangement that were found by an independent expert to be not fair but reasonable: See In the matter of GRD Ltd [2009] FCA 1595 and Re Cytopia Ltd (No 2) [2010] VSC 4. In approving the scheme of arrangement in Re Cytopia Croft J noted that the size of the majority in favour of the scheme permitted the court to infer that the shareholders found the conclusion of the independent expert that the scheme was reasonable, despite being not fair, was persuasive. In the present case, that reservation only applies to the option scheme and that scheme was approved without dissent at the option holders' meeting.
There is no reason to doubt that the results of the meetings represent the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the members and option holders of Westgold. I am satisfied that prior to those meetings occurring the members and option holders received all of the information necessary to make fully informed decisions about their voting intentions. The fact that no members or option holders who were present at the meetings raised any questions or voiced any dissent supports a conclusion that the process was fair and appropriate. Both meetings were also informed of the intention of the company to make application to the court for approval of the share scheme on 4 October 2012 in the event that the resolutions were passed. At the hearing of the application no member or option holder sought to oppose the approval process.
146 In this case, of course, SMX's security holders voted overwhelmingly to approve the schemes.
147 It seems to me that the material before the security holders provided more than sufficient disclosure to enable the security holders to make a sufficiently informed decision.
148 As is clear from what I have set out above, the security holders had before them Mr Goldman's further supplementary report, which set out the advantages and disadvantages of the schemes, and his conclusion about the lack of fairness and reasonableness of them. Those advantages and disadvantages were themselves matters that security holders could sensibly weigh in the balance in deciding what to make of his conclusions. (See [12]-[13] above).
149 They also had before them the so-called "Directors' critique".
150 There is nothing in the assertion - and it was no more than that - that the critique was misleading. It seems to me that having taken advice from Mr Purcell and Dr Rothman, considered it and, as a board, agreed with it, the Directors were bound to convey their view to the security holders. As SMX submitted, "[i]n doing so, the directors were doing what is required under clause 8301(a) of Schedule 8 [of the Corporations Regulations], which requires that an explanatory statement must set out 'in relation to each director of the company... whether the director recommends the acceptance of the Scheme or recommends against acceptance and, in either case, his or her reasons for so recommending'". There is nothing to suggest that the Directors' view that they did not accept the conclusions reached or the approach taken Mr Goldman in relation to several matters was anything other than a bona fide and reasonable one. The reasons for not accepting his conclusions included that the Directors relied on advice, including from Mr Purcell and Dr Rothman, about the schemes and the methodology used by Mr Goldman, including:
(1) the benefits of a listing on NASDAQ (as compared with a listing on ASX), including higher trading volumes, greater liquidity, greater access to capital (including by more varied investment tools than may be available in Australia), the technology orientation of NASDAQ and its reputation as a market with that orientation;
(2) the advantages of those benefits to a larger entity with new capital (i.e. entity created by the merger of Lionheart, Empatan and SMX) and the timeframe to obtain them (which will be faster under the Lion heart transaction than if SMX sought to obtain a NASDAQ listing in the ordinary course);
(3) the method used by Mr Goldman to value a NASDAQ listing;
(4) the relevance of shareholder dilution in determining fairness and reasonableness;
(5) the assumptions and calculations used by Mr Goldman in calculating, and drawing conclusions about, the value of shares in the merged entity.
151 It is unnecessary, and probably undesirable, to say much more about it. It is emphatically not the court's role to second guess the decision - here the overwhelming decision - of the security holders to vote in favour of the schemes, in circumstances where the evidence establishes that they had to disclosed to them, in effect, a concise and clear statement of the pros and cons of the schemes.
152 There is, in those circumstances, nothing in ASIC's contentions that I should not approve the schemes in circumstances where the independent expert expressed his view that they were not fair and were not reasonable, and that no court has ever approved a scheme in the face of such conclusions. That is particularly so here, because, as my exchanges with counsel at the hearing demonstrated, Mr Goldman never explained how, having said in his initial report that the shares in Empatan would have a fair value (at a low estimate) of $3.12, or $2.16 at a redemption rate of 100%, said instead in his further supplementary report that they would instead have a fair value of 11 cents.
153 But in any event, I am satisfied that the proposals put to the security holders were fair and reasonable, so that an intelligent and honest person who was a member of the relevant class, properly informed and acting alone in respect of his or her interest as a member, might approve them; that there has been full and fair disclosure of all information material to the decision whether to vote for or against the schemes; and that the schemes do not offend any consideration of public policy (or "process") contended for by ASIC.
154 I also do not accept ASIC's submission that the security holders had insufficient time to consider the schemes. That point was asserted in written submissions, and only mentioned in passing in oral submissions. For the reasons given by SMX (see [98]-[107] above), the security holders had sufficient time to consider the schemes.
155 It follows from what I have already said that I also do not accept ASIC's submission that the scheme members did not have enough information to enable them to assess the merits of the proposal or that some of that information may have been misleading or deceptive because the reports prepared by Mr Purcell and Dr Rothman did not comply with the Act, the relevant ASIC Regulatory Guides or the Federal Court's Expert Evidence Practice Notes (including the Federal Court's Harmonised Expert Witness Code of Conduct), including for the reasons advanced by counsel for SMX (see [108]-[110] above). The simple fact of the matter is that the Directors of SMX did not relevantly rely on those reports other than to inform themselves, including about the matters I have referred to above contained in the so-called "Directors' critique". They did not provide the reports to the security holders. In those circumstances, there was no need for the type of compliance insisted upon by ASIC.
156 I should also say for the sake of completeness that I adopt, without repeating, the concise and helpful oral submissions from Mr Holmes and Mr Bongiorno set out at [121]-[123] above.
157 I am accordingly satisfied that it is appropriate that the court exercise its jurisdiction to approve the schemes.