The Structured Equity Facility
44 In relation to the second matter, being the further equity funding being sought by CBR and the SPAC, the scheme booklet included a detailed discussion of the anticipated terms of the SEF and its likely impact on CBR shareholders who participate in the scheme. This included a reduction in the merger ratio used to calculate CBR shareholders' entitlement to the scheme consideration. In particular, the Chairman's letter in the scheme booklet included the following information:
… The consideration to be provided by MergeCo to Carbon Revolution Shareholders and SPAC Shareholders is MergeCo Shares. … As a result, Carbon Revolution and the combined SPAC/Merger Sub entity will become subsidiaries of MergeCo (the resulting group being the Combined Group) and the existing Carbon Revolution Shareholders and SPAC Shareholders will jointly own MergeCo, which will be listed on NYSE American. Additional stakeholders may also have ownership interests in MergeCo after Implementation of the Transaction should MergeCo securities be issued to them in connection with funding arrangements for MergeCo as discussed below and in section 8.
…
For the purpose of determining the number of MergeCo Shares received for each Carbon Revolution Share, the Scheme uses an enterprise value of Carbon Revolution of US$200 million (A$298.0 million). Based on Carbon Revolution's cash and debt position as at 31 March 2023 and applicable adjustments, this corresponds to an equity value of US$186.7 million (A$278.2 million) as at 31 March 2023. Taking into account the number of Carbon Revolution Shares expected to be on issue at the Scheme Record Date (being 213,029,945) and the deemed value of MergeCo Shares of US$10 each this will mean that each Carbon Revolution Share is expected to be exchanged for approximately 0.0877 MergeCo Shares …
However, Carbon Revolution is seeking additional equity funding for MergeCo of US$60 million or more, which may take the form of, or include, a Structured Equity Facility (discussed further below). If documents to give effect to this equity funding are entered into prior to Implementation, the SPAC's consent will be required and it is possible that the SPAC only provides its consent on the basis that SPAC Shareholders are not diluted. If this occurs in respect of the proposed Structured Equity Facility, whilst the notional enterprise value of Carbon Revolution will not change, the effective equity value for the purpose of determining the number of MergeCo Shares received for each Carbon Revolution Share will fall as low as US$142.7 million (A$212.5 million) assuming no further redemptions of Class A SPAC Shares (beyond redemptions in connection with the Extension Approval) and depending on the size and final terms of the Structured Equity Facility. Taking into account the number of Carbon Revolution Shares expected to be on issue at the Scheme Record Date (being 213,029,945) and the deemed value of MergeCo Shares of US$10 each this will mean that each Carbon Revolution Share would instead be exchanged for approximately 0.0670 MergeCo Shares.
45 Further details in relation to the proposed SEF were included in the Chairman's letter in the scheme booklet, which included the following statements:
Additional equity funding: Carbon Revolution and the SPAC are seeking further equity funding for the Combined Group in connection with the Transaction … This funding may be obtained (if at all) either before or after Implementation of the Transaction. The funding, if signed prior to Implementation, is subject to the consent of the SPAC under the Scheme Implementation Deed. Whilst the form of equity funding has not yet been determined, one form of equity funding which is being sought would involve the issue of non-convertible SEF Preference Shares and SEF Warrants to raise up to US$100 million (Structured Equity Facility) …
46 It was also stated in the Chairman's letter in the scheme booklet that should a SEF be entered into it was likely to have the following features.
47 First, the SEF preference shares would have a term of up to five years and would be entitled to a fixed rate of dividend between 10% and 15% and a liquidation preference over MergeCo shares.
48 Second, the SEF preference shares were expected to have associated board and/or observer appointment rights, negative control rights over certain corporate matters and positive control rights to determine certain corporate matters, which may be effected through the appointment to the MergeCo board of additional directors constituting a majority of directors.
49 Third, the SEF warrants were expected to have a nominal exercise price and when exercised were expected to convert into such number of MergeCo shares that equals between 15% and 20% of the aggregate number of MergeCo shares on issue at implementation, excluding the number of MergeCo shares received by SPAC shareholders in exchange for their class A SPAC shares. This may give rise to a potential dilutive effect on CBR shareholders.
50 Fourth, the SEF may be dilutive to CBR shareholders only, if the SPAC provides its consent to such equity financing on the condition that it is not dilutive to SPAC shareholders and there is therefore a reduction in the number of MergeCo shares received for each CBR share.
51 The Chairman's letter concluded that:
In the event that agreements in respect of the Structured Equity Facility or any other further funding are signed prior to the Scheme Meeting, Carbon Revolution will issue supplementary disclosure to this Scheme Booklet …
52 The scheme booklet also noted that:
In the event that any agreements in respect of additional equity funding (including any Structured Equity Facility) are signed prior to the Scheme Meeting this will be announced to the ASX and the Carbon Revolution Board will obtain the Independent Expert's confirmation of whether the agreement changes the Independent Expert's opinion that the Scheme is not fair but reasonable and in the best interests of Carbon Revolution Shareholders in the absence of a Superior Proposal. This confirmation will be announced to the ASX in advance of the Scheme Meeting. If the Independent Expert opinion has changed, the matter will be relisted before the Court prior to the Scheme Meeting. Carbon Revolution Shareholders are strongly encouraged to read about any additional equity funding (and the confirmation of whether the Independent Expert's opinion changes) before deciding how to vote at the Scheme Meeting.
53 The scheme booklet further addressed this issue, stating that:
However, if agreements for additional equity funding are executed prior to Implementation and the SPAC provides its consent to this on the basis that SPAC Shareholders are not diluted, this will impact the ratio of MergeCo Shares received per Carbon Revolution Share (ie it will no longer be 0.0877). For example, if a Structured Equity Facility is entered into, the number of MergeCo Shares received per Carbon Revolution Share is likely to vary depending on the final number of SEF Warrants issued in connection with the Structured Equity Facility and the level of redemptions of Class A SPAC Shares. Assuming the SEF Warrants are issued in an amount equal to 17.5% [This is the mid-point of the 15-20% range discussed in section 8.4] of the aggregate number of MergeCo Shares on issue at Implementation (excluding the number of MergeCo Shares received by SPAC Shareholders in exchange for their Class A SPAC Shares) …. it is anticipated that the number of MergeCo Shares to be received per Carbon Revolution Share will be between 0.0670 (assuming no further redemptions of Class A SPAC Shares beyond those received in accordance with the Extension Approval) and 0.0672 (assuming 100% redemptions of Class A SPAC Shares).
54 The potential dilutive effect of the SEF on CBR shareholders was also addressed in detail in the scheme booklet. In particular, in the absence of the SEF, the CBR shareholders will own between 62.34% and 78.83% of MergeCo shares, depending upon the final rates of redemption by SPAC shareholders.
55 This is explained in the scheme booklet as follows:
The proportional ownership of MergeCo Shares on Implementation (as between existing Carbon Revolution Shareholders and SPAC Shareholders and assuming agreements with respect to additional equity funding (eg a proposed Structured Equity Facility) are not entered into prior to Implementation) will largely be a function of the SPAC redemption rate. This is because, whilst the aggregate number of MergeCo Shares to be received by Carbon Revolution Shareholders is fixed, Class A SPAC Shareholders will receive 1 MergeCo Share for each Class A SPAC Share that has not been redeemed at Implementation, and the SPAC Founder Shareholders and DDGN Advisors will receive 1.65 million MergeCo Shares and 3.35 million MergeCo Shares respectively for the 5.3 million Class B SPAC Shares held by the SPAC Founder Shareholders. In addition 15,000 MergeCo Shares will be issued to Yorkville shortly after Implementation pursuant to the commitment fee in connection with the CEF.
56 Similarly, the scheme booklet stated as follows:
… assuming a Structured Equity Facility is entered into, an estimated 4,407,483 SEF Warrants expected to be issued in connection with a Structured Equity Facility concurrently with or following Implementation. [Assumes a Structured Equity Facility is entered into, and SEF Warrants convert into such number of MergeCo Shares that equals to 17.5% of the aggregate number of MergeCo Shares on issue at Implementation (excluding MergeCo Shares received by SPAC Shareholders in exchange for their Class A SPAC Shares)… This is the mid-point of the range discussed in section 8.4.] Should a Structured Equity Facility be entered into, given the expected nominal exercise price of the SEF Warrants, these may be converted into the equivalent number of MergeCo Shares for nominal consideration and will substantially dilute existing MergeCo Shareholders. Furthermore, given entry into a Structured Equity Facility prior to Implementation will require the consent of the SPAC, which may only be provided on the basis that the facility does not dilute SPAC Shareholders, entry into this facility may result in a reduction in the merger ratio of 0.0877 for CBR shareholders to as low as 0.0670 which will have an effective dilutionary impact on Carbon Revolution Shareholders. Similar impacts may arise should the proposed additional equity funding take a different form to a Structured Equity Facility.
57 Finally, the scheme booklet included a table which set out the potential maximum impact on ownership of MergeCo shares and the maximum dilution for CBR shareholders arising from the additional securities and arraignments disclosed, including the proposed SEF. The table disclosed that depending on the rate of redemptions of class A SPAC shares, the CBR shareholders will own between 30.97% and 36.74% of MergeCo shares, and the SEF warrants would represent between 9.57% and 11.17% of MergeCo shares. These figures assume that SEF warrants convert into such number of MergeCo shares that equals to 17.5% of the aggregate number of MergeCo shares on issue at implementation, excluding MergeCo shares received by SPAC shareholders in exchange for their class A SPAC shares. This is the midpoint of the range that I discussed earlier of between 15% and 20%.
58 On 22 September 2023, CBR announced to the ASX that the SEF had been signed (SEF ASX announcement), which announcement contained a detailed explanation of the key features of the SEF, including the impact upon the merger ratio used to calculate the scheme consideration, and the dilution of CBR shareholders' interests in MergeCo as a result of the SEF. The draft SSB also contains detailed disclosure in relation to these matters.
59 The key features of the SEF as disclosed in the SEF ASX announcement and the draft SSB are consistent with the anticipated key features disclosed in the scheme booklet. In particular, the SEF ASX announcement and the draft SSB disclose the following key features of the SEF.
60 MergeCo will issue class A preferred shares in MergeCo and warrant(s) to OIC in exchange for initial gross proceeds of US$35 million, with further proceeds to be available in tranches, comprising up to US$35 million that will be deposited by OIC in an escrow account, which funds are subject to release upon satisfaction of further conditions and up to a further US$40 million in aggregate proceeds upon satisfaction of further conditions.
61 The preferred shares have a term of up to five years and are entitled to a fixed rate of dividend of 12% per annum. This is consistent with the statements in the Chairman's letter and in the scheme booklet, which stated that the preferred shares were expected to have a term of up to 5 years and be entitled to a fixed rate of dividend of between 10% and 15%.
62 The preferred shares will result in OIC being provided with substantial positive and negative control rights in respect of MergeCo, including the right to appoint up to 2 directors of the MergeCo board, and a requirement to obtain OIC's prior written approval on certain corporate matters. This is consistent with the matters disclosed in the Chairman's letter and in the scheme booklet, which stated that the preferred shares are expected to have associated board and/or observer appointment rights, negative control rights over certain corporate matters and positive control rights.
63 The SEF warrant(s) will have an exercise price of US$0.01 per MergeCo share and will entitle OIC to be issued up to 19.99% of the MergeCo shares on issue on implementation of the scheme on a fully diluted basis. This is within the expected range contemplated in the scheme booklet where it was stated that, when exercised, the SEF warrant(s) may convert into such number of MergeCo shares that equals between 15% and 20% of the aggregate number of MergeCo shares on issue at implementation.
64 As a result of the funding expected to be provided under the SEF, CBR has agreed to revise the merger ratio with the SPAC from 0.0877 MergeCo shares per CBR share to between 0.0640 and 0.0643 MergeCo shares per CBR share, depending upon the redemption rate of class A SPAC shares. As noted in the SEF ASX announcement and the draft SSB, this is because SPAC has provided its consent under the scheme implementation deed to MergeCo entering into the SEF on the condition that it was not dilutive to SPAC shareholders, resulting in a reduction in the number of MergeCo shares received for each CBR share. The reduction in the agreed ratio to between 0.0640 and 0.0643 MergeCo shares as a result of the signed SEF is slightly lower than the ratio of 0.0670 to 0.0672 MergeCo shares foreshadowed in the scheme booklet. This is because the scheme booklet disclosed that the warrant(s) proposed to be issued under the SEF would potentially amount to 15 to 20% of the fully diluted issued capital of MergeCo at implementation of the transaction subject to certain exceptions, and the possible revised merger ratio disclosed in the scheme booklet took the midpoint of this range and assumed that the warrant(s) representing 17.5% of the issued capital of MergeCo would be issued. Instead, the SEF warrant(s) to be issued under the signed SEF will represent 19.99% of the fully diluted issued capital of MergeCo subject to exceptions. As a result, the revised merger ratio will be lower than the potential merger ratios disclosed in the scheme booklet.
65 The SEF ASX announcement and the draft SSB sets out tables which address the capital structure of the combined group on implementation. Now the scheme booklet included a table which set out the potential maximum impact on ownership of MergeCo shares, and the maximum dilution for CBR shareholders, arising from the additional securities and arrangements disclosed including the proposed SEF. The table disclosed that depending on the rate of redemptions of class A SPAC shares, the CBR shareholders will own between 30.97% and 36.74% of MergeCo shares, and the SEF warrant(s) would represent between 9.57% and 11.17% of MergeCo shares. However, these figures assumed that the SEF warrant(s) would convert into such number of MergeCo shares that equals 17.5% of the aggregate number of MergeCo shares on issue at implementation. Given that the agreements in relation to the SEF provide for the SEF warrant(s) to convert into 19.99% of the aggregate number of MergeCo shares on issue at implementation, the CBR shareholders will in aggregate own slightly less than between 30.97% and 36.74% of MergeCo shares. In particular, they will own between 29.23% and 34.73%, as explained in the tables in the SEF ASX announcement and the draft SSB.
66 Now from what I have just said, it should be obvious that there is a need for supplementary disclosure of such matters.