The nature of the power
79 What is decisive in the process of statutory construction is the nature of the power in question, not the character of the proceeding which attends its exercise: Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564 at 576 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
80 As Gyles J observed in Ryan at [63], there is a "plethora" of statutory provisions which do not involve a hearing but which result in the compulsory acquisition of information and documents that can be used in subsequent proceedings by a regulatory authority. Examples include notices under s 155 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 and similar provisions in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) as well as search warrants issued under Part 1AA, Div 2 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).
81 Counsel for the Receivers provided the Court with a helpful aide memoire of the large number of decisions which have considered the question of whether an obligation of procedural fairness is to be implied in an investigative context. It is not necessary to refer to all of the cases but a brief review of them emphasises the importance of the need to have regard to the nature of the power and the way in which it may be thought to affect a person's rights or interests.
82 In Hare v Gladwin (1988) 82 ALR 307, a question arose as to whether a provision of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth), which empowered an officer of the Electoral Commission to issue a notice requiring production of documents where the officers had reason to believe that a person was capable of producing documents relating to a possible contravention of the Act, was subject to an obligation of natural justice.
83 In that case Sheppard J found that the officer was not required to give the person an opportunity to make submissions about whether the notice should be issued, or the form of it. His Honour observed at 330 that the officer was acting in an investigatory capacity only and that:
(n)othing that she could do could affect any right or interest which he has or expose him, except by the operation of the Act itself, to conviction…
84 In Ainsworth, the High Court characterised the power in question as investigatory but held that it was subject to an obligation of procedural fairness. The power in that case was conferred on the Criminal Justice Commission under the Criminal Justice Act 1989 (Qld) to prepare a report to be tabled in Parliament containing recommendations about persons involved in the poker machine industry. The Commission exercised the power and tabled a report which contained adverse recommendations about certain persons.
85 The plurality in Ainsworth (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) described the process which led to the reports as one of inquiry and investigation. They observed at 576 that not every inquiry or investigation has to be conducted in a manner that ensures procedural fairness. Their Honours went on at 576-579 to explain why the power was conditioned upon such principles in that case.
86 Their Honours referred at 576 to the principle stated in Annetts v McCann that a duty of procedural fairness ordinarily arises where the power is one which may destroy, defeat or prejudice a person's rights or interests. They emphasised, as the decisive consideration, the nature of the power.
87 The nature of the power in Ainsworth was characterised by the plurality at 578-579 as the final step of the Commission in the discharge of its functions which were brought into play because of its decision to investigate and report on the industry. What was decisive was that the nature of the power adversely affected the reputation of the persons who were the subject of the report.
88 Their Honours distinguished the stages in the investigative process and considered the nature of the functions reposed in the Commission and in Parliament. They observed that there may be an opportunity for Parliament to redress any unfairness:
But, if so, that cannot alter the fact that their [the persons'] reputation was blackened in circumstances in which the Commission should have given, but did not give, them an opportunity to put their side of the matter.
89 In May v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 92 FCR 152, a Full Court of the Federal Court dealt with the question of whether the power conferred on the Court under s 264(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act to require production of information, and to attend to give evidence concerning the person's income, was subject to an obligation of procedural fairness.
90 Their Honours (Branson, Finn and Kenny JJ) held that the power was not so conditioned. They said at [36] that if an obligation of procedural fairness was to be imposed, notwithstanding the obvious practical difficulties, it was one for Parliament, not the courts. They also endorsed at [37] the decisions of a number of single judges of the Court who held that the obligation of procedural fairness does not apply to a decision to issue a notice under s 264(1) or equivalent statutory provisions.
91 One of the single judge decisions which was endorsed by the Full Court was Minosea Pty Ltd v Australian Securities Commission (1994) 14 ACSR 642. There, the power was conferred on the Australian Securities Commission to issue a notice to a person under s 33 of the Australian Securities Commission Act 1989 (Cth), to produce books and records in relation to an investigation by the Commission of a suspected contravention of the Corporations Law.
92 In refusing relief in that case, Lindgren J observed at 651 that:
… notices of the kind in issue in this case are given at a fact gathering stage, which is conceptually remote from the taking of any decision by the ASC on the commencement of proceedings…
93 In Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408 the High Court considered the question of whether a power conferred on a delegate to disclose the transcripts of an examination conducted by the Commission under s 19 of the Australian Securities Commission Act 1989 was subject to an obligation of procedural fairness. The delegate exercised a power to authorise disclosure of transcripts conducted in private examinations to a Royal Commission enquiring into the collapse of a large group of corporations.
94 The majority of the Court (Brennan, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) held that before authorising the Royal Commission to use the transcripts, the delegate was required to give the examinee an opportunity to be heard in opposition to that course. In coming to that view, each of the Justices referred to the interests of the examinee in preserving the confidentiality of the transcript: see at 430 per Brennan J; at 437 per Dawson J; at 462 per Gaudron J; at 472 per Mc Hugh J.
95 The nature of the power was expressed quite clearly by McHugh J at 473 as follows:-
…the decisions to release the information to the Royal Commission were in themselves decisions that affected the appellant's interests in a manner that attracts the protection of procedural fairness.
96 His Honour also drew attention at 473 to the statement made in Ainsworth at 578 that where a decision-making process involves different stages before a final decision is made, the requirements of natural justice are satisfied if the process, viewed in its entirety, accords procedural fairness. However, he went on to observe that, as in Ainsworth, the two stages did not form part of the same decision-making process.
97 The decision in Johns was distinguished by a Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Cornall v AB (A Solicitor) [1995] 1 VR 372. The case was concerned with the power of the Law Institute to investigate alleged misconduct by solicitors and to refer the matter to the Solicitors' Board if "of opinion that there appears to have been misconduct".
98 The Full Court (Ormiston, Coldrey and O'Bryan JJ) was of the view, at 396-397 that the decision-maker's investigative function was not to reach conclusions as to guilt or innocence but to determine whether there was an arguable case of sufficient strength to justify the imposition of sanctions by the disciplinary body. Their Honours recognised the possible reputational consequences of the decision to refer the matter to the Board but considered that, by contrast with the statutory regimes in Ainsworth and Johns, the decision-making stages formed part of an entire process which entailed procedural fairness as the second stage.
99 More recently, in Byrne v Marles (2008) 19 VR 612, the Court of Appeal of Victoria cast doubt upon the reasoning in Cornall, before ultimately distinguishing it on the ground that the statutory regime had been altered in 2004.
100 Nettle JA (with whom Dodds-Streeton JA and Coghlan AJA agreed) said at [81] that Annetts, Ainsworth and Johns are not "special cases". Rather, they stand as authority expressed in terms of general application. He continued by stating that its not clear why the solicitor in Cornall was any less affected by the actions of the Secretary of the Law Institute than was Mr Johns affected by the decision of the delegate in ASIC.
101 Three propositions may be drawn from a review of these authorities. First, not every power of investigation attracts a duty of procedural fairness. Second, whilst it may be true that no bright lines can be drawn, a statutory power that is purely investigative, such as the power of the Commissioner of Taxation to require production of documents or to attend to give evidence about the person's income, are less likely to be attended by an obligation to accord procedural fairness. This is particularly so where the investigative function does not include a power to make findings or recommendations.
102 The third, and most fundamental proposition, is that the overriding question will always be whether the exercise of the investigative power carries with it the capacity to destroy or prejudice the rights or interests of the person affected by the exercise of the power. That was why the exercise of the power by the Commission in Ainsworth and by the delegate in Johns were each attended by an obligation of procedural fairness. In those cases there was inevitable public attention drawn to matters that were otherwise protected by statutory obligations of confidence.