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Cited legislation

3 cited instruments linked from this judgment.

This was not her first pro bono referral. On 9 March 2026, Price AJA had granted her a referral for legal assistance in a different proceeding, limited to legal advice. That earlier referral meant the requirement in r 7.36(2A) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR) was engaged. For a further referral, the Court had to be satisfied that “special reasons” justified it (paragraph 2).

The proposed appeal concerned judgments in proceedings in which Sanjiv sought damages arising from alleged breaches by Shah of orders made in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (paragraph 3). Her summons seeking leave to appeal and draft notice of appeal raised 12 grounds and sought to set aside judgments delivered on 6 March 2026 and 30 March 2026 (paragraph 4). Those underlying proceedings are identified in the judgment as Sanjiv v Shah [2026] NSWSC 139 and Sanjiv v Shah (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 343.

Sanjiv relied on two affidavits. In her later affidavit, she said she wanted limited pro bono assistance to avoid wasting time if the matter was hopeless, and described this as a reason for another referral in the interests of justice (paragraph 6). In oral submissions, she confirmed that she also sought representation (paragraph 7). She pointed to the complexity and difficulty of the appeal grounds and her financial circumstances, which prevented her from affording assistance outside the pro bono scheme (paragraph 8).

The respondent did not appear and did not actively oppose or consent to the application (paragraph 5). The Court granted a referral for advice about the merits of the appeal. It did not grant representation at this stage (paragraphs 10–12).

Why the court decided this way

The decision turned on the threshold for a further referral and on the scope of assistance that the circumstances justified. The Court stated that, because a previous referral had been granted, r 7.36(2A) required it to be satisfied that special reasons justified further pro bono assistance (paragraph 2).

Price AJA identified two circumstances relied on by the applicant: the complexity and difficulty of the appeal grounds, and her financial means (paragraph 8). The reasons also emphasised the practical value of advice on the merits. In the Court’s view, such advice would help the applicant assess whether there were reasonable prospects in her application for leave to appeal and in the 12 grounds identified. It could also help her understand defects in her case and consider whether there was any utility in continuing, potentially avoiding unnecessary and futile litigation (paragraph 9).

Those considerations supported advice, but did not lead the Court to grant representation immediately. The applicant had asked for both, but Price AJA said that a grant of representation would depend on advice about the merits of the appeal (paragraph 10). The order therefore drew a boundary between assessing the appeal and representing the applicant in it.

The Court’s conclusion was expressly tied to the “limited nature” of the assistance being granted, the complexity of the grounds, and the applicant’s lack of financial means (paragraph 11). It found special reasons for a further referral and considered a referral confined to legal advice to be in the interests of justice. The operative order sent the applicant to the Court of Appeal Registrar for referral to a barrister or solicitor on the Pro Bono Panel for advice concerning the merits of her appeal (paragraph 12).

This is a procedural ruling about access to limited pro bono assistance. It does not decide whether the proposed appeal has merit, whether leave to appeal should be granted, or whether any of the 12 grounds would succeed. The judgment explains that advice should enable an assessment of those matters; it does not itself carry out that assessment.

Before and after state of the law

The judgment applies, rather than purports to change, the rules governing further pro bono referrals. It records that r 7.36(2A) UCPR required “special reasons” where an applicant sought another referral after receiving one previously (paragraph 2). The decision does not set out the text of the rule or formulate a comprehensive test for special reasons. Its contribution on the material provided is an example of how the Court applied that threshold to the circumstances before it.

The Court treated the combination of complex appeal grounds, limited financial means, and the usefulness of merits advice as sufficient in this application (paragraphs 8–11). It also treated the requested assistance as divisible: advice could be referred at this point, while representation was not granted before merits advice had been obtained (paragraph 10). The order was therefore narrow and staged.

The judgment does not state that any one of those circumstances will necessarily amount to special reasons in another case. Nor does it say that every applicant who is self-represented or financially unable to retain a lawyer qualifies for a referral. Its reasoning connects the circumstances identified to the particular form of assistance granted.

The judgment also mentions r 7.37 UCPR when stating that a limited referral for merits advice was appropriate and in the interests of justice (paragraph 11). It does not reproduce or comprehensively explain that rule. The statutory references include the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW), but the Court did not decide the effect of that Act on this application.

As to the “before and after” position, the source supports a cautious description: the existing special-reasons requirement remained the governing threshold, and this decision applied it to grant a further referral for advice only. The judgment does not announce a broader change in the law.

Key passages with plain-English translation

At paragraph 2, Price AJA stated that, after the earlier referral, the Court had to be satisfied that “special reasons” justified a further referral. In plain English, the applicant could not obtain another referral merely by repeating the request. The Court had to be persuaded there was a reason warranting further assistance.

At paragraph 9, the Court said there was “no question” that legal advice on the appeal’s merits would benefit both the applicant and the Court. It explained that advice could help the applicant assess whether there were reasonable prospects, identify defects, and consider whether continuing had any utility. This explains the value the Court saw in advice; it is not a finding that the appeal was hopeless or had reasonable prospects.

At paragraph 10, the Court declined to grant representation at that stage and made any such grant dependent on advice about the merits. In plain English, the referral was for an initial assessment, not for a lawyer to take over or conduct the appeal.

At paragraph 11, the Court linked its special-reasons finding to the limited nature of the assistance, the complexity of the grounds, and the applicant’s lack of financial means. The wording makes clear that the reasons were assessed together in the circumstances of this application.

There was also a separate leave question. Paragraph 5 notes that an order made by Ierace J under the Vexatious Proceedings Act appeared to constrain the applicant from instituting proceedings against the respondent without leave. Price AJA proceeded, without deciding, on the basis that leave was not required for the present proceeding, referring to Potier v Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales [2014] NSWCA 256 at [2]. This is not a final ruling on the leave question.

What fact patterns trigger this precedent

The decision is most directly relevant to a request for a further pro bono referral by a person who has already received an earlier referral. The judgment identifies that prior referral as the reason the special-reasons requirement in r 7.36(2A) was engaged (paragraph 2).

Its facts also included a proposed appeal with 12 grounds, the applicant’s stated financial inability to afford assistance outside the scheme, and a request for both advice and representation (paragraphs 4, 7–8). The Court considered merits advice useful before the appeal proceeded further, particularly because it could help the applicant evaluate the case and avoid unnecessary litigation (paragraph 9). Those features informed the result, but the judgment does not identify them as a closed or exhaustive list.

The decision may therefore be useful when considering a similar procedural request in which the applicant seeks repeat assistance and the requested assistance can be limited to advice. Its reasoning supports distinguishing the need for an initial merits assessment from a request for representation. It does not establish that a further referral is automatic whenever an appeal is complex, a party lacks funds, or the party is self-represented.

The ruling should also be kept separate from the merits of the appeal and the question of leave under the Vexatious Proceedings Act. It did not resolve either matter. The referral was only for advice about the appeal’s merits, and the leave issue was expressly left undecided (paragraphs 5, 10–12).

How later courts have treated it

The judgment supplied here contains no later judicial treatment of Sanjiv v Shah [2026] NSWCA 151. It was delivered on 27 July 2026, and the provided text does not identify any subsequent decision applying, following, distinguishing, or otherwise discussing it. No conclusion about its later treatment can therefore be drawn from this source.

The cases listed in the judgment are authorities or proceedings referred to in the decision, not later treatment of this decision. Potier is mentioned in connection with the unresolved leave question (paragraph 5). Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2026] NSWCA 25 is identified as the earlier pro bono referral (paragraph 2). The two NSWSC decisions are identified as the judgments challenged by the proposed appeal (paragraphs 3–4). The judgment does not describe any of those cases as later consideration of the present ruling.

Still-open questions

Several matters remain unresolved on the face of the judgment. First, the Court did not assess the merits of the proposed appeal or determine whether leave to appeal should be granted. The referral was made so the applicant could obtain advice about those questions (paragraph 9).

Second, the Court did not grant representation. It said any such grant would depend on advice about the merits (paragraph 10). The judgment does not state what further application, if any, might be made after that advice, or what considerations would govern it.

Third, the question whether leave under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) was required remained undecided. The Court proceeded on an assumed basis for the present application, expressly “without deciding” the point (paragraph 5). The judgment therefore should not be read as resolving the effect of Order 3 made by Ierace J in other circumstances.

Finally, the decision does not provide an exhaustive account of “special reasons” under r 7.36(2A), nor does it detail the full operation of rr 7.36 and 7.37. It records the threshold and explains why the circumstances here satisfied it for a referral limited to advice. Any broader proposition about other applicants, other kinds of assistance, or the application of the rules would go beyond what this judgment says.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.