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[2026] NSWSC 139
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-03-06
Ierace J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Sanjiv v Shah [2026] NSWSC 139
Hearing dates: 27 November 2025
Decision date: 06 March 2026
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Ierace J
Decision: (1) Pursuant to the defendant’s motion filed on 8 July 2025, the statement of claim filed by the plaintiff on 23 April 2025, is dismissed;
(2) The plaintiff’s two notices of motion, filed on 26 September 2025 and 20 October 2025, are dismissed;
(3) As to the defendant’s motion filed on 2 September 2025, the Court orders that pursuant to s 8(7)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW), Rekha Sanjiv is prohibited from instituting proceedings in her own name or through or in the name of SRI Services Superannuation Fund or any other entity controlled by the plaintiff, in New South Wales, against Sanjiv Shah other than with leave of an appropriate court under that Act; and
(4) The plaintiff is to pay the costs of the four notices of motion.
Catchwords: CIVIL PROCEDURE — Parties — Vexatious litigants — Declaration of — Orders under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW)
CIVIL PROCEDURE — Summary disposal — Dismissal of proceedings — Frivolous or vexatious proceedings — UCPR r 13.4(1)(c)
Legislation Cited: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 79, 102Q(1)
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth)
Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 67
Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW), ss 8(1) 8(4)(d), 8(7)(a), 8(7)(b)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, rr 13.4(1)(c), 14.28, r 19.5(2), 42.21(1)(b), 42.21(1)(f)
Cases Cited: Attorney General for NSW v Singh [2024] NSWSC 449
Re Attorney-General (Cth); Ex parte Skyring (1996) 70 ALJR 321; [1996] HCA 4
Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd (No 2) [2025] NSWSC 908
Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2024] NSWSC 1675
Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 1422
Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 528
Sanjiv v Shah [2025] FedCFamC2F 647
Shah v Sanjiv [2014] NSWSC 1535
Uttar & Rajendra (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2F 89
Uttar & Rajendra [2023] FedCFamC2F 1609
Uttar & Rajendra [2024] FedCFamC1A 46
Uttar [2025] FedCFamC1A 21
Vito Zepinic v Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited; Nina Zepinic v Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited [2018] NSWCA 317
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Rekha Sanjiv (Plaintiff)
Sanjiv Shah (Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
In person (Plaintiff)
E Rusiti (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Arch Law (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2025/157940
HIS HONOUR: This is the determination of four notices of motion. Two were filed by the defendant to a statement of claim and the other two by the plaintiff. The defendant and plaintiff were formerly, respectively, husband and wife, having separated on 1 July 2014. The plaintiff commenced proceedings under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (the Family Law Act) in the Family Court of Australia (the FCA), as it then was, on 16 October 2014 and filed a statement of claim in this Court on 23 April 2025 against the defendant, seeking damages in negligence for alleged breaches of orders made in the FCA in 2019 and 2020.
The defendant’s first notice of motion, filed on 8 July 2025, seeks orders that the statement of claim be dismissed, estopped from proceeding without leave of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (the FCFCOA), permanently stayed or subject to a security for costs order. In his second notice of motion, filed on 2 September 2025, he seeks orders that the statement of claim is a vexatious proceeding and that the plaintiff be prohibited from instituting proceedings against the defendant pursuant to ss 7(b), 8(1) and 8(4)(d) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) (the VP Act).
In her first notice of motion filed on 26 September 2025, the plaintiff sought a referral to the Pro Bono Panel and leave to file an amended statement of claim (ASOC). On 3 October 2025, Fagan J dismissed the referral application because the statement of claim did not disclose a justiciable cause of action and was doomed to fail. In her second notice of motion, filed on 20 October 2025, the plaintiff again seeks a referral to the Pro Bono Panel and leave to file a second ASOC. Subsequently the plaintiff filed an affidavit that had attached to it a third ASOC, without a notice of motion.
I have determined to dismiss the plaintiff’s statement of claim and refuse leave to file any of her proposed ASOCs and her further application for a pro bono referral. I also make a vexatious proceedings order against the plaintiff in respect of any further proceedings she may seek to commence, directly or indirectly, against the defendant and an order for costs in favour of the defendant. What follows is my reasoning for these orders.
To better understand the substance of the issues raised by the four notices of motion, it is necessary to briefly trace the litigation between the parties in this Court, in 2014 and again in 2025, and in the FCA (and its continuing successor, the FCFCOA) from 1 September 2021) between 2015 and 2025, which I shall refer to as the family law proceedings.
From 2023, the plaintiff also commenced various proceedings in this Court against a firm who were her legal representatives in the family law proceedings in 2018-19 and again briefly in 2022. The defendant relies upon some judgments in these proceedings to demonstrate that the plaintiff comes within the statutory definition of a vexatious person. The history of those proceedings is outlined, although ultimately, I determined to disregard that evidence.
“29 … It is the court better placed to decide whether the appointment of trustees for sale of the property would be in the interests of both parties to the marriage as the plaintiff submits, or whether for any reasons that the defendant might advance, such as those referred to by her in her affidavit to the effect that she seeks to retain the property, the court should not force a sale.
30 For these reasons I order that the summons be dismissed.”
In this summary of the family law proceedings (and only in that part of the judgment) I will refer to the parties by their previously-married status, that is, the wife and the husband, which is how they were identified in those proceedings.
On 12 February 2015, consent orders were made whereby the husband was to pay maintenance to the wife (the 2015 maintenance orders).
Orders as to the division of the property of the marriage were made by consent on 30 April 2019 (the 30 April 2019 consent orders). At the time, the wife was the sole registered proprietor and occupant of the Epping property. The orders required the wife to organise to have listed the property for sale by blind tender within 30 days. She did not do so.
On 5 February 2020, the FCA made orders appointing the husband as the sole trustee for the sale of the property, and his solicitors to act on his behalf in relation to the sale. The wife was ordered to allow the husband unfettered access to the property to prepare the house and garden for inspection by prospective buyers. The sum of $5,000 was to be deducted from the wife’s share of the sale proceeds to pay the husband for the costs of the application (the 5 February 2020 orders).
The husband continued with the engagement of real estate agents who the wife had (belatedly) engaged. They conducted a tender process which led to a sale being negotiated for $3 million with a 2-year deferred settlement. Contracts for sale were exchanged on 1 April 2020, and settlement was to take place on 1 April 2022.
On 17 April 2020, the wife lodged a caveat on the title of the Epping property and, according to affidavit evidence by the husband’s solicitor, refused to vacate the property before settlement. The husband applied for enforcement and a variation of the 30 April 2019 consent orders and the wife filed an application that the husband be dealt with for contempt. Both applications were heard together in the FCFCOA by Beckhouse J. On 5 December 2023, Beckhouse J dismissed the wife’s contempt application and the following day made orders to enforce and vary the 30 April 2019 consent orders (the 6 December 2023 orders): Uttar & Rajendra [2023] FedCFamC2F 1609.
In her judgment, [1] her Honour outlined the history of the matter from the wife’s filing of the caveat on 17 April 2020, leading up to the hearing, referring to the Epping property as the Suburb C property. The reference to Arch Law is to the firm of solicitors representing the husband:
“27 In early 2020, the wife lodged a caveat against the title of the Suburb C property.
28 The wife failed to vacate the Suburb C property in time for settlement of the sale to occur. Arising from her failure to comply, in mid-2022, the husband filed an Enforcement Application seeking the issuing of a Warrant for Possession of that property. That Application was heard in mid-2022 and a Warrant for Possession issued in the event that the wife failed to vacate the Suburb C property within a further seven days … .
29 A Notice of Intended Execution Warrant for Possession was served on the wife by the Sheriff, but she continued to refuse to vacate the Suburb C property. The Warrant for Possession was executed by the Sheriff in mid-2022 and the wife forcibly removed from the Suburb C property.
30 The purchaser refused to settle on its purchase of the Suburb C property, arguing that the property was not being handed over with vacant possession in accordance with the contract for sale. The husband contends that expenses totalling $12,122 were incurred in assisting the wife to remove her belongings from the Suburb C property, in removing rubbish, cleaning, and otherwise bringing the property up to the standard required to satisfy the vendor’s obligations to deliver vacant possession, as was required by the contract for sale.
31 The husband contends that settlement on the Suburb C property was further frustrated because the wife refused to apply for and obtain a foreign resident capital gains withholding clearance certificate, as requested of her by the husband’s solicitor in early 2022. He argues that this too caused an unnecessary increase in conveyancing costs.
32 Settlement of the sale of the Suburb C property ultimately occurred in mid-2022, approximately three and a half months after the due date of settlement, which was early 2022.
33 From the proceeds of sale, the following payments were made:
(a) $1,790,125.18 to the wife;
(b) $900,000 to the husband; and
(c) $233,331.73 was held in trust by Arch Law.
34 Delays were then occasioned in registering the transfer of the Suburb C property. The husband says, in his capacity as trustee for the sale of the Suburb C property, he has incurred conveyancing costs and disbursements of $27,502.67 in excess of what the husband’s solicitor considered to be the reasonable estimate of ordinary conveyancing costs and disbursements of $4,500.
35 The husband alleges that the wife refused to withdraw the caveat she had registered on the title of the Suburb C property, causing him, in late 2022, to file an Application in a Proceeding seeking orders that a Registrar of the Court sign a Withdrawal of Caveat on behalf of the wife. That Application was heard and a s 106A Order made in late 2022, with the husband’s costs reserved [the 30 November 2022 orders].
36 The husband further alleges that on 5 October 2022, the wife seeks and is granted an adjournment in reliance upon what appeared to be a forged letter, purporting to be from and on the letterhead of the wife’s former solicitors, J Lawyers.
37 The transfer of the title of the Suburb C property from the vendor to the purchaser was not registered by the New South Wales Land Registry Services until mid-2023. These delays arose from:
(a) Difficulties in obtaining acceptance by the New South Wales Land Registry Services of the power of the Court appointed trustee for sale to execute or effect a transfer.
(b) Delay processing the withdrawal of the wife’s caveat signed by the Registrar.
38 On 21 August 2023, the wife filed an Application in a Proceeding that was rejected. When the matter came before his Honour, Deputy Chief Judge McClelland on 25 August 2023, he observed that the wife did not have a current Application before the Court. The husband’s Enforcement Application was listed for hearing before me, and trial directions were made.
39 On 11 September 2023, the wife filed a Contempt Application. The husband argues that she has not proceeded with the correct Application, and rather should have filed an application to enforce orders.
40 On 21 September 2023, the wife says she sent an email to the purchaser of the Suburb C property advising that she was seeking to have the contract for sale declared void. She has filed no Response or Application wherein such orders are sought.
41 Now that the Suburb C property has been sold and the transfer registered, the parties are before the Court to bring all outstanding matters between them to an end. Practically, the remaining issue for determination is how the sum of $203,670.75 held in trust by Arch Law should be divided between the parties, in accordance with the Final Property Orders, or, having regard to all that has transpired since, should they be varied, and if so, how?”
Beckhouse J varied the 30 April 2019 consent orders by adjusting the portion of the proceeds of sale of the Epping property held on trust to be paid to the husband. On 8 December 2023, the wife filed a notice of appeal against the orders made by Beckhouse J. On 22 May 2024, Christie J dismissed the appeal with costs (the 22 May 2024 orders): Uttar & Rajendra (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2F 89.
On 18 January 2024 (while the appeal against the orders made by Beckhouse J was on foot), the wife filed an application for leave to appeal out of time against the 5 February 2020 orders. On 19 February 2024, the application for an extension of time was refused, with costs, by Appeal Judicial Registrar Cameron (AJR Cameron) (the 19 February 2024 orders). On 8 March 2024, the wife filed an application for judicial review of AJR Cameron’s decision. On 28 March 2024, that application was dismissed by Austin J with costs (the 28 March 2024 orders): Uttar & Rajendra [2024] FedCFamC1A 46.
On 28 May 2024, the wife filed an enforcement application concerning the 30 April 2019 consent orders, as varied by Beckhouse J in the 6 December 2023 orders, submitting that the husband had not complied with various provisions in each of them. The application came before Neville J for hearing, who noted at [3]:
“The husband resists the Enforcement Application, contending that an issue estoppel arises or, in the alternative, that the various orders have, in fact, been fully satisfied but for an underpayment of $38,179.10 which arose from a double counting error. He concedes interest is payable on that sum. He seeks, however, that those funds be applied to satisfy a number of costs orders made against the wife in his favour, in earlier proceedings. The husband otherwise seeks that a harmful proceedings order be made against the wife. He also seeks an order that the wife pay his costs of the Enforcement Application.”
“5. Pursuant to s 102QAC(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘the Act’), REKHA SANJIV is prohibited from instituting proceedings under the Act against SANJIV SURYAKAN SHAH without the leave of the Court under s 102QAG of the Act.
- Pursuant to s 102QAC(7) of the Act, in the event that REKHA SANJIV makes an application under s 102QAE of the Act for leave to institute proceedings against SANJIV SURYAKAN SHAH, SANJIV SURYAKAN SHAH shall be notified that:
(a) an application has been made; and/or
(b) if the application is dismissed – that the application has been dismissed.”
On the same date, Neville J made further orders, granting leave to each party to provide a copy of her Honour’s orders and reasons for judgment to “any Commonwealth or State Court or Tribunal before which there are proceedings between the Applicant and the Respondent”, noting that any dispute between the parties as to whether the reasons for judgment should be received is a matter for the relevant judicial officer.
On 2 July 2025, the wife filed a notice of appeal against the 4 June 2025 orders, which was dismissed by Schonell J on 17 July 2025: Uttar [2025] FedCFamC1A 21. His Honour found that the wife’s notice of appeal was vexatious as defined in s 102Q(1) of the Family Law Act, because it was devoid of merit and had no reasonable prospects of success, and dismissed the application as a result.
The statement of claim seeks damages arising from the defendant’s application to be appointed the trustee for sale of the Epping property (the 5 February 2020 orders) and damages in negligence for breaches of duties of care owed to her by the defendant to exercise reasonable care and skill in relation to the execution of the 30 April 2019 consent orders. The plaintiff pleaded five particulars of the claim in negligence identifying specific clauses of the 30 April 2019 consent orders which the defendant was said to have breached, each resulting in the plaintiff suffering loss and damage, which concerned the following: the manner of acceptance of the highest offer; the maintenance of a line of credit; the disbursement of sale proceeds; non-compliance with two of the 30 April 2019 consent orders concerning costs; a payment to a superannuation fund; and the preparation of the contract of sale of the Epping Property.
In an affidavit filed 21 August 2025, the plaintiff explained the bases of the five sets of particulars, effectively alleging that the defendant did not comply with the 30 April 2019 consent orders as to how the Epping property was to be sold, which resulted in a lower sale price. The terms of sale included an extended settlement period which was contrary to a consent order obliging the defendant to allow a 42 day settlement period, with the consequence that an order that he pay out a line of credit with the Commonwealth Bank could not be discharged, causing the plaintiff to be responsible for further interest. The defendant cancelled his guarantee of the line of credit, which deprived her of funds she says she needed to comply with the 30 April 2019 consent orders. The 30 April 2019 order involving costs required that, from the defendant’s share of the sale proceeds, there was to be a dispersal of a set portion ($10,000) in respect of the costs order made by White J and ($2,750) for costs ordered by Senior Registrar Campbell. Further, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to comply with one of the 30 April 2019 orders that required him to pay a sum of money ($4,000) into a superannuation account (SRI Services Superannuation fund) for the plaintiff’s benefit.
As to the reason that she commenced proceedings in this Court rather than pursuing remedies in the FCFCOA, she referred to the terms of Neville J’s harmful proceedings order and stated:
“9. Clearly, I am prohibited from instituting proceedings against Sanjiv Shah under the Family Law Act 1975 NOT Negligence under Civil Liability Act 2002 and/or for loss. of opportunity and/or breach of trust.
- I suffer substantial losses due to the defendant’s conduct which I could not seek as damages by commencing proceedings in family court as Supreme Court has jurisdiction over defendant’s conduct causing me above substantial loss of money.”
The defendant filed a defence on 8 July 2025 in which he denied having breached the 30 April 2019 consent orders and pleaded that the statement of claim was properly characterised as a claim or proceedings against the defendant under the Family Law Act and therefore was an abuse of process in view of the history of the family law proceedings in the FCA and the FCFCOA.
In an affidavit in support filed the same day, the defendant’s solicitor, Keith Spencer, attached sealed copies of the 4 June 2025 orders.
“3 The plaintiff is a former client of CGL. She engaged CGL to act for her in a family law property matter in or about June 2018, at which time the matter had already been on foot for about three years.
4 CGL acted for the plaintiff from about June 2018 to May 2019. There is contention between the parties regarding CGL’s costs and costs disclosure in acting for the plaintiff.
5 CGL asserts that it provided legal services and issued cost disclosures, costs updates and tax invoices in respect of those services. The plaintiff provided a form of irrevocable authority in favour of CGL, which CGL says was a type of confirmation that its outstanding and further fees would be paid within 42 days of final orders being made in the family law proceedings.
6 For her part, the plaintiff disputes the efficacy of the costs disclosures and appears to assert that the authorities were given as a result of threats.
7 Final orders were made in the family law proceedings by consent on or about 30 April 2019. The consent orders provided for a property in Epping to be sold. It is clear that CGL acted for and provided advice to the plaintiff in respect of the making of those orders.
8 In May 2019, CGL ceased to act for the plaintiff due to, on its contention, the plaintiff’s failure both to pay CGL’s tax invoices and to provide instructions to CGL to implement the orders made in the family law proceedings.”
“15 Subsequently, in or around June 2022, the plaintiff retained CGL to assist her in selling the Epping property. The property was eventually sold.
16 It is not in dispute that CGL received a sum of approximately $252,604 for payment in reduction of the District Court Judgment (based on its outstanding invoices) out of the sale proceeds of the Epping property.
17 Out of the original judgment debt, the sum of approximately $8,381 remained outstanding. At least as at April 2024, Karina Ralston, the solicitor with CGL who appears to have had most of the carriage of the matters for which CGL was retained by the plaintiff, gave evidence that CGL does not press the plaintiff for payment of that outstanding sum.
18 Between July and August 2022, CGL asserts that: it attempted to assist the plaintiff in relation to the Epping property and her family law proceedings, but she neglected to provide any instructions to do so; the plaintiff sought a copy of each tax invoice sent to her by CGL; and it produced to the plaintiff each itemised tax invoice which it had issued to her. Further, CGL says that, on 12 July 2023, it sent a copy of trust statements to the plaintiff.” (Footnotes omitted)
Meek J noted that on 31 August 2023, the plaintiff commenced proceedings in the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT), seeking copies of trust account statements and all itemised invoices. On 8 September 2023, CGL emailed her a copy of each trust statement and itemised invoice, although they claimed to have previously done so. On 18 September 2023, the plaintiff withdrew her application.
On 20 September 2023, the plaintiff commenced proceedings in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court by summons (the first summons), naming CGL as the first defendant and an employed solicitor of CGL, Karina Ralston, who had most of the carriage of her matters, as the second defendant. The plaintiff sought six orders:
“1. An order declaring cost agreement, if any, between plaintiff and defendants void and invalid and unenforceable and non-existent and to be set aside.
2. An order requiring defendants to repay under the equity principles/inherent jurisdiction amount of exorbitantly charged and unauthorised costs to plaintiff who bore the costs.
3. An order to make a gross sum costs assessment under s 98 of the Civil Procedure Act or reference to a referee under UCPR 20.14.
4. An order for contempt of court for wilful, knowing and deliberate breach and disobedience of court order 2.4.3 made by Court on 30 April 2019.
5. An order for all invoices with number of hours and rate per hour to be given to plaintiff.
6. An order for pre-judgment interest and costs such as payment for court fees.”
The matter was set down for hearing before Meek J on 26 September 2024. In early September, the plaintiff indicated that she would not press for orders 1 and 5. The evening before the hearing, CGL received an email from the plaintiff attaching a proposed amended summons, seeking eight orders, including all six orders previously sought, although order 1 was reframed so that a referee would make the determination sought.
The hearing proceeded the following day. Meek J refused leave to file the amended summons and, at the time of Meek J’s judgment, the hearing to strike out the first summons was part-heard, the parties to indicate their availability for further hearing dates. The following day (27 September 2024) the plaintiff sent an email to Meek J’s associate, copied to CGL, that she was “making preparation” to relocate overseas permanently from January 2025.
In her second summons, that was filed three days later (on 30 September 2024,) the plaintiff named CGL as the sole defendant and sought 10 orders. It came before Meek J for directions on 29 October 2024. Mrs Young appeared for CGL. His Honour made eight directions. Four concerned a filing timetable. The other four were:
“THE COURT:
1. Notes that Mrs Young contends that the relief sought by the plaintiff in the Summons filed on 30 September 2024 in substance is relief that had either been abandoned by the plaintiff or the subject of the request for leave to file an Amended Summons which was refused on 26 September 2024.
2. Notes that the Defendant foreshadows an application to dismiss the Summons as a form of abuse of process or on other grounds connected to the orders made by Meek J on 26 September 2024, being Orders 1 and 2.
3. Notes that whilst the Plaintiff appears to have acknowledged that the relief has the tendency nonetheless, she wishes to have the relief progressed and dealt with at the time of the adjourned hearing on 7 April 2025.
4. Notes that in light of the above the Court will address the application for dismissal of the summons first and subject to that determination consider (if there is no dismissal) the making of orders for the substantive relief sought in the summons noting that the Plaintiff has filed an affidavit in support of the summons.”
A notice of motion filed by CGL seeking that the second summons be struck out pursuant to r 14.28 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (the UCPR), “on the grounds the pleading has a tendency to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceedings against the defendant or is otherwise an abuse of process”, was heard on the first date of the hearing (10 December 2024). Meek J permitted CGL to amend the notice of motion to include an alternative motion, to dismiss the summons pursuant to r 13.4, since r 14.28 relates to pleadings, which a summons is not. His Honour ordered that the summons be dismissed and made an order for costs against the plaintiff.
The proceedings concerning the first summons, filed on 20 September 2023, were determined on 26 May 2025 by Meek J in a comprehensive judgment (574 paragraphs and 445 footnotes) in favour of the defendant with an order for costs against the plaintiff: Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 528.
On 29 May 2025, that is, three days after Meek J handed down his judgment concerning the first summons, the plaintiff filed a notice of motion seeking three orders:
“(1) the Principal Judgment be set aside or varied under rr 36.15 and 36.16(3A) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR);
(2) these proceedings be transferred to the Common Law Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales “to travel, be heard and determined” with the Negligence Proceedings; and
(3) the Principal Judgment be stayed before it is transferred to the Common Law Division.”
The notice of motion was dismissed with costs by McGrath J on 13 August 2025: Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd (No 2) [2025] NSWSC 908.
On 2 April 2025, that is, about 8 weeks before Meek J’s judgment concerning the first summons, the plaintiff commenced fresh proceedings against CGL by way of a statement of claim in the professional negligence list of the Common Law Division of this Court. On 2 November 2025, Harrison CJ at CL struck out the statement of claim as an abuse of process: Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 1422. CGL had submitted, and Harrison CJ at CL found, that the Anshun estoppel doctrine operated to preclude the claim of negligence against CGL, because it was unreasonable of the plaintiff to not have raised that claim in the context of the proceedings before Meek J concerning the first summons. His Honour’s judgment was handed down two days after the hearing of the instant matter. The parties were given a timetable to make written submissions, if they wished, concerning the judgment.
CGL also sought an order pursuant to s 5 of the VP Act that the plaintiff not be permitted to commence proceedings against the defendant arising from her prior retainer of them in relation to the family law proceedings. His Honour declined the prayer, explaining:
“55 … I am confident that Ms Sanjiv, who has highly regarded academic qualifications, will appreciate the force of those conclusions. It is preferable that she not be burdened with the stigma as a vexatious litigant if that can be avoided. It is to be hoped that Ms Sanjiv will accept the fact that it is in nobody’s interests for further hopeless litigation between her and Coleman Greig to be pursued.”
On 8 July 2025, the defendant filed, with his defence to the statement of claim, a notice of motion seeking that the proceedings be dismissed pursuant to r 13.4(1)(a) and/or (c) of the UCPR; further or in the alternative, that the plaintiff be estopped from carrying on with the proceedings; further or in the alternative, a declaration that this Court is “a clearly inappropriate forum” for the plaintiff’s claim to be determined, and therefore that it be permanently stayed pursuant to s 67 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW); and, further or in the alternative, pursuant to r 42.21(1)(b) and/or (f) of the UCPR, that the plaintiff give security for the defendant’s costs and, in the event that she fails to do so within the time set by the Court, that the proceedings be dismissed.
On 2 September 2025, the defendant filed a second notice of motion seeking, by way of substantive orders, a declaration that, pursuant to ss 8(1) and 8(4)(d) of the VP Act the proceedings are vexatious; that pursuant to s 8(7)(a) [2] of the VP Act the proceedings be stayed and that pursuant to s 8(7)(b) of the VP Act the plaintiff be prohibited from instituting proceedings in New South Wales against the defendant.
“Fiduciary Duty
11 Further and in the alternative, by reason of the matters pleaded above both defendants owed the plaintiff a fiduciary duty.
12 The fiduciary duty included a duty to act in the best interests of the plaintiff.
13 Plaintiff suffered losses and damages as a result of the above and is entitled to restitution.”
I note that the reference in par 11 to “both defendants” suggests that either the plaintiff intended to add the superannuation company as a second defendant rather than as a second plaintiff, or mis-drafted (if not misconceived) the particulars.
As noted, that motion, in respect of the relief sought by way of an order of referral to the pro bono scheme, was dismissed by Fagan J on 3 October 2025. In an ex tempore judgment Fagan J observed:
“The statement of claim pleads in paras 3-8 various respects in which it is said that the defendant failed to carry out the orders of the Family Court. In each of those paragraphs there is a generalised allegation that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care that he failed to exercise reasonable care and skill. The pleading does not say with respect to what activities he owed that duty or in what respect he failed to exercise reasonable care and skill. The substance of what is alleged throughout the statement of claim is simply that he did not comply with or implement the Family Court’s orders.
It is patent on the face of the pleading on a cursory reading and, indeed, with more close attention to detail, that there is absolutely no cause of action disclosed. There is no pleading of any facts that would give rise to any common law duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. The whole nature of the claim is that the orders of the Family Court were in various respects not complied with or carried out.
The only litigious action that the plaintiff could validly take with respect to such grievances is to return to the Family Court and seek further enforcement orders or to seek to have the defendant dealt with for contempt. ...
…There are also to be heard on that date two notices of motion that have been filed by the defendant. They seek orders that the proceedings be dismissed as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. On the material that is before me, an order to that effect would almost certainly be made unless the plaintiff can between now and then reconsider what it is that she wishes to agitate in this case and can successfully obtain leave to amend her statement of claim to something that does reveal an issue capable of being litigated in this jurisdiction.”
Since the statement of claim would inevitably be dismissed, his Honour’ reasoned that it would be a waste of resources to involve a Pro Bono legal adviser. The balance of the notice of motion, seeking leave to file the first proposed ASOC, was stood over for hearing by this Court.
On 20 October 2025, the plaintiff filed her second notice of motion, again seeking a referral to a member of the Pro Bono Panel and leave to file a different amended statement of claim (the second proposed ASOC).
The plaintiff’s second notice of motion was supported by an affidavit filed on the same date. The plaintiff annexed the second proposed ASOC. It does not comply with r 19.5(2) of the UCPR in that the proposed amendments are not indicated and, in any event, it is effectively a complete re-draft. The plaintiff retains the proposal of a second plaintiff (SRI Services Superannuation Fund). The causes of action are identified as: “NEGLIGENCE (CIVIL LIABILITY ACT 2002 AND TRUSTEES ACT 1925) LOSS OF OPPORTUNITY, BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES, DAMAGES, RESTITUTION”.
Contrary to timetable directions for the filing of affidavits made by the Registrar, the plaintiff filed an affidavit on 7 November 2025 annexing a third proposed ASOC, which is also a redraft with no indicated amendments. The plaintiff did not file a further notice of motion in relation to the third proposed ASOC.
At the hearing of the notices of motion, the defendant indicated that he was not prejudiced by the plaintiff reading her affidavit dated 7 November 2025 and relying upon the third proposed ASOC. I directed that the plaintiff could do so.
“13.4 Frivolous and vexatious proceedings
(1) If in any proceedings it appears to the court that in relation to the proceedings generally or in relation to any claim for relief in the proceedings—
(a) the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious, or
(b) no reasonable cause of action is disclosed, or
(c) the proceedings are an abuse of the process of the court,
the court may order that the proceedings be dismissed generally or in relation to that claim.”
The defendant submitted that, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s characterisation of the bases of liability pleaded by her in her statement of claim and various proposed ASOCs, it is a re-agitation of issues that have been settled in the family law proceedings. The pleaded breaches of the defendant’s alleged obligations as a trustee in those documents are in fact alleged breaches of orders made in the family law proceedings and therefore the statement of claim comes within all three limbs of r 13.4(1) of the UCPR.
In oral submissions, the plaintiff said that she had not previously made a claim against the defendant as a trustee for a breach of duty and continued:
“… no findings and no conclusions have been made by any Court in relation to negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. Deciding the matter under the Trustee Act and claims under common law and claims for equitable relief is part of the Court’s functions of the Court, but not of the Family Court. That is why in the interests of justice I seek leave to amend my statement of claim …
My claims for negligence and breach of fiduciary duties are bono fide and there are real issues to be tried. That is why I respectfully request this Court to dismiss all relief shown in notice of motion filed by [the defendant]. I am entitled to have an amount equally relevant to the legal costs that I paid [the defendant] paid back to me by way of restitution. I am entitled to obtain from [the defendant] equitable compensation for the amount I paid to third party in consequences of [the defendant’s] breaches of fiduciary duty. …”
“I have not founded my case based on breaches of court orders. I have founded my case based on trustee’s common law and equitable duties and statutory duties under Trustees Act 1925 (NSW) and damages under the Civil Liability Act 2002”.
“A reason for refusing an order for security is that it is likely that no benefit to [the defendant] will result from an order for security. If ’[the plaintiff’s] proceedings are stayed because of a failure to provide security for costs, the proceedings would still be continued by Sri Services Superannuation Fund of which [the plaintiff] is a trustee and member. As indicated below, those proceedings would likely deal with the same issues and will thus cause [the defendant] to incur the same level of costs. …
The statement of claim indicates considerable overlap between the claims made by the two separate plaintiffs. The proceedings by each plaintiff involve the same issues. …”
Proceedings that attempt to relitigate issues that were determined in earlier judicial proceedings may give rise to an issue estoppel. The plaintiff’s claim that the defendant should not have been appointed a trustee for the sale of the Epping property is, effectively, an appeal against the 5 February 2020 orders. The application by the plaintiff on 18 January 2024 for leave to appeal the 5 February 2020 orders out of time was disposed of by AJR Cameron (19 February 2024 orders) and, on the appeal of that decision, by Austin J (the 28 March 2024 orders).
The plaintiff has also previously challenged, in the family law proceedings, the defendant’s compliance with his obligations pursuant to the 30 April 2019 consent orders. Those challenges were dealt with to finality by Neville J (the 4 June 2025 orders). On the basis of issue estoppel alone, the statement of claim is an abuse of process. Accordingly, the statement of claim will be dismissed pursuant to r 13.4(1)(c) of the UCPR.
The proposed ASOCs do not overcome the basis of dismissal. The first proposed ASOC, in which a further layer of apparent liability (“a fiduciary duty”) is added, does not address the issues I have identified with the statement of claim; it would still be dependent upon orders made in the family law proceedings that the plaintiff has previously challenged to finality, subject to any further application by her to seek leave to file an appeal in the family law proceedings.
As noted, the second proposed ASOC is a re-write of the statement of claim. Regrettably, the paragraphs are unnumbered. The plaintiff pleads breaches of the defendant’s duty of care as a trustee to perform certain functions that, I note, coincide with the defendant’s obligations pursuant to the 30 April 2019 consent orders, as varied by the 6 December 2023 orders, and the 5 February 2020 orders. The plaintiff also pleads that the defendant had a duty of care to comply with the cost order made by White J “and Family Court Registrar” which coincides with the terms of the 30 April 2019 consent orders. However, the defendant’s liability for that costs order was incorporated into the 30 April 2019 consent orders. The amounts outstanding from those orders were the subject of the orders made by Neville J (4 June 2025 orders), so that the issue of its payment has been resolved in the family law proceedings.
The third proposed ASOC (also with unnumbered paragraphs) is a more elaborate re-write which nevertheless ultimately depends upon alleged breaches of duties of care arising from orders made in the family law proceedings. The essence remains a claim that the defendant breached his duties in failing to comply with the terms of the 30 April 2019 consent orders. The third proposed ASOC also refers to the 2015 maintenance orders, seemingly pleading that the defendant did not comply with those orders as well.
Accordingly, leaving aside procedural impediments to granting leave to amend, none of the three proposed ASOCs overcome the fundamental flaws with the statement of claim. It follows that the plaintiff’s renewed prayer for a referral to the pro bono scheme is dismissed.
The logical next prayer to consider is the defendant’s application for relief in the form of a vexatious proceedings order, since acquiesce to those prayers, renders it unnecessary to consider a permanent stay.
“8 Making of vexatious proceedings order
(1) When orders may be made An authorised court may make an order under this section (a vexatious proceedings order) in relation to a person if the court is satisfied that—
(a) the person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia, or
(b) the person, acting in concert with a person who is subject to a vexatious proceedings order or who is referred to in paragraph (a), has instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an authorised court may have regard to—
(a) proceedings instituted or conducted in any Australian court or tribunal (including proceedings instituted or conducted before the commencement of this section), and
(b) orders made by any Australian court or tribunal (including orders made before the commencement of this section), and
(c) evidence of the decision, or a finding of fact, of any Australian court or tribunal hearing such proceedings or making such orders, even if that evidence would otherwise not be admissible by virtue of section 91 of the Evidence Act 1995.
(3) An authorised court must not make a vexatious proceedings order in relation to a person without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity of being heard.
(4) Orders may be made on court’s own motion or on application An authorised court may make a vexatious proceedings order of its own motion or on the application of any of the following persons—
…
(d) a person against or in relation to whom another person has instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings,
…
(7) Orders that may be made by Supreme Court The Supreme Court may make any one or more of the following vexatious proceedings orders in relation to a person—
(a) an order staying all or part of any proceedings in New South Wales already instituted by the person,
(b) an order prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings in New South Wales,
(c) any other order that the Court considers appropriate in relation to the person.”
“4 Meaning of ‘proceedings’
In this Act, proceedings includes—
(a) any civil proceedings, criminal proceedings or proceedings before a tribunal, and
(b) any cause, matter, action, suit, proceedings, trial, complaint or inquiry of any kind within the jurisdiction of any court or tribunal, and
(c) any proceedings taken in connection with or incidental to proceedings pending before a court or tribunal, and
(d) any interlocutory proceedings or applications, or procedural applications, taken in connection with or incidental to civil proceedings, criminal proceedings or proceedings before a tribunal, and
(e) any calling into question of a decision, whether or not a final decision, of a court or tribunal, and whether by appeal, challenge, review or in another way.”
“6 Meaning of ‘vexatious proceedings**’**
In this Act, vexatious proceedings includes—
(a) proceedings that are an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal, and
(b) proceedings instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose, and
(c) proceedings instituted or pursued without reasonable ground, and
(d) proceedings that are conducted to achieve a wrongful purpose, or in a way that harasses, or causes unreasonable annoyance, delay or detriment, regardless of the subjective intention or motive of the person who instituted the proceedings.”
“7 In Viavattene v Attorney General (NSW) [2015] NSWCA 44 at [14], Basten JA said, with respect to s 6 of the Act:
‘Although the definition is not expressed to be exclusive, for reasons considered under the next heading, one might expect it to be rare for a court to treat proceedings as vexatious proceedings unless they could fairly be characterised as falling under one of the descriptions in s 6. Secondly, as has been remarked in a number of cases, the separate paragraphs are not to be construed as independent and self-contained categories. For example, most proceeding which would fall within pars (b)-(d) would constitute an abuse of process for the purposes of par (a).’
8 In Vito Zepinic v Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited; Nina Zepinic v Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited [2018] NSWCA 317 (“Zepinic”), Simpson AJA, McColl and Macfarlan JJA agreeing, identified the necessary steps in order for the Court to determine such an application:
‘13 The task assigned to a judge asked to make orders under the VP Act is not simple. The first step is to identify the “proceedings” the subject of the application, and said to be “vexatious”. The second step is to determine (applying s 6) which, if any, of those proceedings is:
(a) an abuse of the process of the court or tribunal in which it is brought; or
(b) instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose; or
(c) instituted or pursued without reasonable ground; or
(d) conducted in such a way as to achieve a wrongful purpose, or in a way that harasses, or causes unreasonable annoyance, delay or detriment, and therefore “vexatious”.
…
14 The third step is to determine whether the person has “frequently” instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia, or has acted in concert with such a person (whether or not subject to a vexatious proceedings order) or who is the subject of a vexatious proceedings order (s 8(1)). (The requirement for frequency does not apply if the court is satisfied that the person has acted in concert with a person who is subject to a vexatious proceedings order, or who has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia (see s 8(1)(b)).
15 The power conferred by s 8(7) being discretionary, the final step is to determine the manner in which the discretion is to be exercised, bearing in mind the wide scope of the power, particularly as stated in s 8(7)(c).’
9 Simpson AJA, at [17] of Zepinic, noted that the Court has repeatedly emphasised that a judge determining an application for a vexatious proceedings order must deal individually with each proceeding that is alleged to come within the s 6 definition. In Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No 8) [2014] NSWCA 125, the Court (Beazley P; Emmett JA; Sackville AJA) explained at [56] that the purpose of a vexatious proceedings order is not punitive, but rather ‘to shield other litigants from harassment and to protect the Court itself from the expense, burden and inconvenience of baseless and repetitious suits’.”
The plaintiff submits that an examination of the proceedings relied upon, in particular some of the judgments delivered in those proceedings, establishes that they were vexatious and of such frequency (although not great in number) and persistence that a vexatious proceedings order is warranted.
The plaintiff submitted in writing that she has only been declared vexatious on one occasion (the judgment of Schonell J), and that the proceedings before Beckhouse J and Neville J could not be characterised as “frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance or fanciful”, nor could it have been said of those proceedings that they “must fail”, because she was “partially successful” in both cases. She noted that in Vito Zepinic v Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited; Nina Zepinic v Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited [2018] NSWCA 317 at [197], Simpson AJA (McColl and Macfarlan JJA agreeing) noted that two cases would not ordinarily establish the necessary frequency for an order under the VP Act to be made.
In his written submissions dated 22 September 2025, the defendant submitted that if the Court is minded to make a vexatious proceedings order, it should extend to a prohibition on the plaintiff instituting proceedings through or in the name of the trustee of SRI Services Superannuation Fund, through or in the name of any other entity controlled by the plaintiff or through a person or entity acting in concert with the plaintiff. In his submissions dated 3 December 2025, the defendant submitted that in view of the 2024 proceedings against the plaintiff’s former solicitors, such an order should be broader; it should extend to a prohibition on the plaintiff, or any person or entity controlled by or acting in concert with her, commencing or continuing with any proceedings against any person or entity in any way arising out of or connected with the plaintiff’s matrimonial property dispute with the defendant. The plaintiff did not respond to that submission.
Beckhouse J’s judgment is not relied upon by the husband as being vexatious, although since the wife has raised it, I note that the wife’s submission that she was “partially successful” in that case is to be understood in the context that her Honour dismissed all four counts of her contempt application and upheld the husband’s enforcement and variation applications. Her Honour noted at [129] that “the husband has not been completely successful” because the wife correctly sought to be paid an additional amount for outstanding spousal maintenance and an outstanding costs order, however: “Whilst not contained in his initial application, the husband made this concession prior to the hearing.”
The husband submits that the following family law proceedings come within s 6 of the VP Act. I make my determination in relation to each proceeding.
“10 These recurring themes have been the subject of the appellant’s various applications to this Court and the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) over a number of years and the appellant, who has appeared without the assistance of lawyers, has some difficulty accepting that these issues have been finally determined. This has led to a mismatch between the issues which the appellant wished to agitate and the grounds of appeal. …”
Her Honour referred to the absence of proper bases of appeal. The wife objected to a costs order made against her but had not pointed to any error in the process by which the discretion to make the order was exercised. As to a ground contending that the primary judge, Beckhouse J, made “jurisdictional errors” and “lacked jurisdiction”, Christie J was unable to determine from the wife’s submissions the basis of those assertions. As to a ground that the primary judge erred in failing to order on its own motion leave to take specific actions on her own motion, Christie J said: “This ground needs only to be articulated to be rejected.” Christie J described another ground, that contended that the primary judge “erred in all findings and conclusions and erred in making of all orders”, as a global assertion of factual error that was incompetent and would not be further considered.
I am satisfied, on the basis of Christie J’s judgment, that the proceedings were instituted without reasonable ground: s 6(c) of the VPA.
“1. Extension of time to appeal all orders made on 5 February 2020 as appeal has reasonable prospects of success.
2. Jurisdictional error and invalid orders 1 and 2 and 3 in view of Section 86 of Real Property Act 1900.
3. Error of principle and substantial miscarriage of justice not to vary cost order 3 where [the applicant] with the benefit of legal advice and representation failed to serve Registrar General with a copy of orders of 5 February 2020 made by [the primary judge] and thus order 1 has no effect or operation in transferring or otherwise vesting the land the subject of the order and [the respondent] continues to remain registered proprietor of the land who had engaged a real estate agent.”
In his judgment dated 19 February 2024 refusing the wife’s application, AJR Cameron noted that the first ground “is not a competent ground of appeal” since “[t]he issue of extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal against the primary orders is the subject of the application currently before the court. … Asserting that an appeal has reasonable prospects of success does not make it so.” AJR Cameron concluded: “This proposed ground of appeal has no prospect of success, is entirely devoid of merit and is doomed to fail.”
As to ground 2, AJR Cameron observed:
“65 It is impossible to clearly identify the basis for the applicant’s contention that the primary Judge lacked jurisdiction to make the primary orders. Construing this proposed ground of appeal most benignly in favour of the applicant, the contention appears to be that the primary Judge acted upon a wrong principle.
66 Firstly, and perhaps fatally to this proposed ground of appeal, no submissions were made to the primary Judge that the court lacked jurisdiction to make the primary orders. It hardly needs to be stated that the applicant is bound by the conduct of her case. …”
“88 Proposed ground of appeal 3 is a more detailed re-statement of the complaint contained in proposed ground of appeal 2.
89 The applicant contends that the respondent’s failure to serve the Registrar General with a copy of the primary order somehow rendered those orders void and of no effect. Not only is this argument difficult to understand, it is simply wrong.”
“95 It will be apparent from the foregoing that each of the applicant’s proposed grounds of appeal are either entirely devoid of merit, doomed to fail or do not enjoy reasonable prospects of success. The extension of time application must therefore be dismissed. It would be futile to extend time to file a notice of appeal that does not enjoy reasonable prospects of success.
…
101 The applicant has failed to provide any reasonable or cogent explanation for her delay in seeking to bring her appeal.
102 The applicant’s delay is approaching four years. In these circumstances the court would demand a compelling explanation for such delay.
103 It is noted that the applicant was legally represented at the final hearing in 2019 and also at the hearing before the primary Judge in February 2020. The applicant chose not to explain why she failed to obtain legal advice regarding the possibility of lodging an appeal against the primary orders in 2020.
104 It is also difficult to accept that the applicant, even as a self-represented litigant, was entirely unaware of the existence of a time limit for the filing of a notice of appeal.
...
106 The applicant made a forensic decision not to seek to commence an appeal against the primary orders until she received what she considered to be a disappointing result in the proceedings heard by Judge Beckhouse. I do not accept that the applicant was seriously dissatisfied with the primary orders since early 2020 and chose to do nothing for nearly 4 years.
…
110 It is also clear that the sale of the Epping property has been concluded. The applicant wishes to overturn the entire transaction, which would entail the unjustifiable re-commencement of proceedings that commenced in 2014, with the addition of the innocent purchasers of the Epping property. The applicant’s ‘grand plan’ falls well outside the ambit of any proposed appeal against the primary orders.
111 As the sale of the Epping property has been finalised, the question of whether or not the court was correct in appointing the respondent as trustee for sale is now entirely otiose. The proceeds of sale of the Epping property have been disbursed in the manner set out at [33] of the reasons for judgment delivered by Judge Beckhouse on 5 December 2023. Any appeal against the primary orders would now be entirely nugatory.”
The appeal of AJR Cameron’s orders was in the form of a de novo hearing of the wife’s three grounds extracted at [76*].
Austin J made the following observation of the wife’s application.
“16 The applicant’s review application over-reaches the review of the appeal registrar’s decision.
17 Not only does the applicant want the appeal registrar’s decision reversed (Orders 1 and 2), she wants her proposed appeal from the orders made on 5 February 2020 allowed (Order 3) and those orders set aside (Order 4). Inconsistently, she also wants the proposed appeal listed for hearing in conjunction with another pending appeal, which is already listed for hearing before another judge… (Order 5).”
“23 … Ground 1 is not a ground of appeal at all. It is merely a re-statement of the applicant’s request for an extension of time to appeal blended with her unduly optimistic opinion about the prospects of its success.
24 The asserted errors which allegedly vitiate the orders made on 5 February 2020 are: first, jurisdictional error; and secondly, their invalidity by reason of the respondent’s failure to later register the orders with the NSW land titles registrar (‘the State agency’) under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW).
25 Before explaining the misconceptions which beset the grounds of appeal, it is worthwhile pointing out the absolute futility of the appeal.
26 The orders made on 3 February 2020 were not substantive orders adjusting the parties’ property interests under s 79 of the Act. Rather, they were merely consequential orders to facilitate the implementation of the property settlement orders made earlier in April 2019.
27 Once the substantive property settlement orders were consummated by the sale of the property and the division between the parties of the net proceeds, the consequential orders were spent. The orders are no longer executory. They have been executed. Neither party has enjoyed any legal or beneficial interest in the property since the purchaser became the exclusive registered proprietor of the property in April 2023. The entertainment of any appeal now from spent orders would be an exercise in futility and waste.”
“36 The proposed appeal evinces no reasonable prospects of success and so an extension of time within which to bring it should not be granted, making it unnecessary to say anything about the paucity of evidence to excuse the gross delay in bringing the application to extend time.”
“164 Although the wife submitted that she will not return to Court after I determine this matter, I do not feel confident that she will remain true to her word. The litigation history I canvassed in the Background section of these reasons (noting that it was, in effect, a snapshot and did not cover the entire litigation history going back to 2014) [satisfies] me that the wife has been pursuing arguments similar to those ventilated before me, for some time now. She attempted, unsuccessfully, to appeal the orders of Rees J some four years after the orders were made. She has returned numerous times to the theme of the husband’s purported breaches of the 2019 orders.
165 The wife has appeared, self-represented, in the appeal proceedings, the proceedings before Judge Beckhouse and now, in the proceedings before me. Although she contended she had no funds to pursue litigation, as a litigant in person, she has no solicitor’s or counsel’s fees to pay and she need meet only any filing fee subject to any fee relief the Court may grant. I do not consider impecuniosity to be a matter that will preclude the wife from filing further proceedings.
166 Costs orders have been made against the wife which have gone unpaid by her. But for the fact that there are funds owing to her which can be applied to outstanding costs orders, I have doubt as to whether the costs orders made by Austin J, Christie J and Appeal Judicial Registrar Cameron would have ever been paid by the wife given her submissions about her financial circumstances. Costs have not proved to be an effective deterrent to the wife pursuing litigation about matters which she has already brought to the Court.
167 I accept that ongoing litigation exposes the husband to stress, although in the absence of direct evidence by the [husband], or some medical evidence about the extent of that stress, I cannot be [satisfied] that any stress he experiences rises as high as ‘psychological harm or oppression or major mental distress’ as set out at s 102QAC(2)(a) and (b) of the Act.
168 I am, however, [satisfied] that the proceedings are now financially harmful to the husband. He has had costs in the vicinity of $200,000.00 for legal fees and for the sale of the Epping property. To the extent that those costs may have been accounted for by way of costs orders and the by the provisions of the 2023 orders which effectively reimbursed him for some of the sale costs of the Epping property, I am [satisfied] that he will have recouped only a portion of the money he has spent.
169 Ten years is a long time to spend before the Court. I am comfortably [satisfied] that the proceedings between these parties must now be brought to an end. A person who is the subject of a harmful proceedings order may, with leave of the Court, commence further proceedings. In this instance, a harmful proceedings order against the wife will not prevent her from litigating any proper claim for relief she may have. She will, however, require leave to do so.
170 For these reasons, I am [satisfied] that a harmful proceedings order should be made against the wife.”
The plaintiff submitted that she was “partly successful” before Neville J and therefore it was an inappropriate basis to find that the proceedings came within s 6 of the VP Act. I presume that she refers to the husband having conceded in the hearing before Neville J that there was an underpayment of $38,179.10 by him that arose from a double counting error and that he was liable for interest on that amount, as well. However, I note that the amount ($41,965.10) was completely offset by costs orders against the wife and the findings made against the wife by Neville J above and, as noted by Neville J at [206] of her judgment, had the wife accepted an offer by the husband to resolve the double payment, she would have been financially better off than she was by litigating the matter.
I am satisfied, on the basis of Neville J’s judgment, that those proceedings were instituted without reasonable ground: s 6(c) of the VP Act.
“The appeal is devoid of merit and has no reasonable prospects of success. The consequence is that it is vexatious within the terms of s 102Q(1) of the Act and the application must be dismissed.”
I have concluded that these proceedings, which are relied upon by the defendant, have marginal relevance to the current application for a vexatious proceeding order by the defendant and therefore I do not make a determination as to whether they are vexatious.
In Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2024] NSWSC 1675, in considering the relief sought in the new summons, Meek J said:
“85 I consider that the relief sought in prayers 1 to 5 of the new summons is untenable. Further, given that the plaintiff had sought leave to pursue similar relief on the hearing of the related proceedings which was denied, I consider that her attempt to re-agitate similar claims by her new summons constitutes an abuse of process of this Court.
86 In respect of prayers 6 to 9 of the new summons, I accept Mrs Young’s submission that those claims, in substance, attempt to re-agitate the claims made by the plaintiff that were either abandoned in or indeed are still the subject of the related proceedings. The plaintiff ought not be permitted to seek essentially similar relief in two concurrent proceedings in this Court. …”
“1 This is a meritless application brought by the plaintiff, Rekha Sanjiv, against the defendants, Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd (CGL) and Karina Ralston (a Principal/Director of CGL) in proceedings between them that have been finally determined by Meek J against Ms Sanjiv.
…
93 … I find that Ms Sanjiv has failed in every aspect of the Notice of Motion. Applying the principles in Cappello v HomeBuilding Pty Ltd [2023] NSWCA 109… I regard her claim for the orders sought to be hopeless and based upon groundless contentions. As such, I will award indemnity costs to CGL and Ms Ralston.”
Although the statement of claim is the only proceeding that the plaintiff has commenced against the defendant in this Court, it was filed by her in anticipation of Neville J blocking her from continuing to litigate in the family law proceedings without leave. Indeed, she has conceded with candour that is why she filed the statement of claim.
As to the first three steps that were identified in Zepinic, I have found that the defendant has repeatedly commenced family law proceedings against the defendant that have been determined to be devoid of merit and doomed to fail, so that the defendant has been put to unnecessary cost and stress. The instant proceedings in this Court may be characterised in the same way. They are a a continuation of the pattern of litigating against the defendant in respect of past orders made in the family law proceedings with no prospect of substantive success. Accordingly, pursuant to s 8(1)(a), I am satisfied that the plaintiff has frequently instituted and conducted proceedings that are vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a) and/or (c) and (d) of the VP Act.
The defendant had submitted that some proceedings came within s 6(b) of the VP Act, that is, that they were instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose. There is a subjective element of intent to s 6(b) that is not made out on the balance of probabilities, although objectively, I have no doubt that the proceedings in question did in fact cause harassment, unreasonable annoyance, delay and detriment, and therefore that they came within s 6(d) of the VP Act.
In so finding, I disregard the 2024 proceedings by the plaintiff against her former solicitors. In my view, they are only of tangential relevance since they do not involve the defendant and therefore do not directly inform the issues to be resolved in this application. Whether those proceedings warranted a vexatious proceedings order against the plaintiff was determined in the negative by Harrison CJ at CL, although his Honour did not have before him the family law proceedings or the 2025 proceedings against the defendant in this Court.
I am satisfied that the defendant has established the necessary foundation for the plaintiff to be declared vexatious insofar as she may seek to commence further proceedings against the defendant.
As to the fourth step identified in Zepinic, the terms of s 8(1) (“An authorised court may make an order under this section”) allow for a discretion to be exercised by the Court to not make an order, even though there is a proper basis to do so. In view of the plaintiff’s track record in the family law proceedings of commencing proceedings with no merit, filing her statement of claim in this Court two weeks before Neville J’s judgment was handed down and the flurry of proposed ASOCs over the three months before the hearing of the notices of motion, I have no doubt that in the absence of a vexatious proceeding order being made against her pursuant to s 8(7)(b) of the VP Act, the plaintiff would continue to initiate proceedings against the defendant that, in essence, would revisit issues that have been settled in the family court proceedings.
As noted, in her submissions resisting an order for security of costs in respect of her statement of claim, the plaintiff referred to her proposed second plaintiff (SRI Services Superannuation Fund) as having as strong a case as her and on an identical basis against the defendant. I am minded to accede to the defendant’s submission that the vexatious proceedings order should be expressed so as to exclude the plaintiff from attempting to circumvent it by effectively commencing a fresh action through SRI Services Superannuation Fund or another entity controlled by her.
I note that the defendant seeks an order for indemnity costs and an opportunity to be head further on that application. I will make an order for costs. Whether there should be an order for indemnity costs will need to be heard separately.
Accordingly, I make the following orders.
**********
Her Honour approved publication of the judgment under a pseudonym pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (since repealed).
The notice of motion in fact referred to “s 7(a)” and “s 7(b)” of the VP Act, which is clearly a typographical error.
Sanjiv
Shah [2026] NSWSC 139
(1996) 70 ALJR 321