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[2026] NSWCA 25
procedural. The applicant was referred to the Court of Appeal Registrar for referral to a barrister or solicitor on the Pro Bono Panel for the provision of advice in relation to the proceedings, pursuant to r...
The Court granted a limited pro bono referral for advice, even though it considered the applicant’s case did not reveal merit. The appeal was still at an early stage, and advice might help prevent unnecessary litigation or help clarify and plead any claims considered viable. The order did not provide general representation; it was confined to advice about the proceedings.
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1,999 words · generated 08/10/2026
In Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2026] NSWCA 25, Rekha Sanjiv applied for a pro bono referral while self-represented in appeal proceedings concerning a series of decisions in litigation against Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd. The judgment was delivered by Price AJA on 9 March 2026.
The motion was filed on 3 March 2026 under r 7.36 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR). Sanjiv relied on two affidavits. In the second, she said the proceedings were complex, that she had no or limited funds for representation, that assistance from another source was unobtainable, and that a referral was in the interests of the administration of justice [1]–[2]. The respondent did not appear and had not actively opposed or consented to the application [3].
4 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The appeal concerned several decisions in proceedings arising from Coleman Greig’s former role as Sanjiv’s legal advisers during a Family Court dispute. The judgment identified decisions of Meek J, McGrath J and Harrison CJ at CL as forming part of the appeal’s procedural history [4]–[5]. It did not repeat the underlying factual history, noting that it had been comprehensively set out in those earlier judgments [5]. The appeal was listed for directions on 13 April 2026, and the summons seeking leave to appeal had been filed on 26 February 2026 [6].
The Court made a referral, but not in the broad form requested. The order sent Sanjiv to the Court of Appeal Registrar for referral to a barrister or solicitor on the Pro Bono Panel for advice in relation to the proceedings [11]. It did not order that a lawyer represent her generally in the appeal.
The controlling criterion under r 7.36(1) is whether a referral is in the interests of the administration of justice. Rule 7.36(2) allows the court to consider the litigant’s means, capacity to obtain legal assistance outside the scheme, the nature and complexity of the proceedings, and any other appropriate matter [7]. The applicant’s stated financial limitations and difficulty obtaining assistance were relevant, but the judgment’s summary of the governing principles makes clear that inability to obtain legal assistance is not sufficient by itself [8].
At [8], Price AJA set out principles from Renshaw v New South Wales Lotteries Corporation Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 41, as discussed in Allchin v Hunter Water Corporation (No 2) [2024] NSWCA 315. Those principles describe pro bono assistance as a valuable and scarce resource and say that the court should consider the likely availability and utility of the assistance. They also explain the relevance of apparent merit. Ordinarily, the Court will want to see some indication of merit, but a referral for advice may still be appropriate where advice could help a litigant understand defects in a case and avoid unnecessary or futile litigation.
Price AJA applied that approach to the particular procedural circumstances. The Court said the applicant’s case did not reveal merit. It nevertheless regarded the appeal’s early stage as important: professional advice before the appeal proceeded further might help avoid unnecessary or futile litigation, or assist with properly pleading claims if they were considered viable [9]. Thus, the reasoning did not treat a referral as an endorsement of the appeal. It treated advice as potentially useful precisely because the proceedings had not yet progressed further.
The scope of the order reflects that distinction. Sanjiv sought a general referral, but the Court was satisfied that the interests of justice supported an order confined to advice in relation to the proceedings [9]. The judgment refers to r 7.37 UCPR in explaining that limitation [9]. The order was therefore not a finding that the applicant should receive ongoing representation, and it did not express a conclusion about the merits of the appeal.
A separate issue arose from an order made against Sanjiv under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) in another proceeding, Sanjiv v Shah [2026] NSWSC 139. Price AJA said the present motion did not appear to be constrained by that order, referring to Potier v Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales [2014] NSWCA 256 [10]. The Court then made the referral order.
The judgment presents the governing framework as an existing discretionary test under r 7.36, rather than announcing a new rule. Before this decision, the rule already required the court to be satisfied that referral was in the interests of the administration of justice. The factors expressly listed in the rule included means, capacity to obtain assistance outside the scheme, and the nature and complexity of the proceedings [7].
The principles quoted at [8] give practical content to that test. They explain that lack of funds or inability to secure other assistance does not automatically justify a referral. The court also considers the likely utility of assistance and whether the case appears to have merit. At the same time, the principles recognise a limited-purpose referral for advice where an apparently weak case might be clarified, abandoned or better understood, thereby avoiding unnecessary litigation.
After Sanjiv, the decision illustrates how those established principles can operate at an early appellate stage. A finding that the case does not reveal merit need not inevitably result in refusal. The potential value of advice, including the possibility of avoiding futile litigation or properly formulating claims that are considered viable, can be material. The outcome is fact-sensitive: this judgment does not establish that every early-stage appeal, or every litigant with limited means, should receive a referral.
The decision also illustrates a distinction between a referral for advice and general representation. Although the applicant sought general assistance, the Court granted the narrower form it considered justified [9], [11]. The decision does not change the terms of r 7.36 or provide a comprehensive interpretation of every part of r 7.37. Its reasoning is limited to the referral sought and the circumstances described in the judgment.
At [8], the judgment adopts the principle that “Mere satisfaction that a litigant cannot otherwise obtain legal assistance is an insufficient reason.” In plain English, being unable to pay for a lawyer or find another source of help matters, but it does not decide the application on its own. The court must still assess whether a referral serves the administration of justice.
Also at [8], the judgment states that pro bono assistance is “a valuable and scarce resource” and that the court has a responsibility to use it carefully. This explains why the referral scheme is not treated as a general substitute for privately retained representation. The utility of the particular referral is relevant.
The judgment’s central application is at [9]: “Upon the material before me, the applicant’s case does not reveal merit. Nevertheless, an important consideration is that the appeal is still at an early stage.” In plain English, the Court did not see apparent merit on the material before it, but it considered that the timing of the appeal left room for advice to have practical value before further steps in the appeal.
Price AJA then explained the possible value of advice: it might lead to “unnecessary or futile litigation being avoided” or to claims being “properly pleaded if they are considered viable” [9]. This is a conditional explanation of why a limited advice referral could serve the interests of justice. It does not state that any claim was in fact viable, nor that the applicant would succeed.
Finally, at [9], the Court said it was in the interests of justice to make an order “confined to the provision of advice in relation to the proceedings.” In practical terms, the order granted assistance for advice, not an unrestricted entitlement to representation.
This decision is most directly relevant to applications under r 7.36 where a litigant is self-represented, seeks pro bono help in an appeal, and can identify both difficulty obtaining assistance and a potential utility for legal advice. The features that mattered here included the stated complexity of the proceedings, limited or no funds, inability to obtain assistance elsewhere, and the early stage of the appeal [2], [6], [9].
The judgment is particularly relevant where the court is not persuaded that the case presently reveals merit, but advice could help clarify whether claims are viable, identify defects, or prevent unnecessary litigation. It demonstrates that the apparent absence of merit and the possible value of advice are not necessarily mutually exclusive considerations [8]–[9].
It should not be read as establishing an automatic entitlement to a referral based on financial hardship, complexity, self-representation, or an early procedural stage. The judgment expressly recites that inability to obtain legal assistance is insufficient on its own [8]. Nor does it establish that a pro bono referral will always be appropriate for an appeal involving several earlier decisions. The order was based on the material and procedural posture before Price AJA.
The judgment may also be relevant where a litigant is subject to a vexatious proceedings order made in another matter. Here, the Court considered that the order did not appear to constrain the particular motion, but it did so briefly and by reference to Potier [10]. The decision does not supply a general account of the scope or effect of such orders.
The supplied judgment contains no later judicial treatment of Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2026] NSWCA 25. It is dated 9 March 2026, and the material provided does not identify subsequent cases citing or applying it. Accordingly, no conclusion about how later courts have treated this decision can be drawn from the judgment text alone.
The judgment itself describes the earlier authorities it considered. It relies on the summary in Renshaw and discusses Allchin, which in turn referred to earlier Court of Appeal decisions on r 7.36 [8]. It also invokes Dafaalla for the possibility of a referral for advice even where a case appears to lack merit, if advice could help avoid unnecessary litigation [8]–[9]. Those are the authorities’ treatment in this decision, not subsequent treatment of Sanjiv.
For research purposes, the key precedential contribution visible from the judgment is therefore an illustration of the established r 7.36 principles in a particular procedural setting. The source does not support claims about later approval, distinction, limitation or reversal.
The judgment does not explain in detail why the case did not reveal merit. It expressly states that conclusion but does not set out the underlying merits analysis, instead referring to the fuller history in earlier judgments [5], [9]. The available text therefore does not permit a reader to identify which particular claims, grounds or defects informed that assessment.
Nor does the judgment decide whether any claim could ultimately be properly pleaded. It says advice might assist with proper pleading if claims were considered viable [9]. That is a possible benefit of advice, not a determination that viable claims existed.
The decision also does not describe how the referral process would unfold in practice. Rule 7.36 provides that the Registrar must attempt to arrange assistance and may terminate the referral if assistance cannot be arranged within 28 days [7]. The order itself sends the applicant to the Registrar; the judgment does not state whether a practitioner accepted the referral or what advice was later provided.
Finally, the treatment of the Vexatious Proceedings Order is expressed cautiously: the present motion did not “appear” to be constrained by its terms [10]. The judgment does not set out the terms of that order or decide a broader question about the interaction between the Vexatious Proceedings Act and pro bono referral applications. Its statement should therefore be understood as confined to the motion before Price AJA and the material then available.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on, relying on, or using this analysis, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2026] NSWCA 25
Hearing dates: 9 March 2026
Date of orders: 9 March 2026
Decision date: 09 March 2026
Before: Price AJA
Decision: (1) Pursuant to r 7.36 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) the applicant is referred to the Court of Appeal Registrar for referral to a barrister or solicitor on the Pro Bono Panel for the provision of advice in relation to the proceedings.
Catchwords: CIVIL PROCEDURE – application for pro bono referral – where proceedings at an early stage – whether referral in the interests of the administration of justice – referral confined to the provision of advice
Legislation Cited: Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 7.36, 7.37
Cases Cited: Allchin v Hunter Water Corporation (No 2) [2024] NSWCA 315
Dafaalla v Concord Repatriation General Hospital [2007] NSWSC 602
Potier v Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales [2014] NSWCA 256
Renshaw v New South Wales Lotteries Corporation Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 41
Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd (No 2) [2025] NSWSC 908
Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2024] NSWSC 1675
Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 1422
Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 528
Sanjiv v Shah [2026] NSWSC 139
Category: Procedural rulings
Parties: Rekha Sanjiv (Applicant) (self-represented)
Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd (Respondent)
Representation: Counsel:
Self-represented (Applicant)
No appearances (Respondent)
Solicitors:
Wotton Kearney (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2025/465371
Publication restriction: Nil
PRICE AJA: By notice of motion filed on 3 March 2026, the applicant, Rekha Sanjiv, seeks an order pursuant to r 7.36 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (“UCPR”), for referral to a barrister or solicitor on the Pro Bono Panel for legal assistance. The applicant is presently self-represented.
The applicant relies on two affidavits in support of the motion, the first affirmed on 25 February 2026 (“first affidavit”) and the second affirmed on 4 March 2026 (“second affidavit”). In her second affidavit, the applicant states the following reasons why she requires the referral for pro bono assistance: that the proceedings are complex; that she has no money or limited funds to obtain legal representation; that legal assistance from another source is unobtainable; and that the referral is in the interests of the administration of justice referring to the applicable principles under r 7.36 of the UCPR.
The respondent, a law firm, Coleman Greig Lawyers, did not appear this morning before me and has not taken an active role in either opposing or consenting to the applicant’s motion.
The applicant’s notice of intention to appeal filed on 1 December 2025, appears to involve a number of successive proceedings as being the subject of her appeal. This includes two decisions of Meek J, the first was a motion heard on 10 December 2024, where his Honour delivered an ex tempore judgment dismissing the applicant’s summons with costs: Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2024] NSWSC 1675. The second was a comprehensive judgment delivered on 26 May 2025, where his Honour dismissed the applicant’s summons: Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 528. There is further an appeal from the decision of McGrath J delivered on 13 August 2025, where his Honour dismissed the applicant’s application to set aside or vary Meek J’s judgment: Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd (No 2) [2025] NSWSC 908. The appeal also involves a decision of Harrison CJ at CL: Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 1422.
The substantive proceedings to which this application relates arise from various proceedings initiated by the applicant against the respondent, who were her legal advisers during a dispute in the Family Court of Australia. The factual background and history of litigation between the parties have been comprehensively detailed in the judgments of Meek J, McGrath J and Harrison CJ at CL and it is not necessary to be repeated.
The applicant’s appeal is listed for directions on 13 April 2026, the summons seeking leave to appeal was filed on 26 February 2026.
“7.36 Referral to a barrister or solicitor
(1) If satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice, the court may, by order, refer a litigant to the registrar for referral to a barrister or solicitor on the Pro Bono Panel for legal assistance.
(2) For the purposes of subrule (1), the court may take into account—
(a) the means of the litigant, and
(b) the capacity of the litigant to obtain legal assistance outside the scheme, and
(c) the nature and complexity of the proceedings, and
(d) any other matter that the court considers appropriate.
(2A) The court may not refer a litigant for assistance under this rule if the litigant has obtained assistance under a previous referral at any time during the immediately preceding period of 3 years unless the court is satisfied that there are special reasons that justify a further referral.
(3) The power to refer may be exercised in the absence of the public and without any attendance by or on behalf of any person.
(4) If a litigant is referred for assistance under this rule, the registrar must attempt to arrange for legal assistance to be provided to the litigant by a barrister or solicitor on the Pro Bono Panel.
(4A) If the registrar is unable to arrange legal assistance for a litigant who is referred under this rule within 28 days after the litigant’s referral, the registrar may make an order terminating the litigant’s referral.
(5) The registrar may refer a litigant to a particular barrister or solicitor only if the barrister or solicitor has agreed to accept the referral.
(6) A referral to a barrister does not prevent a referral also being made to a solicitor and a referral to a solicitor does not prevent a referral also being made to a barrister.”
“[12] The principles guiding the discretion to make a referral under r 7.36 of the UCPR have been considered in a number of decisions of this Court, including, in recent times, in Iqbal v Hotel Operations Solutions Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 88; Amgad v Cairns [2022] NSWCA 101 and Young v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2022] NSWCA 133. Each of those decisions referred with approval to what Brereton JA said regarding r 7.36 of the UCPR in [Renshaw], which included the following passage (omitting the footnotes):
‘[10] The essential test for making a referral for pro bono assistance under the rule is that it be in the ‘interests of the administration of justice’ to do so. Mere satisfaction that a litigant cannot otherwise obtain legal assistance is an insufficient reason. As subrule (2) contemplates, it is relevant to consider the person’s means, needs and capacity, the nature of the proceedings, and the likely availability and utility of legal assistance.
[11] Moreover, pro bono assistance is a valuable and scarce resource, dependent on the goodwill of members of the legal profession, which should not be lightly dissipated. The Court has a responsibility to husband this resource carefully. The obligations undertaken by a lawyer who accepts a referral import a concomitant obligation on the Court to exercise discretion in the making of referrals. As I said in Dafaalla v Concord Repatriation General Hospital [[2007] NSWSC 602]:
‘The success of the scheme is dependent upon the support of the profession, and the obligations which are undertaken by a lawyer on the pro-bono panel import a concomitant obligation on the Court to exercise discretion in the grant of referral certificates. While, by r 66A.1(4), a referral does not indicate that the Court has formed an opinion on the merits of a litigant’s case, the Court should ordinarily be reluctant to grant certificates in respect of matters that appear to be without merit. That is not to say that a referral should never be made in a case apparently lacking merit: for example, it may well be appropriate to grant a certificate, for the limited purpose of obtaining advice, in a case without legal merit, where there is some prospect that the advice will assist the litigant to understand the defects in the case, so that unnecessary litigation may be avoided.’
[12] While referral for legal assistance does not reflect any opinion on the merits of a litigant’s case, normally the Court will want to see some signs of merit in a case before making a referral; absent merit, referral will rarely be ‘in the interests of the administration of justice’. In some cases, the possibility that examination of the case by a competent practitioner will reveal merit may suffice. In still others, apparently devoid of merit, the Court may grant a referral for the purposes of advice, if there is a prospect that such advice may assist the litigant to appreciate the defects in the case, with the result that unnecessary and futile litigation may be avoided. However, it would be a misuse of this valuable resource to grant a referral to a litigant whose case is devoid of apparent merit simply to make the Court’s task in dealing with the litigant easier.’
[13] There is no question that it would be to the advantage of the Court if the appellant were represented by Counsel. However, as Basten JA said in Lane v Northern NSW Local Health District (No 2) [2014] NSWCA 32 at [8]:
‘It is true that in every case this Court benefits from the availability of professional legal assistance, however it is not always available and there are limits to the cases in which this Court can impose upon members of the Bar to provide assistance without return by way of fee’.”
Upon the material before me, the applicant’s case does not reveal merit. Nevertheless, an important consideration is that the appeal is still at an early stage. In my view, it is in the interests of justice that the applicant receives professional legal assistance on the merits of her appeal before it proceeds further, especially where that advice may lead to unnecessary or futile litigation being avoided or her claims being properly pleaded if they are considered viable: Renshaw at [12]; Dafaalla v Concord Repatriation General Hospital [2007] NSWSC 602 at [9] (Brereton J). Although the applicant seeks a general referral for legal assistance, I am satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to make an order confined to the provision of advice in relation to the proceedings: r 7.37 of the UCPR.
An unusual development arose last Friday evening, 6 March 2026, when an order was made by Ierace J under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) against the applicant in a different proceeding: Sanjiv v Shah [2026] NSWSC 139. The present motion does not appear to be constrained by the terms of that Vexatious Proceedings Order: see, eg, Potier v Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales [2014] NSWCA 256.
Accordingly, I make the following order:
Pursuant to r 7.36 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) the applicant is referred to the Court of Appeal Registrar for referral to a barrister or solicitor on the Pro Bono Panel for the provision of advice in relation to the proceedings.
**********
Sanjiv
Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2026] NSWCA 25
The applicant was referred to the Court of Appeal Registrar for referral to a barrister or solicitor on the Pro Bono Panel for the provision of advice in relation to the proceedings, pursuant to r 7.36 UCPR.