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[2026] FWC 812
General information, not legal advice.
Fair Work Commission
2026-03-12
Original judgment source is linked above.
The Applicant was employed by Singapore Funds Corporation, which :
The correct respondent, if any, is Singapore Funds Corporation. Dr Rekha Nair and Mr Goh merely engaged the services of Singapore Funds Corporation and were not principals or employers of the Applicant.
[56] Dr Nair provided invoices which she purported evinced that she paid Medcallz Company $27,000.00 (AUD) for 'Contract /PO Ref Sally Koh' for a 'Service or Labor Description Rate' which included on at least one invoice, virtual receptionist salary, virtual practice manager salary, coding for medical AI, virtual medical transcriptionist to type note and medical records manager march'.
[57] Dr Goh explained in his Form F8A that the Applicant was 'hired from a Singaporean company that the we hired typing services from' and that the doctors had 'raised the concern that the Applicant had committed multiple typing errors leading to her dismissal from the Singaporean company'.
[59] By way of explaining these payments, Dr Goh said that if there were fees that Medcallz Company wanted him to pay, for example, for the purchase of a server, then he would help them and make payment, and he would pay one of their staff a 'top up' if there was a missed payment. When asked why he would be paying Ibrahim directly, Dr Goh gave evidence that he also paid Medcallz Company's fee. Dr Goh further noted that the direct payment to Ibrahim was the last direct payment to pay for the Applicant's last salary when the Singaporean company had terminated her contract.
[60] I turn then to the Applicant's assertion that prior to making this application, she had no knowledge of the Singaporean company - that is, she had never heard of a Singaporean company. There is some difficulty squaring her evidence with the documentary evidence provided. The Applicant made her application on 24 November 2025 but as of 10 November (presumedly 2025) the Applicant, through Ibrahim, sent a 'Formal Legal Demand' for unpaid wages to 'Medcallz Company'. On that same date, a Rachel Madison, Legal Counsel for Medcallz / Dr Robin Goh, responded to Ibrahim informing him that 'Medcallz' was a Singaporean-incorporated entity wholly owned by Singapore Funds Corporation, and not a personal business or sole proprietorship of Dr Goh. Given that Ibrahim responded to the Madison email on 10 November 2025, it cannot be said that Ibrahim was unaware that Medcallz purported to be a Singaporean company and as the representative of the Applicant, I consider it reasonable to impute that the Applicant similarly was, or ought to have been, aware, that as of 10 November 2026 that Medcallz Company purported to be a company registered in Singapore.
[62] I am unimpressed with the evidence of Dr Goh who gave evidence that notwithstanding having engaged the Medcallz Company to provide a 'Technology Licence' and 'Managed Services' and that Dr Nair was, apparently, paying Medcallz Company $27,000.00 a month for the service (as evinced by a Commonwealth Bank statement), he would nevertheless pay the workers purportedly hired by Medcallz Company in the circumstances he described.
[63] In short, I found Dr Goh to be a shambolic witness as was Dr Nair. As noted, it was only after the hearing that Dr Goh provided the contractual document in respect of Medcallz Company and the trust deed for 'The Trustee for the JSRS Trust'. Whether the opaqueness surrounding the Applicant's employment was deliberate or unintended (insofar as the First and Second Respondents are concerned), it is difficult to say. It struck me as very odd that Dr Goh purported to be a sole trader in circumstances where he had established a corporate vehicle as a trustee. Essentially however, there was simply a dearth of material upon which to premise any findings. Albeit I accept that Dr Goh was candid when he provided viva voce evidence to the effect that he had sought to outsource the performance of administrative work associated with a medical practice to avoid making superannuation contributions and providing leave to administrative employees.
[64] There is no written contract in evidence between the Applicant and Medcallz Company or between the Applicant and Dr Goh in the standard sense of the word. All I have is a series of WhatsApp messages between Dr Goh and the Applicant, the other documentary evidence referred to and the viva voce evidence of the witnesses. Where there is not a wholly written contract, it is necessary at the threshold level to identify the terms of the contract, the parties to it, and when it was formed. The question of whether an enforceable contract has been entered into depends upon an assessment of the intention of identified parties, viewed objectively, to voluntarily assume legally enforceable duties for real consideration.
[65] Contemporaneous documentation shows that Dr Goh established the 'timecamp' facility for the Applicant on or around 1 June (presumedly 2025), agreed to the Applicant's commencement of work on 1 June (presumedly 2025), instructed the Applicant in respect of work to be performed at a detailed level and expected those instructions to be followed, provided feedback directly to the Applicant in respect of her performance, informed the Applicant that her job was a risk (clearly he was positioned to inform her of that) and ultimately removed the Applicant from the WhatsApp group message therefore precluding the Applicant from obtaining further instruction with respect to work. One chain of WhatsApp messages between Dr Goh and the Applicant sets out Dr Goh stating:
[66] It is, in addition, apparent that Dr Goh made direct payment for the Applicant's services to Kuzman and Ibrahim, for reasons already detailed.
[67] Having considered the applicable principles, s 15AA of the Act, the totality of the relationship between the Applicant and Dr Goh, inclusive of control, and the Applicant and Dr Nair, and given the limited evidence before me, I nevertheless find that there was an employment relationship between the Applicant and 'Dr Goh' and that it was Dr Goh who terminated the Applicant's employment when he removed her from the WhatsApp group message and failed to assign further work to her.
[68] However, whether the employment relationship was established between Dr Goh as a sole trader, as he purported to be, or through 'Goh RGYH Pty Ltd' as the trustee for the JSRS Trust, noting that 'Dr Robin Yeong Goh' was both the beneficiary and principal under the JSRS Trust, and further noting that Goh RGYH Pty Ltd had purportedly contracted with Medcallz Company, on balance, I find it more likely than not that the employer of the Applicant was the corporate vehicle Goh RGYH Pty Ltd. It is difficult to reconcile Dr Goh's assertion of being a sole trader with the documentary evidence before me, and his evidence was far from convincing.
4 Extraterritorial application of the General Protections provisions
[70] In Milford, the Full Court of the Federal Court stated at paragraph [54]:
...For an application to be "made under" s 365, it must be made by a person described in s 365 and it must be made within the time prescribed or allowed under s 366(1). The opening phrase in s 368, "if an application has been made under s 365", incorporates both concepts. The words erect an essential precondition to the FWC's authority to perform both its conciliation function and its associated power to issue a certificate under s 368(3).
[72] If Milford is to be followed and understood in the context that whether a person is entitled to make the application requires the determination of the extra-territorial application of Part 3-1 of the Act, the question that would then appear to arise is whether the Applicant is a person entitled to make the application given she performed the work described in Egypt.
[74] Section 34(3) of the Act gives effect to regulations which prescribe extensions of the Act, or of specified provisions of the Act, beyond the outer limits of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf in respect of any "Australian employer" and any 'Australian-based employee'. Regulation 1.15F(4) of the Fair Work Regulations 2009 extends Part 3-1 to such employers and employees.
[75] The expression 'Australian employer' is defined in s 35 of the Act in the following terms:
(a) is a trading corporation formed within the limits of the Commonwealth (within the meaning of paragraph 51(xx) of the Constitution); or
(b) is a financial corporation formed within the limits of the Commonwealth (within the meaning of paragraph 51(xx) of the Constitution); or
(e) is a body corporate incorporated in a Territory; or
(f) carries on in Australia, in the exclusive economic zone or in the waters above the continental shelf an activity (whether of a commercial, governmental or other nature), and whose central management and control is in Australia; or
[76] An 'Australian-based employee' as that expression is defined in s 35(2) and (3), is stated as follows:
(2) An Australian - based employee is an employee:
(a) whose primary place of work is in Australia; or
(b) who is employed by an Australian employer (whether the employee is located in Australia or elsewhere); or
(3) However, paragraph (2)(b) does not apply to an employee who is engaged outside Australia and the external Territories to perform duties outside Australia and the external Territories.
[77] Given the medical services that Dr Goh provides and noting that he would appear to do so through a corporate vehicle, I am content to find that the Applicant's former employer falls within the definition of a 'trading corporation' as referred to in s 35(1)(a) of the Act. Further to this, I find that the alleged action taken against the Applicant was action taken by a constitutional corporation.
[78] However, it is far from obvious whether the Applicant is an 'Australian - based employee'. Whilst I have found that the Applicant was employed by an Australian employer (based on the limited evidence before me), it is less than clear whether s 35(3) operates so as to place the Applicant outside the scope of the definition of 'Australian-based employee' and thus beyond the geographical scope of the operation of the Act. It follows that the issue would now appear to be whether the Applicant was 'engaged outside of Australia'.
[79] I find that the Applicant was recruited by Goh RGYH Pty Ltd on the recommendation of a former worker of the medical practitioner(s). At that time, the Applicant was resident in Egypt and was employed to perform work in Egypt. The Applicant was employed by Goh RGYH Pty Ltd from 1 June 2025 until the Applicant was removed from the WhatsApp group message by Dr Goh on 10 November 2025. The Applicant has never attended Australia in person for recruitment or work purposes. It is therefore not in dispute that the Applicant at all times performed her duties outside Australia and its external territories.
[80] In Munjoma v Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust, the then Vice President made the following observations in relation to s 35(3) of the Act:
[38] The exclusion in s 35(3) has two limbs, both of which must be satisfied in order for the exclusion to operate. The first is that the employee is 'engaged outside Australia and the external Territories'. The second is that the engagement is to 'perform duties outside Australia and the external Territories'. It is clear that the second limb applies, since Dr Munjoma's duties under her contract of employment were to be performed primarily if not wholly in Nauru. The question therefore is whether it is manifest that the first limb also applies - that is, was Dr Munjoma 'engaged' outside of Australia?
[45] I do not find the respondent's argument that the expression 'engaged outside Australia and the external territories' refers to the performance rather than the formation of the employment persuasive. As earlier stated, the exclusion has two limbs. The second limb clearly refers to the purpose or function of the engagement of the employee as being to perform duties overseas. That is, it refers to the location where the employee's obligations under the contract of employment are to be performed. That being the case, the first limb of the exclusion - 'engaged outside Australia and the external Territories' - must have some separate and different work to do. The respondent's approach does not give it any separate work to do; it takes the first limb as also referring to the location of the performance of duties under the employment contract also. On that approach, the second limb becomes unnecessary verbiage.
[46] An approach which has the first limb of the exclusion referring to the location of the formation of the employment contract gives it separate and distinct work to do. It conforms to the ordinary meaning of the word 'engaged'. And because an employment relationship formed in Australia between an Australian employer and a person located in Australia at that time can be characterised as having a 'substantial connection to Australia', it conforms to the intention of the legislature as stated in paragraph of the explanatory memorandum."
[81] As was identified by the Boyce DP in Parimoo v Lake Resources NL ('Parimoo'), in Winter v GHD Services Pty Ltd, Heffernan J concluded:
The decision in Cohen's case [Cohen v iSOFT Group Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 49; (2013) 298 ALR 516] has been held to establish that there are two limbs to be considered. Firstly, the 'engagement outside' limb which requires identification of the location of formation of the contract and, secondly, 'the performance' limb dealing with the issue of whether the duties were to be performed outside Australia.
I accept the submission of the applicant that Cohen does not stand for the proposition that a party who is outside Australia when they append their signature to a contract is a person 'engaged outside Australia'. In that matter, as I have said, the contract was formed in Singapore. As a result, Dr Cohen was 'engaged outside Australia'. In this matter, the contract was formed in Australia. [22]
[82] It is clear that the second limb of s 35(3) applies, since the Applicant's duties under of employment contract were to be performed primarily if not wholly in Egypt.
[84] The Applicant communicated her acceptance of the employment contract when she sent her WhatsApp message to Dr Goh on 1 June 2025. The Applicant was therefore 'engaged' by Goh RGYH Pty Ltd at the time when the employment contract was made. The 'place' where the employment contract was made, and where the Applicant was thus engaged, was at the Respondent's registered place of business in Western Australia.
[85] It therefore follows that in the context of the Applicant's application under s 365 of the Act, the Applicant would appear to be an 'Australian-based employee' employed by an 'Australian employer' for the purpose of s 35(2)(b) of the Act, noting that the Applicant was not engaged by Goh RGYH Pty Ltd 'outside Australia' therefore rendering the exception in s 35(3) of the Act inapplicable.
[86] In view of my findings and conclusions as set out in this decision, the Respondents' jurisdictional objections are dismissed. The evidential onus that arises with such objections was not met.
[87] However, it is worth outlining s 370 of the Act, which, in setting out the pre-requisites for the making of a general protections court application, provides an overview of the next steps for the conduct of the Applicant's application:
A person who is entitled to apply under s 365 for the FWC to deal with a dispute must not make a general protections court application in relation to the dispute unless:
(i) the FWC has issued a certificate under paragraph 368(3)(a) in relation to the dispute;
(ii) the general protections court application is made within 14 days after the day the certificate is issued, or within such period as the court allows on an application made during or after those 14 days; or
(b) the general protections court application includes an application for an interim injunction.
[89] Finally, while I have determined the Applicant was dismissed by Goh RGYH Pty Ltd and is therefore entitled to apply under s 365 of the Act for the Commission to deal with her dismissal dispute, it should be noted that the Full Court in Milford made observations of the following nature regarding s 370 of the Act and the making of a general protections court application:
a) the Act establishes multiple alternate pathways for an applicant and prospective litigants;
b) s 370 of the Act is to be interpreted against the background that while the Commission may determine the question of a person's entitlement to make an application to it, this may not be conclusive; and
[90] That is, should the Applicant proceed to bring a general protections court application in circumstances where the conference held by the Commission does not result in the resolution of the dispute and the certificate under s 368(3)(a) has issued, the Respondents to the application are not necessarily precluded from again raising jurisdictional objections to the general protections court application.
[3] Coles Supply Chain Pty Ltd v Milford [2020] FCAFC 152; (2020) 279 FCR 591, 602 [51], special leave to appeal declined in [2021] HCASL 37 ('Milford').
[15] [2024] FWCFB 429, [46].
[16] [2025] FWCFB 2, [29].
[20] Munjoma v Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust [2013] FWC 3337, [33].
[22] [2023] FWC 2543, [17] quoting Winter v GHD Service Pty Ltd [2019] FCCA 775, [15], [24]
[23] Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation (No 3) [2016] FCA 196, [79].
[24] Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 368(1)-(2).
[26] Milford (n 3) 607 [74]-[75].
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
Sandra Kuzman
The Trustee for Nair Family Trust, Robin Goh [2026] FWC 812
(2013) 298 ALR 516
(2020) 279 FCR 591