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[2026] NSWSC 1089
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-09-10
Coleman J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Run Nation Championship Pty Ltd v Combat Sports Authority of New South Wales & Anor [2026] NSWSC 1089
Hearing dates: 8 September 2026
Date of orders: 10 September 2026
Decision date: 10 September 2026
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Coleman J
Decision: 1. The Amended Summons is dismissed
2. The plaintiff is to pay the defendants’ costs of the proceeding.
Catchwords: STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION — plaintiff seeking to quash a notice under s 62(1) of the Combat Sports Act 2013 (NSW) made by the NSW Combat Sports Authority — plaintiff is organiser of an event scheduled to be held on 12 September 2026 — whether the event involves a “combat sport” and is therefore a “combat sport contest” — whether the event would be excluded from the definition of “combat sport” by operation of clause 5(1)(d) of the Combat Sports Regulation 2014 (NSW) — whether the activity could properly be construed as being an “strike” or “hit” — consideration of the primary objective of the activity — summons dismissed
Legislation Cited: Combat Sports Act 2008 (NSW)
Combat Sports Act 2013 (NSW)
Combat Sports Regulation 2014 (NSW)
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v GSF Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 568; [2005] HCA 26
Palmanova Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] HCA 35; (2025) 99 ALJR 1362
Qantas Airways Ltd v Transport Workers Union of Australia [2023] HCA 27; (2023) 278 CLR 571
Will v Brighton (2020) 104 NSWLR 170; [2020] NSWCA 355
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Run Nation Championship Pty Ltd (ACN 690 321 343) (Plaintiff)
Combat Sports Authority of New South Wales (First Defendant)
Tracey Crowther (Second Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
B Quinn KC with Mr F Maghami and Mr C Honnery (Plaintiff)
C J Tran with R Haidairy (First Defendant)
Solicitors:
Longton Blackwell (Plaintiff)
Crown Solicitor’s Office NSW (First and Second Defendants)
File Number(s): 2026/00360133
Publication restriction: Nil
The plaintiff (Run Nation) is the organiser of an event which is scheduled to be held at the Randwick Racecourse on Saturday 12 September 2026. That event is billed as “Run Nation Championship 4” or “RNC 4”. The nature of the event is described below.
On 5 August 2026, Tracey Crowther (the second defendant) as delegate of the Combat Sports Authority of New South Wales (the Authority) issued a notice under s 62(1) of the Combat Sports Act 2013 (NSW) (the Act), directing Run Nation not to hold RNC 4. [1] The premise of the direction was that RNC 4 would be a “combat sports contest” as that term is defined in the Act, and there would likely be a contravention of the Act if the event was held.
On 31 August 2026, Run Nation approached Emmett J sitting as the duty judge and obtained orders for short service of the Summons and supporting affidavits. His Honour made further directions for the preparation of the matter and listed it for hearing on 8 September 2026.
As finally pressed at the hearing, [2] by way of relief sought in the Amended Summons, Run Nation seeks a declaration that the contest proposed to be held on 12 September 2026 at Royal Randwick Racecourse is not a “combat sport contest” within the meaning of Schedule 3 to the Act.
An order is also sought pursuant to s 69(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) quashing the decision of the delegate of 5 August 2026. The grounds for seeking this order were in essence that the contest to be held does not involve a “combat sport” and is not a “combat sport contest” as defined in the Act. It is asserted, therefore, that the decision of the delegate to issue the notice on 5 August 2026 was ultra vires.
Counsel for the Authority, Mr Tran, told the Court that if it was held that the activity at RNC 4 on 12 September 2026 would not be a “combat sport” and the Act therefore did not apply, the Authority would withdraw the notice of 5 August 2026. This would obviate the need to consider the relief under s 69 of quashing the decision of the delegate.
It can be seen, therefore, that the questions in this case are narrow:
The first question is whether the RNC 4 event to be held next Saturday involves a “combat sport” and is therefore a “combat sport contest” so as to come within the ambit of the Act.
If so, the second question is whether RNC 4 would be excluded from the definition of “combat sport” by operation of clause 5(1)(d) of the Combat Sports Regulation 201**4 (NSW) (the Regulation).
I note that the second defendant makes a submitting appearance.
The matter was prepared and heard with urgency by reason of RNC 4 being scheduled for 12 September 2026, just 4 days after the hearing. I have endeavoured to refer to as much of the evidence as possible and expose my reasons as fully as I can within the time available to prepare the judgment for delivery as quickly as I was able.
(a) to promote the health and safety of combat sport contestants; (b) to promote the integrity of combat sport contests; (c) to regulate combat sport contests on a harm minimisation basis; and (d) to promote the development of the combat sport industry.
The Act requires a “combatant” who takes part in a “combat sport contest” to be registered, [4] and persons who organise or hold a “combat sport contest” to hold a permit to do so. [5] It may be a criminal offence to hold such a contest without a permit. [6]
The Authority supervises and regulates combat sports in New South Wales. It provides advice to the Minister on matters related to combat sports and the Act, and promotes awareness of issues relating to combat sports. [7] Under Division 4 of the Act, the Authority can give a direction not to hold a combat sport contest if it is of the opinion that there is likely to be a contravention of the Act, the Regulation, or rules if the direction is not given. [8] A person subject to a direction must not, without reasonable excuse, fail to comply with the direction, or may face fines and/or imprisonment. [9]
Schedule 3 to the Act contains a dictionary which defines words used in the Act. [10] Relevantly, the following terms are defined:
combat sport means any sport, martial art or activity in which the primary objective of each combatant in a contest, display or exhibition of that sport, martial art or activity is to strike, kick, hit, grapple with, throw or punch one or more other combatants, but does not include a sport, martial art or activity that is prescribed by the regulations.
combat sport contest means a contest, display or exhibition of combat sport—
(a) to which the public are admitted on payment of a fee, or
(b) arranged or held on a for profit basis, or
(c) that is held on premises licensed under the Liquor Act 2007 or the Casino Control Act 1992, or
(d) where at least one of the combatants is competing for a monetary prize or other valuable reward, or
(e) that is prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this definition,
but does not include a contest, display or exhibition excluded from this definition by the regulations.
…
combatant means a person who engages or proposes to engage as a contestant in a combat sport contest. …
3 Definitions
(1) In this Regulation—
…
protective material means any clothing or equipment that is worn or used by a combatant in a combat sport contest to protect the combatant and may include, but is not limited to, the following—
(a) a mouth guard,
(b) gloves,
(c) padding,
(d) taping,
(e) a chest guard,
(f) a groin guard.
sports rules, in relation to a combat sport, means rules made or adopted by any organisation, group or other person concerned with the combat sport, being the rules under which the combat sport is held.
the Act means the Combat Sports Act 2013.
5 Other sports, martial arts and activities not included in definition of “combat sport”
(1) For the purposes of the definition of combat sport in section 4 (1) of the Act, the following sports, martial arts or activities are prescribed as not being included within the definition—
…
(d) sports, martial arts or activities the relevant sports rules of which do not allow any contact to be made to the head of a person engaged in the sport, martial art or activity and require that all strike zones on the body of a person are fully protected by use of protective material,
…
The Court received evidence by way of affidavits from several deponents. It also heard oral evidence. Some of the affidavit evidence was not relevant to the task of statutory construction. A clear example of this is the evidence going to the risk of commercial losses to the plaintiff and those that financially support it if RNC 4 could not proceed on 12 September 2026. [11] There was no objection to the Court receiving that evidence and it was admitted. It is not necessary to refer to it.
I will first summarise the evidence of Mr Tremaine Fernandez, CEO of the plaintiff. I will then provide relevant details of the Run Nation Championship Official Competition Code Version 3.1 (the Code) annexed to Mr Fernandez’s affidavit. It is accepted by the parties that this document constitutes the rules under which RNC 4 would operate should it proceed on 12 September 2026.
Mr Fernandez, in his affidavit affirmed 31 August 2026, deposes that he is the founder, CEO and sole director of Run Nation. He also made a further affidavit on 7 September 2026. He gives evidence as to the background of the foundation of the company and three events it has previously held. The last of which, RNC 3, was held in May of 2026 in Queensland.
He describes the upcoming event as a “one-on-one athletic contest” conducted on a marked lane 1.75 metres wide. In each exchange, or run, “one athlete (Runner) seeks to advance down the lane carrying a ball, and the other athlete (Defender) seeks to halt that advance with a tackle of the kind used in rugby league and rugby union”. [12]
As I have mentioned, he annexes to his affidavit the “current version” of the Code. [13] This is version 3.1 of that document. Despite it stating it “Draft. For internal and legal review prior to publication”, [14] Mr Fernandez gave evidence that this was the final and approved version of the document which will govern RNC 4.
Mr Fernandez says that Run Nation’s rules have been designed and continually refined with athlete safety as the primary design constraint. He says the sport is materially different and safer than informal “run it straight” style challenges which were the first iteration of the sport in 2025. [15] In his oral evidence, he said he had brought in former National Rugby League player, Sandor Earl, to assist in the modification of the rules. He said he wanted to base RNC on the “off the back fence” type of runs and collisions in rugby league. [16]
Mr Fernandez deposes to rule changes following two incidents at the second event held by Run Nation (RNC 2) which resulted in the athletes having concussions. [17] He discusses how participants are recruited and screened, at events called “combines” before they can engage in the events. [18]
He deposes to the fact that each of the athletes are covered by workers’ compensation insurance for injuries that may be sustained while competing. [19]
Mr Fernandez refers to protective equipment that is now mandated for each athlete to wear under their playing uniform. For the upcoming event, that is the Gilbert XP 1000 body armour. [20] There are expert reports dealing with this equipment to which reference will be made later in these reasons. Mr Fernandez sets out a medical and athlete welfare framework which he says Run Nation has implemented, including neurological assessment checks before, during, and after an event. [21]
With respect to the Code, Mr Fernandez says at [43]-[44] of his affidavit:
43. The Championship is conducted under the Code, a structured written instrument which governs following: eligibility and athlete registration; weight/size matching; match format; scoring; prohibited acts and sanctions; equipment; medical requirements; officials’ powers; and disciplinary procedures.
- The Code is administered by myself in connection with advice from medical advisers, coaches, important input from… an ex-NRL player… to a lesser extent referees. The Code is reviewed as frequently as required with input and data from the sources I have just referred to being a crucial part of the ongoing review process.
It is relevant to set out in more detail certain provisions of the Code that is annexed to Mr Fernandez’s affidavit (and in the Court Book) and about which he gave evidence. The Code will be the governing document for the upcoming RNC 4. What is below is a summary of the Code’s provisions. References are to the pages of the Court Book where that part of the Code can be found.
Section 3 of the Code deals with the contest structure. [25] The contest is between two athletes. The contest structure is that there are two exchanges for each contest. An exchange consists of one ball run and one defence, such that in each contest an athlete will run the ball on two occasions and defend on two occasions. Competitors alternate lanes after each exchange.
Section 4 of the Code sets out the scoring system. [26] The scoring system for the competition follows the contest principle that:
Every exchange is a contest for forward momentum and ground.
The runner’s objective is to advance the ball through their lane.
The tackler’s objective is to halt that advance using approved technique.
Judges score who won the momentum contest, not the contact itself.
The “core scoring model” is a 10-point scoring system. The athlete who wins the exchange is awarded 10 points. The opposing athlete is awarded 10, 9 or 8 points based on momentum outcome, tackle control and ball security. A 10-10 exchange is permitted when no clear advantage is demonstrated. [27] At the end of each contest, if the athletes are even, a “sudden death” run takes place to determine the winner.
The “judging hierarchy” is expressed as follows: [28]
Judges must assess each exchange using the following hierarchy, in order:
Momentum Outcome
Tackle Control
Ball Security
Field Position, as a secondary modifier only
Field position must never override momentum outcome, tackle control and ball security.
“Momentum Outcome” is described as the highest priority judging factor. [29] It identifies which athlete wins the contest for forward momentum and ground. If the runner maintains forward momentum through the contact with the other athlete and continues to advance, that athlete wins the advantage. If the tackle halts or reverses the ball runner’s forward momentum, the tackler wins the advantage.
A grounding of an athlete immediately determines the tackle outcome. A grounding is defined as being “[a]ny body part other than the feet contacting the field as a direct result of the tackle” or “[s]tructural collapse preventing immediate recovery”. If a grounding occurs, the athlete who caused the grounding wins the tackle. In that scenario, the score must be 10-8 (the highest possible score). The Code states that field position is irrelevant in grounding scenarios. [30]
If no grounding occurs, then the judges must assess tackle control. “Tackle Control” refers to advantage in the contest for momentum. Indicators include redirection or halting of forward momentum, “displacement” of the opposing athlete, control of posture, balance and direction following contact, and sustained leg drive through contact. Control determines whether the exchange is scored 10-9 or progresses to further evaluation.
“Ball Security” means that the runner must maintain control of the ball throughout the tackle. [31] Loss of ball control as a direct result of the tackle means the tackler wins the exchange. Clean ball retention under contact may support a higher assessment for the runner.
As has been referred to, field position is a secondary modifier only. It is considered only after the momentum outcome, tackle control and ball security have been assessed. The code provides that field position refers to where the tackle occurs relative to the Tackle Zone. A tackle on the defending athlete side of the Tackle Zone may support a higher control assessment, whereas a tackle on the ball running athlete’s side of the Tackle Zone does not negate control. It is stated that field position cannot override a grounding, override clear tackle control, or convert a losing tackle into a winning score. The Code states that “[f]ield position exists to contextualise tackles, not to determine winners”. [32]
Section 5 of the Code sets out the field specifications, lane and field layout, and relevant markings. [33] Each athlete must begin each exchange from the Start Zone and crossing the Centre Line of the lane is strictly governed. There is an Engagement Line, being the point at which the defender may legally cross the centre line to initiate contact with the runner. Tackles are expected to take place in the Tackle Zone. No contact can take place in the Dead Zone, being the area outside the active lane. Mr Fernandez said in evidence that one of the significant changes made to the Code since the last RNC event was to shorten the distance between the runner and the defender to minimise speed and impact when they engage in the tackle. [34]
Section 6 includes post tackle procedure. [35] Following the completion of a tackle, any referee review for penalties, and separation, the athletes must reset for continuation. Each athlete has 60 seconds to return to the assigned Start Zone after the referee’s signal. Athletes must return to the Start Zone under their own power without assistance from referees, coaches or their corners. Failure to return to the Start Zone within 60 seconds results in the referee stopping the contest and the opposing athlete winning that contest.
Any athlete who is grounded or dropped during a tackle must undergo a medical assessment. This is conducted by a doctor immediately upon the athletes returning to the Start Zone. The assessment must occur before the next exchange takes place. Failure to clear the medical assessment then awarded to the other athlete.
Section 7 of the Code is the “Code of Conduct” for athletes. [36] It includes a prohibition on “unsporting behaviour”. Engaging in unsporting behaviour “may result in official intervention or disciplinary action and include any form or attempt to strike, hit, punch, grapple, throw, lift, kick or any other type of physical contact including any attempts to instigate a blow or exert physical dominance other than the anticipated tackle as permitted under the contest”.
Section 8 of the Code also has safety protocols and description of protective equipment. [37] It prescribes that mouthguards are mandatory. Protective uniforms are also mandatory and will be supplied by Run Nation. Headgear is recommended but the choice whether to wear it remains with the competitor. There is a prohibition of jewellery of any kind including necklaces and earrings, and no metal studs are permitted. Shoulder strapping is mandatory and will be checked by a designated physio prior to warm up.
The mandatory uniform includes mandatory protective equipment. It is the Gilbert XP 1000 vest. There is to be pre-event equipment inspection, and the mandatory uniform must be worn in the correct manner, failing which athletes will be removed from the event.
The Code also prescribes defensive tackle techniques and standards in Section 8. Defenders must initiate contact with controlled forward intent, and defensive posture must prioritise stability, balance and head safety. Defenders are responsible for maintaining legal body position throughout the tackle. Squaring the chest to the ball runner to brace the contact is permitted. Leading with the shoulder is permitted “only when the head remains clear”. [38] Leg drive through contact is legal. Defenders may absorb, redirect, or stop forward momentum through legal body positioning.
Illegal defensive techniques are set out. No shoulder charges are allowed where the shoulder leads and the body is rotated towards a 90 degree angle. No direct contact to the head or neck and no contact below the hips. There is no contact outside the designated contact zone and no targeting of the knees or lower legs. There is no leading with the head. There is no lifting, twisting or driving after contact is established.
The legal tackle framework is that primary contact must occur within the legal contact zone: from the lower ribs to the base of the collarbone. Incidental contact between the hips and lower ribs is permitted only within a legal tackle action. Deliberate targeting outside of the legal contact zone is an “infringement”. Leg drive is permitted but the top of the tackler’s head must remain clear of the opponent’s body at contact.
The safety protocols deal with ball running tackle technique standards. Ball runners must not excessively rotate the upper body into contact. They must square their chest to the defender to brace for contact. No contacts permitted when the shoulder leads and has turned at a 90 degree angle towards the defender. Elbow lift that occurs after contact as a natural reaction is permitted. Bracing for contact is legal, but projecting the ball and forearm is not. Ball runners must brace for contact “with the intent to advance through the tackle”. Ball runners must not lift the lead leg unless it occurs as part of the natural running great and stride timing. No leading with the head. Head position must remain neutral and controlled at contact.
For carriage and security the ball must be carried on the inside arm, closest to the centre line. The runner must maintain control of the ball throughout the tackle. Loss of ball control as a direct result of the tackle scores the tackle to the defender.
The ball runner may lower the body height into contact when he does not drop into contact to bump the defender. Ball runners must initiate movement immediately on the start call. Stutter steps or hesitation within the start zone are not permitted.
The Code states that safety rulings are not part of judging criteria. Penalties, stoppages, and removals are enforced solely by officials and medical staff. Safety violations may result in immediate contest stoppage, disqualification, suspension, or removal from competition. Any athlete dropped to the field during a tackle is subject to mandatory medical assessment. Medical staff have full authority to stop a contest, remove an athlete, and enforce clearance protocols. Athletes must comply with medical instructions.
The Code states that where contact with the head or neck is suspected, the participant must not resume competition unless and until cleared by the medical and concussion management protocols.
By way of enforcement of contact and safety rules, the Code states that a referee must immediately stop, suspend or otherwise intervene in an exchange where the referee reasonably suspects:
(i) prohibited contact with the head or neck; (ii) contact initiated outside the permitted contact zone; (iii) dangerous, reckless, excessive or uncontrolled contact, (iv) a suspected injury, concussion or other medical concern; (v) non-compliance with mandatory protective equipment requirements; or (vi) that mandatory protective equipment is unavailable, displaced, damaged, incorrectly fitted, or no longer provides continuous coverage of the permitted contact zone. Further, a serious, reckless or repeated breach of the head and neck contact rule or permitted contact zone rule may result in immediate disqualification and suspension from future events.
The Authority read an affidavit of Ms Emma Moss affirmed 4 September 2026. She is a solicitor in the office of the Crown Solicitor who acts for the Authority. Ms Moss annexed prior versions of the Code, and the current version of the Code (although it had some differences with respect to the required protective equipment to that annexed to Mr Fernandez’s affidavit). Objection was taken to the receipt of the earlier versions of the Code on the grounds of relevance. I allowed them to be received and would afford them such weight as I considered appropriate. I do not take them into account for the purposes of construing the Act and whether the activity that was conducted under those rules was a combat sport. I do think they are relevant, however, to explain the nature of the activity and put context to Mr Fernandez’s evidence as to its evolution. They are also relevant to assist in construing the Code as it has evolved.
Ms Moss also deposes to meetings between the Authority and Run Nation on 29 May 2026, where the Authority informed Run Nation of its view that the activity at RNC 2 was a combat sport. [39]
Each party tendered a video of the last RNC event held, being RNC 3. [40] That event was held in May 2026 in Queensland.
Both parties showed me some contests from that event as recorded on the video. Although it was conducted under a different version of the Code, [41] Senior Counsel for the plaintiff did not identify any physical part of the contests from that event, including the tackles or contact between the competitors, that would be different under the current version of the Code. He accepted that the style of tackling and the general nature of the game had not changed. [42] There were differences as to how the event was scored, and some of the distances that the competitors run may have been changed.
It is accepted by both parties that the task at hand involves a construction of the Act to determine whether the activity at RNC 4 is a “combat sport” within the meaning of the Act. I mention below some of the relevant principles to be kept in mind in undertaking the task of statutory construction.
In Palmanova Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] HCA 35; (2025) 99 ALJR 1362, it was said at [4]-[6]: [43]
[4] Statutory construction is the process of attributing meaning to statutory text. The construction of a statutory provision begins and ends with the statutory text understood in context and in light of the statutory purpose — being what the provision is designed to achieve in fact — insofar as that purpose is discernible from the statutory text and context…
[5] That being the nature of the task to which the process is directed, the “modern approach“ to statutory construction, as was explained nearly 30 years ago in CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd in a statement repeated and endorsed many times since: “(a) insists that the context be considered in the first instance, not merely at some later stage when ambiguity might be thought to arise, and (b) uses ‘context‘ in its widest sense to include such things as the existing state of the law and the mischief which, by legitimate means … , one may discern the statute was intended to remedy”…
[6] …Understanding context, including so much of the context as might be revealed by extrinsic material, “has utility if, and in so far as, it assists in fixing the meaning of the statutory text”. Focus on the statutory text is not to the exclusion of extrinsic material that has the potential to assist in fixing its meaning.
In so far as the task is construing the definition of “combat sport”, the proper course with a definition section is to “read the words of the definition into the substantive enactment and then construe the substantive enactment”. [44] The definition, or part of the definition, is to be read with the rest of the statute in the context in which it appears and considering the objects of the act as a whole. [45]
Care must be taken not to place too heavy reliance on the definition of words in dictionaries. In Will v Brighton (2020) 104 NSWLR 170; [2020] NSWCA 355 at [52]-[57], Bell P considered the use of dictionaries as an aid in statutory construction. His Honour noted that the authorities indicated that:
Focussing on the definition of a particular word or words in a dictionary may detract from the need to attend to the meaning of the words of a statutory provision as a whole and the meaning of the whole statutory provision in the wider context of the Act: see Thiess v Collector of Customs (2014) 250 CLR 664; [2014] HCA 12 at [23] (Thiess); Residual Assco Group Ltd v Spalvins (2000) 202 CLR 629; [2000] HCA 33 at [27]; 2 Elizabeth Bay Road Pty Ltd v Owners — Strata Plan No 73943 (2014) 88 NSWLR 488; [2014] NSWCA 409 at [81] (2 Elizabeth Bay Road); Smalley v Motor Accidents Authority of New South Wales (2013) 85 NSWLR 580; [2013] NSWCA 318 at [47]–[48] (Smalley).
Dictionaries will often supply a range of meanings for a particular word and consultation of a dictionary will supply no guidance to the meaning of the word or words which the legislature intended: see Federal Cmr of Taxation v BHP Billiton Ltd (2011) 244 CLR 325; [2011] HCA 17 at [49]; South Western Sydney Local Health District v Gould (2018) 97 NSWLR 513; [2018] NSWCA 69 at [78] (Gould); House of Peace Pty Ltd v Bankstown City Council (2000) 48 NSWLR 498; [2000] NSWCA 44 at [28].
Accepting that the use of dictionaries is rarely determinative in ascertaining the meaning of a term in a statute where there is doubt as to its scope, dictionaries may supply some assistance in the interpretation of a statutory provision or at least the identification of a range of possible meanings: see 2 Elizabeth Bay Road, Gould, Smalley and Thiess*.*
The injunction not to “make a fortress out of the dictionary” (Cabell v Markham 148 F 2d 737 at 739 (2nd Cir 1945)) does not disclaim the value of the use of dictionaries entirely, or render such reference irrelevant to the exercise of statutory construction. It simply warns that dictionaries are not a substitute for the ordinary process of statutory construction, taking into account the broader context of the relevant provisions: see, for example, Provincial Insurance Australia Pty Ltd v Consolidated Wood Products Pty Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 541 at 560, citing Life Insurance Co of Australia Ltd v Phillips (1925) 36 CLR 60 at 78; [1925] HCA 18.
As Leeming JA acknowledged in Gould at [81] that, while a dictionary may be of assistance “if a question truly arises as to the meaning of a word…”and “in identifying the full range of literal meanings a statute might bear”, “the court’s task is not accomplished by surveying the range of meanings found in a dictionary and choosing that which seems most apt”. This would be to abdicate the task, properly understood, of statutory construction.
With these principles in mind, I will set out a summary of the submissions of the parties and consider the construction of the Act.
It was accepted during submissions that of the verbs in the definition of “combat sport”, the relevant ones into which the activity to be conducted at RNC 4 may fall would be “strike” or “hit”. I accept this is the case.
The plaintiff submitted there are two questions in determining whether the definition of “combat sport” is met:
First, whether the activity in RNC 4 that is described in the Code as the tackle would be such that it falls within the definition of strike or hit? The plaintiff submits “no”; and
Second, even if the first question is answered yes, it must still be determined whether the primary objective of the activity in RNC 4 is to strike or hit the other competitor. The plaintiff submits “no”.
The plaintiff submits that the definition of “combat sport” is exhaustive and the activities are limited to those in the definition. It was submitted that the meaning of each of the verbs in the definition must be construed in light of the Act as a whole, reading the defined term into the relevant provisions of the Act. Relevantly, the plaintiff noted that a failure to comply with the direction given by the Authority under s 62(1) of the Act may result in a criminal sanction.
The plaintiff submitted that the ordinary meaning of “kick, punch, grapple with” are tolerably clear and not reasonably capable of capturing the contestants’ objectives in RNC 4. The plaintiff accepted, correctly in my view, that the meaning of “strike” and “hit” are more ambiguous and hold a range of potential meanings.
The plaintiff submitted that care should be taken in placing too heavy a reliance upon the dictionary definition of words which is not a substitute for the ordinary process of statutory construction which focuses on the statutory text understood in its context. It was submitted that the Court should strive to give meaning to every word of the definition of “combat sport” which requires not giving any of the words an overly broad construction that would render any of the alternative verbs insignificant or redundant. It submitted that a wide construction of the words that are ambiguous (for example “strike” or “hit”) risks criminalising a collision sport that is not within the purview of the Act. The plaintiff noted that the absence of any collision sports from the list of excluded sports under Schedule 1 of the Regulation, which is confined to martial arts or fighting activities that would otherwise have been captured by the Act.
The plaintiff submitted that a proper analysis of the activities to be undertaken in RNC 4 are that the competitors engage in a tackle which, in its ordinary understanding, is not a “strike” or “hit”. The plaintiff submits that the Authority has selected marginal and unorthodox definitions from dictionaries that extend beyond the ordinary and natural meaning of these words. It was also submitted that the Authority’s construction does not conform with a contextual reading of the definition.
The plaintiff submits that it could not be found that the conduct required and permitted by the Code could be held to be within the definition of being a “combat sport”.
The plaintiff referred to the fact of the Act replacing the Combat Sports Act 2008 (NSW) which had the objective of regulating “professional combat sports, and wrestling and amateur combat sports contest”. The plaintiff referred to the definition of “combat sport” in s 3 of the 2008 Act which was relevantly:
… (c) any sport, martial art or activity in which each contestant in a contest, display or exhibition of that sport, art or activity is required to strike, kick, hit, grapple with, throw or punch one or more other contestants and that is prescribed by the regulations… (Emphasis added.)
The necessity of “required to” in that definition is in contradistinction to the definition in the Act which looks at the “primary objective of each combatant in a contest” being to strike, kick, hit, grapple with, throw or punch one or more other combatants. The plaintiff emphasised that even if it could be held that conduct required and allowed under the Code could properly be construed as being an “strike” or “hit”, it could not be found that this was the primary objective of each of the competitors. It was submitted that to satisfy the definition in the Act, the primary objective must be the same and coincident for each competitor. Put another way, there must be a mutuality and simultaneity of that primary objective being held by each of the combatants. [46]
The plaintiff submitted that the primary objective of the ball runner and the primary objective of the defender were different. It submitted the primary objective of the ball runner was to advance the ball through the lane and maintain forward momentum through the contact whilst maintaining control of the ball, thus achieving a better “momentum outcome” by running through the tackle. The primary objective of the defender was to halt the momentum of the ball runner (which does not require the grounding of the opponent) using approved tackle technique. Senior Counsel for the plaintiff noted that the Code prescribes that judges “score who won the momentum contest, not the contact itself”. He submitted, therefore, that the definition in the Act is not met.
Whilst accepting that it was a requirement of the Code that each of the competitors engage in a physical contact with their opponents by way of engaging in the tackle, and that avoiding the contact involved in a tackle was prohibited by the Code, it was submitted that the primary objective for each of the competitors was not the contact itself but gaining a better “momentum outcome” from that contact. This is reinforced by the scoring hierarchy set out in the Code.
Senior Counsel for the plaintiff also referred to that part of the Code which expressly stated that “unsporting behaviour may result in official intervention or disciplinary action and includes any form or attempt to strike, hit, punch, grapple, throw, kick or any other type of physical contact including any attempt to instigate a blow or exit physical dominance other than the anticipated tackle as permitted under the contest”. He submitted that this explains that the conduct potentially constituting that which would fall within the definition of a “combat sport” is thereby expressly prohibited and categorised as unsporting behaviour. This, he submitted, tells strongly against such conduct being treated as an objective, let alone “the primary objective” as required so as to constitute a “combat sport” under the Act.
The plaintiff submitted that the definition in the Act is not satisfied.
The plaintiff submitted that if the Court was against it on this construction issue and determined that the activity to be conducted at RNC 4 was a “combat sport” within the meaning of the Act, then on a proper construction of regulation 5(1)(d), the activity would not be included within the definition. That is because the Code does not allow any contact to be made to the head of a person engaged in the sport or activity and requires that all strike zones on the body of a person are fully protected by use of protective material. The plaintiff referred to the definition of “protective material” in the Regulation which is set out at [14] above.
The plaintiff submitted that the reference to “strike zones” in the Regulation must refer to the parts of a combatant’s body with which contact may be made in accordance with the Code. Further, whilst the phrase “fully protected” is not defined in the Regulation, in circumstances where the object of the Act is to minimise harm – as opposed to avoid harm entirely, and to promote the development of the combat sport industry, “fully protected” or to be construed as operating as a barrier or shield to minimise the consequences of physical contact in the strike zones.
It was submitted that the Code prescribes that the legal primary contact zone for the legal tackle framework is from the lower ribs to the base of the collarbone. Incidental contact between the hips and lower ribs is permitted only within a legal tackle action and deliberate targeting outside the legal contact zone is an infringement.
It was submitted that the Code mandates protective equipment be worn by every athlete in each engagement. This includes a mouthguard and the Gilbert XP 1000. It was submitted that the Gilbert XP 1000 provides some protection to all areas of the strike zone and, therefore, it should be concluded that this amounts to all of the strike zones being fully protected within the meaning of the Regulation. Senior Counsel for the plaintiff accepted that having regard to the expert evidence, that there was not complete protection to all parts of the strike zones, but that the protection afforded by the Gilbert XP 1000 is sufficient to satisfy the Regulation.
It was submitted that the Code prescribed that direct contact with the head was prohibited. This was sufficient to satisfy the requirement in the Regulation. Insofar as there may be incidental contact to the head, which was not specifically prohibited in the Code, Senior Counsel for the plaintiff observed that under the Code, any contact with the head required medical assessment and was implicitly prohibited.
Counsel for the Authority said that three questions are raised:
First, is the primary objective of each participant in the sport or activity to be conducted in RNC 4 to strike, hit or throw the other participant within the meaning of the definition in the Act? If yes, then the activity is prima facie a “combat sport” under the Act. The Authority submits “yes”.
Second, does the Code permit contact to the head? If no, then the activity or sport may not be a “combat sport” due to regulation 5(1)(d). The Authority submits “yes”.
Third, does the requirement in the Code for participants to wear the Gilbert XP 1000 clothing mean that the Code requires that all strike zones on the body of a person be fully protected by use of protective material within the meaning of regulation 5(1)(d)? If yes, and if the second issue is answered “no”, then RNC 4’s activity is not an “combat sport”. The Authority submits “no”.
The Authority submitted that the words in the definition, including “strike” and “hit”, should be given their ordinary and natural meaning. Counsel for the Authority accepted in argument that the relevant verbs in the definition to be considered were those two. It was submitted that they are words of considerable breadth. He submitted that the context of the Act reinforce that no narrow meaning should be adopted.
Counsel submitted that the objects of the Act favour eschewing any narrow definition of “combat sport”. A purposive and beneficial approach to interpretation of the Act can extend to giving a broad interpretation of that phrase.
The Authority, whilst accepting that reference to dictionaries has limitations, said that they can be a useful starting point. It referred to the definition of “strike” which can mean “to come into forcible contact or collision with”. Further, it referred to the dictionary definition that to “hit” a person can mean to “collide with” or “crash into” them.
The Authority submits that the primary object of the activity to be undertaken at RNC 4 is for each participant to collide into the other with as much force as possible, ideally to knock them to the ground or else to knock them enough to alter their momentum in the opposite direction. This is supported by the fact that the Code provides the maximum 10-8 score is awarded when a run results in a “grounding”. A grounding is defined under the Code as being when “any body part other than the feet” contacts the field as a direct result of the tackle or “structural collapse preventing immediate recovery”.
If no grounding results from the contact, the Authority notes that the Code provides then that scoring goes on tackle control which is indicated by redirecting or halting the other person’s forward momentum and “displacement” of the opponent. Only afterwards is ball security taking into account and field position is a secondary consideration which cannot win the tackle for an athlete.
The Authority refers to the requirement in the rules for the competitors to engage in the contact of the “tackle”. The Code prohibits either competitor from avoiding the contact.
The Authority submitted that, in substance, the primary objective of the activity is the contact or collision in the tackle. It is submitted, therefore, that giving the words “strike” or “hit” their natural meaning, the primary objective of the activity is for each competitor to “strike” or “hit” their opponent. The definition of “combat sport” is therefore satisfied.
Counsel for the Authority submitted that the primary objective of each of the runner and the defender was to strike or hit each other with as much force as possible to either ground the opponent (and get maximum score) or get points for the “momentum outcome” after the collision. He submitted that there can be no other primary objective as contact in the “tackle” is required by the Code.
As to issue two, the Authority submits that the Code does allow contact to be made with the head, neck and spinal cord. The proscription on direct contact to the head or neck does not prohibit indirect contact to those areas. The Authority submitted that the Code contemplates some contact with the head or neck, and that a violation of the Code in that regard does not affect judging outcomes. It submitted that only a serious reckless or repeated breach of the head and neck contact rule may result in disqualification or suspension.
In any event, the Authority submitted that having regard to the expert evidence, it could not be found that the Code requires that all strike zones of the body are fully protected by the use of protective material. The Gilbert XP 100 prescribed by the Code cannot meet that requirement.
Because the Regulation requires the Rules of the activity to prohibit contact with the head and full protection by protective material, the Court did not need to decide issue two as elements of the Regulation which would otherwise exempt the activity from being a “combat sport” are not satisfied.
For these reasons, the Authority submitted that the Amended Summons should be dismissed.
I consider that a plain reading of the words in the definition of “combat sport” in the context of the whole of the Act, and taking into account the objects of the Act, lead to a conclusion that the activity to be conducted at RNC 4 on 12 September 2026 is a “combat sport” and the event is therefore a “combat sport contest”. Those objects are (most relevantly) to promote the health and safety of the combat sport contestants, regulate combat sport contests on a harm minimisation basis, and promote the development of the combat sport industry.
When read in the context of the definition of “combat sport” (and the Act) as a whole, the words “strike” and “hit” in the definition are, as the Authority submits, words of considerable breadth. I do not consider they should be confined to the limited more restrictive meaning submitted by the plaintiff.
As referred to in the written submissions of the Authority, [47] the second reading speech of the Attorney General in the Legislative Assembly does not support a narrow construction of the words and the definition. In that speech, the Attorney General said: “[t]he reforms in the bill were developed in response to a review of the current Combat Sports Act, which found that new combat sports continue to emerge and should be regulated until such time as it can be demonstrated that they are sufficiently safe do not justify regulation”. She identified a concern that emerging combat sport disciplines were not then regulated unless added through regulation. She said of the definition of “combat sports”:
… By having a brand (sic, broad) definition, new disciplines will be covered from the outset. I make one thing clear: the bill not applied to those sports where the health and safety of combatants and the integrity and governance arrangements are satisfactory. Those sports will be exempted in the regulations made under the bill…
I also accept that the Authority’s summary of the legislative history of regulation of combat sports [48] supports a broader construction of the definition. That history is one of the Parliament broadening the definition of combat sports to ensure regulation of new and emerging combat sports.
I accept the cautions I have referred to in making reference to dictionaries as an aid in statutory construction. [49] However, they are a useful starting point. Counsel for the plaintiff referred to meaning of “strike” from the Oxford English Dictionary which can mean “to come into forceful contact or collision with”. [50] Further, “hit” can mean to “collide with” or “crash into”. [51] These definitions are criticised by the plaintiff as being an exercise of seeking a definition to suit the desired meaning (for example, it was said the definition of strike referred to is the 59th definition given in that dictionary). I do not accept this is so. I consider these meanings accord with the breadth of the ordinary use of those words, particularly in the context of contact sport.
In oral submissions, the plaintiff handed up some different definitions of those words. [52] Those definitions of “hit” and “strike” sought to limit a strike to being a blow with the hand or fist, or something held in the hand, or a projectile from a weapon. I do not consider in the context of the definition and the Act that such restrictions on the meaning of the words (and the definition) are appropriate. If this was the intended meaning of the words, this could have been made clear in the definition.
I see no reason to confine a proper reading of the Act to sports involving fighting as seems to be suggested by the plaintiff. [53] I accept the Authority’s submission that if this was intended, Schedule 3 of the Act could easily have said so. I do not accept that to be within the definition of combat sport, a strike or hit (or indeed a throw or a grapple being other verbs in the definition) must be within the context of a fight.
The plaintiff submits that to give the ambiguous words “strike” and “hit” a wide construction risks criminalising a collision sport that is not within the purview of the Act – noting the absence of collision sports from the list of excluded sports under Schedule 1 of the Act. [54] I do not accept this submission. First, whilst the possibility of criminal sanctions being imposed on a sport or its participants are relevant matters in the construction exercise as the plaintiff submitted, [55] the fact that such sanctions may be visited upon a person who engages in conduct that is otherwise caught by the operation of the Act should not deter the Court from its primary task of construing the statute in accordance with principle. Second, it is important to realise that a finding that the activity to be undertaken at RNC 4 comes within the definition of “combat sport” does not criminalise the activity. It has the consequence that the sport and its participants will be regulated by the Authority and must comply with the provisions of the Act. It is only non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of the Act, or a direction lawfully given by the Authority, which may result in criminal consequences.
I do not accept Mr Fernandez’s evidence that the essential nature of the activity has changed as he described it. [56] He said after earlier RNC events, they analysed the game of rugby league to shape how the defender should act in this sport. [57] He described the job of the defender under the current iteration of the activity to be:
So your job, just as in rugby league, is to use an orthodox tackle technique, look at your opponent as he running to you, plant your feet and dip and tackle effectively instead of having to try and run and make their way up the field.
That does not properly describe what occurred in any of the runs shown to the Court by the parties from RNC 3. Whilst he did not specify what he meant by “an orthodox tackle technique”, I do not accept that the tackle technique set out in the Code is representative of a tackle, let alone an orthodox tackle.
The activity at RNC 4 required and allowed by the Code is a forceful coming together of the two competitors. The Code describes it as a “tackle”. That is for both the ball runner and the defender. [58] The descriptor “tackle” is inapt. What is required by a “legal tackle technique” for both ball runner and defender in the Code does not describe a tackle as that term is ordinarily understood in the context of sport in Australia. For example, under the Code no contact is allowed below the lower ribs – you cannot tackle around the legs. No wrapping of the arms in order to bring the opponent to the ground is allowed. As I understand it, an orthodox rugby league tackle would involve the use of the arms of the defender, or defenders, to bring the ball runner to the ground and prevent them from making ground up the field, or prevent them from passing the ball to a teammate, or prevent the scoring of a try. In RNC, the Code require**s a collision and the competitors are “scored” on the results of that collision. This happens 4 times, if the competitors are able to complete 4 exchanges. That is the beginning and end of a contest under the Code.
The exchanges from the video from RNC 3 shown in Court by each party only serve to confirm that what occurs in RNC is not tackling. In every instance the competitors hit or struck each other without the use of arms. They approached each other from their own lanes and propped and drove a shoulder square on into the other. On one occasion, a “centre call” was made and the competitors ran at each other along the centre line until they hit each other. The object of the exercise was plainly to collide as forcefully as possible with the opponent. As I have said, whilst that event was under a previous version of the Code, it was accepted by Senior Counsel for the plaintiff that the style of the “tackling” has not been changed in the current iteration of the Code.
That the runner must carry a ball and maintain ball security does not assist the plaintiff’s argument. Indeed, the fact that if the ball runner loses the ball as a result of the hit by the defender, the defender “wins” that exchange, highlights the essence of the contest to be the collision between the runner and the defender.
What is required by the Code is for the competitors to run at each other from a set distance and collide with their bodies. None of the changes made to the Code alter the fundamental premise of the sport. Changing the judging hierarchy from “Collision Outcome, Collision Dominance, Collision Damage” [59] to the present hierarchy of “Momentum Outcome, Tackle Control, Ball Security” has not changed the objective of the activity being to hit your opponent with your body using the techniques allowed, with more force and effect than the competitor’s hit on you.
The wording in the Code describing the contact as a “tackle” cannot alter the fact that RNC is a collision sport. The collision can appropriately and comfortably be described as a strike or hit within the broad meaning of those words in the definition of “combat sport” in the Act.
The question then becomes whether the primary objective of each combatant in a contest under the Code is to strike or hit the other combatant. In my opinion, it is overwhelmingly clear that this question must be answered “yes”.
As has been mentioned, and as is accepted by Senior Counsel for the plaintiff, [60] the Code requires there to be contact between the combatants in each exchange. Any action to avoid the contact by either the runner or the defender is prohibited. The essence of the activity is the collision between them. All else that follows, including the points awarded under the Code’s scoring system, flow from and are as a direct result of the collision of the combatants. It must therefore be the primary objective of each of the combatants to hit or strike the opponent with as much force, or in the best position (subject to being in the manner described as “legal” and in the strike zone in the Code) to “win” the collision.
I do not accept the plaintiff’s submissions that the runner and defender have different primary objectives. “Momentum outcome” may be the primary point scoring consideration – but the runner obtaining that momentum, or the defender halting the runner’s momentum, can only be achieved by the combatant who has the most forceful or impactful strike or hit. Each of the runner and the defender have that primary objective. As Counsel for the Authority pointed out, the maximum scoring opportunity is when one of the competitors is “grounded” as a result of the collision. This reinforces the conclusion that the primary objective of each of the combatants is to strike or hit each other as best as one can to achieve that outcome.
I do not think the “contest principle” in the Code stating that “judges score who won the momentum contest, not the contact itself” [61] leads to a different conclusion. As I have said, the winner of the momentum contest can only result from the collision between the combatants, or which one achieves the biggest hit.
I have set out the differences between the definitions of “combat sport” in the 2008 Act compared to the Act. Assuming the Court found that the conduct involved in RNC 4 was a “strike” or a “hit”, as I have, Senior Counsel for the plaintiff accepted that the activity would be a combat sport within the meaning of the 2008 definition. [62] That is because the Code requires such contact. However, he submitted that the different and distinguishing feature in the definition under the Act is that such contact must be the primary objective of each competitor. He submits momentum is the primary objective. For the reasons I have given, I do not accept that argument.
For these reasons, I find that the activity to take place under the Code is a “combat sport” and the RNC 4 event would be a “combat sport contest” within the meaning of the Act.
I have set out regulation 5(1)(d) above. It was on this issue that the parties each relied on expert reports.
For a sport or activity to be excluded from the definition of “combat sport” by reason of the operation of regulation 5(1)(d), the rules must not allow any contact to the head and require that all strike zones are fully protected by the use of protective material. It is whether there is full protection by protective material that the expert evidence was primarily directed to.
I will summarise the evidence relevant to that question and deal with it first. That is because my conclusion may make it unnecessary to determine whether the rules do not allow any contact to the head.
Run Nation tendered an expert report of Dr Mark Gillies dated 31 August 2026. Dr Gillies did some tests on supplied protective equipment under the standard ISO 22439:2008. However, he did not test the Gilbert XP 1000 equipment. [63] That equipment only arrived in Australia very close to the date of the hearing. [64] The results of those tests are therefore irrelevant to the question to be determined as it is the Gilbert XP 1000 equipment that is the prescribed “protective equipment” under the Code. The opinion expressed by Dr Gillies as to whether the protective equipment supplied to him provided protection to the strike zones is also irrelevant.
He did opine on the Gilbert XP 1000 by looking at pictures of it. He said that it provided ideal coverage for a rugby style tackle in the contact zone, He opined it fully protected the contact zone described in the Code.
Dr McIntosh is a biomechanics expert. He opined that the Gilbert XP 1000 would not provide any direct protection to the head and neck (cervical spine) and very little protection to the thoraco-lumbar spine of athletes. He said that equipment would provide minimal protection to different parts of the body of participants for impact related injuries more severe than bruising or abrasions.
Dr McIntosh did not test, nor have custody of the Gilbert XP 1000 equipment. [65] He opined from photos that the Gilbert XP 1000 would provide minimal protection to different parts of the body of participants in RNC. It would offer limited protection to soft tissue in an impact.
He noted that there were only four sections of padding on the equipment which appeared to offer any potential impact energy attenuation: central sternum, superior shoulders (x 2) and mid spine. He set outside those zones there would be essentially no protection.
He noted that the Gilbert XP 1000 complied with the Rules of Rugby and is listed on World Rugby’s website as an approved product. This meant that under the relevant test conditions the measured impact force was GREATER than 5 kN. He stated by reason of the nature of the mandated test in the standard, it is not possible to claim that a product complies with Rugby’s Body Padding Performance Specification (the Rugby Specification) and also exceeded it in a positive manner would infer any protective capacity.
Dr McIntosh referred (at [31] of his report) to the Laws of Rugby where it is stated:
This specification for headgear, shoulder padding and breast padding looked to encourage players to protect themselves rather than providing equipment which would provide additional protection from potential injuries. The only injuries that body padding compliant with this specification are intended to protect against are cuts and abrasions.
Dr McIntosh said that even if a competitor in RNC was only struck directly on the four padded areas in the Gilbert XP 1000, that equipment would offer minimal protection against impact-related injuries more severe than bruising or abrasions. Outside of those areas, the equipment will offer no specific protection against impact related injuries.
Dr McIntosh was critical of several aspects of Dr Gillies’ report, including with respect to his testing results.
Dr Gillies provided a supplementary report dated 7 September 2026. In that report, he accepted that his calculations in his first report needed to be changed. That was because he had used incorrect distances in his first report. The shorter distances properly to be used meant the calculations of loadings were less than expressed in his first report. His calculations were now changed due to the shorter lane distance. He accepted Dr McIntosh’s criticism of his use of quasi-static loading as being fair. He said his amended calculations were now correct.
Dr Gillies generally agreed with the report of Dr McIntosh.
Dr Gillies opined that the opinions in his first report remain, with the added padding of the Gilbert XP1000 being further protection for the competitor. He said that the lower energy and impact loads as recalculated would not cause major injuries to the competitor’s musculoskeletal system in the contact zone.
Dr Gillies and Dr McIntosh gave concurrent evidence. Each were asked questions as to the standard ISO 22439:2008. Testing of equipment according to this standard is used by World Rugby to approve padded clothing to be worn by players. The effect of their evidence is that the purpose of the use by Rugby Union of testing under this standard is to ensure that the tested padded clothing is not rigid. The standard does not deal with the protective nature of the equipment to be used. [66]
Dr McIntosh was taken to the Rugby Specification (Exhibit 2). This document states in terms that the padded equipment is not to protect the player from injury. That specification states (as reflected in the rule referred to at [124] above):
The use of padded clothing has been prevalent in the sport of rugby since the mid-1990’s. World Rugby, at this time, looked to create a performance specification to ensure that the use of these devices was conducted in a manner which did not materially affect the way the game was played. This specification for headgear, shoulder padding and breast padding looks to encourage players to protect themselves rather than providing equipment which would provide additional protection from potential injuries. The only injuries that body padding compliant with this specification are intended to protect against are cuts and abrasions. (Emphasis added.)
QUINN: So you don’t go any further than saying that the Gilbert XP 1000 in your view would only provide limited protection to the soft tissue, is that it?
WITNESS MCINTOSH: In some situations but it wouldn’t provide any in other situations because it’s not, it complies specifically complies with World Rugby padded clothing standards which means from the World Rugby perspective it’s not intended to protect the user and the test methods for impact energy attenuation mean that it cannot offer any protection against anything beyond some superficial injury.
WITNESS Macintosh: The answer is that the material that is used does not offer any impact energy attenuation, it does not offer any reasonable protection outside of what I just described earlier and there are areas on the padded clothing which have no padding at all and so theoretically you could have padded clothing, padded headgear and people and impacts would benefit from the fact that the other people are wearing padded clothing and padded shoulder pads and things which actually had some protective function theoretically but in practice with the Gilbert XP that you are describing, it doesn’t offer that protection and it intentionally doesn’t offer that protection because they meet the World Cup Rugby standard because to meet the World Rugby standard it does not offer any protection and you could have two players wearing it and it will not offer any protection.
A consideration of the expert evidence overall, particularly the concurrent evidence and cross-examination of Dr Gillies and Dr McIntosh, leads me to the conclusion that the requirement that every competitor in RNC 4 must wear the Gilbert XP 1000 equipment does not satisfy the requirement of regulation 5(1)(d). That is, I am not satisfied that all of the strike zones on the body of a competitor would be fully protected by use of that equipment. The equipment has not been tested to assess what protection it does offer. Run Nation chose it because it was certified by the World Rugby Union under its specification. [71]
I prefer the evidence of Dr McIntosh with respect to the utility and effect of the use of the Gilbert XP 1000. I do not consider that protection offered by the padded areas for superficial injuries could on any view amount to the competitor being fully protected by the use of protective material within the meaning of the Regulation. As Dr McIntosh said, contact on an area where there is no padding affords no protection. Dr Gillies opinion that “some” protection would be afforded does not alter this conclusion, indeed it reinforces it.
Nor do I consider that the evidence that if both players are wearing the equipment there would be some protection afforded changes the position. The most favourable conclusion with respect to the use of the Gilbert XP 1000 equipment is that it would provide some protection, to some of the areas of the competitor’s body within the strike zone, some of the time.
Senior Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that implicit in the regulation is a position that needs to be substantially complied with, or practically complied with and not perfectly complied with. He submitted that it is sufficient for compliance with the regulation that the competitors would be substantially protected. [72] He submits that each competitor wearing the equipment is likely to be fully protected through a combination of their own padded garment and the padding from the opposition who is coming into contact with them. [73] I reject these submissions. The first ignores the plain language of the Regulation. The second is at odds with the expert evidence I have referred to.
By reason of my conclusion with respect to the use of the Gilbert XP 1000, it is not strictly necessary to determine whether the Code does not allow any contact to be made to the head of a competitor in RNC.
Briefly stated, I would accept the submissions of the Authority on this point. [74] Whilst direct contacts to the head is not allowed, there is no express prohibition on indirect contact to the head.
The effect of my decision is that the notice issued by the Authority on 5 August 2026 remains on foot. No basis was put forward to challenge the notice other than seeking the declaration that activity under the Code was not a “combat sport”. I will not make that declaration. There may be commercial consequences for Run Nation and its backers because of this decision. There may also be inconvenience to members of the public who have purchased tickets to attend the event. [75] Neither of those consequences are relevant to the proper construction of the Act and the decision I have made. Those consequences must also be seen in the context of the dealings between the Authority and Run Nation. Run Nation has been on notice of the Authority’s concerns about the nature of the activity since 29 May 2026. [76] Those concerns continued through June and August despite the discussions between the parties and the changes made by Run Nation to the Code over that time. [77] Run Nation was not able to satisfy the Authority that it had dealt with its concerns.
As I have observed in [102] above, my decision that the activity that was to be conducted under the Code at RNC 4 is a “combat sport” within the meaning of the Act does not criminalise the conduct of such an activity. Nor does it equate to a ban of that activity. Whether the activity conducted under the Code is an activity that should be banned is not within the scope of this decision and I express no view about it.
The fact that I have found that the activity under the Code is a combat sport means that those who wish to organise or participate in such an activity, as with all combat sports, must comply with the regulatory requirements under the Act. This is a reflection of my conclusion as to the proper construction of the Act and the nature of the activity under the Code. It is also a reflection of the legislative intention that it is in the public interest that combat sports be subject to appropriate regulation on a harm minimisation basis, to promote the health and safety of combat sport contestants, and allow that industry to develop within the framework of the Act and Regulation.
For the above reasons, the orders of the Court are:
The Amended Summons is dismissed.
The plaintiff is to pay the defendants’ costs of the proceeding.
**********
Court Book (CB) p 4.
Tcpt, 8 September 2026, p 100(17).
Combat Sports Act 2013 (NSW) s 3.
Section 9.
Section 39.
Section 39.
Section 81.
Section 62(2).
Section 62(6).
Section 4.
Joshua Cross affirmed an affidavit on 30 August 2026. He is a director of Cross Sports & Events Holdings Pty Ltd which is the principal financier of Run Nation. It is the entity which produces the events, including the proposed event for 12 September 2026. The principal aspect of his affidavit is the financial exposure faced by his company if the event does not take place on 12 September 2026. He was not cross-examined and I do not consider his evidence as relevant to the task of statutory construction at hand.
Affidavit of Tremaine Fernandez affirmed 31 August 2026, [12].
CB pp 233-271.
CB p 234.
Affidavit of Tremaine Fernandez affirmed 31 August 2026, [18].
Tcpt, 8 September 2026, p 27(17).
Affidavit of Tremaine Fernandez affirmed 31 August 2026, [21]-[23].
[24]-[29].
[30]-[31].
[32]-[34].
[35]-[41].
Tcpt, 8 September 2026, p 10(23).
Tcpt, 8 September 2026, p 10(45).
Affidavit of Tremaine Fernandez affirmed 31 August 2026, [21].
CB p 240.
CB pp 241-243.
CB p 241.
CB p 241.
CB p 242.
CB p 242.
CB p 243.
CB p 243
CB pp 244-245.
Tcpt, 8 September 2026, p 11(34)-(39).
CB p 252.
CB pp 253-255.
CB pp 256-261.
CB p 258.
Affidavit of Emma Moss affirmed 4 September 2026, [11].
These videos are exhibited and marked EM-2 or annexed as TF-11.
That version appears at CB pp 486-502.
Tcpt, 8 September 2026, p 61(19)-(21).
Per Gageler CJ, Gordon, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ, and omitting references to authorities there cited.
Qantas Airways Ltd v Transport Workers Union of Australia [2023] HCA 27; (2023) 278 CLR 571 at [80] Gordon and Edelman JJ citing Kelly v The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 216 at 253; [2004] HCA 12 at [103].
Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v GSF Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 568; [2005] HCA 26 at [12]-[13] (per McHugh J).
Tcpt, 8 September 2026, p 70(31)-(33).
The Authority’s Written Submissions, [16].
The Authority’s Written Submissions, [17]-[21].
See [62] above.
The Authority’s Written Submissions, [12].
The Authority’s Written Submissions, [12].
MFI-3.
Plaintiff’s Written Submissions, [16].
Plaintiff’s Written Submissions, [16].
Plaintiff’s Written Submissions, [16] and Tcpt, 8 September 2026, p 89(11)-(14).
Tcpt, 8 September 2026, p 11(27)-(46).
Tcpt, 8 September 2026, p 11(26).
See CB p 260 which describes “Ball running tackle technique”.
See version of the Code at CB pp 467-502 at 474.
Tcpt, 8 September 2026, pp 71(31), 72(6).
CB p 241.
Tcpt, 8 September 2026, p 72(25)-(32).
Tcpt, 8 September 2026, p 51(15)-(18).
Tcpt, 8 September 2026, p 64(42)-(43).
Tcpt, 8 September 2026, p 45(5)-(6).
Tcpt, 8 September 2026, pp 36(40)-37(23), 38(32)-(43).
Tcpt, 8 September 2026, p 45.
Tcpt, 8 September 2026, p 47(5).
Tcpt, 8 September 2026, p 47(41).
Tcpt, 8 September 2026, p 48(6)-(16).
Tcpt, 8 September 2026, p 9(39)-(40).
Tcpt, 8 September 2026, p 80(5).
Tcpt, 8 September 2026, p 80(35)-(44).
See [34] Authority’s written submissions.
Affidavit of Tremaine Fernandez affirmed 31 August 2026, [49].
Affidavit of Emma Moss affirmed 4 September 2026, [11].
See the affidavit of Simon Kang affirmed 31 August 2026 and the correspondence attached thereto.
Typographical amendments to [11], [24], [25], [32], [38], [97], [99], [103], [102], [106], [132], and [140]
Run Nation Championship Pty Ltd
Combat Sports Authority of New South Wales & Anor
(2005) 221 CLR 568
(2025) 99 ALJR 1362
(2023) 278 CLR 571
(2020) 104 NSWLR 170
(2014) 250 CLR 664
(2000) 202 CLR 629
(2014) 88 NSWLR 488
(2013) 85 NSWLR 580
(2011) 244 CLR 325
(2018) 97 NSWLR 513
(2000) 48 NSWLR 498
(1991) 25 NSWLR 541
(1925) 36 CLR 60
(2004) 218 CLR 216