R v Storey [1998] 1 VR 359; DPP v England [1999] VSCA 95; [1999] 2 VR 258; DPP v Ristevski [2019] VSCA 287, referred to.

1. Pursuant to leave granted by a judge of this Court on 3 December 2024, the appellant appeals against a sentence of 15 years and six months' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 11 years, imposed upon him by a judge of the Supreme Court on 21 June 2024 for the manslaughter[1] of Jessica Geddes. He relies on two grounds:
   1. The judge erred in treating the lies told by the [appellant] in his record of interview as matters of aggravation.
   2. The sentence is manifestly excessive in all the circumstances of the case.
2. We consider that neither ground has been made out, and that the appeal must be dismissed. Our reasons for that conclusion follow.

The circumstances of Jessica Geddes' injuries and death

1. Jessica Geddes, aged 27 years, was killed by the appellant during the afternoon of Friday, 6 November 2020, in the course of a violent physical assault. The precise mechanism by which she met her death cannot be specified. By his plea to manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act, however, the appellant acknowledged that he consciously, voluntarily and deliberately committed the acts that caused her death, and that those acts were unlawful and dangerous.
2. Moreover, it is clear from the array of skeletal and other injuries found in and on Jessica Geddes' body post-mortem that the fatal violence inflicted upon her by the appellant that afternoon was not inflicted in the course of an isolated incident. There was evidence from Jessica Geddes' family and neighbours of the appellant's history of aggressive and violent behaviour towards her. Moreover, a post-mortem examination of Jessica Geddes' body made it plain that she had suffered extensive skeletal and soft tissue injuries over an extended period, the vast majority of which could only have been inflicted upon her by the appellant in the course of multiple episodes of violence.
3. When paramedics responded to a call made by the appellant to the '000' emergency services number at 6.42 pm on 6 November 2020, they found Ms Geddes dead, naked from the waist down, lying face up on the floor of a bedroom of the house she had shared with the appellant in Endeavour Hills. Her body was in a pitiable state. Both her hands and her left ankle were swollen. Injuries to her face included a crescent-shaped cut to her right eye socket, and her left ear was partially separated. There were bloodstains on various surfaces throughout the bedroom and the remainder of the house, including the hallway, the laundry and the bathroom.
4. The following day, Saturday, 7 November 2020, Dr Linda Iles, a forensic pathologist, conducted a post-mortem examination on Ms Geddes' body. It was found that Ms Geddes had suffered extensive blunt force injuries that were acute, sub-acute and chronic in nature. Dr Iles found bruises, lacerations and abrasions at various locations on Ms Geddes' body, including her head and face, together with many older bruises, lacerations and abrasions. There were some injuries which were more recent but showed some evidence of healing. Further, forensic medical examination showed that there were healing and malunited skeletal fractures throughout multiple parts of Ms Geddes' body which showed no evidence of having been treated in any conventional fashion.
5. The catalogue of injuries found in and on Ms Geddes' body are nothing less than shocking. To understand the dreadful state of Ms Geddes' body, it is necessary to set the injuries out in some detail. They included:

a. four scalp lacerations - two of full thickness - associated with a small amount of bruising (albeit there was no skull fracture or intracranial haemorrhage);

b. a fresh fracture of the ninth right rib, and a corresponding quantity of 200 millilitres of blood in the right pleural cavity;

1. multiple rib fractures of varying age with features of acute haemorrhage associated fifth healing fractures of the left ninth and seventh ribs, with a quantity of 70 millilitres of blood within the left pleural cavity;

d. healed and healing bilateral rib fractures (of the right fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and tenth ribs, and the left third, fourth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth ribs);

e. right lateral lumbar transverse process fractures (that is, a fracture of the bony protrusions extending from the sides of the lumbar vertebrae), associated with fresh haemorrhage and a right retroperitoneal haematoma around the kidney;

f. pale kidneys and thyroid;

g. focal early bronchopneumonia in the right lower lobe of the lung on a background of extensive fat embolism;

h. extensive soft tissue bruising and organised haematoma along with fat necrosis (that is, the death of fat tissue) involving the left upper arm, left elbow, left forearm and left hand;

i. extensive soft tissue haemorrhage and fat necrosis involving the entire right arm;

j. extensive soft tissue bruising about both legs associated with quadriceps necrosis (death of cells in thigh muscle) bilaterally;

k. rhabdomyolysis (muscle breakdown) with focal myoglobin deposits in the kidneys;

l. mild diffuse cerebral cortical pallor;

m. focal traumatic axonal injury to the corpus callosum (that is, traumatic brain injury due to shearing forces);

n. multiple healed scars on the scalp;

o. numerous self-harm scars over the volar aspects of both forearms; and

p. mild dysplasia right hippocampus (that is, abnormality of part of the brain).

1. Ms Geddes had also suffered extensive skeletal injuries to her spine, sternum, shoulder bones, upper and lower arm bones, pelvis, upper and lower leg bones, ankle, hand and foot bones, and face, including:

1. healed comminuted (shattered) nasal bone fractures; 2. a healing C7 spinous process (cervical vertebra) fracture; 3. a recent right superior glenoid (ball of the shoulder) fracture; 4. healing left scapular (shoulder bone) fractures; 5. a buckle fracture anterior mid sternal (breast bone) body; 6. a healing right supracondylar distal humeral (long bone of the upper arm) fracture displaced with exuberant callus (malunion); 7. deformed healing right mid radial and ulnar shaft (forearm) fractures with exuberant callus; 8. a healing right mid shaft third metacarpal (hand bone) fracture; 9. a recent base right first metacarpal fracture; 10. a healed proximal right fourth phalangeal (foot bone) fracture; 11. a non-united ulnar (forearm) styloid fracture; 12. a left supracondylar distal humeral (upper arm bone) fracture with marked posterior displacement (recent); 13. a healing left base second metacarpal fracture; 14. a malunited distal pole of left scaphoid (wrist bone) fracture; 15. a healing base left fourth metacarpal fracture; 16. a healed neck of fifth metacarpal fracture; 17. a healing left second distal phalangeal fracture; 18. a non-united left ulnar styloid fracture; 19. healing T9 to T12 spinous process (thoracic vertebra) fractures; 20. recent and healing lumbar transverse process (lumbar spine) fractures; 21. a healing comminuted left iliac (pelvic) crest fracture;

1. a healing right comminuted patellar (knee cap) fracture;

1. a healing right lateral malleolar (ankle) fracture;

1. a healing right distal fibular (leg bone near ankle) fracture;

1. a healed right lateral malleolar (ankle bone) fracture; 2. healing and displaced right mid shaft fifth metatarsal fracture, healing and displaced;

aa. healing right mid shaft fourth metatarsal fracture, healing;

bb. healing right base second metatarsal fracture, healing;

cc. recent left medial femoral condyle (end of thigh bone) sagittal fracture; and

dd. distal left tibial and fibular shaft (lower leg bone) comminuted fractures displaced and angulated with exuberant healing callus.

1. Ms Geddes' weight at the time of autopsy was 46.2 kilograms. Medical records showed that her weight in 2017 had been between 70 and 79 kilograms.
2. In Dr Iles' opinion it was not possible to determine the number of blunt force impacts required to produce the injuries she found at autopsy. She determined that the cause of death was complications from multiple blunt force injuries. There was no one injury that led to death. In Dr Iles' view, a number of physiological mechanisms are likely to have caused death. The three primary possible mechanisms were: first, hypovolaemia (a reduced blood volume which can lead to shock and cardiac arrest); secondly, hyperkalaemia (an electrolyte disorder from the process of muscle breakdown, which can contribute to cardiac arrhythmia or arrest); and, thirdly, changes as a consequence of fat and bone marrow embolism, which can impact on cardiorespiratory function.
3. Dr Iles' opinion was that the physiological mechanisms causing death were likely to be 'multi-factorial'. She was unable to say that one of them was the primary operative mechanism. There was not one specific injury that led to death. In Dr Iles' view, it was probable that each of these phenomena in combination led eventually to cardiorespiratory failure. None of the mechanisms, however, would necessarily have resulted in a rapid death. There would have been a gradual decline in Ms Geddes' functioning after she had been beaten, possibly lasting hours.

1. On 6 November 2020, the appellant and Ms Geddes were alone at home - it had previously been the appellant's family home - when, at 9.45 am, the appellant joined an online 'Zoom' teleconference related to a community correction order ('CCO') to which he was subject at the time. The conference continued until around 2.40 pm, with some breaks in between. During the first of those breaks, the appellant left his home to collect Ms Geddes from a local 7-Eleven convenience store. Shortly before doing so, he had tried to call her several times between 11.31 and 11.39 am, but she did not answer. The appellant sent her two text messages in an attempt to get her to do so.
2. On arrival at the convenience store, the appellant appeared angry. Ms Geddes told him she was getting him lunch. She told others she was getting her lunch and that she was hungry. Ms Geddes also told them she was scared. On two occasions she and the appellant embraced. At another point, Ms Geddes was upset and crying. They left the store together and arrived back home at 11.46 am.
3. After he arrived home, the appellant resumed the Zoom conference, which ended at 2.40 pm.
4. At about 5.33 pm, the appellant spoke to his father by telephone, and asked him to order pizzas from a local store. The order for pizzas was placed at 5.45 pm. At 5.55 pm the appellant left home to collect them, returning at 6.08 pm.
5. Precisely what occurred between 2.40 and 5.55 pm is unclear, save that the appellant beat Ms Geddes severely. In the course of a very violent assault upon her in that period, the appellant inflicted a number of serious injuries upon Ms Geddes, causing her death.
6. Between 6.17 pm and 6.38 pm the appellant either called, received a call from, or sent a text message to, his father 18 times. He also called his mother at 6.27 pm. Both told him to call an ambulance.
7. The appellant first called the '000' emergency services number at 6.31 pm, but the call lasted no time. It was not until 6.41 pm that he called and spoke with a 000 operator, requesting an ambulance. By the time of this call he had been home for 33 minutes. It was 14 minutes after first receiving the instruction to do so from his mother (at 6.27 pm) and nine minutes after his father told him to do so (at 6.32 pm). He told the operator that he came home and found Ms Geddes lying unconscious on the bed. At the direction of the 000 operator, the appellant moved Ms Geddes off the bed onto the floor and commenced cardio pulmonary resuscitation.
8. The appellant's father arrived at the scene at 6.46 pm, followed by paramedics at 6.48 pm. Paramedics determined that Ms Geddes was dead. They observed several injuries on her body. As a result, they contacted police who attended and established a crime scene.

1. The appellant was initially charged with Ms Geddes' murder. His trial was due to commence on 25 May 2024. On 23 May 2024, however, he offered to plead guilty to manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act.[2] That offer was accepted by the prosecution on the eve of the trial, and, upon arraignment, the appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter.
2. Following a plea in mitigation conducted on 17 June 2024, the judge sentenced the appellant on 21 June 2024 to 15 years and six months' imprisonment, and fixed a non-parole period of 11 years.[3]

The judge's remarks concerning the appellant's lies

1. In his reasons for sentence,[4] under the heading 'Aggravating circumstance of deliberately and repeatedly lying', the judge stated that he was 'satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that [the appellant] deliberately and repeatedly lied to deflect suspicion away from [himself] in the aftermath of Jessica's death'.[5] The judge remarked that, not only had the appellant denied any involvement in Jessica Geddes' death, but he had untruthfully told police that there had never been any form of violence or abuse in their relationship and that he had never assaulted her. As part of the appellant's efforts to divert police from his 'misdeeds', he referred to the fact that Ms Geddes 'had mental health issues and had harmed herself in the past'.[6]
2. The judge noted that in his first record of interview on 6 November 2020, the appellant falsely told police that he was asleep between about 3.00 pm and 5.00 pm. (It subsequently became clear, however, that the appellant had attempted to call his father eight times between 3.59 pm and 5.15 pm.)[7] Further, the judge noted that, so as to convey that Ms Geddes was not harmed at that time, the appellant told police that he went to get some pizzas at about 6.00 pm, and then falsely stated that he returned to find Ms Geddes unconscious on the floor, thereafter commencing CPR and calling an ambulance. A little later in the interview, the appellant said that he panicked upon seeing her body and called his father, repeating that he then immediately called an ambulance.[8]
3. The judge also noted that, in his second record of interview on 24 October 2021, the appellant repeated some of his previous lies. The appellant told police that at the time he went to collect the pizzas, Ms Geddes had a closed gash to her head from four days previously, and had a bruised and swollen arm that had been like that for a couple of days, but that she otherwise appeared to be 'fine'. He told police that upon his return, the gash to Ms Geddes head was open. The appellant again asserted that he did not have anything to do with her death.[9] Remarkably, the appellant 'even stated to police that [he] did not know how she sustained any of the numerous injuries identified during her post-mortem examination'.[10]
4. Observing that, by his guilty plea and his agreement to the revised summary of prosecution opening, the appellant had acknowledged that the assertion that he had nothing to do with Ms Geddes' death was 'completely false',[11] in his reasons for sentence the appellant the judge then stated:[12]

In broad summary, you falsely told police that:

(a) You did not physically assault Jessica either on the day of her death or at any other time.

(b) She was walking and talking shortly before 6 o'clock when you went to collect the pizzas.

(c) On your return you found her unresponsive and obviously badly injured and she did not have those injuries when you left only some 11 minutes earlier.

(d) You did not know how she sustained them.

The uncontroverted medical evidence was that Jessica's death was not rapid and that her physical state declined, probably over hours. Thus, by the time you left to collect the pizzas, Jessica would not have been able to walk or talk normally as you had falsely intimated to police.

1. In his sentencing reasons, the judge observed that the appellant's offending was 'a grave betrayal of trust'.[13] Jessica Geddes was a vulnerable person. Not only did she have ongoing mental health issues, but she was in poor physical health. At the time of her death, she weighed only 46.2 kilograms. Not only was she physically weak, the judge said, but the appellant was 'much bigger and stronger'.[14] The appellant took advantage of their 'joint isolation', compounded by COVID-19 restrictions in 2020, and his stronger physique to physically abuse her.[15] Having again 'severely' beaten Ms Geddes on the afternoon of 6 November 2020, the judge observed, the appellant 'failed to get her the medical attention she desperately needed'. Incredibly, not only did the appellant fail to obtain medical help for Ms Geddes, but he left home to collect pizzas. His decision to do so 'was made at a time when Jessica was alone and suffering, if not already dead'.[16]

1. Outlining the appellant's personal circumstances, in his sentencing reasons the judge said that the appellant was 26 years old at the time of offending.[17] He grew up in the same home in Endeavour Hills that he and Jessica resided in. His parents - whose marriage was problematic, involving arguments, yelling and crying - used cannabis and maintained a room for growing marijuana plants for personal use. While still in primary school, the appellant stole and used his parents' cannabis.[18]
2. The appellant's mother left the family home in 2006, and the appellant soon after moved to Queensland to be with her. The appellant did not form a good relationship with her new partner and returned to Endeavour Hills to live with his father. They lived on takeaway food and the appellant failed to develop homemaking skills. From time to time the appellant visited his mother in Queensland, where his grandmother taught him some basic life skills. The appellant attended the local primary school, but did not thrive there. He was bullied and his self-esteem was low. During secondary school years, the appellant met somebody who supplied him with ecstasy, amphetamine and methylamphetamine. Having attended three different high schools, the appellant dropped out of school in Year 9.[19] He undertook a painting apprenticeship for three years (but did not complete it), and also took on additional work as a bookbinder.
3. From the age of 14, the judge noted, the appellant regularly used methylamphetamine. He used his income to pay for it. Over time, however, the appellant developed a need to use the drug to keep working, so that his use became an addiction. The judge observed that, whilst addicted to methylamphetamine, the appellant met Jessica Geddes in Queensland in 2017, and they moved to Melbourne together. They were then both addicted at that time, mutual drug addiction being a 'constant' throughout their relationship.[20]
4. The judge said that in 2018, for the first time in his adult life, the appellant found himself unemployed. He and Ms Geddes received unemployment benefits from that time onwards. The appellant's father also moved out of the family home that year, at a time when it was already in a state of disrepair. Over time 'it became completely squalid and largely unfit for habitation'.[21]
5. On 13 September 2019, the judge said, Ms Geddes was admitted to hospital with multiple injuries caused by blunt force trauma. Although police did not lay charges, they issued a family violence safety notice against the appellant in order to protect her. A full order, which was made in January 2020, expired on 16 September 2020, as there had been no application to extend its operation.[22]
6. The judge noted that the appellant was arrested and remanded in custody on 5 April 2022. Some of his time on remand was affected by the pandemic and 'the more arduous conditions' imposed as a result. The appellant's experience in custody had been made more difficult by the media attention the case had attracted and the 'hostile response' of other prisoners, which resulted in the appellant being moved to protection units at two different locations. The appellant was medicated with methadone, and Avanza for treatment of anxiety. At the time of sentence, the appellant had spent more than two years in custody facing a murder charge. He had thus spent a significant period of time in custody in suspense, not knowing his fate.[23]
7. With respect to Ms Geddes' situation prior to her death, the judge observed the following:[24]

Jessica's life in Endeavour Hills was unfortunate to say the least. She often appeared dishevelled; she constantly begged for food, money, cigarettes and petrol, both door-to-door and at local shops; she visibly declined in health and appearance in the months leading up to her death; she exhibited mental health and drug abuse problems with strange behaviour; she was regularly seen with visible injuries to her face; and she sometimes struggled to walk. Although Jessica suffered from serious mental health issues which sometimes resulted in her self-harming, you materially contributed to her misfortune. As I have said, there was substantial evidence of your previous mistreatment of her.

1. The judge took into account victim impact statements that had been received from Ms Geddes' mother, father, sister, daughter and grandmother. Their statements 'were deeply moving and universally spoke in loving terms about how much Jessica was cherished, and about the severe pain that was caused and continues to be caused by her untimely and tragic death'.[25]
2. Having referred to various sentencing principles,[26] the judge observed:[27]

Cases involving domestic violence have justifiably attracted particular opprobrium.[28] Bringing violence into the sanctity of a home is abhorrent and must be denounced in the strongest terms. Outbursts of rage towards a vulnerable and trusting domestic partner are totally unacceptable, and your sentence must make this plain.

1. And as to the nature and gravity of the offence he said:[29]

The court must ensure just punishment. What is just in part depends upon the nature and gravity of the offending. Manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act is self-evidently a very serious offence. As for the gravity of your offending, the circumstances of this case are truly shocking. Inexplicably, by your vicious assault through multiple acts of aggression, you have brutally taken the life of someone who trusted you and who had moved far away from her family to be with you. Jessica was also particularly vulnerable given her mental health issues, and you knew of her vulnerability and that she relied on you for support and care. The taking of a domestic partner's life undermines the foundations of personal relationships and family trust upon which our society rests.[30] The sanctity of human life must be taken into account, as well as society's abhorrence towards violence against vulnerable and trusting partners who could legitimately have expected the offender to be the protector, not the perpetrator of violent abuse.[31]

1. Further, the judge later observed:[32]

General deterrence is a very important matter in this context. The scourge of domestic violence in our society is well-documented and cannot be tolerated. In recognition of this, on behalf of the community sentencing courts express the strongest denunciation of such abhorrent conduct.

1. Since the murder trial had been estimated to run for four to five weeks, and there were to be a considerable number of witnesses called (including some of Ms Geddes' family members), the judge considered that there was 'considerable utilitarian value' in the appellant's guilty plea, which was 'of significant weight in determining the appropriate sentence'. The late adoption of a guilty plea to manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act was, however, the first indication of any remorse on the appellant's part. His conduct up until that time 'gave no sign of any such remorse'.[33]
2. The judge noted that the appellant was deprived of a satisfactory upbringing in a number of respects (albeit his counsel eschewed reliance on Bugmy[34] considerations). Furthermore, the judge noted that there was no evidence of any rehabilitation from the appellant's serious drug addiction.[35] In March 2018, the appellant was convicted of reckless conduct endangering serious injury and driving whilst suspended and a CCO was imposed. He was subject to that CCO when he killed Ms Geddes.[36] The judge considered that the appellant's prospects of rehabilitation 'should be viewed as guarded'.[37] He also noted that, in light of the appellant's 'limited criminal record', the prosecution accepted that specific deterrence is less relevant.[38]
3. Finally, with respect to current sentencing practices and comparable cases, the judge observed:[39]

Current sentencing practices are a factor, albeit not a controlling factor,[40] to be taken into account as part of the instinctive synthesis. The court was referred to a number of cases involving manslaughter in a domestic situation, though both parties correctly acknowledged that the facts of those cases were not directly comparable to the circumstances now confronting the court.[41]

Importantly, to the extent they are of assistance, the sentences in those cases were imposed at a time when the maximum penalty for manslaughter was imprisonment for 20 years rather than 25 years. By increasing the maximum penalty by 25 percent, parliament's intention is to convey that previous penalties for this crime were inadequate.[42] The higher maximum penalty provides broader scope to impose more severe sentences in cases such as this that involve high levels of moral culpability.[43]

Ground 1: The appellant's lies as matters of aggravation

1. Under cover of the first ground, counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant's lies to police in the records of interview might stand in the way of a finding of remorse, but the judge was not entitled to treat them as matters of aggravation. Counsel contended that post-offence lies have only been treated as aggravating in circumstances where they were made outside the police interview and were connected with the laying of a false trail; the concealment or destruction of evidence; or the creation of a trauma to victims, over and above the failure to admit the offending.[44] The appellant's lies simply forced the prosecution to prove its case without the assistance of admissions. They simply amounted to a denial of responsibility for Ms Geddes' death. So much cannot be a matter that aggravates sentence.
2. The respondent's counsel submitted that it was open to the sentencing judge to conclude that the appellant's lies aggravated the offending. As the sentencing judge found, the appellant deliberately and repeatedly lied to deflect suspicion away from himself in the aftermath of Ms Geddes' death.[45] Those lies were not confined to the records of interview, but also included lies told to attending paramedics and others. The prevailing law is that an offender's deliberate lies to police about the true circumstances of his or her offending can be an aggravating feature (in addition to detracting from remorse).[46] This Court has previously accepted that post-offence lies are capable of aggravating offending whether or not they were made in a police interview, whether or not they were connected to the laying of a false trail or destruction of evidence,[47] and whether or not they were particularly traumatic for victims.[48]

1. One of the purposes of the Sentencing Act 1991, set out in s 1(d)(iv)(C), is 'to prevent crime and promote respect for the law by ... ensuring that offenders are only punished to the extent justified by ... the presence of any aggravating or mitigating factor concerning the offender and of any other relevant circumstances '. Moreover, s 5(2)(g) provides that, in sentencing an offender, a court 'must have regard to ... the presence of any aggravating or mitigating factor concerning the offender or of any other relevant circumstances'. The Act does not, however, attempt to define 'aggravating factor' (or, for that matter, 'aggravating circumstances'), or in terms spell out those factors which a sentencing judge must regard as 'aggravating'.
2. Notwithstanding the lack of a statutory definition, it must be accepted that the aggravating circumstances of an offence are those that increase its seriousness. Aggravating circumstances point towards greater severity of sentence[49] (albeit their presence will not necessarily lead to the imposition of a more severe penalty). Such circumstances may be present before, in the course of, or following, the commission of an offence. If conduct that follows an offence is so connected with it so as to be viewed as one of its circumstances, that conduct may regarded as an aggravating circumstance of the crime.
3. Some care must be exercised when considering whether post-offence conduct may be taken into account as an aggravating circumstance which increases the objective seriousness of the offence. The circumstances of an offence are not neatly marked out by two lines, one at its technical beginning and the other at its technical end.[50] Common sense and moral sense extend the circumstances of an offence which may be considered when assessing the objective seriousness of a offence, to events which precede and follow its technical limits.[51] Thus, when imposing sentence, a judge is entitled to take into account not only the conduct which actually constitutes the offence, but also the surrounding circumstances that are directly related to it. And it must be borne in mind that the descriptions of aggravating and mitigating circumstances are 'no more than shorthand expressions',[52] and that factors 'cannot be characterised as always aggravating or always mitigating'.[53]
4. In the present case, the appellant had the right to remain silent. Had he done so, his silence could not have been regarded as an aggravating circumstance of the offence. Rather than remain silent, however, through his lies the appellant sought actively to mislead the police, and to deflect their attention from him. The appellant did not merely fail to admit his offending. Instead, he told deliberate lies that went beyond a simple denial of responsibility, those untruths, as we have said, being calculated to divert attention away from his criminal conduct.
5. Thus, as part of the appellant's efforts to deflect suspicion, he raised Ms Geddes' mental health issues and her previous self-harm. During the second record of interview, he asserted that Ms Geddes had hidden her previous injuries from him, and he suggested that she had lied to him about how injury to her had been inflicted. When questioned about how Ms Geddes may have sustained the various healed and healing injuries found in and on her body, the appellant asserted 'a number of people' had access to her and that she 'went to people's houses ... nearly every fuckin' day'. In response to questions about how she sustained injuries on the day of her death, the appellant stated 'someone's killed her ... I haven't killed her'. The evident purpose of those lies was to suggest falsely that Ms Geddes may have harmed herself, or that a third party might have done so, in an attempt to create false leads for the police to follow.
6. In our view, the appellant's lies, designed as they were to mislead the police in that way, were capable of being regarded as aggravating circumstances of the appellant's offence. Hence, the judge was entitled to consider the appellant's lies, motivated by his desire to mislead the police, and divert blame onto the victim or other persons, as aggravating his offending. The appellant's submissions to the contrary cannot be accepted.
7. Ground 2 must fail.

1. In support of ground 2, counsel for the applicant acknowledged that the significant features of aggravation of the appellant's manslaughter included that he killed a vulnerable domestic partner in her own home. Counsel also conceded that general deterrence and denunciation were matters of considerable weight. The appellant's counsel submitted, however, that common features of aggravation were absent. Moreover, the appellant had a limited criminal history; and, as soon as the prosecution preferred a charge of manslaughter rather than murder, he pleaded guilty.
2. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the sentence imposed on the appellant is the highest ever imposed in this State for manslaughter. Bad though the appellant's offending was, counsel submitted, it was not so grievous as to justify this distinction, and the sentence is wholly outside the range of sentences open in the sound exercise of the sentencing discretion. In an endeavour to make good the contention that the sentence imposed was wholly outside the appropriate range, counsel relied on a number of sentencing cases - some decided when the maximum penalty for manslaughter was 20 years' imprisonment, and some decided after the maximum penalty was increased to 25 years' imprisonment - in all of which the sentences imposed for manslaughter were lower.[54]

1. The respondent's counsel submitted that the appellant treated Ms Geddes with 'complete contempt'. She submitted that the appellant's was a grave example of intimate partner violence. Ms Geddes was beaten to death in her own home. Her death was slow. She deteriorated over a period of hours in the presence of the appellant, who took no steps to secure medical treatment for her, and, in fact, callously left her to collect take-away pizza. Ms Geddes was particularly vulnerable, and the offending involved a serious betrayal of trust. Her death was caused against the backdrop of longstanding mistreatment and violence, which had left Ms Geddes with numerous injuries. The appellant's moral culpability was high. Relevantly, he was subject to a CCO at the time of the offending, and had apparently been engaged in a therapeutic component of that order for some hours on the very day he killed his victim.
2. Counsel for the respondent submitted that, beyond the plea of guilty, there was relatively little to mitigate the appellant's offending. He could not call in aid youth, mental ill-health or childhood deprivation. His remorse was limited to that evident from the bare plea of guilty. There had, however, been some delay, and part of his time on remand had been burdensome by reason of the pandemic. The sentencing judge took these matters into account.
3. Identification of current sentencing practices, the respondent's counsel submitted, is difficult given that the maximum penalty for manslaughter was increased from 20 to 25 years' imprisonment for offences committed after 1 July 2020. The appellant's sentence of 15 years and six months' imprisonment, however, equates to 62 per cent of the available 25 year maximum, which is proportionally lower to the sentences imposed in AB,[55] Sherna,[56] Smith[57] and Ristevski,[58] where the 20 year maximum applied. Looked at in percentage terms, the appellant's sentence is not out of step with sentences imposed in other cases of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act.

1. Jessica Geddes was subjected to appalling mistreatment and violence by the appellant over an extended period. His treatment of her was brutal, cruel and sadistic, and rendered her extremely vulnerable. It is no exaggeration to say that it had resulted in Ms Geddes suffering serious injuries from the tips of her toes to the top of her head. At the time of her death, she had evidence of breaks - some of which had not properly knitted - in the bones of her feet, ankles, knees, legs, pelvis, wrists, elbows, arms, shoulders, spine and face. No doubt these would have caused her pain and discomfort - neighbours and others observed her at times to have difficulty walking - and blighted her life. While the applicant is not to be punished for his previous mistreatment of Ms Geddes, that conduct provided a significant relevant context to the offence for which he was sentenced.
2. The appellant's callous treatment of her culminated in Ms Geddes' death in the afternoon of 6 November 2020. He, a physically much bigger and stronger individual, had beaten Ms Geddes, who weighed a mere 46.2 kilograms, so severely that (among other things) she had two full thickness lacerations to her scalp, and an ear had become detached. It almost defies comprehension that a man could inflict such wanton and despicable violence on a vulnerable woman who was entitled to look to him for protection.
3. This Court has previously observed that male violence against women is a scourge in our society, the rate of death and serious injury suffered by women at the hands of their intimate partners being deeply shocking. Those who engage in such violent offending should be in no doubt that it will attract very heavy sentences, thereby expressing the courts' strong denunciation - on behalf of the community - of such abhorrent conduct. [59]
4. General deterrence, denunciation and community protection were all factors that needed to be given weight in the sentence imposed on the appellant. The appellant also needed to be adequately punished for his reprehensible offending.
5. Moreover, notwithstanding the prosecution's acceptance on the plea that specific deterrence was 'less relevant', we consider that factor also needed to be given full weight in the sentence imposed. Just how many months or years the appellant had been violently mistreating Ms Geddes cannot be determined with precision. But her manifold injuries catalogued post-mortem establishes that she had been subjected to severe abuse over a long period, yet the appellant does not appear to have had any insight into his contemptible conduct. Furthermore, we note that the appellant was subject to a CCO when he killed Ms Geddes, so much being a feature of aggravation.[60]
6. At one point in her oral submissions, we understood counsel leading for the appellant to contend that the sentence of 15 years and six months' imprisonment imposed on the appellant is of an order reserved for the worst category of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act. If that was her contention, it cannot be accepted. Being cognisant of the fallacy of naïve fractions, the sentence imposed on the appellant represents a mere 62 per cent of the available maximum penalty. It is hardly of an order reserved for the 'worst category of offending'.[61] That said, it cannot be gainsaid that the appellant's offending represented a very grave example of the offence.
7. The approach this Court must adopt to a complaint that a sentence is manifestly excessive was set out in Leimonitis:[62]

As has been observed more than once, manifest excess is a conclusion which does not depend upon the attribution of identified specific error. Moreover, it is a conclusion that ordinarily does not admit of much elaboration or sustained argument,[63] since excess is, or is not, plainly apparent, and a sentence is, or is not, unreasonable or plainly unjust. The sentence may be excessive because the wrong type of sentence has been imposed, or because the sentence imposed is manifestly too long.[64] A judge of an appellate court will approach the task of assessing whether a sentence is manifestly (as opposed to simply arguably) excessive in much the same way that a sentencing judge approaches the imposition of sentence at first instance; that is, by instinctively synthesising all relevant factors in order to determine whether he or she considers the impugned sentence to be just and appropriate.[65] But it is not enough for appellate intervention to be warranted that the judges of the appellate court regard the impugned sentence as stern, or that they would not themselves have passed the same sentence. Intervention is justified only if the sentence is wholly outside the range of those open in the sound exercise of discretion.[66]

1. Synthesising for ourselves all relevant considerations, we consider that the contention that the appellant's sentence is manifestly excessive cannot be sustained. As was put by the respondent's counsel, beyond the plea of guilty, a moderate period of delay and some custody restrictions, not much mitigates the appellant's very serious offending. Given the extremely serious nature of the appellant's offending - aggravated by the appellant's prolonged mistreatment of his victim - we are unable to conclude that the sentence imposed on the appellant is excessive, manifestly or otherwise. Indeed, in our view, the sentence is just, proportionate and entirely fitting.

[1] By virtue of s 5 of the Crimes Act 1958, the maximum penalty is 25 years' imprisonment.

[2] On 8 August 2023, the appellant offered to plead guilty to manslaughter by gross negligence. That offer was rejected.

[3] Pursuant to s 6AAA of the Sentencing Act 1991, the judge declared that, had the appellant not pleaded guilty, he would have imposed a sentence of 18 years' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 14years.

[4] DPP v Rickerby (No 2) [2024] VSC 334 ('Reasons').

[17] His date of birth is 1 December 1993.

[28] See, for example, Dragovic v The King [2024] VSCA 95, [32]-[33] (Kennedy and T Forrest JJA); Freeburn v The Queen (No 2) [2020] VSCA 176, [45]-[47] (Kyrou, Kaye and Emerton JJA); Director of Public Prosecutions v Ristevski [2019] VSCA 287, [3], [10] (Ferguson CJ and Whelan JA); Felicite v The Queen [2011] VSCA 274; (2011) 37 VR 329, 333 [20] (Redlich JA, with whom Harper JA and Robson AJA agreed).

[30] Felicite v The Queen [2011] VSCA 274; (2011) 37 VR 329, 333 [20] (Redlich JA, with whom Harper JA and Robson AJA agreed), citing Diver v The Queen [2010] VSCA 254, [41] (Ashley JA, with whom Neave and Weinberg JJA agreed).

[34] Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571.

[39] Ibid [61]-[62]. (Footnotes as in original.)

[40] Director of Public Prosecutions (Victoria) v Dalgliesh [2017] HCA 41; (2017) 262 CLR 428, 445 [50]-[52], 447 [56], 448-449 [63], 450 [68] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ), 453-454 [82] (Gageler and Gordon JJ). This is so whether or not an accused pleads guilty; ibid, 449-450 [64]-[68], 454-455 [85].

[41] Generally speaking, the utility of sentencing statistics in respect to manslaughter is limited because the range of culpability is so wide: see R v Jagroop [2009] VSCA 46; (2009) 22 VR 80, 85-86 [35]-[37] (Dodds-Streeton JA, with whom Weinberg JA and Williams AJA agreed), a case concerning manslaughter by criminal negligence.

[42] The second reading speech for the Crimes Amendment (Manslaughter and Related Offences) Bill 2020 (Vic), introducing the 5 year increase to the maximum term of imprisonment before your offence was committed, stated that the government intended to send a clear message that past sentences imposed for the most serious offending involving manslaughter had been inadequate: Victoria, Parliamentary debates, Legislative Assembly, 6 February 2020, 182.6 (Jill Hennessy, Attorney General). See also R v AB (No 2) [2008] VSCA 39; (2008) 18 VR 391, 402-406 [37]-[51] (Warren CJ, Maxwell P and Redlich JA).

[44] Counsel cited DPP v England [1999] VSCA 95; [1999] 2 VR 258 ('England'); R v Boyle [2009] VSCA 289; (2009) 26 VR 219; R Mochenigo [2013] VSCA 231; DPP v Ristevski [2019] VSCA 287, [8] (Ferguson CJ and Whelan JA), cf [75] (Priest JA).

[45] See [22] above.

[46] Counsel cited Moody v The Queen [2014] VSCA 349, [23] (Redlich and Beach JJA); DPP v Ross [2006] VSCA 223; (2006) 166 A Crim R 97, 105 [31] (Maxwell P, Warren CJ and Buchanan JA agreeing).

[48] Counsel cited DPP v Weston [2016] VSCA 243; (2016) 262 A Crim R 304.

[49] England, 263 [17] (Brooking JA, Batt JA agreeing at 268-9 [41], and Charles JA agreeing at 269 [42]).

[52] R v Storey [1998] 1 VR 359, 371 (Winneke P, Brooking, Hayne and Callaway JJA, and Southwell AJA).

[54] Counsel referred to: AB v The Queen (No 2) [2008] VSCA 39; (2008) 18 VR 391; Sherna v The Queen [2011] VSCA 242; (2011) 32 VR 668; DPP v Ristevski [2019] VSCA 287; Freeburn v The Queen (No 2) [2020] VSCA 176; Naddaf v The Queen [2020] VSCA 41; DPP v Turner [2017] VSC 358; Mocenigo v The Queen [2013] VSCA 231; DPP v Atkinson [2024] VSC 286; DPP v Belmore [2024] VSC 213; DPP v Ho [2024] VSC 162; DPP v Latuhoi [2024] VSC 136; DPP v Nguyen [2024] VSC 99; DPP v Maskell [2023] VSC 689; R v Smart and Ors [2023] VSC 469; R v Kennedy [2023] VSC 401; DPP v Armstrong [2023] VSC 374; DPP v Seymour [2023] VSC 324; R v Deng [2023] VSC 257; DPP v Clark [2023] VSC 220; R v Bos [2023] VSC 68; R v Gurlu [2022] VSC 820; DPP v Hocking [2022] VSC 608; DPP v Tiumalu [2024] VSCA 192; Armstrong v The King [2024] VSCA 316; DPP v Mehdi [2025] VSC 532; DPP v Hansen [2025] VSC 534; R v Twomey [2025] VSC 529; DPP v Allen [2025] VSC 219; DPP v Clifford [2025] VSC 199; R v Shumski [2025] VSC 148; DPP v Ivankovic [2025] VSC 50; DPP v Vuong [2024] VSC 821; DPP v Ford [2024] VSC 797; DPP v Riley [2024] VSC 777; DPP v Gatwech-Chouil [2024] VSC 700; DPP v Lin [2024] VSC 685; R v Nguyen [2024] VSC 616; DPP v Sisal [2024] VSC 589; DPP v Wain [2024] VSC 533; and R v Kidd [2024] VSC 458.

[55] R v AB (No 2) [2008] VSCA 39; (2008) 18 VR 391. The sentence of 15 years' imprisonment represented 75 per cent of the available maximum penalty.

[56] Sherna v The Queen [2011] VSCA 242; (2011) 32 VR 668. The sentence of 14 years' imprisonment represented 70 per cent of the available maximum penalty.

[57] Smith v The Queen [2020] VSCA 159. The sentence of 13 years' imprisonment represented 65 per cent of the applicable maximum penalty.

[58] DPP v Ristevski [2019] VSCA 287. The sentence of 13 years' imprisonment represented 65 per cent of the applicable maximum penalty.

[59] Smith v The Queen [2020] VSCA 159, [7] (Maxwell P, Kyrou and Weinberg JJA).

[60] Bieljok v The Queen [2018] VSCA 99, [68] (Weinberg, Beach and Hargrave JJA); DPP v Basic [2017] VSCA 376, [70] (Weinberg, Osborn and Priest JJA); DPP v Milson [2019] VSCA 55, [66] (Priest and Weinberg JJA).

[61] See R v Kilic [2016] HCA 48; (2016) 259 CLR 256, 265-6 [17]-[20] (Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ).

[62] Leimonitis v The Queen [2018] VSCA 198, [32] (Priest JA).

[63] R v Kenny (Unreported, 2 October 1978, Vic, CCA); Noa v The Queen [2013] VSCA 4, [12] (Priest JA); Allen v The Queen [2013] VSCA 44; (2013) 36 VR 565, 573 [51]-[52] (Priest JA).

[64] Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321, 325-6 [6] (Gleeson CJ and Hayne J).

[66] Lowndes v The Queen [1999] HCA 29; (1999) 195 CLR 665, 671-672 [15] [Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ].