1. This is a hearing de novo: Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020 (TASCAT Act), s 75(1). The Tribunal's task is to make the correct or preferable decision based on the evidence adduced by Mr Richardson and the council. I am not limited to the materials that were before the council.
2. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. I am not bound by the rules of evidence, although they are a useful guide including as to questions of weight. More convincing evidence is required to prove an allegation of a particularly serious, grave, or unlikely nature: Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 366; [1938] HCA 34 at 361-362.
3. The Act provides several grounds on which a dog may be declared as dangerous. The council relies on one ground:

Section 29 of the Dog Control Act

1. Section 29 relevantly states

29. Declaration of particular dangerous dog > > (1) A general manager, by notice served on the owner of a dog - > > (a) may declare that dog to be a dangerous dog if - > > (i) the dog has caused serious injury to a person or another animal; or > > (ii) there is reasonable cause to believe that the dog is likely to cause serious injury to a person or another animal; and > > (b) is to give reasons for the declaration in the notice; and > > (c) is to advise the owner of the right of appeal under section 31.

(a) an injury requiring medical or veterinary attention in the nature of - > > (i) a broken bone; or > > (ii) a laceration; or > > (iii) a partial or total loss of sensation or function in a part of the body; or > > (b) an injury requiring medical or cosmetic surgery;

3. 'Laceration' is defined in s 3 as a wound caused by "the tearing of body tissue" or "multiple punctures caused by more than one bite from a dog".
4. It is necessary to interpret two further terms in s 29(1)(a)(ii): 'reasonable cause', and 'likely'.
5. 'Reasonable cause' implies an objective test of reasonableness.
6. Although I could file no cases defining the word 'likely' in the context of the Act, I accept the council's submission that it should be interpreted not as 'more probable than not', but as something more than a remote or theoretical possibility. The latter is a lower threshold. Blow CJ considered 'likely' in s 40(b) of the Mental Health Act 2013 in B v Mental Health Tribunal [2020] TASSC 10. It is worth setting out paragraph [14] of his Honour's judgment in full:

Section 40(b) is concerned with what is "likely". When that word is used in legislation, it can have various meanings. It can mean "more probable than not" or "more than a 50% chance". It can refer to something that might well happen. It can refer to a possibility that is more than a remote or theoretical possibility. The meaning of the word has been considered in a great many cases. See, for example, Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10; Tillmanns Butcheries Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union [1979] FCA 85; (1979) 42 FLR 331 at 339; Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee [2003] EWCA Civ 103; [2003] 3 WLR 999. Much depends on the legislative context. It is significant that the principal purpose or object of s 40(b) is the protection of mentally ill persons and others from risks of harm. Having regard to the purpose and context of the provision, I consider that "likely" should be given a wide interpretation. It should not be interpreted as meaning "more probable than not". It must be interpreted as meaning something more than a remote or theoretical possibility. I think it should be interpreted as referring to something that might well happen. Having regard to the evidence that I have referred to, I consider that it was open to the Tribunal to conclude that, without treatment, the appellant's mental illness was "likely" to result in her killing herself. Ground 2 must therefore fail.

7. I follow his Honour's approach. The word 'likely' in the Act should be given a similarly wide interpretation. By its long title, the Dog Control Act's purpose is to regulate the control and management of dogs. Division 3 of Part 3, which contains s 29, is directed to protecting persons from the risk of dog attack. Like s 40(b) of the Mental Health Act 2013, s 29 of the Dog Control Act is focused on risk.
8. Accordingly, the test is whether, on the evidence before me, there is a substantial, real, and not remote, chance that the dog will cause serious injury (such as a wound or several bites leading to punctures) to a person.
9. That is the threshold question. But it does not follow that a declaration must be made. Section 29(1) confers a discretion: Ayton v Turner [2010] TASMC 7 at [8];[1] Stewart v Heath [2012] TASMC 27 at [32]- [45]; and Duffy v Circular Head Council [2014] TASMC 15 at [25]. If the council establishes a substantial chance, I then need to consider whether I should make a declaration.

Section 30 of the Dog Control Act

1. Although not relied on as a ground justifying the declaration, the council submits that s 30 is nonetheless relevant contextually. It provides:

30. Guard dogs > > (1) The owner of a dog used to guard premises that are not residential premises must notify the general manager, by notice in writing, that the dog is a guard dog. > > Penalty: Fine not exceeding 10 penalty units. > > (2) On receipt of the notification, the general manager is to declare the dog to be a dangerous dog. > > (3) If a dog ceases to be a guard dog, the owner of the dog may apply to the general manager to revoke the declaration that the dog is a dangerous dog. > > (4) On receipt of the application, the general manager may revoke the declaration if satisfied that the dog - > > (a) is no longer a guard dog; and > > (b) is not a dangerous dog.

2. I will return to s 30 later.

1. The council led evidence of three separate incidents in which either or both of Shadow and Titan attacked a person. Mr Richardson disputes that each incident occurred. I commence with the council's evidence, then discuss Mr Richardson's evidence.

1. I received statements of evidence from Nickolas Evison and Brianna Gleeson. Neither was available for cross-examination and their evidence must therefore be approached with caution. Mr Evison described being attacked by two dogs tied up with rope on a ute tray at the park's picnic area. His statement included four photographs of his injuries, which included puncture wounds. Mr Evison made his statement to a council officer two days after the incident.
2. Ms Gleeson described visiting the same park with her son on a different day. She says that both dogs attacked her son, with one latching onto his arm. She described an "open wound on his hand" and said that she had earlier seen those dogs "tied up on a long lead chained to a vehicle unsupervised camped at this park". Ms Gleeson's statement was also made to a council officer two days after this incident.
3. I afford Mr Evison's and Ms Gleeson's evidence limited weight given each's unavailability for cross-examination. Mr Richardson criticised Ms Gleeson's credit. It is unnecessary to consider that criticism, save as to note that the matters raised by Mr Richardson were not relevant. Rather, the reason that I place little weight on her evidence is that, like Mr Evison's evidence, it could not be tested by Mr Richardson in cross-examination. The principle in Briginshaw v Briginshaw is of particular importance here.
4. On balance, I accept that the dog attacks occurred but am unable to make a finding as to whether it was Shadow, Titan, or neither who committed each attack, nor am I able to make any findings about the circumstances in which each attack occurred.

1. The council called Carol Gordon to give evidence, which she did in person. She was an impressive witness, and I accept her evidence without reservation. She swore an affidavit and was unshaken in cross-examination. On 22 May 2024, Mrs Gordon was walking through the outdoor carpark at the Racecourse Crescent shopping complex. She was walking between the cars on her way to Coles. She passed a white ute with a man in the driver's seat and the window down. There were two dogs on the tray of the ute, one of which bit Ms Gordon's arm. A passer-by, Kimbra Davis, checked with Mrs Gordon whether she was okay. Mrs Gordon noted the ute's numberplate which, she was later told by police, was registered to Mr Richardson. She made a complaint to the council and saw a doctor to have her wounds (photographs of which were in evidence) attended to. During the hearing, Mrs Gordon identified Mr Richardson as the driver of the vehicle.
2. Mrs Davis also gave evidence. She was putting groceries in her car parked at the Racecourse Crescent shopping complex on 22 May 2024. She heard dogs "barking intensely," turned around, and saw a man in a white ute. She also saw Mrs Gordon and her dog bite injuries. Her evidence corroborates Mrs Gordon's account.
3. Mr Richardson suggested to Mrs Gordon and Mrs Davis that these events never happened. Each witness rejected that assertion and was unshaken in cross-examination. Each was an independent witness, previously unknown to each other, the council, and Mr Richardson. I accept their evidence and find that either or both of Shadow and Titan bit Mrs Gordon, and that both dogs were behaving aggressively.

1. Joanne Denney, a council officer, swore an affidavit and was cross-examined. She investigated complaints made to the council about Shadow and Titan, visiting Mr Richardson's site at the park many times (she estimated having seen the dogs there some 50 to 70 times since 2023). On occasion, Shadow and Titan were there without Mr Richardson. Whenever Shadow and Titan were there, each was tethered to a car tow ball, to the front of a ute tray, or to a tree. The most common method of tethering was to a tow ball. She had seen the dogs behave aggressively and try to chase people, albeit while tethered.
2. I also received a schedule of complaints made to the council about Shadow and Titan but give this little weight in circumstances where the schedule simply records complaints without providing much detail or analysis. The only conclusion I draw from it is that the council received several complaints about Shadow and Titan.

1. The council also called Tracy Irons. Ms Irons, a qualified canine behaviour trainer with more than 20 years' experience, prepared a dog behaviour assessment report. Ms Irons was an impressive witness who gave considered answers in cross-examination and made appropriate concessions. I accept her evidence.
2. Ms Irons does not live in Tasmania. Her report was prepared without her having seen the dogs, although she viewed a short video of each of them and considered the various witness statements. Her report opined that the dogs "demonstrate ongoing signs of significant psychological distress... [and] are highly reactive and remain in a state of elevated arousal, even during quite periods." She considered each dog's temperament not to differ materially from the other. She concluded that:
   1. each dog is likely to cause serious injury;
   2. together, "the dogs are a compounded threat, with a demonstrated history of causing injury"; and
   3. the dogs' "living arrangement [at the park] places the public and other animals at an unacceptable risk of further serious injury".
3. Shadow and Titan are currently housed at the Dogs Home in Launceston. That Ms Irons' report was prepared before she interacted with Shadow and Titan does not much diminish the weight I give it. Ms Irons visited Shadow and Titan the day before giving evidence and said that her observations were consistent with her report. In her words, she would not have changed anything in her report after having seen the dogs.
4. Ms Irons defined aggression as behaviour at a particular time when stimuli are there. Her approach in assessing temperament, and therefore risk, was to look at whether the behaviour is proportionate to the stimuli. Ms Irons considered that tethering would increase the dogs' reactivity (and therefore aggression), particularly when with unfamiliar people within the dogs' usual environment at the park.
5. She considered Shadow and, particularly, Titan to be "uncomfortable" and in a heightened state of arousal when she visited them at the Dogs Home, such that it would not take much for either to meet their threshold and attack. Shadow had earlier bitten a trainer at the Dogs Home.
6. She considered both dogs to be "highly aroused and reactive", which was "very unusual" for dogs who had remained in a particular environment for so long. Ms Irons considered her conclusions to be valid notwithstanding that she saw the dogs in a foreign environment rather than at the park. Of the five staff members at the Dogs Home, only two had been able to safely interact with Shadow and Titan. One staff member was bitten by one of the dogs.
7. The factual assumptions underpinning Ms Irons conclusions included the attacks on Mr Evison, Ms Gleeson, and Mrs Gordon. I asked Ms Irons whether she was able to disaggregate her conclusions: did her conclusions change if assumed that the attacks on Mr Evison and Ms Gleeson did not occur? Ms Irons said that she was unable to offer an opinion, and that she could not disaggregate her conclusions. I address this issue later.

1. Mr Richardson swore an affidavit and was cross-examined. He also relied on several written statements made by other persons which, in substance, contain lay evidence of Shadow and Titan's good temperament, their importance to Mr Richardson, and the unfortunate circumstances in which Mr Richardson and his son find themselves. It is unnecessary to recount that evidence.
2. Mr Richardson, his son, and the dogs started living at the park in or around 2023. The four have lived at the park consistently since February 2025. Mr Richardson acknowledged that people come and go through the park, although he says that he is not always there during the day and that the dogs are always with his son.
3. Mr Richardson conceded that the dogs provide security but denied that they provide guarding, and therefore were not guard dogs. He said that Titan reacts negatively to high visibility jackets as typically worn by council and police officers.
4. He disputed that Shadow or Titan committed any of the attacks in respect of which the council led evidence. In relation to Mr Evison's evidence, Mr Richardson said that he was not there at the time.
5. In relation to the attack on Mrs Gordon, Mr Richardson produced a bank statement and a receipt showing that a transaction was made at a Petstock store away from Racecourse Crescent on that day. He said that he was not at the Racecourse Crescent car park when Mrs Gordon was attacked.
6. However, the bank statement only shows that Mr Richardson's bank card was used to buy something in a different place on the same day. For reasons which I have endeavoured to explain, I prefer Mrs Gordon's evidence.
7. More generally, Mr Richardson was not an entirely satisfactory witness. I accept the council's submission that Mr Richardson's great affection for Shadow and Titan coloured his evidence. Occasionally, Mr Richardson was evasive in answering questions (for example, when answering whether he operated a business).

1. Mr Richardson also called a neighbour, Nancy Hook. Mrs Hook was a careful and considered witness. She said that she had never heard screaming as described by Ms Gleeson, and that she had never felt threatened by Shadow or Titan. I accept Mrs Hook's evidence as truthful and accurate. However, that Mrs Hook did not hear the attack as described by Ms Gleeson does not mean that it did not occur. She could simply have not heard it.
2. Moreover, Mrs Hook's opinions (and her husband's, which were told to me by her) as to the dogs' temperament are of little weight when compared to the expert opinion of Ms Irons.

1. I repeat that the council relies only on s 29(1)(a)(ii) as a ground for each declaration; that is, that there is reasonable cause to believe that each dog is likely to cause serious injury.
2. The council relies on three categories of inference to suggest that threshold is satisfied. The first is the dogs' history of injuring people. The second is evidence, primarily from Ms Irons' report, of the dogs' temperaments and demonstrated poor socialisation and aggression. The third is the kennelling arrangements which, in a public place like the park, heighten the risk.
3. The council told me that it does not rely on s 29(1)(a)(i) as an alternative ground. That surprised me, given that the council led evidence of attacks by the dogs. I am not bound by the approach taken by the council and must, instead, make the correct and preferable decision. However, given that Mr Richardson was self-represented and given how he and the council ran their respective cases, it would be unfair for me to rely on this alternative ground or pathway. I therefore confine myself to the ground relied upon by the council and the three categories of inference.
4. I find that the dogs ordinarily live with Mr Richardson and his son in the park, typically tethered to a vehicle and often on the tray of a ute owned by Mr Richardson or his son.
5. The park is a public place and members of the public, including children, often are nearby. Sometimes the dogs will be at the park without Mr Richardson or his son being present.
6. Mr Richardson's intention is to continue living at the park with Shadow and Titan, although he does not intend to be there forever. Accordingly, although tethered, Shadow and Titan would be in a public place where interaction with members of the public, including vulnerable members such as children, is likely.
7. I am unable to find that the attacks occurred as described by Ms Gleeson and Mr Evison. Having regard to the vagueness of their evidence and the diminished weight (having regard to their unavailability for cross-examination), and the principle in Briginshaw v Briginshaw as explained earlier, I am not affirmatively satisfied that Shadow and Titan committed those attacks as described.
8. I find that either Shadow or Titan (I am unable to determine which) attacked Mrs Gordon as described by her. Of course, there are two separate dogs in issue. The conduct of or risk posed by one cannot be transposed to the other. This is where Ms Irons' evidence assumes great importance.

Is there is reasonable cause to believe that each dog is likely to cause serious injury?

1. There is reasonable cause to believe that Shadow and Titan are each likely to cause serious injury. The evidence of Mrs Gordon (corroborated by Mrs Davies) and Ms Irons is particularly persuasive. Ms Irons offered opinions in respect of both Shadow and Titan. That she was unable to disaggregate her opinions in respect of the factual assumptions underpinning them does not render her entire evidence inutile. She examined the way in which Mr Richardson keeps the dogs and considered the dogs' behaviour in the Dogs Home.
2. I am satisfied that each dog is likely to cause serious injury to another person or animal.

Should the discretion be exercised to declare each dog as dangerous?

1. I am guided by the following principles in exercising the discretion. The Act's paramount purpose is protection of the public: Munday v Larrarte at [42]; Stewart v Heath at [38]. So much is apparent from the Act's silence as to other matters relevant to the discretion: Stewart v Heath at [43]. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the consequences of a declaration for Mr Richardson are irrelevant: Stewart v Heath at [45].
2. I accept that Mr Richardson is attached to Shadow and Titan. There is some lay evidence of each having a good temperament. I also accept that Mr Richardson is in an unfortunate situation, as is his son (who lives with several disabilities), and that the dogs provide support and comfort to them. However, these matters do not constitute extraordinary circumstances. In any event, they are overwhelmed by my conclusion that there is reasonable cause to believe that Shadow and Titan are likely to cause serious injury.
3. The council does not rely on s 30 as a ground for declaring the dog to be dangerous. It nonetheless contends that s 30 is relevant as evidencing Parliament's intent that a guard dog be regulated as a dangerous dog. This is relevant to the residual discretion. Section 30 will be satisfied where a dog is used to guard a premise, and that premise is a non-residential premise. Premise is defined in s 3 as "land or any part of any premises or land and includes private premises and a public place". Residential premises is defined as "any premises lawfully used as a residence". The Act adopts the definition of 'public place' in the Police Offences Act 1935. Section 3 of that Act defines as a park as a public place. By this definition, St Leonards Park is a public place. The uncontradicted evidence is that Mr Richardson, his son, and Shadow and Titan live in their cars at a park.
4. It is uncontroversial that neither Shadow nor Titan is registered as a guard dog. It is unnecessary for me to determine whether the dogs are guard dogs within the meaning of s 30. I find that the dogs are used to provide some security to Mr Richardson and his property. Whether, on a proper construction of s 30, they are guard dogs is not to the point.

1. There is reasonable cause to believe that each of Shadow and Titan is likely to cause serious injury to another person or animal. I am also satisfied that, weighing up the discretionary matters, I should exercise my discretion to declare each dog as dangerous.
2. The appeal fails. The correct and preferable decision is to declare each of Shadow and Titan a dangerous dog. I affirm each decision under review.

[1] Section 10A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1931 is inapplicable because the Dog Control Act 2000 was passed (on 14 November 2000) after the Justice Legislation (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2000 commenced (on 20 December 2000). However, the text, context, and purpose nonetheless compel a conclusion that the word 'may' in the Dog Control Act is discretionary. See generally, albeit in a different statutory context, Director of Housing v Lefevre [2021] TASSC 33 at [48]- [51].