[2014] TASMC 15
General information, not legal advice.
Magistrates' Court of Tasmania
2014-07-16
Magistrate Michael
Original judgment source is linked above.
COURT: MAGISTRATES COURT TASMANIA (CIVIL DIVISION)
CITATION: Duffy v Circular Head Council [2014] TASMC 15
Animals - Various statutory provisions - Regulation of companion animals - Declaration of dangerous dog under Dog Control Act 2000 - Nature of discretion.
Dog Control Act 2000 (Tas), ss 29, 31.
Stewart v Heath [2012] TASMC 27; Ayton v Turner [2010] TASMC 17.
Decision Number: [2014] TASMC 15
(a) The appeal is conducted as an original proceeding to be determined by me upon the evidence called before me, in accordance with the provisions of the Act, in particular those contained in s 29;
(b) A declaration under s 29(1) should only be made after consideration of a two-step process, namely:
(i) Does one or the other, or both of the preconditions set out in s 29 (1) exist? In this case the contention of the respondent on the appeal is consistent with the basis for the declaration set out in the notice i.e., the precondition set out in s 29(1)(ii) that:
There is reasonable cause to believe that the dog is likely to cause serious injury to a person or another animal.
(ii) If so, should the declaration be made in the exercise of discretion? That discretion must be exercised judicially. In relation to the matters that might be relevant to the exercise of that discretion, I refer to, and respectfully adopt the analysis of Magistrate McTaggart in Stewart v Heath [2012] TASMC 27 at [43] and [44].
"Bandit suddenly jerked upright looking past me, and as I turned my head to see what he was looking at, Brew hit me in the head with enough force to break one of my teeth as my jaw was slammed together. Brew had cleared the dividing fence without a sound and proceeded to savagely attack Bandit, and all attempts to separate them failed...I picked up a long handled shovel, and as Brew was so intent on keeping his jaws clamped on Bandit, I took the opportunity to shove the handle under Brew's chain collar, grabbed the end of the handle and twisted it until his oxygen was cut off. He finally released Bandit, who crawled away and then got to his feet and ran for the gate up to the kennels."
(a) I accept the opinion of the three witnesses called by the Council as described above. All have significant expertise, and expressed considered and balanced opinions;
(b) I accept Ms Kim Taylor's evidence concerning Brew's attack on Bandit. Whilst he did not actually cause serious injury, it is clear that he was intent on doing so, and had he punctured an artery or significant blood vessel during the attack, may well have caused serious injury or even death. It is also concerning that this attack took place despite the presence of a human, and that he used his strength and mobility to force his way past the human on his way to attack Bandit. He only desisted after Ms Taylor had applied a choking force around his neck, and even then persisted with the attack for some time. He directed his attack at Bandit's throat from the outset. The attack was particularly aggressive and focussed, and I note in this regard, that he did not bark or make a sound prior to the attack;
(c) Although Mr Duffy spent some considerable time in the hearing focussing on why Brew may have acted in this way, it seems to me that that issue is of little relevance to this determination. In my view, it is impossible to determine what factors induced Brew to undertake this attack. The concern expressed by Dr Dwyer and Mr Jordan is that if such factors, or similar factors were present again, then there is a probability that Brew would act in the same way;
(d) I am not satisfied that Brew's propensity to attack would be limited to another dog. Mr Jordan was of the view that had Brew not been restrained by a chain on 10 December 2013, he would have attacked him. It seems that he demonstrated similar aggression towards the woman and the child walking along the footpath, and the people picnicking across the road. Whilst it may be the case that Brew was simply defending his immediate territory from perceived intruders, it is impossible to conclude that Brew would be capable of respecting the notional boundary between the property and public areas. I have no doubt that Mr Duffy and Ms Kathleen Taylor have truthfully described their experience of Brew in the past. However, the reality is that that experience is limited to times when Brew has been in their presence and under their supervision. I accept Mr Jordan's point that whilst Brew's behaviour may be controllable in those circumstances, his aggression and propensity to attack may well manifest when they are not present. Mr Jordan's experience on 10 December 2013 supports this conclusion; and
(e) I accept also the evidence of Dr Dwyer and Mr Jordan to the effect that any attack by Brew, given his strength and power, would be likely to have devastating consequences to his target. I have no doubt that Brew would be capable of causing the death of another animal, or even a child. He would certainly be capable of causing serious injury to any other being, animal or human.
(a) The circumstances in which Brew, and the other dogs, are housed by Mr Duffy and Ms Taylor are clearly deficient. The property is unfenced; it is adjacent to public areas including a shop frequented by the public, and a public camping and recreation area. It is clear that from time to time, Brew is left on the property without human supervision. I do not consider chaining Brew to be an appropriate or effective method of obviating the risk posed by his propensity to attack. Mistakes can happen and if Brew were to escape this restraint, the results in the event of an attack could be catastrophic;
(b) I am not satisfied that either Mr Duffy or Ms Taylor has appropriate and adequate insight into the danger posed by Brew. This is understandable; he is a member of their family and their own personal experience of him has been benign. However, it is this experience and their refusal to contemplate the reality of danger posed by his conduct on 13 December, or at other times in their absence, which suggests that the declaration is necessary. I cannot be satisfied that they would take the steps and measures necessary to ensure that Brew is appropriately restrained, and any resulting danger is sufficiently obviated, because they do not believe that such danger exists. I have found to the contrary. It follows that the protective mechanism referred to in s 29 is appropriate in the circumstances; and
Duffy
Circular Head Council [2014] TASMC 15