REYNOLDS -v- NICHOLSON [2026] WASC 15 (30 January 2026)

1. The appellant was personally present in court when the matter was tried but, when the matter was first called, refused to answer to his name 'Kellan John Reynolds'.[1] Instead, he informed the court that he was known by the 'common tongue or common language as Kellan John, gifted to me by our creator',[2] and that he appeared 'in defence of the legal named decedent'.[3]
2. The magistrate accepted the appellant's appearance for the purpose of the trial and offered him an opportunity to enter a plea to each of the charges.[4] The appellant's plea to all charges was 'no jurisdiction'.[5] Recognising this plea was incompetent, the magistrate entered pleas of not guilty on the appellant's behalf and proceeded with the trial.[6]
3. During trial, the prosecution called two witnesses who gave oral evidence: police constables Nicholson and Turner.
4. The prosecution also tendered:

(a) a bundle of three photographs of the vehicle driven by the appellant, including of the plates displayed on the vehicle;[7] and

(b) two evidentiary certificates issued pursuant to s 110 of the Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008 (WA) (RTAA).[8]

1. The appellant did not testify and led no witnesses. He relied solely on a bundle of documents (Exh 4) which was received into evidence by consent subject to considerations of relevance and weight.[9]
2. A review of the trial transcript reveals that the appellant's defence was founded upon notions of 'pseudolaw' including a version of the 'strawman duality' theory.[10] The magistrate rejected this defence and, having been satisfied that each charge had been proven beyond reasonable doubt, convicted the appellant on all three offences.[11]
3. The magistrate imposed a sentence comprising a 9‑month cumulative licence disqualification period, fines totalling $1,500, and half the annual cost of a licence fee ($346.37).[12] His Honour also ordered the appellant to pay costs in the sum of $272.70.[13]
4. The appellant now seeks leave to appeal his convictions and sentence pursuant to the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) (CA Act). He relies on numerous grounds including arguments as to the purported operation of the Commonwealth Constitution (Constitution).
5. In early December 2024, in accordance with orders made by Forrester J, the appellant complied with s 78B(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) by sending a notice combined with his written submissions in support of the appeal to the Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth and the States.
6. No Attorney sought either to intervene or to have the matter removed to the High Court.

1. The following issues arise on my reading of the appellant's materials:

(1) Whether I should recuse myself because of apprehended bias.

(2) Whether any one or more of a series of orders sought by the applicant, after judgment was reserved, should be made.

(3) Whether leave should be given to the appellant to adduce further evidence on appeal.

(4) Whether the court transcript of the proceedings below is an accurate record of those proceedings.

(5) Whether leave should be granted to the appellant with respect to any one or more of his grounds of appeal.

(6) Whether any of the appellant's grounds of appeal should be upheld.

1. After judgment in the appeal proceedings was reserved, the appellant filed an application seeking my recusal because of an apprehension of bias.
2. The recusal application formed part of a broader application (r 68 application) purportedly brought pursuant to r 68 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2005 (WA) (CP Rules).
3. The test for determining whether a judicial officer is to be disqualified for apprehended bias is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judicial officer might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judicial officer is required to decide.[14]
4. As the High Court observed in Charisteas,[15] the test is a two-step process:

first, 'it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge... to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits'; and, second, there must be articulated a 'logical connection' between that matter and the feared departure from the judge deciding the case on its merits.

1. According to the appellant, the conduct from which an apprehension of bias may be inferred occurred during an exchange with the respondent's counsel at a directions hearing on 20 June 2025.
2. The directions hearing had been listed to discuss questions identified by the court after judgment was reserved. The questions were initially put to the respondent in correspondence from my associate, copied to the appellant, in May 2025.
3. Relevantly, at the directions hearing the court queried whether an evidentiary certificate upon which the prosecution had sought to rely at trial (Exh 2) was sufficient to safely ground the appellant's convictions on the expired vehicle licence and number plate charges.
4. After explaining the point, I understood the appellant to accept an invitation extended by the court to add a further ground of appeal relating to this issue.[16]
5. Noting the respondent also expressed no difficulty with the court adopting such an approach,[17] I relevantly made orders:

(1) Permitting the appellant to rely upon the following additional ground of appeal being that:

The learned magistrate erred in fact and in law in convicting the appellant on [the number plate charge] and AR 15174/2023 [the expired vehicle licence charge] in that the evidence relied upon by the prosecution in support of those charges, specifically [Exh 2] being a certificate purportedly issued pursuant to s 110(3) of the [RTAA], was insufficient to prove the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

(2) Causing the appellant's grounds of appeal to be deemed amended accordingly, and dispensing with any need for the filing and service of amended written grounds of appeal.

(3) Facilitating the filing of further submissions in relation to the additional ground of appeal by both parties.

1. Despite the orders being for the potential benefit of the appellant himself, the appellant now argues that at the directions hearing:

(1) I engaged in 'speculative reinterpretation' of Exh 2 and in conduct which 'raises a reasonable apprehension that [I] may not bring an impartial mind to the constitutional questions before the Court'.[18]

(2) During an exchange with counsel for the respondent, I 'intervened' to 'judicially correct' the respondent's 'reliance' on s 110(3) of the RTAA (being the subsection referred to in Exh 2) 'without notice or request from the appellant',[19] in order to assist the respondent in 'remedying' a 'fatal evidentiary defect'.[20]

1. Regarding (1) above, the appellant among other things suggests that a judicial officer who is prepared to 'act in assistance of one party's arguments while failing to uphold the same duty to inquire into unresolved constitutional issues on the record ... violates the requirements of procedural fairness and judicial neutrality'.[21]
2. With respect to (2) above, the appellant appears to rely on the following words spoken by me at the directions hearing as part of an exchange with counsel for the respondent:[22]

MUSIKANTH J: - - - - - - Noting that the certificate ... appears to come straight out of section 110(1), rather than (3) ... It was simply an error to refer to (3) and it should have been (1).

1. The full exchange, relevantly for context, was as follows:[23]

MUSIKANTH J: Yes. All right. It might just assist to have a preliminary discussion about those two grounds, just so that I can indicate some preliminary observations of the court given that this hasn't been articulated by the appellant. So perhaps turning first to the - and again, I stress that these are just preliminary observations - - -

BERSON, MR: Yes, your Honour.

MUSIKANTH J: - - - based on the certificate.

BERSON, MR: Yes, your Honour.

MUSIKANTH J: So just turning first to the expired vehicle licence charge. Now, the question then is, if one is looking at section 110, sub (3), and I think this was appreciated by your office in the written response that was sent, it would seem, at least on a preliminary basis to the court, that the purpose of that section is fairly narrow, when one compares it to 110(1) -

BERSON, MR: Yes.

MUSIKANTH J: - - - which is a far broader purpose on its face. Noting that the certificate, when one reads it as whole, towards the end uses language which appears to come straight out of section 110(1), rather than (3). So I'm surmising that the thrust of the written submissions, at least relating to this charge, will be to the effect they properly understood the certificate. It was simply an error to refer to (3) and it should have been (1).

BERSON, MR: Yes, your Honour.

MUSIKANTH J: Yes. All right. So if that construction is accepted, would it be your position, likely, that there was sufficient evidence because the matters to which the certificate alludes are all matters which are permissible under sub (1)?

BERSON, MR: Yes, your Honour.

(emphasis added)

1. In my view, it would have been objectively clear to a fair‑minded lay observer that nothing said by me during my exchange with counsel for the respondent could reasonably:

(1) Have amounted to any 'speculative reinterpretation' of Exh 2, let alone to a 'rectification' or 'correction' of any potential error.

(3) Have been perceived as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension that I might not bring an impartial mind to bear in determining the appeal, whether in relation to any question raised by the appellant concerning the application of the Constitution or otherwise.

1. I accordingly dismiss the application for my recusal.

1. In addition to seeking my recusal, the appellant by the r 68 application also seeks orders to the effect that:

(1) All proceedings, charges, and prosecutorial actions in the Magistrates Court Midland MDL no: 3969505 arising from or related to the matters now before this court be permanently quashed or stayed, for want of jurisdiction and procedural fairness.

(2) Declaring that the said proceedings are void ab initio, having proceeded in breach of section 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and contrary to Chapter III of the Constitution.

(3) All prosecution notices, courtroom transcripts, bench notes, and any related recording material relevant to proceedings in the Magistrates Court (including Midland and Armadale matters connected with this appeal) be produced and made available to the appellant without cost, in the interests of justice and pursuant to the duty of Commonwealth and judicial officers to inquire into jurisdictional issues and procedural fairness.

(4) Affirming the facts stated in the appellant's 'unrebutted affidavits and submissions' filed in this matter and in matter SJA 1009 of 2025[24] 'as standing truth in law for all procedural and constitutional purposes, in the absence of response from the [r]espondent'.

(5) Declaring the record of proceedings dated 5 January 2023 (presumably in the proceedings below) as being 'void for procedural fraud, misrepresentation of attendance, and breach of natural justice'.

(6) Finding that certain submissions filed by the respondent in this matter failed to respond to the appellant's 'properly served constitutional objections, affidavit evidence, and procedural history, thereby constituting tacit acquiescence under the doctrine of constructive estoppel as per Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394'.

(7) Both this matter and matter SJA 1009 of 2025 are 'procedurally and jurisdictionally linked and be determined 'consistently'.

1. In connection with the last point, I pause to note that on 30 July 2025 Forrester J dismissed an application by the appellant to have this appeal and matter SJA 1009 of 2025 heard together.[25]
2. By s 50(2) of the CA Act, this court may make rules prescribing any matter that is required or permitted by the CA Act to be prescribed, or that is necessary or convenient to be prescribed for the giving effect to its purposes.
3. Rule 68 of the CP Rules is one such rule. It reads as follows:

68. Interim order, applying for

(1) At any time after an appeal is commenced and before it is concluded a party may apply for an interim order or an order amending or cancelling an interim order.

(2) To make such an application, the party must lodge a Form 23 (Application in an appeal) with -

(a) an affidavit by the applicant or the applicant's legal practitioner or both explaining why the interim order is wanted; and

(b) a document setting out the proposed order,

1. By r 58 of the CP Rules, the expression 'interim order', in an appeal, is defined to mean:

(a) an order staying the proceedings in the primary court or the execution of the primary court's decision;

(b) an order made under the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 section 12;

(c) an order granting bail made under the Bail Act 1982;

(d) an urgent appeal order;

(e) an order that an appellant provide security for a respondent's costs;

(f) an order extending or shortening the time for obeying a requirement of these rules, other than the time for commencing an appeal;

(g) any other order that the Court may make before the appeal is concluded, other than an order giving or refusing to give leave to appeal;

1. The evident purpose of r 68 is to empower this court to make orders that are relevant to the proceedings or decision to which to the appeal relates, or to the proper conduct of the appeal, pending conclusion of the appeal itself.
2. This much is clear from the types of orders enumerated in the definition of the expression 'interim order' in r 58.
3. Given this statutory purpose, and noting the r 68 application was filed after judgment in the appeal was reserved and after both parties had been afforded more than ample opportunity to raise any matters potentially relevant to its proper disposition, I do not consider r 68 to be an appropriate vehicle for an application of the kind now made.
4. The r 68 application, which is in any event without merit, is accordingly dismissed.

Application to adduce further evidence on appeal & accuracy of transcript

1. By s 40(1)(e) of the CA Act, the court has power to admit 'any other evidence' in a criminal appeal.
2. While the discretionary power to admit such further evidence is not expressly limited or confined by the CA Act, the subject matter, scope and purpose of the relevant provisions in that Act, and the issues to be resolved in each appeal, will indicate those considerations which are relevant to its exercise.[26]
3. The appellant proposes to adduce further evidence in the form of two 'affidavits' affirmed by him on 11 November 2024 (first affidavit) and 27 November 2024 (second affidavit) respectively.[27]
4. For the most part these affidavits comprise a series of prolix submissions which are largely dependent on pseudo law concepts repeatedly rejected by Australian courts. Several annexures are also attached to the first affidavit. The sole purpose of all but one annexure appears to be to sustain these repeatedly rejected concepts.
5. The one exception is an affidavit by one George Christoper Carey affirmed on 4 November 2024, which is annexed to the first affidavit.[28]
6. Mr Carey deposes that he witnessed the trial on 4 May 2024 and suggests that the trial transcript is, at times, erroneous. His evidence is to the effect that he recalled certain verbal exchanges between the appellant and the magistrate which do not appear in the court transcript.
7. As Campbell JA (Whealy and Meagher JJA agreeing) observed in Altaranesi v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales:[29]

Any question that arises in a court about whether the transcript of a hearing in another court or tribunal is defective can sometimes be decided on the basis of evidence, but starting with a presumption of fact that an official transcript is accurate, and exercising caution in allowing the official record to be supplemented... The presumption of accuracy of the transcript is one of fact. It is a presumption of the type that Hodgson JA described in Hill v Woollahra Municipal Council & Ors [2003] NSWCA 106 at [52] as being:

'... associated with a reasonable inference based on what ordinarily happens in the ordinary course of human affairs...In deciding whether the presumption of regularity is rebutted, this inference from the ordinary course of human affairs carries some weight, which may vary according to the proved circumstances.'

1. The respondent accepted no prejudice would arise from the reception of Mr Carey's affidavit into evidence, it ultimately being the respondent's position that the affidavit was 'insufficient to challenge the accuracy of the transcript'.[30]
2. Noting the respondent's position, I will grant leave to the appellant to adduce the affidavit of Mr Carey by way of further evidence on appeal. However, I otherwise refuse to grant leave to the appellant to adduce the first and second affidavits which otherwise do not amount to evidence (or at least relevant evidence) at all.
3. Mr Carey's affidavit of course falls to be considered subject to the weight of the other evidence, including the certified transcripts.
4. The court received certified copies of the relevant transcripts relating to the magistrates court hearings on 10 March 2025. The transcripts were certified in accordance with r 19(5) and r 21 of the Magistrates Court General Rules 2005 (WA) read with s 50A of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA).
5. Each certificate reads in substantially the same terms.
6. Relevantly, for present purposes, the certificate relating to the trial before Magistrate Mahon on 8 May 2024 reads as follows:

Certificate Made Under Section 50A of the Evidence Act

I, the undersigned, [name redacted], certify that:

1. I am employed by VIQ Solutions as a Quality Coach at [address redacted].
2. At the request of the Magistrates Court of Perth, I reviewed pages 1 to 168 of the transcript of proceedings relating to the matter number AR 15712-15714/2023, Western Australia Police v Kellan John Reynolds, heard before Magistrate Mahon on 8 May 2024.
3. This review involved obtaining a copy of the aforementioned transcript from the company's records and reading it while listening to the recording of the aforementioned proceedings which were produced by Transcriptionists of VIQ Solutions on 16 July 2024 and provided to the Magistrates Court of Perth on 17 July 2024.
4. The proceedings were clearly audible and there was no evidence of the audio having been damaged in any way.
5. I was able to confirm that the audio was of the proceedings in question by:

(a) Comparing the details provided in the system pertaining to the audio with the log sheet produced by a Magistrates Court of Western Australia employee at the time the recording was made; and

1. After review of the audio and the transcript, I advise that the transcript was produced in good faith and is an accurate and complete transcription of the aforementioned proceedings.

[Signature]

[redacted]

Quality Coach

Certified on 11/12/2024

(emphasis added)

1. As would be apparent, the quality coach who signed the s 50A certificate certified that the work undertaken in reviewing the transcript included listening to an (undamaged) recording of the proceedings themselves; a recording which was 'clearly audible' according to the signatory.
2. The exercise described in the certificate is to be contrasted with that implicit in Mr Carey's evidence which appears to have been based entirely on Mr Carey's own recollection of events, nearly six months after the trial, in circumstances where, on Mr Carey's own version, he had not been permitted to take contemporaneous notes.
3. Accordingly, and while I will admit Mr Carey's affidavit into evidence to the limited extent previously indicated, I consider the certified transcript to be a far more reliable indicator of what transpired at the trial before Magistrate Mahon on 8 May 2024.
4. I have neither any reason to doubt that the process outlined in the certificate was properly undertaken by its signatory, nor the completeness or accuracy of the trial transcript as certified.
5. Accordingly, and mindful of the presumption of fact referred to earlier,[31] I find the transcript to be an accurate and complete record of the hearing to which it relates.

1. On 9 December 2024, the appellant effectively confirmed that his grounds of appeal comprised 32 grounds contained within his appeal notice filed on 24 July 2024 (Appeal notice), and more than 100 points raised in his written submissions filed on 11 November 2024.[32]
2. The appellant's grounds, which are prolix and difficult to understand, for the most part incorporate legal terminology without identifying any specific error.
3. They fall broadly into three categories:

(1) Grounds concerning the trial before Magistrate Mahon on 8 May 2024.

(2) Grounds concerning an earlier mention hearing on 4 December 2023 before Magistrate Thompson.

(3) Grounds relating to the Constitution.

1. Doing the best I can, the appellant's grounds appear to be to the following effect:[33]

(1) With respect to the trial before Magistrate Mahon, that his Honour:

(a) Erred by listing matter PE 2383/2023 (evidently for mention only) on the day of the trial.[34]

(b) Erred in relation to permitting the prosecution to rely on evidentiary certificates.[35]

(c) Failed to consider or adhere to various matters directed to or concerning the 'strawman duality theory'.[36]

(d) Was biased.[37]

(2) With respect to the earlier mention hearing before Magistrate Thompson, that her Honour:

(a) Failed to consider or adhere to various matters apparently directed to or concerning the 'strawman duality theory'.[38]

(b) Failed to verify the 'legitimacy' of evidence produced by the respondent.[39]

(c) Failed to verify the validity of the prosecution notice.[40]

(d) Was biased.[41]

(3) With respect to the Constitution, that:

(a) The magistrate acted in a 'protectionist' and 'discriminatory' manner or otherwise infringing s 92 of the Constitution.[42]

(b) The appellant has been discriminated against contrary to s 117 of Constitution. [43]

(c) Section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution is enlivened in relation to the seizure of his vehicle. [44]

(d) Sections 79 and 80 of the Constitution are somehow engaged.[45]

(e) Section 109 of the Constitution is also somehow engaged.[46]

1. In addition, as noted earlier, at the directions hearing on 20 June 2025, I granted leave to the appellant to rely upon the additional ground of appeal identified in paragraph 21(1) above.
2. For reasons which will soon become apparent, it is convenient first to consider the additional ground of appeal and the two charges to which it relates; namely, the expired vehicle licence charge and the number plate charge.

1. By this ground it is contended that the learned magistrate erred in finding Exh 2 was sufficiently adequate to safely ground a conviction on the expired vehicle licence charge and the number plate charge.

1. Exh 2 was tendered into evidence by the prosecution at trial through Constable Nicholson. It is the focal point of the additional ground and appears to have played a central role in the appellant's conviction on both the expired vehicle licence charge and number plate charge.
2. Exh 2 reads as follows:

Certificate Evidence

I, [redacted], being a person delegated by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Department of Transport to issue certificate evidence under Section 110 Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008, certify that the vehicle register maintained in accordance with Section 14 of the Road Traffic (Vehicles) Act 2012 has recorded that;

As at 30 September 2023 the white 2010 Ssangyong utility identified by the Vehicle Identification number (VIN) [redacted] and engine number [redacted] was not a licenced vehicle.

At the last expiry date, the vehicle licence holder was;

REYNOLDS, Kellan John

Current Address: [redacted]

Acquisition date: 18 September 2017

It is recorded that the previous vehicle licence issued for this vehicle expired on 17 December 2021 and the number plate at that time was [redacted].

It is recorded that on 29 April 2022 the number plates [redacted] were returned to the CEO.

There is no record of the purchase of a Temporary Movement Permit for the vehicle described above for a period including 30 September 2023.

This certificate evidence is issued pursuant to Section 110(3) of the Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008.

A fact specified in this certificate appears or is derived from the vehicle register or another record maintained by the CEO.

[signed by delegate of the CEO]

(emphasis added)

1. The challenge to the sufficiency of Exh 2 is based on the uncontroversial fact that although its author records it was issued pursuant to s 110(3) of the RTAA, its contents stray beyond the type of evidence which s 110(3) contemplates.
2. Section 110(3) of the RTAA is to be read with, relevantly, s 110(4)(a). The two provisions read as follows:

(3) For the purposes of a prosecution for an offence under any written law the CEO or any person authorised by the CEO for that purpose may issue a certificate which states -

(a) that on a specified date or during a specified period -

(i) a vehicle was registered; or

(ii) a vehicle was not registered,

under a road law in the name of any person specified in the certificate; or

(b) that as at a specified date or during a specified period a specified person in the certificate was -

(i) registered as the holder of a vehicle licence in respect of a specified vehicle; or

(ii) nominated under section 5(2) as the owner of a specified vehicle.

(4) In a prosecution for an offence under any written law -

(a) a certificate issued or purporting to be issued under subsection (3) is evidence of the facts stated in the certificate ...

1. The matters with which s 110(3) are concerned are limited to:

(a) whether a particular vehicle was registered or not registered, under a road law,[47] in the name of a specified person on a particular date or during a particular period; and/or

(b) whether a specified person was registered as the holder of a vehicle licence or was the nominated owner of a specified vehicle, on a particular date or during a particular period.

1. Exh 2 does not on its face address any of the above matters. Instead, it seeks to record:

(a) that a specified vehicle was not a licenced vehicle on a specified date;

(b) that a specified person was the vehicle licence holder of the vehicle at the 'last expiry date';

(c) that on a specified date the 'previous vehicle licence' which had been issued for the specified vehicle expired;

(d) the details of the number plate issued for the specified vehicle at the time the 'previous vehicle license' expired;

(e) the date on which the number plate(s) referenced in the certificate were returned to the CEO; and

(f) the fact that there was no record of the purchase of a Temporary Movement Permit for the specified vehicle for 'a period including' the specified date referred to in (a) above.

1. The respondent accepts that, despite referring to s 110(3) of the RTAA, the facts certified by the author of Exh 2 go beyond what is permissibly contained in a certificate issued pursuant to that subsection.[48] If the only provision that can be relied on is s 110(3), the respondent accepts that the certificate is inadmissible.[49]
2. Nonetheless, according to the respondent:

(a) the reference in Exh 2 to s 110(3) was 'erroneous';[50]

(b) Exh 2 'otherwise complies' with the requirements of s 110(1) and 110(2) of the RTAA;[51] and

(c) the 'true nature or subject matter' of Exh 2 is that of a certificate 'purporting' to have been issued pursuant to s 110(1).[52]

1. Section 110(1) of the RTAA is to be read with, relevantly, s 110(2). The two provisions read as follows:

(1) For the purposes of a prosecution for an offence under a road law or verifying the accuracy of information provided to corresponding authority under section 13(1) or to another Australian driver licensing authority under section 14(2), the CEO or a person authorised by the CEO may issue a certificate stating that a fact specified in the certificate appears in or is derived from the driver's licence register or another record kept by the CEO or the Commissioner for Main Roads under a road law.

(2) A certificate purporting to be issued under subsection (1) or under a law in force in another jurisdiction that corresponds to that subsection is evidence of any fact stated in the certificate.

Exh 2 a certificate purportedly issued under s 110(1)?

1. According to the respondent, Exh 2 is a certificate purportedly issued under s 110(1) for three reasons:

(1) The word 'purport' bears its ordinary meaning[53] being, relevantly, '... to convey to the mind as the meaning or thing intended ...'. [54]

(2) The 'true nature or subject matter' of Exh 2 is that of a certificate which purports to be issued pursuant to s 110(1). Therefore, the principle of falsa demonstration non nocet applies to the extent required. [55]

(3) Noting a particular observation I made in Porter v Kelly,[56] the reference to s 110(3) in Exh 2 should not detract from a document which 'otherwise' purports to be a certificate issued under s 110(1).[57]

1. I accept that, for present purposes, the ordinary meaning of 'purport' bears the meaning contended for by the respondent. It follows from that meaning that the focus of the inquiry into what a document 'purports to be' is on the message (if any) conveyed to the ordinary reader as to the meaning or thing intended by its author or signatory. This process necessarily requires the drawing of inferences from the contents of the document itself.
2. I also accept the effect that Exh 2 in substance describes matters alluded to in s 110(1). However, significantly, the document also does something else. It asserts expressly that it is 'certificate evidence ... issued pursuant to [s] 110(3) of the [RTAA]' (emphasis added).
3. In my view, these words cannot simply be wished away. On their face, they reflect a deliberate statement which is at the very least reasonably capable of conveying to the mind of the reader that the document was, in fact, intended by the signatory to be a certificate issued pursuant to s 110(3).
4. It is not open to the court to readily infer that the reference to s 110(3) was simply an error. I say this because there was also in evidence before the magistrate another evidentiary certificate (Exh 3) bearing the same date as Exh 2 and executed by the same signatory. Tellingly, that certificate contained an express statement that it was 'certificate evidence ... issued pursuant to [s] 110(1) of the [RTAA]'.[58]
5. Noting the proceedings below were a criminal prosecution, I consider the above matters alone to be fatal to a conclusion that the magistrate could permissibly have relied upon Exh 2 as a certificate purportedly issued under s 110(1).
6. In the circumstances where it would have been impermissible for the magistrate to have treated Exh 2 as such a certificate, the principle of falsa demonstratio non nocet[59] has no relevant role to play.
7. Nor, in my view, do my remarks in Porter v Kelly assist the respondent.
8. In that case I noted that certain words which had appeared in an evidentiary certificate merely replicated the substance of s 110(1) itself, and did not detract from what was set out in the certificate's chapeau.[60]
9. However (critically) unlike Exh 2 the signatory of the evidentiary certificate in Porter v Kelly had expressly recorded that the certificate was issued pursuant to s 110(1).[61]

1. As noted earlier, the respondent contended that if s 110(3) of the RTAA is the only provision which could be relied upon, Exh 2 was 'inadmissible'.
2. Even if that was so, a question arises as to whether, despite it having been incumbent on the magistrate to exclude evidence tendered against the appellant which was inadmissible,[62] Exh 2 became 'admissible for all purposes' because the appellant did not formally object to its tender.[63]
3. However, it is in my view unnecessary to finally resolve this question in the context of this matter. Evidentiary certificates may only provide proof of the matters identified in the statutory provision which empowers the issue of such a certificate,[64] and the magistrate was under a duty to put Exh 2 only to that use.[65]
4. It follows that it was in any event not open to the magistrate to afford any weight to material contained within Exh 2 to the extent such material strayed beyond the matters stated within s 110(3) itself.
5. Simply put, such extraneous material could have had no probative value because s 110(3) did not contemplate its reception.

1. To secure a conviction on the expired vehicle licence charge, it was incumbent on the prosecution to establish the following elements of that offence:

(a) the appellant used a motor vehicle on a road;

(b) a licence had been granted for the vehicle; and

(c) the licence was not current.[66]

1. As the respondent correctly submits, the evidence of Constables Nicholson and Turner,[67] along with certain photographic evidence (Exh 1), established element (a).
2. The respondent accepts that the only evidence relied upon at trial by the prosecution in support of elements (b) and (c) was Exh 2. However, as observed earlier, no weight should have been afforded to Exh 2 at all because of its deficiencies.
3. Given there was otherwise no evidence to prove that a licence had been granted for the vehicle or that the licence was not current, the prosecution failed to prove each element of the expired vehicle licence charge.
4. The appellant should therefore have been acquitted of that charge.
5. It was not suggested the appellant's failure to object to the reception of Exh 2 was in consequence of a calculated forensic decision,[68] and I readily infer that the appellant has suffered material prejudice given his Honour's wrongful reliance on Exh 2 and the appellant's resulting conviction on the expired vehicle licence charge.[69] I am accordingly satisfied there has been a miscarriage of justice.
6. The appellant's conviction and sentence with respect to the expired vehicle licence charge should be set aside.

1. In relation to the number plate charge, the prosecution notice states that the appellant 'drove a vehicle on a road whilst it had on it a number plate other than one issued for that vehicle'.[70]
2. Noting these particulars, and the requirements of the relevant statutory provision, it was necessary for the prosecution to establish the following elements to secure a conviction for this offence:

(a) the appellant drove a motor vehicle on a road; and

(b) the vehicle had on it a number plate on it other than the one issued for the vehicle.[71]

1. The evidence of Constables Nicholson and Turner established element (a).[72]
2. Concerning element (b), I note that:

(1) A 'number plate' is defined in the RTVA to be 'an identification tablet or number plate bearing numerals, or letters, or numerals and letters'.[73]

(2) Number plates can be issued by the CEO:

(a) to a licenced vehicle under reg 111(1) of the Road Traffic (Vehicle) Regulations 2014 (WA) (RTV regulations);

(b) to an unlicenced vehicle under s 13(2) of the RTVA;

(c) to an 'on-demand rank or hail vehicle' under reg 111(2) of the RTV regulations;

(d) in replacement of stolen number plates under reg 115 of the RTV regulations; or

(e) to an 'overseas vehicle'[74] which does not bear any number plates or does not meet the requirements of an ordinary number plate under s 27(2) of the RTVA.

(3) Alternatively, number plates can be taken to be issued by the CEO under s 26(1) of the RTVA if they are mounted on an 'overseas vehicle' when that vehicle enters Western Australia.

1. The respondent effectively contends it was open to the magistrate to find that element (b) was established from the following:[75]

(1) The statements in Exh 2 to the effect that:

(a) the previous vehicle licence issued for the vehicle in question expired on 17 December 2021;

(b) the number plate at that time was [redacted];

(c) on 29 April 2022 the number plates [bearing the same redacted number] were returned to the CEO; and

(d) there was no record of the purchase of a Temporary Movement Permit for the vehicle for a period including 30 September 2023.

(2) Documents tendered by the appellant as part of Exh 4 which include:

(a) a notification of change of ownership dated 10 April 2022 and signed by the appellant as 'seller' of a vehicle which records the 'plate number' of the vehicle (described as a Ssangyong Action Duel (sic) Cab 2010 with VIN and engine numbers stated) as the same one mentioned in the unredacted version of Exh 2; and

(b) a statutory declaration dated 6 September 2022 and signed by the appellant, requesting transfer of vehicle licence details from the 'estate of Kellan John Reynolds' to 'Kellan-john', relating to a SSangyong Duel (sic) Cab vehicle also bearing the same 'vehicle plate number' mentioned in the unredacted version of Exh 2.

(3) Constable Turner's evidence to the effect that the appellant was stopped because the number plates mounted on the vehicle the appellant was driving were 'not West Australian plates'[76] or 'West Australia-issued licence plates'.[77]

(4) Constable Nicholson's evidence that his searches of the police database recorded that the plate should have been [the one mentioned in the unredacted version of Exh 2].[78]

(5) Exh 1 which depicts the number plates themselves, which had had the Australian Red Ensign in the corner, the word 'PRIVATE' in the middle in capitals, 'The Original Commonwealth of Australia' at the top, and 'Commonwealth National' at the bottom.

(1) The fact that Exh 2 was silent on whether any further number plates were or were not issued by the CEO with respect to the vehicle was 'explicable' by reference to the legal framework; particularly regulation 111 of the RTV regulations and s 13(1) of the RTVA.

(2) Regulation 117 of the RTV regulations made clear that the number plate on the appellant's vehicle was not one issued by the CEO.

(3) The number plate itself did not purport to be 'issued by Western Australia or even a corresponding authority under the [RTAA], but rather an entity called the 'Original Commonwealth of Australia'.

1. According to the respondent, the above matters were sufficient to ground an inference that the number plate 'PRIVATE' was not the number plate issued for the vehicle, and this was the only reasonable inference to be drawn.
2. In addition, the respondent submits that the magistrate also appeared to take judicial notice of the fact that the number plate failed to comply with the requirements of Western Australian number plates.
3. I infer that, in support of this proposition, the respondent relies on remarks by the magistrate to the effect that 'the number plate visible on the photographs of our exhibit was clearly a non-standard WA DOT issued plate. It was a plate of a particular nature and was self-evidently irregular such that, I don't doubt it prompted the interest of the police officers'.[79]
4. With respect, I do not agree that there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for the magistrate to find, beyond reasonable doubt, that the vehicle driven by the appellant bore number plates other than ones issued for it.
5. I say this for the following reasons.
6. First, for the reasons previously expressed the magistrate ought not to have afforded any weight to Exh 2.
7. Secondly, and in any event, the statements in Exh 2 were simply to the effect that number plates previously issued for the vehicle were returned to the CEO on 29 April 2022, and that there was no Temporary Movement Permit for the vehicle for a period including 30 September 2023.
8. That is, Exh 2 could in any event not have been evidence either of the fact that the relevant number plates had not been issued, or of the fact that no new number plates had been issued, for the vehicle.
9. Thirdly, as was acknowledged by the respondent, the most recent of the documents forming part of Exh 4 was dated 6 September 2022. Accordingly, all of the documents comprising Exh 4 pre-dated the alleged offence by more than 12 months. It follows that Exh 4 could not have assisted the magistrate in determining what number plates (if any) had been issued for the vehicle as at the date of the alleged offences (i.e. 30 September 2023).
10. Fourthly, although Constable Turner testified that the number plates on the vehicle were not 'West Australian plates'[80] or 'West Australia-issued licence plates',[81] he gave this evidence in the context of explaining why the appellant was stopped. It would thus seem to me necessarily implicit that her evidence was simply adduced for the purpose of explaining why she and Constable Nicholson acted in the way they did (i.e why they stopped the appellant) rather than to prove, as a fact, that the number plates were not officially issued in Western Australia. As such, the magistrate would not have been permitted to rely on it for the latter purpose which would otherwise have been inadmissible as hearsay.
11. Fifthly, with respect to Constable Nicholson, his oral evidence concerning the number plates was given after the prosecutor put the following question: 'what should [the number plate] have been?'[82] Constable Nicholson's answer was 'I believe [the same number plate referred to in Exh 2]'.[83] And, when then asked 'how did you establish that', the constable responded that it was 'basically' through searches on the 'police computer database'.[84]
12. Constable Nicholson later clarified that the database was the 'police instant management database, which holds all the records', and that his search was conducted by using the 'OneForce Core application'.[85]
13. Given the context, I consider Constable Nicholson's evidence of the product his search to have been, at best, adduced for the purpose of explaining the investigative steps he took leading to the prosecution of the appellant rather than to prove the truth of any information forming part of the police database.
14. Such a conclusion is in my view further supported by the fact that, shortly after he gave the evidence referred to in paragraph 109, Constable Nicholson was asked about the document which would become Exh 2. When shown the document, the constable explained that he had 'requested information from the Department of Transport's Driving Vehicle Services as to the status of the vehicle he pulled over'.[86] The document was then received into evidence as Exh 2.
15. Noting the above, I do not consider it would have been open to the magistrate to have relied on Constable Nicholson's evidence as truth of the matters that were the product of his search.
16. Even if I am wrong in this respect, I do not consider it would have been open to the magistrate to have afforded any real weight to such evidence in circumstances where the ultimate source of the records on the police database was not identified, and no information concerning their accuracy or reliability was elicited.
17. Sixthly, given the RTV regulations were not in evidence, it would have been impermissible for the magistrate to have taken judicial notice of their contents or to have found that the license plate did not meet the requirements of reg 111 of the RTV regulations.[87]
18. However, even if that were not so, or if the RTV regulations had been tendered, it seems unlikely to me that the regulations could have led the magistrate to conclude that the only reasonable inference was that the relevant number plates were not issued by the CEO.
19. That is particularly so in circumstances where:

(a) regulation 126 appears to empower the CEO to issue a number plate that is a 'special plate' consisting of:

(i) a reflective background containing the words, letters, numerals, symbols or logo approved by the CEO in the colours approved by the CEO; or

(ii) reflective words, letters, numerals, symbols or logo on a non-reflective background approved by the CEO in the colours approved by the CEO, and

(b) there was no evidence led to the effect that no part of the number plates was reflective such to exclude the possibility that it was a 'special plate'.

1. Nor, in my view, would it have been permissible for the magistrate to have sought to have taken judicial notice of the relevant number plates having not been issued by the CEO for some other reason.
2. Put simply, I do not consider any of the CEO's practices to have been 'so generally known that every ordinary person may be reasonably presumed to [have been] aware of [them].'[88]
3. It follows, in my view, that the magistrate erred in finding that the number plate charge had been established beyond reasonable doubt and the appellant ought to have been acquitted of that charge.
4. I am satisfied there has been a miscarriage of justice with respect to the appellant's conviction on this charge for the same reasons given in the context of the expired vehicle licence charge.
5. The appellant's conviction and sentence with respect to the number plate charge should therefore be set aside.

Remaining grounds of appeal, suspended driver's licence charge

1. Noting the relevant statutory requirements, it was necessary for the prosecution to establish the following elements to secure a conviction for the suspended driver's licence charge:

(a) the appellant drove a motor vehicle on a road;[89] and

(b) the appellant was not authorised to do so under the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act 2008 (WA) (RTADA) Part 2, his authority to drive having at the time been suspended.[90]

1. As with both the expired vehicle licence plate charge and the number plate charge, the evidence of Constables Nicholson and Turner was sufficient to establish element (a) of the suspended driver's licence charge too.[91]
2. Regarding element (b), the prosecution at trial relied upon Exh 3 which revealed that the driver's licence register maintained in accordance with the RTADA recorded that the appellant had been disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for a period of six (6) months on 30 August 2024 (i.e. one month before the date of his offending).
3. Given the content of this certificate, the fact that the appellant adduced no evidence to cast doubt as its accuracy, and the absence of a suggestion that it suffered from any deficiencies (unlike Exh 2), I am satisfied that Exh 3 was sufficient to establish element (b) of the suspended driver's licence charge beyond reasonable doubt.
4. That said, the appellant has raised various grounds of appeal concerning the conduct of the trial before Magistrate Mahon on 8 May 2024, concerning an earlier mention hearing on 4 December 2023 before Magistrate Thompson, and relating to the Constitution.
5. I infer that the appellant seeks to rely on all these grounds for the purpose of having all his convictions set aside and, as a consequence, his sentence.
6. I have already concluded that the appellant's convictions (and each corresponding sentence) should be set aside with respect to both the expired vehicle licence plate charge and the number plate charge. However, I have reached those conclusions based on the additional ground of appeal alone.
7. Accordingly, I will now consider the appellant's further grounds in the context of the suspended driver's licence charge.

1. As noted earlier, the appellant's grounds related to this topic appear to be to the effect that his Honour:

(a) erred by listing matter PE 2383/2023 (evidently for mention only) on the day of the trial;

(b) erred by permitting the prosecution to rely on the evidentiary certificates without calling the authors to give direct testimony and without the respondent being permitted to explore the validity of the certificates by way of cross-examination;

(c) failed to consider or adhere to various matters directed to or concerning the 'strawman duality theory'; and

(d) was biased.

1. This complaint concerns the fact that another charge against the appellant, matter PE 2383/2023, was listed for mention before Magistrate Mahon on the same day as his trial with respect to the charges the subject of this appeal.
2. The sole purpose of the mention was to determine a future date for that other matter to be heard,[92] and after confirming the appellant's availability, the matter was listed for trial more than two months later (on 22 July 2024).[93]
3. The crux of the appellant's grievance seems to be that mentioning matter PE 2383/2023 on the same day as the trial was a 'deceptive tactic' which left the appellant 'no reasonable time to mount a defence'.[94]
4. The appellant's ground does not appear to be directed at the decision to list the mention on the day of trial, which is incapable of being appealed under part 2 of the CA Act.[95] Rather, his complaint seems to be that the decision to list the matter for mention denied him procedural fairness in his trial on the charges the subject of this appeal.
5. There is no merit in this submission. Nothing in his Honour's approach could conceivably be viewed as having limited the appellant's ability either to defend the charges tried on 8 May 2024, or as having otherwise denied him a procedurally fair trial.
6. By adjourning matter PE 2383/2023 for trial two-months later, I consider his Honour afforded the appellant ample opportunity to mount a defence with respect to that matter and permitted the appellant to focus his attention solely on defending the charges which are now the subject of this appeal.
7. It follows that ground 22 enjoys no reasonable prospect of success and leave to appeal on that ground will be refused.

1. The substance of this complaint appears to be that the magistrate erred in permitting the prosecution to rely on evidentiary certificates (presumably Exh 2 and Exh 3) without calling their authors to give direct testimony thereby permitting the respondent to explore the validity of the certificates by way of cross-examination.
2. The challenge, so far as it relates to Exh 2, may be put to one side given my conclusions in the context of the additional ground of appeal.
3. Regarding Exh 3, s 110(2) of the RTAA expressly provides that a certificate purporting to be issued under s 110(1) is evidence of any fact stated in the certificate.
4. As I noted in Porter v Kelly,[96] the evident purpose of s 110(1) and s 110(2) is to facilitate proof of facts relevant to an alleged offence by tendering, at trial, a certificate purportedly issued under the hand of either the CEO or a person authorised by the CEO without the need for a witness to be called.[97]
5. It is not open to a trier of fact to treat information recorded in a certificate purportedly issued pursuant to s 110(1) as inadmissible, not admissible, or not validly capable of being adduced, so as to exclude it from consideration as admissible evidence for the purposes of the prosecution case.[98]
6. In the circumstances, there is no merit in the appellant's contentions to the extent they challenge the prosecution's capacity to rely on Exh 3 for the purpose of proving its case.
7. To the extent that any of the appellant's grounds, properly understood, seek to advance such contentions they enjoy no reasonable prospect of success and leave to appeal on any such grounds will be refused.

1. This pseudo law theory ran like a golden thread through much of the appellant's defence of the charges below and continues to do so in many of his grounds of appeal.
2. The theory and its variants have been repeatedly rejected by Australian courts, including this court, on occasions too numerous to mention.[99]
3. It follows that appellant's grounds of appeal relating to the proceedings before Magistrate Mahon, and falling within this rubric, namely grounds 25 to 31, are devoid of merit and therefore enjoy no reasonable prospect of success.
4. Leave to appeal on each of grounds 25 to 31 is refused.

1. By grounds 23, 27 and 30, the appellant alleges that apprehension of bias arose from Magistrate Mahon's conduct during the course of the trial.
2. In his submissions, the appellant suggests this apprehension arose in consequence of the magistrate having:

(1) Described the appellant's defence as a 'pseudolaw-type situation'.[100]

(2) Continued with the trial, presuming that the appellant was the 'legal name (decedent)' and ignoring the issue of non‑jurisdiction.[101]

(3) Prevented the appellant from 'drawing out relevance' of 'how status legal recognition has been constructed for recognition of its true effect according to law'.[102]

(4) Denied to the appellant the right to 'question the evidence produced by the prosecution'. [103]

(5) Failed to ascertain the true legal effect of all police documents or how those documents were obtained in circumstances where the respondent was the stronger party.[104]

(6) Accepted a prosecution notice that was not signed and witnessed or recorded 'according to law'.[105]

1. The first point is a complaint about the magistrate's characterisation of the appellant's defence as 'pseudo-law'. The section of the transcript relied upon by the appellant pertains to his Honour querying with the appellant in his opening address whether his views were fairly described as a 'pseudo-law-type situation'.[106]
2. I infer the complaint is that the magistrate's characterisation of his defence as 'pseudo-law' might have indicated to a reasonable person that his Honour had predetermined the appellant's defence was not valid at law. If this is indeed the basis of the appellant's complaint, the transcript reveals that it is simply not correct.
3. His Honour initially only queried with the respondent in opening whether the appellant's views were fairly described as a 'pseudolaw‑type situation' to which the appellant denied.[107] His Honour then proceeded to hear the evidence and only reagitated the issue again in the appellant's closing.
4. The exchanges in the appellant's oral closing address reveal that his Honour, in an apparent effort to fully understand the appellant's defence, engaged with him not only at great length, but also carefully, respectfully, and with considerable patience.[108] There is little to suggest, on a fair reading of the transcript, that his Honour was anything but a model of civility.
5. After having those discussions, his Honour reserved his decision and delivered his reasons two months later. In those reasons, his Honour, in my view correctly and consistent with authority,[109] effectively characterised and rejected much of what the appellant had submitted as it was pseudolaw.[110]
6. The appellant's second point is self-evidently premised upon on pseudolaw notions. Pseudolaw is not law.[111] The magistrate was entirely correct to continue with the trial in the manner that he did, and no apprehension of bias could conceivably have arisen in consequence of that approach.
7. With respect to the third and fourth points, I infer the appellant's complaint is directed at the fact that the magistrate at times restricted him from cross-examining prosecution witnesses about the capitalisation of his last name 'Reynolds'.
8. In this regard, the transcript reveals there was an exchange between the appellant and one of the police officers concerning the capitalisation of 'Reynolds' on the prosecution notice. The magistrate allowed the exchange to continue before stopping it on the basis that the officer had answered the question and the appellant was free to make submissions on the effect of that evidence.[112]
9. No apprehension of bias arises from the magistrate having adopted this approach. His Honour did what any trier of fact would have done. Consistent with his Honour's duty to 'discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial,'[113] his Honour disallowed questions or propositions that were baseless, irrelevant and/or repetitive,[114] and proceeded with the trial.
10. Regarding the fifth point, it would in my view not conceivably be open to infer that his Honour's acceptance of the formal evidence tendered by the prosecution gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
11. Finally, with respect to the sixth point, for reasons which will shortly emerge the prosecution notice was in my view valid as a matter of law and it was therefore appropriate for his Honour to continue with the trial.
12. In all the circumstances, having reviewed the transcript, I do not consider that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably have apprehended that the magistrate might not have brought an impartial mind to bear on the question of whether the appellant was guilty or not guilty of the offences with which he was charged.
13. It follows that each of grounds 23, 27 and 30 enjoys no reasonable prospect of success and leave to appeal on those grounds will be refused.

1. By grounds 1 to 12 and 14 to 21, the appellant raises complaints about the short mention before Magistrate Thomson on 4 December 2023. The sole purpose of this brief mention was to set a trial date for the charges the subject of this appeal.
2. The appellant does not seek to appeal her Honour's order, which is in any event incapable of being appealed under part 2 of the CA Act.[115]
3. An error of law or fact made in the determination of an interlocutory issue may give rise to a valid ground upon which to appeal against a conviction.[116] However, as with any ground of appeal, the appellant must demonstrate that any identifiable error in the interlocutory ruling resulted in a substantial miscarriage of justice having occurred. [117]
4. The only interlocutory issue which her Honour was required to determine on 4 December 2023 was whether to set a trial date and, if so, to select that date. Her Honour did this in the presence of the appellant, and her decision cannot sensibly be said to have occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice.
5. Even if an error were capable of being identified, it could not conceivably have had any adverse impact either on the appellant's ability to defend the charges or on the outcome of the trial which occurred more than five months later before a different magistrate.
6. It follows that grounds 1 to 12 and 14 to 21[118] have no reasonable prospect of success, and leave to appeal on those grounds will be refused.

1. In his affidavit affirmed 11 November 2024, the appellant contends that the prosecution notice was not signed and witnessed as required by the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) (CP Act). It is presumably this point which the appellant seeks to advance for the purposes of ground 13 of his Appeal notice.
2. The formal requirement for prosecution notices are set out in s 23(2) of the CP Act. The requirements are that the prosecution notice must: (a) be in writing in a prescribed form; (b) comply with Schedule 1 Division 2; (c) contain any information prescribed; and (d) be signed by the person who is commencing the prosecution.
3. As the respondent correctly points out, there is no longer a requirement that a prosecution notice be witnessed, and while there remains a need for the notice to be signed this does not need to be a physical signature.
4. In the above respects, I refer to and gratefully adopt without repeating, the analysis and conclusions of Vandongen J in Kelly v Fiander[119] concerning a similar argument raised by the appellant in that matter.
5. As was the case before Vandongen J, in this matter too:

(1) The certified copy of the electronically filed prosecution notice was authenticated by operation of s 13A(3) of the Magistrates Court (General) Rules and is therefore taken to have been signed. In this regard, I infer from the fact that the prosecution notice was lodged electronically[120] that the identity of the person who lodged it was recorded by the electronic court management system.

(2) The name of the person who signed the document, ie. the respondent, is stated in the electronic version of the prosecution notice in the place where that person's signature is required.

(3) Given the combined effect of s 10(4) of the Courts and Tribunals (Electronic Process Facilitation) Act and s 174 of the CP Act, the prosecution notice must be taken to have been signed by a police officer. This is because there is no evidence to the contrary.

(4) The prosecution was validly commenced by a police officer, as contemplated by s 20(3)(a)(iii) of the CP Act, who signed the prosecution notice as required by s 21(3) and s 23(2)(d) of the CP Act.

1. It follows that ground 13 has no reasonable prospect of success and leave to appeal with respect to that ground will be refused.

The Constitution

1. Finally, as noted earlier the appellant has also sought to advance propositions relying on various provisions of the Constitution.
2. I agree with the respondent that the appellant's reliance on the Constitution is misplaced as none of the provisions assist his case.
3. I say this for the following reasons:

(1) Section 51(xxxi) is a limitation on the Commonwealth's legislative power and does not affect the legislative power of the State to acquire property on 'terms which are thought not to be just.'[121] It therefore has no role to play in this appeal, which relates to convictions on charges based on contraventions of State legislation.

(2) Section 79 of the Constitution provides that the federal jurisdiction of any court may be exercised by such number of judges as the [Commonwealth] Parliament prescribes, while s 80 provides that the trial on indictment of any offence of any law of the Commonwealth shall be by jury. Neither of these provisions is relevant to this appeal for the same reason. There was in any event no indictment.

(3) Section 92 prohibits laws which are directed to discriminating against, or in fact discriminate against, interstate movements unless justified by reference to a non-discriminatory purpose and goes no further than is reasonably necessary to achieve that object.[122] It is not enlivened in this appeal as the appellant has not identified any such discrimination.

(4) Similarly, s 117 renders laws invalid which subject an Australian citizen resident in one State to a disability or discrimination in another State which would not be equally applicable to that citizen if they were resident in that other State.[123] It is not enlivened in this appeal because again the appellant has not identified any discrimination.

(5) Finally, s 109 concerns legislative inconsistencies between State and Commonwealth legislation. The appellant has failed to identify with precision any legislative inconsistency. Instead, he has referred to various pieces of legislation, and the King James Bible 1611, and baldly asserts there is an inconsistency in the manner in which the courts have applied 'State legislation and Acts, when applied in litigation'.[124] A general assertion of this nature is insufficient to enliven s 109 of the Constitution.

1. For these reasons alone, the appellant has failed to make out whatever points he may have intended to rely upon in relation to the Constitution.
2. Accordingly, leave to appeal on these grounds will be refused.

Sentence with respect to suspended driver's licence charge

1. None of the appellant's grounds of appeal touch on his sentence. It appeared to have been his case that he should not have been sentenced because he ought not to have been convicted in the first place.
2. Nonetheless, I have reviewed his remaining sentence on the suspended driver's licence charge. I do not consider it to be manifestly unfair or unreasonable.
3. The maximum sentence for a contravention of s 49(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) read with s 49(c)(i) is a fine of not less than $400 or more than $2000, a driver's licence disqualification for a period of not less than 9 months and not more than 3 years, and a term of imprisonment of not more than 12 months.[125]
4. In this case, the magistrate elected to impose a cumulative licence disqualification of 9 months, a fine of $600 and costs of $272.70.
5. In my view, the penalties imposed by the magistrate fell at the lesser end. There is certainly nothing to suggest appellate intervention is warranted.

(1) Leave to appeal will be granted on the additional ground of appeal.

(2) The additional appeal will be upheld, and the appellant's conviction on (and corresponding sentences for) the expired vehicle licence and number plate charges will be set aside.

(3) The appeal will otherwise be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[10] As to which see generally Kelly v Fiander [2024] WASC 275 [26] - [29] (and the authorities there cited); Reynolds v WA Police [2025] WASC 104 [11] (and the authorities cited at fn. 4).

[14]Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337; 176 ALR 644; 75 ALJR 277 [6] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow & Hayne JJ).

[15]Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29 [11] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon & Gleeson JJ).

[18] Applicant's application in an appeal filed 24 July 2025 point 5. See also appellant's affidavit affirmed 21 July 2025 and filed 24 July 2025 [5].

[19] Appellant's submissions filed 23 July 2025 [31] read with [9], [10] and [33]. See also appellant's affidavit affirmed 21 July 2025 and filed 24 July 2025 [5].

[20] Appellant's submissions filed 24 July 2025 [31]. See also appellant's affidavit affirmed 21 July 2025 and filed 24 July 2025 [5].

[21] Appellant's submissions filed 24 July 2025 [32].

[22] Appellant's submissions filed 24 July 2025 [9] read with [10].

[24] Another single judge appeal commenced by the appellant, not listed for hearing before me.

[25] ts 30 July 2025 in matter SJA 1009 of 2025, 20 read with 15.

[26] Clarke v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 14 [236] (Buss P, Mazza JA agreeing); Tsang v Franics [2021] WASCA 131 [87] (Buss P, Mazza JA & Hall J).

[27] See Application in an appeal to adduce evidence filed 3 December 2024.

[28] Annexure 'KJ 2' to the first affidavit.

[29] Altaranesi v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 351 [91]. Citations omitted.

[30] ts dated 10 March 2025, 48 (appeal hearing in Supreme Court).

[31] See Altaranesi v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 351 [91]. Citations omitted.

[32] ts 9 December 2024, 23 - 24 (Supreme Court).

[33] I have been unable to discern the nature of any complaint or error from ground 24 or ground 32 so leave to appeal will be refused on those grounds.

[35] Cf. Appellant's written submissions filed 11 November 2024 (points 18, 41 and 44). See also appellant's written submissions filed 5 December 2024, points 116 and 117.

[37] Appeal notice (grounds 23, 27 and 30).

[38]Appeal notice (grounds 1 - 8, 10 - 12, and 14 - 20).

[42] Appellant's written submissions filed 11 November 2024 (points 60 and 93). See also Appellant's written submissions filed 5 December 2024 (points 7, 95, 100, 119).

[43] Appellant's written submissions filed 11 November 2024 (points 3 and 87). See also Appellant's written submissions filed 5 December 2024 (point 21).

[44] Appellant's written submissions filed 11 November 2024 (point 87).

[45] Appellant's written submissions filed 11 November 2024 (point 96). See also Appellant's written submissions filed 5 December 2024 (point 98).

[46] Appellant's written submissions filed 11 November 2024 (point 25). See also Appellant's written submissions filed 5 December 2024 (points 21 to 25).

[47] Each of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) (RTA), the Road Traffic (Vehicles) Act 2012 (WA) (RTVA) and the RTAA is, relevantly, a 'road law' for the purposes of s 110: RTAA Act, s 4 'road law'.

[48] Respondent's submissions filed 11 July 2025, [13].

[49] Respondent's submissions filed 11 July 2025, [13].

[50] Respondent's submissions filed 11 July 2025, [15] and [18].

[51] Respondent's submissions filed 11 July 2025, [14].

[52] Respondent's submissions filed 11 July 2025, [18] read in the context of [16] - [17] and [19] - [21].

[53] Respondent's submissions filed 11 July 2025 [16].

[54] Macquarie Dictionary 'purport' (as a verb), definition 2.

[55] Respondent's submissions filed 11 July 2025 [18].

[56] Porter v Kelly [2024] WASC 282 [16].

[57] Respondent's submissions filed 11 July 2025 [21].

[59] As to which see for example Diocesan Trustees of Church of England in WA v Solicitor-General [1909] HCA 66; (1909) 9 CLR 757.

[62] MacPherson v R [1981] HCA 46; (1981) 147 CLR 512, 523 [15] (Gibbs CJ & Wilson J). See also 543 [14] (Brennan J).

[63] Cf. Milne v State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 38 [23].

[64] Cf. Woolmer v Police [2020] SASC 184; (2020) 94 MVR 147 [101].

[65]Cf. Hughes v National Trustees, Executors and Agency Company of Australia Ltd [1979] HCA 2; (1979) 143 CLR 134, 153 (Gibbs J, Mason & Aickin JJ agreeing) and Fitzroy River Limited Liability Company v Richard Scott Tucker as joint and several administrator of Yeeda Pastoral Company Pty Ltd (Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) [2025] WASCA 118 [112].

[67] ts 8 May 2024, 33 - 34 (Nicholson), 80 (Turner).

[68] Cf. LCB v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 201 [10] (Martin CJ, Hall J agreeing); Oblak v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 176 [6] - [9] (Buss JA); R v Soma [2003] HCA 13; (2003) 212 CLR 299 [11], [79] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby & Hayne JJ); and Carney v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 90 [40] (Pullin JA, Owen JA & Jenkins J agreeing).

[69] Cf. Oblak v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 176 [64] (Miller JA, Le Miere AJA agreeing); Birks v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 29; (2007) 33 WAR 291 [44] - [60] (Buss JA, Steytler P & Pullin JA agreeing).

[70] Prosecution notice for charge AR 15713/2023.

[72] ts 8 May 2024, 33 - 34 (Nicholson), 80 (Turner).

[73] Road Traffic (Vehicles) Act 2012 (WA) s 3.

[74] As defined in RTVA, s 20.

[75] Respondent's submissions filed 11 July 2025 [24] - [34].

[79] ts dated 8 July 2024, 12. Emphasis added.

[83] ts dated 8 May 2024, 32. Emphasis added.

[84] ts dated 8 May 2024, 32. Emphasis added.

[87] Norton v R (2001) 24 WAR 488; [2001] WASCA 207; Ostrowski v Palmer [2004] HCA 30; (2004) 218 CLR 493 [3] (Gleeson CJ & Kirby J) [70] (Callinan & Heydon JJ). See also Pearce and Argument ("Delegated Legislation in Australia", 6th Ed, LexisNexis, 2023, at [27]).

[88] Holland v Jones [1917] HCA 26; (1917) 23 CLR 149, 153. See also generally Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 9 [64] (McHugh J); Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCA 33; 237 ALR 194, 361 (Heydon J).

[89] RTAA, s 49(1)(a).

[90] RTAA, s 49(1)(b).

[91] ts 8 May 2024, 33 - 34 (Nicholson), 80 (Turner).

[94] Appeal Notice filed 24 July 2024 [22].

[99] Cf. Kelly v Fiander [2024] WASC 275 [29] and the authorities cited therein.

[100] Appellant's submissions dated 11 November 2024 [26].

[101] Appellant's submissions dated 11 November 2024 [59], [77].

[102] Appellant's submissions dated 11 November 2024 [34].

[103] Appellant's submissions dated 11 November 2024 [75].

[104] Appellant's submissions dated 11 November 2024 [83] - [84].

[105] Appellant's submissions dated 11 November 2024 [93].

[109] Kelly v Fiander [2024] WASC 275 [29] and the authorities cited therein.

[111] Kelly v Fiander [2024] WASC 275 [36].

[113] Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488 [12] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow & Hayne JJ).

[114] Kelly v Fiander [2024] WASC 275 [48].

[116] Gazeley v State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 279 [25] - [28].

[117] See Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) s 14(2).

[118] The overwhelming majority of which are in any event premised on pseudo law notions (namely, grounds 1 - 8, 10 - 12, and 14 - 20).

[119] Kelly v Fiander [2023] WASC 187 [77] - [89].

[120] Being the default method for lodgement of prosecution notices: Magistrates Court (General) Rules, r 45(1).

[121] Merrick Tyler Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads [2015] WASCA 82 [52] citing Pye v Renshaw [1951] HCA 8; (1951) 84 CLR 58, 79 - 80.

[122] Palmer v Western Australia [2021] HCA 5; (2021) 272 CLR 505 [50] (Kiefel CJ, Keane J), [190] - [192] (Gordon J).

[123] Palmer v Western Australia [2021] HCA 31; (2021) 274 CLR 286 [6].

[124] Appellant's additional submissions dated 6 December 2024 [22] - [25].

[125] Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) s 49(1) read with s 49(c).