JURISDICTION: South Australian Employment Court

Return to Work Act 2014 (SA)

South Australian Employment Tribunal Act 2014 (SA)

HEARING DATE: 27 February 2026 and 6 March 2026

DECISION OF: His Honour Deputy President Judge Rossi

The applicant made application to modify an obligation in law to the District Court of South Australia in relation to medical reports disclosed and produced under compulsion in proceedings in that court, to allow the medical reports to be utilised by an assessor of permanent impairment in accordance with s 22 of the Return to Work Act 2014 (SA) and for the reports to be able to be used in any subsequent proceedings in the Tribunal arising from that assessment - HELD - The circumstances did give rise to a legal obligation not to use the documents for any purpose other than for which it was given, without leave of the court - HELD - In the circumstances of this case, the most appropriate forum to determine the application is this Tribunal - HELD - The obligation in law should be modified so as to allow the applicant, the Return to Work Corporation of South Australia and the applicant's employer to use the documents in the process of the assessment of permanent impairment and in any subsequent proceedings in the Tribunal arising from that assessment.

Hanton v Return to Work Corporation of South Australia [2026] SAET 27

Lohmann v Return to Work Corporation of South Australia [2019] SAET 213

Paschalis v Return to Work Corporation of South Australia (2021) 140 SASR 77

Harman v Secretary of State the Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280

Crest Homes Plc v Marks [1987] AC 829

Hearne v Street [2008] HCA 36; (2008) 235 CLR 125

Riddick v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1977] QB 881

Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10

Holpitt Pty Ltd v Varimu Pty Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 576

Credential Assurance Co Ltd v Fountain Page Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 756

Helicopter Aerial Surveys Pty Ltd v Gary Robertson [2015] NSWSC 2104

State of New South Wales v McCarthy [2015] NSWSC 1780

Liberty Funding Pty Limited v Phoenix Capital Limited [2005] FCAFC 3; (2005) 218 ALR 288

Global Medical Solutions Australia Pty Ltd v Axion Molecular Pty Limited [2013] NSWSC 665

Springfield Nominees Pty Ltd v Bridgelands Securities Ltd (1992) 38 FCR 217

Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (In Liquidation Receivers Appointed) and Ors [2012] SASC 12

Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd v Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd (No 21) [2023] WASC 169

Lighthouse Equity Pty Ltd v Dale Alcock Homes Pty Ltd [2025] WASC 227

Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v DFD Rhodes Pty Ltd (No 2) [2023] WASCA 108

Kairns v Workcover Corporation/CGU Workers Compensation (SA) Ltd (Chateau Yaldara Pty Ltd) [2004] SASC 352

1. By application for directions dated 16 February 2026 (AFD) the applicant Joseph Rayan (Mr Rayan) has sought the following order:

1. The parties are granted leave to refer to and rely upon the following identified documents, which were produced in connection with the applicants of possibly previous motor vehicle accident claim arising from the incident on 27 September 2012. In addition, any further documents that may come into existence during the course of these proceedings may also be used for the purpose of advancing the workers compensation claim: -

• Medical Report of Jason Ward dated 26 September 2016.
  • Medical Report of Dr John Meegan dated 4 July 2016.
  • Medical Report of Dr Donald Angus dated 25 July 2016.
  • Medical Report of Dr Peter Tziavrangos dated 6 April 2016.
  • Medical Report of Dr Jason Ward dated 17 November 2015.
  • Medical Report of Dr Jason Ward dated 10 July 2015.
  • Medical Report of Dr Jason Ward dated 5 December 2014.
  • Medical Report of Dr Keith Elsner dated 23 September 2014.

2. Although the AFD listed the Return to Work Corporation of South Australia (the Corporation) as a respondent and Murphy Transport Solutions Pty Ltd (Murphy Transport) as another party, there is no current or prior originating substantive proceeding between these parties in the Tribunal. The AFD was not served upon either of those entities and proceeded ex parte. It appears that the Corporation and Murphy Transport were named as Mr Rayan understands they too may need to be provided with the documents if there is to be a substantive proceeding in this jurisdiction seeking lump sum payments for permanent impairment arising from a work injury. The order sought is to facilitate an assessment of permanent impairment arising from work injuries sustained by Mr Rayan in the course of his employment with Murphy Transport. To have the impairments assessed, Mr Rayan and the Corporation are required to undertake a process in accordance with s 22 of the Return to Work Act 2014 (SA) (RTW Act). As noted recently in Hanton v Return to Work Corporation of South Australia,[1] s 22 sets out a scheme for assessing the degree of permanent impairment arising from a work injury[2] and the % WPI, as assessed, may then form the basis of entitlements to lump sum and potentially other compensation.[3]
3. As there has been no originating substantive proceeding between the parties, the AFD is irregular as to form. It should have been an application in the general form, as final orders have been sought.[4] Section 80 of the South Australian Employment Tribunal Act 2014 (SA) (SAET Act) empowers the Tribunal to cure such irregularity if it would be conducive to the expeditious resolution of the question at issue. I am so satisfied and treat the AFD as if it were an application in the general form.[5]
4. The assessment of permanent impairment is required to be undertaken in accordance with the Impairment Assessment Guidelines (IAG).[6] Chapter 1.33 of the IAG states that the assessor should be provided with all relevant medical and allied health information, including the results of all clinical investigations and previous assessments related to the work injury in question, with the assessment request. That assessment request is prepared by the Corporation. It is, relevantly, the "requestor" as referred to in the IAG. In support of the AFD, two affidavits were read. The first was of Ms Christine Ashworth, solicitor for the applicant, affirmed on 16 February 2026. The second affidavit was also of Ms Ashworth, and that was affirmed on 4 March 2026.
5. In the first affidavit, Ms Ashworth refers to Mr Rayan having suffered significant injuries including an injury to his right shoulder, in the course of his employment with Murphy Transport on 11 October 2024. The second affidavit of Ms Ashworth exhibits the medical reports that are the subject of the application. They refer to various injuries arising from a motor vehicle accident that has been reported to have occurred on 27 September 2012 (MVA). That included an injury to the right shoulder which had been surgically treated after the MVA and before the claimed work injury to the right shoulder.
6. The medical reports obtained following the MVA are relevant to an assessment of the permanent impairment arising from the work injury. Section 22 of the RTW Act requires an assessor to assess the impairment at the time of the examination and to disregard or deduct any part of that impairment that is not attributable to the work injury. As observed that by the majority in Paschalis v Return to Work Corporation of South Australia,[7] only a work injury, or an impairment to the extent that it is attributed to a work injury, is to be assessed and compensated.[8]
7. Mr Rayan instituted proceedings on 22 April 2015 in the District Court of South Australia, claiming damages for the personal injury that he sustained as a result of the MVA. The District Court is the main trial court to hear and determine such claims. The Supreme Court of South Australia may hear such claims but a cost penalty may apply if a monetary threshold is not reached. The Magistrates Court of South Australia is also conferred with relevant jurisdiction but is subject to a statutory monetary limit. The South Australian Employment Tribunal is not conferred with jurisdiction to hear and determine such claims. It is conferred with jurisdiction to hear and determine claims for compensation under the RTW Act. Mr Rayan and the Motor Accident Commission of South Australia (MAC), as the relevant insurer, were required to exchange medical reports relating to the injuries sustained in the MVA prior to the commencement of the proceedings but not because of an order, at that time, of the District Court. There was a statutory obligation upon Mr Rayan pursuant to ss 126A and 127 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) (MVA Act).
8. Ms Phua, who appeared as counsel for the applicant in this Court, informed the Court the medical reports that are the subject of the application, including those which came into existence after the District Court proceedings were instituted, were exchanged pursuant to an order of the District Court that required the parties to provide discovery and production of relevant documents. It was submitted that gave rise to an implied undertaking to the District Court that the documents disclosed under compulsion as a result of an order of the Court, be used only for the purpose of those proceedings.
9. Ms Phua submitted that this Court should relieve Mr Rayan of the implied undertaking to the District Court so as to allow the statutory function of s 22 of the RTW Act to be properly exercised, and should there be any dispute, for this Tribunal to have regard to relevant documents.
10. The AFD was served upon the solicitors that have represented the MAC in relation to the applicant's claim for damages arising from the MVA. The MAC did not object to the application to this Court but its solicitors raised two matters for the Court's consideration. The first is whether the documents are the subject of what is commonly referred to as a 'Harman undertaking'. The second is whether, in circumstances of a finding the documents are subject to the Harman undertaking, the current application should have been made to the District Court where the proceedings related to the MVA claim were instituted.

1. The reference to a 'Harman undertaking' is a reference to Harman v Secretary of State the Home Department.[9] Their Lordships referred to the relevant obligation as flowing from an 'implied undertaking'.[10]
2. In Australia, in Hearne v Street,[11] Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ addressed when the relevant obligation arises and its content:

Where one party to litigation is compelled, either by reason of a rule of court, or by reason of a specific order of the court, or otherwise, to disclose documents or information, the party obtaining the disclosure cannot, without leave of the court, use it for any purpose other than that for which it was given unless it is received into evidence.[12]

1. The affidavits of Ms Ashworth and the submissions of Ms Phua do not establish the documents that are the subject of the AFD to have been received into evidence.
2. The obligation has been held to apply to documents inspected after discovery.[13]
3. In Hearne v Street, the Court cautioned the use of the term 'implied undertaking'. Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ referred to the term as misleading unless it is understood as an obligation of law arising from the circumstances in which the material was generated and received.[14]
4. The obligation extends beyond the parties to the proceedings. Any person who, knowing that the material was generated in legal proceedings, uses it for purposes other than those of the proceedings, in the absence of being released from the obligation, may commit a contempt of court.[15]
5. The power to release a person from the obligation or to modify the obligation was addressed in Hearne v Street:

The importance with which the courts have viewed the obligation under discussion is indicated by the fact that although it can be released or modified by the court, that dispensing power is not freely exercised, and will only be exercised where special circumstances appear.[16]

1. In addressing circumstances of a document or information being produced to the court pursuant to a legal obligation and where otherwise the document or information would have remained confidential to the party producing it, Hobhouse J expressed the reluctance, generally, of courts to release a party from the obligation or to modify the obligation, firmly in Credential Assurance Co Ltd v Fountain Page Ltd:[17]

Circumstances under which that relaxation would be allowed without the consent of the serving party are hard to visualise, particularly where there was any risk that the statement might be used directly or indirectly to the prejudice of the serving party.[18]

1. Nevertheless, the courts in Australia have recognised special circumstances where the obligation may need to yield. Relevant to this case, in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman, Mason CJ (with whom Dawson and McHugh JJ agreed) stated that the obligation must yield to inconsistent statutory provisions and to the requirements of curial process in other litigation.[19]
2. In Helicopter Aerial Surveys Pty Ltd v Gary Robertson,[20] Brereton J addressed the meaning of "special circumstances" when considering whether the Court should release or modify the undertaking provided to it:

Generally, all that is required by special circumstances is some good reason - or, as I would be inclined to put it, some circumstance - that warrants relief from the undertaking.

In State of New South Wales v McCarthy [2015] NSWSC 1780, Fagan J adopted with approval the dicta of the Full Federal Court in Liberty Funding Pty Limited v Phoenix Capital Limited [2005] FCAFC 3; (2005) 218 ALR 288 at [31]. In particular, his Honour stated:

...The notion of special circumstances does not require that some extraordinary factors must bear on the question before the discretion will be exercised. It is sufficient to say that in all the circumstances good reason must be shown why, contrary to the usual position, documents produced or information obtained in one piece of litigation should be used for the advantage of a party in another piece of litigation or for other non-litigious purposes. The discretion is a broad one and in all the circumstances of the case must be examined... [see also Global Medical Solutions Australia Pty Ltd v Axion Molecular Pty Limited [2013] NSWSC 665 at [21] (Stevenson J)].[21]

1. In Springfield Nominees Pty Ltd v Bridgelands Securities Ltd,[22] Wilcox J set out circumstances, which were not expressed to be exhaustive, relevant to the exercise of the Court's discretion:

The nature of the document, the circumstances under which it came into existence, the attitude of the author of the document and any prejudice the author may sustain, whether the document pre-existed litigation or was created for that purpose and therefore expected to enter the public domain, the nature of the information in the document (in particular whether it contains personal data or commercially sensitive information), the circumstances in which the document came into the hands of the applicant for leave and, perhaps most important of all, the likely contribution of the document to achieving justice in the second proceeding.[23]

1. In Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (In Liquidation Receivers Appointed) and Ors,[24] Kourakis J addressed the onus of persuasion and where the obligation may not apply or not apply with as much force:

The onus of persuading the Court to exempt a party from the rule of preclusion falls on the party seeking the exemption. The party seeking an exemption must establish special circumstances. Special circumstances may exist where the rationale for the rule is inapplicable or does not apply with as much force as it does in the generality of cases or where there is a strong public interest in allowing the use of the document. That public interest will usually need to be an interest other than, or transcending, the mere private advantage to the other party to the proceeding.[25]

1. The address, by other courts to what amounts to "special circumstances" is in the context of the High Court not having addressed, in Hearne v Street, factors relevant to a determination of whether special circumstances exist. That was because the case was concerned with the nature of the obligation, where third parties are bound by the obligation, and where a contravention of the obligation may amount to a contempt of the Court.

1. In this case, proceedings were instituted. I am satisfied that all of the documents that are the subject of the AFD, were required to be disclosed in the course of those proceedings, under compulsion, through the process of disclosure required by the Court. I accept the submission that the medical reports obtained by Mr Rayan that came into existence before the proceedings were instituted, were required to be disclosed and produced to the other party, under compulsion, due to statutory provisions within the MVA Act. Section 126A addresses the obligation upon a person who seeks to make a claim for damages or other compensation in relation to the death of, or bodily injury to, a person for which insurance is provided under that Part of the MVA Act. That person must furnish the insurer or the nominal defendant (as the case may be) with a notice of claim that complies with the requirements of subsection (2). That subsection requires the person claiming to furnish the insurer or the nominal defendant with a certificate or opinion as to the nature and probable cause of the death or injury (as the case requires) provided by a medical practitioner.[26] The notice of the claim must also be accompanied by a statement (in a form prescribed by the regulations) authorising the insurer or the nominal defendant to have access to records and other sources of information relevant to the claim.[27] Under statutory compulsion, the insurer or the nominal defendant may thereby gain access to relevant medical records.
2. Section 127 of the MVA Act addresses the medical examination of claimants. Under statutory compulsion, a claimant must, within 21 days of consulting a legally qualified medical practitioner in relation to the injury to which the claim relates, or such longer period as may be reasonable in the circumstances or as the insurer may allow, inform the insurer by notice in writing of the name of the medical practitioner, the day on which the consultation occurred and within 21 days of receiving a written report from a legally qualified medical practitioner consulted by a claimant in relation to the injury, or such longer period as may be reasonable in the circumstances of the case, send a copy of that report to the insurer.
3. I am satisfied that the medical reports that are the subject of the AFD, that were obtained by Mr Rayan prior to instituting the proceedings in the District Court were required to be disclosed and produced to the MAC upon compulsion in accordance with these statutory provisions. As already noted, they and any reports that were obtained by the MAC were required to be disclosed and produced pursuant to the obligation of disclosure and production in accordance with the Rules of Court. As already noted, the evidence does not establish that any of those medical reports have been tendered in evidence.
4. I would conclude that the relevant obligation in law does arise in relation to the documents that are the subject of the AFD.

The appropriate court or courts to hear the application

1. There are a number of judgments that have considered the appropriate forum in which to bring an application to be relieved of the obligation in law referred to. In Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd v Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd (No 21),[28] Smith J observed that there had been at least seven prior judgments where a court had held that an application for leave to use a document subject to the obligation should properly be taken out in the proceedings in which the implied undertaking to the court was given.[29] His Honour also observed that there had been at least nine cases where one court has made orders (or contemplated the making of orders) as to discovery or permitting the use of documents otherwise the subject of the obligation even though the obligation was owed to another court or tribunal.[30]
2. Of the cases which support the application being brought in the court in which the obligation to the court was given, Smith J stated:

However, none of these cases establish a principle that an application to release or to obtain orders to use a document or document subject to a Harman obligation cannot be made to a court that is not the court in which the implied undertaking was given.[31]

1. In Lighthouse Equity Pty Ltd v Dale Alcock Homes Pty Ltd,[32] an application was made by the plaintiff in a Supreme Court proceeding to be relieved of the obligation that arose from proceedings in the State Administrative Tribunal. The application was to allow the use of the relevant documents in the proceedings before Howard J in the Supreme Court. His Honour proceeded on the basis that he did have the power, in an appropriate case, to relieve a party of its obligation of its Harman obligation arising out of an arbitration or proceedings before a tribunal.[33]
2. Similarly, in Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v DFD Rhodes Pty Ltd (No 2),[34] the Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis that it could relieve a party of its Harman obligation arising from either an arbitration or an earlier or different proceeding. After surveying a number of authorities, in various jurisdictions, the Court reached the following conclusions:
   1. Whether material which is subject to a Harman obligation can be used by a party in subsequent litigation is a matter that may potentially impinge on the integrity and authority of two sets of judicial proceedings.
   2. It has been suggested - particularly in the older cases - that an application to dispense with or modify the implied obligation should be made in the proceedings in which the obligation arose. In practice, albeit with some exceptions, this guideline is accorded less significance in more recent authorities.
   3. This may be because, often, the second court will be in a far better position than the first court to form a view as to the relevance and use of the materials in the subsequent litigation. So too, the second court will generally be in the best position to determine the significance of the important consideration of the likely contribution of the materials to achieving justice in the second court.
   4. Where, however, this is not the case, the perceived advantage of the first court will, ordinarily, be a factor in the second court declining to dispense with or modify the implied obligation - allowing the first court to consider any application that may be made to it. The perceived advantage of the first court is likely to be a material consideration, and depending on the circumstances may even be a decisive consideration, in determining whether there are special circumstances which justify dispensing with or modifying the implied obligation. Thus, the circumstances of the case will determine whether and to what extent the first court has an advantage in considering any application to modify the implied obligation.
   5. The Harman obligation does not diminish the authority or powers of a second court in subsequent proceedings. A court hearing subsequent litigation has full power and authority to ensure that its decision is reached by reference to all material that is necessary and probative in the discharge of its jurisdiction and powers. The implied obligation cannot restrict or fetter, and was not stated as a restriction or fetter, on a court's powers in relation to its own processes in proceedings properly commenced before the court.[35]

1. The Court thereby concluded that a second court is empowered to modify a Harman obligation arising in a different court or tribunal by causing the implied obligation to yield in one of two ways. The first is by way of an order permitting use in the subsequent litigation or the second is by an order requiring action in the subsequent litigation that is contrary to the implied obligation.[36]
2. The Court went on to observe that there is a distinction between an application to release the Harman obligation and an application for permission to use materials otherwise the subject of a Harman obligation in subsequent litigation. Whilst the former extinguishes the obligation, the latter only modifies the obligation to the extent of the permitted use.[37] The Court added:

This explains why a second court may make an order for permitted or required use but will decline to make an order for release of the implied obligation. An order for permitted or required use in the interests of justice in the subsequent litigation is within the second court's jurisdiction and powers in the way previously explained. But a wider order, extinguishing the Harman obligation altogether, is necessarily outside the second court's power. It exceeds what is necessary or incidental to the exercise of the jurisdiction and powers conferred on the second court.

Accordingly, a second court may cause a Harman obligation arising in a different court or tribunal to yield by an order permitting use in the subsequent litigation or by an order requiring action in the subsequent litigation that is contrary to the implied obligation. Each such order necessarily modifies the Harman obligation to the extent of the permitted or required use in the subsequent litigation. The implied obligation no longer binds the relevant party to the extent that the second court permits or requires the use of the materials in the subsequent litigation.[38]

The application of the legal principles in this case

1. The documents that are the subject of the application are medical reports or other medical records relating to Mr Rayan. The only medical report not obtained by Mr Rayan's solicitors is the report of Mr Keith Elsner dated 23 September 2014. That report is addressed to Allianz Australia Insurance Limited being the nominated compensating authority for the MAC. The MAC has not opposed at the making of the order sought by Mr Rayan. The order sought is to permit the use of the documents to facilitate an assessment of permanent impairment in accordance with s 22 of the RTW Act. The AFD seeks an order that would modify the operation of the obligation to the District Court to the extent of the required use to fulfil the statutory requirements of s 22. It is also to allow this Tribunal to discharge its function in the event of subsequent proceedings arising from the assessment. It is not an application for release of the implied obligation.
2. In the circumstances, it is appropriate for Mr Rayan to seek an order in this Tribunal that would allow himself, the Corporation and Murphy Transport to use the medical reports in any process to assess impairment and proceeding in the Tribunal that may arise from the assessment of Mr Rayan's permanent impairment and claims to be entitled to compensation under the RTW Act. The Tribunal is in the best position to assess the importance of the order sought to a discharge of the statutory function of s 22 and the importance of the documents in any proceedings in the Tribunal arising from the assessment, and whether the obligation in law to the District Court should thereby be modified. Apart from the limited circumstances of an application for judicial review to the Supreme Court, it is the South Australian Employment Tribunal that has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with matters at first instance arising from claims for compensation under the RTW Act.
3. There is a statutory requirement, in this case, that the medical reports, and other medical documents attached to the reports, that are the subject of the application, be provided to the assessor when the assessment of permanent impairment is undertaken in accordance with s 22 of the RTW Act. I am unable to identify a significant prejudice to another party if the obligation in law to the District Court were to be modified so as to allow an assessor to consider the specified medical reports identified in the order sought or if the Tribunal were to consider those reports in any subsequent dispute arising from the assessment.
4. The evidence before this Tribunal does not disclose the District Court to be a more appropriate forum to hear and determine the AFD.
5. The obligation in law to the District Court must yield to the statutory requirements of the process identified in s 22 and it is in the interest of justice that in any subsequent proceeding in the Tribunal arising from this assessment, the Tribunal have before it and be able to consider the medical reports that are the subject of the order sought. Section 33 of the SAET Act empowers the Tribunal to require a person to produce evidentiary material. Subsection 36(2)(a) directs the Tribunal to take all practical steps to ensure that all relevant material is disclosed to the Tribunal to enable it to determine all the relevant facts in issue in any proceedings. It is in the public interest that the Tribunal have all relevant evidentiary material before it and that injured workers receive their entitlements under the RTW Act but no more and no less.[39]
6. The circumstances relating to the assessment of permanent impairment and any subsequent proceedings are "special reasons" that enliven the making of the order sought in relation to the specified medical reports.
7. The AFD is not confined to the medical reports specified in paragraph one of these reasons. The proposed order refers to 'in addition, any further documents that may come into existence during the course of these proceedings...'. It is not clear as to which proceedings are being referred to. It would be surprising if proceedings commenced in the District Court on 22 April 2015 are yet to be concluded. In any event, it would not be appropriate to make an order relieving a party from or modifying a legal obligation to a court in relation to a document that is yet to come into existence.
8. It is appropriate for an order, in relation to the identified medical documents and records, to be made modifying the obligation in law to the District Court so as to allow Mr Rayan, the Corporation, and Murphy Transport to be able to utilise the documents in relation to the process to assess permanent impairment in accordance with s 22 of the RTW Act and any subsequent proceedings in the Tribunal where those documents may be directly relevant to an issue to be tried. The IAG provides that it is the requestor of the permanent impairment assessment report that is to collate and provide the relevant medical records to be considered by the assessor. If there are any subsequent legal proceedings in this Tribunal, Murphy Transport, as Mr Rayan's employer, will be a party to the proceeding.[40]

1. Joseph Rayan, the Return to Work Corporation of South Australia and Murphy Transport Solutions Pty Ltd are permitted to use, in the process of obtaining an assessment of permanent impairment of Mr Rayan for his claimed work injuries including an injury to the right shoulder in accordance with s 22 of the Return to Work Act 2014, and in relation to any proceedings in the South Australian Employment Tribunal, where the documents would be directly relevant to an issue to be tried, the following documents:
   1. Medical Report of Dr Jason Ward dated 26th September 2016
   2. Medical Report of Dr John Megan dated for July 2016.
   3. Medical Report of Dr Donald Angus dated 25 July 2016.
   4. Medical Report of Dr Peter Tziavrangos dated 6 April 2016.
   5. Medical Report of Dr Jason Ward dated 17 November 2015.
   6. Medical Report of Dr Jason Ward dated 10 July 2015.
   7. Medical Report of Dr Jason Ward dated 5 December 2014.
   8. Medical Report of Dr Keith Elsner dated 23 September 2014.

[1] [2026] SAET 27.

[4] Lohmann v Return to Work Corporation of South Australia [2019] SAET 213 [92]-[93] (Rossi DPJ (with whom Kelly DPJ agreed)).

[7] (2021) 140 SASR 77.

[8] Ibid p 123-4 [198] (Livesey and Bleby JJ).

[9] [1983] 1 AC 280.

[10] Ibid at p 304, 309, 319, 320, 321. See also Crest Homes Plc v Marks [1987] AC 829 at 853.

[11] [2008] HCA 36; (2008) 235 CLR 125.

[12] Ibid [96] with footnote omitted.

[13] Hearne v Street at [96]; Riddick v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1977] QB 881; Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10 at pp 32-33.

[15] Hearne v Street supra [103], [109].

[16] Hearne v Street supra [107]. See also Crest Homes Plc v Marks [1987] AC 829 at 854; Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (Plowman) (1995) 183 CLR 10 at 37 (Brennan J); Holpitt Pty Ltd v Varimu Pty Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 576 at 579.

[17] [1991] 1 WLR 756.

[20] [2015] NSWSC 2104.

[22] (1992) 38 FCR 217.

[24] [2012] SASC 12.

[25] Ibid [106] with footnotes omitted.

[28] [2023] WASC 169.

[32] [2025] WASC 227.

[34] [2023] WASCA 108.

[39] Kairns v WorkCover Corporation/CGU Workers Compensation (SA) Ltd (Chateau Yaldara Pty Ltd) [2004] SASC 352, [38] (Gray J (with whom Nyland J agreed)).

[40] See the definition of 'party' to a proceeding in s 96 of the RTW Act.