R v Rosamond

District Court of NSW|2023-04-26

Solicitors: Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown) AA Criminal Lawyers (Offender) File Number(s): 2019/000067521

INDEX OVERVIEW FACTS WITH RESPECT TO THE 90 GUILTY VERDICTS TWO VERDICTS OF NOT GUILTY ASSESSMENT OF OBJECTIVE SERIOUSNESS S 249B Provision of Corrupt Benefits S 192E Obtain financial advantage SUBJECTIVE FACTORS MITIGATING FACTORS COMPARATIVE CASES PARITY CONSIDERATION Table summarising counts

FACTS WITH RESPECT TO THE 90 GUILTY VERDICTS

In circumstances where the Crown Prosecutor's closing address occupied the better part of eight sitting days and the Crown Case Statement of Facts is 93 pages in length, the Court does not propose to replicate that level of detail in recounting the facts for the purpose of these Remarks on Sentence. The Crown Case Statement is part of Exhibit 1 on sentence.
However, to simply itemise each of the 90 counts in the form of a Table would not adequately convey a proper picture of the fraudulent activity which has resulted in these guilty verdicts.
It will be necessary to set out a summary with some detail with respect to the individual counts. The summary in each instance indicates the facts, consistent with the jury's verdicts, of which I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt.
An extension of the Human Group contract was signed in December 2012 for the ensuing 12 months.
Pursuant to the contract there were two Enterprise Leadership Program sessions required to be delivered in February 2013 and May 2013. The contract value was approximately $3.6 million. During the 12-month period 11 invoices were issued by Human Group to the NAB. All of these invoices were approved by Rogers and paid to a total value in excess of $11.5 million. None of the invoices had any supporting documentation.
During 2013 a series of corrupt benefits were paid to Rosemary Rogers by means of the provision of travel and accommodation for the Rogers family and other relatives, cash transfers and the provision of pre-paid Mastercards.
The following summary will deal with each count in the Rosamond trial indictment in numerical sequence. Where a benefit was received by Rogers, I will indicate the related count in the Rogers sentence proceedings both by reference to the count in the indictment and by reference to the sequence number which is the way the individual sentences are referred to in the judgment of Conlon SC ADCJ.
Count 1 related to Rosamond organising flights from Melbourne to Sydney and accommodation at the Four Seasons Hotel for a relative of Rosemary Rogers in February 2013. The cost of this weekend away was paid by Human Group to a value of $3,207.74.
The receipt of this benefit, together with three other received benefits were placed together in a rolled-up count, Count 1 (seq. 1), to which Rosemary Rogers pleaded guilty.
Count 2 related to providing a corrupt benefit of an overnight stay at Crown Towers in Melbourne in February 2013. This was organised by Ms Rosamond for Rogers and her husband. The cost was $1,624.68.
The receipt of this benefit was part of the rolled-up Count 1 (seq. 1) in relation to the Rogers sentence.
Count 3 related to the provision of flights from Melbourne to Sydney and accommodation at the Four Seasons Hotel between 8 - 11 March 2013 together with the provision of a chauffeur at the disposal of the family of Rosemary Rogers' sister, Maree Cocks. The cost of this benefit given to Rogers for her sister's family was $4,819.55.
This benefit was similarly part of Count 1 (seq. 1) in relation to the Rogers sentence.
Some two weeks later Rogers and her own family, together with her sister's family and other extended family members, a total of 13 people, returned to Sydney between 22 and 26 March 2013 to celebrate the 50th birthday of Rosemary Rogers' brother-in-law. The entire group flew Business Class return from Melbourne, had four nights' accommodation in the Four Seasons Hotel, and dined at Quay and Catalina restaurants. The use of a chauffeur and a private chartered boat on Sydney Harbour also contributed to the cost of this 50th Birthday.
The expenses were recorded in the MYOB accounts of Human Group as 'Project Outlaw'. The total cost of the weekend was $69,872.63. The provision of these benefits was Count 4 in the Rosamond indictment.
The receipt of this benefit was also part of the rolled-up Count 1 (seq. 1) against Rogers.
Count 5 related to the very next weekend which was the extended break over Easter. Ms Rosamond provided tickets for Rogers, her husband and their child to fly Business Class from Melbourne to Fiji. The cost of the flights was $7,517. The provision of this benefit was Count 5.
The receipt of this corrupt benefit was Count 2 (seq. 4) in the indictment to which Rosemary Rogers pleaded guilty.
Count 6 related to the provision of pre-paid Mastercards provided by Rosamond to Rogers. The account with Mastercard Pre-Paid Management Services was opened by Rosamond in her own name. She duly provided two pre-paid Mastercards to Rogers and in due course made cash deposits into the account. The Mastercards were provided to Rogers for her own personal use.
Payments totalling $37,616.99 were loaded on the prepaid Mastercards by Rosamond. The provision of this benefit was Count 6 in the indictment.
The receipt of this benefit was Count 3 (seq. 5) in the Rogers sentence proceedings.
Shortly after the provision of the Mastercards, Rogers and five other family members departed on a European holiday. All arrangements and payments for the holiday between 26 May 2013 and 30 June 2013 were made by Rosamond. The six people who went on the European holiday, including Rosemary Rogers, flew Business Class return from Melbourne to Europe at a cost in excess of $61,000. The group stayed at high-end hotels throughout Europe at a cost which exceeded $67,000. The group was also provided with the use of chauffeurs on a daily basis at a cost of approximately $31,000.
These benefits provided to Rogers and her family members by Helen Rosamond form the basis for Count 7 in the present proceedings. The total cost of the corrupt benefit was $159,490.59.
The receipt of this benefit was Count 4 (seq. 6) in the Rogers sentence proceedings.
In September 2013 Rogers told the offender Rosamond that she was having some 'cashflow' problems. Rosamond said that she would fix it and over the following weeks provided 15 Bank cheques to a total of $350,000 to Rogers. Each of the Bank cheques was made payable to Rosemary and Anthony Rogers. Rogers cashed each of them over the ensuing months. The provision of this benefit was Count 8 in the Rosamond indictment.
The receipt of this benefit was Count 5 (seq. 7) in the Rogers sentence proceedings.
In October 2013 Ms Rosamond arranged and provided to the Rogers family and also Rogers' sister Maree Cock's family, a weekend getaway holiday at the Emirates 'One and Only' Resort in the Wolgan Valley in New South Wales. This luxury resort was in the Mudgee region. The two families flew Business Class from Melbourne to Sydney and then were flown by private helicopter to the resort. The flights cost $12,320.48 for the 8 persons. Accommodation for three nights at the resort was almost $30,000. Additional private transfers cost $3,570.
The total cost of this weekend getaway was approximately $45,000. The provision of this corrupt benefit was Count 9 in the Rosamond trial.
The receipt of the benefit was Count 6 (seq. 8) in the Rogers proceedings.
The next count, Count 10 in the trial, related to the provision of an additional pre-paid Mastercard with an authorisation to the value of $10,000. It was provided by Rosamond to Rogers in December 2013, who then gave it to another employee who was an Executive Assistant to the CEO in the NAB. It was represented by Rogers to that employee that it was a 'bonus' from her and the CEO for her efforts. The CEO at the time, Cameron Clyne, had no knowledge of the provision of this Mastercard and said that had he intended to give that employee a $10,000 bonus from the Bank, it would have come from the bonus pool.
There was no corresponding charge against Rosemary Rogers in her sentence proceedings with respect to this transaction.
Count 11 related to a further weekend getaway for Rosemary Rogers' family and her sister's family in early December 2013. Two nights at Crown Towers in Melbourne was charged to Ms Rosamond's American Express card and provided as a corrupt benefit for Rogers. The accommodation cost in excess of $4,000 for the two nights.
In the Rogers proceedings this matter was included on a Form 1 and taken into account with respect to Count 6.
Shortly before Christmas, on 23 December 2013, Rosamond transferred $145,000 into the personal Bank account of Rogers. The provision of this corrupt benefit was Count 12 in the Rosamond indictment.
The receipt of those funds was Count 7 (seq. 11) in the Rogers proceedings.
In due course, the Consulting Services Panel Agreement between the NAB and Human Group was extended for a further period ending in October 2016. Despite the original agreement requiring Human Group to enter into event specific contracts or engagement contracts as they arose, no such event specific engagement contracts were separately entered into by Human Group.
Work for the NAB continued to be arranged directly between Rogers and Rosamond and fraudulent invoices continued to be approved by Rogers.
During 2014 invoices to the total value of more than $9.8 million were issued by Human Group to NAB.
Rosamond continued providing corrupt personal benefits to Rogers.
In late February 2014 a yet further weekend getaway was organised and paid for Rosemary Rogers' family, and again, the family of Rosemary Rogers' sister. Business Class flights from Melbourne to Sydney cost in excess of $4,600 and accommodation and incidentals for two nights at the Park Hyatt Hotel in Sydney exceeded $35,000.
The total cost of the weekend away exceeded $40,000. The provision of this corrupt benefit was Count 13 against Rosamond.
The receipt of the benefit was Count 8 (seq. 12) in the Rogers proceedings.
After returning to Melbourne, Rosemary Rogers made arrangements in early March 2014 for the purchase of a Bayliner powerboat for $46,590. Rosamond made arrangements for the payment of the deposit direct to Avante Marine who were selling the boat and in due course payment for the balance, including a 220HP engine and a trailer. The boat was registered in the name of Rosemary Rogers' husband.
The invoices issued by Avante Marine were in due course physically located following the execution of a search warrant at the Human Group offices in 2018. The remittance advice for the deposit and the invoice for the payment of the balance had details regarding the boat, the engine and the trailer deleted from them. The remittance advice for the deposit had the reference: 'Office of the CEO costs held' and the invoice had been altered by deleting the name of Rosemary Rogers and inserting the name 'Human Group - Project UK/AUS Strategy'.
Whilst the payment for the boat, its engine and trailer provided the basis for the giving of a corrupt benefit in Count 14, the detailed alteration to the invoice and the remittance document were relied upon at trial to illustrate steps taken by the offender to conceal the nature of the payments from her own staff within Human Group.
The receipt of the payment for the Bayliner boat was the basis of Count 9 (seq. 13) in the Rogers proceedings.
During Easter 2014 the Rogers family, again together with her sister's family, flew Business Class for a holiday in Fiji. The Rogers family had time-share accommodation in Fiji but the cost of the return flights together with private transfers was $24,136.63 which was paid for by Human Group. The provision of this benefit was Count 15 in the Rosamond indictment.
The receipt of it was Count 10 (seq. 14) in the Rogers proceedings.
In February 2014 Rosamond provided two additional pre-paid Mastercards to Rogers for her personal use. In all, a total of $96,423.55 was paid into the pre-paid Mastercard account which was dissipated during the balance of the year by Rogers. The detail of Rogers' use of the funds in that account included cash withdrawals in Torquay which was close to where the Rogers had their holiday house, payment for living expenses such as telephone and electricity bills, payments with respect to a time-share membership, and more than $30,000 for the services of a live-in nanny. The provision of these benefits is Count 16 in the present proceedings.
The receipt of these benefits was Count 11 (seq.15) in the Rogers proceedings.
Count 17 was the first of a number of charges relating to the obtaining of a personal financial advantage by the offender herself. In July 2014 Rosamond and her husband purchased a large inflatable boat called a Brig Falcon for use as a tender. $12,000 of the purchase price was paid by the Human Group. The tax invoice from the vendors of the boat, Sirocco Marine, was forwarded to Ms Rosamond by her husband.
The invoice was forwarded by the offender to the accounts section of Human Group described as an 'Invoice relating to Job Centre 2013-30 Project Code 5-5041'. The attached invoice had been altered from that actually issued by Sirocco Marine to delete the references to the boat's identification numbers and to a trade-in.
The payment was in due course entered into the MYOB accounts under 'Project 30' which was an actual NAB event and coded as 'Job Centre 41' relating to 'theming'. The allocation of the costs in this manner in the Human Group accounts caused it to be charged to the NAB and taken from the money received by way of pre-payments. This obtaining of a financial advantage by deception is Count 17 in the present proceedings. It was one of a number of matters in which altered invoices or other documents were created to conceal the true disposition of the funds from the accounting and finance personnel within Human Group.
Count 18 related to the provision of another benefit to Rogers. Ms Rosamond arranged an extensive holiday in June and July 2014 for Rosemary Rogers and her family, together with Rogers' sister's family, for a luxury holiday to New York, Washington, Miami and Hawaii in the United States. Eight persons undertook the trip. The Business Class flights cost more than $144,000. Accommodation and other miscellaneous expenses including the charter of a private jet, a luxury yacht cruise in Hawaii, chauffeurs and travel insurance amounted to $476,536.58. The holiday was for a period of about 3 weeks and the total cost was $620,627.30.
Additional expenses were placed on some of the credit cards that had been previously provided to Rogers.
The receipt of this benefit was Count 12 (seq.16) in the Rogers proceedings.
Count 19 against the present offender related to the manner of charging to the NAB for some of the costs of the extended holiday to the United States. The cost had been accounted for in the Human Group MYOB accounting records as 'Project 27 -NAB USA'. $142,904.93 was allocated under that heading and a markup and fees purportedly incurred with respect to that amount totalled an additional $86,502. The indictment, as ultimately particularised, identified the receipt of an amount between $142,904.93 and $210,521.90.
There was no corresponding count in the Rogers' proceedings.
Count 20 again related to the provision of a benefit by the offender to Rosemary Rogers. Rogers and her husband owned a holiday house in Bellbrae, a semi-rural area south of Melbourne which is close to Torquay and Bells Beach. In 2014 they undertook extensive renovations of the holiday home. Various accounts for progress payments to the builder were forwarded by Rogers to Rosamond who then organised payment from the Human Group Bank accounts. Scanned copies of the invoices were altered to conceal the nature of the payments including the removal of all names and addresses from the invoices. These corrupt payments totalled $128,555.
The receipt of this benefit by Rogers was Count 13 (seq.17) in the proceedings against her.
Count 21 related to the obtaining of a financial advantage by Rosamond in orchestrating the payments to the builder to be charged to the NAB. Two separate accounts or invoices from the builder had been forwarded to the offender by Rosemary Rogers. The first, in the amount of $52,205, was allocated to NAB 'Project 35' in the Human Group accounts, whilst the second, in an amount of $38,175, was allocated to 'Project 12'. The total paid by the NAB, namely $90,380, was the subject of this count.
Count 22 once again related to the provision of a corrupt benefit. In August 2014 another weekend away for Rosemary Rogers and her family, together with a different sister's family, was organised at the Palazzo Versace, a 5-star hotel on the Gold Coast in Queensland. The party of seven flew Business Class from Melbourne. The return flights cost $11,623.43. The three nights' accommodation cost $18,808.39. Private transfers and car cost an additional $4,030. The total cost was in excess of $35,000.
The receipt of this benefit was included as part of a rolled-up count relating to 5 separate receipts of benefits included in Count 14 (seq.18) in the Rogers' proceedings.
Count 23 related to the obtaining of a financial advantage by Rosamond in causing payments directly linked to two of the invoices from the Palazzo Versace being paid by the NAB. Those two identified payments had invoices from Palazzo Versace attributed to 'Project 35-ELT Off-site Aug' in the Human Group accounting records and thereby drawn down from the NAB prepayments. These two identified invoices came to a total of $18,808.39.
Count 24 related to a further obtaining of a financial advantage by Rosamond. During the 2014/2015 financial year the offender purchased a Toyota Kluger for her parents-in-law to use in their home town of Tamworth and in commuting to Sydney to assist her in looking after the children. The purchase price of $39,390 came from the Human Group Bank account and the costs were then on-charged to NAB by being allocated in the MYOB accounts to 'Project 12, Office of the CEO' and the costs 'category 41' which related to 'theming'. The vehicle was registered in the name of the offender.
Count 25 related to the provision of a corrupt benefit to Rogers. The offender paid for a 70th birthday celebration put on by Rosemary Rogers for her father-in-law in September 2014 at the Polperro Winery in the Mornington Peninsula in Victoria. This benefit to Rogers cost $15,230.
This benefit was part of the rolled-up Count 14 (seq. 18) in the Rogers proceedings.
Count 26 was an obtaining count related to causing the NAB to pay for this birthday celebration. This was a verdict of not guilty.
Count 27 arose as a consequence of a payment by way of a purported 'gift' from the offender to her sister-in-law and her partner. They were having some difficulties in their trucking business and the offender provided them with $33,000, inclusive of GST, to assist them through their difficulties. She obtained an invoice from them described as: 'Project fuel logistics'. The payment to them, less GST, was entered into the MYOB accounts of Human Group as: 'Project 42, ELT Off-site: Dec 2014'. The misleading of the accounts section at Human Group continued by allocating these costs in the accounting as: 'Cost Centre 11 - logistics'.
The effect of charging the $30,000 gift to the NAB formed the basis for the obtaining of a financial advantage by Rosamond in Count 27.
In due course however, all items which had been placed in 'Project 42' had mark-ups and additional fees added to the amount and an additional figure of between $13,500 and $15,000 was added to the amount charged to the NAB. This represented a 45% mark-up. The variation in the fee charged to NAB arose because it was unclear as to whether the 45% mark-up was calculated with or without GST.
The added mark-up constituted the further financial advantage obtained with respect to Count 28.
Count 29 related to a further provision of a benefit to Rogers and her husband who were given a one-night stay at Crown Towers in Melbourne in October 2014. The cost of the overnight stay was $2,337.39.
The receipt of this benefit was also part of the rolled-up Count 14 (seq. 18) against Rogers.
Count 30 related to the provision of a BMW X5 to Rosemary Rogers in late 2014. Rogers herself had paid the $5,000 deposit, and the balance of $172,162.21 was paid by Human Group. The transaction description within Human Group was: 'Office of CEO tx'.
The receipt of this benefit, namely the BMW motor vehicle, was Count 15 (seq. 21) against Rogers.
Count 31 related to causing the NAB to pay for the BMW. The obtaining of a financial advantage by Rosamond was caused by allocating it to 'Project 12' and 'Costs Centre 41' within the MYOB records of Human Group.
Count 32 related to a further personal financial advantage to Rosamond. She and her husband lived in a home at 18 Upper Spit Road in Mosman. Garden umbrellas were installed at a total cost of $39,700. That cost was allocated to two different NAB projects and described as 'ELT Offsite - NAB conversations'.
Count 33 was a further benefit provided to Rosemary Rogers. This related to another weekend away for Rosemary Rogers and her family, her sister's family and her in-laws at the Emirates 'One and Only' Resort in Wolgan Valley in October 2014. Nine people attended and return Business Class flights from Melbourne to Sydney cost $17,086. They then flew by private helicopter from Sydney to the resort at a cost of $10,710. Accommodation for two nights at the resort cost over $35,000 and there were additional private transfers to and from the airport of $2,200. The total cost of the weekend for the group was $65,527.96.
A number of the corrupt benefits provided to Rogers were allocated to 'Project 42-ELT offsite Dec14 (Wolgan Valley)' and on-charged to the NAB. These included the travel costs which had been booked through an agency.
The receipt by Rogers of the cost of this weekend at Wolgan Valley was not separately charged as a substantive offence against her but was included as part of the rolled-up Count 14 (seq. 18) in her sentence proceedings.
Count 34 was an additional overnight stay in Melbourne provided to Rogers and her husband in November 2014. The one-night stay at the Crown Metropole in Melbourne cost $4,732.82.
The receipt of this benefit was also part of the rolled-up Count 14 (seq. 18) in the Rogers proceedings.
Count 35 was a further provision of a benefit from Rosamond to Rogers. The offender arranged a marina berth at the Anchorage Marina in Williamstown for the Bayliner boat which had previously been purchased by Rogers and her husband and paid for by Helen Rosamond. Rosamond arranged to pay for the marina berth on an ongoing 12-month basis. The payment for the marina berth in December 2014, 12 months in advance, was $7,500.
In the Rogers proceedings the receipt of this benefit (seq. 24) was placed on a Form 1 together with three other matters to be taken into account with respect to the purchase of another boat (Count 23 seq. 39) to which we will come in due course.
In early 2015 Rosemary Rogers discussed with the offender the purchase of a caravan. In due course a 2015 Bunkhouse Caravan costing $93,290 was ordered by Rogers. She paid the deposit of $2,000 and the balance of $91,290 was paid by Human Group.
The provision of this benefit formed the basis of Count 36 against Rosamond.
The receipt of the benefit was Count 17 (seq. 26) against Rogers.
The on-charging of the cost of the caravan to NAB formed the basis for the obtaining a financial advantage by Rosamond in Count 37. It had been allocated in the MYOB accounts as 'Project 46 - NAB conversations: Feb 2015'. The invoice from the company which sold the caravan had described the caravan as '2015 Bunkhouse'. The invoice was altered by removal of those words and substituting the words: 'Project Offsite Logistic'. This concealed the personal nature of the expenditure from the accounting staff in Human Group.
Count 38 related to Rosamond providing Rogers with a holiday in Tasmania in March 2015 for Rogers' tenth wedding anniversary. Rogers and her husband flew Business Class return from Melbourne to Hobart at a cost of $3,500. They stayed for three nights at the Sapphire Freycinet Lodge at a cost of $22,680. There were costs in excess of $3,000 for private transfers and chauffeurs. The total cost exceeded $29,000.
The receipt of this benefit by Rogers was part of a rolled-up Count 16 (seq. 25) which related to six separate instances of travel and accommodation to a total of $140,814.90.
Count 39 related to another provision of a benefit to Rogers in the form of another holiday. Rosemary Rogers and her family, together with her sister's family, a total of eight persons, flew Business Class return from Melbourne to Fiji at a cost of more than $25,000. They then flew from Nadi to the privately owned island of Laucala at a cost of $22,568. Eight nights' accommodation on the island, together with miscellaneous expenses, exceeded $200,000. The total cost of the one-week holiday and travel was $250,414,16.
The receipt of this benefit was separately charged against Rogers as Count 18 (seq. 27).
Count 40 related to the direct payment by Human Group to Laucala Island Resort Ltd of $221,285.95. it was on-charged to the NAB by it being allocated to 'Project 52'.
In April 2015 Rosamond paid approximately $140,000 to a travel agency for part payment for a holiday for her family, including her husband, her twin sons, and her parents to the Canadian Rocky Mountains. The allocation of that payment to 'Project 52 - Cost Centre 11' caused the payment to be allocated to the NAB. This obtaining of a financial advantage from the NAB was Count 41.
The accused allocated a 50% mark-up to items in 'Project 52' which added an additional amount of almost $70,000 to the $140,000 dishonestly obtained from NAB. This separate obtaining of $69,925 was Count 42.
Count 43 was for the provision of flights from Melbourne to Adelaide for Rosemary Rogers' husband and his brother-in-law. The cost of these flights was $3,913.
This benefit formed part of the rolled-up Count 16 (seq. 25) in the Rogers proceedings.
Count 44 related to the provision of further accommodation at Crown Towers in Melbourne. Rogers family, her sister's family, and other guests stayed overnight. The one-night stay for 13 people cost $26,168.27.
The receipt of that benefit was similarly part of Count 16 (seq. 25) in the Rogers proceedings.
Count 45 related to Helen Rosamond's own 40th birthday party in May 2015. The party was held at the home of one of her acquaintances, Ms Rosalind Oatley. The private function included ice sculptures and singing waiters. The cost of the catering was $14,358.20. The caterers were asked to include the identification of 'Project 54' on the invoice provided to Human Group where it was allocated to a cost centre relating to catering for NAB events. The effective charging of the catering to NAB formed the basis for Count 45 of obtaining a financial advantage by deception.
Count 46 related to the obtaining of a financial advantage by Rosamond herself. The offender and her husband owned a catamaran called 'Avalanche'. Repairs and installation of furniture on the boat incurred costs in excess of $32,000. The various invoices which were received were allocated to NAB project numbers and accordingly paid by NAB.
Count 47 related to the provision of a benefit to Rogers in the form of payment of return flights from Melbourne to Sydney for one of Rogers' sisters. The cost was $4,345.50.
This benefit was included in the rolled-up Count 16 (seq. 25) against Rogers.
Count 48 related to the provision of a benefit relating to Rogers' sister and her husband, who flew Business Class from Melbourne to Broome where they stayed at the Cable Beach Club Resort. The total cost of the holiday was $21,538.96.
The receipt of this benefit was similarly part of of the rolled-up Count 16 (seq. 25) in the Rogers proceedings.
Count 49 related to Helen Rosamond causing the NAB to pay for the design and construction of a new garden at her family residential home in Upper Spit Road, Mosman. Various invoices rendered by the garden construction company were allocated to different NAB project numbers and described as relating to Executive Leadership Team programs or meetings. The total cost paid by the NAB for the new garden was $372,611.
Count 50 related to a yet further weekend getaway to the Emirates Resort in Wolgan Valley. In August 2015 Rosemary Rogers and her sisters' families, nine persons in total, flew Business Class from Melbourne to Sydney, stayed overnight at the Darling Hotel at Pyrmont, and on this occasion travelled via private limousine to Wolgan Valley near Mudgee where they stayed at the Emirates Resort for two nights. The total cost of this holiday was $55,472.17.
In the proceedings against Rogers the receipt of this benefit was part of the rolled-up Count 16 (seq. 25).
In December 2015, Ms Rosamond's parents-in-law flew to Perth where they stayed for three days in the Hyatt Regency before boarding the Indian Pacific for return travel to Sydney. Rosamond organised the holiday and paid for it in July 2015 through Human Group. It was allocated to NAB 'Project 69' and described as an 'Executive Leadership Team meeting'. The cost of $14,268 was charged to the NAB. This fraudulent obtaining was Count 51.
Count 52 was a further obtaining of a financial advantage by Rosamond. A company undertook electrical work at the offender's Mosman residence. She requested that the description of the work be put simply as 'electrical equipment as per scope of works - Project 61'. Various different invoices were allocated to NAB project numbers and on-charged to the NAB. The identified invoices totalled $11,987.80.
Count 53 related to the provision of benefits to Rogers. Pre-paid Mastercards were provided to Rosemary Rogers to a value of $110,000. The receipt of this benefit was Count 19 (seq. 33) against Rogers.
Count 54 related to charging the NAB for renovations to the offender's home in Upper Spit Road, Mosman. Payment for the renovations of more than $86,000 was paid by Human Group. The offender specifically asked that the invoice be made out to Human Group and to add a Project Number. The invoice was allocated to a specific NAB project which caused the on-charging of the payment to the NAB.
Count 55 related to a second Mastercard pre-paid account and the provision of a further Mastercard to Rosemary Rogers with the same amount loaded onto it, namely $110,000. The provision of this benefit was Count 55 against Rosamond.
In the Rogers proceedings it was Count 20 (seq. 34).
Count 56 related to a further payment for 12 months for the marina berth at Anchorage Marina. The payment of this benefit of $7,500 was Count 56 against Rosamond.
It was sequence 59 placed on a Form 1 in the Rogers proceedings together with other matters on a Form 1 in relation to acquisition of another boat.
Count 57 related to the provision of a corrupt benefit in the form of flights from Melbourne to Perth return, and accommodation in Perth for a relative of Rosemary Rogers. The cost was $5,136.58.
This travel was part of Count 22 (seq. 36) with respect to Rogers.
Count 58 was again a provision of a benefit to Rogers by virtue of payment for her nanny to fly home to visit her family in Chile. The flights for the nanny and her own child to return to Chile was $6,398.86. The invoice which was issued referred to 'South American Offsite'.
The receipt of that benefit was Count 21 (seq. 35) in the Rogers proceedings.
Count 59 related to $50,000 being paid into Mastercards used by Rosamond during a holiday in the United States. Each of the payments were coded in the MYOB accounts as 'Project 75 - ELT Offsite: Feb 2016 - Cost Centre 11'. These payments were on-charged to the NAB.
In April 2016 the offender paid for the Rogers family and her sister's family for a weekend at Crown Towers in Melbourne. The cost of this weekend was $8,331 and formed the basis of Count 60 against Rosamond.
The receipt of this benefit formed part of the rolled-up Count 22 (seq. 36) against Rogers.
The next guilty finding of obtaining a financial advantage by Rosamond was Count 61. It related to the acquisition of Aboriginal artwork which cost almost $18,000 and was allocated to an NAB project number. The artwork was placed in the home to which the offender moved after the breakup of her marriage and it was on the walls at the Potts Point premises when the search warrant was executed in 2018.
Count 62 was again the provision of overnight accommodation at Crown Towers in Melbourne for the Rogers family and her sister's family. The one-night stay in April 2016 cost $4,472.
It formed part of the rolled-up count 22 (seq. 36) in the Rogers proceedings.
Count 63 related to the trading in of the Bayliner boat which had been paid for by Rosamond in March 2014 (Count 14) and the upgrading to a new boat by Rogers and her husband. The new boat was a 25-foot Chaparral which cost $145,000. A trade-in of $30,000 for the Bayliner powerboat left a balance of $115,000 to be paid. That amount was paid by Human Group direct to Aussie Boat Sales. At the specific request of the offender, Rosamond, the boat vendors added the words 'Project 85 - Costs Centre 41' to the Invoice. The provision of the benefit by payment for the boat was Count 63.
Obtaining the payment for the Chaparral boat by on-charging the NAB was Count 64 against Rosamond.
In the Rogers proceedings the receipt of the funds for this boat was Count 23 (seq. 39). This was the Count to which the four matters on a Form 1 attached.
Count 65 related to the payment of $468,726 to a builder undertaking an extension and renovations to the Rogers holiday house in Bellbrae Victoria. Rosamond sent instructions for the inclusion of a project number on the invoices and organised payments directly to the builder.
Count 66 was the counterpoint offence of causing the entire amount paid to the builder to be on-charged to the NAB.
The receipt of the benefit of the payments to the builder was Count 24 (seq. 40) in the Rogers proceedings.
Count 67 was for the provision of three nights' accommodation at Crown Towers in Melbourne for Rogers' family and her sister's family at a cost of $5,240.87.
The receipt of that benefit was part of a rolled-up Count 25 (seq. 41) which related to six separate instances of travel and accommodation to various locations in the Rogers sentence proceedings.
Count 68 related to a further stay at Crown Towers in Melbourne. On 30 June 2016 Rogers flew from Melbourne to Sydney to have lunch with Rosamond who had booked the flights and restaurant. Rogers flew back to Melbourne that evening and then stayed for two nights at Crown Towers with her husband. The accommodation and miscellaneous costs were $23,570.84.
The receipt of this benefit was part of the rolled-up count 25 (seq. 41) against Rogers.
Count 69 related to a further stay at Crown Towers for Rosemary Rogers' family, and again for her sister's family. The two-night stay cost $5,389.43.
This additional accommodation formed part of Count 25 (seq. 41) against Rogers.
Count 70 was a further corrupt benefit to Rogers. It was another trip for the Rogers family and her sister's family, together with some additional guests, to the Emirates 'One and Only' Resort in Wolgan Valley. The 10 persons flew Business Class from Melbourne to Sydney and then travelled via private helicopter to Wolgan Valley. The cost of the travel and transfers was over $41,000. The two nights' accommodation and services at the resort was approximately $35,000. The total benefit as $75,865.11. The receipt of this benefit was part of the rolled-up Count 25 (seq. 41) with respect to Rogers.
Count 71 related to a payment for accommodation at Onshore Torquay for two nights while the nearby holiday house was still being renovated. The cost of the two nights' accommodation for Rogers and her husband was $1,210.44.
This was dealt with as part of the rolled-up Count 25 relating to Rogers.
Count 73 related to the payment for accommodation in Torquay on another occasion at a cost of $1,089.72.
Count 74 related to a further stay in Torquay while the holiday house continued to be renovated. The cost on this occasion was $2,016.68.
Count 75 related to another weekend at Crown Towers in Melbourne for six people. It included Rogers and her family, and also her sister's family. The accommodation and additional charges for the two nights came to $18,123.17.
Each of the stays at Torquay, and this most recent accommodation at Crown Towers, were included in the rolled-up Count 25 (seq. 41) relating to benefits received by Rosemary Rogers.
Count 76 was a further payment for 12-months for the marina berth at Anchorage Marina for the Rogers' Chaperral boat.
The receipt of this benefit formed part of a further rolled-up count, Count 26 (seq. 51) relating to Rogers.
Count 77 related to Rosamond paying for Rogers and three others attending 'Dinner by Heston Blumenthal' at Crown Towers in Melbourne in 2017. The cost of the dinner was $1,446.15.
Count 78 related to the provision of a one-night stay by Rogers and her husband at Crown Towers in March 2017. The cost including transfers was $3,544.71.
In April 2017 Rosemary Rogers family, together with her sister's family, flew from Melbourne to Cairns before transferring to Port Douglas for a nine-day holiday. The private transfers and daily limousines cost more than $16,000 and the total cost of the nine-day holiday exceeded $65,000 and was paid for in full by Human Group. The provision of this corrupt benefit is Count 79.
This matter would appear to have been included in the rolled-up Count 26 (seq. 51) relating to Rogers corruptly receiving $127,519.63 in corrupt benefits.
Count 80 related to Rosamond having engaged professional interior design services for her new residence in Victoria Street, Potts Point. The design service included the sourcing and installation of furniture. The interior design and furniture obtained cost $228,747.28. The invoices for work done were issued to Human Group and noted as 'Project 106'. 'Project 106' related to 'CEO Offsites 2017' and the interior design payments were on-charged to the NAB.
In addition to the obtaining of a financial advantage of the primary amount mark-ups on the cost yielded an additional amount of between $45,000 and approximately $59,000 which were separately charged as Count 81.
Count 82 related to a further provision of a financial benefit to Rogers. In August 2017 Rogers and her family, together with her sister's family flew from Melbourne to the Gold Coast where they stayed at the Sheraton Grande Mirage at Main Beach. The Business Class flights cost over $28,000; two nights' accommodation was approximately $12,500; private transfers and daily limousines were approximately $5,000; and miscellaneous expenses including 'Animal Encounters' at Sea World were approximately $1,300. The total cost of the two-night holiday was $47,281.22.
Count 83 related to travel from Melbourne to Sydney the following month, September 2017. Rosemary Rogers, together with her husband and brother-in-law, flew to Sydney and stayed for one night at the Four Seasons hotel. The Business Class flights cost over $8,000 and three people for one night at the Four Seasons was approximately $1,400. Including private transfers, the total cost of the flights and one nights' accommodation was $10, 819.34.
The trip to the Gold Coast and the weekend travel to Sydney would appear to have been included in the rolled-up count, Count 26 (seq. 51) in the Rogers proceedings.
From around July 2017 Rosemary Rogers and her husband had been looking to purchase a new home.
By August 2017 they were negotiating to purchase a house at 40 Power Street, Williamstown.
On 12 September 2017, Rogers and her husband signed a contract for the purchase of the premises for $3.8 million. On 15 September 2017, the offender, Ms Rosamond, paid the 10% deposit of $380,000 to the real estate agents with respect to the purchase. Numerous messages between Rogers and Rosamond referred to the house at 40 Power Street as: 'CEO dialogues'. The provision of the $380,000 deposit was Count 84 in the Rosamond indictment.
Its receipt by Rogers was Count 27 (seq. 55) in the Rogers indictment.
Towards the end of September 2017 Human Group issued an invoice to the NAB for $2.2 million bearing the description: 'Project Eagle'. 'Project Eagle' had in fact been the code name utilised within the NAB regarding the recruitment to the Bank's Executive of the former NSW Premier, Mike Baird.
Rogers finessed this invoice through the finance section of the Bank by claiming that the payment related to the onboarding of Mr Baird. "Onboarding" appears to be the industry and commercial term for recruitment. The $2.2 million was paid by the NAB to Human Group in early October 2017.
In November 2017, while Rogers was negotiating with her own personal private Banker regarding a loan towards some of the house purchase, Rosamond transferred $1.5 million from the Human Group Bank account into her own personal Bank account. She subsequently drew a Bank cheque for $1.5 million which she provided to Rogers for payment towards the purchase price of 40 Power Street, Williamstown.
Count 86 in the Rosamond indictment related to the obtaining of the $2.2 million from the NAB to her own financial advantage, while Count 85 related to the giving of the corrupt benefit to Rogers in the form of the Bank cheque for $1.5 million.
Whilst the financial advantage of being able to use the entire $2.2 million as she saw fit gave rise to the amount in Count 86, after giving $1.5 million to Rogers, Rosamond retained $700,000.
The receipt of the $1.5 million by Rogers was Count 28 (seq. 56) in the proceedings against her.
Count 87 related to a further payment for the 12-month marina berth at Anchorage Marina by Rosamond for the benefit of Rogers.
In the Rogers proceedings the receipt of this benefit was placed on a Form 1 and taken into account, presumably on Count 26 (seq. 51).
Count 88 related to the obtaining of further personal funds by Rosamond in the amount of $43,178.58. The receipt of this financial advantage was the basis for Count 88 and related to payments for rent of the premises in Victoria Street, Potts Point.
Rosamond had directed her accounts section to allocate the rental payments to 'Project 106- CEO Offsites 2017' and a costs centre referable to 'Venue and Conferencing'.
In addition to having the NAB pay for her own rent, between September and December 2017 Rosamond also on-charged rent for the premises where her parents were residing, which was also in Victoria Street, Potts Point. The on-charging of these costs of $8,255.96 to the NAB was Count 89.
On 6 December 2017 a number of Executives of the NAB received a whistle-blower letter. The identity of Rosemary Rogers and also Helen Rosamond was immediately ascertained. Rogers resigned from her employment on 11 December 2017.
In due course on 5 February 2018 the NAB notified Rosamond of the immediate termination of the consulting agreement between Human Group and the NAB.
On 14 February 2018 the Bank reiterated the termination of the contract and requested that all outstanding invoices be provided. Rosamond then caused the finance section of Human Group to prepare what was headed as the 'Final Invoice' for a variety of projects to NAB. The invoice set out the charges for 20 different projects and included a termination payment for the financial year 2018 of over $425,000. The final invoice came to a total of $3,331,153.13 inclusive of GST.
Various communications between Rosamond and Executives in the Bank thereafter culminated in the Bank refusing to pay the invoice.
Count 90 in the Rosamond indictment was the attempt to dishonestly obtain the amount set out in that invoice. The jury returned a verdict of guilty with respect to this count.
The final count that the jury returned a verdict of guilty to with respect to a relationship with the NAB was Count 91. It was an obtaining financial advantage count and related to an actuarial calculation with respect to the total payments made to Human Group by the NAB.
Each financial year Human Group would render invoices which were referred to as 'Scheduled budgetary FY'. The payments with respect to those invoices were described as 'pre-payments'. Whilst not strictly held in a literal trust account, they were held as pre-payments in the books of Human Group and not dealt with as revenue until drawn down on the completion of a project.
The amount of the pre-payments each year pursuant to an agreed budget was arranged between Rogers and Rosamond. If pre-payments were not fully expended in each financial year, the funds were supposed to be returned to the NAB.
Each financial year the Human Group finance team prepared a report which set out the unspent pre-payments. The Crown case with respect to Count 91 was that between 1 July 2014 and 30 June 2018 the offender, Ms Rosamond, did not return any of the unspent pre-payments to the NAB but retained them knowing that there was an obligation to return them once the Human Group contract with NAB was terminated.
In the financial years ending 2015, 2016 and 2017 the balance of the NAB pre-payments unspent at the end of the financial year was drawn down as revenue in the Human Group MYOB accounts.
The deception that all the pre-payments had in fact been spent on NAB events was hidden by various accounting mechanisms.
The actuarial calculations ultimately yielded a figure between $2.396 million and $4.956 million as being the unused pre-payments which were retained dishonestly. Based on the evidence led in the trial, I am satisfied that the amount retained was $4.956 million.
The final count in the indictment in respect of which the jury returned a verdict of guilty had nothing to do with the NAB.
In September 2015 Helen Rosamond had been engaged by a real estate investment trust company, Vicinity Centres, which specialised in the ownership and management of a number of shopping centres in both Sydney and Melbourne.
The recommendation to utilise Rosamond came from a lady named Colleen Harris, who was employed as an Executive General Manager by Vicinity Centres. As Harris had formerly been employed by the NAB and had previously engaged with the offender with respect to NAB related events. Ms Rosamond was engaged to run Christmas parties for both the Sydney and Melbourne offices of the company. A total of approximately 800 attendees was anticipated across both events which took place on separate dates in the respective cities.
Communications via email indicated an estimate of between $60 - $100 per head depending upon other inclusions. Ms Harris indicated that that would be the per head cost and other costs, such as venue hire, would add to the cost. Ms Harris left the employee of Vicinity Centres prior to the parties actually taking place.
In January 2016 the offender issued a fraudulent invoice to Vicinity Centres for both parties at a total cost of $627,884.85. The costs averaged to about $784 per attendee. Vicinity Centre questioned the quantum of the invoice. Ms Rosamond claimed that the amount had been approved verbally and also via email with Ms Harris. She forwarded an email exchange purporting to reflect in writing an estimate of the total budget being in the region of $600,000 - $700,000. It also indicated having discussed those amounts on the phone.
Vicinity Centres in due course made enquiries of Ms Harris, who confirmed that there had never been communications of a cost of $600,000 - $700,000. The IT department of Vicinity Centres conducted a review of Ms Harris' archived emails and found an email which corresponded in part to the copied email provided by Rosamond. The provided copy included a reference to $600,000 - $700,000. However these figures were not in the archived email. The apparently forged email was referred to solicitors and Vicinity Centres did not pay the invoice.
The total cost should have only been approximately $120,000.
Count 92 at trial related to the attempt to dishonestly obtain a financial advantage of between $500,000 and $520,000, being the amount in excess of what the invoice to Vicinity Centre should have been for.
Against the above detail of the payments made, and the benefits received, it is appropriate to note that the personal benefits received from Rosamond by Rogers came to a total of 5,570,226.57 between 2013 and December 2017. The quantum of the financial advantage obtained by deception by Helen Rosamond relating to the 29 guilty verdicts with respect to s 192E offences came to a total of $4,741,887.16 during the same period.
It is to be borne in mind that not all of the identified and calculated sum of the financial advantage obtained by Rosamond was actually retained by her. By way of obvious example, the amount of $2.2 million, being the Project Eagle invoice connected with the acquisition of the house at Williamstown by Rogers, which amount was obtained from the NAB funds, does not take into account the provision of $380,000 for the deposit on the house and the Bank cheque for $1.5 million which was provided towards the settlement price.
It is appropriate to note at this juncture that after discovery of the relationship between Rogers and Rosamond by the Bank, an effort to cover up the nature of those funds having been advanced resulted in a Bank cheque for $1.5 million in favour of Rosamond being given to her by Rogers to support the false pretence that the money had originally been advanced merely as a loan. That cheque was ultimately located by Police, having not been cashed by Rosamond during the execution of the search warrant at her home in 2018.

TWO VERDICTS OF NOT GUILTY

The trial indictment presented against Helen Rosamond contained a total of 92 counts. As is by now clear, the jury returned verdicts of guilty with respect to 90 of those counts.
Whilst not strictly relevant to the sentence proceedings, I should note in passing what appear to be the obvious reasons for the two verdicts of not guilty.
Count 25 related to the provision of a corrupt benefit to Rogers by way of payment for the 70th birthday party which she put on for her father-in-law at the Polperro winery. The jury returned a verdict of guilty with respect to the provision of that corrupt benefit.
Count 26 was the counterpoint to Count 25 and related to the offender effectively billing NAB for the benefit she had provided to Rogers. The MYOB accounting records for the invoices for the Polperro Winery 70th birthday for Rogers' father-in-law were: 'Project 40 - ELT: Off-site Sept 21 - CEO projects'.
It would appear clear that the jury has undertaken a detailed analysis of both the accounting evidence and the documentary material relating to the accounting records and have entertained a reasonable doubt that the drawdown of the identified amount was sufficiently able to be identified.
The second not guilty verdict was Count 72, relating to the payment for a holiday at Berkeley River Lodge in Western Australia for Rosemary Rogers and her husband in October 2016. As indicated earlier, the flights and accommodation cost $26,515.44.
The payments for this trip were made partly on the Amex card of Rosamond and partly by Human Group. The costs were allocated to the NAB in the MYOB accounts of Human Group. However, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty with respect to this count.
This holiday had been included in the rolled-up Count 25 (seq. 41) with respect to Rosemary Rogers to which she pleaded guilty to the receipt of a corrupt benefit.
Notwithstanding the plea of guilty by Rogers at her sentence, the evidence in the Rosamond trial left the jury with a reasonable doubt regarding the completely personal nature of the benefit received by Rogers.
In the course of cross-examination of Rosemary Rogers during the Rosamond trial, a series of text messages between Rogers and Helen Rosamond was tendered by the defence as Exhibit 137. Included in those messages were discussions between the two of them about whether the Berkeley Lodge premises at which Rogers was holidaying with her husband in Western Australia might be suitable for an ELT, that is, an Executive Leadership Team 'on-site' conference.
The jury clearly entertained the reasonable possibility that the trip could be construed as, in effect, a reconnaissance of the premises for the potential legitimate future use of it by the NAB leadership team.
This, undoubtedly, was the reason for the not guilty verdict on this count.

ASSESSMENT OF OBJECTIVE SERIOUSNESS

An assessment of the objective seriousness of fraud offences requires a consideration of the elements of the particular offences and consideration of the guidepost provided by the statutory maximums. Various authorities have recognised particular factors that bear generally on a determination of the objective seriousness of a fraud offence. The combination and interplay of these different factors contribute to an appropriate placement of an offence on a spectrum of similar offences.
The first relevant feature is the amount of money involved.
While the amount of money defrauded is "not determinative of the seriousness of the criminality (it) is relevant to a degree and particularly where the offences are pre-meditated, committed on a number of separate occasions and involve a degree of planning, and are for substantial amounts of money": R v Finnie [2002] NSWCCA 533, per Dunford J (Spigelman CJ and Howie J agreeing) at [59].
In circumstances where a defrauding consists of a course of conduct, the value of the individual transactions constituting separate counts in the indictment becomes of lesser importance where the pattern of offending is "more blatant, frequent and entrenched." In Tweedie v R [2015] NSWCCA 71 at [31], R A Hulme J, (Basten JA and Adamson J agreeing), rejected as a fallacy that the criminality of each fraud offence in that matter was to be measured only by the value of the goods obtained. The case involved repeated fraudulent use of stolen credit cards. His Honour said: "But the criminality did not involve isolated acts of offending; it included the fact that the applicant was engaged in systematic, frequent and fraudulent use of stolen credit cards. If there had been two, or a few, offences, it may be that the value of goods obtained in each transaction would be a significant indicator of the seriousness of the individual offences. But the value of the individual transactions is of lesser importance as the pattern of offending is more blatant, frequent and entrenched."
In the present matter the financial benefit provided to Rogers in the offences under s 249B(2) clearly illustrate the dollar amount of the benefit provided. However, a fundamental element of those offences was that the benefits were provided as an inducement or reward for the showing of favour to Rosamond's company, Human Group. The favour obtained was the intangible benefit of the uncritical approval of over-inflated invoices and the continuation of the contract which was being utilised for both legitimate NAB expenses as well as the non-NAB expenditure.
The overall quantum of all of the transactions in the counts in the indictment, as indicated much earlier in these Remarks, was in excess of $19 million. It is important however to be conscious of the fact that some amounts of money are duplicated in separate transactions. The ultimate actual defalcation is reflected in the amounts fraudulently obtained and received by the two co-offenders.
The length of time over which the offences were committed is also a relevant factor in determining the level of objective criminality.
The duration of fraudulent conduct is a relevant factor which may reflect the degree of planning, and demonstrates, in circumstances of an ongoing fraud, that the offence was not committed on an impulse.
As observed by Lee J in R v David Charles Hawkins (1989) A Crim R 430 in assessing objective seriousness, the period of time over which the offences were committed must be taken into account. In that matter, his Honour observed (at 435): "This was no temporary 'dipping into the till' crime to overcome a problem that may have arisen, it was a consistent and persistent demonstration of fraud over a significant period."
The fraudulent offending against the NAB extended over a period of some five years.
The motive for commission of an offence of dishonesty is also a relevant factor when assessing the objective criminality: see R v Mears (1991) 53 A Crim R 141 at 145 per Lee CJ at CL (Gleeson CJ and Loveday J agreeing).
Where a fraud is based on greed rather than need, the objective seriousness is increased. In the present matter, with respect to the obtaining financial advantage offences, the overarching motivation of the offender is accurately described as one of greed, self-gratification and enrichment.
The motive with respect to the provision of corrupt benefits to the employee or agent of the NAB was intended in each instance as an inducement, a bribe, or a reward for the showing of favour to Ms Rosamond's company, Human Group. The clear motivation for these offences was the practical need to exert influence over her co-offender in order to ensure the continuation of the contracts and to hide the true nature of the inflated invoices which were being issued to the NAB.
Some offences involving the provision of benefits in the way of holidays, the payment of rent for her own parents and provision of a motor vehicle to her parents-in-law can properly be viewed as motivated by a need to demonstrate her financial success and grandiosity.
The degree of planning in relation to the commission of a fraud is a factor which is viewed as more serious than offences committed on impulse.
Such a factor overlaps to some extent with the length of time during which the criminal conduct occurs but the authorities clearly indicate that planning and repetition are viewed as clear factors of aggravation: see R v Pont (2000) 121 A Crim R 302 at [43] - [44] per Greg James J.
The present matters involved a high degree of pre-meditation in the rendering of invoices for a prospective future budget leading to substantial pre-payments annually from the Bank to Human Group. The determination of the quantum of those invoices and the subsequent disposition of funds from the NAB for corrupt purposes involved manipulation of the invoices with respect to specific projects which were almost impossible to detect.
The offending conduct by Ms Rosamond included the repeated deception of the Accounts and Finance section of her own company and in some instances the alteration of third-party invoices, either by request to the supplier, or by manipulation and alteration of the invoices after receipt.
The accounting processes utilised within Human Group had the effect of submerging the misappropriation of the corrupt funds. The concealment of the extent of the offending was so successfully done that although Rogers knew that the corrupt benefits she was receiving were included in the inflated invoices and that there was a likely benefit to Rosamond by virtue of mark-ups and fees, she was unaware of the financial advantage with respect to personal acquisitions and payments by Rosamond. I accept her evidence that she believed the only fraudulent advantage offences were the corrupt benefits received by herself.
I accept the Crown's submission that the modus operandi put in place being successful for more than five years is itself testament to the level of planning and monitoring by the offender.
It is well established that a breach of the trust reposed in an offender is a relevant factor of aggravation affecting an assessment of the objective seriousness of a particular crime.
There is no doubt that Rosemary Rogers was in a special position of trust within the Bank as the Chief of Staff to the CEO with a delegated authority of $20 million. Her ability to make decisions and influence the decision-making of others was clear and her breach of the trust placed in her is obvious.
In the Crown's submission, Rosamond was in a position of trust as a preferred contractor and the recipient of many millions of dollars in advance each financial year. The National Australia Bank was entitled to assume that she would act in compliance with her contract and that she would use monies paid upfront by the NAB to Human Group for NAB purposes. She worked closely with senior Executives and very closely with the Chief of Staff. As such, she was in a position where she was entrusted to act professionally and with propriety.
In support of a submission that Rosamond's conduct was a breach of trust the Crown relies upon the observations of R S Hulme J (Spigelman CJ and Carruthers AJ agreeing), in R v Stanbouli (2003) 141 A Crim R 531 at 539. Hulme J said at [34]: "The cases where, traditionally, breach of trust has been regarded as exacerbating criminality are where it is the victim of the offence who has imposed that trust - an employer defrauded by his employee, a solicitor who appropriates trust funds to his own use - or where the criminality involves a breach of that which the offender was engaged or undertook to do, eg a teacher or baby-sitter who indecently deals with the subject of his or her charge."
In the submission of Dr Hughes on behalf of the offender, with specific reference to this passage from Stanbouli, Dr Hughes put that "the interpretation urged by the Crown is over-broad to the extent it is impossible to imagine any s192E offence in a commercial setting which would not fall within such a definition."
It is appropriate to consider the context in which Hulme J's remarks were made. Stanbouli had been an employee of a licenced customs broker and a freight forwarding agency. As such he was in a position to be aware of the monitoring of shipments with respect to the importation of consignments from overseas. He was recruited to assist in processing incoming consignments which were intended to contain quantities of heroin. Over a period of almost two years he assisted in the importation of approximately 70 consignments some of which were "dummy runs" and others of which actually contained heroin. The sentencing judge, Judge Shadbolt, had regarded the breach of trust placed in Stanbouli by his employers as "most serious."
In considering a Crown appeal against the inadequacy of the sentence imposed at first instance, Hulme J said that there could be "no doubt that in his criminality the respondent did breach the trust which his employer had placed in him" and, in the activities carried out by him, had taken advantage of information provided to him by Customs authorities with respect to a particular shipment. However, Hulme J formed the view that the breach of trust involved in those identified events did not add to the criminality in the particular case.
Hulme J found that the breach of trust was that of the employer and the employer was not a victim. The offending was not in direct contravention of what Stanbouli had been engaged to do even though it may have breached an implied term of his employment. In those circumstances the Court of Criminal appeal differentiated the breach of trust by Stanbouli from other cases where a breach of trust could fairly be said to aggravate criminality.
The present matter may be differentiated from Stanbouli in the sense that the breach of trust identified by the Crown did result in the provider of that trust, namely the NAB, being a victim of the crimes.
However, in such circumstances I am of the view that although there is a breach of trust in the sense identified it does not rise to the same level as the breach of trust by Rogers. (See R v Cornell [2015] NSWCCA 258 at [135]) where the offender's involvement as an insider in the Bank "was crucial and represented a grave breach of trust.")
An assessment of objective seriousness is required for the individual offences. In Subramaniam v R [2013] NSWCCA 159 that task was undertaken in the resentencing exercise in the Court of Criminal Appeal by Latham J grouping the 26 fraudulent offences in that case by reference to the quantum of the fraud in the individual transactions.
Her Honour dealt with the sentencing for the various counts by first grouping them in accordance with the quantum of the fraud, and then determining an aggregate sentence for each separate group.
In the present matter, I propose to adopt a similar approach. I will deal with the groups of offences by reference first to the different offending, being the provision of a corrupt benefit, and then the obtaining of a financial advantage. I will group the offences by reference to quantum.
I will deal with the two counts of attempt separately.

S 249B Provision of Corrupt Benefits

Category 1 - provision of corrupt benefit counts which relate to amounts between $250,000 and $1.5 million: counts 8, 18, 39, 65, 84, and 85 (6 counts: above the mid-range of offending).
Category 2 - provision of corrupt benefit counts which relate to amounts between $90,000 - $250,000: counts 7,12, 16, 20, 30, 36, 53, 55, and 63 (9 counts: mid-range of objective seriousness)
Category 3 - provision of corrupt benefit counts which relate to amounts between approximately $10,000 and $75,000: counts 4, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 22, 25, 33, 38, 44, 48, 50, 68, 70, 75, 79, 82, and 83 (20 counts in total: falling lower within the mid-range)
Category 4 - provision of corrupt benefit counts which relate to amounts between approximately $1,000 and $7,500: counts 1, 2, 3, 5, 11, 29, 34, 35, 43, 47, 56, 57, 58, 60, 62, 67, 69, 71, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, and 87 (24 counts in total: falling below the mid-range)

S 192E Obtain financial advantage

Category 5 - obtaining a financial advantage counts which relate to amounts between $450,000 and $4.96 million: counts 66, 86, and 91 (3 counts in total: above the mid-range).
Category 6 - obtaining a financial advantage counts which relate to amounts between $15,000 and $400,000: counts 19, 21, 23, 24, 27, 31, 32, 37, 40, 41, 42, 46, 49, 54, 59, 61, 64, 80, 81 88, and 89 (19 in total: within the mid-range)
Category 7 - obtaining a financial advantage counts under $15,000: counts 17, 28, 45, 51, and 52 (a total of 5: below the mid-range of objective seriousness).

The two remaining counts were both attempts to obtain a financial advantage, respectively a further $3.3 million from the NAB (Count 90) and about $500,000 from Vicinity Centres (Count 92). In the Crown's submission these offences were said, despite being attempts, to "remain at the highest range of objective seriousness."
In forming an evaluative assessment of objective seriousness, I am conscious that in some circumstances an unsuccessful attempt to commit a crime may still be a matter of particular seriousness. As was pointed out by Wood J in R v Doorey [2000] NSWCCA 456 at [29], the suggestion that a matter lacks objective seriousness because it is only an attempt is a proposition that should be rejected. That case involved an attempted armed robbery in a service station with a knife. The attempt to rob the till failed because the offender was not able to open it. The attempt was viewed by the Court of Criminal Appeal as "still constituting a matter of particular seriousness". Similarly, in Kapua v R [2023] NSWCCA 14 Wilson J dealt with a similar submission (see also: Taouk v R (1992) 65 A Crim R 387 at 390; R v Schofield [2003] NSWCCA 3; (2003) 138 A Crim R 19 at [139]).
Given that an attempt, as a consequence of s 344A is liable to the same penalty as a completed offence, I have come to a slightly different view than that advanced by the Crown. The objective seriousness of an unsuccessful attempt, while it may still have particular seriousness, cannot be placed on the same actual level of objective seriousness as a successful commission of the crime.
Accordingly, I do not accept that these two attempts, despite the quantum involved, fall "at the highest range of objective seriousness." However, the circumstances of the attempts and the quantum sought to be obtained do still place these offences within a mid-range of objective seriousness.
In circumstances where I ultimately intend to impose an aggregate sentence it is appropriate to form an assessment of the overall objective seriousness of what was, in effect, a continuing course of conduct. It is, in my view, without argument that the overall conduct bearing in mind the relevant factors including the duration of the offending, the motive, the planning and the quantum place this matter well above any assessed mid-range of objective seriousness.

SUBJECTIVE FACTORS

The offender did not give evidence either at trial or on the sentence proceedings.
A clinical psychological report from Marianne Plahn dated 31 March 2023 was tendered and relied upon.
Ms Plahn was subject to detailed cross-examination by the learned Crown Prosecutor to which I will refer shortly. It is appropriate to be reminded that mitigatory material advanced to the court by the medium of a third party, in circumstances where the offender does not give sworn testimony regarding the factual bases advanced through a third party, requires a degree of reservation in the court's acceptance of such mitigatory material.
Ms Plahn's report provides some personal background which may be accepted at face value. The offender was born in the United Kington and is said to have grown up in a supportive family with both of her parents and three sisters in Lancashire. She described her parents having instilled a hard work ethic and strong moral and ethical values.
Ms Rosamond told the psychologist that she enjoyed her schooling and she had completed a qualification certificate as a Pharmacist Technician. She worked in a variety of pharmacies before travelling to Australia at the age of 21 to visit an uncle and his family. She enjoyed working in Australia and decided to stay. She gained permanent residency and pursued a full-time successful career within the corporate and management industry.
She described that her first marriage to a boyfriend from the United Kingdom had failed because he missed his friends and family in Britain and returned from Australia to his home there.
She described her second marriage to Geoff Rosamond as having deteriorated quickly following the adoption of twin boys when the children were 10 months old.
She described a medical episode at the age of nine which led to extensive surgery which culminated in an inability to have her own children. The psychologist expressed the view that the traumatic medical history resulting in infertility was significant in understanding the offender's deep attachment to the adopted twin boys and the subsequent distress and trauma she experienced during what was described as the "abusive marital relationship breakdown".
A psychometric assessment was carried out utilising the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI).
The psychologist thought that offender's pattern of responses suggested a level of defensiveness in responding. She perceived a reluctance to admit to minor faults and a tendency to minimise any negative impact that the offender's actions might have on other people and also on herself.
The overall Personality Assessment clinical profile was entirely within normal limits. Ms Rosamond's self-concept involved a positive self-evaluation. She presented as normally a confident and optimistic person who approaches life with a clear sense of purpose and distinct convictions.
The offender's interpersonal style was best characterised as, on the surface, self-assured, confident, and assertive. The report stated: "Although not unfriendly, she is likely to be described by others as ambitious and having a leader-like demeanour. She is comfortable in social settings, but is not likely to mix indiscriminately, preferring to interact with others in situations over which she can exercise some measure of control."
On the same page of the report it was stated: "With respect to anger management, Ms Rosamond describes herself as a very meek and unassertive person who has difficulty standing up for herself, even when assertiveness is warranted."
The clinical psychologist ultimately advanced diagnostic possibilities which were suggested by the configuration of the Personality Assessment Inventory scale scores. She did, however, specifically note that they were advanced as hypotheses and not a final diagnosis. The specific diagnostic possibilities were identified as an adjustment disorder and a narcissistic personality disorder. In the psychologist's opinion the results suggested a low-risk of reoffending particularly as the offender demonstrated "sincere remorse and shame".
The psychological report then set out a number of opinions which were responses to specific questions posed by the offender's solicitors.
Without reciting them all verbatim they portray a factual finding that Rosemary Rogers was a more significant principal in the offending than Helen Rosamond. The report includes the following:

"It was clear that the business dealings with NAB and The Human Group were mainly activated via Rosemary Rogers."
"Ms Rosamond told me that she would attend to Rosemary Rogers' requests and demands immediately."
"Ms Rosamond told me that she never questioned Rosemary Rogers requests or demands as she was keen to please, create trust and offer quick, professional and efficient services"
"Ms Rosamond told me that during her business dealings with Rosemary Rogers she felt that she had no option but to obey any of Rosemary Rogers requests or demands"
"Ms Rosamond describes Rosemary Rogers as a dangerous, highly toxic and manipulative person who has betrayed her trust and good will."

The psychologist expressed the view that it appeared "that as Rosemary Rogers' behaviours and demands became more daring, Ms Rosamond became even more compliant." The clinical psychologist reported that the offender was keen to develop greater insight into why she developed "this anxious dependence and pathological dependence to Rosemary Rogers." The psychologist reported that Ms Rosamond had told her that she had included Rosemary Rogers in her will. In the psychologist's opinion, this was an indication of her complete trust and good will, but also a sign of her desperation to keep the confidence and support of Rogers.
With respect to the expressions of sincere remorse and shame Ms Plahn reported: "Ms Rosamond told me that she was keen to be given the opportunity to personally tell his Honour how deeply remorseful and sincerely sorry she now feels regarding her offences."
The identification of Rosemary Rogers as the person principally responsible for the criminal conduct was further emphasised in the report. The psychologist expressed the opinion that: "Ms Rosamond's traumatic experiences following a rather abusive, threatening and domineering marriage and divorce may have created a specific vulnerability for her to enter into another toxic, domineering relationship that initially offered financial support, security and friendship. According to Ms Rosamond's reports, it soon became clear that the specific business arrangement with Rosemary Rogers came at a high price and an extremely high risk."
The psychologist further opined that: "Ms Rosamond has developed an understanding of the possible aetiology of her over-adaption to Rosemary Rogers' excessive, fraudulent and deceptive actions and demands."
Ms Plahn was cross-examined by the learned Crown Prosecutor. She acknowledged that her Curriculum Vitae incorrectly stated that she was a member of both the Clinical College of the Australian Psychological Society and also the College of Forensic Psychologists. She acknowledged that her current qualifications did not enable her to be a member of the College of Forensic Psychologists and she thanked the Crown for pointing out that error in her CV.
The Crown Prosecutor sought a more detailed understanding of the test scores in the Personality Assessment Inventory. Ms Plahn agreed that the two areas which were elevated, namely the positive image management and the stress level scores could definitely have been elevated by what was described as "situational results". The Crown asked: "So it's not necessarily indicative of underlying disorder or problem but something that's situational at the time Ms Rosamond was taking the test in custody for the first time"(sic)(P9 26 April 2023) The psychologist agreed with that proposition.
Ms Plahn agreed that the disorders she had identified had not actually been diagnosed but that there were symptoms which were consistent with such disorders.
With respect to the descriptions in the report regarding the nature of the offender's relationship with her now divorced husband, Ms Plahn indicated she had previously prepared a report for the offender for the purpose of use in the Family Law Court proceedings. She indicated that she had received more detailed information at that time but that the information was reiterated during the prison interviews with the offender. Ms Plahn was asked by the Crown whether she questioned the veracity of the offender's reports in relation to what was described as the "abusive relationship" or whether she had just accepted it as reliable. Ms Plahn said: "I accepted it as reliable."

MITIGATING FACTORS

I have made reference to the question of remorse in dealing with the psychologist report. As I indicated earlier, I view the expressions of remorse which have been conveyed through the psychologist with a level of considerable reserve.
However, various other factors itemised in s 21A (3) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act need recognition. Ms Rosamond has no previous record of convictions and prior to the current offending was a person of good character. Without taking time to refer to specific authority in this respect, I note that white collar fraud offences are most frequently committed by persons of prior good character and such prior good character often allows them to be in the position in which they subsequently commit the frauds.
I accept that she is unlikely to reoffend and that she has reasonable prospects of rehabilitation. I also recognise that the substantial agreement as to the majority of the accounting figures by the defence facilitated the conduct of the trial which might otherwise have been considerably longer.

COMPARATIVE CASES

The court has had recourse to a variety of comparative fraud cases involving substantial sums of money.
There is no doubt that so-called comparative cases need to be approached with some degree of caution. Every case turns upon its own individual circumstances and facts. Similar caution, of course, needs to be exercised when referring to the statistics maintained by the Judicial Commission. Past cases may, however, provide some guidance as to the approach taken in the application of principle to particular categories of offending.
The observations of Bell P (as the Chief Justice then was) in Moodie v R [2020] NSWCCA 160 at [80] - [95] are significant with respect to the proper use of comparative cases. Inter alia, Bell P said: "....the proper and careful use of comparative sentences plays an important role in promoting consistency of sentencing, and consistency of sentencing is an important element of both criminal justice and the rule of law more generally."
It is also necessary to bear in mind that some of the older authorities were determined at a time when there were a number of different factors applicable to the sentence imposed. These include difference in the numerical value of money and different legislative provisions with respect to the length of a sentence to be actually served as a consequence of automatic remissions. In some instances there were different maximum penalties in place. These variable factors need to be borne in mind, particularly when looking at older cases.
In Daley v R (1983) 8 A Crim R 433, the Court of Criminal Appeal dealt with an appeal against severity of sentence brought by a prominent Sydney solicitor who had misappropriated more than $700,000 from two of his clients over a period of eight months. The offences involved a number of separate transactions and resulted in five charges of fraudulent misappropriation and one charge of fraudulently omitting to account. Each of the offences carried a statutory maximum of seven years' penal servitude.
When the defalcations were about to be discovered, the offender went immediately to the Law Society and surrendered his Practising Certificate. He made full admissions and pleaded guilty to the charges preferred. A number of additional offences were placed on a Schedule.
On the first count, taking into account the scheduled matters, he was sentenced to the statutory maximum of seven years. On each of the other five charges he was similarly sentenced to concurrent terms of the maximum of seven years on each, to be served cumulatively on the first seven years. The ultimate sentence was an aggregate 14 years with a non-parole period of 6 years.
The Chief Justice, Sir Laurence Street, described the appellant as, apart from the misappropriations, having led a life which could in every way be described as admirable. He had conducted a successful sole practice as a solicitor and had earned the regard of fellow practitioners of high eminence and other leading citizens. The case, in short, presented the pattern of a man of good professional repute, with an admirable domestic and personal life, having fallen into the criminality of extracting money that did not belong to him and using it for his own purposes, in that case to feed a gambling addiction.
The Chief Justice said, at [435]: "… that for a person in a position of trust, holding himself out as a responsible and honourable practitioner, to take monies in this way from the personswho had entrusted them to him attracts the gravest of disapprobation. The learned sentencing judge described the appellant's conduct as dishonourable in the extreme, and the consequent criminality as being high. I agree with this characterisation which his Honour put upon the appellant's conduct. For solicitors, accountants, or any persons in a position of trust, to betray that trust has traditionally been regarded by the courts as attracting grave disapprobation, accompanied by substantial sentences."(emphasis added)
In the event, the Court held that the first sentence did warrant the maximum penalty permissible under the statute, namely 7 years. However the second group of offences warranted an additional 5 years rather than the cumulative 7 which had been imposed at first instance. Accordingly the Court of Criminal Appeal reduced the sentence to 12 years with a non-parole period of 4 and a half years.
A similar principled approach to the misappropriation of trust monies by a solicitor may be seen again in R v David Charles Hawkins (1989) 45 A Crim R 430. Hawkins had misappropriated a total of $2.6 million which was belonging to or accountable to clients. He had misappropriated a further amount of $4 million which was advanced by a finance company. The multiplicity of charges included some offences under the Commonwealth Crimes Act in relation to forging documents and defrauding Commonwealth and public authorities while others had been preferred under the New South Wales Crimes Act provisions relating to fraudulent misappropriation and obtaining money by deception.
Of significance, a sum of $1.2 million could not be accounted for. The money obtained from the frauds had been used in various property and commercial dealings which, had they been successful and absent discovery of the criminal conduct, would have placed the offender in a very healthy financial position. The judge at first instance, Judge Moore, said that the matter was as serious a case of fraud by a solicitor as had ever come before the Court. At first instance an effective aggregate sentence of 14 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 6 years was imposed following a plea of guilty to all charges.
A Crown appeal against the inadequacy of sentence was successful. The Court of Criminal appeal increased the aggregate head sentence to 15 years imprisonment and imposed a non-parole period of 10 years.
A case dealing with white collar crime not committed by a solicitor was R v McKechnie (unreported, NSWCCA, 1 October 1987). McKechnie had been the Director of a number of companies in Australia which were fully owned subsidiaries of a company in the United Kingdom. The misappropriations extended over a period of four years between 1980 and 1984. The manner in which he drew funds from the company's Bank accounts were described as a simple but systematic and cunning fraud. McKechnie was sentenced on the basis that the net benefit to him in respect of his fraudulent activities was in the order of $4.15 million. The fraud came to notice when the offender himself reported the matter to the company's auditor. He pleaded guilty to nine charges of defrauding a company contrary to the then s 176A of the Crimes Act 1900.
Judge Muir in the District Court sentenced McKechnie to an effective sentence of 12 years with a non-parole period of 7 years following his pleas of guilty.
Each of the offences carried a maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment. An appeal against severity was dismissed in the Court of Criminal Appeal. Wood J, as his honour then was, Hunt and Allen JJ agreeing, said: "There is no reason of public interest or common sense why those involved in white collar crime should expect any leniency when they engaged in plunder of the kind and scale here involved. Executives who hold high office or positions of trust in the commercial world are expected to conform to exacting standards of honesty."
Wood J also observed: "It is impossible to be unmindful of the difficulty of detection of sophisticated corporate crime and of the potential for substantial financial loss." Wood J referred back to the notorious case of R v Glenister (1980) 2 NSWLR 597 in which the significance of general deterrence in white collar crimes was required to play a significant part in sentencing.
Of more recent significance, the Court of Criminal Appeal dealt with a series of fraud offences in McLaren v R [2021] NSWCCA 12 in which the offender had held himself out to be a skilled investment fund manager and had defrauded a number of victims of a total of $7.6 million. There were 17 counts of dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage by deception and one count of knowingly dealing with the proceeds of crime.
In the District Court, McLaren had been sentenced by Acting Judge Charteris SC to 16 years with a non-parole period of 12 years, after a 25% discount for the early plea of guilty.
In circumstances where the notional starting point before the discount for the plea was in excess of 21 years, a challenge to the severity of the sentence was successful in the Court of Criminal Appeal. The aggregate sentence was reduced to 12 years, with a 9-year non-parole period. Noting the judgment of Walton J in Kelly, the notional starting point in the CCA was 16 years. It can readily be discerned that the notional starting point in the CCA was 16 years.
In the leading judgment of Hamill J, with whom Hoeben CJ at CL and Rothman J agreed, Justice Hamill undertook a detailed analysis of numerous other cases involving serious fraudulent offending. The 13 cases to which his Honour specifically referred are to be found between [81] and [96] of his judgment. I do not reproduce the detailed summary of each of those cases in these Remarks. I have, however, had regard to each of them. I will refer to some of them in very brief summary.
Hamill J made reference to R v Dimitri De Angelis [2013] NSWDC 79. That offender was a company director who induced 16 victims to invest more than $8 million into his company under false pretences. Judge Cogswell SC had sentenced the offender to an aggregate term of 12 years with a non-parole period of 7 years and 6 months. That sentence was after a discount of 12.5% for a late guilty plea. The notional starting point was in the vicinity of 13 years, 9 months. An appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal was dismissed: De Angelis v R [2015] NSWCCA 197.
Justice Hamill also referred to R v Albert [2019] NSWDC 869. The frauds committed by Albert related to a number of sham businesses which Albert convinced members of the public to invest in. There were 32 victims over a period of approximately four and a half years who together lost a total in excess of $4.3 million. After allowing a 25% discount for the guilty pleas, Judge Bourke SC imposed an aggregate sentence of 10 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 6 years and 9 months. The notional starting point before the discount was approximately 13 years, 4 months.
Hamill J also referred to R v Burke [2002] NSWCCA 353. Burke had operated as an investment advisor and insurance broker who fraudulently retained money given to him by 26 of his investment clients. Over a six-year period he defrauded his clients of more than $5 million. After a 20% discount for the plea of guilty Burke had been sentenced by Ducker DCJ to an overall term of 10 years with a non-parole period of 7 years and 6 months. The notional starting point before discount was 12 years and 6 months. An appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal was dismissed.
In White v R [2019] NSWCCA 218 a trusted bookkeeper of a family business fraudulently obtained $2.9 million over a seven-year period. The original sentence of 11 years with a non-parole period of 6 years and 6 months was reduced on appeal to 10 years with a non-parole period of 6 years and 6 months. The error which required the Court of Criminal Appeal to resentence was that the judge at first instance had erroneously taken into account as a factor in aggravation that the offences had been committed for financial gain, notwithstanding that financial gain was, in fact, an element of the offence.
The next comparative that the court itself has had regard to is Kelly v R [2023] NSWCCA 104. The offender was employed by a financial investment company whose business model involved obtaining investment funds from Australia and investing those funds in offshore investment entities in the Cook Islands. Over a period of five years the offender diverted funds belonging to investors into Bank accounts which were controlled by him.
The total sum diverted was $6.7 million and there were 90 investors who became victims of his defrauding. The first offence occurred when Kelly was 29 years of age and the last offence when he was 34. The offender had repaid $900,000 of the dishonestly obtained funds and his employer had refunded 20 of the 90 investors as at the time of sentencing.
The offender was described as having a 'predilection' for acquiring luxurious European motor vehicles and had a series of them including porsches, a Lamborghini, a McLaren and a Mercedes Benz, amongst others.
The offender pleaded guilty and was entitled to a 25% discount. Judge Robison had imposed an aggregate sentence of 13 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 8 years for 31 substantive offences with a further 59 such offences being taken into account on a series of Forms 1. The appeal against severity was dismissed by the Court of Criminal Appeal.
The first comparative provided by the Crown was Holloway v R [2017] NSWCCA 17 Holloway was the CEO of the Australasian branch of a company based in the United Kingdom which conducted a freight forwarding business. Over a period of seven years invoices were created relating to work allegedly performed by a packaging service company which did not exist and no such work had been performed. Cheques issued pursuant to such invoices were cashed and some of the proceeds deposited into Holloways personal account. The total amount of money dispersed pursuant to the false invoices was approximately $2 million.
Holloway stood trial on 79 counts of fraud. At issue during the three-week trial was the knowledge of the major shareholder and director of the company who, it was contended, was a participant in the scheme which was intended to reduce tax payable in Australia as a consequence of the payment of the invoices being tax deductible. The jury acquitted Mr Holloway of the first 69 counts but returned verdicts of guilty with respect to the remaining 10 counts.
The financial advantage represented by those ten counts was approximately $270,000. Fraudulent abuse of trust relating to those charges occurred over a ten-month period.
Holloway had no relevant prior criminal record. He was 54 years of age, had lost his employment, and had compromised health to some extent. A measure of delay in commencing the criminal proceedings together with onerous bail conditions over a lengthy period resulted in a reduction of the sentence. Baly SC DCJ imposed an aggregate term of 4 years with a non-parole period of 2 years, 6 months.
Latham J (with whom Hoeben CJ at CL and Johnson J agreed) dismissed an appeal against severity. Her Honour expressed the view that an aggregate sentence of 4 years for 10 offences, each carrying a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment, was well within the sentencing discretion. In her Honour's view the non-parole period of 2 years 6 months was entirely appropriate, having regard to the totality of offending.
Power v R [2002] NSWCCA 244 was an appeal against the severity of sentences imposed by Judge Latham when her Honour was sitting in the District Court. Power had been in a middle management position as a personal Banker at a branch of the NAB with authority to approve loans. She created a number of fictitious loans advanced to fictitious customers. She subsequently drew down the funds by obtaining Bank cheques.
Over a period of four years she fraudulently drew down $7.681 million which was predominantly expended on jewellery, art, furnishings, wine and luxury living. Some of the fictitious loans were used to repay earlier fictious loans and the actual amount she expended was $5.81 million. She was 40 years of age when she commenced the defalcations in 1996 and had been of prior good character. She held a trusted position within the Bank.
She made full admissions when the offences came to light and entered pleas of guilty to all 39 counts of making a false instrument. The maximum penalty for each offence was 10 years.
She had been sentenced at first instance in accordance with Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; 194 CLR 610 to an effective head sentence of eight years with an effective non-parole period of five years. A substantial portion of the offending related to individual fraudulent loans in excess of $300,000. The offending had escalated over the period of time and with respect to the larger and more recent defalcations sentences of seven years with 4-year non-parole periods had been imposed. However, with respect to earlier fraudulent loans, most of which were for substantially lesser sums of money, fixed terms of 5 years had been imposed.
Smart AJ, with whom Greg James J agreed, formed a view that the fixed terms of five years without a specified non-parole period caused an eligibility to be released of five years and in the circumstances could be viewed as too severe. The Court referred to a feature of past sentencing for 'white-collar' crimes involving a fraudulent abuse of trust as being the imposition of lengthy head sentences but with a substantial gap between the head sentence and the non-parole periods or minimum terms (see Corbett v R (1991) 52 A Crim R 112 at 117). The Court of Criminal Appeal, accordingly, allowed the appeal in part by reducing the eligibility for release by 12 months. The effective aggregate sentence was 8 years with a 4-year non-parole period. A discount of 25% had been allowed as a result of the pleas of guilty. The notional starting point was, accordingly, 10 years, 8 months.
The next comparative case provided by the Crown was Siwek v R [2017] NSWCCA 178. Siwek worked for an American multinational corporation as an accountant. He occupied a position of substantial trust as the accounting manager and was the only person in the company able to access the National Australia Bank's on-line Banking system for the company. Over a period of nine years he undertook a multiplicity of fraudulent transactions which in total exceeded $1.7 million.
Siwek was a compulsive gambler and appeared to have continuously suffered substantial gambling losses at The Star Casino in Sydney. When the defalcations were discovered he took serious steps to endeavour to repay as much as he was able. An amount of $450,000 was repaid to his employer. The payment of that amount released the offender from further civil liability but the company was ultimately left more than a million dollars out of funds.
Various counts were rolled-up and other matters were placed on a Form 1 for the purpose of sentencing. The offender pleaded guilty and had strong prospects of rehabilitation. He had sold his house and was 70 years of age at the time of sentencing. The gross breach of trust in his employment was underscored by the fact that he did not require approval from any other person and was able to authorise the transfers without supervision. An appeal against the aggregate sentence imposed by Judge GD Woods QC of 6 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 3 years and 8 months was dismissed.
The next comparative case provided by the Crown was Woods v R [2018] NSWCCA 261. The offender, Linda Woods, had been employed by a transport and warehousing business in Tamworth. She was in charge of payments to sub-contractors. Over a period of five years Ms Woods defrauded the business of approximately $809,000 by altering the invoices issued by sub-contractors and redirecting the increased parts of the payments to their own personal Bank account. There were 155 fraudulent transactions.
After initially using fraudulently obtained sums to pay off personal debts and to fund her partner's father's care in a nursing home, the offender thereafter used a substantial proportion of the money to maintain a number of horses. Her passion for horses was described as effectively an addiction or an indulgence. The money was expended on training, veterinary bills and breeding services in pursuit of breeding a successful racehorse.
The offender made full admissions and demonstrated immediate remorse when the offences were disclosed. The offender was sentenced by McLennan SC DCJ with respect to one rolled-up count contrary to s 192E(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1900 to 5 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years. The maximum penalty for the offence was 10 years imprisonment.
A discount of 25% for the plea of guilty indicates a notional starting point of 6 years and 8 months. The severity appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal was dismissed.
The next comparative case was Edelbi v R (wrongly reported as R v Edelbi) [2021] NSWCCA 122. The background to the commission of the fraudulent offences disclosed a criminal group operating to make fraudulent claims pursuant to the compulsory third party insurance scheme in New South Wales. A company called Physio Rehab Centre Pty Ltd had been set up in December 2014 with a registered Physiotherapist as one of the founding directors. The offender Edelbi was employed as the account manager within the physiotherapy practice.
In very brief overview, a number of fraudulent practices were undertaken within the Physio Rehab Centre including false appointments, false treatment notes and fictitious invoices. False invoices were issued and forwarded to third party insurers pursuant to the CTP scheme and, over a period of two years, an amount of approximately $48,000 was fraudulently claimed with respect to the charges brought against Edelbi.
Of that sum, $33,000 was actually obtained. The fraudulent scheme involved the two directors and shareholders who had incorporated the company as well as the relevant offender Edelbi who had commenced as the account manager. The original director resigned in 2015 and was ultimately convicted of a number of offences where he had used a previous position of employment within a CTP insurance company to cause fraudulent payments with approximately $300,000 to be paid to various fictitious physiotherapy providers.
After being dismissed from that employment, this particular offender, Mr Muhammad Sallam was involved in setting up Physio Rehab Centre with a view to pursuing fraudulent claims, from, in effect, the opposite position from his previous employment. In March 2016 Sallam was convicted of seven offences relating to his causing fraudulent payments whilst employed with the CTP insurer and received concurrent terms of imprisonment for two years to be served by way of an Intensive Correction Order (ICO), together with a three year good behaviour bond pursuant to s 9 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act.
It is not known whether the fraudulent second director who was a qualified physiotherapist was charged with any offending however, it may well be that Edelbi, in addition to pleading guilty and providing assistance regarding the scheme, had also offered to give evidence in other proceedings. As a consequence he received a discount of 45% on an appropriate sentence.
With respect to 10 substantive counts and a further matters on a Form 1, the judge at first instance Hock DCJ imposed a sentence of three years with a two year non-parole period.
It is not necessary to go into the detail of the majority decision in the Court of Criminal Appeal. It suffices to observe that Hidden AJ, with whom Hoeben CJ at CL agreed (Bellew J dissenting) found error in the sentencing judge having failed adequately to consider the option of an Intensive Correction Order. In carrying out the resentencing exercise the Court of Criminal Appeal directed that an appropriate sentence be served by way of an Intensive Correction Order.
It is to be observed that at the time of the appeal, the offender had already served 13 months imprisonment and accordingly a period of 13 months was reduced from the head sentence which had been imposed of 3 years. The ICO was accordingly for one year 11 months. It is a moot point as to whether the fact that the offender had actually served 13 months in prison provided the tipping point in favour of the imposition of an intensive correction order. It is unclear in the judgment in the Court of Criminal Appeal whether that would have been an appropriate outcome if the offender had remained on bail and not served any actual time.
The next comparative was Upadhyaya v R [2017] NSWCCA 162. The offender was a director of a company which operated two horse studs in Australia: one at Murrurundi, in the Upper Hunter Valley, and the other at Diggers Rest in Victoria. The offender was a member of the Board and the financial director of the operations at Murrurundi.
The responsibilities of the offender covered the broad scope of managing the financial operations of the Murrurundi property. It was clearly an extensive operation and the horses on the property were fed both oats and hay to supplement the property's pasture. The offender was responsible for ordering such supplies and authorising payment of invoices issued by suppliers including being a signatory to cheques issued for the payment of such invoices.
The offender caused falsely inflated invoices to be issued by companies which supplied hay and oats. Over a period of five years the offender's employer company overpaid some $10.75 million as a consequence of the fraudulent invoices. On some occasions fodder was supplied to other premises for the use of the offender in his own equine enterprise which he conducted separately from his corporate employer.
Following a trial of approximately three months duration, the offender was found guilty of 14 counts, 10 of which related to a director defrauding a body corporate and four of which related to substantive dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage.
At first instance the sentencing judge, Judge Woodburn SC imposed an aggregate sentence of 12 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 7 years and 9 months.
A challenge to the severity of this sentence was dismissed.
The final case with respect to which some factors might be said to be comparative is Subramaniam v R [2013] NSWCCA 159. The offender in that matter pleaded guilty to 23 counts of obtaining a financial advantage by deception pursuant to the previous section of the Crimes Act relating to such conduct under s 178BA(1) of the Crimes Act 1900. She was also, likely unnecessarily, charged with a number of offences of dealing with the proceeds of crime, being the funds which she had obtained by deception.
Ms Subramaniam had been employed as a senior financial accountant by ING for some 20 years. Over a period of five years, she transferred funds from various corporate accounts either to her own Bank accounts or directly into the accounts of third parties for the purchase of goods such as jewellery, cosmetics, clothing, and furniture. In due course she also used very substantial funds for the purchase of a number of houses.
Over the five-year period a sum in excess of $45 million was misappropriated. Although substantial reparation had been made there was still a considerable shortfall. Her extensive cooperation with the authorities and her early pleas of guilty lead to the judge at first instance, the late Judge Finnane SC, to afford her a 30% discount on the aggregate sentence that his Honour imposed.
Notwithstanding the wide variation in the sums of money with respect to the individual substantive counts the judge at first instance had imposed the same indicative sentence for each of them. He imposed an aggregate sentence of 15 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 7 years.
The Court of Criminal Appeal intervened and upheld an appeal against severity. The offender was resentenced to an aggregate term of 11 years after a discount of 25% and a non-parole period of 6 years. This reflects a notional starting point of 14 years and 8 months.

PARITY

The principle of parity in sentencing co-offenders has been described as "a reflection of the notion of equal justice" (Mason J in Lowe v The Queen [1984] HCA 46; (1984) 154 CLR 606 at 610 [1]).
In the same case, Dawson J, with whom Wilson J agreed, summarised the parity principle as follows: (at 623 [8]) "There is no rule of law which requires co-offenders to be given the same sentence for the same offence even if no distinction can be drawn between them. Obviously where the circumstances of each offender or of his involvement in the offence are different then different sentences may be called for. But justice should be even-handed and it has come to be recognized both here and in England that any difference between the sentences imposed upon co-offenders for the same offence ought not be such as to give rise to a justifiable sense of grievance on the part of the offender with the heavier sentence or to give the appearance that justice has not been done."
Notwithstanding the frequently expressed desirability of co-offenders being sentenced by the same sentencing judge, in many circumstances such a course is not feasible.
In the present matter, Rosemary Rogers was sentenced by Acting Judge Conlon SC in January 2021. As is self-evident from the facts in the present matter, Rosemary Rogers' role on the inside of the Bank was the counterpoint to the role of Helen Rosamond from outside the Bank in the successful commission and continuation of the ongoing fraud committed by both of them.
The submissions of the Crown in the Rosamond sentence proceedings advanced the proposition that the criminal culpability of Helen Rosamond exceeded that of Rosemary Rogers. That submission rested on the proposition that the one person who had all the information, the one person who could issue the invoices and the one person who demonstrated an ability to offend in different areas without the assistance of Ms Rogers, was Helen Rosamond. The Crown, in both the written submissions and oral submissions on 26 April 2023 (T38) submitted that Rosamond controlled everything ultimately.
In the Crown's submission, Rosamond was the only party to the criminal enterprise with full knowledge of the scheme. The Crown placed reliance on intercepted telephone calls and text messages between Rogers and Rosamond which included Rogers telling Rosamond that Rosamond had "spreadsheets and everything" while Rogers did not. The Crown also pointed to the offender Rosamond, counselling Rogers after the Bank commenced making investigations to "story, story, story" and advising her what to do and what to say as illustrative of a position of superior control.
Dr Hughes, on the other hand, advanced submissions that invited the Court to find that the criminal culpability of Rosamond was in fact less than that of Rosemary Rogers.
Dr Hughes listed a number of reasons why the Court would find that Rogers was the principal offender. These included: 1. Rogers initiated the provision of corrupt benefits to herself, by specific requests to Ms Rosamond; 2. Rogers was a person with significant trust, authority and influence at the NAB, whereas Ms Rosamond was not; 3. Rogers trust within the organisation was reflected by her financial delegation of $20 million, the exercise of which was, on the evidence, unsupervised and unscrutinised during the relevant period; 4. Rogers exercised her power and influence within the NAB to ensure that Rosamond's services continued to be approved, and to prevent scrutiny of the arrangement, often without the knowledge of Ms Rosamond. Dr Hughes gave examples of Rogers having prevented steps being taken by the Procurement Division to audit Human Group's services, and also shutting down questions about the 'Project Eagle' invoice without the involvement of Ms Rosamond; 5. Rogers exercised the sole power to approve or to not approve the invoices from Human Group; 6. Rogers was aware of the Human Group's dependence on continuing business from NAB; 7. Rogers deceived or misled Rosamond on a number of occasions in relation to personal trips and bookings that Rosamond was organising for her; 8. The evidence from Rogers, to the extent that it tended to suggest that Ms Rosamond was the principal, should be rejected in circumstances where a s 165 warning was necessary.
Dr Hughes submitted that the combination of those factors indicated a power imbalance between Rogers and Rosamond which was substantial and which would be likely to produce a greater degree of compliance by Rosamond with the requests from Rogers.
Determination of these competing submissions is, to a considerable extent, a question of perception based upon the evidence at trial. There is no doubt that some of the communications between Ms Rosamond and Ms Rogers, both as to tone and content, tend to support the proposition that Rosamond was the more dominant personality in the relationship.
I do not accept the proposition, consistently reiterated in the psychological report, that the dominant and controlling character of Rogers was the cause of Ms Rosamond's offending. I do not accept the description by Ms Rosamond to the psychologist that Rosemary Rogers was a dangerous, highly toxic and manipulative person that had betrayed Ms Rosamond's trust and goodwill.
There are numerous examples in the communications between the two co-offenders where Ms Rosamond was effectively suggesting to Rogers that she spend more on items than originally planned.
Conversely, the personal benefits flowing to Rogers were more substantial than the personal fraudulent expenditure by Ms Rosamond. However, the benefits and advantages flowing to Ms Rosamond from the corrupt agreement between two of them was not limited to the personal expenses that she billed to the NAB. The legitimate side of the business, and ensuring its continuation, clearly resulted in ongoing profits by way of mark-ups and fees to Human Group legitimately during the period up until the contract was terminated.
There can be no doubt that the egregious breach of the trust between Rogers and her employer, the National Australia Bank, was fundamental to the ongoing fraudulent conduct of both women. Dr Hughes placed reliance on a submission that it was Rogers who could have stopped the ongoing conduct at any time.
Whilst this may be technically correct, it might similarly be observed that Ms Rosamond herself could have declined to put in fraudulent invoices.
Ultimately, the relationship between these two co-offenders was clearly symbiotic. Each depended completely on the other for their mutual gratification and the ongoing fraudulent emoluments that they each enjoyed.
Evidence of the fact that Helen Rosamond included a beneficial bequest of 5% of her estate to Rogers in her amended Will reflects an ongoing desire for the relationship to continue. While the evidence at trial was that Rosemary Rogers was unaware of that bequest, the fact of it being provided for in the Will and the potential for the future revelation of the bequest (accepting for present purposes that it had not already been revealed) supports a conclusion that it was intended that the mutually dependent relationship would continue.
After the whistle blower letter had been received by the NAB, a further act of attempted defrauding the Bank, at a time when Rogers had already resigned, was pursued by Ms Rosamond. The attempt to procure a further amount in excess of $3.3 million in circumstances where Rogers was no longer at the Bank to approve it was the subject of the guilty verdict with respect to Count 90 in the indictment.
In addition to the criminal culpability arising from her relationship with the NAB, Helen Rosamond was also found guilty of the attempt to fraudulently obtain between $500,000 and $520,000 with respect to the Christmas parties organised for the company Vicinity Centres. The fraudulent invoice forwarded to that company in January 2016 and the production of forged and altered emails reflect criminal conduct completely separate to what was occurring with the NAB.
I recognise that the determination of a sentence for a co-offender by a different judge is not numerically binding. I note the remarks of Bell CJ (Davies and Fagan JJ agreeing), in MO v R [2023] NSWCCA 26 at [71]. The Chief Justice observed: "It is axiomatic that, while sentences imposed in previous cases may provide guidance in achieving consistency in sentencing, a sentencer must make an individual and independent assessment of the particular case before them."
I have had regard to my finding that the two women were equally culpable in the overall fraud of the National Australia Bank. I have also had regard to the number of offences and to some differences in quantum. I have also had regard to the circumstance that there is additional offending by Rosamond which is unconnected with the activities of Rogers.

CONSIDERATION

I have indicated already my view as to the objective seriousness of both the individual offences and the overall criminal conduct. The charges relating to obtaining a financial advantage have that component as an element of the offence and not as an additional aggravating factor.
Notwithstanding that fact, quantum in particular counts elevates the seriousness of the offending as indicated by the separate groups of offences which I have alreadyidentified.
I am not satisfied that the symptoms of disorders identified by the psychologist had any causative role in the commission of the offences. They do not operate to reduce her moral culpability.
I recognise that Ms Rosamond has come before the court as a person of prior good character. However, as I have already observed, unfortunately prior good character is a hallmark of the vast majority of white-collar frauds as persons of good character are likely to be in the positions which enable them to carry out such fraudulent conduct.
In addition to considerations of parity with the co-offender Rosemary Rogers, Ms Rosamond has been found guilty of additional offences of attempting to defraud Vicinity Centres with respect to their Christmas parties and the subsequent attempt to obtain an additional amount from the NAB of over $3.3 million at a time after Ms Rogers had already resigned from the Bank.
I propose to proceed by way of an aggregate sentence pursuant to s 53A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. I am, however, required to fix an appropriate sentence being the indicative sentence for each offence being the sentence which I would have imposed for that matter alone. The Court must then consider questions of accumulation and concurrence.
Ultimately it is important to consider the principle of totality as described by Street CJ in R v Holder [1983] 3 NSWLR 245: "The principle of totality is a convenient phrase, descriptive of the significant practical consideration confronting a sentencing judge when sentencing for two or more offences. Not infrequently a straight forward arithmetical addition of sentences appropriate for each individual offence considered separately will arrive at an ultimate aggregate that exceeds what is called for in the whole of the circumstances. In such a situation the sentencing judge will evaluate, in a broad sense, the overall criminality involved in all of the offences and, having done so, will determine what, if any, downward adjustment is necessary, whether by telescoping or otherwise, in the aggregate sentences in order to achieve an appropriate relativity between the totality of the criminality and the totality of the sentences."
The ultimate sentence must reflect the total criminality involved. The significance of general deterrence in white collar fraud has been repeatedly emphasised in numerous authorities. The aggregation of all of the sentences must result in a just and appropriate measure of the total criminality. The non-parole period must reflect the minimum period of imprisonment required to be served having regard to the purposes of sentencing set out in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act.
I find that a combination of factors contribute to a finding of special circumstances which I will bear in mind when determining the non-parole period. These include Ms Rosamond's prospects for rehabilitation, the likely effect on her future employment, the circumstance that this is her first term of imprisonment, and the factors identified in the psychologist's report which will play a part in her ability to cope within the Correctional institution.
As indicated, I propose to proceed by way of the imposition of an aggregate sentence pursuant to s 53A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure Act). As I have also indicated, I will deal with the groups of offences by reference to the categories which I have identified earlier.
A Table will be annexed to these Remarks indicating each count, the category into which it falls, and the indicative sentence for each.
The indicative sentences are as follows:

Category 1: provision of corrupt benefits between $250,000 and $1.5 million will be 4 years imprisonment with respect to each of the six counts: 8, 18, 39, 65, 84, and 85.
Category 2: provision of benefits between $90,000 and 250,000 will be 2 years imprisonment with respect to each of the nine counts:7,12, 16, 20, 30, 36, 53, 55, and 63.
Category 3 - provision of benefits between $10,000 and $75,000 will be 18 months imprisonment with respect to each of the 20 counts: 4, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 22, 25, 33, 38, 44, 48, 50, 68, 70, 75, 79, 82, and 83.
Category 4 - provision of benefits between $1,000 and $7,500 will be 12 months imprisonment with respect to each of the 24 counts: 1, 2, 3, 5, 11, 29, 34, 35, 43, 47, 56, 57, 58, 60, 62, 67, 69, 71, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, and 87.
Category 5 - obtain financial advantage counts between $450,000 and $4.96 million will be 6 years with respect to each of the 3 counts: 66, 86, and 91.
Category 6 - obtaining a financial advantage counts between $15,000 and $400,000 will be 3 years with respect to each of the 19 counts: 19, 21, 23, 24, 27, 31, 32, 37, 40, 41, 42, 46, 49, 54, 59, 61, 64, 80, 81 88, and 89.
Category 7 - obtaining a financial advantage counts under $15,000 will be 18 months with respect to each of the 5 counts: 17, 28, 45, 51, and 52.
Count 90 - attempt to obtain $3.3 million from the National Australia Bank 5 years.
Count 92 - attempt to obtain approximately $500,000 from Vicinity Centres 3 years.

The aggregate head sentence will be a period of 15 years. There will be a non-parole period of 8 years. The sentence and non-parole period will be backdated to commence on 2 December 2022. That date acknowledges the four days the offender spent in custody when first arrested and the order for detention made on 6 December 2022. She will be eligible for parole on 1 December 2030. The additional term of 7 years will expire on 1 December 2037.

Table summarising counts Count Date 1 30 January 2013 - 4 February 2013 2 22 February 2013 - 26 February 2013 3 7 March 2013 - 12 March 2013 4 21 March 2013 - 27 March 2013 5 27 March 2013 - 6 April 2013 6 13 May 2013 - 5 July 2013 7 25 May 2015 - 1 July 2013 8 11 September 2013 - 14 March 2014 9 9 October 2013 - 14 October 2013 10 25 November 2013 - 3 January 2014 11 5 December 2013 - 9 December 2013 12 22 December 2013 - 24 December 2013 13 21 February 2014 - 25 February 2014 14 3 March 2014 - 18 March 2014 15 15 April 2014 - 25 April 2014 16 19 February 2014 - 13 May 2015 17 1 July 2014 - 30 June 2015 18 12 June 2014 - 15 July 2014 19 1 July 2014 - 30 June 2015 20 13 August 2014 - 13 January 2015 21 1 July 2014 - 30 June 2015 22 21 August 2014 - 2 September 2014 23 30 January 2014 - 30 September 2014 24 1 July 2014 - 30 June 2015 25 20 September 2014 - 23 September 2014 27 1 July 2014 - 30 June 2015 28 1 July 2014 - 30 June 2015 29 3 October 2014 - 6 October 2014 30 12 October 2014 - 31 January 2015 31 1 July 2014 - 30 September 2015 32 1 July 2013 - 30 September 2015 33 23 October 2014 - 27 October 2014 34 7 November 2014 - 10 November 2014 35 5 December 2014 36 22 February 2015 - 17 April 2015 37 1 July 2014 - 30 June 2015 38 26 February 2015 - 6 March 2015 39 2 April 2015 - 12 April 2015 40 1 March 2015 - 30 September 2015 41 1 April 2015 - 30 September 2015 42 1 April 2015 - 30 September 2015 43 29 April 2015 - 3 May 2015 44 26 June 2015 - 27 June 2015 45 1 April 2015 - 30 September 2016 46 1 February 2015 - 30 September 2016 47 4 July 2014 - 11 July 2015 48 17 July 2015 - 26 July 2015 49 30 June 2015 - 30 September 2016 50 27 August 2015 - 31 August 2015 51 1 July 2015 - 30 September 2016 52 1 July 2015 - 30 September 2016 53 13 October 2015 - 14 October 2016 54 13 October 2015 - 14 October 2016 55 13 October 2015 - 14 October 2016 56 7 December 2015 57 30 December 2015 - 11 January 2016 58 30 August 2015 - 24 January 2016 59 1 July 2015 - 30 September 2016 60 31 March 2016 - 4 April 2016 61 1 July 2015 - 30 September 2016 62 14 April 2016 - 18 April 2016 63 27 April 2016 - 24 May 2016 64 1 July 2015 - 30 June 2016 65 14 May 2016 - 18 May 2017 66 1 July 2016 - 30 June 2017 67 15 June 2016 - 20 June 2016 68 29 June 2017 - 3 July 2017 69 28 July 2016 - 1 August 2016 70 25 August 2016 - 29 August 2016 71 8 September 2016 - 12 September 2017 73 13 October 2016 - 17 October 2016 74 23 November 2016 - 29 November 2016 75 8 December 2016 - 12 December 2016 76 6 January 2017 77 23 February 2017 78 17 March 2017 - 20 March 2017 79 13 April 2017 - 24 April 2017 80 1 September 2016 - 30 September 2017 81 1 September 2016 - 30 September 2017 82 24 August 2017 - 27 August 2017 83 8 September 2017 - 11 September 2017 84 15 September 2017 85 1 October 2017 - 25 November 2017 86 26 September 2017 - 30 June 2018 87 12 December 2017 88 1 June 2017 - 30 June 2018 89 1 July 2017 - 30 June 2018 90 22 February 2018 - 28 February 2018 91 1 July 2014 - 30 June 2018 92 25 November 2015 - 13 February 2016 Amount ($) Use of funds /Description of allegation Section of Crimes Act Category Indicative Sentence 3,207.74 Flights and accommodation for relative of Rosemary Rogers s 249B(2) 4 12 months 1,624.68 Overnight stay at Crown Towers for Rogers and her husband s 249B(2) 4 12 months 4,819.55 Four-day Sydney holiday for Rogers' sister's family s 249B(2) 4 12 months 69,872.63 Sydney holiday for Rogers' brother in law's 50th birthday (13 persons) s 249B(2) 3 18 months 7,517.00 Business Class flights for Rogers' family from Melbourne to Fiji s 249B(2) 4 12 months 37,716.99 Pre-paid Mastercards for Rogers s 249B(2) 3 18 months 159,490.59 One-month European holiday for Rogers and 5 other family members (6 persons) s 249B(2) 2 2 years 350,000.00 15 bank cheques for Rogers for 'cashflow' problems s 249B(2) 1 4 years 44,911.58 Wolgan Valley weekend getaway for Rogers' family and Rogers' sister's family s 249B(2) 3 18 months 10,000.00 Pre-paid Mastercard s 249B(2) 3 18 months 4,006.13 Two nights' accommodation Crown Towers Melbourne for Rogers' family and Rogers' sister's family s 249B(2) 4 12 months 145,000.00 Electronic transfer to Rogers' account s 249B(2) 2 2 years 40,143.20 Accommodation and incidentals for Sydney weekend away for Rogers' family and Rogers' sister's family s 249B(2) 3 18 months 46,090.00 Balance (after deposit paid) for Rogers' Bayliner Boat s 249B(2) 3 18 months 24,136.63 Return flights and transfers for Fiji holiday for Rogers' family s 249B(2) 3 18 months 96,423.55 Two pre-paid Mastercards given to Rogers. Used by Rogers for living expenses at Torquay holiday house, time-share membership, and live-in nanny services s 249B(2) 2 2 years 12,000.00 Purchase of inflatable tender by Rosamond and her husband s 192E(1)(b) 7 18 months 620,627.30 One-month (approx.) US holiday for Rogers and Rogers' sister's family (8 persons) s 249B(2) 1 4 years 142,904.93 - 210,521.90 Mark up on invoices from Count 18 which were fraudulently charged to NAB. s 192E(1)(b) 6 3 years 128,555.00 Progress payments for Rogers' renovations to her Torquay holiday home s 249B(2) 2 2 years 90,380.00 Non-NAB related expenditure charged to NAB for costs associated with Count 20 s 192E(1)(b) 6 3 years 35,096.07 Gold Coast (Qld) weekend away (3 nights) for Rogers' family and her other sister's family s 249B(2) 3 18 months 18,808.00 Non-NAB related expenditure charged to NAB for costs associated with Count 22 s 192E(1)(b) 6 3 years 34,390.00 Purchase by Rosamond of Toyota Kluger for her in-laws s 192E(1)(b) 6 3 years 15,230.00 70th birthday party for Rogers' father-in-law s 249B(2) 3 18 months 33,000 'Gift' from Rosamond to her sister-in-law and her partner s 192E(1)(b) 6 3 years 13,500.00 - 15,000.00 Mark-up and fees charged to NAB for non-NAB expenditure in Count 27 s 192E(1)(b) 7 18 months 2,337.39 One night stay at Crown Towers Melbourne for Rogers and her husband s 249B(2) 4 12 months 172,162.21 Balance (excluding deposit) for BMW X5 purchased by Rogers s 249B(2) 2 2 years 172,162.21 Fraudulent issuing of invoices to NAB for non-NAB expenditure related to count 30 s 192E(1)(b) 6 3 years 39,700.00 Garden umbrellas for Rosamond's Mosman residence s 192E(1)(b) 6 3 years 64,469.96 Weekend away at Wolgan Valley for Rogers, Rogers' sister's family, and Rogers' in-laws s 249B(2) 3 18 months 4,732.84 One-night stay at Crown Metropole, Melbourne for Rogers and her husband s 249B(2) 4 12 months 7,500.00 Rogers' marina berthing fees s 249B(2) 4 12 months 91,290.00 Balance payable for Rogers' Bunkhouse Caravan (excluding deposit) s 249B(2) 2 2 years 91,290.00 Fraudulent invoices issued to NAB for non-NAB expenditure related to Count 36 s 192E(1)(b) 6 3 years 29,377.00 10th Wedding Anniversary trip to Tasmania for Rogers and her husband s 249B(2) 3 18 months 250,414.16 8-night Fiji holiday for Rogers and her sister's family s 249B(2) 1 4 years 221,285.95 Fraudulent invoices issued to NAB for non-NAB expenditure related to Count 39 s 192E(1)(b) 6 3 years 139,841.00 Part-payment for Canadian Rockies holiday for Rosamond, her husband, her twin sons and her parents (6 persons) s 192E(1)(b) 6 3 years 62,000.00 - 70,000.00 Fraudulent invoices including 50% mark-up on non-NAB related expenses in Count 41 s 192E(1)(b) 6 3 years 3,913.00 Flights from Melbourne to Adelaide for Rogers' husband and brother-in-law s 249B(2) 4 12 months 26,168.27 One night stay at Crown Towers Melbourne for Rogers and 12 other guests s 249B(2) 3 18 months 14,358.20 Catering for Rosamond's 40th birthday party s 192E(1)(b) 7 18 months 32,712.70 Repairs and installation of furniture on Rosamond and her husband's catamaran s 192E(1)(b) 6 3 years 4,345.50 Return flights from Melbourne to Sydney for Rogers and one of Rogers' sisters s 249B(2) 4 12 months 21,538.96 Broome Holiday for Rogers' sister and her husband s 249B(2) 3 18 months 372,611.00 Garden renovations at Rosamond's Mosman home s 192E(1)(b) 6 3 years 55,472.17 Wolgan Valley getaway for Rogers' family and her sister's family s 249B(2) 3 18 months 14,286.00 Perth holiday for Rosamond's parents in law s 192E(1)(b) 7 18 months 13,981.30 Electrical work at Rosamond's Mosman residence s 192E(1)(b) 7 18 months 110,000 Prepaid Mastercards s 249B(2) 2 2 years 86,413.26 Renovations at Rosamond's home s 192E(1)(b) 6 3 years 110,000.00 Two pre-paid mastercards s 249B(2) 2 2 years 7,500.00 Rogers' marina berthing fees s 249B(2) 4 12 months 5,136.58 Return flights from Melbourne to Perth for one of Rogers' relatives s 249B(2) 4 12 months 6,398.86 Return flights from Melbourne to Chile for Rogers' nanny and her nanny's child s 249B(2) 4 12 months 50,000.00 Prepaid Mastercard s 192E(1)(b) 6 3 years 8,331.08 Weekend at Crown Towers Melbourne for Rogers' family and Rogers' sister's family s 249B(2) 4 12 months 17,888.88 Aboriginal Artwork purchased by Rosamond s 192E(1)(b) 6 3 years 4,472.04 Overnight accommodation for Rogers' family and Rogers' sister's family s 249B(2) 4 12 months 115,000.00 Amount payable for Chaparral boat purchased by Rogers after trading in Bayliner boat s 249B(2) 2 2 years 115,000.00 Fraudulent invoices charged to NAB for non-NAB expenditure related to Count 63 s 192E(1)(b) 6 3 years 468,726.00 Extensions and renovations at Rogers' holiday house in Bellbrae, Victoria s 249B(2) 1 4 years 468,726.00 Fraudulent invoices charged to NAB for non-NAB expenditure related to Count 65 s 192E(1)(b) 5 6 years 5,240.87 Three nights accommodation at Crown Towers Melbourne for Rogers' family and Rogers' sister's family s 249B(2) 4 12 months 23,570.84 Return trip from Sydney to Melbourne for Rogers to meet Rosamond. Accommodation and miscellaneous expenses at Crown Towers Melbourne for Rogers and her husband (2 nights) s 249B(2) 3 18 months 5,389.43 Two nights accommodation at Crown Towers for Rogers' family and Rogers' sister's family s 249B(2) 4 12 months 75,865.00 Wolgan Valley trip (2 nights) for Rogers' family, Rogers' sister's family and other guests (10 persons) s 249B(2) 3 18 months 1,210.44 2 nights accommodation at Onshore Torquay for Rogers and her husband s 249B(2) 4 12 months 1,089.72 Accommodation at Onshore Torquay for Rogers and her husband s 249B(2) 4 12 months 2,016.68 Accommodation at Onshore Torquay for Rogers and her husband s 249B(2) 4 12 months 18,123.17 Two nights accommodation and miscellaneous charges at Crown Towers for Rogers family and Rogers' sister's family s 249B(2) 3 18 months 7,500.00 Rogers' marina berthing fees s 249B(2) 4 12 months 1,446.15 'Dinner by Heston Blumenthal' for Rogers and three others s 249B(2) 4 12 months 3,544.71 One night stay at Crown Towers Melbourne for Rogers and her husband s 249B(2) 4 12 months 65,874.36 Nine-day holiday in Port Douglas for Rogers' family and her sister's family s 249B(2) 3 18 months 228,747.28 Interior design services including sourcing and installation of furniture for Rosamond's residence at Potts Point s 192E(1)(b) 6 3 years 45,000.00-59,951.58 Fees and mark-up on invoice to NAB for non-NAB related expenditure in Count 80 s 192E(1)(b) 6 3 years 47,281.22 Gold Coast Holiday for Rogers' family and her sister's family s 249B(2) 3 18 months 10,819.34 Travel from Melbourne to Sydney (one night) for Rosemary Rogers, her husband, and her brother-in law s 249B(2) 3 18 months 380,000.00 Deposit for purchase of house in Williamstown, Victoria by Rosemary Rogers s 249B(2) 1 4 years 1,500,000.00 Bank Cheque provided to Rosemary Rogers for payment towards purchase price of house in Williamstown s 249B(2) 1 4 years 2,200,000.00 Fraudulent invoice created for 'Project Eagle' of which Rosamond retained $700,000 (related to Count 85) s 192E(1)(b) 5 6 years 7,500.00 Rogers' marina berthing fees s 249B(2) 4 12 months 82,642.89 Payments for rent of Rosamond's premises in Potts Point s 192E(1)(b) 6 3 years 16,511.92 On-charging of Rosamond's parents' rent for their rental property in Potts Point s 192E(1)(b) 6 3 years 3,331,153.13 Fraudulent invoice issued to NAB following whistle blower letter s 192E(1)(b) Attempt 5 years 2,396,000.00 - 4,956,000.00 Undeclared prepayments not returned to the NAB s 192E(1)(b) 5 6 years 500,000.00 - 520,000.00 Inflated Invoice for services to Vicinity Centres for Christmas parties organised s 192E(1)(b) Attempt 3 years

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 20 July 2023

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