22 The Court also stated that a range and not a fixed starting point is appropriate given that some of the features are inherently variable and the identified factors will not comprise all the factors relevant to the sentencing process.
23 The present was a case in which items (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) and (vii) were each present. Item (vi) would have been satisfied but for the inability of the applicant to open the till. The applicant did fall, in my view, to be considered somewhat more harshly, however, in relation to item (i), since he had a prior criminal history of some significance, for the offences previously mentioned. He was also subject to recognisance to be of good behaviour for three years for an offence of steal from the person - a circumstance of aggravation for the reasons mentioned in Daridis NSWCCA 18 December 1986 per Street J.
24 Moreover, as was made clear in Thwaites NSWCCA 6 October 1993, deterrent sentences must be expected where crimes of the kind before the Court are directed towards service station attendants, and similar persons, whose occupation leaves them particularly vulnerable to robbery. That has an even greater significance concerning offences carried out under cover of darkness, and out of busy trading hours.
25 The matters I have identified were circumstances of seriousness placing this case above, or at least within the upper range noted in Henry, even allowing for the fact of impulsivity and for the extent to which the applicant's judgment might have been impaired for the reasons identified by Doctor Wilcox.
26 So far as it was suggested that the knife used in the present case was only a small pocket knife, and as such not a "large or more lethal weapon calculated to instil additional fear", I would reject that proposition as groundless. History unfortunately shows that pocket knives are capable of inflicting serious, even fatal injuries. The carriage and use of a knife, of any kind, in the course of an offence is regarded by the community with abhorrence. That is not to elevate a crime of armed robbery to any greater significance because of the use or presence of a knife, since proof that the offence was carried out under arms is one of the circumstances which is required for a conviction. However, the abhorrence which the community has in relation to knives has been stated with crystal clarity by this Court on many occasions; see, for example, Underhill NSWCCA 9 May 1996, Rothapfel NSWCCA 26 March 1992 and Randall NSWCCA 19 April 1994.
27 I would firmly reject any notion that the use of a knife is to be regarded as having a degree of seriousness that is proportionate to its size. Such a proposition is, to my mind, lacking in logic.
28 It is the fact, in the present case, that the knife was not used in a way which directly threatened actual harm to the victim, for example, as might have been the case had it been held at her throat. However, it was held in the applicant's hand, and it was observed by the victim who was quite unable to know what might follow if she offered active resistance. Her immediate response to it, and her flight from the premises, provide ample testimony of the fear with which she regarded this aspect of the applicant's conduct.
29 So far as it was suggested that the matter lacked objective seriousness being only an attempt, I would similarly reject that proposition. It is the case that an attempt attracts the same potential maximum penalty as the performance of the substantive crime. Every case has to be treated and assessed upon its merits. In some cases an attempt may constitute an offence of lesser seriousness, if there was a withdrawal or a failure to carry the matter through from a very early stage. In the present case, however, it was only the inability of the applicant to open the till, which meant that the substantive offence was not implemented. In the circumstances of this case I would regard the attempt as still constituting a matter of particular seriousness.
30 So far as the applicant's state of intoxication or need to feed a habit are concerned, I would merely refer to the observations which were passed by me in the decision of Henry at page 397-398. Intoxication and a need to acquire funds to support a habit - whether it be drugs or alcohol - had a relevance in the respects there identified, but they do not provide any excuse for the criminality involved. None of these factors seems to me to require an assessment of the present offence, as one occupying a degree of seriousness less than that attributed to it by the learned sentencing judge.
31 It was next submitted that the applicant's subjective circumstances were exceptional. I am, however, persuaded that they were all given appropriate and sufficient weight. As I have observed, the applicant's history of drug and alcohol abuse provided no excuse. His psychological state and his possible difficulty within the prison system were of relevance and of weight. However to my mind, they were sympathetically and appropriately dealt with by his Honour by way of the reduction of a sentence that he said that he would otherwise have imposed. Moreover, they were allowed for in the finding of special circumstances which led to a significant adjustment in the ratio between the minimum and the additional terms.
32 Any sentence other than that imposed would have failed, in my view, to reflect the criminality involved and would have offended against the principles noted in Rushby (1977) 1 NSWLR 594. So far as it was submitted there should have been a further adjustment in the ratio between the minimum and additional terms, that, to my mind, would have offended against the principle in Morrissey NSWCCA 15 July 1994 where this Court observed that:
"A decision to vary the statutory proportion requires consideration not only of the desirability of increasing the additional term, but also the appropriateness of reducing the minimum term which must nevertheless remain such as appropriately reflects the criminality involved."