De Angelis v R

The psychiatric evidence

1. A forensic psychiatrist, Dr Stephen Allnutt, conducted clinical evaluation of the applicant over three (possibly four) separate days in a three week period in October and November 2012. During that time, Dr Allnutt took a detailed history from the applicant. Dr Allnutt's report runs to 19 pages. Appended to it is a further 18 pages, which is a review of documentation provided to Dr Allnutt. Dr Allnutt also gave oral evidence.
2. He recorded (on the basis of information provided to him by the applicant) a 2009 admission to a psychiatric unit at Hornsby, as well as a psychiatric history when the applicant was 10 years of age and living in France. He also recorded a history of cocaine use from 2005 until 2009. The applicant told Dr Allnutt that he was born in France, abandoned by his parents as a child, and abused by his foster carers.
3. Dr Allnutt noted that the applicant: "… seemed unsure about the basis for the charges and had not read the facts." (The Agreed Statement is dated 3 September 2012 - before the assessments by Dr Allnutt - and is signed by the applicant, as well as by his legal representative.)
4. Dr Allnutt then recorded the following history: "At the time that he saw me he was an intelligence officer - he worked for the CIA, and for the French Secret Service; he alleged that the local council were poisoning his plants every day in an attempt to persecute him; he had asked the FBI, the FSB and the CIA to follow up on this and to find out why all the agents were following him; he added that he had also worked for the KGB. He continued to work for secret service agencies, providing them with intelligence about what was happening in Australia which was a uranium producing country; he was being followed by police all the time, everywhere he went they followed him; he would see cars following him, other agents also tried to poison him with polonium and they tried to inject him with polonium; there were secret doors underground in Wahroonga Park which only opened up at 10pm and people would go in; these were people who wanted to extract uranium; they were scientists who worked for government intelligence; he said that Barry O'Farrell lived in Wahroonga which is why this was a 'secret thing' that was happening."
5. There was very much more of similar, or equally fantastic, nature. The applicant also gave Dr Allnutt an account of hearing voices. In subsequent interviews he gave further accounts of voices and persecution.
6. He gave various histories of psychiatric treatment. For example, he said that he had, in 2009, been diagnosed by Hornsby Mental Health Services with depression following the death of his dog, and believed that he had been diagnosed with bi-polar attentive disorder and possible mania. He gave a history of a suicide attempt in 2006, and of contact with Mental Health Services in France, as a child.
7. He told Dr Allnutt that a Dr Bennett had made a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia.
8. I here interpolate that, ordinarily, it has been the practice of this Court to accept the histories taken from offenders by health professionals. In this case, no reliance can be placed upon any account given by the applicant to Dr Allnutt. Dr Allnutt himself did not accept that the applicant believed the account of persecution, voices and delusions that he gave.
9. Dr Allnutt expressed his opinion as follows: "Overall this is a man who has a history of abuse and neglect in childhood; who developed personality vulnerabilities of a narcissistic nature as well as mood and anxiety disorder; he likely had ongoing difficulties with mood and anxiety symptoms through his life, with underlying deep seated insecurities about himself; more recently he commenced using cocaine and experienced other stressors related to his business dealings which had the effect of triggering an aggravation of his mood disorder … he now presents with more significant symptoms of mood disorder requiring ongoing treatment with mood stabilising mediation [sic - medication]; I am reasonably confident of a current diagnosis of mood disorder, predominantly recurrent depressive disorder and anxiety disorder (with panic attacks) with a vulnerability to periods of hypomania; differential diagnosis includes bipolar affective disorder. I am unable to conclude a diagnosis [of] chronic psychotic disorder based on the current information; am reluctant to definitively rule it out - this is a diagnosis that will become clearer in the course of time, but at this stage on balance, I would not conclude a diagnosis of chronic psychotic disorder."
10. He then diagnosed narcissistic personality disorder. He noted but did not endorse a prior diagnosis (by whom he did not say) of antisocial personality disorder. In part he withheld endorsement of the diagnosis because it depended upon a history of conduct disorder prior to the age of 15. Since the only basis for such a conclusion lay in what the applicant told him, he considered the information insufficient. With respect to the applicant's history of hearing voices, and of his asserted involvement with security agencies, Dr Allnutt said: "… consideration needs to be given to the concept of 'pseudologia fantastica' which describes a tendency to fabricate highly improbable stories which are not delusional; this which tendency [sic] arises out of innate underlying personality vulnerabilities …" He nevertheless expressed himself unable to conclude that the applicant was driven by an underlying delusional motivation, and concluded that it was unlikely that the applicant experienced delusional beliefs at the time of his arrest.
11. Dr Allnutt acknowledged that, since 2010, the applicant had been a patient of mental health services with multiple psychiatric admissions, and was currently being prescribed anti-psychotic and mood stabilising medication as well as an anti-depressant.
12. In giving oral evidence, Dr Allnutt was questioned extensively both by counsel for the applicant and counsel for the Crown. In examination in chief he said: "Personally I think it's a very difficult case not only because of the voluminous amount of information and documentation and writings on his behalf [and other] people's behalf but I think it's very much clouded by his unreliability in reporting. So that makes it a very complex case."
13. Later, he said, when questioned about the applicant's asserted history of cocaine use: "Once again it leaves it open, I understand that, but this is a case that is very open your Honour."
14. He repeated that he did not consider that the applicant believed the grandiose claims that he had made; if Dr Allnutt considered that if the applicant held those beliefs, he would have diagnosed him as delusional. He said: "It seems to become more dense after his arrest and my impression is that you know he's panicking and he's highly anxious and he doesn't want, he doesn't want to go to prison. I'm more prone to accept mood disorder because there is evidence of mood symptoms that are quite prominent in the notes prior to his arrest."
15. In preparation for the fitness hearing, Dr Allnutt's report as well as records of the applicant's psychiatric history were reviewed, on behalf of the Crown, by two psychiatrists, Dr Dinah Bennett (of the Hornsby Mental Health Service), and Dr Yvonne Skinner. It is unnecessary and unproductive to detail all of what was reported by those two practitioners; it is sufficient to say that, in many respects, they contradicted, as a matter of fact, the histories of his psychiatric treatment given by the applicant. For example, Dr Skinner said that much of the history recorded by Dr Allnutt differed from that given to her by the applicant (although she was not specific as to the differences). Dr Bennett reported, reviewing a great deal of documentation, detailing variations and inconsistencies in what the applicant had told Dr Allnutt, and what he had told other mental health authorities. She denied any diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia.
16. There is evidence, however, that the applicant had contacted the Hornsby Mental Health Service in January 2010, shortly before his arrest.
17. The result is that there is little concerning the applicant's history and background upon which any reliance can be placed. What is known is that he was born in December 1965 and was about 40 years of age at the commencement of the offending. He has no prior criminal history.

The Remarks on Sentence

1. The sentencing judge reviewed the relevant facts at some length and in some detail. With respect to the applicant's personal circumstances, he made the following observation: "38. I add here that of course any history which comes directly from [the applicant] I regard as unreliable unless corroborated, for the reasons stated by Dr Allnutt."
2. He referred to Dr Allnutt's psychiatric opinion and diagnosis. He said: "42 I am inclined to accept the noted history of early abusive experiences in childhood …" This was because, he considered, they were supported by the documentation from France.
3. He observed that, in order to deceive, as the applicant did, victims of the capacity of the applicant's victims, the applicant was required to engage in "very skilled criminal craft and perseverance". He said the enterprise: "… required hard work, co-ordination, preparation, perseverance, extravagance, ruthlessness, exploitation of friendships, deviousness, cunning, heartlessness and intelligence." He described the conduct as "not only fraudulent, it was predatory".
4. He accepted that there were, pursuant to s 44(2) of the Sentencing Procedure Act, special circumstances warranting an adjustment of the normal relationship between the non-parole period and the head sentence (of 75 per cent). He considered that the applicant's "mental health condition" was one feature warranting that conclusion. Another factor was that the applicant had not previously been sentenced to a period of incarceration. He was unable to make a clear finding that the applicant was unlikely to re-offend or had good prospects of rehabilitation.
5. He found no significant evidence of contrition. He accepted there was some force in a defence submission that the offending could be seen as "one episode of an ongoing criminal enterprise", but considered the significance of that was outweighed by the number of individual victims of the applicant's criminality.
6. It was put to the sentencing judge that, by reason of his pleas of guilty, the applicant was entitled to a reduction in the sentence that otherwise would have been imposed of 25 per cent: see R v Thomson; R v Houlton. The submission was made on the basis that the applicant had, very shortly after the finalisation of the proceedings concerning his fitness for trial, entered pleas of guilty. In the result, his Honour reduced the sentence he otherwise would have imposed by 12.5 per cent.
7. In doing so, he cited Howie J in R v Borkowski [2009] NSWCCA 102; 195 A Crim R 1 at [32]: "The utilitarian value of the pleas will be determined largely by the timing of the plea so that the earlier the plea the greater the discount."
8. He then considered the provisions of s 21A(2) of the Sentencing Procedure Act, itemising aggravating factors relevant to sentence. It is unnecessary to go into the detail of this, since it does not feature in the matters raised on behalf of the applicant with respect to sentence.

The application for leave to appeal

1. Two grounds of appeal were proposed. They were pleaded as follows: "Ground 1: His Honour erred in his assessment that the appropriate discount for the plea of guilty was 12.5 percent rather than the full discount. Ground 2: The aggregate sentence is manifestly excessive."

Ground 1: the pleas of guilty

1. The argument in respect of this ground is simply stated. It is that, since the applicant's pleas of guilty were entered within a short time after the determination of his fitness for trial, they warranted the maximum reduction. In Thomson; Houlton, it was envisaged that, depending upon the utilitarian value of the pleas of guilty, a reduction of up to 25 per cent might be allowed. The point that was made was that, until the issue of his fitness to be tried was resolved, the applicant could not have been expected to enter pleas.
2. Two principles concerning the reduction to be allowed in respect of pleas of guilty are well established. The first is that any such reduction is a matter of discretion lying within the province of the sentencing judge, and not readily upset on appeal: see House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499. The second is that the principal consideration is the timing of a plea; this is related to its utilitarian value.
3. Reference was made to remarks of Whealy J in R v Sharrouf [2009] NSWSC 1002 at [67] in which a reduction of 25 per cent had been allowed when pleas of guilty were entered at the earliest available opportunity after a fitness determination. However, what distinguishes Sharrouf from this case is that Sharrouf had earlier been found unfit to be tried (or to plead). The timing of his plea can be seen to be related, not only to the finding of fitness, but to the actuality of fitness. Here, having regard to the determination of Marien DCJ, it cannot be concluded that there was any time when the applicant was not, in fact, fit.
4. Similarly, in Hatfield v R [2011] NSWCCA 286, on which the applicant also relied, it was found that the offender's mental health was "significantly impaired" from a time after his arrest until the date when he was found fit to stand trial. Hall J, with whom McClellan CJ at CL and Hidden J agreed, considered that it would not have been reasonable for him to have entered a guilty plea until after the date of the fitness finding.
5. In this case, there is no basis for a finding that the applicant's mental health was "significantly impaired" in a way that impacted on his capacity to enter a plea.
6. Although, in my opinion, it would have been open to the sentencing judge to have allowed a greater reduction, having regard to the issues raised with respect to the applicant's fitness, no basis has been shown for interference with the essentially discretionary judgment made by Cogswell DCJ. I would reject this ground of appeal.

Ground 2: manifestly excessive?

1. The submissions made in respect of this ground also drew heavily upon the evidence of the applicant's "mental condition". Reference was made to Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194; 79 NSWLR 1.
2. It is without doubt that a psychiatric condition, bearing a causal connection with criminal offending, is a relevant consideration warranting, in some cases, the imposition of a lesser sentence.
3. However, the evidence in this case establishes neither a "mental condition" of sufficient severity to warrant any significant amelioration in sentence, nor any causal connection with the offending. The applicant has a narcissistic personality disorder.
4. Indeed, a strong inference is available that the applicant quite deliberately attempted to create an illusion of a psychiatric condition of a dimension which could not be established.
5. A second basis put in support of the ground drew upon sentences imposed in previous cases of significant fraudulent offending. These tended to show that offences of a similar kind had resulted in lower sentences than that imposed upon the applicant.
6. No issue was raised as to any of the "indicative sentences" stated in respect of the individual offences; the nub of this proposed ground of appeal must have been directed towards the totality of the aggregate sentence by reference to the totality of offending.
7. In my opinion, the statement of facts indicates criminality on a vast, deliberate and continuing nature. It was properly characterised by the sentencing judge as "predatory" and as involving: "… hard work, co-ordination, preparation, perseverance, extravagance, ruthlessness, exploitation of friendships, deviousness, cunning, heartlessness and intelligence."
8. I am not persuaded that the sentence of 12 years with a non-parole period of 7 years and 6 months was outside the range of sentences legitimately available for offending of this nature.
9. I would, therefore, grant leave to appeal but dismiss the appeal.
10. The orders I propose: (1) Extend the time for filing an application for leave to appeal against sentence to 17 April 2015; (2) Grant leave to appeal against sentence; (3) Dismiss the appeal.
11. BUTTON J: I agree with Simpson JA.
12. FAGAN J: I agree with Simpson JA.

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