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[2020] QDC 132
respondent. Mr Mrkajic’s sentence was varied to declare that one day in presentence custody, 3 April 2020, was time already served; otherwise his appeal was dismissed, and Ms Panic’s appeal was dismissed.
The District Court did not reduce the effective sentences for the ATM-skimming and related offending. It considered the offending sophisticated and potentially profitable, and accepted that deterrence and the serious receiving offence supported imprisonment involving actual custody. The court found no error in treating Mr Mrkajic as more culpable than Ms Panic, or in using the receiving counts as the basis for the head sentences. Mr Mrkajic received a limited variation: the court declared one day of presentence custody to be time already served. Ms Panic's appeal was dismissed.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
2,181 words · generated 28/09/2026
Smith DCJA heard two sentence appeals under s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld). Filip Mrkajic and Romana Panic had pleaded guilty in the Brisbane Magistrates Court on 2 June 2020 to a range of offences arising from ATM skimming and associated conduct. Their formal appeal ground was that their sentences were manifestly excessive. Their submissions also challenged the Magistrate's reliance on , the use of imprisonment on receiving counts, and the difference between their sentences ([1]-[5]).
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
The offending attributed to Mr Mrkajic included installing skimming and pinhole-camera devices at Commonwealth Bank ATMs at Cannon Hill, Wynnum and Kelvin Grove. The devices were used to record ATM users' card and PIN information. The evidence summarised in the judgment described about 20 people using the Cannon Hill ATM while a device was attached, about 15 at Wynnum, and footage and banking information connected with Kelvin Grove as well ([13]-[19]). The prosecution said 22 cards with correct account and PIN details were located, five linked to Commonwealth Bank customers and 17 to other banking organisations. It also said banks had to cancel and reissue cards, although no customer financial loss was alleged ([31], [33], [53]).
Police located the appellants at a Spring Hill unit on 3 April 2020. They seized equipment and banking information, and found $23,500 in cash. The prosecution could not prove that the money came from the skimming activity. The appellants' pleas to receiving were on the basis that they knew or must have known the property was tainted, not that they had obtained it through the skimming offences ([21]-[22], [36], [46]).
Ms Panic's charges included forgery and uttering in relation to 22 cards, and offences concerning fraud, identification information, use of restricted computers, privacy recordings and possession of equipment ([8], [24]-[29]). The evidence described her involvement in obtaining a card reader and other relevant conduct, while the appeal court later recorded the concession that Mr Mrkajic was the principal and Ms Panic the party ([26]-[29], [69]).
Mr Mrkajic received an effective head sentence of 14 months' imprisonment, suspended after three months for two years. Ms Panic received an effective head sentence of 12 months, suspended after two months for two years. Forfeiture orders were also made ([7], [9]). On appeal, the court left the substantive sentencing outcomes undisturbed. It varied Mr Mrkajic's sentence only to declare that his one day in presentence custody, on 3 April 2020, was time already served. Ms Panic's appeal was dismissed ([90]-[91]).
The court approached the appeal as a review for error, rather than as an opportunity to choose a different sentence simply because another sentence might also have been available. It noted that an appeal under s 222 is by way of rehearing and that an appellant will usually need to establish legal, factual or discretionary error ([4]-[5]). The manifest-excess authorities referred to by Smith DCJA reinforced that a sentencing court cannot be expected to produce a mathematically precise outcome. A difference from sentences in other cases is not enough by itself; the circumstances must support a conclusion that principle was misapplied ([81]-[83]).
On Stroia, the appeal court accepted that the earlier case involved more serious offending. It involved a longer course of conduct, transfers of substantial sums overseas, and an organised international criminal organisation, as described in the judgment's account of that case ([58]-[59]). The Magistrate had expressly recognised that distinction. Smith DCJA nevertheless agreed that Stroia identified the importance of personal and general deterrence for this kind of offending. Because the sentences in the present appeals were far lower than those in Stroia, reliance on it did not establish error ([59]).
The nature of the present offending remained important to the sentence assessment. The court accepted that the skimming was sophisticated, involved three ATM locations and had the potential for significant gain ([84]-[85]). It also considered the receiving charge serious in its own right. Although the money was not proved to be proceeds of the skimming, it was property obtained from an indictable offence and the pleas accepted that the appellants knew or had reason to believe it was tainted ([65], [86]). The court therefore rejected the argument that the uncertain source of the $23,500 made the receiving sentence excessive.
For the receiving counts, the court applied the totality approach to multiple offences. It cited R v Griffiths for the proposition that sentencing must account for the total effect of the sentence, and noted that Queensland authority had applied this practice ([63]-[64]). A sentence can reflect overall criminality through an appropriate head sentence, with other terms served concurrently. In this case, the highest head sentences on the receiving counts and lesser concurrent terms for other counts were considered appropriate ([62], [65]). The court also noted that Mr Mrkajic's receiving charges covered the $23,500 and other property ([65]).
The disparity argument failed because the appellants' roles differed. Smith DCJA said sentencing should account for each offender's level of involvement and culpability ([68]). At the appeal hearing, it was conceded that Mr Mrkajic was the principal and Ms Panic the party. Mr Mrkajic had installed the skimming devices and faced a second receiving charge. The court found no justifiable sense of grievance about the difference in their sentences ([69]-[70]).
Finally, the court considered the guilty pleas and absence of criminal histories, but held that these mitigating factors did not make the sentences manifestly excessive. It observed that the Magistrate had released each appellant substantially earlier than the usual one-third period ([88]-[89]). The respondent accepted that Mr Mrkajic's day in presentence custody should be declared, and the court made that limited correction ([56], [90]-[91]).
The judgment did not announce a new sentencing tariff or a new offence-specific rule. Its reasoning applied existing principles to the appellants' sentences. The procedural framework was that an appeal under s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 is by way of rehearing, with appellate intervention ordinarily requiring an error of law, fact or discretion ([4]-[5]). The court used Markarian, Hili and Wong to explain why manifest excess is not determined by arithmetic or by a simple comparison with other cases ([81]-[83]).
On the facts before it, the judgment confirms that deterrence can be important where ATM-skimming conduct is sophisticated and capable of producing significant gain. It also confirms that a prior case such as Stroia may be relevant to deterrence without being treated as directly equivalent, particularly where the sentencing judge recognises that the earlier offending was more serious ([58]-[59], [84]-[87]).
The court applied the totality principle to the structure of the sentences, accepting that a head sentence on the receiving counts could represent the total criminality while lesser terms ran concurrently ([62]-[65]). It also applied the principle that different culpability can justify different outcomes for co-offenders ([68]-[70]). Those are applications of the authorities identified in the judgment, not declarations that every ATM-skimming case or receiving offence must receive the same structure or weight.
The supplied judgment contains no later decisions or subsequent treatment of Mrkajic. Accordingly, it does not establish whether later courts followed, distinguished or otherwise treated this decision. Its account of the law after the decision can be stated only as the principles the court applied in June 2020.
At [59], Smith DCJA said Stroia was “a more serious case than the present one”, but agreed it set out the need for personal and general deterrence in this type of offending. In plain English, the earlier case was not a sentence template. It was relevant to the sentencing purpose of deterrence, with the difference in seriousness expressly recognised.
At [62], the court held it was “entirely appropriate” to impose the highest head sentence on the receiving charges and lesser concurrent terms on the other charges. In plain English, the court considered that the receiving counts could carry the sentences that represented the overall criminality, while the other sentences did not add further consecutive time.
At [68], Smith DCJA said different sentences may reflect different degrees of culpability. In plain English, co-offenders need not receive identical sentences just because they were involved in the same overall course of offending. Their roles matter.
At [85], the court agreed that the offending was sophisticated and had “the potential for significant gain”. This is the court's characterisation of the seriousness factors relevant to sentence. It does not say that customers actually lost money; the judgment records that no financial detriment to customers was alleged ([33], [42], [53]).
At [89], Smith DCJA concluded that the sentences were not manifestly excessive despite the early guilty pleas and lack of previous convictions. In plain English, the mitigating circumstances were considered, but did not establish the kind of sentencing error necessary for appellate intervention.
The decision is most directly relevant to sentence appeals involving ATM skimming or related financial-information offending where devices are placed at multiple ATMs, banking information is captured, and the conduct is described as sophisticated and potentially profitable. Its reasoning on deterrence depended on those features and on the associated offences, not simply on the label “computer offence” ([84]-[87]).
It is also relevant where receiving tainted property is sentenced alongside a larger group of offences. In this case, the prosecution could not prove that the $23,500 came from ATM skimming, but the pleas admitted knowledge or reason to believe the property was tainted. The court treated the receiving offence as serious in itself and accepted a head sentence reflecting overall criminality ([36], [46], [65]-[66], [86]). The decision should not be read as finding that the money came from the skimming.
For co-offender cases, the relevant comparison is the difference in role and culpability. The court had a specific concession that Mr Mrkajic was the principal installer and Ms Panic the party, and identified a further receiving charge against Mr Mrkajic ([69]). The parity reasoning is therefore tied to those role differences.
More generally, the appeal principles apply where a party alleges manifest excess based chiefly on comparison with other sentences. The decision emphasises that a comparison is not enough without a basis to conclude that sentencing principle was misapplied ([81]-[83]). Whether that reasoning bears on another case depends on the actual offences, offending circumstances, roles, pleas, personal circumstances and sentence structure.
The supplied text is the judgment itself, delivered on 24 June 2020, and does not identify any later decision that considered Mrkajic. No claim about later judicial treatment can therefore be grounded in this source.
Within Mrkajic, Smith DCJA discussed earlier authorities in distinct ways. Stroia was considered and applied as support for the relevance of deterrence, while being distinguished as more serious ([58]-[59]). McGrath v Garrett was held not comparable because it concerned less serious charges and a police appeal, although the judgment noted that the receiving charge in that case had been regarded as serious ([61]). Seagrave was treated as a different case illustrating a discretionary decision not to impose actual custody ([77]-[78]).
The court considered Sea, Lopera and Rangel as comparators, identifying factual differences and using them to assess the seriousness of the present offending ([73]-[80]). It referred to Griffiths for totality and to Green for differences in co-offender culpability ([63]-[70]). These are the relationships described by Smith DCJA; they do not establish how any subsequent court treated Mrkajic.
The judgment does not determine a fixed sentencing range for ATM skimming, computer offences, or receiving tainted property. It expressly relies on discretionary sentencing and the proposition that there is no “magic number” for a particular crime ([81]). Sentences in other cases therefore remain fact-dependent.
The decision does not establish how the result would differ if the prosecution proved actual customer losses, a specific amount obtained through skimming, a connection between cash received and the skimming, or involvement in an organised criminal enterprise. The judgment records that customer financial loss was not alleged and the $23,500 was not proved to derive from the skimming ([33], [42], [46], [86]). It discusses Stroia as a more serious comparison involving an organised operation and transferred proceeds, but does not prescribe the effect of those facts in another case ([58]-[59]).
Nor does the judgment establish a general rule that receiving counts should always carry the highest head sentence. Its holding was tied to the offences, property and total criminality before the court ([62]-[66]). Similarly, its parity conclusion depended on the appellants' different roles and the additional receiving charge faced by Mr Mrkajic ([69]-[70]).
Lastly, the judgment makes no finding about later appellate treatment, the consequences of different plea or custody circumstances, or the sentencing significance of deportation or onerous bail conditions in another case. Those matters appeared in the appellants' submissions, but the reasons do not provide a broader ruling on each of them ([37], [41]). This analysis is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on it, relying on it, or using any draft, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE - SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE - WHETHER ERRORS ESTABLISHED - where the appellants pleaded guilty to computer hacking, fraud, and receiving - whether the Magistrate erred in his approach to sentence - whether the Magistrate misapplied R v Stroia [2011] QCA 317 - whether the Magistrate erred in imposing imprisonment on the counts of receiving - whether the parity principle breached - whether the sentences are manifestly excessive
Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) ss 398, 408C, 408D, 408E, 432, 433, 488
Justices Act 1886 (Qld) ss 222, 223
Allesch v Maunz [2000] HCA 40; (2000) 203 CLR 172, cited
McGrath v Garrett [2013] QDC 312, distinguished
Green v R [2011] HCA 49; (2011) 244 CLR 462, cited
Griffiths v R [1987] HCA 39; (1989) 167 CLR 372, applied
Hili v R [2010] HCA 45; (2010) 242 CLR 520, cited
Markarian v R [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 352, cited
Mella v R [2017] NSWDC 193, cited
R v Bedington [1970] Qd R 353, cited
R v Lopera McGinness DCJ 17 October 2014, considered
R v Nagy [2003] QCA 175; [2004] 1 Qd R 63, cited
R v Sea [2006] QCA 421, considered
R v Seagrave Dick SC DCJ 24 January 2013, considered
R v Stroia [2011] QCA 317, considered
R v UE [2016] QCA 58, cited
R v Ungvari [2010] QCA 134, cited
Teelow v Commissioner of Police [2009] QCA 84; [2009] 2 Qd R 489, cited
Wong v R [2001] HCA 64; (2001) 207 CLR 584, cited
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondents
Using restricted computer without consent and causing or intending to cause detriment, damage, or gain contrary to s 408E(1) & (2) of the Criminal Code.
Obtaining or dealing with another entity's identification information for the purpose of committing or facilitating the commission of, an indictable offence contrary to s 408D(1) of the Criminal Code.
Fraud contrary to s 408C (1)(B) of the Criminal Code.
Observations or recordings in breach of privacy contrary to s 227A(1) of the Criminal Code.
Possessing equipment for the purpose of committing/facilitating the commission of an offence against s 408D(1) of the Criminal Code.
Using restricted computer without consent and causing or intending to cause detriment, damage, or gain contrary to s 408E(1) & (2) of the Criminal Code.
Obtaining or dealing with another entity's identification information for the purpose of committing or facilitating the commission of, an indictable offence contrary to s 408D(1) of the Criminal Code.
Fraud contrary to s 408C(1)(B) of the Criminal Code.
Observations or recordings in breach of privacy contrary to s 227A(1) of the Criminal Code.
Possessing equipment for the purpose of committing/facilitating the commission of an offence against s 408D(1) of the Criminal Code.
Obtaining or dealing with another entity's identification information for the purpose of committing or facilitating the commission of, an indictable offence contrary to s 408D(1) of the Criminal Code.
Possessing equipment for the purpose of committing/facilitating the commission of an offence against s 408D(1) of the Criminal Code.
Stealing to contrary to s 398 of the Criminal Code.
Receiving tainted property contrary to s 433(1) of the Criminal Code.
Receiving tainted property contrary to s 433(1) of the Criminal Code.
Obtaining or dealing with another entity's identification information for the purpose of committing or facilitating the commission of, an indictable offence contrary to s 408D(1) of the Criminal Code.
3 April 2020. Westpac Bank details located at Spring Hill.
Obtaining or dealing with another entity's identification information for the purpose of committing or facilitating the commission of, an indictable offence contrary to s 408D(1) of the Criminal Code.
3 April 2020. St George bank details located at Spring Hill.
Using restricted computer without consent and causing or intending to cause detriment, damage, or gain contrary to s 408E of the Criminal Code.
Fraud contrary to s 408C(1)(F) of the Criminal Code.
Forgery and uttering contrary to section 488(1) of the Criminal Code.
Forgery and uttering contrary to section 488(1) of the Criminal Code.
Forgery and uttering contrary to section 488(1) of the Criminal Code.
Forgery and uttering contrary to section 488(1) of the Criminal Code.
Forgery and uttering contrary to section 488(1) of the Criminal Code.
Forgery and uttering contrary to section 488(1) of the Criminal Code.
Obtaining or dealing with another entity's identification information for the purpose of committing or facilitating an indictable offence contrary to s 408D(1) of the Criminal Code.
Obtaining or dealing with another entity's identification information for the purpose of committing or facilitating the commission of, an indictable offence contrary to s 408D(1) of the Criminal Code.
Using restricted computer without consent and causing detriment, damage, or gaining in excess of $5,000 contrary to s 408E(1) & (3) of the Criminal Code.
Using restricted computer without consent and causing detriment, damage, or gaining in excess of $5,000 contrary to s 408E(1) & (3) of the Criminal Code.
Observations or recordings in breach of privacy contrary to s 227A(1) of the Criminal Code.
Observations or recordings in breach of privacy contrary to s 227A(1) of the Criminal Code.
Possessing equipment for the purpose of committing/facilitating the commission of an offence against s 408D(1) of the Criminal Code.
Receiving tainted property to s 433(1) of the Criminal Code.
Obtaining or dealing with another entity's identification information for the purpose of committing or facilitating an indictable offence contrary to s 408D(1) of the Criminal Code.
"[19] But deterrence was a particularly important consideration in this case. Stroia was part of an organised international professional criminal organisation. Whilst he may have been a lowly foot soldier in that sinister cartel, if the criminal masterminds were unable to recruit people like him their unlawful schemes would flounder. He received about $30,000 for his part in the crimes, none of which has been repaid. Stroia's offending struck at the integrity of and public confidence in the use of ATMs, the Australian banking system's mode of providing convenient services to customers. The misuse of credit card information had the potential to undermine public confidence in credit and savings card use, practical and much-used tools of modern commerce and banking. The sending of over $80,000 of stolen Australian money overseas was also a significant crime against the Australian public. Stroia's illegal conduct continued over 18 months during three separate visits to Australia when, according to one of his own referees, he could have obtained gainful, honest employment for which he was well qualified. His offending was carefully and professionally planned. A substantial penalty involving a significant period of actual custody had to be imposed to deter him and others. People like Stroia and Flutur who are tempted to make easy money through sophisticated criminal enterprises like this one, even if only to help family members in straightened circumstances, must appreciate that they are likely to be caught and sentenced to a significant prison term. The promise of quick money for joining in an international criminal enterprise is not worth the risk."
"It is well established that in sentencing a person in respect of multiple offences regard must be had to the total effect of the sentence on the offender: Reg. v. Smith (1983) 32 SASR 219, at pp 220, 221, 222; Boyle and Allen, Sentencing Law and Practice, (1985), p 282; Hall, Sentencing in New Zealand, (1987), p 195. This may be done through the imposition of consecutive sentences of reduced length with or without other sentences to be served concurrently or through the imposition of a head sentence appropriate to the total criminality with all other sentences to be served concurrently."
"Unfortunately, discretionary sentencing is not capable of mathematical precision or, for that matter, approximation. At best, experienced judges will agree on a range of sentences that reasonably fit all the circumstances of the case. There is no magic number for any particular crime when a discretionary sentence has to be imposed."
"Intervention is warranted only where the difference is such that, in all the circumstances, the appellate court concludes that there must have been some misapplication of principle, even though where and how is not apparent from the statement of reasons.... And, in the present matters, the Court of Criminal Appeal, having described the circumstances of the offending and the personal circumstances of the offenders, said that "the sentence imposed in these matters is so far outside the range of sentences available that there must have been error".
"Reference is made in House to two kinds of error. First, there are cases of specific error of principle. Secondly, there is the residuary category of error which, in the field of sentencing appeals, is usually described as manifest excess or manifest inadequacy. In this second kind of case appellate intervention is not justified simply because the result arrived at below is markedly different from other sentences that have been imposed in other cases. Intervention is warranted only where the difference is such that, in all the circumstances, the appellate court concludes that there must have been some misapplication of principle, even though where and how is not apparent from the statement of reasons."
[2] Section 222(2) (c) of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld).
[3] Section 223(1) of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld).
[4] Allesch v Maunz [2000] HCA 40; (2000) 203 CLR 172 at [23]; Teelow v Commissioner for Police [2009] QCA 84; [2009] 2 Qd R 489 at [4].
[5] Charge 6 relates to the installation of the card skimming device.
[6] Charge 7 relates to obtaining the details of 15 people.
[7] Charge 8 relates to copying user's details to a magnetic strip.
[8] Charge 9 relates to recording the 15 people using the ATM.
[9] Charge 10 relates to possessing the card skimming and camera devices.
[10] Charge 11 relates to obtaining unknown persons banking details at Kelvin Grove.
[11] Charge 12 relates to possessing the card skimming and camera devices.
[12] Charge 13 relates to stealing personal banking information.
[13] Charge 18 relates to using personal banking information.
[14] Charge 14 relates to possession of a card reader.
[15] Charge 15 relates to the $23,500 cash.
[16] Charge 16 relates to bank card information.
[17] Dishonestly inducing Ms Varagic to obtain a card scanner device.
[21] Transcript day 1 pages 22.45-23.10.
[29] Transcript day 1 page 27.42. The appellants relied on R v UE [2016] QCA 58.
[36] Mella v R [2017] NSWDC 193 at [47].
[37] [2011] QCA 317 at [19].
[42] [1987] HCA 39; (1989) 167 CLR 372 at 393.
[43] R v Nagy [2003] QCA 175; [2004] 1 Qd R 63 at [39] and [66].
[44] Clothing, computers, electronics, mobile phones, debit cards, tools, storage devices and personal accessories.
[45] Section 432 (1) (a) of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld).
[46] R v Bedington [1970] Qd R 353 at p 363.
[47] Green v R [2011] HCA 49; (2011) 244 CLR 462 at [28].
[48] Green v R [2011] HCA 49; (2011) 244 CLR 462 at [31].
[53] [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 352 at [65].
[56] R v Ungvari [2010] QCA 134 at [30].
R
Mrkajic & Panic [2020] QDC 132
(2005) 228 CLR 352
(2001) 207 CLR 584
(2011) 244 CLR 462
(2010) 242 CLR 520
(2000) 203 CLR 172
(1989) 167 CLR 372
(1983) 32 SASR 219
Mr Mrkajic’s sentence was varied to declare that one day in presentence custody, 3 April 2020, was time already served; otherwise his appeal was dismissed, and Ms Panic’s appeal was dismissed.