HIS HONOUR: Robert Aldo Mella stands for sentence for four offences to which he pleaded guilty. At the time of the offences he was 29 years old. He pleaded guilty to the first two charges at an early stage in the Local Court and pleaded guilty to the final two charges on 13 September 2016 after the matter had been listed for hearing in Sydney on 11 September 2016 in this Court. However, conveniently the four charges have been listed in the one indictment presented on 13 September 2016 which is the only indictment I shall refer to in these reasons.
A short overview of the crimes committed by the offender is contained in the first eight paragraphs of the agreed facts. In citing these agreed facts I would use some licence in correcting poor expressions of English and poor grammar, and excluding unnecessary material.
In March and April 2015 the offender operated a cocaine "delivery service" to a client base that exceeded 900 customers primarily in the Sydney CBD, the inner suburbs and in particular the Eastern Suburbs. The offender supplied cocaine for between $250 and $300 per bag. Each bag weighed approximately 0.65 grams. On 4 March 2015 police commenced an authorised controlled operation using undercover police officers to purchase prohibited drugs from the offender. On 11 March 2015 the police obtained a telephone intercept warrant for a telephone service being used by the offender. The offender was known to customers by the name of Sam and would also respond to the name "Mikey", which it appears from the material before me, was the name of the former user of the telephone service in question. The offender would receive text messages or phone calls from customers on the telephone service. The customer would generally state his or her location and ask the offender if he were available to supply cocaine. The offender would then respond that he was available if he were and advise the customer of his estimated time of arrival. Customers who contacted the offender would use coded conversations and refer to cocaine as either "Bs", "bags", "tickets", "tix" or state things such as "can we catch up tonight?" The customer would then enter the front passenger of a vehicle driven by the offender and state how many bags or she required. The offender would then retrieve the required number of bags of cocaine from a large freezer style bag which he kept on his lap. He would hand the bags to the customer and would obtain in return payment in cash. The offender used two vehicles in his delivery service. Each was his own which would make identifying him easy for the investigating police. Each cocaine transaction was conducted inside one of his two vehicles. Between 5 March 2015 and 17 April 2015 police lawfully intercepted over 11,000 phone calls and text messages from the offender's mobile phone service. The phone was used exclusively for the purpose of supplying cocaine. Indeed in one intercepted conversation the offender pointed out to an unidentified male that it was not a "social phone".
The first count in the indictment is this,
"Between 11 March 2015 and 10 April 2015, at Sydney …[he] did on three or more separate occasions during a period of 20 consecutive days supply a prohibited drug, namely, cocaine for financial or material reward."
That is an offence contrary to s 25A(1) of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 ("the Drug Act"). The maximum penalty for this offence is imprisonment for 20 years and/or a fine of $385,000. There is no standard non-parole period.
The short facts of that count are these:
"9. Between 11 March 2015 and 10 April 2015 the offender supplied various amounts of cocaine to a number of customers on 44 occasions.
…
11. In relation to 39 actual supplies that took place, the offender supplied:
• 0.65 grams on six occasions at $300 each;
• 1.3 grams on 20 occasions at $500-$600 each;
• 1.4 grams on one occasion at $600;
• 1.95 grams on three occasions at $900 each;
• 2.6 grams on three occasions at $1000 each;
• 3.25 grams on three occasions at $1250;
• 4.55 grams on one occasion at $1900 (estimate);
• 4.8 grams on one occasion at $1,900;
• 10.05 grams on one occasion at $3,750."
One will note the discrepancy between paragraph 9, which I have quoted, and paragraph 11. The first refers to 44 supplies and the second refers to 39 actual supplies. However, the facts go on to recite details of the eight largest transactions and they are numbered 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 28, 40 and 41 indicating that the number of transactions was probably 44. The total value of these supplies was between $29,400 and $31,900 and the range of supplies was between 0.65 grams and 10.05 grams.
Count 2 in the indictment is another offence contrary to s 25A(1) of the Drug Act but covering the period between 11 April 2015 and 16 April 2015, although, as a matter of pleading, it probably ought to have been extended to 30 days after 11 April 2015. The facts behind this count are these:
"33. Between 11 April 2015 and 16 April 2015 the offender supplied various amounts of cocaine to a number of customers on eight occasions.
34. Of these eight transactions, the offender supplied:
• 0.65 grams on two occasions at $300 each; and
• 1.3 grams on six occasions at $500-$600 each."
The value of those transactions has been estimated to be between $3,600 and $4,200. The facts concerning count 2 go on to provide details of supplies numbered 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7.
The other offences contained in the indictment again refer to cocaine but as I shall point out they were part and parcel of the supply activity in which the offender engaged between 11 March 2015 and 17 April 2015.
There is reference in the material before me to a view held by the offender at one time that the supply of cocaine, a notorious "party drug", was not as heinous as the supply of other prohibited drugs. However, the Courts no longer approach the matter in that fashion. The Drug Act adopts a quantity based penalty regime in Schedule 1. It makes no other distinction between drug types. Since Regina v Naipoon (2003) 56 NSWLR 284, there is no longer any judicially constructed gradation of penalties based on perceived harm caused by different types of drugs. It was said in Regina v Dang [2005] NSWCCA 430 at [29] that the Court of Criminal Appeal:
"… no longer approaches the evaluation of this seriousness of a particular supply offence by distinguishing between different types of drugs according to the perceived dangerousness of the drug being supplied. Rather the Court has stressed that the appropriate consideration is the relevant statutory regime and the maximum penalty prescribed for the offence."
This was cited with approval in Regina v Des Rosiers (2006) 159 A Crim R 549 at [23]."
A number of the supplies of cocaine were to undercover police agents identified in the agreed facts as "UCO". The fact that the offender supplied to undercover police agents is irrelevant, although it is relevant that the drugs so supplied did not make their way into the community. While it is relevant to take into account that drug supplied to undercover police will not be disseminated into the community, "of itself this is usually unlikely to lead to other than a very minor diminution of culpability": R v Chan [1999] NSWCCA 103 at [21]. In that case the offender believed that the drugs were likely to find their way into the community and the fact that they did not do so was not due to the offender. The same applies in the current case. In Regina v Gao [2007] NSWCCA 343 the Court of Criminal Appeal emphasised that it is not a matter of principle that supplying drugs to undercover operatives always involves a diminution of culpability. There may be cases assessed within the midrange of objective seriousness despite a guilty plea and supply to undercover police operatives. That is the effect of that decision. Such an offence may still be regarded as one committed without regard for public safety, an aggravating factor pursuant to s 21A(2)(i) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. That was one of the findings in R v Way (2004) 60 NSWLR 168 at [172]. In the current case the supply of all the drugs can be seen as having been committed without regard for the safety of the general public. Although the offender may have thought that he was supplying to the wealthy, generally people that might be thought to be "well-heeled", it is never known exactly who might ingest the drug. The drug could be ingested by somebody other than the person who buys it.
A very important question in respect of both counts 1 and 2, but also counts 3 and 4, is the offender's role in the supply of drugs. Mr Brady SC who appeared for the offender referred me to the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Mirza v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 248. The facts are set out in para [4] and [5] of that judgment:
"4…The applicant was subject to a police undercover operation whereby he supplied cocaine on three occasions between 27 July and 12 August 2005. The supplies took place in Double Bay on 28 July, 4 August and 11 August. On each occasion the same procedure was adopted. The undercover officer contacted the applicant and arranged to purchase an ounce of cocaine at a price of $7,500. The officer attended a coffee shop in a hotel and spoke to the applicant. He left and returned a short time later. He then placed a package in the officer's handbag and removed an envelope containing the money. The first supply involved 29.8 grams of cocaine with a purity of 49%, the second involved 28.7 grams with a purity of 47% and the third 28.4 grams with a purity of 27%.
5. The applicant had told a psychiatrist who prepared a report for the sentencing proceedings that he had agreed to place a person who wanted to purchase cocaine in contact with a supplier he knew. He was willing to assist in the supply of the drug for a reward of $250 on each occasion."
That paragraph of the judgment goes on to record that similar histories were given by that offender to both police and corrective services officers who prepared a presentence report.
At [13] Howie J said this,
"It was well open to the Judge [Marien DCJ] to find that the applicant was "highly instrumental in setting up the various meetings where the drug supplies occurred". He arranged the meetings with the officer on his mobile telephone. The act may not have been at the top of the organisational tree in this business of supplying drugs but he was not in the position of a mere courier of the drug or a runner. Nor was he a street dealer. There may have been no person under him in the organisation in which he was involved, but that is because he was supplying on behalf of a wholesaler of the drug. it would have been obvious to the applicant by the amount sold and the frequency of the sales that the officer was purporting to be a trafficker who would on-supply the drug received."
The amounts supplied by the present offender were nowhere near the quantity involved in Mirza v R. In the current case it cannot be said that it ought to have been obvious to this offender that he was selling to persons who would then supply drugs to others on a commercial basis. There is evidence to suggest that he did supply a quantity of drugs to one person who was to disseminate them to his "friends" at a 40th birthday party. The criminality of the current offender is, in my assessment less than that of Mirza.
On the evidence before me I am not persuaded beyond reasonable doubt that the present offender should be seen as a principal but neither could I describe him as a mere "runner" or "courier". I shall discuss these legal principles further when I discuss count 3. However it is convenient this time to point out the fact basis underlying my assessment. There was a supply on 16 March 2015. The agreed facts concerning that are these:
"14. At 8.59pm on 16 March 2015 the offender exchanged a number of text messages with a customer, the exchange went as follows:
Customer: 'Hi mate. Can I see you one night this week? Got my own 40th coming up this weekend, with about 12 mates, possibly a few more. Cheers.'
Offender: 'Of course mate, just let me know where/when the day before woo hoo big 40th, look out!'
Offender: 'Relax mate, it's only a number. Try N back to me before fri. Cheers bud.'
Customer: 'Thanks. Could I see you We'd night at Curl Curl?'
Offender: 'Yeah. I suppose. Can't do it in the city."
Customer: 'Can I give you a buzz?'
15. The offender and the customer then had a conversation where they discussed what day would suit the customer and offender for the cocaine to be supplied. The offender also advised the customer that:
Offender: 'I will check with the boss and see if I can throw you a freebie'.
Customer: 'You fucking legend.'
Offender: 'I'll just check with the boss. Alright we will leave it for Wednesday then.'
16. On 18 March 2015 the offender and the same customer exchanged a number of text messages in relation to the address and the time that the cocaine would be supplied.
17. Later that evening a further conversation took place between the offender and the customer on their phones where the offender advised the customer that he is 'just out front'.
18. At 9.25pm police observed the offender arrive at the agreed address and meet with a customer outside his address. The offender supplied the male customer with 15 "bags" of cocaine weighing an estimated total of 10.05 grams for $3,750.'
The thing there to note is that the offender referred to having to check out the proposed transaction with his "boss" and also asking the "boss" whether he could sweeten the deal by including a free bag of cocaine by which I infer was meant a free supply of 0.65 grams.
On 18 March 2015 there was another supply. The details of that are set out in an intercepted telephone call recorded on page 8 of the agreed facts. After an exchange of greetings the call was this:
Customer: … mate just wondering you around Randwick … I bumped into you last night and last week …
Offender: Yeah I know who you are.
Customer: All I wanted to say mate was top top. Last night mate was not that good. I was just wondering if tonight is the same as last night?
Offender: It will be the same … it will be the same. I'm not going to lie to ya.
Customer: Really.
Customer: I value your honesty mate. Thank you very much… it just weren't as good as … like last week was bangin, it was the first time I used ya.
Offender: Yeah, nah, nah … fair enough but yeah if you want to see me I'm pretty sure it's the same [,] man.
Customer: Mate, no worries … I appreciate your honesty. I will probably give it a miss tonight and maybe I will catch you later in the week or something…"
The important thing to note about that conversation is that the customer first used the offender to supply cocaine in the week preceding 18 March 2015 indicating that he may have been new on the job. It also indicates that he offender was aware that the quality of the cocaine being supplied could vary from time to time.
The next relevant supply occurred on 21 March 2015. There is, commencing at the foot of page 8 of the agreed facts, a lengthy telephone conversation in which a customer complained that he had been supplied less than the agreed or usual amount. He complained that the amount was supposed to be "point 8" but the bag supplied only had point 7. The offender pointed out that: "I don't bag them up, man, sorry bro." That indicates that the offender was not responsible for the packaging of the drug. A little later after making his complaint, the customer said this:
"Customer: Well, who, where's Mikey? I know you're not Mikey. I've met Mikey before.
Offender: That's who I work for. That's where I get him from so I gotta go talk to him.
Customer: Well you talk to him and ask him to call me back.
Offender: All right man.
Customer: Will you see him tonight?
Offender: No I won't be seeing him tonight and I won't be seeing him until tomorrow.
Customer: All right, well …
Offender: I mean I can come back and give you your money back if you give it back.
Customer: Well, no, I'm going out. It's the whole reason I rang him. I thought this was his number.
Offender: Hey, no, yeah it's his number, I'm working for him if that makes sense. I can come and refund it. That's about all I can do until tomorrow when I call him.
Customer: No. I'm not going to get you to come back but just if you can text him, you have got my number. You've obviously got a number for him at this moment. Text him and get him to ring me back or get him to call me tomorrow. Coz I've been, I've come to him heaps of times.
Offender: It'll will have to be tomorrow mate because he's not going to call you from his personal mobile.
Customer: That's fine.
Offender: Sorry mate. Sorry."
Not only does this indicate that the offender was not responsible for packing the cocaine, it clearly indicates firstly that his "boss" was "Mikey" and that Mikey had given to the offender a phone that Mikey previously used when Mikey was doing what the offender was now doing.
It is clear from agreed facts concerning count 3 in the indictment that the offender had 935 contacts, presumably all the mobile phone used in this drug distribution business. The Crown submitted that the offender must have been dealing in drugs for a long time prior to March 2015 to obtain so many contacts. However, it would appear that the phone that had previously been used by "Mikey" had been given to the offender by Mikey and hence some customers who were speaking with this offender who used the name "Sam" were calling him "Mikey" not realising that the identity of the supplier changed. Again it points to this offender not being a principal.
There are two relevant supplies on 26 March 2015. The agreed facts tell me this:
"23. At 5.52pm on 26 March 2015, the offender supplied a UCO with five bags of cocaine weighing 3.29 grams for $1,250. The transaction took place in Pyrmont Street, Pyrmont inside the offender's vehicle.
24. During the transaction the offender stated that he was only able to supply five bags of cocaine but was about to "reload" and could return within the hour supply a further quantity of cocaine."
At 9.14 that evening there was a telephone call between a person who whom the offender had made a supply of two bags. Although the customer mistakenly thought the price for each bag was $250 as opposed to the actual price of $300. In the recorded conversation which is set out on page 10 of the agreed facts the offender agreed to waive the underpayment, but informed the customer that in future each bag for sale for $300 and not $250. That is the only occasion in which the offender on the evidence before me exercised any discretion on his own part to waive an underpayment. The other evidence concerning payment indicates that payment was always to be made in cash and that no credit would be allowed. Indeed in a telephone conversation on 4 April 2015 set out at page 14 of the agreed facts there was a refusal to allow credit. The relevant part of the agreed facts is this:
"At 7.12pm on 4 April 2015 the offender had a conversation with a customer via text message on his mobile phone. The customer said 'bro, I've exceeded my limit with bank. Could only get $1000 out. Will u still come. I will still get 5 [bags] but have to give you $250 on Monday.' The offender responded "no, but you can take four [bags].'
Again no credit was allowed. In a conversation recorded on 6 April 2015 the offender clearly made the point to a customer that the business was 'strictly COD', strictly cash on delivery.
A further fact relevant to the offender's role in the supply of cocaine is the fact that, on the day before his arrest by the police, the police executed a search warrant at 8.15pm on 16 April 2015 at his then address in Waterloo. The police found anabolic steroids but no indicium at all of the supply of cocaine, let alone any cocaine. Indicia of supply include things such as bags or other means of packaging drugs, scales for weighing the quantity of drugs to be supplied, lists of the customers or sums of money or the like which indicate money that was being received and/or given on to somebody higher up the distribution chain, and cash in large quantities, the proceeds of supply. Nothing of the sort was found at the execution of the search warrant, meaning that the offender's residence was not a base for the distribution of drugs. The only bases used for the distribution of drugs were the offender's own motor vehicles.
I should indicate that the offender himself did not give evidence. That is unfortunate but offenders in the present offender's position often avoid doing so for fear of being cross-examined about others with whom the offender was involved in a distribution of drugs which could endanger themselves and/or members of their family, not, I must say, from the law's point of view. I would describe the offender as a retailer as distinct from a wholesaler. Whether he was paid wages or commission or part of the profit which was probably another way of expressing commission I do not know. However I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the offender was not a principal. The principal appears to have been Mikey. It was Mikey who gave him the mobile telephone with the contacts recorded on it and the offender exercised little discretion of his own. He did waive an underpayment once but, clearly on the evidence before me, was not responsible for packaging, was not responsible for the quality of the drug and needed to "reload", meaning to get more drugs from some other source while he was supplying to customers.
On the Crown's estimates the total amount of money that passed through the offender's hands was between $33,000 and $35,600 adding together the amounts thought to have been derived in the offences covered by both counts 1 and 2. However that was not "profit". That was the price of the drugs paid by the ultimate user, the customers/drug consumers and it does not take into account the cost of the drugs which is unknown to me but one might think the offender probably took commission if not wages for what he was doing . As can be seen from the facts in Mirza v R, the payment of cash for a transaction appears to have been a method used in eastern suburbs drug supply 10 years before the events now in question. Again the inferences I draw from the facts that I have described is that Mikey was the offender's boss, that the offender was given his telephone with contact numbers on it and then the offender disseminated the cocaine in the fashion that I have set out above of obtaining the drugs from the boss "Mikey".
As in every criminal case it is necessary to assess the seriousness of the crime. The quantity of drugs is an ingredient of a charge under s 25A. The section is directed to repetition, system and organisation. That is the business operation of supplying prohibited drugs. That is what is stated in Regina v Giang [2005] NSWCCA 387 commencing at [18]. The objective criminality of any offence under s 25A is determined by reference to those features, not merely the number of instances of supply nor the individual quantities supplied. The authority for that proposition is Regina v Hoon [2000] NSWCCA 137 at [16]. The quantity of the drug is not irrelevant, nor are repetition, system and organisation of greater importance. They take their place beside the number and quantities of the individual incidences of supply. The authority to that proposition is Regina v MRN [2006] NSWCCA 155 commencing at [142].
In the present case there clearly was repetition, system and organisation. It is undoubted. However, it appears to be likely to me that this system had been established by "Mikey" who gave it on to the current offender. I have discussed the quantity of drugs and the number of individual supplies as well. In my view, the offences contrary to s 25A of the Drug Act are toward the mid-range of seriousness for an offence of this nature. The saving feature for the present offender is that he was not the principal or the organiser but took an active part as a retailer.
I have considered statistics made available by the Judicial Commission for offences contrary to s 25A(1) of the Drug Act. There are 58 cases on the database. Only 64% of offenders have been sentenced to full time imprisonment. Three per cent of cases have ended up with a s 9 bond. Sixteen per cent of cases involved a suspended sentence. Sixteen per cent of cases have received intensive corrections order. One case gained a sentence of home detention. Those sentenced to prison were, as I said only 64% of all those who were found guilty of the offence. However, perhaps I should say those that pleaded guilty to the offence because all of these 58 cases involved pleas of guilty. The median head sentence after the plea of guilty was three years imprisonment and the median non-parole period was 18 months.
I turn now to discuss count 3 in the indictment. The count is this:
"On 30 March 2015, at Sydney … did supply an amount of prohibited drug, namely cocaine, being an amount which was not or less than the commercial quantity of cocaine."
The commercial quantity of cocaine is 250 grams. The large commercial quantity of cocaine is 1 kilogram. The offence is one contrary to s 25(2) of the Drug Act. The maximum penalty is imprisonment for 20 years and/or a fine of $385,000. Parliament has prescribed a standard non-parole period of 10 years imprisonment. The agreed facts are these:
"46. Between 11.10am and 4.59pm on 30 March 2015, the offender sent a text message to a database of 935 contacts. The offender offered a 'special deal' of two bags of cocaine for $500 (usually $600). The text message stated:
'Hey guys long weekend special. Two for 500. Have a safe weekend and enjoy you time off. sam and Mikey and the guys'
[followed by now what I understand to be called an emoji.]
47. The offender also offered an additional 18 customers a "special" of two bags of cocaine for $450 (usually $600).
48. This offer to supply customers was a genuine offer with intention that it was to be regarded as genuine by the customer.
49. The following are text messages that were received by the offender from a number of customers in response to the offer: …
50. The offender intended to supply or offer to supply just under 1 kilogram of cocaine in the above text messages. The Crown is unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the offender intended to supply or offered to supply a large commercial quantity of cocaine."
In making that quotation I have omitted the thirteen text messages under paragraph 49. I do so to save some time. However of those thirteen messages two in fact declined the offer. The other eleven clearly were very interested in the offer. The third text message, declining of the offer, was:
"Thanks buddy. I'm having a quiet few months at the moment."
The seventh, also declining the offer, was interesting. The seventh text message was this:
"Hey mike hope you're good, I'm a new path so happy for you to take me off the mailing list. All the best."
This may represent a former customer who no longer wishes to consume cocaine. Interestingly enough, he believed the text message sent by the offender on the mobile phone service he was using, was sent by Mike, the person I had previously found on the balance of probabilities the person who engaged the present offender to retail drugs to customers. Indeed the offer contained in paragraph 46 of the agreed facts clearly indicates that the offender "Sam" was part of a syndicate that included Mikey as well as others.
The Crown concentrated on the proposition that this was an offer made to 935 people and it was envisaged that up to 1 kilogram of cocaine might be supplied. Any actual supply following upon this Easter special advertisement occurred during the period covered by count 1. Itemised supply in the agreed facts concerning count 1 specify the eight largest transactions and none of them occurred after 30 March until 9 April, long after any long weekend and this was probably an Easter special, long after the four days of the Easter Public Holidays. The inference I draw is that any drug supplied pursuant to the offer would have been small, under 2.6 grams which represents four bags. Furthermore, the positive text messages received indicate only eleven persons responded positively to the offer of discounted cocaine for Easter.
I accept the submission put to me by Mr Brady SC on behalf of the offender that this crime was towards the bottom of the range of seriousness for offences contrary to s 25(2) of the Drug Act which offences of course would include actually supplying slightly less than 1 kilogram of cocaine. Furthermore, the offender's role in this offence appears to have been the same as it was as for counts 1 and 2, that is that he was not likely to have been the principal. It appears to me highly unlikely that the current offender could offer to discount the price of the drugs without consent of the supplier of the drugs, Mikey.
Again one must consider a number of legal propositions. Firstly, there was no, what the Crown relies upon is not supplying drugs but offering to supply drugs. The definition of "supply" of the Drug Act includes offering or agreeing to supply drugs. Therefore an offer to supply drugs amounts to a supply. The objective seriousness of any activity falling within "supply" must depend on the particular evidence in the case in the absence of any general "hierarchy of seriousness attaching to one or other of the activities that may constitute a supply." Those are words used in Vu v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 188. Concluding at [87] in Vu v R, Hall J said this:
… agreements to supply or offers to supply prohibited drugs each constitute transactional activities that play an important and essential role in the chain of drug trafficking."
No generalised statement can be made about the relative seriousness of the differing forms of supply: McKibben v R [2007] NSWCCA 89 at [16]. In Vu v R, Hall J at [89] set out the following factors relevant to determining the objective seriousness of an offence under s 25(2) involving an offer to supply:
"The terms of the offer, in particular, as to the quantity of a drug, its price, etc.
Whether a particular offer is an isolated one or whether it occurs in the context of an ongoing supply of prohibited drugs.
Whether, and if so, the extent to which the offer is motivated by reasons of commercial gain or greed.
Whether the offeror at all material times had the intention to fulfil the offer.
Whether the offeror had the capacity to fulfil the offer to supply.
Whether the offeror attempts to fulfil the offer. If not, whether any failure to perform was a result of a decision by the person concerned not to supply or whether it was due to some intervening or extraneous circumstances."
Here the offer was made in the course of a continuing ongoing supply of drugs. It was a seasonal special. It was clearly motivated by reason of commercial gain and, therefore, greed. There was no suggestion that those who took up the offer, who appear to be eleven, did not have their order fulfilled. However the quantity of drugs offered was not particularly large and the discount was not particularly great.
I return to the role of the offender and his level of participation in this crime, that is, count 3. What I now say is also relevant to counts 1 and 2. The offender's role and the offender's level of criminality are more important in determining sentence than the quantity of the drugs involved which is not the sole or even a principal determinant. For supply offences, an offenders role is not to be determined by the use of shorthand labels but rather by assessing what his or her involvement was in the steps taken to supply the drugs. As a general proposition one should refer to what fell from the High Court of Australia in The Queen v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270 at [14]. General descriptions of the types of participation must not obscure the assessment of what they did. In some cases it will be difficult for a court to determine the offender's role for lack of evidence. That was pointed out in Paxton v Regina (2011) 219 A Crim R 104 at [35]. The term "principal" is often used to describe an offender's role. Simpson J in Nguyen v Regina (2011) 208 A Crim R 432 in the context of an offence of cultivating a large commercial quantity of cannabis said this about who might be a principal:
"… the indicator of the role of an offender as 'principal' involves at least some of the following characteristics:
• contributing financially to the cost of setting up the operation;
• standing to share in the profit (as distinct from receiving payment);
• having some hand in the management of the operation (although it is well recognised that principals will, so far as possible, distance themselves from the day to day operation, they nevertheless maintain considerable control over the enterprise);
• having some decision-making role (which may not be different from the item above).
This does not purport to be anything like an exhaustive list. There may well be other features that indicate that an offender ought to be characterised as a principal."
There is no evidence in the current case that the offender contributed anything to setting up the distribution of the business. The only thing that he contributed was his car. I do not know whether he shared the profit as distinct from being paid wages but it seems likely that if he wasn't paid wages, he was paid commission which could be a part of the profit. I pointed out that the only evidence about any control or management that the offender exercised was in waiving an underpayment on one occasion but everything that I have read and everything that I have thus far cited indicates that the offender had to answer to Mikey or others for things such as the packaging, the quality of drugs, special deals and obtaining drugs for further supply. Any decision-making which this offender did appears on what is before appear to have been minor.
However there are some countervailing considerations. In Regina v Shi [2004] NSWCCA 135 the then Chief Judge at Common Law, Wood J, with whom the then Chief Justice, Spigelman CJ agreed, as did Simpson J, one must give consideration to:
"… the well-recognised principle that the culpability of those who engage, at any level, in drug supply networks is significant, and the deterrent sentences are necessary, since absent involvement of couriers, warehouse men and so on, these networks, whether established for the purposes of importation or subsequent distribution would simply collapse: R v Le Cerf (1975) 13 SASR 237 and R v Larentiu & Becheru (1992) 63 A Crim R 402."
The Court in Regina v Shi concluded that the role of the offender is germane to the assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence. Here there was an offer to supply. The supply appears to have been taken up by eleven customers. The amount supplied would not have been very great and clearly Mikey had a substantive role to play in this offer. The phone used by the offender was clearly a means of making the offer and probably the offender also made deliveries to the 11 customers who responded positively. However, in the grand scheme of offences contrary to s 25(2), this as I have previously said was towards the bottom of the range.
The fourth count in the indictment is that on 17 April 2015 at Pyrmont the offender supplied a prohibited drug namely 9.7 grams of cocaine. That is an offence contrary to s 25(1) of the Drug Act and carries a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment and/or a fine of $220,000. There is no standard non parole period for that offence. This offence could have been included in the offences covered by count 2 in the indictment. The facts are these:
"51. On 17 April 2005, the offender engaged in a number of text messages and telephone conversations with a UCO in relation to the supplying of cocaine. The intended supply location was behind the Star Casino in Pyrmont Street, Pyrmont.
52. At approximately 7.25pm, the offender drove his vehicle to the agreed location where he was arrested by police.
53. At the time of arrest police located a small freezer bag containing 15 small bags of cocaine weighing 9.75 grams. This bag was located on the driver's seat where the offender was seated prior to arrest.
54. Police also located the mobile phone the offender used during the supplies. Also the offender was found in possession of $440 that is believed to be the proceeds of drug supply."
Again the 9.75 grams of cocaine did not find their way into the community. It is to be borne in mind that the trafficable quantity of cocaine is 3 grams, the indictable quantity of cocaine is 5 grams but as I have mentioned earlier the commercial quantity is 250 grams. The amount of the drug found in the offender's possession at the time of his arrest was less than twice the indictable amount. Statistics available from the Judicial Commission for this offence indicate that of 147 cases only 32 per cent received a fulltime custodial sentence. Of those sentenced to imprisonment the median head sentence was 30 months imprisonment and the median non parole period was 18 months imprisonment. Some of these offences, of course, could be dealt with not by the District Court, (the statistics I have quoted are those from this Court) but rather they could be dealt with in the Local Court. If this were a stand alone crime then this offence may not have attracted a fulltime custodial sentence, because that amount of drug was deemed to be trafficable but might be an amount that a user of the drug could have in his or her possession. However the fact remains that if the drug was actually for supply a fulltime custodial sentence ought be imposed.
The general proposition is that a person who supplies drugs on more than one occasion, where his or her activities can be described as trafficking, or who is substantially involved in supply must receive a fulltime custodial sentence unless there are exceptional circumstances. What constitutes substantial involvement in the supply of drugs and whether such activities may be described as trafficking are matters for evaluation in each separate case. However, recently, in EF v Regina [2015] NSWCCA 36 it was pointed that an intensive corrections order could be imposed in a case which otherwise warranted fulltime custody where there had been actual trafficking in drugs. Therefore this offender who did not use drugs, and I will refer to that later, who was found in possession of drugs could only have been doing so for the purpose of supply but if this were a stand alone offence this Court could consider imposing an intensive corrections order. However it is common ground that because of the other offences to which the offender pleaded guilty a fulltime custodial sentence is inevitable.
The real question is for how long must the offender go to gaol. I am asked to take into account on a Form 1 four offences. The four offences are the possession of the $440 found on the offender at the time of his arrest which was property suspected to be the proceeds of crime. The other three offences relate to the possession of the anabolic steroids found in his home at the time the police executed the search warrant. It would appear that the offender is a "body builder" and those anabolic steroids were for his own use. The Form 1 itself does not make it clear in respect of which offence I should deal with them with the Form 1 matters but it is headed thus:
"To Robert Aldo Mella, charged with the offence of supply prohibited drugs on an ongoing basis, before District Court at Sydney."
I take it, therefore, that the Form 1 matters are to be taken into account in respect of count 1 in the indictment. As I said at the beginning of these reasons the offender pleaded guilty to the offences at different times.
It is agreed between the Crown and the offender that in respect of counts 1 and 2 the offender is entitled to a discount of 25 per cent and it is also common ground between the parties that in respect of counts 3 and 4 the offender is entitled to a discount of 10 per cent.
I turn now to the subjective features. The offender was born on 2 March 1986. As I stated at the commencement of these reasons he was 29 years old at the time of the offences. He is now 31. He is a single man and has no dependents. His background is to be gleaned from an affidavit sworn by one of his sisters, Ms Michelle Mella, on 14 June 2017 which became exhibit 9 in these proceedings. The following other relevant paragraphs:
"4. In 1988, my siblings [her sister Nicky and the offender] and I were estranged from our paternal family in accordance with a Family Court judgment. We left our father who ran a successful painting business and our large comfortable family home. We were then forced to live with our mother in a small, dilapidated caravan. We remained in this situation for six years.
5. During this time we experienced a high level of neglect, mostly benign but occasionally malicious. My sister and I assumed significant responsibilities in relation to looking after our younger sibling who was not yet in school. We continued to fulfil these duties until we were liberated in 1994. At this time we moved in with our grandmother, a post-war Italian migrant, in her hometown of Lismore. We also spent considerable time with our father from this point on. Our quality of life improved dramatically, however, the inviolable bond between my siblings and I remains to this day.
6. In 2009, our father died from a sudden accident at the age of 51. We have also been estranged from our mother since the early 1990s. For all intents and purposes, Robert was an orphan from the age of 23. My sister and I have consequently assisted Robert with learning to drive, buying a car, starting an apprenticeship and relocating to Sydney after high school. Robert has been demonstrably grateful for this support. At all times he has been a loyal, gentle and generous brother. Life continued with all siblings working hard to forge a bright future in a big city. My sister worked in banking and finance and I pursued a career in education.
...
11. Robert has always tried to be a self-sufficient and hard-working individual. He is also known to throw himself into projects and hobbies with enthusiasm and gusto. After coming to Sydney he gravitated towards security work and quickly climbed the ranks in that field. He was earning enough money to pay his own way in an expensive city. This situation continued for a number of years until circumstances meant he had to discontinue this career path.
12. ... he had been involved in a minor fight on the footpath in Newtown [on 11 November 2010]. Nobody was injured but there was CCTV footage of shoving between a number of pub patrons. My brother was recognised by the local police, as he was a well-known security guard in the area. The incident then went before the court. The magistrate took into account my brother's lack of criminal record and that the scuffle happened on the one-year anniversary of our father's death. Notwithstanding this, the relatively minor incident resulted in an affray charge and something called a Section 10. From this point on Robert was unable to earn his living in the security industry. He called upon his contacts to get work as an RSA Marshall or fire warden in bars and clubs but this work was not as constant or well paid.
13. Robert therefore commenced an electrician's apprenticeship as a mature age student in [2011]. He supplemented his meagre apprentice wages ($8 per hour) with weekend work - namely RSA and fire warden shifts. By the start of 2015, this work was becoming scarce as a consequence of bad publicity and lockout laws in the Kings Cross area. Robert explained that he made a number of calls seeking more work. He was becoming desperate, paying for tools and trade equipment and maintaining his car repayments and petrol costs.
14. Eventually one of his contacts offered him work selling cocaine to make some fast money. Robert refused this offer twice. He reluctantly agreed later when he believed that his apprenticeship would soon be in jeopardy."
Clearly much of what the offender told his sister is hearsay but the hearsay was not objected to as such. However, I was asked to give it less weight than I would do if the evidence had been given by the offender himself. I should point out that Ms Michelle Mella was not required for cross examination on her affidavit. In quoting from Ms Mella's affidavit I have corrected some incorrect dates that she gave. However I should point out that what she says about the affray charge is consistent with the offender's criminal history. That records that the offence of affray occurred on 11 November 2010, that the offender was charged at the Newtown Police Station on 15 January 2011 and went before the Local Court at Newtown on 16 June 2011 when he obtained a bond under s 10 to be of good behaviour for a period of eight months, the charge being dismissed. It is consistent that a minor scuffle outside a hotel was the subject of CCTV footage which was later viewed by the police who on identifying the offender because he was known to them as a local security guard that the charge was made by the police some two months after the event leading to the s 10 bond being imposed on 16 June 2011. The bond was for a period of eight months. There is no suggestion that it was ever breached. I can however give no weight to the second and third sentences in that part of par 14 which I have just quoted. Clearly it would be in the offender's self-interest to describe his reluctance to accept the proposal that he take up selling cocaine and furthermore there is no evidence that his apprenticeship was ever in jeopardy.
However, it is quite possible that the offender being unable to obtain work serving alcohol or being a fire warden on weekends was finding it very difficult to live in Sydney on an apprentice's wages and he found himself in financial difficulties. However, in Botero (unreported, NSWCCA, 24 June 1998), Barr J pointed out that to make substantial amounts of money from trading in drugs for the purpose of the payment of personal or family debts is no less criminal than to make the same amounts for pure profit. In other words, although the offender may have been driven by economic considerations into taking up drug trafficking it is no less criminal than merely taking it up for the purpose of pure greed.
That which Ms Michelle Mella said about her brother's character is largely corroborated by evidence adduced from the offender's former employer and a work colleague who was superior in the work hierarchy to the offender. The offender's employer Mr Demetri Harpas gave sworn evidence. He is an electrician by trade. He is the owner of Utech Pty Limited, a company which he established in March 2004. At the time he gave evidence on 31 March he employed seven electricians directly and was the offender's employer. He had given the mature age apprenticeship to the offender. He described the offender as a person with whom it was a pleasure to work. He described the offender as punctual, well-mannered and respected by all other employees in his company and other people on building sites. He described the offender as one of his better apprentices and one of his better tradesmen. Despite the fact that he knew about the offender's offences and knew that he would be sentenced to imprisonment, he offered to re-employ the offender and pointed out that he has a number of changes in personnel each year and said there were 10 to 15 changes in any one year in his workforce. The offender had started his apprenticeship with him in mid-2011. When the offender first started working for him he would see him two or three times per week and over the last two years he ran into him weekly on building sites. He clearly had regular contact with him to assess both his character and his work and he told me that on no occasion had any suspicion that the offender was a drug user. Suffice it to say that there is no evidence that the offender himself has ever used drugs.
The work colleague who provided a reference is Mr Maqsood Nile. He, in his letter of 27 March 2017, described himself as a licensed electrician who has been working as a construction site electrical supervisor for nine years and at the time of writing his reference was employed by Mr Harpas' company, Utech Pty Limited. He had known Mr Mella since the commencement of his apprenticeship. He was the offender's direct supervisor commencing in the first year of his apprenticeship. He thought that the charges against the offender were completely out of character. He went on to say this:
"He has been one of my best apprentices [;] he is exceptionally quick learner and hard worker [;] he has been doing very well in his TAFE studies and I'm sure you're aware that he just finished his final exam for TAFE after which he is eligible to apply for his electrician's licence. I describe Robert Mella as a gentle giant, the kindest person I've ever seen [;] he will go out of his way to help others, he hardly takes sick leave even when he needs it, end of February this year he sprained his ankle; he was back at work the next day. In the construction site of more than 180 people of different trades almost everyone knows him."
He went on to point out that he believed the offender committed these crimes because of financial problems and he believed that the offender sincerely regretted what he had done and was embarrassed by what he had done. From documentary evidence before me the apprenticeship was completed after the offender's arrest on 17 April 2015 and after his release on bail on 30 April 2015. The sentencing proceedings were adjourned so that the offender could apply for his electrician's licence from the Department of Fair Trading but that body made the decision to defer any decision until after the Court had imposed the necessary sentence upon the offender for the crimes he has committed.
Again the evidence from the offender's employer and co-worker indicate a hard-working man who was motivated to complete his apprenticeship and of course the apprenticeship being completed, one would expect his wages to have increased substantially. There is only one relevant prior conviction, that for the affray, to which I have referred and the offence appears to have been a minor one with the unhappy result, however, that the offender lost his employment in the security industry. Otherwise the offender should be seen as a man of good character as the evidence of both Mr Harpas, Mr Nile and his sister confirmed.
The prospects of rehabilitation were described by Mr Brady SC as very good. Perhaps he does not like to be thought to engage in hyperbole, I would have thought the prospects of rehabilitation are excellent. If the assessment I have made of Mr Mella be correct, he needs no prison sentence to deter him from ever committing this crime again. However, specific deterrence is of minor consideration. In cases of this nature it is general deterrence that is all important, stopping other people from even considering taking up a job in drug supply or involving themselves in the supply of drugs. The prospects of rehabilitation are positively affected by the offender's good character, his demonstrated approach to rehabilitation whilst on bail, he has continued to work since his release on bail on 30 April in his trade and as I pointed out has completed his apprenticeship.
Having completed his apprenticeship he can now look forward to proper wages which may enable him to live comfortably even in an expensive city such as Sydney, albeit not in the inner suburbs. He has something to look forward to when he comes out of gaol, unlike most persons released from custody, he has a job to walk back into with Mr Harpas as an electrician. He has the ongoing support of his sisters and he has demonstrated his positive response to the justice system by strictly observing what could be described as onerous bail conditions. There is evidence before me that the offender is remorseful. I have set out what Mr Nile said in his reference. The offender's sister also referred to his remorse. Her affidavit contains this matter:
"8. By the time we could see our brother at Silverwater Gaol he had been incarcerated for almost three weeks. He seemed very nervous to see us, in his own words the pain of facing our disappointment was far worse than being arrested.
9. Upon being released, Robert came to live with me in my home at Leichhardt. He had to abide by strict bail conditions that meant he could only go to work or the police station each day to report. He was also allowed to leave the house in the company of my sister and I only. During this time he seemed desolate, withdrawn and lost his normal confidence. He did not want to communicate with any of his friends and he worried about what they would think of him. Work took on increased importance in Robert's life. He directed all his energy towards completing his electrician's apprenticeship..."
Those two paragraphs speak perhaps more of metanoia than remorse but they clearly indicate that the offences committed by the offender and his being arrested for them had a significant effect upon him and his life. More particularly on the question of remorse the offender's sister said this in her affidavit:
"Robert continued to express dismay for his poor moral judgment. He said that all his years in nightclubs had exposed him to 'well-heeled socialites' and people with 'good careers and prospects'. These people were known to take cocaine recreationally. He did not regard them as drug addicts or vulnerable members of our community. He said this mistaken belief allowed him to suspend his normal moral/ethical convictions. In his own words he regarded these people as his 'social betters'. He expressed his remorse for his actions on countless occasions, not because of his arrest, but because of his insight to the damage to people and to the wider community through drugs and drug supply."
The Crown has submitted that I should give this little weight because the offender did not give evidence. However, I can give it exactly the same amount of weight that I will give to the same protestations being made by an offender to a professional person such as a psychiatrist or a psychologist. As I said Ms Mella was not cross examined on her affidavit. She is faithfully telling me what her brother has told her and he has repeatedly expressed his remorse and has repeatedly shown insight into the effect that committing these crimes has on members of our community. Some might think that cocaine is merely a party drug used by the wealthy or the well-heeled, but any form of drug can have fatal consequences for many people and often those who consume the drugs are not those who buy them. I accept that the offender is remorseful.
There are in this case special circumstances to warrant the breaking of the statutory nexus between the head sentence and the non-parole period. Firstly this will be Mr Mella's first experience of custody. I trust it will be his last. The fact that this is his first time in custody is in itself insufficient to amount to special circumstances but it does assist. One's first time in custody is a frightening, upsetting and dangerous experience. Special circumstances are intimately tied up with rehabilitation. What will rehabilitate this man is getting back into his trade and earning good wages as an electrical tradesman. To do that he needs to get back into the workforce as quickly as he can. Any lengthy period in gaol will take him out of the workforce, and work systems change, the tools with which one works can change, the materials with which one works can change and a lengthy period out of the workforce will essentially rob the offender of the skills which he has acquired over the last five years or more since he started his apprenticeship. This calls for the breaking of the statutory nexus. Furthermore a lengthy period on parole will enable Corrective Services to ensure that the offender maintains his determination not to commit any further offences.
I have determined that it is appropriate in this case to impose an aggregate sentence. If four separate sentences were to be passed, there would need to be substantial concurrence of the sentences because all these offences overlap, they are all part of a continuing supply of cocaine over a period of some 37 days. I am required by the Sentencing Act to indicate what sentences I would have imposed for each individual offence. The following are my indicative sentences. For count 1, a four year sentence, less a 25 per cent discount, means a three year head sentence. For count 2, a three year sentence, less 25 per cent discount, means a head sentence of two years and three months. For count 3, a five year sentence, less 10 per cent, indicating a head sentence of four years and six months. For count 4, a sentence of two years, less 10 per cent, indicating a head sentence of one year and ten months. As count 3 has a standard non-parole period of ten years I must give reasons for not imposing that non parole period and I must also indicate the non-parole period that I would impose for that offence if I passed a separate sentence in regard to it. Those reasons are these. Firstly, the offence contrary to s 25(2) of the Drug Act is at the bottom of the range of objective seriousness for offences against that provision. Secondly, the offender pleaded guilty, there was no need for a trial on this charge. Thirdly, the indicative head sentence which I have made is well within the range of statistics that are kept by the Judicial Commission. Fourthly, because of special circumstances I believe that the appropriate non parole period is two thirds of the head sentence. Therefore the non-parole period for count 3 would be three years.
I have reached the conclusion that the aggregate head sentence should be six years, and consistently with the finding I have just announced, that the non-parole period should be four years subject to one further consideration.
The affidavit of the offender's sister refers to his bail conditions. A copy of them is exhibit. They imposed a residential requirement that the offender reside with his sister. He has continued to live with one of his sisters since his release on bail on 30 April 2015. There is also a curfew between 8pm and 5am unless the offender is in the company of his sisters Michelle and Nicky. In other words he could not leave home after 8pm without being in the company of both his sisters. He was also not permitted to have more than one mobile phone and details of it had to be supplied within 24 hours of obtaining a mobile phone to the police. The residential requirement and the curfew can be seen as being onerous conditions which have been observed by the offender from 30 April 2015 until today, a period of over two years.
In Regina v Cartwright (1989) 17 NSWLR 243, Hunt and Badgery Parker JJ (as their Honours then were) said this at 258F:
"The basis of the applicant's complaint is that the judge failed to take into account the circumstance that, during the period of eight months when he was on bail before the trial commenced, he was in fact only nominally on bail. What had happened was that the bail was granted on condition to the effect that the applicant resided in Canberra, that he reported daily there to the Australian Federal Police, that he obeyed their reasonable directions and that he accepted their supervision. This arrangement was to enable the applicant to give further assistance to the authorities in their enquiries. He was unable to return to his home in Sydney. The applicant has submitted that, although not in lawful custody, he was effectively in custody and should have been given credit for this period as well.
It is impossible from the records still available to ascertain whether this argument was put to the judge at the time. The absence of any reference to it in his remarks on sentence suggest that it was not, but in the absence of any formal transcript to confirm that suggestion, we believe that the applicant should be given the benefit of the doubt. In our view, this period of quasi custody should have been taken into account in the circumstances by giving credit for a substantial proportion (but not the whole) of that period. We assess that a fair allowance in this case for that additional period of eight months is a reduction of six months in the minimum period."
This issue was revisited in Regina v Khamas [1999] NSWCCA 436; (1999) 108 A Crim R 499. In that case RS Hulme J said at [27]:
"Of course, a lengthy delay awaiting trial coupled with stringent bail conditions may operate in reduction in sentence but there is a vast difference between reporting to a nearby police station, albeit on a daily basis, and the types of "quasi custody" which have been taken into account in favour of a prisoner in cases such as Cartwright ... and Eastway (unreported, CCA, NSW, 19 March 1992)."
In the current case the offender was required to report daily to police which was the factual situation in Khamas but here not only was he required to report to police daily but also there was the residential requirement and the curfew.
The matter was again discussed by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Regina v Jajou [2009] NSWCCA 167; (2009) 196 A Crim R 370 between [46] and [48] but I shall not lengthen these reasons any further by setting that out at length. However it was there accepted that the continuance of onerous bail conditions was a ground for ameliorating an otherwise appropriate penalty and in my view both the length of the period on bail and the conditions indicate to me that this is an appropriate case to warrant a further reduction in the non-parole period.
I have therefore concluded that the non-parole period should be not four years but three years and nine months. It is agreed that the sentence should commence on 2 June 2017 to account for the time spent by the offender in custody prior to his release to bail.
Robert Aldo Mella, on the four counts contained in the indictment presented on 13 September 2016 you are convicted. I sentence you to imprisonment. I set a non-parole period of three years and nine months commencing on 2 June 2017 and expiring on 1 March 2021. I impose a further period of imprisonment of two years and three months to commence upon the expiration of the non-parole period and expiring on 1 June 2023. The total sentence is, therefore, six years, comprising the non-parole period and the balance of the sentence. I have found special circumstances. You are eligible to be considered for release to parole at the expiration of the non-parole period. In passing that sentence I have taken into account the matters on the Form 1, in particular with regard to the first count in the indictment. The indicative sentences are in respect of count 1 three years, in respect of count 2 two years and three months, in respect of count 3 four years and six months with a non-parole period of three years and in respect of count 4 one year and ten months.
HIS HONOUR: You now want me to do what, Ms Stuart?
STUART: The Crown now withdraws all of the back-up offences on the 166 certificate.
HIS HONOUR: The charges contained on the certificate under s 166 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 are withdrawn and dismissed.
STUART: Not all of them. So all of the back-ups and the four drug supply offences that are listed as related offences but there's four other offences that are listed as related which are on the Form 1.
HIS HONOUR: I will just revoke that order. The "back-up offences" listed in the certificate under s 166 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 are withdrawn and dismissed.
HIS HONOUR: Now what do you want me to do with the related offences.
STUART: Some of them were on the Form 1s your Honour has already taken them into account, that's sequences 9
HIS HONOUR: That's H\91.
STUART: Yes so sequences 9, 11, 12 and 13 were all taken into account on the Form 1.
HIS HONOUR: All right well they've been taken into account so I should dismiss - I should otherwise - I don't need to deal with them in other words.
STUART: Exactly then there's
HIS HONOUR: Now what about the remaining four.
STUART: The remaining four those are the four supply charges listed under the heading "Related Offences" on the 166 certificate, those
HIS HONOUR: Yes that's sequence 34, 37, 39 and 41.
STUART: That's correct, those are withdrawn.
HIS HONOUR: I note the Crown withdraws the related offences bearing sequence numbers 34, 37, 39 and 41.
[2]
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Decision last updated: 01 August 2017