17 Section 25A(1) of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act came into operation on 7 August 1998. It provides that a person who, on 3 or more separate occasions during any period of 30 consecutive days, supplies a prohibited drug (other than cannabis) for financial or material reward is guilty of an offence. Because the offence is so new, no helpful Judicial Commission sentencing statistics are, as yet, available.
18 In Ms Hoon's ERISP she was cooperative with the police and named the middle level manager who supplied her with the drugs. She said that she had been working on and off for him since March 1999. She was charged with supplying heroin on three separate occasions between 1 June 1999 and 28 June 1999. Apart from the one supply to the undercover officer on 21 June, some of the answers in the ERISP were equivocal and ambiguous leading his Honour to observe that she would not have been charged with this offence had she not been totally frank with the police. It was on the basis of her admissions that she was charged with a breach of s 25A(1). While there was no direct evidence of three separate supplies during the period charged, she pleaded guilty and her plea admitted the supply alleged in the charge.
19 Turning to the objective seriousness of the offence in respect of Ms Hoon, the Crown relies on the ongoing nature and commercialism of the operations, rather than the amounts involved. However, the amount of drugs supplied is still relevant, as is the number of times the drug was supplied during the relevant period. Here, the amount of heroin supplied on any one occasion was 0.25g. Three occasions are specified in the charge within the period mentioned. It is to this offence that she pleaded guilty, even though her ERISP may have admitted to other earlier acts of supply.
20 As to the commercialisation of the operation, it is plain that Ms Hoon was not in any way involved in the administration of the organisation. She did not receive any real profit from the commercialisation. The seriousness of being involved in an organisation concerned with the distribution of drugs must be acknowledged, as his Honour did. Nonetheless, both Ms Hoon and Ms Pouoa were 'runners' on the lowest rung of culpability.
21 Turning to the subjective circumstances of Ms Hoon, there is an obvious and direct link between her addiction and the offence. The offence was not committed purely for monetary gain. She was 19 years old and her age and addiction placed her in a vulnerable situation. His Honour observed that these factors appeared to have led her (and also Pouoa) into being recruited into a sophisticated distribution operation.
22 Ms Hoon gave evidence about her background which his Honour found to be frank. Her difficult background was outlined. Her parents separated when she was three. She was assaulted by her step-father and went to live with her father when she was 13 years. She started using drugs when very young and has a record for a number of drug-related matters. This was, however, her first time in prison. She was frank with his Honour about her difficulty in dealing with her drug problem and, perhaps with refreshing honesty, could not promise to overcome her addiction. His Honour was entitled to find that there was some 'possible chances of rehabilitation' and to find 'special circumstances', as he did.
23 A pre-sentence report was also before his Honour. It was not in our appeal papers but has been handed to the Court. The report corroborates a deal of Ms Hoon's evidence to his Honour and does not assist in her opportunity for rehabilitation.
24 Bearing in mind the facts upon which Ms Hoon was sentenced, her cooperation with police, her subjective circumstances and her plea of guilty, I do not see that the sentence has been shown to be manifestly inadequate. It is necessary for the Crown to demonstrate an error in sentencing principle. See Griffiths v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 293, Malvaso v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 227 and Everett v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 295.
25 I can see no error in principle. His Honour gave appropriate weight to general deterrence. Recently in R v Baker [2000] NSWCCA 85, Spigelman CJ noted the difficulties of Crown appeals succeeding where no particular error can be identified in the sentencing process and the Crown relies on an assertion of manifest inadequacy as the basis for the conclusion of some error in principle.
26 Another factor which I take into account in relation to both respondents, is a justifiable sense of grievance that they may have on being re-committed to prison. This arises from circumstances relating to two other 'runners' whom I have already mentioned. The defendant Rojanavong was sentenced to an 8 months fixed term by his Honour at the same time that the sentences on these respondents were imposed. It seems that his Honour did this because Mr Rojanavong was a Thai national and was to be deported, which has in fact occurred. However, he was also 19 years of age, around about the same age as these two respondents, and he was a 'runner' in the same organisation in similar circumstances to these respondents. He was not given any additional term of imprisonment.
27 The other matter of concern in relation to a sense of grievance relates to the defendant Con Karamitsios, who was also a 'runner', and in relation to whom I have mentioned was sentenced on 9 March 2000 to a minimum term of 9 months and an additional term of 2 years and 3 months. He was 25 years at the time - quite a deal older than these respondents - and the offence under s 25A(1) with which he was charged related to the supply on 5 occasions within the stipulated period. As I have mentioned, he also had a number of other offences which were taken into account. He has been released to parole following the serving of his minimum term and, importantly, has not been the subject of any Crown appeal.
28 To summarise, I do not think that the Crown has demonstrated any manifest inadequacy in the sentence or error of principle in relation to Ms Hoon. Further, one must not lose sight of the element of double jeopardy involved in Crown appeals. As I have mentioned, both respondents have now served their minimum terms.
29 I would dismiss the Crown appeal regarding the respondent Ms Hoon.
30 Turning to the respondent, Ms Pouoa, similar considerations apply. Her position is, to some extent, factually different to that of Ms Hoon. She supplied 0.25g of heroin to undercover police on three occasions between 16 and 22 June 1999. Like Ms Hoon, she was a 'runner' engaged in street sales. She was aged 18 years at the time and had become an addict at the age of 17 years. Feeding her drug habit was the principle reason for her participation in the organisation.
31 In terms of subjective considerations, while addiction is no excuse for supplying drugs, the offence was not for greed but doubtless to feed her habit. While the prospect of conviction, given the evidence, was probable, her plea of guilty and admissions should be given weight.
32 His Honour also had the benefit of a pre-sentence report and a report from a psychologist, both of which supported her prospects of rehabilitation.
33 The reports reveal that the respondent Ms Pouoa's father died when she was aged 8 and she was raised by her mother alone in circumstances of considerable hardship. She was young and immature and subject to negative peer pressures which contributed to her entering the drug culture. There was a suggestion in the psychologist's report which indicated a rebellion on her part against a very strict religious upbringing. She had not been to prison before and had two previous convictions for possessing drugs. His Honour found 'special circumstances', especially relating to her youth and concluded that her sentence should be the same as imposed on Ms Hoon.
34 Again, I do not see that his Honour committed any error of principle and I am satisfied the Crown has not demonstrated the sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate. In my opinion, the sentence was within his Honour's discretion and this Court ought not intervene.
35 In both of these cases there was a substantial delay in sentencing the respondents while they remained in custody. This resulted in the respondents completing their minimum terms prior to the hearing of the Crown appeals. A re-committal to prison after seven weeks on parole for the respondent Ms Pouoa, heightened in the case of a youthful offender, may prejudice her prospects of rehabilitation. These facts would lead me, assuming I had found the sentence to be manifestly inadequate, to decline to intervene, see R v Allpass (1994) 72 A Crim R 561.
36 I propose that the Crown appeal regarding the respondent Ms Pouoa also be dismissed.