HIS HONOUR: Mitchell Honeysett appears today for sentence in relation to three offences for which he was committed for sentence and which are indictable matters and two other offences on a s 166 certificate which are "summary" matters but pursuant to s 167 Criminal Procedure Act can be dealt with in this jurisdiction.
The indictable offences are, firstly, knowingly taking part in the supply of 6.22 grams of MDMA as it is shortly described under s 25(1) Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act. That carries a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment and/or 2,000 penalty units and it has no standard non-parole period. That offence was committed on 1 May 2015.
There is a second offence of supplying 6.27 grams of the prohibited drug MDMA, as was the drug supplied on 1 May, contrary to s 25(1) Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act that has the same maximum penalty. That offence being committed on 2 May 2015.
There is a third offence for which the prisoner was committed for sentence of what is described as "ongoing" supply of prohibited drugs between 3 June and 16 June 2015 in that the prisoner on three or more separate occasions supplied a prohibited drug for financial or material reward. Those three supplies as they are particularised in the facts, occurred as I understand on 4 June and on 15 June. That offence carries a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment and/or 3,500 penalty units. There is no standard non-parole period for that matter.
Furthermore, there is an offence of supplying 398.5 grams of cannabis between 17 March 2015 and 11 June 2016. This is concerned with ten individual supplies of various quantities of cannabis up to around about 55 grams over that period of time, and a further charge on the s 166 certificate of knowingly take part in the supply of 34.6 grams of cannabis between 19 March 2015 and 26 March 2015. That is concerned with his involvement in two individual supplies. Those offences dealt with summarily, as I would understand it, would carry a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment.
In relation the facts of the matter, there are various extensive facts and I will endeavour to encapsulate or summarise the effect of those facts in a moment. But to just deal with the bare bones of the allegations against the prisoner, what is described as the Sequence 1 offence, that is the ten individual supplies of cannabis amounting to nearly 400 grams, is the commencement of the criminal conduct of the prisoner. It is clear from the facts that the prisoner was ensnared in an undercover operation conducted in Wagga apparently at the beginning of last year, a matter about which I know little personally beyond what I have read in various facts.
It is clear that undercover officers were dealing with another person, an associate of the prisoner, and he contacted the prisoner with a view to obtaining cannabis from him. The prisoner was able to supply a quarter of an ounce of cannabis for $90 and that set in train in effect a relationship between the prisoner and undercover officers of various types, identities of whom need not be dwelt upon. It is quite clear in the course then of what appears to be something in the order or 15 or 16 or 17 transactions, the prisoner was willing in his various ways to assist in the supply initially of cannabis and then MDMA and also the drug described in the facts, to summarise it, as 25B-NBOMe.
The quantity of that particular drug supplied, which is one of the three supplies that constitutes the charge of ongoing supply carrying the greatest maximum penalty, has a trafficable quantity. I am advised by the Crown that 0.003 grams, form a very small quantity, yet the prisoner was involved supplying, on that particular occasion, 26 capsules containing white powder which total in all 0.31 grams. It is a prohibited drug of which I am unfamiliar and I have no knowledge whatsoever, nor have I been assisted in any way with any particular reliable detail of what is its effect.
With regard to the first substantive indictable supply of MDMA, the prisoner received $500 for the tablets or capsules he supplied. In relation to the second supply, he received another $500, and in relation to the ongoing supply, on my calculation, he received a total of $3,150.
In relation to the supplies which constitute the supply of the cannabis in the two offences on the s 166 certificate, my calculation reveals that he received in excess of $4,500 over the period of time as I said between mid‑March and mid-June.
With regard to the ongoing supply matters, I have already pointed out the quantity of 25B-NBOMe that he supplied on 4 June. On 15 June, for $950, he supplied 2.5 grams of MDMA, which was 76% pure, and on the same date, showing his enthusiasm to be of assistance to the undercover police officers, he supplied, as I understand it, 5.5 grams of MDMA which was 77.5% pure, for $1,600.
As I have pointed out, the prisoner was introduced to undercover officers by another person that they targeted. It is quite clear in relation to other particular cases I have seen that because people were so willing to cooperate by supplying them with drugs, the undercover officers had no difficulty finding people around Wagga who were prepared to supply them with prohibited drugs.
What is apparent clearly from the facts available to me is that the accused was a person who was enthusiastically, if I could use that word, engaged in the supply of cannabis, being able to facilitate repeated, and to some extent, the persistent requests for that particular prohibited drug in escalating quantities. Although it must be said in each individual supply, the quantities involved were modest.
Obviously the prisoner would have had to obtain the cannabis from other people. There can be no doubt of that. There is no suggestion the prisoner is a major distributor of cannabis within the Wagga District or anywhere else. He was just another person in a chain of supply. The precise details of which are denied to the Court.
It is quite clear also from the facts that having established in the mind of the undercover officers that he was capable of supplying cannabis, they asked him to supply them, or a particular undercover officer, with MDMA. It is clear on the facts the prisoner himself did not suggest to the undercover police officers that he was prepared to supply more than cannabis. But when asked if he could do so he was able to do so. He was willing to do so in the particulars that are set out in the charges which involve committal for sentence allegations.
It is fair to say, however, from the facts, that what he supplied was done at the request of the undercover police officers. It is correct to say that on the facts available to me he met their requests as they escalated. Although again in relation to the MDMA particularly, it was clear that he also had to go to others to fulfil the orders that were placed upon him.
He was not able to immediately produce the relevant prohibited drugs set out in the committal for sentence charges as a rule. Certainly he clearly knew people involved in that trade and I would expect that the money paid to him would have involved him receiving some financial reward. He in fact has pleaded guilty to charges which acknowledge a financial reward, particularly in the ongoing supply.
It is clear also that but for the requests made of the undercover officers, he would not have supplied the particular drugs identified. That having been said, that is their purpose, to lure people, quite properly and lawfully, into revealing themselves as persons capable of supplying prohibited drugs. Again my reading of the facts suggests that when first approached the prisoner was more concerned to supply cannabis than other prohibited drugs. I have pointed out that there were small quantities of the relevant prohibited drugs supplied at first and the amounts escalated at the request of the undercover police officers.
The ongoing supply charges arise out of, in effect, the same course of relationship with the undercover police officers that relates to the other offences. There is no suggestion of entrapment in the course of submissions. More fool the prisoner that he was ensnared in this operation. He demonstrated himself willing and capable of fulfilling particular requests made of him, although, as I said, not necessarily on the spot.
I am quite satisfied that the prisoner, in terms of his involvement in the supply of drugs, was reflecting, to a large extent, the circumstances of the milieu in which he lived. He is a young aboriginal man living in Ashmont, a public housing area. There is no doubt from the evidence available throughout these sittings and beyond these sittings, in dozens and dozens and dozens of cases that I have done as a judge in Wagga, that the use of prohibited drugs, particularly amphetamine style drugs, is widespread amongst certain segments of the population of Ashmont and Mount Austin.
I am not suggesting for one moment that all the citizens of those particular suburbs or nearby suburbs are drug users. But clearly a large number of people from those areas come before this Court. It is quite clear that the use of prohibited drugs has had a profound impact upon that community and particularly upon the Aboriginal community which is a very sad thing indeed. Aboriginal people have had a historical disadvantage in services and life experience which is reflected greatly in the over-representation of aboriginal people in custody in our country. This is a matter of considerable concern to anybody involved in the justice system.
To my mind, although the prisoner was a person willing to assist the undercover officers, his involvement in these crimes was obviously opportunistic. The requests were made, he was prepared to fill them. As I have said earlier, there obviously must have been some financial gain for him but I do not believe for a moment that he profited the entirety of the sums of money handed over to him by police. He certainly received substantial sums over an extended period of time and his criminality cannot be seen as isolated or 'one-off'. His involvement in these offences reflected very much the circumstances of his lifestyle.
I have taken into account very much his social background and the impact of his background upon his circumstances that led him to Court in relation to these offences.
The pleas of guilty in relation to the committal for sentence matters were entered at the first reasonable opportunity. I have given the prisoner 25% discount upon all relevant sentences - in fact all sentences imposed, to reflect the utilitarian benefit of the pleas of guilty in accordance with the guideline judgment of R v Thomson and Houlton from 1999.
The prisoner was in custody from the date of his arrest, 16 June 2015, and appears before me in custody. All time spent in custody will be taken into account in sentencing him in relation to these offences.
Because there are five different sentences to be imposed, I am required to have regard to the High Court judgment of Pearce v R [1998] 194 CLR 610, particularly the judgment of the majority of [45]. That requires me to fix an individual sentence for each offence having proper regard to the totality of the criminality.
His counsel, in his skilful submissions, put there should be a high degree of concurrency having regard to the relationship of the various offences, one to the other, and the course of conduct of the prisoner in the circumstances in which that course of conduct was engendered. However, I have structured the sentences where there are, in effect, two effective partial accumulations.
With regard to the sentencing of the prisoner of course, I am required to have regard to his criminal history. I note he was not on parole or on bail at the time of the commission of the offences and whilst he does have prior convictions, he does not have convictions for supply of drugs. He has some street offences, some driving offences, one conviction for violence - assault occasioning actual harm - for which he was gaoled, as I understand it, on 15 June 2012. Sentenced to an 18 month term of imprisonment with a non‑parole period of six months. There was another offence of affray related to that offence for which he received the same sentence.
He successfully completed that parole period. He had sporadic appearances in the Children's Court but he does not have a lengthy history, even allowing for his relative youth. He was born on 25 June 1988 and on my calculation will turn 28 this year. In fact his criminal history does not speak in its terms of sustained antisocial conduct, nor does it speak, as I have indicated, of him being a person for a lengthy period of time involved in drug supply.
The presentence report that I have reflects upon his compliance with his parole conditions and his previous supervision. He was assessed for an ICO - that is an Intensive Correction Order - in 2011, but was found to be unsuitable and was subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment with another non‑parole period, that parole being also successfully completed in 2011.
He has had some substantial employment. He worked as a car detailer, as I understand it, on leaving school and has had other work. He was in receipt of a NewStart allowance at the time of his arrest, but was also undertaking a building and construction course which he hopes to finish post‑release.
The explanation he gives for his involvement in the offences reflects some regret for his conduct, although not necessarily sufficient to lead to a finding that he is contrite as required pursuant to s 21(3) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, to which I will herein after refer to as 'the Act'.
He has claimed both to a psychologist and as I understand it to the Community Corrections officer that his involvement in this offending was to help friends or to help out or to try and do something meaningful or positive for others. I am prepared to find there was some element of the prisoner assisting others to provide drugs to the undercover officers, but he was a persistent and enthusiastic participant and ultimately, although he was approached through a third person, he was dealt with directly by the undercover officers and was able to comply with their requests.
The Community Corrections Service deems him to be at 'medium to low' risk of reoffending but it does give a positive assessment of him. First of all, there is the support of his partner whose reference I have read and who maintains her support as does his family. Of course, this support has existed for some years and it did not stop him offending last year. He also, in the view of the Community Correction Service, holds "some regard" for leading a pro-social life, particularly having regard to his wish to complete the building and construction course he was working on prior to his incarceration and his positive attitude towards finding employment. I appreciate the difficulties a person such as the prisoner has in finding substantial employment but the Community Corrections office believes that he has a positive attitude in that regard.
Like myself, the Community Corrections view his explanation for his conduct, that is, to "assist a friend financially", as not credible. But it acknowledges that he recognises the seriousness of his behaviour.
The truth of the matter is that the drugs that he was supplying to the undercover police, although they were not to go to the community, were not known by him not to go to the community. He, with his own experience of drug use, would know the effect of the drugs that he was supplying upon other people in various ways.
So far as his partner's letter is concerned, she was available to give evidence and I accept that she would have given evidence in accordance with the reference she wrote,. She reflects upon his affection for his family and particularly his extended family, which is a common feature of aboriginal people, and that is reflected in the psychologist's report. She reflects upon his upbringing as less than fortunate and disadvantaged which I acknowledge. She also describes him as a very generous person, a thoughtful person, and willing to help others, part of the claim he makes in relation to his offending.
She states that essentially he is a "good man". She refers to him having made a "quite bad mistake". The truth of the matter is he made 15 or 16 bad mistakes over an extended period of time.
I have read the psychologist's report. It sets out details of his history which I have taken into account in his explanation for the offending. The most important part of the report, to my mind, concerns the testing of the prisoner in relation to, for example, what is called 'intelligence quotient'. She applied the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test and her finding was that his verbal subtest score fell just into the below average range and was commensurate with a 'percentile rank of 4'. That means 96% of his age cohort would score stronger than him. On the non-verbal test he was at the lower end of the below average range and commensurate with a 'percentile rank of 6'. The combined tests, for reasons not explained, let him with a percentile rank of 3 meaning 97% of his age cohort would score equal or ahead of him.
Her summary of the matter is that he impressed as a socially immature person for his age, probably a reflection of the limitations upon his intellect. He identified strongly with family and was very supportive and connected to his extended family.
So far as his intelligence testing was concerned, she observed that his adaptive functioning, which refers to his capacity to care for himself and cope with day-to-day demands of independent daily living, was under‑developed for his age. His social maturity appeared to be deficient and he seemed to feel safest with members of his family and identified more particularly with relatives younger than himself, reflecting a lack of maturity for a person of his age.
She wrote that he could arguably be in a developmental disabled category as defined in DSM-5, as it is described, the American Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. She said that his level of cognitive functioning left him with limited problem‑solving capacity and learning by experience. I trust he will learn from the experience of this that he should not supply drugs to other people as occurred in this situation.
She noted that he gave an explanation of wanting to withdraw from the activities in which he was involved with the undercover officers, particularly after a friend died of a drug overdose. The death of his friend had given him some insight, but he could not withdraw from the arrangements that he was making with others. He has had an unstable background. He left school in Year 9. He has had limited education, but he is making some positive steps through the TAFE course that he was undertaking. His criminal history, in her view, did not suggest a person who was decidedly antisocial. He did not have the benefit of certain stable role models during his formative years and this has had a negative impact upon his healthy personality growth and development which may be reflected in his criminal history and his involvement in these offences.
She recommended that he should receive assistance both in relation to his cognitive function and also in relation to reintegrating into the community through Community Corrections. Also she identified the need for him to abstain from drugs. I accept that he was a drug user, although there is no significant evidence of substantial drug dependency at the relevant time.
His counsel in the submissions placed very great emphasis upon the findings to which I have referred and made various submissions relating to the character of the way the prisoner was recruited, the nature of the drugs, the quantities and the amount of money that was paid. It was a substantial sum of money, it is to be said, but these matters are all matters of degree as is well known.
The universe of drug dealing is not defined by the activities of people at Ashmont and if you are a Judge sitting around the State of New South Wales, particularly in Sydney, one sees the full range of criminal activity from Mexican cartels importing hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of kilograms down to university students at musical festivals taking six or seven MDMA pills into a music festival. It was sought to be suggested that because of his personality he may be vulnerable in gaol. He is not on protection and I have heard no evidence of any particular matter that renders him vulnerable. But his counsel, by reference to the psychological report, did, in my view, raise matters that needed to be taken into account by reference to the judgment of McClelland J in De La Rosa (from 2010), and particularly his Honour's observations about the relevance of mental disability or dysfunction to sentencing at paras [177] - [178] of that judgment. His Honour, in his usual thorough and erudite way, brought together many, many authorities, going back to Scognamiglio, Letteri, through Engert to Israil, Hemsley and the like, where there has been extensive discussion about the role of mental illness in sentencing.
It is a great issue in our community. Many, many people in custody suffer very significant mental illnesses or mental disabilities, and in fact many of their crimes are driven by mental disabilities or disorders beyond their control. That is not to say they necessarily should be in gaol, but it may mean in particular cases that there is a need for them to be away from the public if only for the protection of the public.
But the point is that His Honour pointed out that a particular mental disability or disorder need not be necessarily severe to be relevant and could be relevant to a number of factors including the weight to be given to general deterrence and personal deterrence and the like.
Because of the prisoner's assessed cognitive ability, I believe slightly less weight might be given in this matter to the function of general deterrence, although it still must be present in the sentencing exercise for reasons I will explain in a moment. There does not need to be a greater emphasis on personal deterrence because the character of the disability of the prisoner is not one that makes him a danger to the community.
As to his vulnerability in custody, I do not have persuasive evidence of that per se, although I am prepared to accept that being cognitively challenged, this could present some difficulties in custody. But he may not be on his own in that regard, and certainly I have had no evidence of circumstances in custody of hardship beyond the usual hardships.
It was submitted I should find that he was remorseful and contrite and as I said whilst he has expressed regret for his conduct - and I accept his plea of guilty is some evidence of contrition - I could not find it as a relevant "mitigating factor".
But I am prepared to accept that he has some prospects of rehabilitation, even though it may not necessarily be said that he is unlikely to re‑offend. He needs a great deal of assistance. I have already dealt with the issues of totality and accumulation and the other matters that have arisen from the evidence which I have tried to summarise, including the objective facts.
The Crown's position was that the prisoner was substantially involved in drug trafficking, as the facts reveal, that I would not accept the explanation that he solely seeking to help a relative, and the Crown submitted, as I understand it, that I would not accept that he was contrite and that clearly a term of imprisonment must be imposed.
I have had regard, I must say, to the statistics that were provided to me. They provide some outline of statistics for sentencing in relevant areas to the substantive committal for sentence charges. But I must say I am somewhat dismayed, without having done the research, of the small sample numbers. I would have dealt with as many of these cases in the last three or four years as the sample suggests, or so it seems to me at this time. In any event, statistics are only of limited value. The facts of particular cases are more important one would have thought and even then comparative cases are of only limited value. One should not fix on a particular comparative case.
The value of statistics, if the sample is big enough, is that it does give one some idea of the range of sentences imposed in the 'Higher Courts' across the broad range of alternatives that may be available for particular offences. I have taken that into account. But as was pointed out in Bloomfield, back in 1998, by Spigelman CJ for the Court of Criminal Appeal, statistics have limited value. He pointed to eight or nine matters that limited their effectiveness, particularly dealing with cases on appeal.
Getting to the heart of the matter by reference to the sentencing principles by which I am bound, clearly the starting point of any discussion of the appropriate sentence are the general principles which have been referred to in other judgments I have given this sittings and elsewhere relating to the sentencing of people charged with supplying prohibited drugs.
The facts of the matter are that the authorities are as one, saying that a person who supplies drugs on more than one occasion to a degree where his or her activities can be described as trafficking, or substantially involved in supply, must receive a full-time custodial sentence unless there are exceptional circumstances.
Learned counsel appearing for the prisoner did not argue that there were exceptional circumstances and it was acknowledged that by definition the ongoing supply matter of itself represents trafficking to a substantial degree. As Hunt J pointed out in the seminal decision of Clark , in 1990, the position is "worse when there has been profitable commercial exploitation". I could not conclude that this was "profitable commercial exploitation", but clearly the prisoner received some financial benefit, far less of course than the sums paid to him by police. I need not dwell on any further principles or analyse exceptional circumstances. The matter was not raised with me.
With regard to ongoing supply of course, it carries a greater maximum penalty. It has been pointed out, for example, by Adams J in the decision of Fayd'Herbe [2007] NSWCCA 20, citing an earlier decision of then the Chief Judge at Common Law, Wood J:
"An offender charged with a s 25A offence cannot rely upon an argument that the act of supply was an isolated event, nor can he expect to receive a sentence of the kind which may be appropriate for a single offence of supply. Significant sentences must be imposed in such cases in order to give effect to the clear legislative intention to discourage the ongoing trade in drugs which depends entirely upon the availability of a person such as the present applicant."
There are a large number of judgments that deal with the assessment of the objective seriousness of offences brought under s 25A, a provision introduced consequent upon the Wood Royal Commission into the Police Service, when his Honour divined in the course of the Royal Commission, drug operations using runners handling very small quantities but on many, many occasions on the one day to avoid being charged with indictable offences. I refer to decisions as Giang from the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal [2001] NSWCCA 276 and particularly the judgment of Smiroldo which is now of some age, particularly Hulme J (R S), reported at (2000) 112 A Crim R 47.
"It has been pointed out in other cases that the seriousness of this type of offence will not necessarily be diminished simply because the overall amount of drugs supplied is small, but it does not follow that the amount of drugs supplied is an irrelevant matter in determining the seriousness of a particular offence."
So said Howie J in the decision of Mirza. The learned Judge said further on in the same judgment: "There clearly will be cases where the amount of drugs supplied is determinative of the sentence".
I believe that is the case here because, amongst other things, the amount of the drug was dictated by the requests made by the police and the factors as evident from the statement of facts that the prisoner had to get the drugs from other people.
The quantities of drugs that might be supplied consistent with a s 25A offence could include quantities far greater than the quantities with which we are concerned here. The truth is the prisoner was, at a street level, a relatively small-time dealer in an objective sense.
One other feature of the matter to be borne in mind concerns the fact that undercover police officers were involved. Of course this is not necessarily a matter of mitigation as the decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal have made clear. But it may be a relevant factor to take into account in several ways. Firstly, it will mean of course the drugs do not find their way into the wider community. Although that would not have been within the mind of the prisoner. It may be that supplying drugs to an undercover officer might, in some way, mitigate the objective facts. But as has been made clear, only to a minor degree because at the time of the supply, the person supplying is not aware of the fact. But the role of the undercover officer may be relevant because it may be the case that a person commits a crime that he or she might not otherwise have committed, but for the approach of the undercover officer. Of course, it is quite proper for undercover officers to seek out, identify and lure drug suppliers into committing crimes. That is perfectly proper. It is a perfectly acceptable police operational tactic. But it is the case, as it appears here, that particularly in relation to the indictable matters, the prisoner may not have supplied those drugs but for the approaches of the police.
Just one other decision I refer to in the context of the general principles is the decision of Polley v R [2015] NSWCCA 247. That case turned upon an extensive discussion about 'exceptional circumstances' which did not arise here. But that case also reflected general principles to which I have already referred, and particularly the principles that arise from earlier cases concerning the emphasis being placed in sentencing drug suppliers upon "general deterrence". That here, to some extent, is ameliorated by the prisoner's intellectual functioning. In any event, that case adopted what had been previously said about the fact that an applicant's or a prisoner's subjective circumstances will only be shown to mitigate the objective gravity of the offending to make it an exceptional case where those subjective circumstances "distinguish it from a general run of cases", which does not arise here.
In sentencing the prisoner, I have had regard to s 3A of the Act. I have referred to s 21A of the Act. The primary aggravating factor present in all but the ongoing supply offence would be the financial reward, modest though it would appear to be. That is not an aggravating factor in relation the ongoing supply offence because it is an element of the crime, as s 21A(2) states, the Court is not to have additional regard to any such aggravating factor in sentencing if it is an element of the offence.
With regard to other mitigating factors, I have already reflected upon his prospects of rehabilitation. I have obvious reservations about his likelihood to re-offend. I cannot make any comment upon his record favourable to him. But I do not believe his record is such to be an aggravating factor and I do not believe his record is such to necessarily spare him any leniency. I believe his record, whilst it does not do him credit, is not one that prevents him from some small element of leniency, noting his family and social background.
I am prepared to conclude that his criminality is not part of planned or organised criminal activity. I know drug supply networks are organised criminal groups, but his offending was opportunistic and responsive to the circumstances, not planned or considered .I have reflected upon his remorse. His pleas of guilty are themselves a mitigating factor but for that he receives a discrete discount.
I have made a finding that I should conclude that there are 'special circumstances' pursuant to s 44 of the Act, partly in recognition of reality that I have to accumulate certain sentences and the accumulation of sentences requires a finding of special circumstances for the offence for which one fixes a non-parole period, because the effect of the accumulation is to distort the relationship of the base sentence with the balance of the sentence. But following the lead from the Community Corrections Service report and the psychologist, there is clearly a need for an extended period of supervision to encourage the prisoner to seek employment, to seek assistance in relation to the matters raised in the psychology report and particularly his integration back into the community. In other words, to assist him to adjust to community living.
Thus, I have concluded that I should impose the sentences that I foreshadowed.
Could you stand up please Mr Honeysett? I'm sorry it takes so long but you know, if you had some understanding of the fact that I've got to have regard to many pieces of legislation, amongst other things, because the Parole Authority will look at my judgment, the Crown's entitled to know why I've come to a particular decision as is your counsel and regrettably I know prisoners only really are concerned at the end of the day as to the end result, but there's more to it than simply an end result. That's why I paid you the courtesy of telling you in effect what I'm going to do earlier. I'm going to just announce the sentences by reference to sequence numbers and explain where those particular offences appear either as committal for sentence documents or on the s 166 certificate.
Firstly, in relation to the two offences on the s 166 certificate, the related offences, in respect of Sequence 1, that is the supply of the 390-odd grams of cannabis, you are convicted. You are sentenced to a term of nine months' imprisonment to commence from 16 June 2015 and to expire, on my calculation, on 15 March 2016.
In relation to the smaller supply of cannabis, Sequence 2, you are convicted, you are sentenced to three months' imprisonment, again to date from 16 June 2015. That sentence expired on 15 September 2015.
In relation to the indictable supply, Sequence 9, you are convicted. You are sentenced to a term of 12 months imprisonment to date from 16 October 2015 to expire on 15 October 2016.
In respect of Sequence 11, the other single supply, you are convicted. You are sentenced again to 12 months imprisonment. That will date from 16 October 2015 and expire on 15 October 2016.
In relation to the ongoing supply, that is what we call Sequence 18, that is the way it was charged, you are convicted. You are sentenced to a term of imprisonment by way of a non-parole period of ten months. That will date from 16 December 2015, and on my calculation, will expire on 15 October 2016.
I direct that you be released to parole on that date.
In relation to that sentence, I fix a balance of sentence of one year four months. That sentence of one year four months, just quickly calculating it, would expire, on my calculation, on 15 February 2018.
The effective non-parole period, as I calculate it, is one year four months. The effective balance of sentence is one year four months. That is a total of two years eight months. Each of those sentences reflect a discount of 25% as I said for your pleas of guilty.
Just take a seat.
Now Mr Crown, are there any technical matters from you?
MEREDITH: Your Honour, the only further issue is there is a drug proceeds order that's been filed. I'm not sure if the paperwork--
HIS HONOUR: For what?
MEREDITH: In relation to Mr Honeysett, in relation--
HIS HONOUR: Yes, but for what amount?
MEREDITH: For the amount of $8,540.
HIS HONOUR: Well you better let me know what the - I've dealt with this on another occasion. I've got to be satisfied that he received the benefit of the money and I'm not sure that that's immediately available on the facts.
MEREDITH: Yes your Honour. I understand the order's not objected to but I can hand up--
HIS HONOUR: Well look, to be brutally frank, that's all well and good that it's not objected to, but if it doesn't comply with the law I'm not going to make it. I don't care what the parties agree to, if I may. I'll reserve on that. You don't object to it. I'll look at the legislation. I'll come back to you sir in relation to that. We won't bring Mr Honeysett back to court and I won't deal with the matter now.
But I grant leave for the summons to be filed. I will read that material.
It's s 31 isn't it of--
MEREDITH: Section 29 is the order in which - the section--
HIS HONOUR: That's the order but the basis upon which the order's made is, from memory, s 30 or 31?
MEREDITH: Thirty I believe is where your Honour--
HIS HONOUR: Thirty. I had a drug dealer who received X dollars from an undercover police officer as it turned out, but it was clear on the evidence he gave it to another person, the cash, so--
MEREDITH: I do have a case your Honour that potentially deals with that issue. The matter of R v Hall that I can--
HIS HONOUR: Right, well I'll read that. But if you don't mind, it's a quarter past 3 on a Friday afternoon--
MEREDITH: Yes your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: --and I'm not being rude to you and I'm certainly not being disdainful of your application, but I'd like to give it proper consideration. I'll certainly do that over the weekend, all right?
MEREDITH: Thank you your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: So Mr Honeysett, do you understand the sentence I've imposed? You're eligible for release to parole at this stage in October 2016. You're excused. Thank you very much, you can go with the officers, thank you.
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Decision last updated: 18 May 2018