9. It was submitted on behalf of South Australia that Mr. O'Shea was not entitled to a hearing in the present case for the reason that the decision not to act on the recommendation for his release did not adversely affect any relevant "right" or "legitimate expectation". There are two short answers to that submission. First, whatever meaning one gives to the unsatisfactory phrase "legitimate expectation" (see, e.g., Churches, "Justice and Executive Discretion in Australia", Public Law (1980), 397, at pp.407ff.; Hodgson, "The Current Status of the Legitimate Expectation in Administrative Law", Melbourne University Law Review, vol.14 (1984), 686), a person who has been deprived of his liberty on medical grounds has a "legitimate expectation" of being released on licence once the stage is reached where the appropriate specialist statutory tribunal, acting on independent medical advice and after full inquiry, has concluded and recommended that he be so released. Put in language that has been used in this Court, he has a "reasonable expectation" that "some form of ... liberty will be available" in accordance with the recommendation to the Governor of the competent statutory authority (see Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission [1977] HCA 39; (1977) 137 CLR 487, at p 508). Secondly, the common law requirements of procedural fairness cannot, in any event, properly be confined, in a case involving the exercise of government power or authority, by reference to some formula framed in terms of "rights" or of some rigid view of "legitimate expectation". The question which matters in such a case is not whether the claimant who asserts a denial of procedural fairness had some legal right or "legitimate expectation" in the sense of the benefit of some new type of administrative estoppel, but whether the relevant government power or authority was being exercised to his individual disadvantage (cf. Wade, Administrative Law, 5th ed. (1982), p.465; Hlophe, "Legitimate Expectation and Natural Justice: English, Australian and South African Law", South African Law Journal, vol.104 (1987), 165, at p 176). In Kioa v. West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550, at p 632, I expressed the view that the common law rules of procedural fairness extend, in the absence of a clear contrary legislative intention, to control any administrative decision which is made pursuant to statutory power and which "directly affects the rights, interests, status or legitimate expectations of another in his individual capacity". In that statement of my understanding of the area of operation of those common law rules in relation to the exercise of government or public authority or power, I was led to use the words "rights ... or legitimate expectations" by the strong support which their use derives from modern authority. I added the words "interests" and "status", which I consider to be words of wide and flexible connotation, to cover other cases in which the effect of the exercise of public power or authority on the person, affairs or aspirations of another, in his individual capacity as distinct from merely as a member of the general public, is such that minimum standards of fairness demand that consideration be given to his particular position and circumstances. In such a case, the person affected will have standing to assert invalidity if procedural fairness is denied. That is not, of course, to say that the applicability and content of those common law rules is left to "individual predilections ungoverned by authority" (cf. per Jacobs J., H.C. Sleigh Ltd. v. South Australia (1977) 136 CLR 475, at p 514). In cases where there is room for doubt about whether a person is sufficiently affected in his individual capacity to invoke their protection, the path to decision must lie essentially in the ordinary processes of legal reasoning by analogy and deduction, enlightened, in an appropriate case, by considerations of public policy and common sense. The present does not, however, seem to me to be a borderline or unclear case. To the contrary, I find it difficult to envisage a category of case to which the common law rules of procedural fairness are more clearly in point than the case of a political decision that a person be indefinitely held in gaol notwithstanding expert advice and specialist recommendation to the effect that the medical grounds upon which his detention was initially ordered no longer justify it.