The Board submitted a statement of agreed facts, in which the respondent agreed that his conduct constituted professional misconduct despite having no memory of engaging in the conduct due to excessive alcohol consumption.

The Board submitted that the respondent's conduct warranted the imposition of a reprimand, a disqualification from applying for registration for 12 to 18 months, and a prohibition from providing health services unless in the presence of a third person until the respondent is registered in a health profession. The respondent submitted that the proposed period of disqualification would prevent him from obtaining provisional registration in time to complete the final placement component of his Master's degree.

Held, finding professional misconduct and imposing sanctions:

• The Tribunal is satisfied that the respondent committed the acts referred to in each of the complaints and that the respondent's behaviour constitutes professional misconduct;
• The respondent is reprimanded;
• The respondent is disqualified from applying for registration for a period of 18 months;
• The respondent is prohibited from providing any health service until he is registered again in a health profession.

Health practitioners - Complaint by the Psychology Board of Australia - Professional misconduct - Unlawful or improper behaviour outside of the workplace - Reprimand - Disqualified from applying for registration for 18 months - Prohibited from providing any health service until re-registered

Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (South Australia) Act 2010 sch 2 ss 3, 3A, 4, 5, 138, 193, 196

South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 s 138

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33

Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34, (1938) 60 CLR 336

Chiropractic Board of Australia v Oborne [2023] VCAT 770

Chiropractic Board of Australia v Riordan [2024] SACAT 110

Commonwealth of Australia v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate; Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46

Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield [1997] NSWSC 297

Marin v Chiropractic Board of Australia [2020] SASCFC 74

Maroulis v Psychology Board of Australia [2021] SASC 16

Medical Board of Australia v Ainsworth (Review and Regulation) [2019] VCAT 734

Medical Board of Australia v Arulanandarajah [2021] VCAT 85

Medical Board of Australia v Forgione [2022] WASAT 67

Medical Board of Australia v Grajn [2023] QCAT 433

Medical Board of Australia v Holten [2019] VCAT 837

Medical Board of Australia v Isman [2023] VCAT 232

Medical Board of Australia v Singh [2017] WASAT 33

Medical Board of Australia v Siow [2016] SAHPT 1

Medical Board of Australia v YZV [2024] VCAT 1134

Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Chalmers [2015] VCAT 2061

Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Dunjey [2024] QCAT 96

Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Farrow [2022] VCAT 43

Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Gibbs [2025] VCAT 231

Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Pickett [2021] VCAT 162

Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v TGA [2021] VCAT 220

Osteopathy Board of Australia v Gardner [2024] SACAT 111

Osteopathy Board of Australia v Ratcliff [2021] VCAT 658

Paramedicine Board of Australia v Jackson [2023] SACAT 66

Paramedicine Board of Australia v Jackson; Physiotherapy Board of Australia v Smith [2025] SASCA 25

Pharmacy Board of Australia v Roberts [2022] SACAT 111

Physiotherapy Board of Australia v Montalto [2019] VCAT 1445

Physiotherapy Board of Australia v Rivett [2024] SACAT 5

Podiatry Board of Australia v McMurray [2022] VCAT 1222

Wiliams v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (Occupational and Business Regulation) [2008] VCAT 1784

Mr Relf and Mr Jacobi KC of counsel appeared in person for the applicant

This is an edited version of the Tribunal's decision pursuant to s 60 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013. Some of the parties and participants of the proceedings have been de-identified in accordance with the Tribunal's anonymisation policy. Other facts and details that may lead to the identification of any person may have also been anonymised or omitted. These changes do not affect the Tribunal's decision or its reasons for decision.

1. The Psychology Board of Australia (the Board) has referred this matter to the Tribunal under s 193(1) of the Health Practitioner National Law (National Law).[1]
2. The Board is the responsible Board for the respondent's health profession.
3. In making our decision, we have taken into account the Board's Book of Documents, and the evidence and submissions of the parties. We refer to the parties' submissions at relevant points in the body of these reasons.

1. The respondent enrolled as a student in the Master of Psychology (Clinical) degree program at the University of Adelaide at the beginning of 2021.
2. On 4 July 2021, the incidents that are the subject of the complaints occurred (see below). The respondent was 24 years old at the time.
3. On 5 October 2021, the respondent obtained provisional registration as a psychologist.
4. On 15 May 2022, a notification was made to AHPRA in respect of the matters that are the subject of the complaints.
5. On 26 August 2022, the respondent was subjected to immediate action under the National Law. Conditions were placed on his provisional registration for weekly supervision sessions with a registered psychologist in relation to "understanding and managing personal factors as they relate to the safe practice of the profession of psychology, and upholding the Code of Ethics".[2] The supervising psychologist was Mr Ross Evans.
6. On 15 May 2023, certain amendments were made to the National Law. The relevance of this is discussed further below.
7. On 27 March 2024, these proceedings were commenced in the Tribunal.
8. On 4 October 2024, the respondent's provisional registration lapsed.
9. On 7 January 2025, the Board refused an application made by the respondent for provisional registration.

1. There are two separate complaints made against the respondent in respect of his conduct towards a young woman. It is adequate that the facts of the complaints be summarised here.
2. The respondent and the young woman were in an intimate relationship, that involved consensual sexual practices, from late March 2021 to about September 2021.
3. The first complaint is that, on 4 July 2021, during consensual sexual activity with the young woman at her home, the respondent asked her whether he could make a video recording of their activity and send it to the "rugby boys". The young woman refused the respondent's request to video record their sexual activity. Despite not receiving the young woman's consent, and without her knowledge, the respondent proceeded to record the sexual activity occurring between him and the young woman. The respondent then circulated the recording by Snapchat to his friends and teammates from the Adelaide University Rugby team. He told the young woman later that morning that he had made the video and circulated it to his teammates.
4. The subject of the second complaint occurred later on the same day during sexual activity between the respondent and the young woman. The respondent slapped the young woman hard with an open palm a number of times, despite her asking him to stop and saying that he was hurting her.
5. The respondent stated in his formal response to the complaint that he has no memory of the events of 4 July 2021.[3] This is due apparently to excessive alcohol consumption. He said in a response to the notification that he had been drinking for seven hours and had blacked out.[4] However, he subsequently signed a statement of agreed facts as to the facts in the complaints in which he also agreed that it constitutes professional misconduct.[5]

1. The Board proposes the following sanctions be imposed on the respondent:
   1. a reprimand;
   2. disqualification from applying for registration as a health practitioner for a period of 12 to 18 months; and
   3. prohibition on delivering a health service unless in the presence of a third person until the respondent is registered in a health profession.
2. The Board also proposes that the respondent pay its costs.

1. The law that we must apply is well settled and is reflected in numerous reported decisions of this Tribunal and other tribunals in Australia exercising jurisdiction under the National Law.
2. However, as the respondent was unrepresented for the duration of the proceedings, for his benefit we set out below the law that we must apply, and other relevant principles.

1. Section 4 of the National Law requires the Tribunal (as an entity that has functions under the Law) to exercise its functions having regard to the objectives and guiding principles of the national registration and accreditation scheme set out in ss 3 and 3A of the National Law.
2. Sections 3 and 3A relevantly state (underlining added):

3 - Objectives > > (1) The object of this Law is to establish a national registration and accreditation scheme for - > > (a) the regulation of health practitioners; and > > (b) the registration of students undertaking -

(i) programs of study that provide a qualification for registration in a health profession; or

(ii) clinical training in a health profession.

(2) The objectives of the national registration and accreditation scheme are -

(a) to provide for the protection of the public by ensuring that only health practitioners who are suitably trained and qualified to practise in a competent and ethical manner are registered;

...

3A - Guiding principles

(1) The main guiding principle of the national registration and accreditation scheme is that the following are paramount -

(a) protection of the public;

(b) public confidence in the safety of services provided by registered health practitioners and students. ...

(d) restrictions on the practice of a health profession are to be imposed under the scheme only if it is necessary to ensure health services are provided safely and are of an appropriate quality.

1. Part 8 of the National Law relevantly states:

138 - Application of Part to persons who are registered health practitioners > > (1) A notification may be made under this Part about, and proceedings may be taken under this Part against, a person who is a registered health practitioner in relation to behaviour that -

(a) occurs while the practitioner is registered in a health profession under this Law; or

(b) occurred before the practitioner was registered in a health profession under this Law; or

(c) occurred during any other period in which the practitioner was not registered in a health profession under this Law, including, for example, if the registration had ended or was cancelled, suspended or withdrawn.

(2) A registered health practitioner's behaviour that occurred at a time specified in subsection (1)(b) or

(c) may not constitute -

(a) unsatisfactory professional performance; or

(b) unprofessional conduct, except as provided by section 139.

193 - Matters to be referred to responsible tribunal

(1) Subject to section 193A, a National Board must refer a matter about a registered health practitioner or student to a responsible tribunal if -

(a) for a registered health practitioner, the Board reasonably believes, based on a notification or for any other reason, the practitioner has behaved in a way that constitutes professional misconduct; ...

196 - Decision by responsible tribunal about registered health practitioner

(1) After hearing a matter about a registered health practitioner, a responsible tribunal may decide -

(a) the practitioner has no case to answer and no further action is to be taken in relation to the matter; or

(b) one or more of the following -

(i) the practitioner has behaved in a way that constitutes unsatisfactory professional performance;

(ii) the practitioner has behaved in a way that constitutes unprofessional conduct;

(iii) the practitioner has behaved in a way that constitutes professional misconduct;

(iv) the practitioner has an impairment;

(v) the practitioner's registration was improperly obtained because the practitioner or someone else gave the National Board established for the practitioner's health profession information or a document that was false or misleading in a material particular.

(2) If a responsible tribunal makes a decision referred to in subsection (1)(b), the tribunal may decide to do one or more of the following -

(a) caution or reprimand the practitioner;

(b) impose a condition on the practitioner's registration, including, for example -

(i) a condition requiring the practitioner to complete specified further education or training, or to undergo counselling, within a specified period; or

(ii) a condition requiring the practitioner to undertake a specified period of supervised practice; or

(iii) a condition requiring the practitioner to do, or refrain from doing, something in connection with the practitioner's practice; or

(iv) a condition requiring the practitioner to manage the practitioner's practice in a specified way; or

(v) a condition requiring the practitioner to report to a specified person at specified times about the practitioner's practice; or

(vi) a condition requiring the practitioner not to employ, engage or recommend a specified person, or class of persons;

(c) require the practitioner to pay a fine of not more than $30 000 to the National Board that registers the practitioner;

(d) suspend the practitioner's registration for a specified period;

(e) cancel the practitioner's registration.

(3) If the responsible tribunal decides to impose a condition on the practitioner's registration, the tribunal must also decide a review period for the condition.

(4) If the tribunal decides to cancel a person's registration under this Law or the person does not hold registration under this Law, the tribunal may also decide to do one or more of the following -

(a) disqualify the person from applying for registration as a registered health practitioner for a specified period;

(b) prohibit the person, either permanently or for a stated period, from doing either or both of the following -

(i) providing any health service[6] or a specified health service;

(ii) using any title or a specified title;

(c) impose restrictions, either permanently or for a stated period, on the provision of any health service or a specified health service by the person.

1. Any disciplinary action must be proportional and appropriate to all the circumstances of the particular case.
2. The Tribunal is the responsible Tribunal under s 193 for the purposes of these proceedings because the relevant behaviour occurred in this State.
3. In s 5 of the National Law, the following definitions appear:

unsatisfactory professional performance, of a registered health practitioner, means the knowledge, skill or judgment possessed, or care exercised by, the practitioner in the practice of the health profession in which the practitioner is registered is below the standard reasonably expected of a health practitioner of an equivalent level of training or experience. > > unprofessional conduct, of a registered health practitioner, means professional conduct that is of a > > lesser standard than that which might reasonably be expected of the health practitioner by the public or the practitioner's professional peers, and includes -

(a) a contravention by the practitioner of this Law, whether or not the practitioner has been prosecuted for, or convicted of, an offence in relation to the contravention; and

(b) a contravention by the practitioner of -

(i) a condition to which the practitioner's registration was subject; or

(ii) an undertaking given by the practitioner to the National Board that registers the practitioner; and

(c) the conviction of the practitioner for an offence under another Act, the nature of which may affect the practitioner's suitability to continue to practise the profession; and

(d) providing a person with health services of a kind that are excessive, unnecessary or otherwise not reasonably required for the person's well-being; and

(e) influencing, or attempting to influence, the conduct of another registered health practitioner in a way that may compromise patient care; and

(f) accepting a benefit as inducement, consideration or reward for referring another person to a health service provider or recommending another person use or consult with a health service provider; and

(g) offering or giving a person a benefit, consideration or reward in return for the person referring another person to the practitioner or recommending to another person that the person use a health service provided by the practitioner; and

(h) referring a person to, or recommending that a person use or consult, another health service provider, health service or health product if the practitioner has a pecuniary interest in giving that referral or recommendation, unless the practitioner discloses the nature of that interest to the person before or at the time of giving the referral or recommendation.

professional misconduct, of a registered health practitioner, includes -

(a) unprofessional conduct by the practitioner that amounts to conduct that is substantially below the standard reasonably expected of a registered health practitioner of an equivalent level of training or experience; and

(b) more than one instance of unprofessional conduct that, when considered together, amounts to conduct that is substantially below the standard reasonably expected of a registered health practitioner of an equivalent level of training or experience; and

(c) conduct of the practitioner, whether occurring in connection with the practice of the health practitioner's profession or not, that is inconsistent with the practitioner being a fit and proper person to hold registration in the profession.

1. Reference to a fit and proper person is made in the definition of professional misconduct.
2. There has been much judicial consideration of the expression "fit and proper person" in respect of professional regulatory regimes. For brevity, it suffices to adopt the following passage from the High Court:

The expression "fit and proper person", standing alone, carries no precise meaning. It takes its meaning from its context, from the activities in which the person is or will be engaged and the ends to be served by those activities. The concept of "fit and proper" cannot be entirely divorced from the conduct of the person who is or will be engaging in those activities. However, depending on the nature of the activities, the question may be whether improper conduct has occurred, whether it is likely to occur, whether it can be assumed that it will not occur, or whether the general community will have confidence that it will not occur. The list is not exhaustive but it does indicate that, in certain contexts, character (because it provides indication of likely future conduct) or reputation (because it provides indication of public perception as to likely future conduct) may be sufficient to ground a finding that a person is not fit and proper to undertake the activities in question.[7]

3. However, it must be noted that the definition of professional misconduct does not require a finding that the practitioner is or is not a fit and proper person to hold registration in the relevant profession. There is a subtlety that needs acknowledgement. The definition requires consideration of whether the impugned conduct is inconsistent with the practitioner being a fit and proper person to hold registration in the profession.

1. In these proceedings, the Tribunal needs to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that there is proper cause for taking disciplinary action against the respondent and, in considering the matter, we have been mindful of the following caution expressed in Briginshaw v Briginshaw:

The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters 'reasonable satisfaction' should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences...This does not mean that some standard of persuasion is fixed intermediate between the satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt required upon a criminal inquest and the reasonable satisfaction which in a civil issue may, not must, be based on a preponderance of probability. It means that the nature of the issue necessarily affects the process by which reasonable satisfaction is attained.[8]

1. We adopt the following succinct summation of the nature of the Tribunal's role in these disciplinary proceedings:

The Tribunal's primary role is to protect the public rather than to punish health practitioners who engage in professional misconduct or unprofessional conduct. Determinations also assist to maintain proper ethical and professional standards to protect the public and to protect the profession in the sense of maintaining stature and integrity in the eyes of the public. The Tribunal is also required to, in appropriate cases, make determinations which will deter the individual health practitioner from engaging in the same or like conduct again and/or which serve as a warning to other health practitioners that engaging in the conduct will bring serious consequences - the latter is known as general deterrence.[9]

2. The protective purpose of disciplinary proceedings is well settled.[10]
3. We have also adopted the following comprehensive statements of principle articulated in a recent Tribunal decision in this jurisdiction to guide us on the question of appropriate sanction:

1. In NSW Bar Association v Evatt (1968) 117 CLR 177; [1968] HCA 20 at [12], the High Court confirmed that the purpose of disciplinary proceedings for a barrister was:

entirely protective, and, notwithstanding that its exercise may involve a great deprivation to the person disciplined, there is no element of punishment involved.

4. This statement was adopted and applied to the discipline of health practitioners in Craig v Medical Board of South Australia [2001] SASC 169; (2001) 79 SASR 545 at 553-554, where Doyle CJ (Williams & Martin JJ agreeing) stated:

The purpose of disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public, not to punish a practitioner in the sense in which punishment is administered pursuant to the criminal law. A disciplinary tribunal protects the public by making orders which will prevent persons who are unfit to practise from practising, or by making orders which will secure the maintenance of proper professional standards. A disciplinary tribunal will also consider the protection of the public, and of the relevant profession, by making orders which will assure the public that appropriate standards are being maintained within the relevant profession.

5. The protection of the public may sometimes require disciplinary action which has a greater adverse effect on the practitioner than may be warranted if punishment was the relevant consideration. Unlike the process of sentencing for a criminal offence, personal circumstances of a practitioner may be of limited significance in the process of determining what is necessary in the public interest.
6. In Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield [1997] NSWSC 297; (1997) 41 NSWLR 630, at page 636, the Court of Appeal made it clear that:

The gravity of professional misconduct is not to be measured by reference to the worst cases but by the extent to which it departs from the proper standards. If this is not done, there is a risk that the conduct of delinquents in a profession will indirectly establish the standards applied by the Tribunal.

7. In Physiotherapy Board of Australia v Adey [2017] SAHPT 3 at para [36], the SA Health Practitioners Tribunal observed that:

... the imposition of disciplinary action may serve one or all of the following purposes: > > • preventing practitioners who are unfit to practice from practising; > > • securing maintenance of professional standards;

• assuring members of the public and the profession that appropriate standards are being maintained and that professional misconduct (or unprofessional conduct) will not be tolerated;

• bringing home to the practitioner the seriousness of their conduct;

• deterring the practitioner from any future departures from appropriate standards;
• deterring other members of the profession who might be minded to act in a similar way;
• imposing restrictions on the practitioners' right to practice so as to ensure that the public is protected.

1. In order to achieve these purposes, the Tribunal should impose disciplinary sanctions that adequately reflect the incompatibility of the misconduct with the fitness of the person to be registered. The disciplinary action should be such as to convey to other practitioners and the general public that such conduct is incompatible with registration and will not be tolerated. The sanction should be sufficient to assure the public that standards within the profession will be maintained and the public will be adequately protected.
2. In Marin v Chiropractic Board of Australia, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of SA rejected a submission that the period of disqualification in that case need not have been long as the Tribunal could rely on the National Board refusing re-registration if any risk to the public still remained. The Court made the point that the Tribunal generally has before it, a wealth of information that may not be before a national board on a subsequent application for admission. The Tribunal is far better placed to understand the extent to which the conduct is incompatible with fitness to be registered. The Chief Justice, with whom the other members of the Full Court agreed, stated:

However, there are specific considerations to which a Tribunal must have regard in fixing a period of disqualification, which are informed by the material received in the disciplinary proceedings which may not be revealed on an application for readmission to a health profession. An order of disqualification must 'bring home to the practitioner the seriousness of the practitioner's departure from professional standards'. A Tribunal which finds professional misconduct and must fix the period of disqualification is best placed to make the assessment of the period necessary to achieve that purpose. > > I accept that there is an overlap between the length of disqualification to be imposed for the purposes of enforcing professional standards and an evaluation of the suitability of the practitioner at a future time, but in assessing the suitability of an applicant it would duplicate the function of the Tribunal, and twice vex the disqualified practitioner, if a National Board were to ask itself whether an applicant, whose period of disqualification has ended, has been unregistered for a sufficient period of time to have learnt his or her lesson, and thereby to have become a suitable person for registration. > > The Tribunal is responsible for professional discipline; its orders should be effectively final and not interim measures. A National Board should not have the function of second guessing the sanctions it imposes. > > In any event, the Tribunal must also impose a period of disqualification which emphasises to other members of the profession that unprofessional conduct will be visited with significant sanctions. Even though that consideration has some analogy with general deterrence, its purpose is to maintain public confidence in the system of regulation of registered practitioners. If those wider considerations were absent, and if the Tribunal were to confine itself to a subjective assessment of when the particular practitioner is likely to have changed his or her ways, relatively shorter periods of disqualification might be imposed. > > After a period of disqualification fixed by the Tribunal has expired, the function of a National Board, when considering an application for registration, is not to revisit the wider considerations evaluated by the Tribunal, but to assess how the applicant has responded to the sanctions and the steps he or she has taken to address and correct the root causes of his or her misconduct.

3. We note the observation by the Tribunal in Medical Board of Australia v Nicholas that disqualification periods should not be so short as to hold out false hope to a practitioner or place national boards under the pain of premature and unmeritorious applications.[11]
4. We consider also that we should have regard to the following general observations made by the Western Australian State Administrative Tribunal in Medical Board of Australia v Singh:

1. In determining an appropriate sanction, twelve matters may require consideration. Those matters are interrelated and are not mutually exclusive. The list of matters is not exhaustive. The twelve matters are: 1. Any need to protect the public against further misconduct by the practitioner .... 2. The need to protect the public through general deterrence of other practitioners from similar conduct ... 3. The need to protect the public and maintain public confidence in the profession by reinforcing high professional standards and denouncing transgressions and thereby articulating the high standards expected of the profession ... such that, even where there may be no need to deter a practitioner from repeating the conduct, the conduct is of such a nature that the Tribunal should give an emphatic indication of its disapproval ... 4. In the case of conduct involving misleading conduct, including dishonesty, whether the public and fellow practitioners can place reliance on the word of the practitioner ...

a) Act;

b) Regulations;

c) Guidelines or Code of Conduct, issued by the relevant professional body; and

d) whether the practitioner has done so knowingly.

1. Whether the practitioner's conduct demonstrated incompetence, and if so, to what level.
2. Whether or not the incident was isolated such that the Tribunal can be satisfied of his or her worthiness or reliability for the future ...

3. Whether or not the practitioner understands the error of his ways, including an assessment of any remorse and insight (or a lack thereof) shown by the practitioner, since a practitioner who fails to understand the significance and consequences of misconduct is a risk to the community ...
4. The desirability of making available to the public any special skills possessed by the practitioner.
5. The practitioner's personal circumstances at the time of the conduct and at the time of imposing the sanction. However, the weight given to personal circumstances cannot override the fundamental obligation of the Tribunal to provide appropriate protection of the public interest in the honesty and integrity of legal [sic] practitioners and in the maintenance of proper standards of legal [sic] practice ...
6. The Tribunal may consider any other matters relevant to the practitioner's fitness to practise and other matters which may be regarded as aggravating the conduct or mitigating its seriousness .... In general, mitigating factors such as no previous misconduct or service to the profession are of considerably less significance than in the criminal process because the jurisdiction is protective not punitive ...[12]
7. On the question of insight and reformation of character, it has been observed that insight might be reflected in a variety of ways, such as:
   • an understanding of the nature of the conduct;
   • an acceptance that the conduct was seriously wrong;
   • an appreciation of why the individual engaged in that conduct;
   • empathy with the consequences; and
   • a willingness to take measures to identify risk factors and to avoid similar behaviour.[13]
8. In a matter concerning disciplinary action taken against a doctor, the New South Wales Court of Appeal[14] said:

Lapse of time since the events... may also be relevant in determining whether the doctor has undergone a reformation of character and behaviour, or whether the incidents can be viewed as isolated or passing departures from proper professional standards or attributed to youth or inexperience. > > and said also: > > ... the Tribunal and this court should not assume that the doctor has become a reformed person. As Walsh JA said in Ex Parte Tziniolis (1966) SR (NSW) 448 at 461: > > Reformations of character and of behaviour can doubtless occur but their occurrence is not the usual but the exceptional thing. One cannot assume that a change has occurred merely because some years have gone by and it is not proved that anything of a discreditable kind has occurred. If a man has exhibited serious deficiencies in his standards of conduct and his attitude it must require clear proof to show that some years later he has established himself as a different man.[15]

1. We generally agree with the general proposition of parity in the imposition of sanction in like cases and endorse the following passage from a decision by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal:

Determinations in other cases of similar or analogous conduct will provide useful guidance - consistency and proportionality are important. Every case is different, with its own combination of facts and relevant factors, including the degree of seriousness of the conduct, the length of time the practitioner engaged in the conduct, the number of patients impacted by the conduct, and the circumstances involved. Nevertheless, as VCAT observed in Medical Board of Australia v Topchian (Occupational and Business Regulation) [2013] VCAT 86 ...: > > [I]t is important that in a broad sense there be consistency between those decisions.[16]

2. The Board has referred us to a number of previous decisions on sanction under the National Law.[17]
3. In Marin v Chiropractic Board of Australia, the Chief Justice commented on the limited assistance that might be provided by decisions provided by the parties as comparators. His Honour (with whom the other Judges agreed) said:

It is well accepted that in sentencing for criminal offences the assistance provided by comparative sentences is limited. That is all the more the case in periods of disqualification imposed to maintain professional standards. In Lee v Health Care Complaints Commission, the Court of Appeal of New South Wales observed:

(a) comparison with the outcomes in earlier cases may be useful if those earlier cases show some discernible range or pattern;

(b) such a range or pattern, even when discernible, cannot be regarded as a precedent indicating what is 'correct';

(c) the range or pattern is, at best, a reflection of the accumulated experience and wisdom of decision-makers;

(d) the range or pattern will potentially be of value only if it is possible to gather from it an appreciation of some unifying principle;

(e) since the predominant consideration is the protection of the public, a decision can only be made by reference to the facts of the particular case and by considering what measures are needed to ensure that the future behaviour of the particular practitioner is shaped in a way that is consistent with that protection ...[18]

1. We have not obtained much assistance from the comparator cases referred to us by the Board. There are substantial variables and factual permutations among the cases. As the Board conceded in written submissions, they concern behaviours that differ significantly from the unique facts of the present matter.
2. To execute our duty in this matter we must have regard to the specific factual matrix before us, the relevant considerations in the case and what is necessary to achieve the objectives of a determination on sanction.[19]

1. We received written submissions as to the Tribunal's jurisdiction to deal with this matter and in respect of the application of s 138(1) to this matter following a recent decision of the Court of Appeal.[20] Mr Jacobi attended the hearing and made brief oral submissions on the matter at the commencement of the hearing.
2. At the time that these proceedings were commenced in the Tribunal, s 138 was in the form that appears above.[21]
3. As the background section of these reasons indicates, when these proceedings were commenced, the respondent was provisionally registered under the National Law.
4. The conduct that is the subject of this complaint occurred some four months before the respondent was registered. However, s 138(1)(b) allows for proceedings to be taken under Part 8 in respect of behaviour that occurred before the practitioner was registered in a health profession under this Law.
5. We are well satisfied that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with this matter.

1. As noted earlier, the respondent has agreed to the facts of the two complaints.
2. Despite the agreed position of the parties as to the factual basis of the complaints, it is for the Tribunal to be satisfied of both the facts and, should the facts demonstrate grounds for a sanction to be imposed, also of the appropriate sanction.[22]
3. The information in the materials before the Tribunal is consistent with the agreed factual position.
4. Taking into account the Briginshaw caution, we are satisfied that the respondent committed the acts referred to in each of the complaints.

1. The Board submitted that the respondent's conduct constituted professional misconduct under paragraphs (a) and (c) of the definition of professional misconduct, although in submissions pressed only the latter.
2. As to the paragraph (a) definition, the Board referred us to a number of authorities where findings under paragraph (a) have been made with respect to conduct by a registered health practitioner outside of his or her practice and, more relevantly, pre-registration conduct.[23]
3. However, it is not necessary for us to deal with the paragraph (a) definition of professional misconduct as we explain below that we are well satisfied that the respondent's conduct falls within the paragraph (c) definition.
4. Given the introduction of s 138 of the National Law in its present form in May 2023, we would have benefitted from additional submissions if we were to make a finding under paragraph (a). The respondent's conduct occurred before he was registered under the National Law. We note that the concept of unprofessional conduct bears an integral role in the definition of professional misconduct in paragraph (a)[24] and that s 138(2)(b) appears to have the effect that behaviour that occurred before the partitioner was registered may not constitute unprofessional conduct.[25] There does not appear to have been an analog to s 138(2)(b) in the National Law prior to May 2023.
5. As we have based our decision on the paragraph (c) definition of professional misconduct, it is not necessary to definitively deal with this matter. It can be left for when it is critical to the facts and outcome of a particular case.

1. It is clear that the respondent's conduct did not occur in connection with the practice of psychology. It occurred in his private life. However, behaviour in a person's private life can be relevant to a determination under the National Law, particularly given the terms of paragraph (c) of the definition of professional misconduct.
2. We consider that the respondent's behaviour was heinous. It constituted a serious breach of trust and a total disregard of the young woman's right to personal autonomy and dignity. Rather than respect her wishes not to record their sexual activity, and to stop striking her when she asked him to, he persisted (and, in the former case, did so surreptitiously and then circulated the recording to his friendship group).
3. We find that there was a power imbalance between the respondent and the young woman in that the young woman was vulnerable to the respondent. She quite reasonably would have expected that the respondent, as someone with whom she had been in an intimate relationship for some time, would respect her wishes that their sexual activity not be recorded and that he would stop striking her during that activity when she asked him to.
4. The respondent ought to have understood the profound breach of trust that he was engaging in at the time. He ought to have understood that recording the young woman engaging in sexual activity with him, and later sharing that recording with his friendship group, might have a serious and traumatic effect on her, such as shame, embarrassment and humiliation. As a student psychologist, the respondent ought to have understood, more clearly than many, that the young woman might suffer psychological consequences of his conduct and of his profound breach of her trust.
5. We agree with the Board's submissions that the respondent's conduct was fundamentally incompatible with foundational tenets of professional practice as a psychologist, namely respect for the rights and dignity of others, propriety and integrity.[26] We agree that his conduct was dishonest in respect of the videoing complaint and, in respect of both complaints, was demeaning, disrespectful, objectifying and exploitative of the young woman. We agree that the respondent's misconduct was a serious departure from foundational professional values.
6. We are satisfied that members of the profession, and of the community in general, would view the non-consensual filming and dissemination of the recording to be particularly disgraceful and repugnant.
7. We note that in some circumstances conduct of this nature may amount to a criminal offence.[27] We were informed at the hearing that no criminal proceedings were commenced against the respondent.
8. We are satisfied that the respondent engaged in the behaviour set out in the complaints for no reason other than to meet his personal ends, including to improve or maintain his status with his friendship group and his sense of self-worth, and to achieve his personal sexual gratification. He disclosed to the young woman that it made him feel good "for about five seconds" to send the video[28] and that he was most turned on when she was uncomfortable during sex.[29] He disclosed to AHPRA that the videoing was the "only way he could get a boost".[30] He disclosed to his private psychologist Ms Sarah Larsen-Smith that he sent the video it to "build his self-esteem".[31]
9. We have also taken into account the opinion of psychiatrist Dr Michael Clarke, who assessed the respondent in November 2022, that it is not uncommon for there to be a lack of memory for actions when heavily intoxicated while taking the antidepressant escitalopram[32] but that conscious decision making at the time is not affected.[33]
10. We are not satisfied that there is evidence from which we could find that the respondent was intoxicated to a significant extent during the events in question on 4 July 2021. We agree with the Board that there is no evidence that the respondent was not in control of his faculties at that time. In any event, the respondent said that being intoxicated did not justify or explain his actions and we agree with him.[34]
11. Dr Clarke also opined that the respondent's behaviour appears to have occurred during a depressive episode but that he did not consider that the behaviour could be fully explained by depression. He opined that the respondent's:

broader mood and behavioural instability, self-harm during his adolescence, alcohol abuse and his focus on his own needs at the expense of his partner are suggestive of borderline and narcissistic personality traits also playing a part. ... > > While his history and aspects of his personality suggest an increased risk of him experiencing problems in the future, I consider that he has a favourable prognosis for ongoing stability of his mood and behaviour. > > ... > > It would be advisable for him to continue counselling to help him further address issues that have been raised for him.

12. We are satisfied that the balance of the evidence indicates that the respondent's conduct is inconsistent with him being a fit and proper person to hold registration in the profession of psychology.
13. We are therefore well satisfied that the respondent's behaviour is properly categorised as professional misconduct.
14. To be clear, we have placed no weight on the fact that the intimate relationship between the respondent and the young woman continued for a few months after the conduct referred to in the complaints. This is not relevant.

1. We turn to considering the sanctions that might be imposed under s 196 of the National Law in this case.
2. We are satisfied that our decision on sanction appropriately has regard to the objectives and guiding principles of the National Law set out earlier in these reasons.
3. We are satisfied that our determination adequately addresses the need to ensure appropriate deterrence of the practitioner from repeating this conduct (specific deterrence), deterrence of other practitioners (general deterrence), protection of the public, maintenance of professional standards and of public confidence in the profession.
4. As the respondent is not currently registered, we cannot consider the sanctions in s 196 that relate to circumstances where a person is currently registered, such as suspension, cancellation or imposing conditions on a registration.
5. However, if the respondent had been currently registered, we would have had no hesitation in cancelling his registration.

1. We agree with the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal that:

a reprimand is not a trivial determination. For a professional person it has the potential for serious adverse implications. It tells the public, patients and other practitioners that the standards expected of a practitioner have not been met and that the practitioner has been censured.[35]

2. We have given some thought to whether we should impose a reprimand on the respondent in respect of conduct that he committed in his private life against a person who was not a client.
3. We are satisfied that there is sufficient proximity between the respondent's misconduct and the practise of the profession of psychology. We note that at the time of this misconduct the respondent was a student of a higher degree in clinical psychology and was a mere few months away from obtaining provisional registration and undertaking his first placement.
4. The respondent will be reprimanded.

1. A fine is not a punishment but an attempt to assure the public that practitioner conduct is being appropriately regulated and is designed to maintain public confidence in the regulation of the profession and encourage other practitioners to approach their responsibilities in an appropriate way.[36]
2. For these reasons, a fine has broad functions. We respectfully depart from the view of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal that "a fine is directed more to specific deterrence".[37]
3. The Board has not submitted that we should fine the respondent.
4. We consider that the other sanctions imposed in these reasons are adequate and we consider that nothing further would be served by imposing a fine on the respondent.

1. The Western Australian State Administrative Tribunal observed that:

... 'the power to order a period of disqualification is to be exercised for the protective purposes that apply to the disciplinary proceeding generally' and ... 'all of the various aspects of the protection of the public will be relevant to whether the Tribunal orders a period of disqualification, and, if so, what that period should be'. > > The aspects of the protection of the public include: the immediate need to protect the public from the practitioner's conduct; the need to bring home to the practitioner the seriousness of his or her conduct; the need to deter the practitioner from future breaches; and the need to emphasise to other members of the profession, or reassure the public, that a certain type of conduct is not acceptable professional conduct.[38]

2. We adopt these comments.
3. The Board has proposed that the respondent be disqualified from applying for registration for a period of between 12 and 18 months.
4. We consider in this particular case that the degree and nature of the respondent's insight into his misconduct is particularly relevant to the issue of whether, and for how long, he should be disqualified. The degree and nature of the respondent's insight and reformation is relevant to the issue of specific deterrence and thus protection of the public but also to make it clear to the public and other practitioners that professional standards will be maintained.
5. First, we acknowledge that the respondent apologised to the young woman later on the day of the events in question in text messages exchanged with her.[39] We note also that he admitted to his conduct in 2022 in an interview that August with the Board regarding the immediate action process and to Dr Clarke that November.[40] Dr Clarke observed that the respondent was "greatly remorseful for his actions".[41]
6. This weighs in the respondent's favour.
7. We note that, in July 2024, in his formal response to the first of the complaints, the respondent said:

I have no memory of that particular evening after arriving at the individual's house ... I admit my guilt ... fully and with complete remorse, I cannot imagine the initial, as well as the ongoing damage my actions have caused to the individual involved, and have spent the time since it happened to the present moment thinking about it. It is a hard fact to face, given my desire to support and help people improve themselves and their lives, to have done something so horrible to another person, and even harder knowing that this person was a friend at the time who only wanted the best for me. I am incredibly sorry for my actions and have taken time to reflect on what I have done, and have spent large amounts of time and effort working on myself to prevent anything similar from happening again. Since this incident I can attest to the fact that nothing remotely similar has happened, nor has there been any interest in something similar.[42]

8. In respect of the second complaint, the respondent said:

I have no memory of the evening this happened...Prior to this moment the individual and I had engaged in certain BDSM like practices such as slapping and choking, which at the time I viewed as consensual. ... Regardless of this, if this did occur as outlined, I am disgusted with my behaviour. Like the first incident I had spent a great deal of time since this evening to the present moment thinking about this. After the evening in question, we spoke more fully about the BDSM like practices that had occurred during our sexual relationship, including when the individual joined myself and my psychologist briefly to discuss their concerns. At this point it became clear to me that while we had discussions about our sexual preferences and things we wanted to do, we had never fully spoken about it. This realisation caused me a great deal of distress, and as such I undertook a wave of research and reflection to bring myself to a point where I could be sure nothing like this could happen again. I now pride myself on my commitment to transparency and open dialogue with my partner regarding any similar issues. > > I believe I am not at risk of anything similar to this occurring again due to what I have mentioned above, as well as my coming to terms and processing being sexually assaulted in 2018. In hindsight this moment began my interest in BDSM and similar practices. It was only resolved when I analysed this event and how it changed my perceptions of sex and what it meant to have sex. Upon processing this my interest in BDSM and similar practices stopped, as I came to terms with what happened and recentered my beliefs and perceptions of sex to a healthier place I have not engaged in anything similar since my relationship with the individual involved. > > I understand that this explanation does not justify any of my actions, and I do not seek to explain them away. I am fully aware of the pain and damage my actions may have caused, and think often about the long-term consequences of my actions on the individual. This is something I feel deeply ashamed of.[43]

9. These sentiments are similar to those the respondent expressed to AHPRA in March 2023 in a written response to the notification against him.[44] He said that he was deeply ashamed of, and often thinks about, the video recording incident and that it is without a doubt the biggest mistake of his life. He said that he struggled to come to terms with what he had done and how he could have done it to someone he cared about. He said that after the alleged sexual assault in 2018, sex had become about power and control to him, rather than something that happens between two individuals for the sake of pleasure, or love, or both.
10. We note also an undated, open letter from the respondent included in the Book of Documents.[45] It states:

These are disgusting actions to admit to... I have thought about that night and my actions every day since, and not a moment has gone by where I haven't felt intense guilt and shame for them. Thinking about the trauma and damage I have inflicted upon [the young woman] only furthers this guilt. Knowing that she may not trust her partners again, or feel safe and protected when at her most vulnerable makes me feel sick. The distress I witnessed first hand in the weeks and months following the event, her feeling of betrayal, the anxiety around her most private moments being shared with others, the depression at knowing it was someone she trusted who did this. And while I acknowledge the trauma my actions have caused, I am overwhelmed when I think about all the potential psychological sequelae that has gone unseen to me since her and I last spoke ... > > I have come to believe and understand that [these actions] came from a place of pure selfishness, one that I thought would only benefit myself. At the time I was quite depressed, and I think that in that moment I embraced a foundation of toxic masculine beliefs I did not realise I had, and felt that my ego would be boosted if some friends saw me sleeping with an attractive woman ... > > As for the slapping, I believe this comes from a moment that occurred in 2018, where I was sexually assaulted while travelling. With hindsight it is clear that after this happened my views around sex and what sex was changed for the worse. My experiences led me to a place where sex was something that happened to people, not something shared between them ... > > Around August 2022 I came across the research of Kristin Neff and her work on self-compassion. Using this I was able to understand that without self-compassion I would never be able to change and make sure that I did not repeat my actions, by understanding that what I had done was terrible but did not mean I was a terrible person, I allowed myself the space to critically reflect on what I had done. I was able to think of what motivated me on the night and work backwards from that to work on preventing a repeat ... > > I have also spent a great deal of time engaging in education around consent and how I could have misunderstood this. This has taken the form of reading research in the field, and going over the basics in a thorough manner.... > > I believe that due to these efforts, I will not repeat my actions again. These are changes made to my entire being, that are future oriented, and have left me in a much healthier space than I was in in 2021 ... > > There are no excuses for my actions... they are actions that I will be forced to live with for the rest of my life, and the guilt I feel for having hurt someone so profoundly, caused long term damage, and for such selfish and misguided reasons, is something I will struggle to reconcile and pay back for years to come. I am committed to doing whatever I can to address the damage I have done and understand that my actions have serious consequences.

11. The young woman's victim impact statement speaks of the serious and wide-ranging physical, psychological and emotional consequences for her of the respondent's behaviour.[46] These consequences ought to have been reasonably predictable, more so by a person such as the respondent who had training and education in the practice of psychology.
12. We consider that the material before the Tribunal clearly indicates that the respondent has an understanding that he should not have committed the misconduct that is the subject of these proceedings and that he has an understanding that he should be remorseful and that he has harmed the young woman that was the victim of his misconduct. This is to his credit. But there is a limit to how much weight we can place on this where there is little evidence of the steps he has taken and little objective evidence as to the changes those steps have brought about in the respondent.
13. The respondent has referred to the quantity of personal time he has spent reflecting on what he has done and other measures he has taken to improve himself. Evidence of him having done so would speak to his commitment to change. Evidence that any measures taken by the respondent were positively productive would also have assisted him. However, as noted, there is limited evidence to corroborate the respondent's assertions either as to the steps he has taken towards reformation or as to the outcome of any such measures he has taken.
14. We agree with Mr Relf's submission that, where behaviour is fundamentally inconsistent with foundational expectations, "good hard evidence of consistent engagement in activities towards rehabilitation and reformation are necessary".[47]
15. We are concerned also that the respondent appears to have engaged in a marked degree of self-diagnosis and "self-treatment" rather than seek out skilled or professional assistance.
16. We agree with the Board that the evidence of tangible steps taken in support of reformation is limited. Despite the almost four years that has elapsed since the incidents that are the subject of the complaints against the respondent, there is no concrete evidence that he has undertaken any counselling, training or education to develop his insights into the matter. For this reason, we cannot be satisfied that the respondent has demonstrated a willingness to take measures to identify risk factors and to avoid similar behaviour.
17. We observe that, despite the many sessions of supervision and discussion with Mr Evans between March 2023 and August 2024, the written summaries submitted to AHPRA by Mr Evans of these sessions did not appear to delve significantly, or at all, into the genesis of the respondent's misconduct and the degree and nature of the harm experienced by the young woman, nor what the respondent might do, or had done, to reform his character.[48] We were not particularly assisted by these reports and have given them little weight. They were unusually brief and repetitive, and restated each time with no elaboration that the topics covered included respectful relationships and consent and that the respondent presented as insightful into his past actions. Of course, this does not mean that the sessions with Mr Evans did not explore in a meaningful and useful way the important issues of insight and character reformation. It is just that Mr Evans' reports present no evidence of that.
18. In the respondent's written submissions of 16 April 2025, he appended what he states are extracts of his diary entries of sessions with Mr Evans from January 2023 to May 2024. If these brief extracts are a truthful and genuine account of the sessions with Mr Evans, we note that the sessions would appear initially to have dealt with the ethical considerations of the respondent's conduct towards the young woman, and issues such as consent and respectful relationships. However, within two or three months, it would appear that the focus of the discussions during these sessions (or, at least, the topics the respondent considered noting in his diary) largely concerned issues about his return to placement and the AHPRA proceedings.
19. In any event, we cannot place significant weight on these diary extracts. They are unsworn and uncorroborated by Mr Evans.
20. We note that the respondent told Dr Clarke that he had been sanctioned by the University Sports Association in July 2022 for the video recording incident and that part of the sanction required him to attend counselling to mitigate the risk of similar behaviour occurring in the future.[49] It seems that the respondent did not persist with more than about four sessions of counselling as he says he sought permission from the University to have his sessions with Mr Evans counted towards that.[50] There is no evidence of this permission and, importantly, there is no evidence that the four sessions occurred, what was dealt with in them or the outcome of those sessions.
21. Similarly, there are references in Dr Clarke's assessment to the respondent attending appointments with Ms Larsen-Smith for most of 2021 but we also have not been told anything of significance about that treatment and how it might relate to the respondent's sexual misconduct.[51] We do not know if the respondent acted on Dr Clarke's recommendation that he continue with counselling.
22. We understand also that the respondent had enrolled in an online consent workshop from the University of Victoria in April 2023, but did not undertake that course. The respondent explained that he initially understood that the University of Victoria was in Australia, when it is in fact in British Columbia, and the online hours would conflict with his shift at the supermarket where he works. The respondent said that he had checked other opportunities for him to attend similar workshops but "most" were only offered to large corporate groups.[52] We were not impressed by this reason for not persisting with the Canadian course or pursue others and consider that it demonstrates the respondent's lack of commitment to pursuing personal growth and his prioritising his personal interests.[53]
23. We are concerned also that there is a significant degree of "impression management" in the written expressions of acknowledgement and remorse from the respondent. We observed the same to be true in the respondent's personal presentation at the hearing. In other words, we are concerned that the respondent, who by all appearances is an intelligent and articulate young man, is simply telling us what he thinks we need to hear from him and that it does not reflect a genuine and profound comprehension of his conduct and the effect of it on the young woman, or of the professional and personal qualities required of a clinical psychologist.
24. In summary, we have largely only the respondent's assertions of reform. There is no evidence from objective skilled professionals that the measures the respondent says he has pursued have been effective. Without this, we cannot find (as the respondent is urging us to) that he will not repeat this conduct again and that "the risk of repeat behaviour is ... zero".[54] We cannot be satisfied that he understands why he engaged in that conduct and we cannot be satisfied that he has a real empathy and understanding of the consequences on the young woman of his behaviour.
25. We agree with the submissions of the Board that by far the most reliable evidence of insight and measures taken by the respondent to avoid similar behaviour is appropriate actions taken by him, rather than the volume of hypotheses or the earnestness with which they are expressed by him.
26. The respondent asked us to place weight on the lack of issues across two placements, with different Board approved supervisors and the supervision of him by Mr Evans.[55] We recognise that there is no other adverse information against the respondent. We consider however that we should be cautious before placing a significant amount of weight on assertions of good conduct that took place when the respondent knew he was being scrutinised by AHPRA and when he would have known that his future as a psychologist would be at risk if there were further misconduct. We consider that greater weight can be placed on evidence of good conduct that occurs outside of a supervised context.
27. We agree with Mr Relf's observations that the nature of psychological practice will very likely involve clients with confronting issues relating to consent, gendered violence and exploitation, either as a victim survivors or perpetrators.[56] We concur with the Board's view that, in psychology practice, clients have a higher than average degree of vulnerability, there is an inherent power imbalance involving a high degree of personal exposure of the part of the client and the concomitant risk to the client's welfare. We agree with the Board's submissions that, due to the highly personal information necessarily disclosed during psychological treatment, a perception that the respondent's conduct is tolerated may undermine the public's confidence and risk influencing healthcare choices taken by members of the community.
28. We are satisfied that the respondent has not shown his fitness to practice and that, if the respondent were able to practice as a psychologist (or undertake a placement as a psychology student) immediately or in the near future, the public would not be adequately protected and the standards of the professional would not be adequately maintained. We agree that, for these reasons, that the protection of the public requires a substantial period before the respondent should be in a position where he might be dealing clinically with members of the public. As noted above, if the respondent were currently registered, we would have cancelled his registration.
29. In all the circumstances, we consider that the higher limit of what the Board has proposed as the period of disqualification is adequate. We take into account that the respondent has already been unregistered since October 2024.
30. An 18 month period of disqualification means that the respondent will not be able to apply for registration until December 2026. He must then, of course, persuade the Board that he ought to obtain registration.
31. We recommend to the Board that, when considering registering the respondent in the future, the Board satisfy itself that the respondent has evidenced adequate improvement to his insight and reformation of character, and that it consider how he has responded to the sanctions and what steps he has taken to address and correct the root causes of his misconduct.[57] We note that, at the conclusion of the hearing, the respondent indicated to us (albeit in somewhat of a tentative fashion) his willingness to consult a forensic psychologist, and to consult a regular psychologist on other issues such as his narcissism and borderline personality disorder, and to pursue training on the issue of consent.[58]
32. We have placed no significant weight in making our decision on the personal character references provided by the respondent, including from his current partner and other close associates.[59] These are subjective, lay assessments by persons already predisposed to think well of the respondent. Also, we cannot be certain that these persons are aware of the full particulars of the complaints against the respondent.

The effect of disqualification on the respondent's degree candidature

1. Before leaving the topic of disqualification, we turn to submissions made by the respondent to the effect that he must complete the requirements of his Masters course by the end of the second semester in 2026. We understand his submissions to be that we should take into account that he must undertake a further period of clinical placement to qualify for his degree and that he will need to obtain registration from the Board in order to undertake that placement and complete it prior to the end of the second semester in 2026.
2. The respondent indicated that the placement would take between 16 and 18 weeks and involve 175 hours of direct client contact. He said that an 18 month "suspension" [sic, disqualification] would leave him unable to complete his final placement and, as a result, he would not be able to complete his degree.[60] He indicated that, if he was unable to complete his degree, he would have to "do the whole course again. I wouldn't be able to carry over any credits"[61] and suggested that the degree has a low intake quota and that he may find it difficult to reapply for candidature.
3. In other words, we understood the respondent to be submitting, in effect, that he should not receive a period of disqualification that would prevent him from obtaining provisional registration in time to complete his placement prior to the end of the second semester in 2026.
4. In dealing with this particular submission, we remind ourselves of two things.
5. First, that the authorities are clear that the purpose of sanctions under the National Law is entirely to protect the public and that the personal or professional consequences on the respondent are of limited significance.
6. Secondly, that s 196 requires that any period of disqualification imposed on the respondent be for a specified period. We cannot disqualify the respondent indefinitely or permanently from applying for registration.
7. We consider therefore that, in making our decision, we should be alive to the prospect that any disqualification period we may impose on the respondent may, as a practical consequence, prevent him from completing his Masters studies and therefore prevent him indefinitely or permanently from applying for registration as a psychologist. In other words, if the respondent were unable to obtain provisional registration to undertake his remaining placement before the end of 2026, would we be precluding the respondent from ever obtaining provisional or full registration as a psychologist?
8. For this reason, at the conclusion of the hearing, we invited both parties to address us further on:
   1. whether the respondent may be permitted an extension by his university to complete the requirements for his Masters candidature; and
   2. whether the respondent may be permitted to re-enrol in his Masters course; and
   3. whether the respondent may receive status or credit for previous Masters studies and/or placements if he were to re-enrol.
9. The respondent provided a letter dated 6 May 2025 from Professor Peter Strelan, Head of School, School of Psychology, University of Adelaide. The Board provided responding submissions on 13 May 2025. We have taken these materials into account. The Board's submissions are consistent with the approach that we have taken in considering this issue.
10. Professor Strelan prefaced his letter by saying that it is difficult to comment on the respondent's case beyond 2025 as the new Adelaide University, which will be created by consolidating the existing University of Adelaide and the University of South Australia on 1 January 2026, will have its own rules, policies and procedures.
11. In brief, Professor Strelan indicated that:
    1. the end point of the maximum duration of the respondent's Masters degree is the end of semester 2, 2026;
    2. there are processes in place in accordance with the University's Coursework Academic Programs Policy to enable students to request consideration for an extension to the maximum program duration. In this regard, currency of learning is likely to be a consideration when a student has had an extended period in which they have being unable to actively engage in skills, knowledge, or competency development relevant to their Masters degree program;
    3. the respondent received a fail grade for the course Master of Psychology (Clinical) Placement III in semester 2 2024 because he was unable to complete the placement requirements due to not being registered as a provisional psychologist. He must complete this course to qualify for the Masters degree;
    4. a student who has been admitted to the Masters degree program is able to enrol in the individual courses that comprise that program provided the maximum duration of the program has not been reached (see above); all prerequisites for that course have been completed; the student has not received a fail grade for the same course on more than one previous occasion; and any relevant requirements for that particular course (for example, AHPRA registration for placement courses) have been met; and
    5. if the respondent can meet the requirements to enrol in the Master of Psychology (Clinical) Placement III course for a second time, and receives a fail grade for that course on a second occasion, he will not be able to complete this course and therefore will not be eligible to complete the Master of Psychology (Clinical) degree at the University of Adelaide.
12. We are satisfied that, assuming completion of the Master of Psychology (Clinical) degree is a prerequisite for registration as a psychologist,[62] there is no evidence before us that disqualifying the respondent from applying for registration for 18 months would conclusively prevent the respondent from applying again for registration as a psychologist indefinitely or permanently. There is no evidence to support the respondent's pessimistic view of the matter. While there will be hurdles for the respondent to overcome, it appears that there is (at least currently) a pathway for the respondent to seek an extension of the maximum duration of his candidature and then to reenrol in the Master of Psychology (Clinical) Placement III course that he requires to complete his Masters degree.
13. Therefore, while we are alive to the potential consequences of disqualifying the respondent for a period of 18 months, we have given it no significant weight in our considerations.
14. We entirely agree with the Board's submissions that we "should not identify a nominally appropriate period of disqualification and then reduce it in order to accommodate [the respondent's academic] ambitions".[63] The difficulties that an appropriate period of disqualification will pose for the respondent ought to bring home to him the seriousness of his misconduct and assist to achieve specific and general deterrence, and to assure members of the public of the maintenance of professional standards.

1. In Osteopathy Board of Australia v Ratcliff, it was observed:

It would undermine the effectiveness and reputation of the system for the regulation of the profession, if a practitioner who is disqualified from seeking registration as an osteopath for six years is able, and seen to be able, to work as a masseur. That is, carrying out work which has many similarities to, and utilises many of the same skills, as osteopathy. It would be seen as a 'backdoor' way of overcoming orders for cancellation and disqualification.[64]

2. We agree with the logic of these observations as to the prohibition sanction.
3. The Board has proposed that the respondent be prohibited from providing any health service to any patient, client or consumer unless in the presence of a third person until he is registered again in a health profession.
4. Given the findings we have made about the lack of evidence of adequate insight and reformation, we do not consider that the public will be adequately protected, or the standards of the profession adequately maintained, if the respondent were able to provide a health service in the circumstances proposed by the Board, i.e. if in the presence of a third person. Therefore, we will not make orders in the precise terms proposed by the Board.
5. We agree however that the respondent should be prohibited from providing a health service until he is registered again in a health profession.

1. Section 195 of the National Law empowers the Tribunal to make any order about costs it considers appropriate for the proceedings.
2. The Board seeks its costs. We see no reason to depart from the usual position in proceedings under the National Law in this Tribunal that the respondent bear the Board's costs.

1. These reasons may be published by the Tribunal. The parties may have a view as to whether any redactions to these reasons need to be made in light of the Tribunal's directions of 7 May 2024 that prohibited the publication of the name of, or any material tending to identify, the young woman referred to in the complaints. Any such submissions by the parties must be received within 14 days of the date of these reasons.
2. Addendum: No redactions were requested by either party.

1. The Tribunal decides pursuant to s 196(1) of the National Law that:

1.a. The respondent has behaved in a way that constitutes professional misconduct.

1. The Tribunal imposes the following disciplinary action:

2.b. The respondent is disqualified from applying for registration as a registered health practitioner for a period of 18 months from the date of this order.

2.c. The respondent is prohibited from providing any health service to any patient, client or consumer until he is registered again in a health profession.

1. The respondent must pay the costs of the Board to be agreed or fixed by the Tribunal.

[1] Schedule 2, Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (South Australia) Act 2010.

[6] "Health service" has the meaning set out in s 5 of the National Law.

[7] Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33 at [36].

[8] Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34, (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 362-363 per Dixon J.

[9] Medical Board of Australia v Ainsworth (Review and Regulation) [2019] VCAT 734 at [52].

[10] See for example Paramedicine Board of Australia v Jackson [2023] SACAT 66 at [29] - [30], where the President of the Tribunal cites Maroulis v Psychology Board of Australia [2021] SASC 16.

[11] Pharmacy Board of Australia v Roberts [2022] SACAT 111 at [39] - [46] (footnotes in original omitted).

[12] Medical Board of Australia v Singh [2017] WASAT 33 (S) at [30] (all internal citations omitted).

[13] Wiliams v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (Occupational and Business Regulation) [2008] VCAT 1784 at [99].

[14] Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield [1997] NSWSC 297.

[15] See also Pharmacy Board of Australia v Roberts [2022] SACAT 111 at [51].

[16] Medical Board of Australia v Holten [2019] VCAT 837 at [32]. See also Chiropractic Board of Australia v Oborne [2023] VCAT 770 at [30].

[17] Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Chalmers [2015] VCAT 2061; Physiotherapy Board of Australia v Montalto [2019] VCAT 1445; Medical Board of Australia v Arulanandarajah [2021] VCAT 85; Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Pickett [2021] VCAT 162; Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Farrow [2022] VCAT 43; Medical Board of Australia v Isman [2023] VCAT 232; and Physiotherapy Board of Australia v Rivett [2024] SACAT 5.

[18] [2020] SASCFC 74 at [79] (internal citation omitted).

[19] Medical Board of Australia v Grajn [2023] QCAT 433 at [47] and Chiropractic Board of Australia v Oborne [2023] VCAT 770 at [30]. See also the recent endorsement of the Tribunal of this approach in Chiropractic Board of Australia v Riordan [2024] SACAT 110 at [43]).

[20] Paramedicine Board of Australia v Jackson; Physiotherapy Board of Australia v Smith [2025] SASCA 25.

[21] Section 138 commenced in this form on 15 May 2023.

[22] Commonwealth of Australia v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate; Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46 at [57] - [58]; Medical Board of Australia v Siow [2016] SAHPT 1 at [38].

[23] Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v TGA [2021] VCAT 220; Osteopathy Board of Australia v Ratcliff [2021] VCAT 658; Podiatry Board of Australia v McMurray [2022] VCAT 1222; and Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Gibbs [2025] VCAT 231.

[24] And also the paragraph (b) definition.

[25] Except in the circumstances anticipated in section 139, which are not relevant here. See also Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Dunjey [2024] QCAT 96.

[26] As reflected in the three general ethical principles in the Australian Psychological Society's Code of Ethics.

[27] Part 5A, Summary Offences Act 1953.

[28] Book of Documents, Document 13, p 89.

[29] Book of Documents, Document 13, p 99.

[30] Book of Documents, Document 6, [16].

[35] Medical Board of Australia v Ainsworth (Review and Regulation) [2019] VCAT 734 at [80] (internal footnote omitted).

[36] Osteopathy Board of Australia v Gardner [2024] SACAT 111 at [74].

[37] Medical Board of Australia v YZV [2024] VCAT 1134 at [58].

[38] Medical Board of Australia v Forgione [2022] WASAT 67 at [71] - [72] (internal citations omitted).

[40] Book of Documents, Documents 6 and 10.

[48] Book of Documents, Documents 17-32.

[50] Respondent's submissions, 16 April 2025; Transcript, p 24.

[51] We note that the Book of Documents, at Document 12, contains some handwritten notes apparently made by Ms Larsen-Smith during a consultation with the respondent on 24 September 2021 but this is not a professional report and is not helpful to us.

[52] Respondent's submissions, 16 April 2025.

[53] We note that it is the Board's position that there are free courses on consent offered by each of the three South Australian Universities: Transcript, pp15 - 16.

[54] Respondent's submissions, 16 April 2025.

[55] Respondent's submissions, 16 April 2025.

[57] See the extract from the decision of Marin v Chiropractic Board of Australia cited earlier in these reasons.

[59] Book of Documents, Documents 33, 34, 35, 37 and separate statement provided by the respondent on 16 April 2025.

[60] Respondent's submissions, 16 April 2025.

[62] Essentially, we have been asked to infer this.

[63] Board's submissions, 13 May 2025, at [10].

[64] [2021] VCAT 658 at [144].