Plaintiff v Defendant

1 In this proceeding, Fiona Austin sought leave to appeal from a series of personal safety intervention orders made against her since 26 August 2016 under the Personal Safety Intervention Orders Act 2010 (Vic). The respondent to the proceeding is Trent Dwyer, a detective senior constable of Victoria Police, who has been the applicant for the intervention orders made against Ms Austin since June 2019. The earlier intervention orders were made on the application of a young man who I will refer to as the affected person. Mr Dwyer was also the informant in a number of criminal charges against Ms Austin.

2 On 26 July 2024, Ierodiaconou AsJ disallowed Ms Austin's application for leave to appeal.[1] Ms Austin was later ordered to pay Mr Dwyer's costs. Ms Austin filed a notice of appeal in respect of both orders. On 3 July 2025, I made orders dismissing Ms Austin's appeal, and ordered her to pay Mr Dwyer's costs of the notice of appeal.[2]

3 In the course of deciding the appeal, I formed the view that it was time for the Court to consider whether it should make a litigation restraint order against Ms Austin under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 (Vic). That view was based on Ms Austin's litigation history, her conduct in this proceeding, and the following exchange that took place towards the end of the hearing of the appeal:

HER HONOUR: ...I have a question, and if you'd let me finish it, you can answer it. So I've become familiar with the large number of proceedings that you've brought in relation to the personal safety intervention orders that are the subject of this proceeding. And it seems to me that apart from a small procedural success in the Court of Appeal last year, you've not been successful in any of those proceedings. And I do wonder after 10 years, when does it end?

MS AUSTIN: When I get justice.

HER HONOUR: And what would that look like for you?

MS AUSTIN: To have all of those orders declared invalid. They're - they're invalid. And you say, 'Oh look at all the applications there'. No. Every single one of those is in response to an application by Trent Dwyer and his lawyers. Every single one. It is them who are making all of the applications... I am just trying to defend myself.

...

HER HONOUR: Ms Austin, are you going to persist in bringing these proceedings until you get justice, as you describe it?

MS AUSTIN: Absolutely. Absolutely. ...

4 Accordingly, I made directions for the parties to file evidence and submissions relevant to the Court's power to make an order pursuant to s 17(1) or s 29(1) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act of its own motion. Both parties filed material as directed. Mr Dwyer, as a representative of Victoria Police, submitted that the Court should make a litigation restraint order in respect of Ms Austin, either generally or in respect of certain people, entities and matters. Ms Austin opposed the making of any order. Both parties appeared and made oral submissions at a hearing on 30 January 2026.

5 For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that a general litigation order can and should be made against Ms Austin.

Vexatious Proceedings Act - Provisions and principles

6 The Vexatious Proceedings Act was introduced to reform and consolidate the law regarding vexatious proceedings in Victoria, in a way that balances individual rights of access to the court and the public interest in an efficient and effective justice system.[3] The Act empowers Victorian courts and the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) to make several different types of orders restraining a person from commencing or continuing a proceeding without leave.[4] A person who is subject to a litigation restraint order must obtain leave from the relevant court or VCAT before commencing or continuing a proceeding specified in the order.

7 The Court may make a litigation restraint order on an application or on its own motion.[5] In either case, the Court must not make a litigation restraint order against the person without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity to be heard, either in writing or at an oral hearing.[6]

8 A 'vexatious proceeding' is defined in s 3 to include:

(a) a proceeding that is an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal;

(b) a proceeding commenced to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose;

(c) a proceeding commenced or pursued without reasonable grounds;

(d) a proceeding conducted in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose.

9 A 'proceeding' is defined in s 3 to mean 'any matter in an Australian court or tribunal, whether civil or criminal', and includes appeals, applications for judicial review, and interlocutory applications.

10 As Quigley J observed in Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of Victoria v Taylor:[7]

The term 'vexatious proceeding' is not necessarily limited to the matters in sub-paragraphs (a)-(d) of the definition. The authorities in considering the predecessor power which was found in (the now repealed) section 21 of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), and the litigation restraint schemes in other jurisdictions are also relevant. Accordingly, in addition to the factors expressly identified, a proceeding may also be characterised as 'vexatious' where:

(a) the litigant brings proceedings in order to restore the wrongs of a perceived conspiracy against them, or otherwise to gain retribution against those who had committed perceived wrongs; or

(b) the proceedings involve 'outlandish allegations' and seek 'forms of relief that the Courts do not grant', even if it were possible for the Court to identify an arguable cause of action; or

(c) the proceedings are an attempt to relitigate matters that have been decided previously, or should have been raised previously.

11 Whether a proceeding was vexatious depends on its nature and substance, which can generally be determined by reference to court records. The character of a proceeding should be apparent from the court's reasons for judgment and its orders. If a proceeding has been dismissed or struck out on the ground that it is vexatious or an abuse of process, it is usually unnecessary to look behind that order.[8]

12 The authorities as to whether a proceeding is 'vexatious' were conveniently summarised in Mr Dwyer's written submissions:[9]

In accordance with relevant authorities, the 'vexatious proceedings' requirement may be satisfied where, among other circumstances: a person brings proceedings to right the wrong of a perceived conspiracy against them;[10] proceedings involve 'outlandish allegations' and seek 'forms of relief that the courts do not grant' (even if it may be possible for the Court to identify a cause of action for which, arguably, there may be some form of remedy);[11] proceedings are an attempt to re-litigate that which has already been determined by a final and binding decision of a court;[12] proceedings are so obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless;[13] or a person has caused others to incur legal costs in responding to hopeless applications, in circumstances where they have blithely disregarded costs orders made against them.[14] Proceedings may be vexatious even though they are not completely devoid of merit or brought in bad faith.[15]

13 Under s 29(1), the Court may make a general litigation restraint order if it is satisfied that a person has 'persistently and without reasonable grounds commenced or conducted vexatious proceedings.' Section 29 provides:

Supreme Court may make general litigation restraint order

(1) The Supreme Court constituted by a Judge of the Court may make a general litigation restraint order against a person if the Court is satisfied that the person has persistently and without reasonable grounds commenced or conducted vexatious proceedings.

(2) In determining whether it is satisfied of the matters specified in subsection (1), the Supreme Court may take into account any matter it considers relevant, including but not limited to any of the following -

(a) any proceeding commenced or conducted by the person, or an entity controlled by the person, in any Australian court or tribunal;

(b) the existence of any order made by an Australian court or tribunal against the person, or an entity controlled by the person, including -

(i) a litigation restraint order; or

(ii) an acting in concert order; or

(iii) a vexatious proceeding order;

(c) any other matter relating to the way in which the person conducts or has conducted litigation.

(3) The Supreme Court may take into account a matter referred to in subsection (2) that relates to a proceeding commenced or conducted before, on or after the commencement of this section.

(4) The Supreme Court may make a general litigation restraint order -

(a) on its own motion; or

(b) on an application under section 28.

14 In the context of s 29, 'persistently' has been interpreted to mean 'continually and repeatedly', and to suggest 'determination' and 'continuing in the face of difficulty, with a degree of stubbornness'.[16] The term 'persistently' is intended to represent a higher threshold than the term 'frequently', but there is no quantitative threshold. A person may 'persistently' commence a small number of proceedings that seek to relitigate issues that have already been decided.[17]

15 Proceedings are commenced or continued 'without reasonable grounds' where they have been conducted without a proper basis.[18]

16 Section 30 specifies the content of a general litigation restraint order:

(1) A general litigation restraint order made against a person may direct that the person must not do either or both of the following for the period specified by the Supreme Court -

(a) continue any proceeding in a Victorian court or tribunal without leave of -

(i) the Supreme Court; or

(ii) the Victorian court or tribunal in which the proceeding is being heard;

(b) commence any proceeding in a Victorian court or tribunal without leave of -

(i) the Supreme Court; or

(ii) the Victorian court or tribunal in which the proceeding is to be commenced.

(2) A general litigation order may include any other direction or order that the Supreme Court considers appropriate.

(3) Without limiting subsection (2), the Supreme Court may direct that the person who is subject to the general litigation restraint order may commence or continue a specified proceeding in a Victorian court or tribunal.

17 The Court may make an extended litigation restraint order under s 17(1) if it is satisfied that a person has 'frequently commenced or conducted vexatious proceedings' 'against a person or other entity' or 'in relation to a matter'. Section 17 provides:

Court or VCAT may make extended litigation restraint order

(1) A Court or VCAT may make an extended litigation restraint order against a person if the Court or VCAT is satisfied that the person has frequently commenced or conducted vexatious proceedings -

(a) against a person or other entity; or

(b) in relation to a matter.

(2) In determining whether it is satisfied of the matters specified in subsection (1), a Court or VCAT may take into account any matter it considers relevant, including but not limited to any of the following -

(a) a proceeding commenced or conducted by the person, or an entity controlled by the person, in any Australian court or tribunal;

(b) the existence of an order made by an Australian court or tribunal against the person, or an entity controlled by the person, including -

(i) a litigation restraint order; or

(ii) an acting in concert order; or

(iii) a vexatious proceeding order;

(c) any other matter relating to the way in which the person conducts or has conducted litigation.

(3) A Court or VCAT may take into account a matter referred to in subsection (2) that relates to a proceeding commenced or conducted before, on or after the commencement of this section.

(4) A Court or VCAT may make an extended litigation restraint order -

(a) on its own motion; or

(b) on an application under section 16.

18 Section 20 provides for the content of an extended litigation restraint order made by this Court, in the following terms:

Content of extended litigation restraint order made by Supreme Court

(1) An extended litigation restraint order made by the Supreme Court against a person may direct that the person must not do either or both of the following for the period specified by the Supreme Court -

(a) continue a proceeding in a Victorian court or tribunal against a person or other entity named in the order, or in respect of a matter described in the order, without leave of -

(i) the Supreme Court; or

(ii) the Victorian court or tribunal in which the proceeding is being heard;

(b) commence a proceeding in a Victorian court or tribunal against a person or other entity named in the order, or in respect of a matter described in the order, without leave of -

(i) the Supreme Court; or

(ii) the Victorian court or tribunal in which the proceeding is to be commenced.

(2) An extended litigation restraint order made by the Supreme Court may include any other direction or order that the Supreme Court considers appropriate.

(3) Without limiting subsection (2), the Supreme Court may direct that the person who is subject to the order may commence or continue a specified proceeding in a Victorian court or tribunal.

19 If the Court is satisfied that the criteria for making a general litigation restraint order or an extended litigation restraint order exist, it has a discretion whether to make an order, on what terms, and for what duration.[19] The discretion is to be exercised by reference to the subject matter and purpose of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, in a way that balances individual rights of access to the Courts with the public interest in an efficient and effective justice system. As Quigley J said in Taylor:

Litigation restraint orders have been described as serving a general protective purpose to shield both the public, whose individual members might be molested by vexatious proceedings, and the Court itself, whose limited resources needs must be carefully managed and protected from the expense, burden, and inconvenience of repetitious suits.[20]

20 It will ordinarily be appropriate for the Court to make an order, unless there is good reason to believe that the person's established pattern of bringing vexatious proceedings will not continue.[21] In that regard, the impact of the person's vexatious proceedings on other litigants and the justice system is relevant, as is any insight shown by the person.[22]

21 Ms Austin is a former high school teacher. On 26 August 2016, the affected person, a former student of Ms Austin's, applied for and was granted an interim personal safety intervention order (PSIO), ordering Ms Austin to refrain from stalking, assaulting or harassing, contacting or communicating with, or publishing material about the affected person. A final PSIO was made on 28 September 2016. Various other PSIOs have been made against her since that time, with substantially the same requirements.

22 On 18 October 2016, Ms Austin was charged with a number of criminal offences, including stalking the affected person, using a carriage service to harass, and breaching the final PSIO. On 7 December 2016, Ms Austin was charged with further breaches of the final PSIO and of her bail conditions. In 2022, a jury found Ms Austin guilty of three charges of stalking and of one charge of using a carriage service to harass, and she was sentenced to a term of imprisonment.[23]

23 Ms Austin has represented herself in all of the civil proceedings outlined in the following paragraphs. From May 2018, she also represented herself in the criminal proceedings.

Challenges to intervention orders made in Magistrates' Court proceeding G12353529

24 Many of the proceedings commenced by Ms Austin have stemmed from appeals challenging three PSIOs made against her in Magistrates' Court proceeding G12353529:

(a) first, an interim PSIO made 26 August 2016, (2016 interim PSIO) when the affected person applied for and was granted an order restraining Ms Austin from stalking him, or contacting or communicating with him in any way;

(b) second, a final PSIO made 28 September 2016, (2016 final PSIO) granted in the same terms as the 2016 interim PSIO, for a period of 12 months. Ms Austin says she was unaware of the application for a final PSIO until 3 October 2016, when she was served with a copy of the application and summons. This is so, notwithstanding that the 2016 final PSIO stated that Ms Austin had been served with a copy of the application and summons; and

(c) third, a further interim PSIO made 11 September 2017, (2017 interim PSIO) which extended the 2016 interim PSIO until a final order was made. Ms Austin was remanded in custody at the time and was not present at the hearing on 11 September 2017. She was not served with a copy of this PSIO until 15 September 2017.

25 On 10 March 2017, Ms Austin filed an application in the County Court to appeal from a decision of the Magistrates' Court, refusing an application for a rehearing in proceeding G12353529. On 31 March 2017, Judge Cotterell struck out this appeal because Ms Austin refused to attend the hearing via video link from the Dame Phyllis Frost Centre, where she was imprisoned at the time. On 10 August 2017, Ms Austin applied to set aside the order striking out her appeal, on the grounds that she was unrepresented and was not informed as to what the hearing was about until three days before the hearing. Ms Austin subsequently withdrew her application.

26 On 5 March 2018, Ms Austin made a separate appeal to the County Court in respect of the PSIOs outlined above at [24]. The appeal was dismissed by Judge Taft on 6 June 2018 on the basis that it was brought out of time and that the County Court lacked jurisdiction to extend the time in which to file an appeal.

Austin v Dobbs [2019] VSC 355

27 Ms Austin then commenced Supreme Court proceeding S ECI 2018 00234, seeking judicial review of the County Court's decision to strike out her appeal. Ms Austin also sought judicial review of orders made by the Magistrates' Court on 15 May 2018, adjourning the hearing of an application for a final PSIO because the magistrate determined that there was insufficient time allocated to hear the application and the magistrate's prior involvement in previous related hearings meant that he should disqualify himself.[24] This became Supreme Court proceeding S ECI 2018 00235. Relevantly, Derham AsJ had already summarily dismissed an appeal regarding that same decision, on 10 December 2018.[25]

28 Proceedings S ECI 2018 00234 and S ECI 2018 00235 were heard together in the Supreme Court before Ginnane J. On 29 May 2019, Ginnane J published reasons for decision in Austin v Dobbs [2019] VSC 355, dismissing both of Ms Austin's appeals. His honour found, (a) that the County Court judge was correct to conclude that no power existed to extend the time in which to file an appeal against the PSIOs,[26] and (b) that the magistrate was justified in adjourning the hearing based on his determination that he should not hear the application, for which there was insufficient time allocated.[27]

29 On 29 August 2019, Ginnane J ordered that Ms Austin pay Mr Dwyer's costs of proceeding S ECI 2018 00234 on the standard basis.

Austin v Dobbs [2019] VSCA 296

30 Ms Austin then applied for leave to appeal from the orders of Ginnane J as to costs, and his Honour's orders dismissing proceedings S ECI 2018 00234 and S ECI 2018 00235. These applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal were heard together with applications by Ms Austin for leave to appeal from:

(a) orders made by Derham AsJ in proceeding S ECI 2018 00261, where his Honour dismissed Ms Austin's application for judicial review of the decision of a magistrate to adjourn a hearing on 15 May 2018; and

(b) orders made by Coghlan JA in proceeding S ECI 2018 02859, where his Honour dismissed an application for judicial review of a special witness declaration made by a magistrate on 10 December 2018 in Ms Austin's criminal proceeding.

31 On 13 December 2019, the Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal in each proceeding.[28] No error of law was found in any proceeding, and the Court held that there was no arguable basis for concluding that an error had been made by Coghlan JA or Magistrate Gilligan at first instance.[29] In its reasons for decision, the Court noted that there had been in excess of 50 hearings or hearing dates scheduled regarding this matter, and that four of the five judicial review proceedings commenced in the Supreme Court by Ms Austin have already been decided against her.[30]

32 Ms Austin subsequently filed applications for special leave to appeal to the High Court, challenging the orders made dismissing each appeal. Ms Austin's applications for special leave were dismissed on 13 May 2020.[31] The reason given for dismissing the applications was that 'in no application is it apparent that there is a sufficient prospect of a successful appeal to warrant the grant of special leave to appeal'.[32]

Challenges to intervention orders made in Magistrates' Court proceeding K11461342

33 Ms Austin has challenged the following intervention orders made in Magistrates' Court proceeding K11461342:

(a) first, an interim PSIO made 14 June 2019 (2019 interim PSIO) in substantially the same terms as the 2017 interim PSIO. Mr Dwyer, as a member of Victoria Police, applied for and was granted the 2019 interim PSIO to replace the 2017 interim PSIO, supplanting his name in place of the affected person so that Victoria Police could act on his behalf at all future court hearings;

(b) second, an interim PSIO made 27 October 2021 (2021 interim PSIO) which included an exception to the requirement that she not approach or communicate with the affected person, save for the purpose of conducting cross-examination of him at her criminal trial; and

(c) third, a final PSIO made 29 November 2022 (2022 final PSIO) in the same terms as the 2021 interim PSIO, due to expire at midnight on 28 November 2027 unless extended or varied before then. The 2022 final PSIO was served on Ms Austin on 16 December 2022 while she was imprisoned at the Dame Phyllis Frost Centre.

34 Ms Austin commenced an appeal in the County Court against the magistrate's decision to grant the 2019 interim PSIO and the decision not to deal with her stay application. This became County Court proceeding AP-19-1476. On 25 October 2019, Judge Pillay struck out Ms Austin's appeal because she did not appear at the hearing.

Austin v Dwyer [2019] VSC 837

35 On 23 July 2019, Ms Austin commenced proceeding S ECI 2019 03477 seeking judicial review of the 2019 interim PSIO. In this proceeding, Ms Austin contested whether there was a proper basis for the PSIO to be made. On 20 December 2019, Forbes J published reasons for decision in Austin v Dwyer [2019] VSC 837, dismissing the proceeding.[33] Her Honour found no error of law.[34]

Austin v Dobbs [2021] VSC 508

36 On 6 November 2019, Ms Austin commenced proceeding S ECI 2019 05218 seeking judicial review of the decision of Judge Pillay on 25 October 2019 to strike out her appeal to the County Court, after Ms Austin failed to appear at a hearing. On 20 August 2021, Forbes J reserved this proceeding for consideration by the Court of Appeal.[35]

Austin v Dwyer & ors [2023] VSC 76

37 On 12 January 2023, Ms Austin sought to apply for judicial review of an interim PSIO that she believed had been made by the Magistrates' Court on 27 October 2022. However, her application for judicial review did not include a copy of the order, and Ms Austin was able to say only that she believed she was the respondent to an interim PSIO.[36] Ms Austin was also under the mistaken belief that the 2021 interim PSIO was made on 27 October 2022, not 2021. Ms Austin's application for judicial review in the Supreme Court came after many attempts to initiate appeals in the Magistrates' Court and the County Court regarding both the 2021 interim PSIO and the 2022 final PSIO. Some of her letters and emails went unanswered.[37]

38 The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court refused to accept Ms Austin's originating motion for filing, on the basis that the proposed proceeding would be irregular and an abuse of process. Ms Austin asked for this decision to be reviewed by a Judge. On 23 February 2023, John Dixon J published reasons for decision in Austin v Dwyer & ors [2023] VSC 76, refusing to direct the Prothonotary to seal the originating motion. Ms Austin could not provide a copy of the form of order she sought to challenge, and, as such, his Honour found that her appeal as it stood was premature.[38]

Current proceeding - Austin v Dwyer [2024] VSC 435 and Austin v Dwyer [2025] VSC 369

39 On 20 April 2023, Ms Austin commenced this proceeding (S ECI 2023 01654) under s 109 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1989 (Vic), in which she sought leave to appeal all of the PSIOs made against her. As outlined above, Ierodiaconou AsJ dismissed the proceeding and awarded costs in favour of Mr Dwyer.[39]

40 Ms Austin appealed those orders, and on 3 July 2025 I made orders dismissing that appeal, for the reasons given in Austin v Dwyer [2025] VSC 369.

41 Ms Austin applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal from the orders of Forbes J made on 10 February 2020, dismissing proceeding S ECI 2019 03477. That application was heard on 5 November 2021, together with proceeding S ECI 2019 05218 which had been reserved for consideration by the Court of Appeal. Ms Austin refused to appear at the hearing, either via video link or in person, and the hearing proceeded in her absence.[40]

42 On 12 November 2021, the Court of Appeal refused the application for leave to appeal and dismissed proceeding S ECI 2019 05218.[41] The Court found no merit in any of the grounds raised by Ms Austin in either proceeding.

43 Ms Austin then applied to the High Court for special leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal's decision in each proceeding. On 7 April 2022, the High Court refused Ms Austin's special leave applications, finding that neither had any prospect of success .[42]

44 On 31 July 2025, Ms Austin filed an application with the Court of Appeal seeking leave to appeal from my judgment and orders in this proceeding. This application has not yet been heard.

45 The third category of proceedings commenced by Ms Austin relate to the criminal proceedings in which she was the defendant.

46 In October 2016, Ms Austin was charged with stalking the affected person and with a number of related offences. Mr Dwyer was the informant. She was subsequently charged with additional offences, including breaching her bail conditions by attempting to contact the affected person.

47 On 2 April 2019, Ms Austin was committed to stand trial in the County Court on two charges of stalking and two charges of using a carriage service to harass. The remaining charges for summary offences were transferred to the County Court, to be dealt with after the completion of the trial.

48 On 7 February 2022, Ms Austin was arraigned in the County Court on Indictment No. G13348766, comprising four charges of stalking and four alternative charges of using a carriage service to harass. After a 16 day trial, in which Ms Austin represented herself, the jury found Ms Austin guilty of three charges of stalking and one charge of using a carriage service to harass.

49 On 14 September 2022, Ms Austin was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 18 months' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 12 months.[43] Her application for bail pending appeal was refused by Priest JA on 2 November 2022.[44] Ms Austin served her entire sentence of imprisonment and was released from the Dame Phillis Frost Centre on 29 March 2023.

50 Ms Austin claims to have appealed against both conviction and sentence. However, no application for leave to appeal has been determined by the Court of Appeal, and none is pending.

51 In the course of these criminal proceedings, Ms Austin commenced two proceedings in the Supreme Court in which she sought to challenge procedural orders made in the Magistrates' Court.

Proceedings arising from Magistrates' Court order made 15 May 2018

52 The Magistrates' Court commenced hearing the charges on 7 December 2017. At the resumed hearing on 15 May 2018, the magistrate recused himself from further hearing the charges and ordered that the hearing be adjourned to January 2019.

53 Ms Austin commenced Supreme Court proceeding S ECI 2018 00261, seeking judicial review of the magistrate's order of 15 May 2018. On 10 December 2018, that proceeding was summarily dismissed by Derham AsJ, who found that the proceeding could not succeed.[45] His Honour subsequently ordered Ms Austin to pay half of Mr Dwyer's costs.

54 Ms Austin then sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from the decision and orders of Derham AsJ and from his Honour's order as to costs. This application was dismissed on 13 December 2019, along with the other applications the subject of the Court of Appeal's decision in Austin v Dobbs [2019] VSCA 296, discussed above at [31].

Proceedings arising from special witness declarations made 10 December 2018

55 On 10 December 2018, the Magistrates' Court made an order under s 15YAB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) declaring the affected person and his mother to be special witnesses. The order required a person to be appointed to appear on Ms Austin's behalf for the purposes of cross-examining the special witnesses, if Ms Austin chose to be unrepresented at the hearing listed for January 2019.

56 Ms Austin promptly sought judicial review of this order, in Supreme Court proceeding S ECI 2018 02859. An early application for summary judgment was dismissed, with liberty to renew the application if it became apparent during the course of the committal process that the orders of 10 December 2018 were spent.[46]

57 The proceeding was summarily dismissed by Coghlan JA on 16 August 2019.[47] By then Ms Austin had been committed for trial in the County Court, and there were no longer any proceedings in the Magistrates' Court to which the special witness declarations applied. In addition, his Honour was satisfied that none of the grounds set out in the originating motion for judicial review were made out.[48]

58 Ms Austin applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal from the decision of Coghlan JA. This application was dismissed on 13 December 2019.[49]

59 Finally, on 2 May 2022, Ms Austin commenced a civil claim against the State of Victoria, Victoria Police and Mr Dwyer, seeking damages for false imprisonment, abuse of process, and misfeasance in public office. Her claims relate to her arrest in December 2016 and the subsequent criminal proceedings against her. Ms Austin commenced the proceeding in the Supreme Court, but on 1 September 2022 it was transferred to the County Court, where it was initially managed by Judge Tran.

60 The State of Victoria applied to strike out Ms Austin's statement of claim and remove Victoria Police and Mr Dwyer as defendants. Ms Austin made an application for Judge Tran to recuse herself. After a number of adjournments at Ms Austin's request, the hearing of the applications was listed for 16 May 2023. However, Ms Austin did not appear at the hearing and it proceeded in her absence.

61 On 5 June 2023, Judge Tran made orders dismissing Ms Austin's recusal application, removing Victoria Police and Mr Dwyer as defendants, striking out Ms Austin's statement of claim, directing her to file an amended writ and statement of claim by 12 July 2023, and listing a directions hearing on 24 July 2023.[50] Judge Tran also made a self-executing order, dismissing the proceeding with costs if Ms Austin failed to file an amended writ and statement of claim as ordered or failed to appear at the next directions hearing.[51]

62 Ms Austin applied to the Court of Appeal leave to appeal from these orders. On 19 September 2023, the Court of Appeal granted Ms Austin's application in respect of the self-executing order only, finding no error in respect of any of the other orders.[52] At the conclusion of their judgment, Niall JA and J Forrest AJA mentioned three matters for consideration by Ms Austin:

First, her unfounded and scurrilous allegations against multiple judicial officers and others must cease if she is to get her claim to court. Second, any repleading of her case against the State must be based on fact and properly drawn inference, and relevant to the pleaded case alone. Third, in the course of the hearing before us Ms Austin made numerous unjustified and outrageous allegations against counsel for the State and his instructing solicitor. If she is to be permitted to appear on her own behalf, she must desist from this type of behaviour, which in a court proceeding involving a represented party would not be tolerated.[53]

63 Ms Austin filed an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court from this decision. On 7 March 2024, Gordon and Steward JJ dismissed Ms Austin's application, on the basis that the proposed appeal had no prospect of success.[54]

64 County Court proceeding CI-22-04028 remains on foot and is being managed by Judge Pillay, regarding whom Ms Austin has made two unsuccessful recusal applications.[55] As at 15 August 2025, Ms Austin was yet to file an amended writ and statement of claim, despite having been granted further time in which to do so.[56]

65 The requirements of s 45 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act have been met. Ms Austin has had an opportunity to be heard on whether a litigation restraint order should be made, and has taken that opportunity. She filed voluminous affidavit material and lengthy written submissions opposing any order, including submissions in reply and a further written statement provided at the hearing, all of which I have read and considered. Ms Austin appeared at the hearing and spoke to her written submissions, as well as reading her written case in support of her application for leave to appeal from my orders of 3 July 2025.

66 As to whether the other preconditions for making a litigation restraint order in respect of Ms Austin have been satisfied, Mr Dwyer submitted that the Court's powers under ss 29(1) and 17(1) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act were enlivened because Ms Austin had both:

(a) persistently and without reasonable grounds commenced or conducted vexatious proceedings; and

(b) frequently commenced or conducted vexatious proceedings against Mr Dwyer and the affected person, in relation to PSIOs made against her in favour of the affected person.

67 Mr Dwyer emphasised that the vexatious character of the various proceedings brought by Ms Austin could be determined by looking at the orders made in each proceeding and the reasons for those. He submitted that it was not necessary to engage in a minute examination of each individual proceeding; rather, the Court should be concerned with the overall impression created by the number of proceedings, their general character, and their outcome.[57]

68 Ms Austin contended that the underlying bases of her criminal convictions were wrong, the intervention orders made against her since 2016 should not have been made, and the judicial officers she has interacted with since 2016 had exceeded their authority, and were lazy, incompetent, wrong, biased, or corrupt. She sought to relitigate every proceeding that had been decided against her since 2016, by reference to her extensive affidavit material. Ms Austin described Mr Dwyer's submissions in support of making a litigation restraint order as 'nothing but a regurgitation of lies previously, and on many occasions, corrected by me'.

69 Ms Austin denied that any proceeding commenced by her had involved an abuse of process. Rather, she submitted, the proceedings against her involved abuses of process, her own applications clearly had merit, and she was entitled to the protection of the law. She also denied commencing any proceeding to harass, annoy, cause delay or detriment, or for any other wrongful purpose. Ms Austin submitted that she was entitled to justice and that she had suffered a monumental miscarriage of justice. She further argued that every legal proceeding she had commenced had reasonable grounds, but that the law and the incontrovertible facts had been ignored in court orders and judgments.

70 It is apparent from Ms Austin's litigation history that she has persistently commenced and conducted proceedings challenging the intervention orders made against her in Magistrates' Court proceedings G12353529 and K11461342. She has litigated these issues continually and repeatedly, undeterred by her lack of success, with determination and a high degree of stubbornness.[58]

71 Almost all of those proceedings have been without reasonable grounds, and hence vexatious. The appeal to the County Court referred to at [26] above was beyond that court's jurisdiction because it was filed out of time. The numerous judicial review and appeal proceedings in the Supreme Court were all dismissed. Despite the careful explanations given in the judgments of several judges of the Supreme Court, Ms Austin persisted with applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal and for special leave to appeal to the High Court. None of those applications was[59]uccessful.59

72 I reject Ms Austin's submission that I should not rely on the orders and reasons for judgment of the various courts that have considered and dismissed her challenges to the intervention orders made against her. Those orders and reasons are the best evidence of the nature and character of the proceedings that she has pursued since 2017.[60] It would be an abuse of process to permit Ms Austin to relitigate those decisions, notwithstanding her enduring belief that all of the decisions were wrong.

73 A number of proceedings pursued by Ms Austin are vexatious for the additional reason that she has conducted them in such a way as to 'harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose'.[61]

74 Several proceedings were struck out or delayed because Ms Austin failed or refused to appear at a hearing.[62] While one or two non-appearances by a litigant in person might be excused, Ms Austin has repeatedly refused to appear at listed hearings, citing her own convenience and her preference for in-person hearings over audiovisual links. The most stark example was her refusal to appear when the Court of Appeal gave judgment on 19 September 2023,[63] which was communicated to the Court in terms which were 'intemperate, unjustifiable and rude'.[64]

75 Most seriously, Ms Austin's attempts to overturn the PSIOs made against her have developed into a broader campaign against the justice system, in which she has felt free to make 'unfounded and scurrilous allegations against multiple judicial officers and others', including Mr Dwyer and his lawyers.[65] Despite being warned that such behaviour would not be tolerated, Ms Austin has continued to display open defiance of judicial authority, right up to the end of her submissions against the making of a litigation restraint order.

76 It is abundantly clear that Ms Austin has persistently commenced numerous vexatious proceedings without reasonable grounds, and conducted them in such a way as to harass, annoy, delay, and demonstrate her contempt for the justice system. It is not necessary to decide whether some of Ms Austin's proceedings are also vexatious because they are an abuse of process, involving an attempt to relitigate matters already decided.

77 Mr Dwyer submitted that a litigation restraint order should be made in respect of Ms Austin, for the protection of members of the public who might be vexed by further proceedings - in particular the affected person - and to preserve the Court's limited resources. He said that there was compelling evidence that Ms Austin's established pattern of vexatious litigation is likely to continue, unless restrained.

78 In Mr Dwyer's submission, the residual discretion not to make an order, even though the criteria are met, should be reserved for cases where there are good grounds for confidence that the litigant has some insight into their conduct and does not intend to conduct vexatious proceedings in future. Those factors were not present in this case, where Ms Austin had made plain her intention to persist with her challenges until she gets justice.

79 Ms Austin maintained her position that the Court could not make a litigation restraint order against her, because the power to do so had not been enlivened. She submitted that the Court should not make such an order because she had been the victim of a significant miscarriage of justice involving 'criminal conduct engaged in by judicial officers' who have 'engaged in abuse of process every step of the way'.[66]

80 I accept Mr Dwyer's submission that a litigation restraint order should be made in respect of Ms Austin. I am satisfied that the criteria for making a general litigation restraint order exist, and there is no good reason to believe that Ms Austin will cease her established pattern of vexatious litigation. Indeed, Ms Austin has made absolutely clear her intention to continue until all of the PSIOs against her had been declared invalid, and she achieves 'justice'. She demonstrated no insight at all into the impact of her conduct on the other people involved in the litigation or the unreasonable demands she has made on the justice system since 2016.

What litigation restraint order should be made?

81 I have given anxious consideration to whether it is appropriate to make a general litigation restraint order or a more confined litigation restraint order. Ms Austin's particular focus on overturning the PSIOs suggested that an extended litigation order might be sufficient to achieve the purposes of the Vexatious Proceedings Act. However, having considered the parties' submissions I am satisfied that a general litigation order is required in this case. Ms Austin's complete lack of insight into the effect of her conduct on others, her inability to accept the finality of judicial decisions (even after exhausting all avenues of appeal), and her defiant and contemptuous attitude towards the courts, are powerful reasons to make a general litigation restraint order.

82 Pursuant to s 30 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, I make a general litigation restraint order against Ms Austin, directing that she must not:

(a) continue any proceeding in a Victorian court or tribunal without leave of the Victorian court or tribunal in which the proceeding is being heard; or

(b) commence any proceeding in a Victorian court or tribunal without leave of the Victorian court or tribunal in which the proceeding is to be commenced.

83 Pursuant to s 33(2) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, I specify that the order is to remain in force indefinitely.

84 The effect of the general litigation restraint order is that any pending proceeding Ms Austin has commenced in a Victorian court or tribunal is stayed, unless and until she obtains leave to continue the proceeding.[67]

85 Ms Austin may at any time apply to the Court to vary or revoke the order, pursuant to pt 9 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.

[1] Austin v Dwyer [2024] VSC 435.

[2] Austin v Dwyer [2025] VSC 369.

[3] Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 (Vic), s 1.

[4] Vexatious Proceedings Act, ss 11 (limited litigation restraint order), 17 (extended litigation restraint order), 29 (general litigation restraint order). See also ss 35 (acting in concert order), 38 (appeal restriction order).

[5] Vexatious Proceedings Act, ss 11(4), 17(4).

[6] Vexatious Proceedings Act, s 45.

[7] [2025] VSC 120, [34] (Quigley J) (Taylor) (footnotes omitted).

[8] Attorney-General (Vic) v Horvath [2001] VSC 269, [28] (Ashley J); Attorney-General (Vic) v Whittingham [2021] VSC 91, [126] (Ginnane J); Donohue v Attorney‑General for Victoria (Vexatious Proceedings) [2024] VSC 564, [62] (Keogh J).

[9] Respondent's outline of written submissions: litigation restraint order dated 24 September 2025, [37].

[10] Referring to Whittingham [2021] VSC 91, [146] (Ginnane J).

[11] Referring to Attorney-General v Michael [1999] WASCA 181, [126] (Anderson J, Pidgeon and Steytler JJ agreeing).

[12] Referring to Granich Partners v Yap [2003] WASC 206, [46] (EM Heenan J); Whittingham [2021] VSC 91, [148] (Ginnane J).

[13] Referring to Attorney-General (Vic) v Weston [2004] VSC 314, [14]-[15] (Whelan J).

[14] Referring to Soden v Croker (No 2) [2016] FCA 15; (2016) 334 ALR 540, 595 [221] (Perry J).

[15] Referring to Michael [1999] WASCA 181, [126] (Anderson J, Pidgeon and Steytler JJ agreeing); Weston [2004] VSC 314, [14]-[15] (Whelan J); Whittingham [2021] VSC 91, [148] (Ginnane J).

[16] Donohue [2024] VSC 564, [59] (Keogh J); Taylor [2025] VSC 120, [36] (Quigley J).

[17] Taylor [2025] VSC 120, [37] (Quigley J).

[18] Whitingham [2021] VSC 91, [147] (Ginnane J); Taylor [2025] VSC 120, [35] (Quigley J).

[19] Donohue [2024] VSC 564, [63] (Keogh J).

[20] Taylor [2025] VSC 120, [130] (Quigley J).

[21] Taylor [2025] VSC 120, [131] (Quigley J).

[22] Donohue [2024] VSC 564, [63], [74] (Keogh J); Taylor [2025] VSC 120, [131] (Quigley J).

[23] Director of Public Prosecutions v Austin [2022] VCC 1571.

[24] Austin v Dobbs [2019] VSC 355, [75] (Ginnane J).

[25] Austin v Dwyer [2018] VSC 770.

[26] Austin v Dobbs [2019] VSC 355, [48] (Ginnane J).

[27] Austin v Dobbs [2019] VSC 355, [76]-[78] (Ginnane J).

[28] Austin v Dobbs [2019] VSCA 296.

[29] Austin v Dobbs [2019] VSCA 296, [101], [111], [119], [129], [137] (Kyrou and Whelan JJA).

[30] Austin v Dobbs [2019] VSCA 296, [2] (Kyrou and Whelan JJA).

[31] Austin v Dwyer; Austin v Dobbs & anor; Austin v Dobbs & anor; Austin v Dwyer & anor; Austin v Dobbs [2020] HCASL 122.

[32] Austin v Dwyer; Austin v Dobbs & anor; Austin v Dobbs & anor; Austin v Dwyer & anor; Austin v Dobbs [2020] HCASL 122 (Keane and Edelman JJ).

[33] Forbes J later published a ruling, awarding costs of proceeding S ECI 2019 03477 in favour of Mr Dwyer. See, Austin v Dwyer (Costs Ruling) [2020] VSC 18.

[34] Austin v Dwyer [2019] VSC 837, [11] (Forbes J).

[35] Austin v Dobbs & ors [2021] VSC 508.

[36] Austin v Dwyer & ors [2023] VSC 76, [21] (John Dixon J).

[37] See Austin v Dwyer [2025] VSC 369, [22]-[32] for a full history (Richards JA).

[38] Austin v Dwyer & ors [2023] VSC 76, [22] (John Dixon J).

[39] Austin v Dwyer [2024] VSC 435.

[40] Austin v Dobbs & ors [2021] VSCA 306, [8]-[11] (Beach and Sifris JJA).

[41] Austin v Dobbs & ors [2021] VSCA 306.

[42] Austin v Dwyer & anor; Austin v Dobbs & ors [2022] HCASL 65 (Gordon and Steward JJ).

[43] DPP v Austin [2022] VCC 1571. Ms Austin had already served 350 days pre-sentence detention, having been remanded in custody between December 2016 and 22 November 2017.

[44] Austin v The King [2022] VSCA 240.

[45] Austin v Dwyer [2018] VSC 770, [90]-[91] (Derham AsJ).

[46] Austin v Dwyer (special witness proceeding) [2019] VSC 206, [42] (Forbes J).

[47] Austin v Dwyer (special witness proceedings) [No 2] [2019] VSC 545.

[48] Austin v Dwyer (special witness proceedings) [No 2] [2019] VSC 545, [28] (Coghlan JA).

[49] Austin v Dobbs [2019] VSCA 296, discussed at [31] above.

[50] Austin v Dwyer & ors (Ruling) [2023] VCC 889, [17] (Judge Tran).

[51] Austin v Dwyer & ors (Ruling) [2023] VCC 889, [90] (Judge Tran).

[52] Austin v Dwyer [2023] VSCA 227.

[53] Austin v Dwyer [2023] VSCA 227, [105] (Niall JA and J Forrest AJA).

[54] Austin v Dwyer [2024] HCASL 31.

1. [55] Austin v Dwyer (Ruling No. 2) [2024] VCC 1221; Austin v Dwyer (Ruling No. 3) [2025] VCC 1071.

[56] Austin v Dwyer (Ruling No. 3) [2025] VCC 1071, [25] (Judge Pillay).

[57] Referring to Horvath [2001] VSC 269, [28] (Ashley J); Whittingham [2021] VSC 91, [126] (Ginnane J); Donohue [2024] VSC 564, [62] (Keogh J).

[58] Donohue [2024] VSC 564, [59] (Keogh J); Taylor [2025] VSC 120, [36] (Quigley J).

[59] Ms Austin had some limited success in Austin v Dwyer [2023] VSCA 227, concerning her civil proceeding in the County Court, but has failed to progress the proceeding since it was remitted to the County Court in September 2023.

[60] See, Horvath [2001] VSC 269, [28] (Ashley J); Whittingham [2021] VSC 91, [126] (Ginnane J); Donohue [2024] VSC 564, [62] (Keogh J); Myers v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal [2024] VSCA 206, [34] (Walker JA).

[61] Vexatious Proceedings Act, s 3 - definition of 'vexatious proceeding'.

[62] See [25], [34], [41], [60] above; Austin v Dwyer [2021] VSCA 306, [8]-[11] (Beach and Sifris JJA); Austin v Dwyer (Ruling No. 2) [2024] VCC 1221, [7], [14]-[17], [21]; Austin v Dwyer (Ruling No. 3) [2025] VCC 1071, [11], [20].

[63] See [62] above.

[64] Transcript of proceedings, Court of Appeal, (Niall JA), Proceeding S EAPCI 2023 0068, 19 September 2023, 2:8.

[65] Transcript of proceedings, Court of Appeal, (Niall JA), Proceeding S EAPCI 2023 0068, 19 September 2023, 2:19-20.

[66] Transcript of proceedings, Supreme Court, (Ms Austin), Proceeding S ECI 2023 01654, 30 January 2026, 54:10-12.

[67] Vexatious Proceedings Act, ss 32(a), 54, 55.