Plaintiff v Defendant

1 The Attorney-General for the State of Victoria applies under s 28 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 ('the Act') for a general litigation restraint order in respect of the defendant Mr George Velissaris.

2 The Attorney-General seeks an order under s 29 of the Act that until further order, Mr Velissaris must not, without leave of the court, commence or continue any proceedings in a Victorian court or tribunal.

3 The application was supported by affidavits sworn by Mr Daniel Jones, a solicitor with the Victorian Government Solicitor's Office. Mr Jones refers to at least 50 proceedings or appeals in proceedings commenced or conducted in Australian courts and tribunals by Mr Velissaris or entities controlled by him over at least 15 years. Mr Velissaris also filed a number of affidavits and gave oral evidence. He cross-examined Mr Jones.

4 The Attorney-General submits that Mr Velissaris, whether in his own name, or in the name of an entity controlled by him, persistently and without reasonable grounds commenced or conducted vexatious proceedings. The Attorney-General contends that in many of his proceedings Mr Velissaris has sought to re-litigate matters which have been the subject of findings of courts or tribunals in earlier litigation. He also contends that on a number of occasions, courts and tribunals have found that Mr Velissaris' conduct has constituted an abuse of process. He has been found to have conducted proceedings for an inappropriate or improper purpose. The Attorney-General also contends that Mr Velissaris has shown a lack of regard for the authority of courts and tribunals in their processes. He submitted that each of the proceedings on which he relied was a vexatious proceeding for one or more of the following reasons:

(b) the proceeding was commenced or pursued without reasonable grounds; or

(c) the proceeding was conducted in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve a wrongful purpose.

5 The Attorney-General submitted that Mr Velissaris has a serious lack of judgment in commencing or conducting litigation. The Attorney-General submitted that Mr Velissaris' past conduct would continue into the future and that he has not expressed any insight into that past conduct.

6 A general litigation restraint order would not prevent Mr Velissaris from commencing or continuing a proceeding if he could show that it was not a vexatious proceeding and there were reasonable grounds for it. Under ss 54 and 55 of the Act he could apply for, and obtain, leave to engage in such a proceeding. Or he could be permitted to apply for leave from the court or tribunal in which the proceeding is to be heard. He could also apply under ss 65 and 69 of the Act for a variation of any litigation restraint order that was made.

7 On a number of occasions courts have made vexatious proceeding orders against Mr Velissaris. The Attorney-General further contends that courts and tribunals have regularly found that Mr Velissaris' claims were without substance but that he has persistently pursued unsuccessful appeals.

8 Mr Velissaris has on many occasions complained about the conduct of various lawyers, the liquidator of Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd ('Maryvell') and the sale of a property previously owned by Maryvell, and plant and equipment contained within it. The Attorney-General submitted that those complaints had been the subject of Mr Velissaris' prior unsuccessful litigation on numerous occasions. They are also the subject of court orders preventing further litigation by Mr Velissaris without leave.

9 The Attorney-General submitted that courts had made remarks critical of Mr Velissaris' conduct and that in response he had made outlandish and unsubstantiated allegations of impropriety against lawyers and judicial officers. He maintains that he does not understand why the Attorney-General has brought the present proceeding. He presents as a person totally consumed by his grievances. In the absence of a general litigation restraint order, the Attorney-General submits that he is likely to impose a very significant and unjustified burden on parties whom he sues and the courts.

10 Mr Velissaris came to Australia in 1961 and worked in real estate. In 1984 he purchased a two storey terrace house on Sydney Road, Brunswick ('the Sydney Road property') on which he operated a 'top class restaurant' named the Greek Bar & Tavern, with functions on two levels, with seating for 300 people and a large reception room upstairs.

11 Mr Velissaris suffers from poor health, which was detailed in the evidence before the Court. He lives on a pension and says that the conduct of others has caused his losses. I adjourned the proceedings for about five weeks because I wished to hear from Mr Velissaris' general practitioner as to his capacity to participate in the proceeding. Having heard the evidence, I was satisfied that he could.

12 Mr Velissaris described an event in 2003 when damage was caused by a vehicle to the front of the Sydney Road property, which he described as the start of a catastrophe for him. He lost everything he had gained from over 50 years work. His son, who was a top university student, became severely depressed and angry because the shops were lost and he had to spend a lot of money on doctors for his son.

13 An order for Maryvell's liquidation was made in June 2006. Mr Velissaris alleges that the liquidator of Maryvell, Mr L Fitzgerald ('the liquidator'), breached his fiduciary duties and sold the Sydney Road property for a quarter of its market value to Dynami Pty Ltd ('Dynami'), which was owned or controlled by Theo and Betty Zervas. Mr Velissaris alleges that the property was worth at least $4.3 million, but was sold by the liquidator to Dynami for $1.6 million. He further alleges that there was no proper advertising or marketing of the very valuable site, which could have been used as a multi-unit development site. He said that the restaurant was his and not Maryvell's. He wants to be able to sue the liquidator.

14 Mr Velissaris alleges that by selling the property at undervalue the liquidator breached his obligations under s 420A(1)(a) and (b) of the Corporations Act 2001. He alleges that the liquidator sold the plant and equipment on the property to Mr and Ms Zervas, who were carrying on business under the name Stonnington Online Conveyancing, for the sum of one dollar. He alleges that the plant and equipment was his and had been valued at $600,000. It included cooking facilities, grillers, hotplates, cooking ranges, fridges, air-conditioners, approximately 250 chairs, six or seven tables, dinner tables, a grease trap, preparation benches, drink bars, cooking utensils, a canopy and plates.

15 In addition to suing the liquidator, Mr Velissaris wants to be able to sue various solicitors who he says have let him down and Sigma Constructions Pty Ltd ('Sigma Constructions'), which is referred to below.

16 In this judgment I set out Mr Velissaris' allegations against many persons who are not parties to this proceeding and who have not had an opportunity in this proceeding to contest those allegations. By stating the allegations I am not making any finding as to their truth or accuracy.

17 Section 29 of the Act sets out the circumstances in which the Court may exercise the power to make a general litigation restraint order and states that:

(1) The Supreme Court constituted by a Judge of the Court may make a general litigation restraint order against a person if the Court is satisfied that the person has persistently and without reasonable grounds commenced or conducted vexatious proceedings.

(2) In determining whether it is satisfied of the matters specified in subsection (1), the Supreme Court may take into account any matter it considers relevant, including but not limited to any of the following -

(a) any proceeding commenced or conducted by the person, or an entity controlled by the person, in any Australian court or tribunal;

(b) the existence of any order made by an Australian court or tribunal against the person, or an entity controlled by the person, including -

(i) a litigation restrain order; or

(ii) an acting in concert order; or

(iii) a vexatious proceeding order;

(c) any other matter relating to the way in which the person conducts or has conducted litigation.

(3) The Supreme Court may take into account a matter referred to in subsection (2) that relates to a proceeding commenced or conducted before, on or after the commencement of this section.

(4) The Supreme Court may make a general litigation restraint order -

(a) on its own motion; or

(b) on an application under section 28.

The term 'vexatious proceeding' is defined in s 3 of the Act as follows:

v_exatious proceeding_ includes the following -

(a) a proceeding that is an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal;

(b) a proceeding commenced to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose;

(c) a proceeding commenced or pursued without reasonable grounds;

(d) a proceeding conducted in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose...

The term 'proceeding' is defined in s 3 of the Act to mean:

... any matter in an Australian court or tribunal, whether civil or criminal, including -

(a) any cause, matter, action suit, proceeding, trial, complaint or inquiry of any kind within the jurisdiction of an Australian court or tribunal;

(b) any proceeding (including any interlocutory application) taken in connection with or incidental to a proceeding before an Australian court or tribunal;

(c) any appeal, review or other challenge, including an application for judicial review or an application for leave to appeal.

18 In the next part of this judgment I set out the proceedings in which Mr Velissaris has been directly or indirectly involved and the background facts to them. I have taken this description from both Mr Jones' and Mr Velissaris' affidavits, especially from the exhibits which contain court and tribunal orders, decisions and judgments.

19 On 8 October 1997, Maryvell was incorporated with Mr Velissaris as its director from 30 January 1998 to 25 October 1999; 5 February to 10 May 2002; and from 15 May 2002 to 11 January 2012.

20 The Sydney Road property was mortgaged to the Bank of Melbourne and upon a default under the mortgage, the Bank auctioned the property. It was purchased by Mr Velissaris' daughter who nominated Maryvell as the purchaser.

21 On 30 January 1998, the Maryvell Family Trust was established with Maryvell as trustee. On 10 March 1998, a document entitled 'Deed of Agreement and Settlement' was executed by Mr Velissaris, on his own behalf and on behalf of Maryvell, acting as trustee of the Maryvell Trust. Maryvell was registered as proprietor of the property.

22 In 1998, Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd sued Mr Velissaris for a debt owing under a finance agreement and he was ordered to pay $94,748.28 plus interest and costs. Ultimately, on 1 October 1999, Mr Velissaris was made bankrupt. Fifteen attempts to serve him had been made and an order for substituted service was made by the Federal Court. Mr Velissaris challenged the order for substituted service. Weinberg J gave leave to Mr Velissaris' solicitor to withdraw and refused him an adjournment because:

(a) four earlier adjournments had been granted due to his ill health;

(b) other solicitors had ceased to act for Mr Velissaris for the same reason as the current solicitor;

(c) having observed Mr Velissaris' cross-examination of a witness he considered that he was capable of handling his own case.[1]

23 Weinberg J refused Mr Velissaris' application to set aside the Registrar's order for substituted service stating that Mr Velissaris:

[H]as sought to avoid personal service throughout by falsely denying, when confronted by a process server, that he was Constantinos Velissaris, and otherwise making himself unavailable to be served.[2]

24 Mr Velissaris' appeal to the Full Federal Court against the sequestration order was dismissed.[3] On 30 October 2002 Mr Velissaris was discharged from bankruptcy.

25 In 2002, Maryvell entered into a licence agreement with Sigma Constructions to give it access to Maryvell's Sydney Road property for a period of 15 months while it constructed a residential unit development on a neighbouring property. In return, Maryvell was to receive the sum of $25,000. Mr Charisou, a builder and architect, guaranteed Sigma Construction's payment of the licence fees and any loss and damage caused by Sigma Construction breaching the licence agreement.

26 The licence permitted Sigma Constructions to use the land for five days per week from 6.30 am to 5.00 pm and required that it not cause damage to the property or its sewer pipes. Mr Velissaris contended that Sigma Constructions breached the licence and occupied the rear of the property for 24 hours a day, seven days per week, using very large and heavy cranes. The sewer pipes were broken several times and Sigma Constructions did not repair them.

27 In May 2003, Mr Velissaris, on behalf of Maryvell, filed an application in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal ('VCAT') seeking a declaration that the licence had been validly terminated or rescinded or, alternatively, an order that it be rescinded pursuant to s 108 of the Fair Trading Act 1999. Maryvell sought an injunction restraining Sigma Constructions from entering the property and also damages resulting from the closure of the restaurant due to the damage caused by Sigma Constructions. In July 2003, Mr Velissaris filed a second proceeding on behalf of Maryvell seeking a declaration that the licence had lapsed.

28 Mr Velissaris was represented at different times in the VCAT proceedings by nine separate solicitors.

29 In July 2003, VCAT ordered that Sigma Constructions be permanently restrained from entering upon any part of the property. In December 2004, the Court of Appeal allowed Sigma Construction's appeal, set aside the injunction and remitted the proceeding to VCAT for further hearing and determination.[4]

30 Mr Velissaris applied for the joinder of additional parties to the VCAT proceedings but he did not comply with the timetable for filing affidavits, had to seek extensions of time, and on one occasion was ordered to pay the costs of an adjournment. On 22 November 2005, Sigma Constructions served a subpoena requiring Maryvell to produce financial documents relating to its claim for loss and damage. On 28 November 2005, a VCAT hearing occurred concerning Mr Velissaris' application to amend Maryvell's Points of Claim and to join as parties, Mr Charisou, Sigma Construction's guarantor; and Mr Stellios and Ms Constantopoulos, the directors of Sigma Constructions. Mr Velissaris alleged that he, on behalf of Maryvell, and the Sigma Constructions directors had entered into an oral contract to personally indemnify Maryvell for any loss it suffered following from a breach of the terms of the licence agreement.

31 On 3 February 2006, His Honour Judge Bowman, sitting at VCAT, ordered that the application to join the directors was barred by s 126 of the Instruments Act 1958, describing the action as 'misconceived and, as stated, doomed to fail'.[5] His Honour gave Maryvell leave to join the guarantor and made directions for amended Points of Claim and defence.

32 His Honour ordered Maryvell to comply with Sigma Constructions' subpoena, but Mr Velissaris sought a number of extensions of time to do so. On 8 March 2006, at a directions hearing, he claimed that Maryvell wished to engage solicitors; should not have to produce the documents until it had amended its Points of Claim so as to add additional parties including the Sigma Constructions' directors; had received advice from two barristers; and could not locate a lot of documents due to various reasons including that they had been destroyed in a flood, due to his ex-wife having been in some sort of accident, and the family being in turmoil.

33 Mr Velissaris told the Tribunal that he refused to answer Sigma Constructions' subpoena, but that Maryvell would when it was ready to do so. Judge Bowman adjourned the directions hearing until 7 April 2006 to allow Maryvell to deal with the issues relating to the subpoena. He stated that he was not prepared to make a self-executing order in relation to discovery as that would be a last resort.[6]

34 On 8 March 2006, VCAT again adjourned the directions hearing and fixed a new time for any amended points of claim to be served. It also ordered Maryvell to pay Sigma Constructions' costs thrown away as a result of the adjournment in the sum of $2500.00

35 On 2 April 2006, Mr Velissaris on behalf of Maryvell applied for the second time to join the Sigma Constructions' directors to the proceeding. On 7 April 2006, lawyers for Mr Velissaris informed the Tribunal that Maryvell again was not in a position to answer the subpoena. But, on behalf of Maryvell, Mr Velissaris issued subpoenas to Sigma Constructions and to the guarantor. Sigma Constructions sought summary dismissal of the proceedings because of the ongoing failings by Maryvell and Mr Velissaris to comply with the subpoena.

36 On 3 May 2006, Judge Bowman refused to grant leave to Maryvell to further amend its points of claim because its proposed amendments were 'substantially concerned with the joinder of the directors'.[7] His Honour also refused the guarantor's applications for summary dismissal stating that the 'shutting out of the litigant, except as a last resort, was something he was reluctant to do.' But he said that 'that last resort is rapidly being approached.'[8] Judge Bowman gave Maryvell a further opportunity to answer the subpoena, but stated that ongoing non-compliance with the subpoena, and the resultant delay could not be tolerated for much longer.[9] He ordered that Maryvell's subpoenas be set aside on the basis that they were vague, irrelevant or oppressive.

37 It is convenient at this point to mention a matter that is not in chronological order. In May 2010, well after Maryvell was placed into liquidation, Mr Velissaris made a third joinder application in VCAT on that occasion for his joinder as a co-applicant on the basis that he had replaced Maryvell as the trustee of the Maryvell trust and, to join the directors of Sigma Constructions as respondents. He argued that he was entitled to bring the proceedings as the trustee of the Maryvell Trust, having replaced Maryvell Pty Ltd as the trustee, and, in his capacity as the former operator of the restaurant. On 20 August 2010, Deputy President Aird ordered that the applications be dismissed stating:

Whilst I understand Mr Velissaris is very distressed, he has not persuaded me that there is any legal basis for his joinder as a co-applicant, or be substituted as the applicant in these proceedings. He could not be joined as a co-applicant to proceedings in which the current applicant, Maryvell, has confirmed it does not wish to continue with those proceedings.

...there is considerable doubt about the validity of Mr Velissaris' appointment as the trustee of the family [trust].

In any event, Mr Velissaris has not demonstrated to me that he has any arguable claim against Sigma either in his capacity as trustee of the Maryvell Family Trust, assuming that his appointment is valid, or in his personal capacity. In the voluminous correspondence he has sent to the tribunal since the beginning of this year, he has consistently said that he wants to claim 'the big loss of profits and goodwill' suffered as a result of the damage to the sewer lines and destruction of his Greek Bar Tavern by Sigma, but he has not set out any legal basis on which those claims are made.

...

In considering the judgments available on AustLII it is clear that all of the matters that Mr Velissaris seeks to raise in support of his application have been ventilated and rejected in his numerous applications to other Courts...[10]

...

The oral submissions made by Mr Velissaris in support of his application for joinder of Sigma's directors are remarkably similar to the allegations before Judge Bowman, including the relevant paragraphs in Mr Velissaris' affidavit of 5 April 2006, when Judge Bowman dismissed the earlier application for joinder in Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd v Sigma Constructions Pty Ltd [2006] VCAT 743...

The material filed by Mr Velissaris in support of this joinder application does not include any new material and does not demonstrate a legal basis for any claims he wishes to make against the directors.[11]

38 On 7 August 2006, Judge Bowman ordered that an application by Sigma Constructions for the proceeding to be transferred to the Supreme Court of Victoria be dismissed. His Honour also noted that the parties had not agreed on a date for the return of the subpoena issued to Maryvell and said:

As far as I can ascertain from the voluminous material on the Tribunal's files, nothing has occurred since in relation to the documents (other than Maryvell's legal representation again disappearing).[12]

39 The liquidator of Maryvell who was appointed in June 2006 did not pursue Maryvell's VCAT proceedings.

40 It is then necessary to return to a significant event in 2003. Mr Velissaris' involvement in much of the litigation to which the Court was referred began with an incident that year when a semi-trailer smashed into his Sydney Road property causing damage to the front veranda, extending 9.5 metres and affecting signage and lighting. The costs of the repairs were estimated at $35,000 to $40,000.

41 Mr Velissaris' insurance company would not pay his claim for the damage because the driver had admitted fault and had his own insurance. The driver's insurance company would not pay Mr Velissaris' damages. In response, he sued the driver in the Magistrates' Court in the name of his company, Maryvell. He retained the firm of Tolhurst, Druce & Emmerson to conduct the proceeding. He alleges that a solicitor at that firm, Mr Lulham, agreed to a maximum charge of $2,500 to handle the case, plus barrister's fees of $1,250 per day for the hearing. Mr Velissaris paid that amount 'upfront'. The Magistrates' Court awarded Maryvell $7,000 for property damage plus $1,432.17 interest, but not any legal costs.

42 Mr Velissaris' solicitor at Tolhurst, Druce & Emmerson demanded that the defendant's lawyer send the whole sum of $8,432 to the firm and Maryvell and Mr Velissaris received nothing from the judgment.

43 Tolhurst, Druce & Emmerson sued Mr Velissaris for a further $12,000 for fees. Maryvell and Mr Velissaris counterclaimed against them but the magistrate dismissed their case. He refused to grant an adjournment although Mr Velissaris contends that he had been in hospital and his lawyer did not attend the hearing. On 13 October 2005, the Court made orders against Mr Velissaris including that he pay costs of some $30,000 to Tolhurst, Druce & Emmerson.

44 On 14 October 2005, Tolhurst, Druce & Emmerson issued a statutory demand against Maryvell in the sum of $37,690.62. Maryvell unsuccessfully applied for that statutory demand to be set aside.

45 On 12 December 2005, Maryvell sought judicial review in this Court of the Magistrate's Court order on the ground that Mr Velissaris had been refused an adjournment and had been left with no lawyer to represent him.

46 On 19 June 2006, Maryvell, was placed into liquidation upon the petition of Tolhurst, Druce & Emmerson. The Master noted in respect of its solvency that 'two opportunities were given for proper accounts to be filed but proper accounts were not filed'. Mr L Fitzgerald was appointed liquidator for the purposes of the winding up. As of that date, Maryvell's judicial review proceeding against the Magistrates' Court order in favour of Tolhurst, Druce and Emmerson was awaiting hearing on 26 August 2006.

47 An appeal to a Judge of this Court against the Master's order was dismissed on 7 July 2006.

48 The liquidator appointed to wind up Maryvell did not continue its Supreme Court proceeding challenging the Magistrates' Court order against it, but sued to evict Mr Velissaris from the building and the restaurant business.

Proceedings following the winding up of Maryvell

49 After Maryvell was placed into liquidation, Mr Velissaris claimed to be personally entitled to possession of the property and to be lessee of it pursuant to a lease with Maryvell dated 15 May 2006.

50 In September 2006, the liquidator applied to this Court for a declaration under s 588FF(1)(h) and (j) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) that the lease was unenforceable as an uncommercial transaction. In February 2007, a Master of the Court granted the liquidator's application and declared the 2006 lease to be void and unenforceable. On 6 June 2007, Mr Velissaris filed an amended interlocutory application seeking leave of the Court pursuant to s 471B of the Corporations Act to bring a proceeding against both Maryvell (in liquidation) and the liquidator, seeking orders that he could occupy the property as licensee.

51 On 2 August 2007, Dodds-Streeton J dismissed Mr Velissaris' appeal against the Master's order and also dismissed an application by Mr Velissaris concerning his claim to occupy the property rent-free as a licensee pursuant to a Deed of Agreement and Settlement. Her Honour also ordered that Maryvell, which was then in liquidation recover possession of the Sydney Road property. Her Honour stated:

I have found that there is no solidly-based, arguable case or serious dispute that Mr Velissaris had an enforceable right to rent-free occupancy of the property pursuant to the deed of agreement and settlement.[13]

52 Her Honour dismissed Mr Velissaris' application and ordered that he pay costs. Her Honour stated:

Despite the many successive, mutually contradictory assertions of Mr Velissaris, he ultimately conceded that he did not transfer the property to the company gratuitously, as he initially deposed. Rather, the company acquired the property as a substituted purchaser for the sum of $425,000 pursuant to a contract of sale with the mortgagee dated 11 October 1998.

...

The uncertainty, contradictions and admittedly false description of the transaction (including the consideration by transfer of the property), indicate, however, that any interest would not have been enforceable.[14]

...

In my opinion, Mr Velissaris has not established a credible claim based on a solid foundation to any current entitlement to occupy or possess the property pursuant to the deed of agreement and settlement. Irrespective of Mr Velissaris' poor credit, there are significant obstacles to the validity of any interest created under or by it. Moreover, any enforceable interest which was created would have vested in Mr Velissaris' trustee in bankruptcy in 1999.[15]

...

Mr Velissaris progressively advanced many widely fluctuating and mutually contradictory versions of events, and at intervals, produced various documents apparently calculated to serve his immediate goals in the litigation, without any adequate explanation for the failure to produce them previously.

...

The widely fluctuating assertions in his many affidavits in the exhibited voluminous correspondence in support of the changing submissions advanced on Mr Velissaris' behalf, indicated a scant regard for the truth. Mr Velissaris attributed the many changes in his evidence to the default of his successive legal advisers, his failure to read and understand affidavits prepared by his lawyers, or his lack of legal training. I am satisfied, however, that he was actively engaged in the conduct of the litigation, exhibited a considerable capacity to understand legal issues and personally devised and prepared many affidavits, documents and letters. Numerous assertions were repeatedly made with apparent deliberation, but were subsequently retracted.

Given the ambiguities, uncertainties and contradictions of the unwitnessed deed of agreement and settlement, its sudden and opportunistic production, the impediments to the enforceability of interests purportedly created or recorded by a document falsely predicated on a non-existent transfer of property to the company by its sole director, the repeatedly false and unreliable evidence of Mr Velissaris and the fact that any valid interest which was, on a reasonable construction, otherwise created by the deed of agreement and settlement would, in any event, have vested in his trustee in bankruptcy in 1999, I am not persuaded that Mr Velissaris has established an arguable case or serious question to be tried that he has any subsisting entitlement to occupy the property based on the deed of agreement and settlement or on the transactions it purports to document.[16]

53 The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Velissaris' applications for leave to appeal against Dodds-Streeton J's orders.[17] The High Court refused Mr Velissaris' application for a stay and for special leave, the latter being determined on 1 November 2007.[18] Hayne J stated:

[M]r Velissaris has had a considerable period during which any compromise of the dispute which underpins the judgment which has since been carried into execution might have been effected. Now, he would seek still further time of up to three months to effect such a settlement. There is, in my opinion, no sufficient cause shown to grant that relief.[19]

54 On 7 November 2007, a short time after the High Court's decision, Mr Velissaris filed in this Court applications for injunctions to restrain the liquidator from proceeding with an auction and sale of the property, termination of the liquidation and a stay pending the hearing of the application. Although the High Court had determined the special leave application, Mr Velissaris' affidavit suggested that it was still on foot. The application was dismissed.

55 The Sydney Road property was sold on 14 November 2007 at auction for the sum of $1.6 million with settlement to be effected within 30 days.

56 On 11 December 2007, Mr Velissaris filed an application in the Federal Court seeking leave to proceed with a substantive claim against Maryvell and the liquidator and an injunction restraining settlement of the sale of the Sydney Road property. He also sought orders for the rescission of the contract of sale and declarations that the liquidator had breached his statutory obligations under the Corporations Act. On 12 December 2007, the Court dismissed his application for an interlocutory injunction. The Court noted that Mr Velissaris appeared to have made two unsuccessful applications to prevent the sale and stated that there was nothing in the way of evidence to support his allegation that the liquidator had sold the property to someone with whom he had a connection. The purchaser had not been notified of the application.[20]

57 On 13 December 2007, Mr Velissaris lodged a caveat on the title of the Sydney Road property claiming an equitable interest in the land pursuant to a resulting or constructive trust. In January 2008, the liquidator sought the removal of the caveat. Mr Velissaris issued subpoenas to the liquidator, the purchaser and the purchaser's solicitors. The liquidator's application was heard on 23 January 2008, when Bongiorno J refused Mr Velissaris' application for a further adjournment, and ordered that the caveat be removed and that Mr Velissaris be restrained from lodging any further caveats and that the subpoenas be set aside and that he pay costs.[21] His Honour stated:

The interest he claims is a fee simple in equity in the property, as it is the subject of a constructive or resulting trust. However, at no stage has any material whatsoever been put before any court....in which any explanation of that claim has ever been made. Indeed, it was first made only when the caveat was lodged on 13 December 2007.

...

Any further delay will doubtless increase costs. One only has to look at the massive amount of litigation which has already been generated by this case, to see that this is almost irrefutable. Mr Velissaris has been ordered to pay costs on a number of occasions by various courts, which costs have not been paid.[22]

58 His Honour considered that the balance of convenience, particularly the interests of Maryvell's unsecured creditors, favoured the removal of the caveat.[23]

59 On 12 February 2008, a directions hearing occurred in the Federal Court in respect of Mr Velissaris 'proceedings and orders were made for Mr Velissaris to file and serve a statement of claim, but he did not comply with them.

60 The 2007 contract of sale did not proceed to settlement. Following negotiations between the liquidator and a substituted purchaser, settlement was rescheduled for late February 2008. It was delayed because of Mr Velissaris' caveat and ultimately did not proceed because the new purchaser could not settle and alleged that Mr Velissaris had interfered with the financing process. The liquidator refused to grant the new purchaser an extension of time to complete the settlement and rescinded the 2007 contract of sale and readvertised the property for sale by private treaty. The highest offer was again the sum of $1.6 million which the liquidator accepted. A contract of sale was accordingly entered into between the liquidator and the purchaser, Dynami for the sum of $1.6 million with the settlement scheduled for 8 May 2008. Ms Betty Zervas was a guarantor.

61 The liquidator invited Mr Velissaris to discontinue his Federal Court proceedings in respect of that contract, but he declined to do so. The respondents sought the dismissal of the Federal Court proceedings and on 15 April 2008, after Mr Velissaris had unsuccessfully sought an adjournment, Gordon J ordered that the proceeding be dismissed and that no further proceedings be accepted for filing by Mr Velissaris in relation to Maryvell or the property without leave of the Court.[24] Her Honour found that Mr Velissaris' claims in relation to the 2008 contract of sale did not have any reasonable prospects of success. She rejected Mr Velissaris' argument that he was willing to purchase the property for an amount in excess of $1.6 million. Her Honour stated:

Moreover, having regard to the number and history of proceedings filed by Mr Velissaris in this court, the High Court and the Supreme Court of Victoria, Mr Velissaris' conduct in these proceedings and, so far as the proceedings are currently framed, the fact that the First Contract of Sale did not settle, the existing proceeding is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process of the court.[25]

62 On 12 May 2008, Mr Velissaris lodged a caveat on the title of the property recording an interest in the property claimed by his daughter. The liquidator filed an application seeking to restrain Mr Velissaris from continuing to lodge further caveats in the property through his daughter.

(1) until further order, the Registrar of Titles reject for lodgement any dealings concerning the Property, except dealings lodged on behalf of Maryvell or the liquidator or Dynami Pty Ltd concerning settlement of the sale of the property;

(2) Mr Velissaris' daughter be restrained from lodging any further caveats on the Property either in her own name or on behalf of the beneficiaries of the Maryvell Trust;

(3) Mr Velissaris' oral application for a stay of the settlement of the sale of the Property to Dynami be dismissed; and

(4) the proceeding otherwise be adjourned until 30 May 2008 to hear from the parties about a possible referral of the matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions in relation to any contempt charges against Mr Velissaris and a possible order for indemnity costs against him.

64 Subsequently, Hollingworth J ordered that Mr Velissaris pay the costs of Maryvell and the liquidator on an indemnity basis. No referral to the Director of Public Prosecutions was pursued.

65 The Court of Appeal refused Mr Velissaris leave to appeal. Maxwell P, referred to Hollingworth J's statement that:

The fact of the matter is he clearly breached the order by placing the caveat, and he has fought up until today his right to have lodged that caveat.[26]

Neither Mr Velissaris nor his daughter (with whom Mr Velissaris told us he discussed the possibility of lodging a caveat) made any serious attempt to put before the Court any evidence capable of supporting the assertion of a caveatable interest in the property. It was open to the judge to take the view that the lodgement of the caveat had no proper basis, and no further purpose than to frustrate the sale of the property.[27]

67 On 27 October 2008, Mr Velissaris filed a summons in this Court against the purchaser of the property, Dynami, and against Ms Zervas as guarantor, seeking an order for possession of the property and access to remove plant and equipment.

68 On 6 November 2008, Senior Master Mahony ordered that the proceeding be 'forever stayed' and Mr Velissaris pay the defendants' costs of the proceedings. Under the heading 'Other Matters', the Senior Master recorded that one half of Mr Velissaris' supporting affidavit was irrelevant and the other half was 'expressed in extravagant, repetitious and, at times, scandalous terms'.[28]

69 On 29 July 2008, Mr Velissaris filed an interlocutory application in this Court seeking orders that the liquidation of Maryvell be terminated or stayed pending the determination of an inquiry into the conduct of the liquidator and that the liquidator pay him and other beneficiaries of the Maryvell Trust damages for breaches of ss 180 and 181 of the Corporations Act. Mr Velissaris sought a declaration that the liquidator had engaged in serious misconduct and gross negligence in relation to the sale of the property in breach of the liquidator's duties both to the Court and under the Corporations Act. The substance of Mr Velissaris' complaint was that the liquidator sold the property for less than its market value. He alleged that the property was not sufficiently advertised prior to the auction and that the settlement period of 30 days was too short and discouraged buyers. He alleged that the liquidator had obtained an artificially low valuation to justify the sale and had paid the valuer to do so and was paid 'under the table' by the purchaser to sell the property at less than fair value. He alleged that the liquidator refused to sell the property to him. The liquidator applied for summary dismissal or the staying of the application.

70 On 25 February 2009, Robson J ordered that the interlocutory application be stayed and that 'no further proceeding in the trial division of the Supreme Court of Victoria concerning Maryvell, the conduct of the liquidation, the liquidator of the property be accepted for filing by the Prothonotary from Mr Velissaris except with prior leave of the court'. He also ordered that Mr Velissaris pay the costs of the liquidator and Maryvell. Robson J stated that 'apart from insults and unfounded assertions, Mr Velissaris puts forward no evidence to establish any of these claims'. His Honour also stated:

The applicants [Maryvell and the liquidator] assert that Mr Velissaris' application is scandalous because it is based on scurrilous and baseless allegations of dishonesty against an officer of the Court. They further say it is frivolous because it is unsupported by any admissible evidence and has no prospect of success. They say it is vexatious because the long history of litigation between the parties indicates a determination on the part of Mr Velissaris to vex the liquidator with legal proceedings and other obstacles at every opportunity. I agree with the applicants' contention.[29]

71 On 21 October 2008, the liquidator served a bankruptcy notice on Mr Velissaris based on outstanding costs orders. Mr Velissaris applied to have it set aside relying on the allegations that: the liquidator had sold the property at an undervalue; the sale having not been concluded properly with advertising and settlement periods being too short in duration; that he had lost good will associated with the restaurant which he valued at $300,000; and that the liquidator had wrongfully detained fixtures and chattels in the restaurant which Mr Velissaris claimed to own personally.

72 A Registrar of the Federal Court dismissed Mr Velissaris' application on 4 March 2009. Mr Velissaris sought a review of the Registrar's orders in the Federal Magistrates' Court, but on 3 April 2009, Phipps FM dismissed the claim on its merits and found that Mr Velissaris had previously instituted proceedings in which he should have advanced his claims relating to the relevant fixtures and chattels and, in the circumstances, Anshun estoppel principles applied.[30] In addition, Mr Velissaris had not shown that he had suffered damages in excess of the amount of the debts the subject of the bankruptcy notice.[31]

73 The Federal Magistrate found that the liquidator was lawfully entitled to take possession of the property on 22 September 2007, and that despite Mr Velissaris having clear notice that he had two weeks in which to remove his possessions from the property, he had made no attempt to do so. He was not satisfied that Mr Velissaris had established that he was the owner of the chattels. Even if Mr Velissaris had a claim for wrongful detention of the fixtures and chattels, it was closely intertwined with his claims that had been determined by Gordon J.

74 On 21 September 2009, Mr Velissaris applied to the Supreme Court for leave pursuant to the Supreme Court litigation restraint order to commence a proceeding against Maryvell and its liquidator claiming that the liquidator had sold the property at an undervalue. Vickery J refused to grant that leave stating:

The statement of claim is in handwriting and occupies some 19 pages. I have read that statement of claim in its draft form. I have formed the view that it is not in proper form and it would be impossible for a defendant, served with such a document, to plead to it.[32]

75 On 27 May 2010, Mr Velissaris applied for leave pursuant to the Supreme Court litigation restraint order to file an application against the liquidator and the liquidator's then employer, BDO, to terminate the liquidation and for an account of moneys from the sale of the property. Again, he asserted that the liquidator had sold the property at an undervalue and had breached its duties in respect of that sale.

In my view, the application based on that material would be bound to fail. I take into account that Mr Velissaris has made many attempts to make the same application, but despite the Court on previous occasions refusing to grant leave, or refusing to give him the relief he sought on the basis that the material on which he relied did not demonstrate that his application had any prospect of success, Mr Velissaris still has not put before the Court any evidence which enables the Court to be persuaded that there is some foundation to the assertions that he has made.[33]

77 On 10 September 2010, Mr Velissaris applied for leave pursuant to the Supreme Court litigation restraint order to file an application pursuant to ss 420A and 482 of the Corporations Act to terminate the liquidation and to sue for loss and damage, again complaining that the liquidator sold the property at an undervalue and that he had offered to buy the property for $3.5 million before the 2008 contract of sale was executed.

78 Davies J refused to grant leave, referring to earlier proceedings in which Mr Velissaris had raised the same issue and stating:

The judgments are binding on Mr Velissaris and have given rise to estoppel by res judicata or issue estoppel. The effect of the estoppel is that Mr Velissaris cannot now re-litigate or re-open the question of the liquidator's conduct in relation to the sale of the property. That matter has been finally determined.[34]

79 Her Honour also stated that there was nothing to demonstrate the application would have any reasonable prospect of success.[35]

80 Mr Velissaris sought to appeal from orders of the Federal Magistrates' Court described above with respect to the issuance of a bankruptcy notice and on 17 December 2010, Bromberg J ordered the proceedings be dismissed with no order as to costs. His Honour stated that Mr Velissaris had not satisfied the court that Maryvell continued to exist as a corporation or that the proper service of its application had been effected. He also stated that he had raised with Mr Velissaris the utility of the application and, as far as the Court was aware, no creditor's petition against Mr Velissaris had been filed in the requisite period under the Bankruptcy Act 1966.[36]

81 On 3 December 2009, Mr Velissaris filed an application in this Court against the purchaser of the property, Dynami, and Ms Betty Zervas as guarantor seeking to recover plant and equipment which remained at the property and which had previously been used in the restaurant. The plant and equipment had been transferred by the liquidator to Stonnington Online Conveyancing, the tenant, for the consideration of one dollar as part of a lease agreement between the liquidator and the tenant made prior to the execution of the 2008 contract of sale. Mr Velissaris claimed that his daughter had gifted him the plant and equipment in mid-2003 after she purchased the property at auction.

82 Mr Velissaris' application was heard for six days in December 2010. On 14 December 2010, Sifris J ordered that Mr Velissaris' application be dismissed with costs. His Honour ordered that:

No further proceeding or process of any kind in the Trial Division of the Supreme Court of Victoria, including this proceeding, concerning Dynami Pty Ltd, Betty Zervas, Theodore Zervas or Stonnington Online Conveyancing Pty Ltd ACN 096 995 053, Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd ACN 080 327 073 (in liquidation), the property known as 333-335 Sydney Road, Brunswick or the plant and equipment once used or located there be accepted for filing by the Prothonotary from George Velissaris except with the prior leave of a judge of the Court.[37]

83 His Honour noted that Mr Velissaris' claim to have owned the plant and equipment was contrary to previous sworn affidavit evidence. He stated that he rejected Mr Velissaris' evidence and that 'he is not a witness of truth and cannot be relied on. He will say whatever it takes to support his case.'[38] He also found that he had signed two documents in the names of others.

The plaintiff called many witnesses of questionable relevance. I permitted him to call anyone he chose. It is not open to him to complain of any unfairness or restriction so far as evidence is concerned. However, I was not impressed with any of the witnesses called by the plaintiff. They did not give any evidence of sufficient relevance or weight. Further, the manner of giving evidence was wanting. The plaintiff could not control himself and in addition to leading the witnesses, made loud suggestive answers. He also interrupted and tried to navigate the answers to suit his case.[39]

85 His Honour noted that during the evidence of Mr Velissaris' daughter, Mary, he had made frequent interjections, including 'no Mary', 'say nothing Mary' and 'do not answer Mary'.[40]

86 His Honour found that the relevant plant and equipment was at all material times owned by Maryvell and rejected evidence that the property had been gifted to Mr Velissaris' daughter. He concluded that the property was acquired by the tenant who was not a party to the proceeding. In addition, Mr Velissaris had failed to establish any loss and damage. There was no evidence as to the value of the plant and equipment.

87 The Court of Appeal substantially dismissed Mr Velissaris' appeal on 24 October 2013.[41] Osborn JA stated that Mr Velissaris' claims were 'enmeshed in a series of blatant frauds' and he had been an 'evasive witness in cross-examination',[42] and had refused to answer questions about his financial affairs and about the document he had fraudulently signed. Whelan JA, who delivered the leading judgment in relation to the litigation restraint order, stated that it went beyond what was appropriate because it would have potentially applied to proceedings having no connection to the plant and equipment which was the subject of the judgment. So the Court varied the order to limit the restraint to:

making any further application or taking any step, including the filing or issuing of any new proceeding, in this Court concerning or relating to the ownership of the plant and equipment once used or located at the property known as 333-335 Sydney Road, Brunswick sold by the liquidator of Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd ACN 080 327 073 ('Maryvell') to Stonnington Online Conveyancing Pty Ltd ('the tenant'), pursuant to clause 22.7 of the lease dated 20 March 2007 between Maryvell and the tenant, without first obtaining the leave of a judge or associate judge of this Court.[43]

88 On 14 January 2011, Mr Velissaris applied to the Federal Court for leave in accordance with the Federal Court litigation restraint order imposed by Gordon J to commence a proceeding against the liquidator and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission ('ASIC') to terminate the winding up of Maryvell. On 17 January 2011 Middleton J gave leave to proceed.

89 A subsequent Full Federal Court decision, referred to below, found that in his ex parte application to Middleton J for leave, Mr Velissaris had failed to disclose various proceedings instituted by him in the Supreme Court after the previous judgment of Gordon J and that it was highly likely that if he had, that leave would not have been granted.[44]

90 When on 2 March 2011, Mr Velissaris' application came before Middleton J, Mr Velissaris argued that Maryvell had a right to pursue causes of action against ASIC, the liquidator of Maryvell and Sigma Constructions. Middleton J dismissed Mr Velissaris' application stating that courts had already considered allegations against the entities that Mr Velissaris claimed Maryvell had a right to sue.[45] Middleton J found that Maryvell's financial situation was hopeless and that he could not be satisfied that it would have the capacity to pay its own lawyers or the costs of other parties to the litigation.[46]

91 In April 2011, Mr Velissaris sought leave to file an application pursuant to s 482 of the Corporations Act to terminate or stay the liquidation so that Maryvell could pursue claims which Mr Velissaris asserted were on foot prior to the litigation. He referred to the 2003 VCAT proceedings. He also sought leave pursuant to the 2009 Supreme Court litigation restraint order to commence a proceeding against the liquidator, claiming that the liquidator had improperly sold plant and equipment owned by him.

92 On 27 April 2011, Ferguson J refused to grant Mr Velissaris leave. Her Honour referred to the judgment of Sifris J and stated:

Essentially he seems to want to make substantially the same claim as the claim in the proceeding before Sifris J; that is, that the plant and equipment is owned by him and has been wrongfully sold by the Liquidator (albeit that the defendants to the proceeding would be different to those in the proceeding before Sifris J).[47]

93 An appeal by Mr Velissaris against Middleton J's judgment was dismissed on 9 September 2011. The Full Court referred to Middleton J's finding that several of Mr Velissaris' allegations had been considered by other courts, listing 20 cases related to the matter before it and mentioned as of particular significance, the proceedings before Gordon J, Robson J, Vickery J and Davies J.[48] In each of those cases, the court had considered matters raised by Mr Velissaris in relation to alleged misconduct of the liquidator and the potential termination of the liquidation.

94 On 29 June 2012, Mr Velissaris applied for leave to file an application for the reinstatement of the registration of Maryvell, on the basis of various claims which he asserted Maryvell should pursue on behalf of the beneficiaries of the Maryvell Trust. One such claim was that against Sigma Constructions. Ferguson J heard the matter on the merits and on 4 July 2012 dismissed Mr Velissaris' application. Her Honour referred to the many previous applications made by Mr Velissaris and stated that 'all of the complaints that Mr Velissaris makes have been the subject of consideration in this Court and the Federal Court'.[49]

95 Mr Velissaris sought to appeal against the order of the judgment of Ferguson J. The Registry formed the view that his notice of appeal was defective, but he disputed that and alternatively sought additional time to overcome the defects. The Court of Appeal determined of its own motion to consider whether the appeal should be dismissed for want of prosecution. It so found on 18 July 2014. Ashley JA stated:

In the period of more than one and a half years which has elapsed since early December 2012, the appellant has taken no step either to file a note of proposed content or, for that matter, to regularise his notice of appeal, which was plainly defective. Significantly, the delay remains entirely unexplained. Had not the Court itself determined to bring the matter on, there is nothing to suggest that the appellant would have pursued the appeal.[50]

96 On 2 December 2013, Mr Velissaris commenced a proceeding in the County Court against the liquidator and BDO Kendalls Pty Ltd. He asserted that the liquidator had at one time been a director of BDO. He alleged that the liquidator had sold the property and the plant and equipment for less than their fair market value and wrongly converted them. He claimed damages of $4.4 million in relation to the undervalue claim and $600,000 in relation to the conversion claims. The liquidator sought summary dismissal of the proceeding and orders restraining Mr Velissaris from filing further proceedings against the liquidator.

97 On 17 March 2014, Judge Macnamara ordered that the County Court proceeding be forever stayed and Mr Velissaris be restrained from filing any further proceeding in the County Court against the liquidator, without first obtaining leave, in relation to the property; the ownership of plant and equipment once located or used at the property; Maryvell; or the business conducted by Maryvell at the property.

98 His Honour stated that Mr Velissaris sought to re-litigate what had already been determined by other judgments and that:

The determinations which I have recited already, first, reject the allegations of misconduct in the sale and, secondly, find that the plant and equipment for which $600,000 by way of damages are sought were the property of the company in liquidation [and] are not the property of Mr Velissaris. The proceeding which he brings now fundamentally challenges both those findings and in my view, it is for that reason an abuse of process. It should be stayed.[51]

99 On Mr Velissaris' appeal, the Court of Appeal ordered that the conversion claim be summarily dismissed, rather than stayed, but that the proceeding otherwise, that is the undervalue claim, be forever stayed.

The various decisions show that the appellant has adopted a breathtakingly inconsistent range of positions from one proceeding to another; and, indeed within the one proceeding. He has been the subject of seriously adverse findings, with respect to his truthfulness, on a number of occasions.

He has not been deterred by any of this. Speaking generally, when avenues for complaint in one court appear to have closed, he has commenced litigation in another court. [53]

101 His Honour found that it was an abuse of process for Mr Velissaris to bring the proceeding in the County Court, because he had therefore sought to avoid the filter of leave established by the orders made in the trial division and in the Federal Court. He stated:

Further, commencement of the proceeding in the County Court was a patent attempt by the appellant to avoid having to confront the filtering mechanism established by orders made in the Trial Division and the Federal Court which required that leave of the court be obtained before any proceeding of a particular kind (as described in the orders) be accepted for filing. The idea that the appellant should be permitted to circumvent orders made, for the soundest of reasons, by superior courts is obnoxious. Appellant's counsel, understandably, could advance no justification for the course taken other than to contend that the appellant could choose where to prosecute his claim. That sound general proposition says nothing when the circumstances of the appellant's past litigation are taken into account. Commencement of the County Court proceeding should be regarded as a quite distinct challenge to the authority of the Supreme Court and the Federal Court.

It follows, in my opinion, that the County Court would have lent itself to a proceeding which was oppressive and unfair to the respondent, and which attempted to circumvent orders of the superior court of this State, and of another superior court, had it not stayed the proceeding as an abuse of process.[54]

...the present proceeding appears to be yet another occasion upon which, a court having rejected a claim put by the appellant in a certain way... he has sought to mount a case formulated in a different way so as to avoid the consequences of adverse findings.[55]

103 His Honour found that an Anshun estoppel[56] operated to preclude Mr Velissaris from bringing the plant and equipment claim, stating:

There is a point at which the conception of freedom to choose who to sue, and when, loses validity. That point, in my opinion, was long past by the time that the appellant initiated and prosecuted Dynami... His long history of litigation arising out of the liquidation should not be ignored.[57]

104 The High Court refused Mr Velissaris special leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal judgment.

105 Mr Jones' affidavits on behalf of the Attorney-General referred to a number of other proceedings in which Mr Velissaris was involved. There were three car accidents which have led to litigation.

106 On 2 July 2009, Mr Velissaris' motor vehicle was involved in a collision with the vehicle of Mr C Yang. He claimed that this collision caused damage to the rear right hand side of his vehicle. Some months later Mr Velissaris' vehicle was involved in another collision with a truck driven by a Mr Vamino, who was an employer of Bruno Distributors Pty Ltd ('Bruno Distributors'). Mr Velissaris claimed that the truck collided with his parked car and caused damage to the same rear right side of his vehicle.

107 In around October 2009, Mr Velissaris commenced proceedings in the Heidelberg Magistrates' Court claiming $7,000 in damage from Mr Yang as a result of the first collision, being the costs of repairs, of a hire car and lost earnings.

108 On 7 December 2009, a Judicial Registrar dismissed the proceeding after a judicial arbitration and ordered that Mr Velissaris pay Mr Yang's costs in the sum of $2,260.03. Mr Velissaris subsequently appealed the dismissal of his claim and the appeal was heard by Magistrate McGarvie and dismissed. The evidence of the damage caused by both collisions became relevant. During the course of that hearing, Mr Velissaris alleged a conspiracy against him in that the insurance assessors had colluded to set him up or, alternatively, one of the assessors had caused the damage to his vehicle.

109 On 8 November 2010, Magistrate McGarvie ordered that Mr Velissaris' claim be dismissed and that he pay Mr Yang's costs in the sum of $9,536. Her Honour found that the first collision was caused by the negligence of Mr Velissaris and she preferred Mr Yang's evidence to that of Mr Velissaris. She rejected the conspiracy submission. Mr Velissaris appealed to the Supreme Court against the Magistrate's orders. He alleged that the Magistrate was 'fully' biased against him. He also alleged that the Magistrate erred in law in accepting the evidence of the assessors.

110 McMillan J dismissed Mr Velissaris appeal rejecting the bias claim and finding that the Magistrate was entitled to accept the evidence of both insurance assessors. She found that the Magistrate correctly concluded that Mr Velissaris was claiming the same damage in respect of both collisions and that his vehicle had not been repaired.[58]

111 Following the second collision Mr Velissaris commenced a proceeding in the Melbourne Magistrates' Court against Bruno Distributors claiming that its employee, Mr Vamino, caused approximately $3,000 damage to his vehicle. On 9 March 2011 Magistrate Johnstone ordered that the proceeding be dismissed and that Mr Velissaris pay Bruno's costs in the sum of $8,574. Mr Velissaris appealed and the appeal was dismissed on 9 June 2011 by Daly AsJ. Her Honour stated that the notice of appeal disclosed no arguable errors of law by the Magistrate. Based upon the evidence before him, the Magistrate preferred one version of events over another, and found that the appellant had not proved his case. There was no basis for the allegation of bias.

112 Mr Velissaris appealed the Associate Justice's judgment and Hargrave J ordered that the appeal be dismissed, rejecting Mr Velissaris' allegations of bias of the Magistrate or that Mr Velissaris had been cut off. His Honour stated:

Reading the transcript as a whole, it is apparent that the Magistrate's patience was stretched by Mr Velissaris' behaviour and that he, understandably, expressed exasperation from time to time. He was not rude.

...

For the reasons stated, whether taken singly or together, there is in my opinion no arguable case raised by the proposed ground of appeal based on apprehended bias.[59]

113 Mr Velissaris applied for leave to appeal from the judgment of Hargrave J but the Court of Appeal refused him.

114 On 11 August 2011, Mr Velissaris was involved in a further collision with a vehicle driven by Mr G Champion, who admitted fault. Following a letter of demand from Mr Velissaris' solicitors, GIO, who was Mr Champion's insurer, sent him a cheque for $1,911.80 in repairs on the basis of a quote he had received. It did not pay the sum of $495 for car rental hire charges, or $2,000 for three days of his time occupied in seeking repairs.

115 On the following day, Mr Velissaris issued a proceeding in the Heidelberg Magistrates' Court against Mr Champion claiming the sum of $4,000 plus $157.60 filing fees, plus interest, which referred to the damage to the vehicle in the sum of $2,216.50, on the basis of a revised quote. After Mr Champion failed to file a defence, Mr Velissaris obtained a default judgment on 17 November 2011 for the sum of $3,041.50.

116 On 14 December 2011, Mr Champion successfully applied for a re-hearing which was set down for 30 April 2012. Shortly prior to the application being granted, Mr Champion's solicitors wrote to Mr Velissaris enclosing a cheque for $480.60 being the difference between the first and second of his repair quotes. On 30 April 2012, a Magistrate granted Mr Velissaris an application for leave to amend his claim and an adjournment and ordered him to pay costs of the adjournment fixed at $832. In his amended statement of claim, Mr Velissaris sought the sum of $9,500. On 3 September 2012, the Magistrate ordered that the claim be dismissed and that he pay Mr Champion's costs in the sum of $2,918, finding that the only damage to which he was entitled was the sum of $2,216.50 which had already been paid. The Magistrate found that Mr Velissaris' evidence in relation to the costs of repairs contained substantial contradictions, which, together with her assessment of Mr Velissaris as a witness, gave rise to considerable reservations as to the reliability of his evidence.[60]

117 Mr Velissaris applied in the Supreme Court for a review of the Magistrate's decision. In turn, Mr Champion applied for summary dismissal and on 6 December 2012 Lansdowne AsJ granted the latter application. Her Honour stated in respect of Mr Velissaris' bias claim that:

The plaintiff clearly objects to the Magistrate's determination of the facts, but a determination against a party is not sufficient to establish bias against that party. There is no evidence shown to support the allegations of bias.

118 Mr Velissaris appealed from that judgment but Macaulay J dismissed the appeal stating that there was an evidentiary basis for each of the Magistrate's findings.[61]

119 Mr Velissaris gave evidence that he was involved in a fourth car accident in July 2015 when his car was hit from behind while stationary in Reservoir outside the local milk bar by a large utility and contended that he should be able to sue the driver for all his losses and damages and for pain and suffering, including serious lower back disc damage.

120 In supplementary submissions, the Attorney-General referred to Mr Velissaris' apparently routine and often protracted challenges in the Magistrates' Court to minor parking and traffic infringements. In Mr Jones' fourth and sixth affidavits he refers to a number of traffic offence cases in connection with which Mr Velissaris commenced proceedings. Little attention was given to them in oral submissions and I do not propose to set out all their details. They involved challenges or applications for rehearings of traffic penalties or motor car offences occurring in the last four years. Some of the proceedings were adjourned on many occasions, for instance in respect of a traffic camera infringement matter. Between 27 February 2014 and 30 October 2015, one or more of three motor traffic charges were adjourned or finalised. Mr Velissaris appears to have made applications in relation to the same charge or other charges on around ten separate occasions before ten separate Magistrates. On 30 October 2015, the Magistrates' Court refused Mr Velissaris leave to file a second application for re-hearing of two traffic camera infringement matters. Mr Velissaris subsequently appealed some of the findings of the Magistrates' Court to the County Court but the appeals were out of time and deemed abandoned.

121 In respect of case number D11118687, which was the second set of charges for which a rehearing was refused on 30 October 2015, one or more of the three charges were first listed for mention on 31 May 2013. Between then and 30 October 2015 one or more of the charges were either adjourned or finalised, but applications in relation to the same charge or charges were made on around six separate occasions involving around six separate Magistrates. On charge 1, Mr Velissaris was convicted and fined for exceeding a 50km/h speed limit sign by less than 10km. On his appeal, the County Court found the appeal out of time and abandoned. In respect of charge 2, upon a rehearing application, the application was struck out due to there being no appearance by or on behalf of Mr Velissaris.

122 On 17 November 2015, the Magistrates' Court refused an application by Mr Velissaris for the re-hearing of a criminal matter which appeared to involve two traffic offences. This matter had been before the Magistrates' Court twice, and had been adjourned, and, on the third occasion, Mr Velissaris was fined $443.00 with conviction and ordered to pay statutory costs of $77.50 for using a hand held mobile phone whilst his vehicle was moving. On an appeal, the County Court found the appeal out of time and thus abandoned.

123 On 25 November 2015, the Magistrates' Court struck out Mr Velissaris' request for the review of a Judicial Registrar's decision in a traffic camera offence infringement matter, which involved two charges. The request was struck out on the basis that he failed to appear. This matter had been adjourned twice before being finalised.

124 On 10 June 2016, a Judicial Registrar adjourned the hearing of charges against Mr Velissaris for, firstly, causing hazard by opening a vehicle door and secondly, failing to position a vehicle completely within a parking bay. Those offences were allegedly committed on 11 December 2013. The proceedings before the Judicial Registrar on 10 June 2016 were concerned with charges that had previously been adjourned on five occasions before five separate Magistrates.

125 There was also evidence of an intervention order being made against Mr Velissaris in the Magistrates' Court in December 2015, with a number of subsequent hearings relating to it. I do not attach weight to this matter as it was not commenced by Mr Velissaris, although he did seek to revoke it.

126 Equally, I do not consider that the evidence of the three additional traffic offences in 2009, 2014 and 2015 are particularly relevant, and in the case of the 2015 charge, Mr Velissaris successfully appealed his conviction.

127 I have set out detail of the matters about which Mr Velissaris complains in describing the proceedings that he has commenced. Mr Velissaris submitted that he was not a vexatious litigant.

128 Mr Velissaris requested that the Court not prohibit him from suing the liquidator; the solicitors; Sigma Constructions; and the driver who ran into him.[62] He stated that it would take him about a year and a half to fix his health problems and that he would then apply, after that time, for leave to sue the various people he wanted to sue out of time. At the end of the hearing, he stated:

Your Honour, if I can make this pleading please. Last pleading is - I respectfully request, Your Honour, not to prohibit me to sue those people; the liquidator, the solicitors, and Sigma Constructions, and of course the driver that smashed me. I do not want to sue anybody else, because I don't like to go to courts, I'm not well.[63]

must have the full legal rights to sue the people and companies who caused me big damages and business losses, and to so recover my loss and damages, and this is the real human right of every person, and no one should deprive him.[64]

130 He complained that he had not been permitted to sue Tolhurst Druce & Emmerson and the liquidator, Mr Fitzgerald and Baker and Armstrong Lawyers, because of Supreme Court orders.

131 He stated that the restaurant was his own business and that he was the main chef and that he, rather than the trustee of Maryvale, was the owner of the 'brand new restaurant plant and equipment' which he bought with his own monies. He had paid over $650,000 but the liquidator had sold it for $1.

132 He questioned why the Attorney-General had not enquired into the liquidator's conduct.

133 I have described much of the Attorney- General's submissions previously. In essence they were that Mr Velissaris had persistently commenced and continued vexatious proceedings and would continue to do so.

134 I consider that the evidence supports the following findings.

135 First, a number of the proceedings brought by Mr Velissaris have been determined to be an abuse of process or vexatious.

136 Dodds-Streeton J's judgment of 6 June 2007 established that Mr Velissaris did not have any legal or equitable interest in the property. Despite that finding, he commenced proceedings in both the Supreme Court and Federal Court and lodged caveats himself, and through his daughter, on the footing that he did have such an interest.

137 In my opinion after Dodds-Streeton J's judgment, each of the proceedings that Mr Velissaris commenced in respect of the property and the liquidator's actions and the purchase of the Sydney Road property by Dynami were vexatious.

138 In 2007, Gordon J described Mr Velissaris' proceeding in the Federal Court as 'frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process of the court'.

139 In May 2008, Hollingworth J found that Mr Velissaris had lodged the caveat on no proper basis and no further purpose than to frustrate the sale of the property.

140 In November 2008, the Senior Master described part of Mr Velissaris' affidavit as being 'expressed in extravagant, repetitious, and, at times, scandalous terms'.

141 In February 2009, Robson J agreed that Mr Velissaris' application concerning the liquidation was vexatious and due to Mr Velissaris' determination to vex the liquidator with legal proceedings and other obstacles at every opportunity.

142 In March 2014, Judge Macnamara described Mr Velissaris' proceeding in the County Court as 'an abuse of process' and ordered that it be stayed. Ashley JA also described the proceeding as 'an abuse of process' and said of Mr Velissaris' conduct that:

[A] court having rejected a claim put by the appellant in a certain way... he has sought to mount a case formulated in a different way so as to avoid the consequences of adverse findings.[65]

143 Mr Velissaris' conduct in his proceedings against Sigma Constructions, its directors and guarantor continued beyond their reasonable prosecution and he continued to assert a claim against its directors after VCAT had rejected that claim.

144 Secondly, Courts on a number of occasions have made proceeding restraint orders against Mr Velissaris. In January 2008, this Court, upon removing a caveat, restrained Mr Velissaris from lodging any further caveats.

145 In 2008, in Federal Court proceedings, Gordon J ordered that Mr Velissaris' proceedings against the liquidator concerning the 2007 contract of sale be dismissed, and ordered that no further proceedings be accepted for filing by Mr Velissaris in relation to Maryvell or the Sydney Road property without leave of the Court.

146 On 21 May 2008, Hollingworth J ordered that Mr Velissaris and his daughter be restrained from lodging dealings concerning the property. Mr Velissaris then turned his attention to the possession of property that had been transferred to the purchasers.

147 On 25 February 2009, Robson J ordered that no further proceeding by Mr Velissaris in the Trial Division of the Court concerning Maryvell, the conduct of the liquidator or the liquidation of the property be accepted for filing by the Prothonotary except with prior leave of the Court.

148 On 3 December 2010 however, Mr Velissaris commenced a further action in the Supreme Court. On 14 December 2010, Sifris J made a wider proceeding restraint order prohibiting Mr Velissaris from commencing further proceedings.

149 Mr Velissaris switched proceedings to the County Court and that led to the orders of Judge Macnamara and the Court of Appeal. As Ashley JA observed, if Mr Velissaris lost one battle, he would move to a new battlefield.

150 Thirdly, Courts have made adverse findings as to Mr Velissaris' credit in the conduct of proceedings. In October 1999, the Federal Court found that in connection with the service of a bankruptcy notice, that Mr Velissaris had sought to avoid personal service by denying his identity.

151 On 7 November 2007, Mr Velissaris, in an application to restrain the liquidator from proceeding with an auction of the property informed this Court that his application for special leave to the High Court against an earlier court judgment was still on foot when in fact it had been dismissed.

152 In December 2010, Sifris J said that Mr Velissaris was not a witness of truth and could not be relied upon. On appeal, Osborn JA described his evidence as 'enmeshed in a series of blatant frauds'. In 2014, Ashley JA stated that Mr Velissaris had been the subject of seriously adverse findings with respect to his truthfulness on a number of occasions.

153 Fourthly, Mr Velissaris' attempts to obtain leave to commence proceedings after litigation restraint orders were made against him also demonstrates the manner in which he has continued to seek to conduct vexatious proceedings which were also an abuse of process. Thus, he unsuccessfully sought leave from Vickery J to commence proceedings against Maryvell and the liquidator. Similarly, Davies J refused him leave on two occasions. Ferguson J also refused him leave.

154 This is not a case where I can conclude that because of Mr Velissaris' age and poor health that he is unlikely to commence and continue further vexatious proceedings. During the hearing of this application, Mr Velissaris stated that he still wanted to continue proceedings against the liquidator and his former solicitors.

155 Fifthly, Mr Velissaris in proceedings or appeals in motor car accident cases on two occasions has alleged that the magistrate deciding the case was biased and this Court has found that those allegations were not established.

156 It is clear that Mr Velissaris feels deeply aggrieved by the events that have affected him. But he has pursued his rights in court and when he has been unsuccessful, he has persisted in again raising the same issues.

157 The Court's discretionary power to make a general litigation restraint order under s 29(1) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act is enlivened if the Court is satisfied that a person has 'persistently and without reasonable grounds commenced or conducted vexatious proceedings'.

158 The Act does not give an exhaustive definition of a vexatious proceeding, however, a proceeding is taken to be a vexatious proceeding if:

(a) it is an abuse or process or has been commenced or conducted to harass, annoy, cause delay or achieve another wrongful purpose; or

(b) it is commenced or pursued without reasonable grounds.[66]

159 Section 29(2) of the Act requires that in determining whether or not it is satisfied of the matters contained in s 29(1), the Court may take into account any matter that it considers relevant. If the Court is satisfied of matters which are the subject of s 29(1), it must then assess the person's conduct as a whole to determine whether a general litigation restraint order should be made.

160 It is generally not necessary, in assessing the character of a proceeding, to re-examine in detail the circumstances of proceedings which are said to be vexatious. Rather, the character of the proceeding should be apparent upon the reading of any reasons for judgment and orders. If a proceeding has been the subject of an order dismissing or striking out the proceeding as frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of process, it is usually unnecessary to look behind that order.[67]

161 Courts and tribunals have on many occasions found that Mr Velissaris' claims were without substance.

162 I find that Mr Velissaris has continually commenced or conducted vexatious proceedings and proceedings without reasonable grounds in the many proceedings he has commenced concerning the liquidation of Maryvell and the sale of its property. I consider that the proceedings that he brought against the liquidator were vexatious proceedings because they were an abuse of process or commenced or pursued without reasonable grounds.

163 Mr Velissaris has consistently sought to re-litigate matters the subject of previous findings by courts or tribunals. In his affidavits, Mr Velissaris has re-stated previous complaints about the conduct of lawyers, the liquidator and Maryvell and Dynami. All of those matters had been litigated in the past. Mr Velissaris' statements in court during the hearing of the proceeding indicated that he wishes to recommence such litigation into the future. Based on the manner in which he has conducted previous cases, there is a real risk that he will commence or conduct such proceedings without reasonable cause. He is unwilling to accept that Court decisions bind him and that he must, however reluctantly, accept their outcome.

164 I accept the Attorney-General's submissions that Mr Velissaris seems to have no insight into his past conduct. I am satisfied that unless the order sought by the Attorney-General is made, it is probable that he will continue to seek to commence proceedings in various forms arising from the sale of the Sydney Road property as well as in respect of his grievances against solicitors and Sigma Constructions. I do not consider that the existing restraint orders cover the total class of proceedings that Mr Velissaris may seek to commence.

165 I consider that the Court's discretionary power in s 29(1) of the Act is engaged and that it is appropriate to make a general litigation restraint order against Mr Velissaris. He should be able to defend any proceeding which is brought against him without leave. He should also be able to commence proceedings arising from a motor vehicle collision that he alleges occurred in Reservoir in July or August 2015 without needing to obtain leave. Otherwise he will need to apply to this Court for leave to commence or continue any proceedings in any Victorian court or tribunal as defined in the Act.

166 I therefore order that a general litigation restraint order be issued against George Velissaris under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014. The order will be in the following terms:

1. Pursuant to ss 29 and 30 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014, the Court orders that save as provided in paragraph 2 of this Order, George Velissaris must not, without the leave of the Supreme Court of Victoria, commence or continue any proceeding, whether civil or criminal, in any of the following Victorian courts or tribunals:

(e) the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal;

2. Paragraph 1 of this order does not prevent George Velissaris commencing a civil proceeding that arises from a motor vehicle collision in which he alleges that he was involved in July or August 2015 in Massey Avenue, Reservoir.

[1] Velissaris v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd [2000] FCA 189 [8]-[9].

[2] Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Velissaris [1999] FCA 1359 [11].

[3] Velissaris v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd [2000] FCA 189.

[4] Sigma Constructions Pty Ltd v Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 242.

[5] Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd v Sigma Constructions Pty Ltd [2006] VCAT 74 [14].

[6] Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd v Sigma Constructions Pty Ltd [2006] VCAT 688 [33].

[7] Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd v Sigma Constructions Pty Ltd [2006] VCAT 743 [10].

[9] Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd v Sigma Constructions Pty Ltd [2006] VCAT 743 [27].

[10] Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Sigma Construction Pty Ltd [2010] VCAT 1380 [28]-[31].

[11] Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Sigma Construction Pty Ltd [2010] VCAT 1380 [34]-[35].

[12] Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd v Sigma Constructions Pty Ltd [2006] VCAT 1599 [30].

[13] Tolhurst Druce & Emmerson v Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 271 [186].

[14] Tolhurst Druce & Emmerson v Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 271 [144],[147].

[17] Velissaris v Maryvell Investments Pty and Laurence Andrew Fitzgerald (in his capacity as liquidator of Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd) Supreme Court of Victoria, Court of Appeal, Order of 5 September 2007.

[18] Velissaris v Maryvell Investments Pty and Laurence Andrew Fitzgerald (in his capacity as liquidator of Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd) Supreme Court of Victoria, Court of Appeal, Orders of 19 September 2007 and 1 November 2007.

[19] Transcript of Proceedings, Constantinos George Velissaris v Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd (in liquidation) and Laurence Andrew Fitzgerald of Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (High Court of Australia, No M102 of 2007, Justice Hayne, 1 November 2007) [680].

[20] Velissaris v Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd (in Liquidation) [2007] FCA 2095.

[21] Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd v Velissaris (Ruling) [2008] VSC 132.

[23] Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd v Velissaris [2008] VSC 19 [19]-[21].

[24] Velissaris v Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (No 1) [2008] FCA 492 and Velissaris v Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (No 2) [2008] FCA 511.

[26] Velissaris v Fitzgerald [2008] VSCA 152 [15].

[27] Velissaris v Fitzgerald [2008] VSCA 152 [18].

[28] George Velissaris v Dynami Pty Ltd (ACN 130 300 542) and Betty Panagiota Zervas, Supreme Court of Victoria, Senior Master Mahony, Order of 6 November 2008.

[29] Re Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2009] VSC 61 [76].

[30] Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 45; (1981) 147 CLR 589.

[31] Velissaris v Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2009] FMCA 342.

[32] Velissaris v Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 448 [7].

[33] Re Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd (in Liquidation) [2010] VSC 278 [13].

[34] Re Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (No 2) [2010] VSC 401 [3] (citations omitted).

[36] Velissaris v Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 1450.

[37] As recorded by the Court of Appeal in Velissaris v Dynami Pty Ltd and Zervas [2013] VSCA 299 [13] footnote 6.

[38] Velissaris v Dynami Pty Ltd & Zervas [2010] VSC 587 [29].

[41] Velissaris v Dynami Pty Ltd & Zervas [2013] VSCA 299.

[44] Velissaris v Fitzgerald [2011] FCAFC 120 [11].

[45] Velissaris v Fitzgerald [2011] FCA 197 [6].

[47] Velissaris v Dynami Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 198 [18].

[48] Velissaris v Fitzgerald [2011] FCAFC 120 [27]-[38].

[49] Re Velissaris [2012] VSC 293 [10].

[50] Re Velissaris [2014] VSCA 153 [20].

[51] Velissaris v Fitzgerald and Anor (unreported County Court of Victoria, 17 March 2014, Judge Macnamara) [20].

[53] Velissaris v Fitzgerald & Anor [2014] VSCA 139 [17]-[18].

[56] Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 45; (1981) 147 CLR 589.

[57] Velissaris v Fitzgerald & Anor [2014] VSCA 139 [97].

[58] Velissaris v Yang [2012] VSC 257 [29]-[32].

[59] Velissaris v Bruno Distributors Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 395 [10],[13].

[60] Reasons for decision of 3 September 2012, proceeding no B12943176 (Magistrate Wakeling).

[61] Velissaris v The Magistrates' Court of Victoria [2013] VSC 23.

[62] Transcript of Proceedings, Attorney-General of the State of Victoria v George Velissaris (Supreme Court of Victoria, S CI 2015 05392, Justice Ginnane, 4 October 2016) 278.

[64] George Velissaris, 'Written submissions of 11 November 2016', Attorney-General of the State of Victoria v George Velissaris, S CI 2015 05329 [4].

[65] Velissaris v Fitzgerald & Anor [2014] VSCA 139 [91].

[66] Section 3 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 definition of vexatious proceedings.

[67] Kay v Attorney-General for the State of Victoria [2000] VSCA 176; (2000) 2 VR 436, 437.