In the circumstances, Deputy President Macnamara denied the application for a joinder. I fully agree with this approach.
14 In my opinion the proposed amendment upon which reliance is placed for the joinder of Mr and Mrs Constantopoulos falls foul of s.126 of the Instruments Act. Whatever assurance is given by Mr Mackinnon that the claim brought is one in which reliance is not placed upon a guarantee but upon simple contract, the fact is that the proposed action to be brought is one which is "... to charge a person upon a special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person" as described in s.126. If it is such an action, it cannot be brought unless there is a memorandum or note of the agreement in writing signed by the person to be charged or by a person lawfully authorised so to sign. Maryvell's action purports to be one pursuant to the provisions of the Fair Trading Act 1999. Apart from the original application, paragraph 8 of the Amended Points of Claim makes this clear. I can find nothing in the Fair Trading Act which, in some way, excludes the operation of s.126 of the Instruments Act. If that be so, and if I am correct in my analysis of what is in fact alleged in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Amended Points of Claim in relation to the foundation for the proposed joinder, s.126 of the Instruments Act represents a complete defence. Any action, as presently framed, against Mr and Mrs Constantopoulos would be untenable and doomed to fail. I appreciate that, at least in the courts, reliance upon s.126 of the Instruments Act would normally be pleaded in the Defence, this being done in a manner similar to a defence pursuant to the Limitation of Actions Act 1958. However, firstly, this is not a court of pleadings. Secondly, in the circumstances of the present application, Maryvell has set out the cause of action against the proposed joined parties upon which it would rely. Mr Aizen, instructed by those proposed joined parties, has squarely raised the issue of s.126 of the Instruments Act. It would be a futile, time-consuming and unnecessarily expensive exercise for me to allow the joinder so that the foreshadowed s.126 defence could be formally pleaded. It has been specifically raised and reliance upon it has been foreshadowed. In my opinion this means that the proposed cause of action against Mr and Mrs Constantopoulos is misconceived, and, as stated, doomed to failure. Therefore, my discretion should not be exercised in favour of the proposed joinder.
15 In the circumstances, there is therefore no need for me to rule upon Mr Aizen's alternative argument that there is no consideration flowing between Maryvell and Mr and Mrs Constantopoulos so as to satisfy the requirements for the existence of an oral contract between each of them and Maryvell. However, it does seem to me that, if the terms of such alleged contract are examined, one comes back to s.126 of the Instruments Act. The consideration allegedly flowing one way is the granting of the licence by Maryvell to Sigma. The consideration flowing the other way is not between Sigma and Maryvell, but, allegedly, is the promise by Mr and Mrs Constantopoulos to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of Sigma. No other consideration, flowing either way, is alleged. There is no written memorandum. Again the proposed joinder seems to be fatally flawed.
16 No argument was advanced as to whether the proposed claims against Charisiou and Mr and Mrs Constantopoulos are of such a nature as to attract the operation of the Fair Trading Act. I make no final ruling in that regard, save to say that it seems to me to be an arguable proposition and not clearly doomed to failure.