[2025] NSWCATAP 105
General information, not legal advice.
NCAT Appeal Panel
2025-05-15
G Burton SC, Senior MemberR C Titterton OAM, Senior Member
Original judgment source is linked above.
74. ... an appeal to the Appeal Panel does not provide a losing party in the Tribunal below with the opportunity to run their case again: Ryan v BKB Motor Vehicle Repairs Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCATAP 39 at [10]. And, as the Appeal Panel stated in [Temple v AMR Motors Pty Limited [2017] NSWCATAP 221], in passages relied on by the respondent:
38 Any decision to grant leave to appeal must be undertaken in a legally principled manner and not simply because, if we were hearing the matter anew on the evidence led before the Member, we might reach a different conclusion when considering that evidence (although in the present case that would not be so).
39. It is fundamental that an appeal on a question of fact does not provide and is not intended to provide an opportunity for an applicant dissatisfied by the result of a hearing at first instance to re-run the same case before an Appeal Panel. Yet, that is, in effect, what the present Appellants seek to do by identifying what they contend are contestable findings of fact by the Member.
75 To put the matter another way, as indicated in the Tribunal's Guideline 1, Internal Appeals (which can be found on the Tribunal's website):
... an appeal is not an opportunity to have a second go at a hearing.
(1) Each party to proceedings in the Tribunal is to pay the party's own costs.
(2) The Tribunal may award costs in relation to proceedings before it only if it is satisfied that there are special circumstances warranting an award of costs.
(3) In determining whether there are special circumstances warranting an award of costs, the Tribunal may have regard to the following--
(a) whether a party has conducted the proceedings in a way that unnecessarily disadvantaged another party to the proceedings,
(b) whether a party has been responsible for prolonging unreasonably the time taken to complete the proceedings,
(c) the relative strengths of the claims made by each of the parties, including whether a party has made a claim that has no tenable basis in fact or law,
(d) the nature and complexity of the proceedings,
(e) whether the proceedings were frivolous or vexatious or otherwise misconceived or lacking in substance,
(f) whether a party has refused or failed to comply with the duty imposed by section 36(3),
(g) any other matter that the Tribunal considers relevant.
(4) If costs are to be awarded by the Tribunal, the Tribunal may--
(a) determine by whom and to what extent costs are to be paid, and
(b) order costs to be assessed on the basis set out in the legal costs legislation (as defined in section 3A of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 ) or on any other basis.
(5) In this section-
"costs" includes--
(a) the costs of, or incidental to, proceedings in the Tribunal, and
(b) the costs of, or incidental to, the proceedings giving rise to the application or appeal, as well as the costs of or incidental to the application or appeal.
(emphasis added)
(1) the tenant is to provide submissions (and if necessary evidence) on costs on or before 29 May 2025;
(2) the landlords may respond on or before 12 June 2025;
(3) the tenant may reply on or before 19 June 2025.
(4) submissions are to be limited to five pages.
... It is the experience of the Appeal Panel that costs decisions in the Consumer and Commercial Division and on appeal (unless dealt with at the time of the hearing) are routinely considered "on the papers", and without a hearing. The parties were given an opportunity to provide written submissions and did so. They can be presumed to have included all relevant issues in their written submissions.
(1) The name of the appellant is amended so as to read "Peter and Amanda Pty Ltd atf The Ryder Superfund";
(2) In so far as the appellant raises a question of law, the appeal is dismissed.
(3) In so far as the appellant raises any other grounds, leave to appeal is refused and the appeal otherwise dismissed.
(4) The respondent is to provide submissions (and if necessary evidence) on costs on or before 29 May 2025;
(5) The appellant may respond on or before 12 June 2025;
(6) The respondent may reply on or before 19 June 2025.
I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.
[1] A reference to par [49] of the Primary Decision.
[2] Transcript appearing at p 43/62 of the landlords' submissions.
[3] Some paragraph breaks have been added for ease of understanding.
[5] We note that the transcript records the following: One of the Landlords: Can I assume that members read through all the submissions? Tribunal: No, definitely not. One of the Landlords: Ok, so I need to go through all the submissions. Tribunal: That's why I'm taking you to the documents as we go, yeah.
[9] Landlords' appeal documents, p 7/112 (email dated 19 June 2024).
[10] Transcript appearing at p 36 of 62 of the landlords' submissions.
[11] Transcript appearing at p 36 of 62 of the landlords' submissions.
[12] Landlords' appeal documents, p 6/112 (email dated 19 June 2024).
Peter and Amanda Pty Ltd atf The Ryder Superfund
Johnson [2025] NSWCATAP 105
33 Pursuant to ... the residential tenancy entered into between the parties, when giving vacant possession to [the landlord], the obligation of the [tenant] was, relevantly, to leave the premises as nearly as possible in the same condition, fair wear and tear excepted, as at the commencement of the tenancy: cl 17.1. Such an obligation is also reflected in s 51(3)(b) of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) (the RT Act).
34 This obligation means that the tenant, for the term of the residential tenancy agreement, is bound to keep the premises in a satisfactory condition, but is not liable for damage or deterioration of condition due to fair wear and tear. If any want of repair is alleged and proved in fact, it lies on the tenant to show that it comes within the exception. Fair wear and tear means the reasonable use of the house by the tenant and the ordinary operation of natural forces: Regis Property Co Ltd v Dudley [1959] AC 370 (referred to with approval by the NSW Court of Appeal in Alamdo Holdings Pty Limited v Australian Window Furnishings (NSW) Pty Ltd & Anor [2006] NSWCA 224).
35 In Pancio v Crompton & Jennings [2015] NSWCATAP 110 the Appeal Panel at [24] applied the principles set out in Adoncello v Sazdanoff [2006] NSWCTTT 577 where the Tribunal referred with approval to the following statement in Fitzpatrick v Wu (RTT 01/16425):
36 The first task for the Tribunal was to determine the condition of the premises at the commencement of the tenancy. This is done through evidence which should be constituted by an ingoing condition report (ICR), preferably signed by both parties, which sets out the condition including the cleanliness of each room of the premises and the external areas. Absence of an ingoing inspection report does not preclude a landlord bringing a claim for compensation due to the condition of the premises at the end of the residential tenancy, but the absence of an ISR goes to the weight of evidence: Hall v Hawkins [2015] NSWCATAP 197 at [59]- [66].
37 These days, contemporaneous photographs and even videos form part of an ICR. ...
39 The next step to be undertaken by the Tribunal is to identify the condition of the premises at the conclusion of the tenancy. Similarly, this is done by the completion of an outgoing condition report (OCR), preferably completed at the conclusion of the tenancy in the presence of both parties at a final inspection.
(emphasis added)
In Herne Investments (NSW) Pty Ltd v Don Watson Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 72, which concerned a motor accident, the appellant contended that the primary judge had failed to give adequate weight to video footage taken from a camera in a vehicle travelling behind the vehicles involved in the accident. Sackville AJA, Ward JA and Garling J agreeing, said, at [42]:
153 The respondent submitted that considerations preventing new points being raised on appeal should be applied to the appellant's arguments: Hudson v Arp 1 (NSW) Pty Ltd (2014] NSWCATAP 61; Drivas v Burrows [2014] NSWCATAP 87.
154 To these authorities could be added Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; (1986) 162 CLR 1, which has been regularly applied by the Appeal Panel, most recently in Independent Liquor & Gaming Authority v Hurlstone Park Operations Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCATAP 232 (15 November 2024) and Unique Commercial Group Pty Ltd v Cusumano (16 October 2024).
155 As the Appeal Panel stated in Chahrouk v Bardouh [2024] NSWCATAP 181 and in Bartel v Ryan [2018] NSWCATAP 231 at [25], the High Court of Australia said in Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33 at [9] that it is elementary that a party is bound by the conduct of their case. Except in the most exceptional circumstances, it would be contrary to all principle to allow a party, after a case had been decided against them, to raise a new argument which, whether deliberately or by inadvertence, the party failed to put during the hearing when they had an opportunity to do so: Palm Homes Pty Ltd v Kav's Constructions Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCATAP 113 at [27].
(1997) 48 NSWLR 430
(2017) 96 NSWLR 503
(1986) 162 CLR 1