[2025] NSWCATCD 76
General information, not legal advice.
NCAT Consumer and Commercial
2025-05-28
Original judgment source is linked above.
Allianz v Waterbrook [2009] NSWCA 224; (2009) 15 ANZ Insurance Cases 224
Catapult Constructions Pty Ltd v Denison [2018] NSWCATAP 158
Crystele Designer Homes Pty Ltd v Wood [2024] NSWSC 1438
Deacon v National Strategic Constructions Pty Ltd; National Strategic Constructions Pty Ltd v Deacon [2017] NSWCATAP 185
Deaves v Sigma Group NSW Pty Limited [2023] NSWCATAP 94
Deaves v Sigma Group NSW Pty Limited [2023] NSWCATAP 94
Fisher v N Phillips and M Phillips t/as Arise Building Services [2022] NSWCATCD 80
Gittany v Keusma [2021] NSWCATAP 264
GMI Construction Pty Ltd v Keshavaraz [2024] NSWCATAP 68
Kurmond Homes Pty Ltd v Marsden [2018] NSWCATAP 23
Leung v Alexakis [2018] NSWCATAP 11
McIntosh v Lennon [2023] NSWCATAP 83
The Owners Strata Corporation Strata Plan No 63341 v Malachite Holdings Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCATAP 256
The Owners-Strata Plan No 87003 v Raysons Constructions Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 66
Vella v Mir [2019] NSWCATAP 28
Walker Group Constructions Pty Ltd v Tzaneros Investments Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 27; (2017) 94 NSWLR 108
Wells Group Pty Ltd v Betts [2025] NSWCATAP 70
(1) Blocked weepholes at brickwork on left-side exterior walls.
(2) Masonry overhanging the slab edge of the footing by more than 15mm on the right-side exterior walls.
(3) Inadequate site drainage that is insufficient to allow drainage away from the base/slab of the dwelling.
(4) Incomplete plumbing works.
(5) Non-structural masonry on the walls of the dwelling deviating for more than 3mm over any 2m in length.
(6) Lintel masonry overhang on left side exterior wall.
(7) Deviation or step in left side exterior wall adjoining brick surfaces.
(8) "Structural damp" in "all areas" of the residential dwelling.
(9) Holes in external walls (referred to as a "minor defect").
(10) Cracking in footpath (referred to as a "minor defect").
(11) Drummy external tiles proximate to garage (referred to as a "minor defect").
(12) Water staining in sections of the external walls (referred to as a "minor defect").
(13) Insufficiently sized screens on windows (referred to as a "minor defect").
(14) Trees overhanging gutters, causing excessive leaf debris (referred to as a "minor defect").
(15) Roof plumbing spreader missing (referred to as a "minor defect").
(16) Grout missing in areas of the balcony tiling (referred to as a "minor defect").
(17) Joint sealant material of kitchen benchtop not of a matching colour and not full sealed (referred to as a "minor defect").
(18) Bathroom waterproofing "inadequate."
(19) Bathroom tap showing evidence of "water hammer" (referred to as a "minor defect").
(20) Bathroom window not latching (referred to as a "minor defect").
(21) Loss fittings and fixtures in bathroom 3 (referred to as "minor defects").
(22) Efflorescence on external brickwork (referred to as a "minor defect").
(23) Door edge sealing of external door leading to main bathroom does not have all sides sealed.
(24) Bedroom window "stiff to slide" (referred to as a "minor defect").
(25) No evidence of installation of termite management system.
(26) Hot water system overflow not connected.
Item 1. Investigate and rectify cause of water entry into foyer and front office (sic). Inspection revealed bubble eight and delamination of plaster to ceiling and wall. Repair all damaged walls and ceilings caused by water entry ensuring colour and surface texture matches that of the surrounding area.
Item 2. Investigate and rectify water entry from roof above alfresco area. Inspection revealed water marks to brickwork above the alfresco aluminium sliding door that is consistent with water penetrating the roof space above. Replace any damaged material in roof space and ensure all flashings are in accordance with the Standard.
Item 3. Investigate and rectify water entry causing damage to dining room window. Inspection revealed bottom timber reveal has rotted leaving a large hole. Replace reveal with new timber and ensure all paint colour matches that of the remaining reveals.
Item 4. Investigate and rectify severe efflorescence calcification to both first floor balconies. Inspection revealed severe calcification to these areas and note that internal water damage is located below these balconies. Thereby indicating that balconies are holding water and/or membrane has failed.
Item 1-Some unrepaired damage to walls and ceiling still existed.
Item 2-The builder had performed remedial work to the soaker flashings above and provided video evidence. However, silicone seal to the masonry wall should have a pressure flashing installed with fixings at a maximum 100 mm. The current work is only a "temporary fix."
Item 3 - Rectification work has not been performed.
Item 4 - Efflorescence has been removed from tiles, but no other remedial work performed to eliminate water entry. The builder has advised that it will apply and epoxy grout, but that is not a waterproofing solution. Epoxy grout can provide a secondary barrier, however the main concern is the failure of the waterproofing membrane below the tiles.
Applicants Points of Claim and Submissions of the Parties Regarding the Issues in Dispute
(a) Expert report of Mr Roberts dated 23 October 2023.
(b) Joint expert report of Mr Xue and Mr Roberts dated 6 May 2024.
(1) Affidavit of Mr Pan dated 13 September 2023, which contained documents including the reports of New South Wales Fair Trading previously referred to, and the building inspection report of Jim's Building Inspections (Mr Xue) dated 16 April 2021.
(2) Statement of Mr Privan dated 13 September 2023. Mr Privan is the tenant who occupies the residential premises. He was not required for cross examination at the hearing.
(3) Expert report of Mr Mehdinezhad (HMS Group) dated 14 September 2023. Mr Mehdinezhad is a quantity surveyor. He was not required for cross examination at the hearing. His report focuses on assessment of the cost of rectifying defects. Neither party referred to his report in their closing submissions, and it is unnecessary to set out in detail the contents of the report.
(4) Expert report of Mr Xue dated 21 December 2023.
(1) An affidavit of Mr Wahba dated 7 August 2023.
(2) The expert reports of Mr Roberts (23 October 2023 and 28 February 2024).
18B Warranties as to residential building work
(1) The following warranties by the holder of a contractor licence, or a person required to hold a contractor licence before entering into a contract, are implied in every contract to do residential building work -
(a) a warranty that the work will be done with due care and skill and in accordance with the plans and specifications set out in the contract,
(b) a warranty that all materials supplied by the holder or person will be good and suitable for the purpose for which they are used and that, unless otherwise stated in the contract, those materials will be new,
(c) a warranty that the work will be done in accordance with, and will comply with, this or any other law,
(d) a warranty that the work will be done with due diligence and within the time stipulated in the contract, or if no time is stipulated, within a reasonable time,
(e) a warranty that, if the work consists of the construction of a dwelling, the making of alterations or additions to a dwelling or the repairing, renovation, decoration or protective treatment of a dwelling, the work will result, to the extent of the work conducted, in a dwelling that is reasonably fit for occupation as a dwelling,
(f) a warranty that the work and any materials used in doing the work will be reasonably fit for the specified purpose or result, if the person for whom the work is done expressly makes known to the holder of the contractor licence or person required to hold a contractor licence, or another person with express or apparent authority to enter into or vary contractual arrangements on behalf of the holder or person, the particular purpose for which the work is required or the result that the owner desires the work to achieve, so as to show that the owner relies on the holder's or person's skill and judgment.
(2) The statutory warranties implied by this section are not limited to a contract to do residential building work for an owner of land and are also implied in a contract under which a person (the principal contractor) who has contracted to do residential building work contracts with another person (a subcontractor to the principal contractor) for the subcontractor to do the work (or any part of the work) for the principal contractor.
Although objective standards such as Australian Standards, the Building Code of Australia and the Guide are of significant relevance in establishing whether work has been performed in a proper and workmanlike manner (Wheeler v Ecroplot Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 61 at [10]), the absence of such evidence does not automatically mean a homeowner has failed to establish breach of statutory warranty. In our view, the relevant principle was succinctly stated by Senior Member Goldstein in G MacFayden and Anor v G Tadrosse [2014] NSWCATCD 194 at [46] as follows:
...[E]vidence that work does not comply with the Building Code of Australia would establish a basis for a finding that sub section 18B(c) of the Act has been breached. Evidence of the details in which work does not comply with the contractual plans and specifications would form the basis for a finding that sub section 18B(a) of the Act has been breached. Evidence of work not being carried out in a proper and workmanlike manner would in my view involve identification of the work in question, a statement of how the expert would expect it to be carried out in in a proper and workmanlike manner and then identification of the factors which establish that the way in which the work has been carried out falls short of it being carried out in a proper and workmanlike manner. Evidence of this nature, if accepted, would form the basis for a finding that sub section 18B(a) of the Act has been breached.
(1) Whether the owner has established on the balance of probabilities that works have not been performed in accordance with s 18B of the HB Act.
(2) If a 'defect' (in the sense of failure to comply with s 18B of the HB Act) is established, what is the appropriate method to rectify that defect.
"...tends to indicate that the test that the test of 'unreasonableness' is only to be satisfied by fairly exceptional circumstances. The example given by the court aligns closely with what Oliver J said in Radford, that is, that the diminution in value measure of damages will only apply where the innocent party is 'merely using a technical breach to secure an uncovenanted profit'."
"In The Owners of Strata Plan No 97315 v Icon Co (NSW) Pty Ltd [2023] NSWCA 303 at [12], Bell CJ (with whom Meagher and Adamson JJA agreed) observed that the qualification as to reasonableness is not confined to the situation described in Tabcorp v Bowen Investments, stating that:
"While it is accepted that the qualification will only apply in 'fairly exceptional circumstances,' it is not confined to where a plaintiff is seeking to rely upon a technical breach to secure an uncovenanted profit."
In that regard, his Honour quoted a passage from the decision of Gleeson JA (with whom White JA and Basten AJA agreed) in Owners SP 92450 v JKN Para 1 Pty Ltd [2023] NSWCA 114 at [67]- [70], which included, relevantly, the following observations at [70]:
"Tabcorp at [16] referred by way of an example of unreasonableness to the situation where the innocent party was 'merely using a technical breach to secure an uncovenanted profit', citing Oliver J in Radford v De Froberville [1977] 1 WLR 1262. Other examples include where the cost of the 'proposed rectification is out of all proportion to the benefit to be obtained': Brewarrina Shire Council v Beckhouse Civil Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 361 at [87]- [88], citing South Parklands Hockey & Tennis Centre Inc v Brown Falconer Group Pty Ltd [2004] SASC 81 at 90 (Debelle J); and Scott Carver Pty Ltd v SAS Trustee Corporation [2005] NSWCA 462 at [120] (Ipp JA); see also Wheeler v Ecroplot Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 61 at [81] (Macfarlan JA, McColl and Basten JJA agreeing). For a recent application of this principle in this Court, see Renown Corporation Pty Ltd v SEMF Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 233."
In Brewarrina Shire Council v Beckhaus Civil Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 361 at [89], Tobias JA (with whom Giles and McColl JJA agreed) observed that:
"In summary, the authorities to which I have referred stand for the proposition that whether the rectification work is a reasonable course to adopt is dependent upon a finding of fact that the proposed work was reasonable in order to achieve the contractual objective. The rectification work would be unreasonable if it was out of all proportion to the achievement of that objective or to the benefit to be obtained therefrom."
"[15] However, the seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether an issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal...
[18] The tribunal must feel an actual persuasion of the occurrence or existence of a fact before it can be found. Where direct proof is not available and satisfaction of the civil standard depends on inference, "there must be something more than mere conjecture, guesswork or surmise" - there must be more than "conflicting inferences of equal degrees of probability so that the choice between them is [a] mere matter of conjecture." An inference will be no more than conjecture unless some fact is found which positively suggests, or provides a reason in the circumstances particular to the case, that a specific event happened or a specific state of affairs existed."
(7) The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in respect of a building claim arising from a breach of a statutory warranty implied under Part 2C if the date on which the claim is lodged is after the end of the period within which proceedings for a breach of the statutory warranty must be commenced (as provided by section 18E)
18E Proceedings for breach of warranty
(1) Proceedings for a breach of a statutory warranty must be commenced in accordance with the following provisions -
(a) proceedings must be commenced before the end of the warranty period for the breach,
(b) the warranty period is 6 years for a breach that results in a major defect in residential building work or 2 years in any other case,
(c) the warranty period starts on completion of the work to which it relates (but this does not prevent proceedings from being commenced before completion of the work),
(d) if the work is not completed, the warranty period starts on -
(i) the date the contract is terminated, or
(ii) if the contract is not terminated - the date on which work under the contract ceased, or
(iii) if the contract is not terminated and work under the contract was not commenced - the date of the contract,
(e) if the breach of warranty becomes apparent within the last 6 months of the warranty period, proceedings may be commenced within a further 6 months after the end of the warranty period,
(f) a breach of warranty becomes apparent when any person entitled to the benefit of the warranty first becomes aware (or ought reasonably to have become aware) of the breach.
(1A) If a building bond has been lodged for building work under Part 11 of the Strata Schemes Management Act 2015, the period of 2 years specified for commencing proceedings for a breach of a statutory warranty for that work is extended until the end of 90 days after the end of the period within which a final inspection report on the building work under that Part is required.
(1B) Subsection (1A) does not limit any other law that permits the period for commencement of proceedings to be extended.
(2) The fact that a person entitled to the benefit of a statutory warranty specified in paragraph (a), (b), (c), (e) or (f) of section 18B has enforced the warranty in relation to a particular deficiency in the work does not prevent the person from enforcing the same warranty for a deficiency of a different kind in the work (the other deficiency) if -
(a) the other deficiency was in existence when the work to which the warranty relates was completed, and
(b) the person did not know, and could not reasonably be expected to have known, of the existence of the other deficiency when the warranty was previously enforced, and
(c) the proceedings to enforce the warranty in relation to the other deficiency are brought within the period referred to in subsection (1).
(3) The regulations may prescribe defects in a building that are not (despite any other provision of this section) a major defect.
(4) In this section -
major defect means -
(a) a defect in a major element of a building that is attributable to defective design, defective or faulty workmanship, defective materials, or a failure to comply with the structural performance requirements of the National Construction Code (or any combination of these), and that causes, or is likely to cause -
(i) the inability to inhabit or use the building (or part of the building) for its intended purpose, or
(ii) the destruction of the building or any part of the building, or
(iii) a threat of collapse of the building or any part of the building, or
(b) a defect of a kind that is prescribed by the regulations as a major defect, or
(c) the use of a building product (within the meaning of the Building Products (Safety) Act 2017) in contravention of that Act.
Note.
The definition of major defect also applies for the purposes of section 103B (Period of cover).
major element of a building means -
(a) an internal or external load-bearing component of a building that is essential to the stability of the building, or any part of it (including but not limited to foundations and footings, floors, walls, roofs, columns and beams), or
(b) a fire safety system, or
(c) waterproofing, or
(d) any other element that is prescribed by the regulations as a major element of a building.
3B Date of completion of residential building work
(1A)...
(1) The completion of residential building work occurs on the date that the work is complete within the meaning of the contract under which the work was done.
(2) If the contract does not provide for when work is complete (or there is no contract), the completion of residential building work occurs on practical completion of the work, which is when the work is completed except for any omissions or defects that do not prevent the work from being reasonably capable of being used for its intended purpose.
(3) It is to be presumed (unless an earlier date for practical completion can be established) that practical completion of residential building work occurred on the earliest of whichever of the following dates can be established for the work -
(a) the date on which the contractor handed over possession of the work to the owner,
(b) the date on which the contractor last attended the site to carry out work (other than work to remedy any defect that does not affect practical completion),
(c) the date of issue of an occupation certificate under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 that authorises commencement of the use or occupation of the work,
(d) (in the case of owner-builder work) the date that is 18 months after the issue of the owner-builder permit for the work.
...
(5) This section applies for the purposes of determining when completion of residential building work occurs for the purposes of any provision of this Act, the regulations or a contract of insurance under Part 6.
The effect of s 48K is tolerably clear. It cuts through the questions of construction which can arise when proceedings are commenced contrary to a time limitation (as evidenced by, for example, David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265 at 277; [1995] HCA 43), and makes it plain that the lodging of a claim under Part 2C must be within the time specified in s 18E, in default of which NCAT lacks jurisdiction. Decisions of the Appeal Panel of NCAT have repeatedly so held: see for example S & G Homes Pty Ltd t/as Pavilion Homes v Owen [2015] NSWCATAP 190 at [53]; Jandson Pty Ltd v James [2021] NSWCATAP 274 at [118] and Unique Commercial Group Pty Ltd v Cusumano [2024] NSWCATAP 204 at [8].
...
Fourthly, s 18E(1)(b) provides that the duration of the warranty period is affected by the character of the damage resulting from the breach: six years if the damage amounts to a "major defect in residential building work", otherwise two years. As was noted in Parkview Constructions at [92], it strains traditional notions of a cause of action to regard a plaintiff who complains of one major defect and one which is not a major defect as having only a single cause of action, because of the availability of different limitation periods.
The Appeal Panel in Ashton v Stevenson; Stevenson v Ashton [2020] NSWCATAP 233 ('Ashton') considered the applicable principles for whether or not a defect was a "major defect" under Section 18E (1) (b) and (4) of the HB Act. Such principles are summarised as follows:
(a) The test under s 18E (4) of the HB Act has two parts. The first is that there must be a defect in "a major element of the building" attributable to one of the specified mattes. The second is that the defect must "cause" or "is likely to cause" (a) the inability to inhabit or use the building (or part of the building) for its intended purpose; or (b) the destruction of the building or any part of the building; or (c) a threat of collapse of the building or any part of the building (Ashton at [63]);
(b) Expert evidence may be necessary to establish the fact of the defect and the likely effect on the ability to inhabit the building or cause the destruction of the building. However, the homeowner may also give lay evidence on such issues, including matters such as observations about the absence of relevant elements of the work; the location of water staining; the fact of water ingress during a rain or flooding event; photographs of such matters; or other observations about which a non-expert could give evidence and which could rationally affect the determination of what is likely in the future (Ashton at [68]).
(c) Whether a particular defect is likely to cause the relevant consequences in the future is evaluated in the context of (a) how long the defect has existed; and (b) whether the defect has resulted in any damage that might indicate the likelihood the premises will become uninhabitable or destroyed in the future by reason of the defect (Ashton at [69]).
(d) The design life of the structure and materials used may be relevant considerations (Ashton at [70]).
(e) Determination of the matters in s 18E (4) (a) (i)-(ii) are questions of fact (Ashton at [130]-[131]). Evidence is required from which it can be concluded the defects will likely cause the specified outcome (Ashton at [134]).
(f) Defects in the drainage system (and the roof structure) designed to keep rainwater from entering the dwelling is a major element under s 18E (4) (c) of the HB Act; and evidence may establish defects are likely to cause the premises to become uninhabitable in the future due to flooding, even if such a rain event has not yet occurred (Ashton at [169]-[170]).
Further, the Appeal Panel stated in Ashton at [135]:
Whilst it is inappropriate to try and catalogue all evidence that might be relevant to resolving the issue of whether the defects are likely to cause the building to become uninhabitable or to be destroyed in whole or in part, it can be readily accepted that the fact of water ingress arising from one or more of the defects would be relevant even though such an outcome had not presently manifested itself. The nature, location and extent of the defects would also be relevant in assessing the likelihood of the prescribed outcome. Lastly, expert evidence assessing the likelihood of the particular defects causing the prescribed outcome would be relevant, it being noted that the evidence must be of a type which is "comprehensible and reach conclusions that are rationally based" in order to "furnish the trier of fact with criteria enabling the evaluation of the validity of the expert's conclusion" .
In Stevenson v Ashton [2019] NSWSC 1689, the Supreme Court (Harrison AsJ) stated at [74]-[76] that the legal test for whether the defect in s 18E (4) of the HB Act is a "major defect" does not require proof that the defect is "presently manifested and dire" or "imminent".
The Tribunal was entitled to form its opinion about whether a major defect exists on the basis of expert evidence and was not required to rely upon evidence from the homeowners directly, but that evidence could be taken into account (Stevenson v Ashton [2019] NSWSC 1689 at [74]). Even if the Tribunal did not expressly rely upon oral evidence for its findings about whether the defects were "major defects," the oral evidence could be relevant to our conclusion about whether the Tribunal's determination that it had jurisdiction was correct. It may have helped to establish, for example, in combination with the expert evidence, that each of the defects associated with the items set out in the Scott Schedule caused the inability to inhabit or use parts of the home.
Alleged Defect 1-Front Façade and Master Balcony Leak
(1) The flashing to the brick wall appears to have failed, allowing water to track down the water cavity into the study below.
(2) There is a "technical breach" in relation to the height of the weepholes when measured from the finished floor level of the balcony floor tiling.
(3) The window to the study is leaking at the mullion allowing water penetration to the internal space of the study.
(4) There is no overflow installed to the balcony.
(5) There is no evidence of balcony waterproofing failure.
Does The Defect Cause, Or Is Likely To Cause The Inability to Inhabit or Use the Building (or Part of the Building) for Its Intended Purpose; or The Destruction of The Building or Any Part of the Building; Or The Threat of Collapse of the Building Or Any Part of the Building?
(1) When it rains the premises feels damp. Rainwater "gushed" into the entrance hall "like a waterfall," and water was "coming down heavily on the kitchen wall." The granny flat "also has water leaks on the main ceiling" (para [7]).
(2) There are "many issues with water ingress, dampness and moisture. Water is still seeping into the entrance hall and kitchen wall when it rains" (para [15]).
(3) The entire wall of the office space near the entrance hall has bubbles due to wetness and moisture when it rains heavily. The ceiling of the entrance hall is stained and bubbled because when it rains water comes in and flows across the ceiling of the entrance hall. When it rains the moisture swells the wooden entrance and internal doors which makes it difficult to open and close the doors to in the property due to dampness. There are water marks all over the kitchen wall under the patio. The flooring in the perimeter of the lounge is failing apart. (para [21]).
Nature of Defect and Appropriate Method of Rectification
(1) Install protection to the existing surface of the balcony in the work area.
(2) Carefully remove skirting tile above 2.5 m length of wall.
(3) Remove and replace 2.5m length of cavity flashing.
(4) Rectify any damage to vertical upturn of waterproof membrane by lapping to existing using a compatible membrane in accordance with Manufacturer's recommendations.
(5) Reinstate skirting tile of wall to match existing.
(6) Instal overflow to balcony (as per paragraph 8.1.7 of CBC Report dated 28 February 2024)
(7) Repair consequential internal damage to ceiling and wall of study (as per paragraph 8.1.4 of CBC report dated 28 February 2024).
Does The Defect Cause, Or Is Likely To Cause The Inability to Inhabit or Use the Building (or Part of the Building) for Its Intended Purpose; or The Destruction of The Building or Any Part of the Building; Or The Threat of Collapse of the Building Or Any Part of the Building?
Nature of Defect and Appropriate Method of Rectification
Mr Roberts: If you put a new window in, your going to have a window with the same extrusion back in and if the joints leak, its going to have the same problem.
Owners Solicitor: Sure, but if you put a new window with a different extrusion, so a different system of window, then that issue may not arise, correct?
Mr Roberts: Well, it depends if the joints are the same.
Owners Solicitor: How many windows do you see with this problem occurring within six years of being installed?
Mr Roberts: Not many, I've got to say.
Owners Solicitor: Its not prevalent, is it?
Mr Roberts: No, its not prevalent. It's not common.
Does The Defect Cause, Or Is Likely To Cause The Inability to Inhabit or Use the Building (or Part of the Building) for Its Intended Purpose; or The Destruction of The Building or Any Part of the Building; Or The Threat of Collapse of the Building Or Any Part of the Building?
Nature of Defect and Appropriate Method of Rectification
Alleged Defect 4-Failed Waterproofing To Balcony Over Garage
Does The Defect Cause, Or Is Likely To Cause The Inability to Inhabit or Use the Building (or Part of the Building) for Its Intended Purpose; or The Destruction of The Building or Any Part of the Building; Or The Threat of Collapse of the Building Or Any Part of the Building?
Owner's Solicitor: Okay. But there's also water damage to the door jamb. But you're not saying the browns..
Mr Roberts: No, that's the mould I'm talking about.
Owner's Solicitor: Okay, so Mr Xue has applied a moisture reading to it and he's found 99.9%. Would you agree that moisture reading is because water is being retained in the door jamb?
Mr Roberts: Well, if that reading is correct, yes, there is moisture at the base of the door, but...
Owners Solicitor: You have no basis, do you, to suggest that Mr Xue has been giving incorrect moisture readings using his equipment, have you?
Mr Roberts: No, and nor do I have to give falls proofs of mine either because I had that...
Owners Solicitor: I didn't say yours was (sic) false. I haven't even raised that issue.
Mr Roberts: I m just saying mine are totally opposite that.
Owners Solicitor: That's right. But Mr Xue is showing you 99.9%with no water on the floor at the time he took his moisture reading.
Mr Roberts: Okay.
Owners Solicitor: So you agree that is fair to assume that the door jamb, being timber, is retaining water?
Mr Roberts: There's water in the vicinity.
Owners Solicitor: You agree that it's not good building practice to build a bathroom with zero fall?
Mr Roberts: No
Does The Defect Cause, Or Is Likely To Cause The Inability to Inhabit or Use the Building (or Part of the Building) for Its Intended Purpose; or The Destruction of The Building or Any Part of the Building; Or The Threat of Collapse of the Building Or Any Part of the Building?
Nature of Defect and Appropriate Method of Rectification
The Respondent's Argument on Causation Based On Allianz v Waterbrook
"I turn now to the general law. As mentioned, the ordinary measure of damages in contract for defective work is the cost of remedying the work. Claims for damages for breach of a statutory warranty are not claims for breach of contract in the strict sense, but I accept, as I have stated, that the same measure would ordinarily apply to such claims.
An issue arises as to whether the same measure applies to a claim by a successor in title who acquires a patently defective building, where the defects result from breaches of statutory warranties. There is, in such circumstances, a difficulty in applying that measure. The successor in title may have purchased the building at a discount that takes into account the cost of remedying the defects. Were that to have occurred it would be difficult to contend that the successor in title suffered a loss. Were that not to have occurred, it might be argued that any loss is due to the fault of the successor in title in overpaying for the building in full knowledge of its defects.
This leads to the question whether, assuming that the successor in title paid more for a patently defective building than it was worth, did the loss that the successor sustained arise from the breaches of statutory warranties? The answer to this question, in my opinion, is the key to the answer to question 2.
In Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd Mahoney JA said (at 361):
"Notwithstanding that a defendant's act or omission has a causal connection with the damage of the person aggrieved, no liability arises if an independent intervening act or event in conjunction with the defendant's act or omission has brought about the plaintiff's damage and the intervening act or event can be treated in a practical sense as the sole cause of the damage."
As his Honour makes clear, this principle is of application under the general law, irrespective of whether the claim is brought in tort or contract. See also McHugh JA at 361-363. There is no reason to think that the principle does not apply to loss caused by breaches of statutory warranties under the Act.
...
In my opinion, applying the same reasoning, a successor in title who acquires a building in full knowledge of its defects, suffers no loss from the existence of those defects. In those circumstances, the builder's breach of statutory warranty could not be said to have diminished the successor's assets, nor increased its liabilities. Any adverse impact to the successor's financial position, and any loss to the successor, would result from the successor knowingly and deliberately paying more for the building than it was worth. The loss would be caused by the successor's own decision to purchase at the agreed price.
The observations in [110] are predicated on the "full knowledge" of the defects being not only knowledge of the existence of the defects but also knowledge of their significance. A party may know of the existence of defects (because they are patent), but may not appreciate - even acting reasonably - that major expenditure would be required to remedy them.
The remarks in [110] are made generally. I repeat that question 2 is couched in terms that bear no reference to any facts, agreed or otherwise. I proceed to consider how the principles of causation bear on the matters raised by the question.
Causation in contract is to be determined by commonsense principles: Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd at 358 per McHugh JA. I have explained why I do not regard the relevant legislation as providing for any different meaning to "loss" as would be attributed to the term according to the general law. Applying those principles, should it be found that Waterbrook acquired the Village in full knowledge of the defects that exist, I would conclude that Waterbrook would fail to establish causation and legal responsibility for its loss. In such circumstances, Waterbrook's knowing and deliberate act in acquiring the Village would constitute a new and independent cause of harm.
But, I repeat, question 2 is articulated in abstract terms without reference to any facts. Thus, the issue under question 2 is simply whether Limitation (9) - because it purports to exclude Allianz's liability for "defects which were reasonably visible at the time that [Waterbrook] acquired the [Village]" - is void by reason of "non-compliance and/or inconsistency" with the Home Building Act and the 1997 Regulation.
I have expressed the view that, in accordance with the general principles of causation Allianz would not be liable under the Policy for claims in respect of defects of which Waterbrook had full knowledge, in the sense I have described. In my view, however, the breadth of Limitation (9) is wider than that; in other words, it attempts to do more work than is achieved by general causation principles.
I have pointed out that where defects are patent a party, even though acting reasonably, might be unaware that major expenditure would be required to remedy them. The repair of patent defects that on their face appear to be trivial, might - on opening up the work - be found to require major reconstruction. In my opinion, applying general principles of causation, in such circumstances the knowledge of a successor in title of the patent defects might not be a new intervening cause. In that event, the chain of causation would not be broken and the successor would be able to prove that it suffered loss.
...
I would, however, reiterate that, on general causation principles, the Policy would still not respond to the claim of a successor in title who acquires a building in full knowledge (in the sense that I have mentioned) of its defects (as that successor would not suffer loss from the existence of those defects)."
"There is no sufficient reason why the person doing the residential building work should be relieved from liability if the defect due to non-compliance with the warranty was reasonably visible at the time of acquisition. The reasonable visibility would not eliminate the person's breach and its consequences. Nor would relief from liability foster consumer protection, and incentivation properly to do residential building work. In this respect I agree with Ipp JA that double recovery from the person doing the residential building work, by the successor in title and then by the person for whom the work was done, would not be available: the express exception in s 18D did not mean that double recovery could otherwise be had. While recovery by a successor in title could benefit a developer, that can be regarded as subservient to protection of the successor in title as consumer.
Treating the acquisition of the dwelling with actual or constructive knowledge of the defect as the causal link would make protection of the successor in title as consumer a complex matter, and one in which the consumer may well not be protected.
Reasonable visibility of a defect as the criterion for recovery by the successor in title would be the beginning of a morass of factual inquiry, alien to consumer protection. Its theoretical justification, for which Allianz argued, is that when the successor in title acquired the dwelling the actual or constructive knowledge of the defect would be reflected in the purchase price. ln many cases that would be contrary to the facts. Purchasers do not always see reasonably visible defects, and if they know of them any effect on the purchase price involves knowledge of the cost of rectifying the defects; that is notoriously often difficult to forecast. Further, if the successor in title is able to recover the cost of rectifying the defect from the person who did the residential building work or an insurer, the purchase price is unlikely to be affected, or may be affected only so as to reflect the expense and trouble of recovery. The theory is essentially circular.
I apprehend that the problem with the theoretical justification is to an extent acknowledged by Ipp JA, in his acceptance that in some circumstances the successor in title's knowledge of patent defects might not be a new intervening cause. Investigation of the circumstances in order to arrive at causation would lead into the depths of the morass. I doubt a legislative intention that a successor in title should have to undergo such an investigation. The preferable view, in my opinion, is that the successor in title's loss, ordinarily the cost of rectifying the defect, arises from breach of warranty because the successor in title is exposed to the cost of rectifying the defect. That is so whether or not the defect is reasonably visible at the time of acquisition.
"Although in my opinion there is much to be said for the view taken by Giles JA, it is not necessary to consider whether the case was correctly decided.
This is first because the present case concerns an assignment of contractual warranties including as I have determined, the right to sue for past breaches. As was pointed out in Renold supra the assignee is entitled to recover damages of the same kind as the assignor could have recovered and steps into the shoes of the assignor for the purpose of pursuing the right vested in the assignor: at [26]. It is irrelevant in my opinion whether the assignee knows of the breaches or otherwise.
That is not to say that an act of the assignee could not break the chain of causation (for example, in the present case by using excess loads on the pavement). However, acquisition with knowledge of the defects, in my opinion, would not do so.
The position is quite different to Lambert v Lewis supra where a person who acquired an item of equipment with the benefit of a warranty deliberately made use of the equipment knowing it to be defective. It was the use of the equipment in those circumstances which broke the chain of causation in respect of the damage which ultimately eventuated.
Second, Ipp JA made it clear that what was required was that the successor in title had full knowledge of the defects, not only their existence but also of their significance: at [111]. In my opinion it could not be said that Tzaneros had such knowledge.
It is clear that Mr Tzaneros knew of the existence of cracks in the pavement. However, his evidence was that he was not aware there was a structural problem until 25 July 2006. Further, the primary judge found (Trial Judgment at [100]) that Mr Tzaneros did not know there was a design defect when Tzaneros acquired the terminal.
WGC sought to avoid the consequence of this finding by submitting that Mr Tzaneros was aware there was a structural issue. However, even that was not accepted by WGC at the time the purchase of the terminal took place. I have referred earlier in these reasons to the inspection carried out by Mr Wright in 2005 and the fact that WGC alleged at the time that damage was caused by the manner in which P&O used the terminal (at [142]) and that Mr Tzaneros was informed by WGC employees that the cracks were surface cracks or shrinking (at [143]). In these circumstances, it does not seem to me that it can be concluded that at the time of the acquisition of the terminal, Tzaneros was aware of the significance of the breach.
WGC also submitted that Tzaneros failed to act reasonably in not investigating the extent of the damage. It does not seem to me that any principle derived from Allianz extends to an assignee who has constructive knowledge by reason of failing to properly investigate the extent of a patent defect. In any event it was not suggested to Mr Tzaneros that he should have made further investigation and no evidence was led as to what reasonable investigations could have been carried out and whether they would have uncovered the significance of the defect."
"In any event, we do not agree that the Tribunal's decision is an application of the majority decision in Allianz, let alone a correct application of that decision. This is because:
(1) The Tribunal did not analyse the matter by reference to any causation principle. Indeed, it makes no reference to the decision in Allianz.
(2) In contrast to the situation in Allianz, there were no patent defects in existence at the time when the appellants signed the contract for sale of the property.
(3) The consumer protection policy concern was different to that in Allianz. It could not be said that knowledge of the defects would have been reflected in the purchase price, or that the successor in title would obtain an unearned profit or that recovery for the successor in title would encourage a situation in which a developer could achieve a contract price that was more than the property was worth.
(4) The Tribunal did not apply a test of "full knowledge" of the defects, but instead applied a test of notice or assumed knowledge.
The Tribunal appears to have applied a limitation to the scope of the statutory warranty provisions in s 18B, s18C and s18D of the HBA that was not founded upon the terms of any legislative provisions or case authority, and which did not apply the effect of the statutory warranty provisions, which create new stand-alone rights, as confirmed by case authority. Instead, the Tribunal gave an unwarranted pre-eminence to the conveyance contract."
The Tribunal then said that it was comfortably satisfied that the respondents did not have full knowledge of the existence of the defects and their significance (per Allianz) because:
(1) some defects were not known from the pre-purchase report or otherwise;
(2) the limitations of the pre-purchase report, referred to above, had the effect that the respondents did not know the significance of the defects that they were aware of; and
(3) the appellant provided them with explanations and reasons which disguised the significance of the defects of which they were aware.
The appellant called the Tribunal's reasoning process a broad-brush approach and submitted that it was erroneous for the Tribunal to take that broad brush approach and "disregard the report in its entirety." The Tribunal should have considered each defect, the extent to which it was described in the pre-purchase report, and the effect of any subsequent discussions concerning it and whether, given those matters, the respondents had knowledge of the relevant defect.
We do not accept the appellant's characterisation of the Tribunal's reasoning process, nor that the Tribunal disregarded the pre-purchase report "in its entirety." Quite the opposite. The Tribunal went through the report and summarised its relevant findings. The Tribunal then noted the report's limitations and made findings of what was said by the appellant to the first respondent.
Those factual findings were critically important to the central question whether the respondents had "full knowledge" of the defects, being not only knowledge of the existence of the defects but also knowledge of their significance. Thus, the respondents knew of the existence of at least some of the defects but the Tribunal found they did not appreciate their significance or that major expenditure would be required to remedy them. The appellant's submissions overlook [111] of Allianz in that, in the examples the appellant sets out in his submissions, no attention is given to whether the respondents had full knowledge of the defects. That is, not only did they know of the existence of the defects but also knew of their significance and whether they appreciated that major expenditure would be required to remedy them.
It was not necessary in this case to undertake the detailed exercise submitted by the appellant. Or, rather, it was not erroneous for the Tribunal to approach the fact-finding task of deciding whether the respondents had full knowledge of the defects in the manner suggested by the appellant.
"...The intervening factor severing the causal link to otherwise entitle Watermark to sue Allianz was its "full knowledge" of the defects in the property before it was purchased..."
(1) The principles referred to by Ipp JA are causation principles, predicated upon a factual finding as to what is the cause of the damage and loss. Causation is determined on the basis of "commonsense principles."
(2) Although the NSW Court of Appeal in Tzaneros stated there was "much to be said" in favour of adopting the approach of Giles JA in Waterbrook, it was not prepared to hold that Ipp JA (supported by Hodgson JA) was wrong in his analysis of causation in the context of a successor in title relying on breach of the statutory warranties, because it was able to distinguish Waterbrook on the facts. Other State courts and Tribunals have referred to the principles discussed by Ipp JA as well as NCAT.
(3) The critical enquiry is whether the chain of causation between the breach of statutory warranty and the damage or loss is broken. That involves consideration of whether the owners who purchased the property had "full knowledge" of the defects at the date of purchase, and their "significance." As Ipp JA stated:
"A party may know of the existence of defects (because they are patent), but may not appreciate - even acting reasonably - that major expenditure would be required to remedy them...where defects are patent a party, even though acting reasonably, might be unaware that major expenditure would be required to remedy them. The repair of patent defects that on their face appear to be trivial, might - on opening up the work - be found to require major reconstruction. In my opinion, applying general principles of causation, in such circumstances the knowledge of a successor in title of the patent defects might not be a new intervening cause. In that event, the chain of causation would not be broken and the successor would be able to prove that it suffered loss."
Builder's Counsel: You were present on the 19th of September in 2023 at the last occasion in this matter weren't you, Mr Pan? You heard Ms Zheng say on that occasion that she consulted our conveyancer. And what I remember is that he mentioned is that we can actually still, well, claim these defects, even though we purchased it. Is that correct?
Mr Pan: Yes
Builder's Counsel: To repeat, you knew that you were effectively indemnified against the cost of rectifying the defects identified in the Jim's Building Inspection report?
Mr Pan: It was not spoken to us.
Builder's Counsel: But you just gave a representation that you didn't receive, that you were not there, that it was Ms Zhen who received the advice from the conveyancer. But were you there?
Builder's Counsel: Mr Pan, you previously said about five minutes ago that that (sic)was not spoken to by the conveyancer. That was your line. That suggest you were spoken to by the conveyancer. Is that correct?
Mr Pan: No, that is not. I can rephrase.
Builder's Counsel: Please.
Mr Pan: My partner, Melody, did not tell me the home warranty would cover up.
Builder's Counsel: What did your partner tell you?
Mr Pan: The home warranty policy exists to take action.
Builder's Counsel: You still went ahead and bought the property. Isn't that right? No further questions.
"If this Report has identified a medium or high risk rating for the undetected defects, we strongly recommend a further inspection of the areas that were inaccessible. This may include an invasive inspection that requires the removal or cutting of walls, floors, or ceilings.
If the Property has been vacant for a period of time, moisture levels or leaks may not be detectable at the time of the inspection because often only frequent use of water pipes (showers, taps et cetera) result in a leak being identifiable. We advise further testing on pipes and water susceptible areas (such as the bathroom and laundry) after more frequent use has occurred.
...
The identification of moisture, dampness or the evidence of water penetration is dependent on the weather conditions at the time of inspection. The absence of dampness identified in this Report does not necessarily mean the Property will not experience some damp problems in other weather conditions audit roofs, walls or wet areas are watertight.
Where the evidence of water penetration is identified we recommended detailed investigation of waterproofing in the surrounding area monitoring of the affected area over a period of time to fully detect and assess the cause of dampness.
...
This Report is not a warranty or an insurance policy against problems developing with the Property in the future. Accordingly, a preventative maintenance program should be implemented which includes systematic inspections, detection and prevention of issues. Please contact the inspector who carried out this inspection for further advice.
...
We don't provide advice on the cost of rectification or repair unless specifically identified in the scope of the Report. Any cost advice provided verbally or in this report must be taken as of a general nature and is not to be relied upon. Actual costs depend on the quality of materials, the standard of work, what price a contractor is prepared to do the work for an may be contingent on approvals, delays and unknown factors associated with third parties. No liability is accepted for costing advice."
Appropriate Remedy-s 48MA and s 48O of the HB Act
(1) The amount claimed or in dispute in the proceedings exceeded $30,000.
(2) The owners (applicants) were the successful party, and that there is no obvious basis to only award them part of their costs, such as by way of a proportionate costs order.
(1) Install protection to the existing surface of the balcony in the work area.
(2) Carefully remove skirting tile above 2.5 m length of wall.
(3) Remove and replace 2.5m length of cavity flashing.
(4) Rectify any damage to vertical upturn of waterproof membrane by lapping to existing using a compatible membrane in accordance with Manufacturer's recommendations.
(5) Reinstate skirting tile of wall to match existing.
(6) Instal overflow to balcony (as per paragraph 8.1.7 of CBC Report dated 28 February 2024).
(7) Repair consequential internal damage to ceiling and wall of study (as per paragraph 8.1.4 of CBC report dated 28 February 2024).
(8) Remove and replace study window with new window and perform all necessary associated works to ensure window is correctly installed and the surrounding area is adequately waterproofed.
(9) Restore and repaint any areas that require such work as a result of the removal and replacement of the study window.
(10) Clean site and leave in tidy condition upon completion of work.
(11) Make good any services affected as part of the work.
(1) Cover and protect adjacent surfaces during rectification work.
(3) Increase up window lintels by one brick course.
(4) Install concrete plinth to the full side of the window and at least 100 mm in height.
(6) Waterproof to external side and top of concrete plinth.
(11) Repaint wall to the nearest architectural joints.
(12) Make good any services affected as part of the work.
(13) Clean site and leave in tidy condition upon completion of work.
(3) Remove two rows of brick to the base of the wall to allow the installation of new flashing to the brick wall in accordance with AS 2904 and AS3700.
(5) Paint internal wall to replaced area to the nearest architectural joints.
Item 4 Failed Waterproofing To Balcony Over Garage
(1) Cover and protect adjacent surfaces during the rectification work.
(2) Remove fixtures and fittings and shower screen, keep for reuse.
(3) Remove floor tiles and one row of wall perimeter tile.
(4) Remove waterproofing and grind concrete substrate to balcony with full to drainage.
(5) Install waterproofing (including water stop angle).
(9) Make good any services affected as part of the work.
(10) Clean site and leave in tidy condition upon completion of work.
(1) The respondent, St George Design & Construction Pty Ltd, is to perform the works set out in Annexure A of this decision at the residential premises of the applicants with due care and skill by 3 months from the date of this decision (the rectification works).
(2) The applicants are to give the respondent and its sub-contractors reasonable access to the premises so that the rectification works can be performed.
(3) The respondent is to pay the applicants' costs of the proceedings as agreed or assessed.
(4) If either party seeks to vary order (3) above (the costs application):
(a) the applicant to the costs application is to lodge and serve the costs application, including submissions limited to 3 pages and any evidence in support, within 7 days of this decision;
(b) the respondent to the costs application is to lodge and serve any submissions limited to 3 pages and any evidence in response within 14 days of this decision;
(c) the applicant is to lodge and serve any submissions in reply limited to 2 pages within 21 days from the date of this decision;
(d) the parties are to indicate in their submissions whether a consent to an order dispensing with an oral hearing of the costs application, and if they do not consent, submissions of no more than one page as to why an oral hearing should be conducted rather than the costs application being determined on the papers. If a hearing is not dispensed with, the parties will be advised of the date for the hearing of the costs application.
I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.
Pan
St George Design & Construction Pty Ltd [2025] NSWCATCD 76;
(2017) 94 NSWLR 108
(2009) 236 CLR 272
(2017) 340 ALR 368
(1954) 90 CLR 613
(1938) 60 CLR 336
(1994) 181 CLR 387
(1995) 184 CLR 265