O'Halloran v Secretary, Department of Education & The Premier of New South Wales [2026] NSWCATAD 72;

1. On 25 February 2025, the first respondent made a late decision, which identified 354 pages of responsive information, all of which were provided to the applicant, with the exception of three pages, which were withheld on the grounds that they were subject to legal professional privilege (LPP).
2. The applicant requested a review of that decision by the Information Commissioner and the Information Commissioner recommended that the first respondent reconsider that decision under s 93 of the GIPA Act. The first respondent declined to make a new decision.
3. The applicant applied for administrative review of the decision dated 25 February 2025 and on 12 August 2025, the Tribunal remitted the matter to the respondents for reconsideration, to enable further searches to be undertaken.
4. On 9 September 2025, the first respondent's made a further decision in relation to additional documents that were located by further searches, and it decided to provide access to an additional 38 pages of information and to refuse access to 24 documents on the basis that they comprised Cabinet Information. This is the decision under review in these proceedings.
5. For the reasons that follow, I have decided that the correct and preferable decision is to affirm the decisions under review.

1. In the application, the applicant raised the following grounds:

I seek external review by NCAT on the grounds that the Department of Education failed to adequately address key aspects of my GIPA application, and this failure was effectively upheld by the IPC in its review. Specifically, the following concerns remain unresolved: the absence of any substantive pre-27 August 2021 advice or briefings from NSW Health; a lack of documentation regarding COVID-19 transmission risk or the rationale behind the 27 August policy; apparent date inconsistencies in the released records; and whether the Department took all reasonable steps to identify and provide relevant material, as required under the GIPA Act.

1. The Crown Solicitor appeared for both the first and second respondents. They argued that the correct and preferable decision is:

(1) To affirm the decision dated 20 February 2025 to refuse access to information on the grounds that it is subject to a claim for LPP, as a result of which there is a conclusive presumption of an overriding public interest against disclosure (sch 1 cl 5 of the GIPA Act).

(2) To affirm the decision dated 9 September 2025 to refuse access to information on the grounds that it is Cabinet information as a result of which there is a conclusive presumption of an overriding public interest against disclosure.

(3) To affirm the implicit decision that no further information responsive to the application is held by the first respondent.

(4) Section 106 of the GIPA Act applies with respect to the request for information made to the second respondent.

1. The respondents relied upon an affidavit of Dr Paul Wood affirmed 30 October 2025. This was admitted into evidence and marked as Ex A, on the basis that the applicant required the witness to attend for the purposes of cross-examination.
2. Dr Wood deposed that he is the executive Director of Equity, Multicultural and Inclusive Education, Teaching Learning and Student Wellbeing for the first respondent. He commenced in that role on 20 October 2025, prior to which he was the Executive Director, Learning and Learning Support, from February 2022. In 2021, he was the Executive Director of the first respondent's COVID-19 Taskforce, in which he was responsible for coordinating the various work streams across the respondents that formed its response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This included the implementation and operation of public health orders relating to vaccination, implementation of and response to rapid antigen testing and other responses implemented in schools. He reported daily to an executive on the work of the Taskforce and worked closely with NSW Health.
3. Dr Wood deposed that he had oversight of the searches undertaken for both the original decision and the decision under review. He stated that any information of the nature sought in the GIPA request would have been dealt with by the Taskforce, which coordinated the respondents' COVID-19 response and was responsible for consultation and engagement with NSW Health.
4. In relation to the original decision, Dr Wood stated that he and three other staff members who had been part of the Taskforce undertook searches of their inboxes to identify potentially responsive information. The reason the original decision was late is that one of those staff members was on extended leave when the GIPA request was received and it was necessary to await their return before completing the searches. Search terms used were "vaccination," "vax," "PHO," "return to school," "Health," "SEOC" and "SHEOC." A research officer then reviewed the correspondence identified by the searches to identify correspondence that was within the scope of the GIPA request. However, separate searches were not undertaken of TRIM/HP Records Manager (the document management system at that time), as he expected that any relevant information would have been identified by the inbox searches.
5. These searches identified 354 pages of information in response to the GIPA request and all but three pages were released to the applicant. The disputed information was identified as being subject to a claim for legal professional privilege (LPP).
6. On remittal, Dr Wood had oversight of the following additional searches:

(1) Searches of TRIM/HP Records Manager using the key words "COVID, COVID-19, Vaccinations, Return to School, NSW Health, Public Health Order, NSW Health Advice, SEOC and SHEOC".

(2) Searches of the following sub-folders in the COVID-19 Taskforce SharePoint - Admin; Briefings; Budget estimates and PAC; Comms; Daily Briefings Secretary exec paper; Health Advice; House Folder Notes; LGA vaccination rollout; Return to School Plan; Vaccination workstream; Year 12 vaxx data;

(3) Additional searches of his own inbox and the inbox of Amber Mackary, Director COVID Taskforce, Project Management Office using search terms consistent with the TRIM/HP records search.

1. These searches identified a further 38 pages of information which were released to the applicant with the remittal decision, and a further 24 pages of information that were considered to be Cabinet Information. Additional searches by Ms Mackay found no further information.
2. Dr Wood deposed that the searches had identified all information responsive to the GIPA request and he is unable to think of any additional searches that could find more information. He noted that the applicant raised concerns about the absence of any substantive pre-27 August 2021 advice or briefings from NSW Health, but he stated that the first respondent did not receive written briefings from NSW Health in the manner contemplated by the GIPA request. Rather, the interaction between officers of the first respondent and NSW Health primarily took place via regular briefings (daily/weekly) that were conducted either online or at the State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC), where communications were shared regarding immediate issues arising, such as arrangements for vaccination of year 12 students, via phone or through feedback on draft policy documents. The more substantive decision-making regarding issues such as vaccination policies and programs for return to school occurred in the Crisis Policy Committee of NSW Cabinet (the CPC). He did not attend any meetings of the CPC or Cabinet, but he is aware that the Chief Health Officer, Dr Chant, attended meetings of that Committee and provided advice directly to it. Otherwise, the first respondent relied upon publicly available and published advice that was provided by NSW Health in order to develop its policies and processes for the return to school, and to implement measures to ensure compliance with public health orders.
3. In relation to the claim for LPP, Dr Wood stated that the three pages of documents contain the following information:

(1) An email chain dated 13 October 2021 between the Director Policy & Stakeholders of the COVID-19 Taskforce and General Counsel and two other legal officers of the first respondent, seeking legal advice.

(2) A reply from the General Counsel of the first respondent dated 14 October 2021.

(3) An email exchange between the Director Policy & Stakeholders of the COVID-19 Taskforce and an officer of NSW Health (discussing that advice) and their response.

1. This correspondence is clearly marked as "Legal Advice" and the correspondence in (3) above clearly reflects the advice provided in (2) above. Consistent with established practice and procedure at that time, the correspondence would have occurred with a mutual expectation as to confidentiality, due to the fact that it reflected legal advice and also due to the nature of the matters being discussed, namely the drafting and preparation by NSW Health of a risk matrix and use of personal vaccination status data of employees.
2. In relation to the additional searches conducted following remittal, Dr Wood stated that he considered that 24 of the documents found were Cabinet Information, but he has since determined that four of those documents are outside the scope of the GIPA request, namely:

(1) Document 4 is am empty template document;

(2) Document 6 is a single slide for a draft PowerPoint presentation that does not deal with the matters requested by the applicant;

(3) Document 16 is a draft internal document that does not contain information requested by the applicant; and

(4) Document 19 is a document relating to the internal governance of the COVID-19 Taskforce and it is outside the scope of the GIPA request.

1. Dr Wood identified documents numbered 1, 17, 18, 21 and 22 as briefing materials prepared by the respondents for the August and October 2021 Budget Estimates hearings. These materials are prepared to support the Minister and executive officers of the respondents in budge estimates hearings. Each document is prominently marked "OFFICIAL: Sensitive - NSW Cabinet" or "SENSITIVE: NSW CABINET." It is a long-standing requirement that such materials be placed before Cabinet for review and approval prior to their use and the Cabinet Office (then part of the Department of Premier and Cabinet) managed the process by which this occurs. In the weeks immediately before Budget Estimates hearings, Departments are required to provide all briefing materials in both electronic and hard copy form by a designated date. The electronic version is uploaded to the e-Cabinet system, which is the confidential document management system used to store Cabinet documents, to which only a very limited number of officers of agencies have access. The hard copy is required to be hand-delivered to the Cabinet Office.
2. Dr Woods stated that for the purposes of the current proceedings, the Cabinet Office had undertaken searches of "e-Cabinet" and had confirmed that a version of document 1 was submitted to Cabinet for approval as part of the Budget Estimates Briefs for August to September 2021; and versions of documents 17, 18 and 21 were submitted to Cabinet for approval as part of the Budget estimates Briefs for October to November 2021.
3. Dr Woods stated, relevantly:

34. It has always been my understanding that Budget estimates briefing material is Cabinet information and, consistent with that, it is my experience that this material is to be managed under strict conditions of confidentiality. Within the Department, access is limited to staff directly involved in their preparation. I am not aware of any circumstance in which such briefing material has been approved for public disclosure or published.

1. Document 2 is an email forwarding a PowerPoint presentation which is described in the email as "The Minister-approved Department of Education Crisis Cabinet submission". It is clearly identified on the cover slide as a document of the Minister for the Crisis Cabinet Committee of Cabinet (CPC) and is marked "OFFICIAL: Sensitive - NSW Cabinet." The second slide sets out a number of recommendations on matters to be considered by the CPC.
2. Document 3 is a draft coversheet prepared to accompany a submission by the Minister to the CPC, it is clearly marked "SENSITIVE: NSW CABINET" and contains recommendations to the CPC that are made in the submission.
3. Document 5 is a draft coversheet prepared to accompany a submission by the Minister to the CPC, it is clearly marked "SENSITIVE: NSW CABINET" and contains recommendations to the CPC that are made in the submission.
4. Document 7 is a draft PowerPoint presentation by the Minister to the CPC. It is clearly identified on the cover page as a submission from the respondents led by the Minister to the CPC and is marked "OFFICIAL: Sensitive - NSW CABINET" and it contains recommendations on matters to be considered by the CPC.
5. Document 8 is also a draft PowerPoint presentation by the Minister to the CPC. It is clearly identified on the cover page as a submission from the respondents led by the Minister to the CPC and is marked "OFFICIAL: Sensitive - NSW CABINET" and it contains recommendations on matters to be considered by the ]CPC.
6. Documents 9, 10 and 13 are documents prepared by KPMG, who was engaged to provide project management support regarding the return to school. These documents reflect preliminary work undertaken to model out the various options of what a return to school might look like, and reflects options being considered regarding settings that were ultimately taken to the CPC for consideration and approval, in particular regarding the timing and implementation of different elements of a return to school plan. These documents are earlier drafts of a calendar for return to school which was ultimately put to the CPC for consideration in a submission by the Minister to the CPC (document 12).
7. Document 11 comprises PowerPoint slides relating to return to school vaccination parameters that are draft slides to be included in the Minister's submission to the CPC (document 12).
8. Document 12 is a PowerPoint presentation by the Minister to the CPC, which is clearly identified as a submission from the respondents, led by the Minister, to the CPC. It is marked "OFFICIAL: Sensitive - NSW Cabinet".
9. Document 14 is a word document containing draft text of a submission to the CPC regarding the "Return to School Plan". It reflects draft recommendations to the CPC on various matters that were to be put to the Committee as part of the return to school plan, and it is prominently watermarked "confidential".
10. Document 23 is a PowerPoint presentation by the Minister to the CPC. It is clearly marked "OFFICIAL: Sensitive - NSW Cabinet".
11. Document 15 is a draft of communications prepared to be released as part of the return to School roadmap, pending certain decisions being made by the CPC on various parameters of that roadmap. Aspects of the draft and comments in the margin reveal potential positions being considered with respect to matters that were put to the CPC for consideration as part of its consideration and deliberations regarding the Return to School roadmap. Additionally, drafts of all such communications were, as a matter of practice, submitted to the CPC for approval prior to publication.
12. Document 20 is a draft document that reflects potential policy settings regarding vaccination rates that were ultimately taken to the CPC as part of its deliberations regarding return to school. It reflects a position that was being considered by the Minister in advance of that matter being taken to the CPC for consideration.
13. Document 24 is a draft of the COVID-19 Safety Plan - HSC Return. Consistent with the practice at that time, it would have been intended and understood at the time the Plan was being prepared that it would ultimately need to be submitted to the CPC for approval (and it was ultimately submitted to the CPC for approval).

1. In cross-examination, the applicant asked Dr Woods if he personally searched for any records in response to the GIPA request. He stated that Search Officers certified that reasonable searches were conducted in all relevant areas where information responsive to the GIPA request could be stored.
2. Dr Woods stated that he conducted additional searches when the matter was remitted to the respondents by the Tribunal. He stated that the respondents would not have created its own records regarding item 3 of the GIPA request, as it would have relied upon health advice etc. received from Health NSW. It relied on Public Health Advice and Public Health Orders that were within the public domain, He considered that using a broad scope for search terms would produce the best return of information and this is what occurred.
3. In relation to the claim for LPP, Dr Woods stated that he was not involved in the creation of documents that are subject to that claim. However, when a document is created under LPP it is created as a legally confidential document. He was not present when legal advice was provided.
4. In relation to information that is subject to a claim of "Cabinet in Confidence," Dr Woods stated that a large number of decisions were required by the CPC at that time relating to the re-opening of schools, including when, how, conditions etc. All critical decisions in relation to the NSW Re-opening Schools Policy were put to the CPC for consideration. His role was to consider the operational issues and he worked on the available layers of available public health advice - i.e. How to with within the Public Health Orders. Dr Woods stated that in the documents released to the applicant, document 81 is a draft COVID-19 HSC Return plan.
5. The applicant put to Dr Woods that if this plan were produced before the relevant Public Health Order was made, it would not address the vaccine mandate. In response, Dr Woods stated that page 23 of the released records was a draft document.
6. The applicant then put to Dr Woods that between 16 August 2921 and the relevant email from Secretary Harrisson, there is an assumption that evidence exists as to why the recommendation for vaccination became a vaccine mandate. Dr Woods replied that there was a draft plan to return HSC students to school based on a recommendation for vaccination. There are no records in existence to explain the respondents' change in policy.
7. The applicant put to Dr Woods that he had marked certain information as "Cabinet in Confidence" before they were properly classified. Dr Woods denied this. He stated that his role as a senior executive officer of the COVID-19 Taskforce was to operationalise a return to school. There was not much health advice available at the time and they were acting on publicly available information. Phone calls were utilised and if there were documents from NSW Health stored in Trim, they would have been found by the search terms and released etc.
8. Dr Woods stated that he had not searched any records of the former Secretary Harrisson or any else who had left the employ of the respondents. The applicant asserted that the searches were inadequate, but Dr Woods disagreed with this. He rejected the applicant's proposition that his classifications are wrong and said that he applied some latitude in searching in order to obtain a suite of documents that responded to the GIPA request.
9. Ms Mattes did not wish to re-examine the witness and he was excused from the proceedings.

1. The respondent argued that the 3-page email chain documents are subject to LPP and that privilege is not waived by communications between the first respondent and NSW Health as both entities are emanations of the State of NSW. The communications were shared confidentially and s 122 of the Evidence Act 1998 (NSW) applies.
2. In relation to Cabinet information, and the claim against the second respondent, the first respondent relied upon s 106 of the GIPA Act, which provides:

106 Decisions about Cabinet and Executive Council information

(1) On an NCAT administrative review of a decision by an agency that there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of information because the information is claimed to be Cabinet or Executive Council information (as described in Schedule 1), NCAT is limited to deciding whether there were reasonable grounds for the agency's claim and is not authorised to make a decision as to the correct and preferable decision on the matter.

(2) If NCAT is not satisfied, by evidence on affidavit or otherwise, that there were reasonable grounds for the claim, it may require the information to be produced in evidence before it.

(3) If NCAT is still not satisfied after considering the evidence produced that there were reasonable grounds for the claim, NCAT is to reject the claim when determining the review application and may then proceed to make a decision as to the correct and preferable decision on the matter.

(4) NCAT is not to reject the claim unless it has given the Premier a reasonable opportunity to appear and be heard in relation to the matter.

(5) The Premier is a party to any proceedings on an application under this section.

1. The respondent argued that there are reasonable grounds for its claim that the relevant information is Cabinet-in-Confidence and that an objective test applies. Sub-sections (1) and (2) contemplate the issue will be determined based on evidence adduced by affidavit rather than the contents of the document itself. Therefore, copies of these documents have not been lodged with the Tribunal at this time. It is only if the Tribunal is not satisfied on reasonable grounds that the claim of "Cabinet in Confidence" is not established that it can determine whether or not it is cabinet information.
2. Schedule 1, cl 2(2) of the GIPA Act provides:

2 Cabinet information

(1) It is to be conclusively presumed that there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of information (referred to in this Act as Cabinet information) contained in any of the following documents -

(a) a document that contains an official record of Cabinet,

(b) a document prepared for the dominant purpose of its being submitted to Cabinet for Cabinet's consideration (whether or not the document is actually submitted to Cabinet),

(c) a document prepared for the purpose of its being submitted to Cabinet for Cabinet's approval for the document to be used for the dominant purpose for which it was prepared (whether or not the document is actually submitted to Cabinet and whether or not the approval is actually given),

(d) a document prepared after Cabinet's deliberation or decision on a matter that would reveal or tend to reveal information concerning any of those deliberations or decisions,

(e) a document prepared before or after Cabinet's deliberation or decision on a matter that reveals or tends to reveal the position that a particular Minister has taken, is taking, will take, is considering taking, or has been recommended to take, on the matter in Cabinet,

(f) a document that is a preliminary draft of, or a copy of or part of, or contains an extract from, a document referred to in paragraphs (a)-(e).

(2) Information contained in a document is not Cabinet information if -

(a) public disclosure of the document has been approved by the Premier or Cabinet, or

(b) 10 years have passed since the end of the calendar year in which the document came into existence.

(3) Information is not Cabinet information merely because it is contained in a document attached to a document referred to in subclause (1).

(4) Information is not Cabinet information to the extent that it consists solely of factual material unless the information is contained in a document that, either entirely or in part, would -

(a) reveal or tend to reveal information concerning any Cabinet decision or determination, or

(b) reveal or tend to reveal the position that a particular Minister has taken, is taking or will take on a matter in Cabinet.

(5) In this clause, Cabinet includes a committee of Cabinet and a subcommittee of a committee of Cabinet.

1. The first respondent argued that the relevant documents were prepared for the Minister for the dominant purpose of consideration by the CPC. Based on Dr Wood's evidence, PowerPoint presentations were not unusual at that time and the cover slide identified the presentations as being by the Minister to the CPC. Therefore, there are reasonable grounds for the tribunal to determine that the information was prepared for consideration by Cabinet.
2. Further, Sch (2)(1)(c) applies to briefing materials prepared for the Budget Estimates hearings. Each of these documents is clearly marked "Sensitive = NSW Cabinet." The process is managed by the Cabinet Office (then a part of the Department of Premier & Cabinet) and the respondents was required to hand over documents for uploading by the Cabinet Office for the approval by Cabinet. Dr Woods deposes tat documents numbered 1, 17, 18 and 21 were documents put before Cabinet in the Budget Estimates hearings, And that document 22 was also put before Cabinet because it is of the same nature. If the Tribunal does not agree, then it was prepared for the same purpose at the time of its preparation.
3. The first respondent argued that the scenario considered by the Appeal Panel in Patrick v Department of Communities & Justice [2025] NSWCATAP 206 (Patrick) is analogous to this matter. In Patrick, the appellant's arguments included an assertion that even assuming that the information was Cabinet information in the first place, it ceased to be Cabinet information once Cabinet approved the Notes containing the information to be used for the dominant purpose for which they were prepared. The Appeal Panel rejected that argument and dismissed the appeal and it stated, relevantly:

10. There is no definition of "information" in the Act; nor is there a definition of document.

11. Under s 4 of the Act, "government information" means information contained in a record held by an agency.

12. "Record" is defined in Sch 4, cl 10 as follows:

10 Meaning of "record"

(1) In this Act -

record means any document or other source of information compiled, recorded or stored in written form or by electronic process, or in any other manner or by any other means.

(2) A reference in this Act to a record includes a reference to a copy of the record.

(3) For the purposes of the definition of record in this Act, the knowledge of a person is not a record.

13. In the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), document is defined in the Dictionary in Sch 4 as follows:

document means any record of information, and includes -

(a) anything on which there is writing, or

(b) anything on which there are marks, figures, symbols or perforations having a meaning for persons qualified to interpret them, or

(c) anything from which sounds, images or writings can be reproduced with or without the aid of anything else, or

(d) a map, plan, drawing or photograph.14.

14. The focus of this appeal is on cl 2(1)(c) of Sch 1 to the Act (the dominant purpose clause). Also highly relevant is cl 2(2) of Sch 1 to the Act (the sunset clause).

15. Administrative review of decisions by the Tribunal, where it is claimed that the information is Cabinet information, is circumscribed by s 106 of the Act, which provides that the Tribunal must follow a step-by-step approach to determining the matter. Initially, the Tribunal is limited to deciding whether there were reasonable grounds for the agency's claim of Cabinet information: s 106(1) of the Act. At that stage, the Tribunal is not authorised to make a decision as to the correct and preferable decision.

16. The Tribunal was indeed satisfied that the Department had reasonable grounds for making the claim and it was therefore not necessary to take any further steps.

1. In relation to the implied decision that no further information is held, the first respondent argued that it complied with its search obligations under s 58 of the GIPA Act by conducting reasonable searches as may be necessary to find any of the government information that it held when the request was received. It used the most efficient means that was reasonably available to it. The evidence of Dr Wood is that he consulted with the search officers in order to select the search terms most likely to produce the best outcome. TRIM was searched upon remittal as issues had been raised by the applicant regarding the reasonableness of searches that were conducted at first instance.
2. The applicant appears to criticise the first respondent for using overly broad search terms, but Dr Wood stated that the terms that were used were generous in order to identify any information that was responsive to the GIPA request.
3. For these reasons, the Tribunal should affirm the decision under review.

1. The applicant relied upon an affidavit that he affirmed on 21 November 2025. This was admitted into evidence and marked as Ex 1. I have summarised the evidence as follows:

(1) He asserted that the documents produced with the original decision were largely irrelevant to the nature of the GIPA request, and that very few documents were related to the 27 August 2021 email from Secretary Harrisson or the role of COVID-19 vaccination in the reduction of SARS-CoV-2 transmission. He therefore sought clarification of the search terms that were used, but the respondent replied to the effect that if he were not satisfied with the information, he could lodger a request for internal or external review.

(2) The applicant then applied to the Information Commissioner for an external review of the original decision. On 30 April 2025, the Information Commissioner determined that the original decision did not provide any explanation for the decision to refuse access under sch 1 cl 5 and it had not satisfied ss 61 & 97(1) of the GIPA Act.

(3) The applicant sought further clarification from the Information Commissioner and on 1 May 2025, the IPC made the following further recommendations to the respondents:

In addition to the IPC's recommendation under section 93, the IPC also recommends under section 92 of the GIPA Act, that the Agency takes into consideration the submissions made by the applicant regarding the adequacy of searches relating to his access application. The Information Commissioner considers that these submissions have not been appropriately addressed by the Agency in its Notice of Decision. Given the deficiencies identified by the PIC in the Agency's original Notice of decision (as addressed by the section 93 recommendation), in any reconsideration of its decision, the Agency is recommended to address these submissions in detail and provide relevant search information to justify the adequacy of its searches. (emphasis added by the applicant)

(4) On 1 May 2025, the first respondent replied that the Information Commissioner's recommendation was neither binding nor reviewable and that its position on reasonable searches and releasing the information was unchanged.

(5) The applicant asserted that Dr Wood did not state the folders, locations, drives, platforms or systems that were searched and the original decision did not identify any of the officers who carried out the searches and/or their positions and qualifications. It did not provide any information regarding the timing of the searches that were performed and it did not state whether searches were conducted using date filters, subject line filters, attachment filters or full-mailbox indexing. It did not state how the respondents satisfied itself that records of interactions with Health NSW did or did not exist. He also stated, relevantly:

39. The original decision did not provide any evidence addressing why significant categories of information that would be expected to have ordinarily existed, such as pre-27 August 2021 NSW Health briefings or advice relating to COVID-19 vaccine transmission reduction, or briefings or advice relevant to the "safest return to face-to-face teaching were not identified during the Department's searches".

(6) The applicant stated that he separated the released records from the original decision into 46 distinct, viewable documents and organised them chronologically in a new document. Based on this, he asserted that: (1) only 13 documents pre-dated 27 August 2021; (2) only three documents were authored by or received from Health NSW; and (3) none of those documents were related to Secretary Harrisson's announcement dated 27 August 2021. Therefore, none of the documents released responded to request 1.

(7) In relation to request 2, he asserted that only 18 were authored by or received from or included correspondence shared by Health NSW. Eight documents contained some relevant information, which was mostly statements in relation to the role of COVID-19 vaccination without any citations or epidemiological/scientific studies supporting them and only three documents contained information that was directly relevant to the role of COVID-19 vaccination in reducing transmission of the SARS-Cov-2 virus. Therefore, the majority of the released information did not respond to the request.

(8) In relation to request 3, he asserted that only 22 documents were created internally by the first respondent and only three of these contained relevant information. However, they contained only general statements in relation to COVID-19 vaccination and none of them contained information that was directly relevant to explaining the role of COVID-19 vaccination in reducing transmission of the virus. Therefore, the majority of the information was not responsive to the request.

(9) In relation to request 4, he asserted that only 18 documents were authored by, received from, or included correspondence from NSW Health and only three responded to the "safest return to face-to-face learning" as stated in the email from Secretary Harrisson on 27 August 2021. These contained only general statements and they did not contain information that was directly relevant to the request.

1. In response to the remittal decision, the applicant asserted that most of the documents released with this decision "contained the same problems." He concluded:

61. I make this affidavit to assist the Tribunal in determining whether the Department has conducted searches to meet the requirements of the GIPA Act and whether the decisions made on my application were properly formed...

1. The Applicant relied upon written submissions that were lodged by his prior legal representatives and he also made oral submissions.
2. The applicant argued that the Tribunal should reject Dr Wood's evidence and that the searches that were conducted were defective because they failed to search for specific terms that were included in the GIPA request.
3. The applicant argued that the respondent's submissions regarding information claimed to be "cabinet in confidence" are mere assertions, He argued that the dominant purpose test is strict and that information from KPMG is not "Cabinet in Confidence" and can be severed as it is not in the nature of health advice. In relation to information submitted for the Budget estimates process, he argued that the information ceased to be Cabinet in Confidence after consideration by Cabinet.
4. The Tribunal referred the applicant to the Appeal Panel's decision in Patrick, which disagreed with his submission and asked whether he was aware of any authority that supported his submission. He replied "no".
5. In relation to the claim for legal professional privilege, the applicant argued that the respondents bears the onus of satisfying the dominant purpose test. He stated, relevantly:

91. It is settled law than where a lawyer provides assistance in an administrative, policy or executive capacity, LPP does not attach Sydney Airports Corporation Ltd v Singapore Airlines Ltd [2005] NSWCA 47. The respondent has failed to adduce specific evidence proving that Ms Hargans was acting in her strict legal capacity to advise on rights and liabilities, rather than in a policy capacity to assist with the drafting of Public Health order communications or risk matrices.

92. Crucially, Wood concedes at [26(c)] of his affidavit that the email chain in question was forwarded by Ms Hill to an officer of NSW Health and discussed in a reply.

93. LPP protects confidential communications between a client (the Department) and its lawyer. NSW Health is a separate agency with distinct statutory functions. The voluntary disclosure of legal advice to a third party such as NSW Health is ordinarily inconsistent with maintaining confidentiality, and therefore amounts to a waiver of privilege under the principles in Mann v Carnell (1999) HCA 66.

94. While Wood asserts there was a "mutual expectation... as to confidentiality", the respondent has not pleaded nor proved "common interest privilege". The interests of the Department of Education (operational school management) and NSW Health (public health management are not identical). Without a specific submission and evidence establishing the requisite common interest, the Tribunal should find that the voluntary disclosure to NSW Health waived any privilege that may have existed.

95. The Information Commissioner previously found the respondent's justification for LPP lacking. The respondent has repeated this error in thee further decision by providing a schedule that lists generic descriptions such as "email dated 21 August 2021" without identifying the author, recipient, or the nature of the advice.

1. The applicant argued that the first respondent's claim that the documents including the "return to school roadmap" and associated communications are cabinet information relies son an assertion that the documents are inextricably linked to the Cabinet's decision to mandate vaccinations. However, that argument was rejected by both the Personal Injury Commission and by the Court of Appeal in Department of Education v Dawning [2024] NSWCA 4.
2. In Dawking, the first respondent argued that there was no real or substantial distinction between the Secretary's email dated 27 August 2021 and the Public Health Order (the Cabinet-level policy). The Deputy President (in the Personal Injury Commission) confirmed the Member's rejection of that submission, finding that the first respondent's implementation of that Public Health Order was distinct and significant. The applicant stated, relevantly:

99. Having been found liable in Dawking precisely because its operational implementation was distinct from the Cabinet mandate, it is an abuse of process for the Department to now claim in these proceedings that the records of that same implementation are identical to the Cabinet mandate for the purposes of the GIPA Act.

100. The judicial findings in Dawking confirm that the Department's actions on 27 August 2021 were operational, distinct, and in some respects "erroneous" compared to the actual Public Health Order. Documents recording these distinct operational actions - specifically requests 1 and 4 of the application - cannot properly be classified as Cabinet-in-Confidence under schedule 1, clause 2. They are records of the Department's distinct administrative response, not the Cabinet's deliberations.

1. The applicant also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court of NSW in Kassam v Hazzard; Henry v Hazzard [2021] NSWSC 1320 (Kassam), which is relevant to Sch 1 cl 2 of the GIPA Act. In Kassam, the Court accepted that NSW Health produced epidemiological advice, modelling, risk assessments and supporting material during August 2021 which informed the making of the Public Health Orders, and that this was provided to the CPC on/around 19 August 2021 and formed part of the material upon which the Minister acted. That material was withheld from the Court on Public Interest Immunity grounds because it was produced to a cabinet sub-committee, but it demonstrates that the advice was created for public health and operational purposes and not for the dominant purpose of cabinet submission.
2. The applicant stated:

104. Public interest immunity is not equivalent to Cabinet-in-Confidence. A document may be immune from production in court proceedings under public interest immunity without satisfying the strict statutory test for cabinet information under schedule 1, clause 2 of the GIPA Act. The fact that public interest immunity was relied upon in Kassam does not establish that the health advice was created for the dominant purpose of Cabinet, nor that it falls within the clause 2 exemption.

105. Accordingly, the fact that NSW Health advice was placed before CPC in August 2021 cannot, in itself, establish that the dominant purpose of its creation was cabinet deliberation within the meaning of clause 2(1)(b).

106. To treat operational or scientific material as Cabinet information merely because it was later forwarded to CPC would collapse the distinction preserved expressly in clause 2(3) and would extend the Cabinet exemption far beyond its statutory scope.

107. Kassam therefore supports, rather than undermines, the applicant's submission: the existence and relevance of NSW Health advice in established, but its subsequent use before CPC does not convert it into Cabinet material for the purposes of the GIPA Act.

1. Otherwise, the applicant argued that the Tribunal should not accept the "conclusive presumption" arguments made by the respondents, as that would effectively render the evidentiary basis of the historic policy immune from public scrutiny, particularly where the respondent's evidence supporting that presumption is generic and flawed.
2. The applicant's written submissions effectively asked the Tribunal to set aside the decision under review and to remit the matter to the respondents for further searches to be conducted and a new decision to be made.

1. The first respondent argued that it conducted reasonable searches to locate the information requested by the applicant, which was basically information to explain its policy pivot in August 2021. The fact that the searches did not produce information that the applicant believes should be held by the respondents is irrelevant.
2. In relation briefing materials for Cabinet, the Tribunal is bound by the Appeal Panel's decision in Patrick, and contrary to the applicant's argument, the decision in Mann v Carnell actually supports the first respondent's claim for privilege. In that matter, disclosure of advice by the Chief Minister of the ACT to a member of the Legislative Assembly was consistent with a claim for privilege as both parties were representatives of the ACT.
3. In Kassam, while there may have been reference to information from NSW Health, this does not mean that this information was given to the respondents. In any event, the respondents was not a party to those proceedings. As far as the matter considered CPC processes, it is consistent with Dr Wood's evidence regarding the decisions that the respondents made at the relevant time.

1. After hearing the parties' oral submissions, the Tribunal adjourned the open hearing and excused the applicant from further attendance. It then conducted a confidential hearing under s 107 of the GIPA Act.
2. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
3. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
4. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
5. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

1. At the conclusion of the confidential hearing, the Tribunal reserved its decision.

1. Under s 9 of the GIPA Act a person who makes an access application for government information has a legally enforceable right to be provided with access to the information, in accordance with Part 4 of that Act, unless there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of the information.

1. If the information is the subject of LPP, it is conclusively presumed that there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of the information: s 14(1), Sch 1 cl 5. Schedule 1 cl 5 relevantly states:

Legal professional privilege

(1) It is to be conclusively presumed that there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of information that would be privileged from production in legal proceedings on the ground of client legal privilege (legal professional privilege), unless the person in whose favour the privilege exists has waived the privilege.

1. The conclusive presumption in Sch1 cl 5 of the GIPA Act refers to information that would be privileged from production in legal proceedings on the ground of "client legal privilege (LPP)." The term "client legal privilege" is found in the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) (Evidence Act) and it is used interchangeably with the term "LPP," a concept understood to encompass both the statutory formulation and common law principles of privilege: Buttrose v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2023] NSWCATAD 165 at [33].
2. While the Tribunal has tended to apply the statutory formulation of privilege when considering the application for the conclusive presumption, the Tribunal observed in Jackson v University of New South Wales [2019] NSWCATAD 224 at [95] (Jackson), that common law principles of privilege remain relevant, in particular in construing the meaning and operation of words not defined in the Evidence Act.

1. The essential elements of LPP derive from ss 118 and 119 of the Evidence Act:

(1) the existence of a client and lawyer relationship;

(2) confidential communication made between a client and a lawyer, or a confidential document prepared by the client, lawyer or another person;

(3) the communication or document was brought into existence for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice to the client, or to provide the client with professional legal services relating an existing, anticipated or pending proceedings.

1. Section 118 of the Evidence Act states:

118 Legal advice

Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of -

(a) a confidential communication made between the client and a lawyer, or

(b) a confidential communication made between 2 or more lawyers acting for the client, or

(c) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) prepared by the client, lawyer or another person,

for the dominant purpose of the lawyer, or one or more of the lawyers, providing legal advice to the client.

1. Section 119 of the Evidence Act states:

119 Litigation

Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of -

(a) a confidential communication between the client and another person, or between a lawyer acting for the client and another person, that was made, or

(b) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) that was prepared,

for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal services relating to an Australian or overseas proceeding (including the proceeding before the court), or an anticipated or pending Australian or overseas proceeding, in which the client is or may be, or was or might have been, a party.

1. The term "client" is defined in s 117 of the Evidence Act to include a person or body who engages a lawyer to provide legal services or who employs a lawyer and an employee or agent of a client. In this case the documents in issue relate to advice provided to the Respondent by persons employed by the Respondent and from an external law firm.
2. LPP applies to confidential communications between a government agency and their salaried legal officers, provided that there existed, at the time of the confidential communication, a relationship of lawyer and client and the requirements of ss 118 and 119 are otherwise satisfied: Waterford v Commonwealth [1987] HCA 25 (Waterford), (1986)-(1987) [1987] HCA 25; 163 CLR 54, at [4].
3. It is a question of fact as to whether a professional relationship exists between the client employer and the in-house lawyer and whether the in-house lawyer was consulted in his or her professional capacity: Telstra Corporation Ltd v Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (No 2) [2007] FCA 1445 at [35] to [41]. Where advice is requested or given outside this professional relationship, the information is not privileged: Jackson at [105].
4. Where an employed lawyer advising in-house also acts in a commercial role, the two will often be intertwined and privilege should not be denied simply on the basis of some commercial involvement. However the person must be acting in a legal context in respect of the documents which privilege is claimed, based on an independent and impartial legal appraisal: Seven Network Limited v News Limited [2005] FCA 142 at [4]- [5]. In that case the court found the in-house counsel was so involved in commercial negotiations that the necessary independence was lacking for some documents.
5. Even where a client-lawyer professional relationship is found to exist, this does not mean that every communication between the lawyer (including the employed legal practitioner) and the client (including a government agency) is thereby privileged. It is only those communications or documents that are confidential and made or prepared for the 'dominant purpose' of the lawyer (in his or her professional capacity) providing legal (professional) advice to the client, or for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal services relating to litigation: Jackson at [106].

Confidential nature of the communication or document

1. The term "confidential communication" is defined in s 117 of the Evidence Act to mean a communication made in circumstances where the person who made it, or the person to whom it was made, was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents, whether or not that obligation arises under law. Similarly, a confidential document means a document prepared in circumstances that when it was prepared, the person who prepared it or the person for whom it was prepared, was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents.
2. In Brazel v Sydney Water [2020] NSWCATAD 188, the Tribunal identified the following principles as applying when determining whether information is confidential (at [100], citing Williams v Department of Industry and Investment [2012] NSWADT 192):

(1) The confidential quality of communications is a question of fact.

(2) To establish its confidential quality, information must have been supplied under an express or implied pledge of confidentiality.

(3) The confidential quality of the information may be inferred from the nature of the relationship between the informer and person informed.

(4) The confidential quality of the information must be determined in the light of all of the circumstances of the particular case.

1. The term "dominant purpose" is not defined in the Evidence Act. However, it has been held to mean the "ruling, prevailing, or most influential purpose" that predominates over other purposes and not the "primary purpose" or "substantial purpose" of the client or the lawyer: Archer Capital 4A Pty Ltd (atf Archer Capital Trust 4A) v Sage Group pic (No 2) [2013] FCA 1098 at [11], cited in Jackson at 104.
2. The "dominant purpose" of a communication is the prevailing paramount purpose: AWB v Cole [2006] FCA 1234 at [44], which can be discerned by asking why the information was brought into existence and what was the intended use: Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCAFC 122; (2004) 136 FCR 357 at [366].
3. A claim of privilege can be established by evidence about the circumstances surrounding the communications, as well as from inference from the document itself: Re Southland Coal Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers appointed) (in liq) [2006] NSWSC 899 at [28]). In some circumstances, an examination of the document itself will be sufficient. As the Tribunal concluded in Chamley v Sydney Children's Hospital Network [2013] NSWADT 197.

5 Legal professional privilege

(1) It is to be conclusively presumed that there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of information that would be privileged from production in legal proceedings on the ground of client legal privilege (legal professional privilege), unless the person in whose favour the privilege exists has waived the privilege.

(2) If an access application is made to an agency in whose favour legal professional privilege exists in all or some of the government information to which access is sought, the agency is required to consider whether it would be appropriate for the agency to waive that privilege before the agency refuses to provide access to government information on the basis of this clause.

(3) A decision that an agency makes under subclause (2) is not a reviewable decision under Part 5.

1. Section 125 of the Evidence Act deals with loss of client legal privilege in circumstances of misconduct. That section states:

125 Loss of client legal privilege: misconduct

(1) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence of:

(a) a communication made or the contents of a document prepared by a client or lawyer (or both), or a party who is not represented in the proceeding by a lawyer, in furtherance of the commission of a fraud or an offence or the commission of an act that renders a person liable to a civil penalty, or

(b) a communication or the contents of a document that the client or lawyer (or both), or the party, knew or ought reasonably to have known was made or prepared in furtherance of a deliberate abuse of a power.

(2) For the purposes of this section, if the commission of the fraud, offence or act, or the abuse of power, is a fact in issue and there are reasonable grounds for finding that:

(a) the fraud, offence or act, or the abuse of power, was committed, and

(b) a communication was made or document prepared in furtherance of the commission of the fraud, offence or act or the abuse of power,

the court may find that the communication was so made or the document so prepared.

(3) In this section:

power means a power conferred by or under an Australian law.

1. The respondents argues that the disputed information is subject to LPP and therefore it is conclusively presumed that there is an overriding public interest against disclosure, as the first respondent's General Counsel and other legal officers in its employ were acting as legal practitioners providing legal advice to the COVID-19 Taskforce. It can be discerned from the disputed information that there was a clear lawyer-client relationship between the General Counsel and other legal officers of the first respondent and the COVID-19 Taskforce.
2. The applicant argues that an overlap between legal and administrative/political functions in this matter renders privilege inapplicable or waived, and that the legal advice was administrative/political and not legal in nature. He also argues that by sharing the legal advice with NSW Health, which is a separate entity, the respondents waived privilege and he asserts that the High Court's decision in Mann v Carnell (1999) HCA 66 supports this assertion, and the respondents have not pleaded common interest privilege.
3. The respondents argues that there was no waiver of privilege because both respondents are emanations of the State of NSW and \the decision in Mann v Carnell supports their position.
4. I am satisfied that there was a lawyer and client relationship in the circumstances of this matter and that as both the respondents are emanations of the State of NSW, the first respondent did not waive privilege when it shared its legal advice was shared with NSW Health.
5. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the information that the Tribunal considered during the confidential hearing is protected by LPP and that by operation of Sch 1 cl 5 of the GIPA Act, there is a conclusive presumption of an overriding public interest against its disclosure.

1. The respondents argued that twenty of the documents considered in the reviewable decision are Cabinet information, and are therefore subject to a conclusive presumption that there is an overriding public interest against disclosure.
2. The respondents relies upon the evidence of Dr Wood, which was not significantly challenged in cross-examination, which indicates that: (1) document number 2 is a Cabinet submission; (2) document 5 is a draft cover sheet to a Cabinet submission that includes an extract of the recommendations made in the submission; and (3) document 11 comprised draft slides to be included in a Cabinet submission.
3. The respondents argue that as Cabinet submissions are the means by which Ministers bring matters to Cabinet for its consideration, it may be accepted that each of these documents are documents (or extracts or drafts of documents) for which the dominant (or sole) purpose of preparation is to submit them to Cabinet for consideration. Therefore, Sch 1 cl 2(b) applies.
4. Dr Wood stated that document 20 reflects potential policy settings regarding vaccination rates, which were ultimately taken to the CPC as part of its deliberations regarding a return to school, and it reflects a position that was being considered by the Minister for Education in advance of the matter being taken to the CPC for deliberation. It is therefore within the scope of Sch 1 cl 2(1)(e) and the issue of "dominant purpose" is not relevant to the Tribunal's assessment of whether the respondents had reasonable grounds for claiming that the document is Cabinet information.
5. The respondent relies upon the Appeal Panel's decision in Patrick on this issue, in which the Appeal Panel stated:

111. The evidence of Ms Ware was of practice. Evidence of established practice is an orthodox way of proving matters of fact: Connor v Blacktown District Hospital [1971] 1 NSWLR 713 at 721 per Asprey JA (Mason JA agreeing). This was relevant evidence; relevant in the sense that it was rationally capable of affecting the Tribunal's assessment of whether a document had been prepared for Cabinet's approval; even in the sense asserted by the appellant.

112. The evidence of the contemporaneous emails from the Cabinet office (and not Cabinet itself, as the appellant emphasises) was also capable of grounding an inference that Cabinet, itself, sought to approve the Notes for their dominant purpose (assuming that to be necessary).

113. Having regard to the evidence, as extracted above, we are satisfied that the evidence relied on at first instance was probative of the fact in issue; namely, that the Notes were prepared for Cabinet (even assuming there to be a need that the Notes must be prepared, at the command of Cabinet). The "no evidence" ground therefore fails.

114. For completeness, it is to be recalled that on review of a decision concerning Cabinet information, the Tribunal is limited to deciding whether there were reasonable grounds for the agency's claim and is not authorised to make a decision as to the correct and preferable decision on the matter: s 106(1) of the Act. In other words, the test is whether the Department had a reasonable basis for its claim and not whether the claim was made out per se.

1. In Lock the Gate Alliance v Department of Planning and Environment [2019] NSWCATAD 6, the Tribunal held;

37. Clause 2 of Schedule 1 clearly distinguishes between "information" and "a document". This is apparent in all of the sub-clauses within cl 2(1) as each of those sub-clauses refers to "Cabinet information" contained in "a document" (see cl 2(1)((a) - (f) set out above). Clause 2(2)(a) specifically refers to public disclosure of "the document" which contains the information having been approved by the Premier or Cabinet. On a plain reading of the text it is the document itself which must have been approved for public release, not information contained in that document. There is no indication in any of the evidence that Document 28 has been approved for public release by the Premier or Cabinet. Clause 2(2)(a) therefore does not apply.

1. The applicant asserts that to be Cabinet information, the material in documents 9, 10 and 13 must be "solely factual". However, the fact that something is in the nature of a model does not mean that the information is necessarily solely factual information. This scenario is analogous to that considered in D'Adam v NSW Treasury [2014] NSWCATAD 68 (D'Adam), in which the Jackson Tribunal rejected the applicant's argument that the roadmaps must fall within the scope of the exception in cl 2(4), and it observed:

71. The statutory test, however, is whether the information consists solely of factual material, not whether it contains factual material as well as other material of a non-factual nature. In this case the information, whether in the Roadmaps or the attachments, consists to a great extent of targets, projections and estimates. While the setting of targets and the making of projections and estimates is in one sense a fact, the information itself consists also of opinions or recommendations about the desirability, likelihood and attainability of certain outcomes. It is not solely factual material. Nor does it lose that character because of the largely in numerical form. The same would be true of the budget documents themselves.

1. The applicant complains that the respondents have failed to address why the factual content in the KPMG documents cannot be severed under s 74 of the GIPA Act, but this complaint misconceives the provision. Where a document contains information of the type set out in each of Sch 1 cll 2(1) (a) to (f), the entire document is Cabinet information that is subject to the conclusive presumption. Therefore, even if it were possible to sever the factual content within the documents, the information would still be Cabinet information.

1. In relation to the applicant's arguments regarding the Court of Appeal's decision in Dawking and the Supreme Court's decision in Kazzam, I accept the respondents' submission that these decisions are not relevant to the current administrative review proceedings.
2. In note that Dawking concerned an appeal against a finding made by the Personal Injury Commission that the respondent's action in relation to its vaccine mandate policy was not reasonable action with respect to discipline of a worker for the purposes of s 11A of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW).
3. I also note that Hazzard included a discussion of evidence given about the CPC process and the privileged status of material generated as part of that process, and the Court confirmed the reasonableness of the respondents' Cabinet information claims in these proceedings. The decision does not support the applicant's submissions.

No further information held - adequacy of searches

1. While the applicant is highly critical of the searches that the respondent's conducted, and particularly Dr Wood's decision to use broader search terms as opposed to the highly specific terms that the applicant proffered, there is no evidence before me that supports a finding that the more specific search terms would have produced a better outcome in identifying responsive information.
2. Under s 53 of the GIPA Act, an agency is required to undertake such reasonable as may be necessary to find government information applied for using the most efficient means reasonably available to the agency (s 53(2)). In this matter, Dr Wood has provided evidence in his capacity as the former Executive Director of the COVID-19 Taskforce and I am satisfied that he is in the best position to identify where information responsive to the GIPA request may be located. His evidence regarding the searches (and particularly the search terms) was not seriously challenged in cross-examination. He stated that most briefings with NSW Health occurred on-line and did not involve hard copy documentation.

1. The applicant seeks to raise issues in relation to the respondents' compliance with the State Records Act 1998 (NSW), but this falls outside the scope of the current administrative review proceedings. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of the GIPA request seeks access to briefings and advice provided by NSW Health. In any event, Dr Wood's evidence is that the respondent's did not receive written briefings from NSW Health.
2. I am satisfied that to the extent that paras 1, 2 and 4 of the GIPA request seek access to any internally-generated records as a result of NSW Health briefings, these are outside the scope of the GIPA request. In any event, Dr Wood gave evidence that he searched sub-folders headed "briefings" and "daily briefings" and no responsive documents were found.
3. As far as para 3 of the GIPA request seeks internally-generated information, I note that the scope of the request is for records related internally about the role of COVID-19 vaccination in reducing transmission of the SARS CoV-2 virus and Dr Wood's evidence is that the respondents relied upon publicly available published advice in order to develop its policies and processes for the return to school. His evidence is that the more substantive decision making regarding issues such as vaccination policies and programs for return to school occurred in the CPC. I am also satisfied that records such as staff vaccination levels are outside the scope of the GIPA request.

(1) I am satisfied that pages 139 to 141 of the documents listed in the schedule of documents to the decision dated 20 February 2025, are subject to LPP and by operation of Sch 1 cl 5 of the GIPA Act that there is a conclusive presumption of an overriding public interest against disclosure.

(2) I am satisfied that documents numbered 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 20 and 22 are Cabinet Information and that by operation of Sch 1 cl 2(1)(e) there is a conclusive presumption of an overriding public interest against disclosure.

(3) I am satisfied that the respondents conducted reasonable searches and that they do not hold any additional information to that identified in the decisions dated 20 February 2025 and 9 September 2025.

(4) Section 106 of the GIPA Act applies with respect to the request for information made to the second respondent.

(1) The decisions dated 20 February 2025 and 9 September 2025 are affirmed.

(2) Section 106 of the GIPA Act applies with respect to the request for information made to the second respondent.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.