The Reasons of McDougall J
13 His Honour's findings of fact were as follows:
"[6] Mr Reardon (the corporate veil is, for present purposes, irrelevant) was commissioned by Ms Jane Wilder (then Wallace), a senior corporate solicitor employed by SACL at the time of the incident. Ms Wilder says that she was informed of the incident by Mr Peter Adams, the occupational health and safety manager of SACL, on the morning of 1 February 2001. She then spoke to Mr Peter Lawrence, head of terminal operations, and Mr Greg Russell, director of aviation. She was told that a meeting was scheduled with parties (including Qantas and Singapore Airlines) 'to discuss the incident, how it happened and what further action was required'.
[7] Ms Wilder says that when she was informed of the incident, she 'formed the view that litigation was likely'. She thought it was likely that Singapore Airlines would claim against SACL and perhaps other parties involved; and that if such a claim were made, SACL would cross-claim against Qantas and BLL.
[8] Ms Wilder therefore says, in paragraph 9 of her affidavit sworn 16 April 2004:
'In contemplation that a claim would be made for damages against SACL by [Singapore Airlines] as a result of this incident, and in order to be in a position to advise SACL in respect to its potential liability to [Singapore Airlines] and any rights it may have against other parties, I decided that an expert report was required and that it should be commissioned immediately. I formed the view that the expert engaged to prepare the report would also be used to give evidence on behalf of SACL in any future proceedings.'
[9] Accordingly, Ms Wilder commissioned Mr Reardon. This was done by letter dated 1 February 2001 but sent by facsimile transmission (as a transmission report shows) at 1.05 pm on 2 February 2001. The letter said, relevantly:
'We confirm that you have been retained by Sydney Airports Corporation Limited (SACL) to investigate the circumstances surrounding the incident involving the collapse of an aerobridge at Bay 61 … on 1 February 2001. Preliminary indications are that no one has been injured, although the collapse caused damage to the door of a Singapore Airlines' aircraft.
PURPOSE OF REPORT
The report is commissioned in contemplation of litigation and anticipated legal liability on SACL's behalf. Its contents are to be kept strictly confidential and its circulation is to be limited.
…
SCOPE OF REPORT
Your report should address the following:-
1. Establish all relevant circumstances (time, date, equipment owners and operators, prevailing conditions etc) leading to the incident. This should include the location and time of the incident, personnel involved and any injuries sustained;
2. Identify items of relevant equipment and their condition prior to the incident;
3. Identify relevant witnesses and where necessary, take statements from each witness;
4. Identify relevant references or established procedures that influence the operation of the relevant aerobridge at Bay 61;
5. Estimate the damage sustained by equipment involved in the incident. Unless your expertise allows you to comment, you are not required to comment on the cost of repairing such damage;
6. Identify any breach of operational regulations or procedures;
7. Identify the cause(s) of the incident and any contributing factors;
8. Make recommendations for eliminating or reducing the instance of similar incidents in the future; and
9. Comment and make recommendations if necessary on the response to the incident and any improvements that could be made in future.
…
Due dates for report
1. A draft interim report is to be provided to the writer and copied to Peter Lawrence by 1800 hr 10 February 2001.
2. The final report is to be provided to the writer and copied to Peter Lawrence by 1800 hr on 17 February 2001.
Please note that if the final report cannot be presented due to outstanding evidence or witness reports, you should contact the writer for further directions. Should any witness be unwilling to provide a statement this fact should be included in the report.'
…
[11] Ms Wilder said in cross-examination that there was a body known as the Airline Operations Committee ('AOC') at Sydney Airport at the relevant time. The AOC included representatives of airlines. Ms Wilder believed that it had the power to direct that the aerobridge not be used. She 'supposed' that it would be necessary to satisfy the AOC that the aerobridge was safe before the aerobridge could be put back into practice.
[12] Ms Wilder said that she thought that litigation was 'highly likely' (as opposed to 'possible'). Her reasons were that the events spoke for themselves in that a malfunctioning aerobridge had sheered the door off an aircraft. She did not know whether this was as a result of mechanical error or operating error. As to the former: the aerobridge had been rebuilt by [Bovis Lend Lease Pty Ltd] (and was still under warranty). She said that 'SACL is the operator of the whole airport and the party that subcontracted the construction of the aerobridges; I viewed that as being a significant potential liability for SACL'. As to the latter: the aerobridge was being operated by Qantas personnel at the time. Ms Wilder said further that she 'operated in a litigious environment'.
[13] The following further points emerged from Ms Wilder's evidence:
(1) She was seeking Mr Reardon's advice because she did not know what had caused the accident.
(2) She had no factual information or expert opinion that might have 'pointed the finger' at SACL.
(3) Prior incidents had been investigated by SACL employees, but 'there was something different about this incident'.
(4) Mr Lawrence identified the need for a report to satisfy the AOC that the aerobridge (after repairs) was in a fit state to be put back into service.
(5) Messrs Reardon and Guselli made a 'presentation' to the members of the AOC: they met them and talked about the incident.
(6) Some at least of Mr Reardon's recommendations in the report were communicated to the AOC to allay their concerns.
(7) Part of the purpose of engaging Mr Reardon was to make SACL's response to the concerns of the AOC 'of greater weight', or 'imbue the recommendations with a higher level of trust than if they had come from a SACL employee'.
(8) Accordingly, there was a disclosure of at least some parts of the Reardon report to members of the AOC, although Ms Wilder could not recall the extent of the overlap between the report overall and what was put to the AOC by Messrs Reardon and Guselli.
(9) The Reardon report was copied to Mr Lawrence because he dealt with airlines and the AOC, and because Ms Wilder had asked Mr Lawrence to conduct his own investigation into the causes of the incident, what SACL knew, and what changes were necessary. She said that this investigation was required so that SACL could review the Reardon report.
(10) Mr Lawrence was also required to conduct the investigation 'to … look at our experience and our internal expertise and look at the causes and anything that we should be doing in future to prevent something like this happening again'.
(11) She agreed that two of the major matters to which she desired Mr Reardon to attend were, first, 'to identify the cause of the incident and any contributing factors' and, second, to 'make any recommendations for eliminating or reducing the instance of similar incidents in the future'.
(12) She instructed Mr Guselli to summarise the conclusions of Mr Reardon's investigation, including factual findings: this he did, and the result was a PowerPoint presentation that Mr Guselli made to the AOC.
(13) Mr Reardon or Mr Guselli prepared a recommended action plan which was designed to make formal documented recommendations to the AOC. The factual matters set out in that plan were taken from the Reardon report. The recommendations made in the plan were taken from the Reardon report. The plan was given to the AOC.
(14) Ms Wilder denied that satisfying the AOC was of equal or greater importance (in the commissioning of the Reardon report) than enabling SACL to be prepared in the event of litigation.
[14] I accept Ms Wilder's evidence that when she was informed of the incident, she formed the view that litigation was likely. I do so because I accept her as a witness of truth. Her evidence on this point was unshaken. It was not put to her that her reference, in her letter of instructions to Mr Reardon, to 'litigation and anticipated legal liability', was a merely colourable device to seek to attract privilege where otherwise it might not be available."
14 His Honour set out par [9] of Ms Wilder's affidavit. It is also relevant to set out, which his Honour did not, the whole of par [14] of the affidavit, noting in particular the use of the word "only" in the last sentence:
"[14] To the best of my recollection, SACL did not have any official protocols or incident response plans that were relevant to this incident, other than in compliance with relevant OHS requirements, SACL was not required to commission a report or to engage an expert to investigate the causes of any equipment failure at Sydney Airport. A report of this kind completed by Peter Reardon, and the issues he was required to investigate and report upon was only commissioned because of my view that this matter would be litigated."
15 His Honour summarised the evidence with respect to the purposes for which the report was commissioned in the following way:
"[23] … On the evidence of Ms Wilder, it is possible to assign at least four purposes (or intended uses) to the report:
(1) For use in the litigation that Ms Wilder thought was 'likely' (including, in this, to qualify Mr Reardon as an expert who could give evidence in such litigation).
(2) To enable SACL to understand what caused the incident.
(3) To enable SACL to allay the concerns of the AOC, both in relation to the particular aerobridge and in relation to other similar aerobridges, so as to persuade the AOC to allow the aerobridge to be put back into service.
(4) For SACL's own operational reasons: to seek to ensure that similar incidents would not occur again.
[24] Although I have referred, as a separate purpose, to enabling SACL to understand what caused the incident, it is clear that this purpose could be seen as part of, or ancillary to, the first and the fourth stated purposes. In some cases, the process of investigation, or of gathering evidence, will be distinct and anterior to the point in time at which it may be said that proceedings are 'anticipated'. See Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (1998) 81 FCR 526, 545-546. However, there is no necessary distinction between the two processes and, as Batt JA said in Mitsubishi at 342 [23], '[t]here must be many cases where it can be said that litigation is likely before the evidence gathering process has even begun'. In the present case, I do not think that it is possible to draw a clear distinction between first and second purposes, or between the second and fourth purposes. In a sense, the second purpose is a necessary part of each.
[25] Thus, if the claim for privilege is to be sustained, SACL must show that the first of these purposes (including, for the reasons just given, the second purpose insofar as it related to the first purpose) was the dominant purpose."
16 His Honour proceeded:
"[30] Consideration of dominant purpose requires not only that the purpose, or intended use, be characterised, but attention to the question: whose purpose? In the ordinary case, the purpose would be that of the person who brings the document (in which the relevant communication is embodied) into existence. However, where the document is commissioned … by an external solicitor, then the relevant intention will be that of the solicitor: …
[31] In the present case, it was Ms Wilder who commissioned the Reardon report. I think the proper inference to be drawn from her evidence is that it was her decision to do so, notwithstanding that she discussed the matter with her superior, and notwithstanding that Mr Lawrence was involved. As to the former: it was not put to her, and there is no evidence otherwise, that it was her superior who directed the preparation of the Reardon report. As to the latter: it was Ms Wilder's evidence that she and Mr Lawrence were of coordinate authority. Notwithstanding that the report, both in draft and in final form, was to be given to Mr Lawrence as well as to Ms Wilder, I do not think that his decision, rather than hers, is the relevant one.
[32] What I have just said does not exclude the possibility that the relevant decision may be that of Ms Wilder and Mr Lawrence (ie, rather than that of one or the other of them). However, that would require evidence that Ms Wilder had discussed with Mr Lawrence the question of instructing Mr Reardon for their joint (or several) purposes. Ms Wilder did not say that this was so, and there is no other basis in the evidence for finding that it is so. Nor does it follow, from my finding that it was Ms Wilder's decision to commission the report, that it is her purpose alone (or the intended use for which she required the report) that is determinative.
[33] In the case of a corporation, the relevant purpose is that of the corporation. When an employee such as Ms Wilder, acting within the scope of her authority, commissions a report such as the Reardon report, the purpose of the employee may be imputed to the employer. Nonetheless, the relevant purpose (in the context under discussion) is that of the corporate employer and not that of the employee. The purposes set out in para [23] include a purpose specific to Ms Wilder in her capacity as an in-house solicitor: the first purpose. However, they include purposes that are, more generally, SACL's purposes: the third and fourth. Whether this is because Ms Wilder was not acting only in her capacity as a solicitor, or because she consulted with other employees (including Mr Lawrence) in relation to the commissioning of the Reardon report, is unnecessary to decide. The privilege (if it exists) is SACL's privilege, not Ms Wilder's. The relevant purpose must, I think, be SACL's purpose, regardless of the particular employee or employees through whom it was articulated. In the ordinary case, SACL's purpose or purposes may be gathered from the individual purposes of particular employees acting within the scope of their authority.
[34] Ms Wilder denied that, in her mind, the third purpose (allaying the concerns of the AOC) was of equal or greater importance than the first (use in 'likely' litigation). I accept that, in her mind, this was so. However, that does not dispose of the issue.
…
[36] In the present case, SACL called no evidence from any employee other than Ms Wilder, notwithstanding that it is clear, on Ms Wilder's evidence, that the relevant purposes included purposes other than for [sic "her"?] particular concern relating to 'likely' litigation. Ms Wilder's denial that the third purpose was of equal or greater importance to her than the first cannot resolve the issue, because it does not follow from this that other officers of SACL would have ranked the importance of the purposes in the same way.
[37] Nor, in my judgment, is it possible, looking at the matter objectively, to say that one of the purposes is inherently such that it should be regarded as dominant. In some cases, no doubt, it will be clear even without evidence of subjective intention that one purpose is 'paramount' (to use an expression favoured by Batt JA as a synonym for 'dominant'), or that one is 'ancillary' (to use an expression favoured by Barwick CJ and Branson J as an antonym). In the present case - and accepting that the second purpose may inform, or be ancillary to, the first and fourth purposes -- I do not think that it is possible, by some process of objective assessment, to characterise one of the first, third or fourth purposes as paramount and the others as ancillary.
[38] The process of classification is not resolved by Ms Wilder's evidence. There are two reasons for saying this. The first is that, as I have indicated, the relevant purposes (of SACL) clearly go beyond her own specific purpose relating to litigation; and Ms Wilder's denial of equality or primacy was limited to her own perception. The second is that Ms Wilder was not questioned at all (even as to her own perception) as to equality or primacy as between the first and fourth purposes.
[39] It may very well be the case that Ms Wilder regarded use in litigation as the most important purpose. It does not follow that other employees of SACL, or SACL generally, would have had the same view. In this context, I regard as significant the failure of SACL to call Mr Lawrence, in circumstances where, clearly, he was closely involved in the investigation of the incident and where he was one of the two people specifically named as intended recipients of the report. Nor (in the absence of evidence) do I think it is possible to arrive at the conclusion, as to dominance, by some process of objective assessment.
[40] The relevant purposes (which, in this context, may be confined to the first, third and fourth purposes set out in para [23] on the basis that the second purpose is ancillary rather than independent) are those of SACL. Those purposes go beyond the purpose in the mind of Ms Wilder, namely the first purpose. It must follow that Ms Wilder's evidence, as to the predominance in her mind of her purpose, cannot be conclusive of the question of dominance from the perspective of SACL.
[41] I therefore conclude that SACL has not shown that the dominant purpose for which the Reardon report was prepared was for use in 'likely' litigation."