[2024] FWC 2754
General information, not legal advice.
Fair Work Commission
2024-10-03
Original judgment source is linked above.
[2024] FWC 2754[Note: An appeal pursuant to s.604 (C2024/7496) was lodged against this decision.]
s.365 - Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal (consent arbitration)
Application for the FWC to deal with a dismissal dispute - Arbitration by consent
a) Discussed and recommended the use of "magic mushrooms" to clients, which was outside the scope of her role and considered serious misconduct.
b) Made disparaging comments about the business, its employees, and clients after her shift, which breaches professional conduct standards.
c) Made an unscheduled check-in with a client at 11.00 pm during inactive hours, which was not an emergency nor requested by the client, breaching the scope of her role.
d) Contacted another staff member outside of her work hours for non-emergency matters, breaching the company's staff communication policy.
a) Ms Soorley denied discussing and advocating the use of magic mushrooms with guests. Specifics of the allegations were requested, and Mr Parer provided a printout of a website article written by Ms Soorley promoting psychedelic drugs. Mr Edwards requested access to the guests involved and was informed the guests did not wish to be contacted.
b) Ms Soorley denied making disparaging remarks about Gunnebah and its staff. Mr Edwards asked for details, including dates and specific remarks. Mr Parer referred to two employees. Mr Edwards insisted on more specifics to respond adequately.
d) Ms Soorley denied breaching the Gunnebah Staff Communication Policy by contacting staff outside work hours for non-urgent issues. Mr Edwards denied any wrongdoing on Ms Soorley's behalf.
During my stay at Gunnebah I found it confronting, inappropriate and triggering that one of your staff members Kerry Soorley was recounting her experience on mushrooms and other illicit drugs and glorifying them.
As you can imagine, while we are there to seek help in all forms of addiction, I found this quite upsetting and it sparked glorifying conversations among a few of the other guests that were unfortunate enough to see and hear this display from Kerry. As I know all staff members at Gunnebah have a zero tolerance and an abstinence philosophy towards drugs and alcohol, I thought I should bring this to your attention.
a) The allegation that Ms Soorley discussed the use of magic mushrooms and promoted psychedelic therapy to residents in her care, which was a matter beyond her scope of responsibility and qualifications was said to be substantiated on the written evidence from multiple residents.
b) The allegation that Ms Soorley engaged in rude and disrespectful behaviour, by making disparaging comments about the business and its employees and clients was said to be substantiated.
c) The allegation that Ms Soorley conducted an unscheduled check-in with a guest during inactive hours without it being an emergency or request, behaviour which was outside the scope of her role, was said to be substantiated.
d) The allegation that Ms Soorley contacted staff outside of business hours on three occasions concerning non-emergency matters, breaching the company's staff communication policy was also said to be substantiated.
In view of the above matters, we are terminating your employment summarily. In the circumstances, and for the reasons as outlined above, we maintain the view that is appropriate that your employment should be terminated with immediate effect and without notice.
(1) A person must not take adverse action against another person:
(a) in an application in relation to a contravention of this Part, it is alleged that a person took ... action for a particular reason ...; and
(b) taking that action for that reason ... would constitute a contravention of this Part;
it is presumed, in proceedings arising from the application, that the action was ... taken for that reason or with that intent, unless the person proves otherwise."
[14] The task of the FWC in a consent arbitration proceeding such as this is to determine three factual questions:
(i) Was the employee exercising a workplace right, within the meaning of s.341?
(ii) Did the employer take 'adverse action' against the employee, within the meaning of s.342?
(iii) Did the employer take the adverse action against the employee because of a prohibited reason, or reasons which included that reason?
81 Where, by way of rebuttal of the presumption established by s 361 of the FW Act, a respondent leads evidence as to why it engaged in the conduct that an applicant seeks to impugn, the relevant inquiry starts and ends with whether, in fact, those reasons relevantly actuated that conduct. It is not necessary for a respondent to prove that the reasons that actuated its conduct were procedurally or substantively fair: see Khiani v Australian Bureau of Statistics [2011] FCAFC 109 at [31].
82 Thus where, as here, a respondent employer cites, as its reasons for taking adverse action against an applicant, opinions that it formed about his or her conduct or capacity, the relevant inquiry is not whether those opinions were fairly or properly formed or vindicated in fact. Rather and more simply, the relevant inquiry is whether the opinions were formed at all and, if they were, whether the respondent was moved to act as it did in consequence of them. A claim under Pt 3-1 of the FW Act '... is not a broad inquiry as to whether the applicant has been subjected to a procedurally or substantively unfair outcome': Ermel v Duluxgroup (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 17, [48] (Bromberg J).
83 In some circumstances, it might be possible to infer from evidence tending to show that a respondent's opinions were formed wrongly or unfairly - that is to say, inconsistently with fact or in a way otherwise susceptible to some other legitimate criticism - that those opinions either were not, in fact, formed or did not relevantly actuate the respondent's conduct (or both). Such circumstances might warrant the rejection of the respondent's evidence as to why it did what it did and a finding that the respondent failed to rebut the presumption established by s 361 of the FW Act. But, regardless, the inquiry remains: did the respondent form the views that it said that it formed; and, if it did, was it actuated to conduct itself in the way that it did on account of them (and not on account of any proscribed reason)?
In a general protections claim brought pursuant to s 340 of the FW Act, success depends upon the Court being satisfied that the applicant has been subjected to adverse action for one or more of the specific reasons identified by the FW Act as an impermissible basis upon which action adverse to the applicant may be taken. A general protections proceeding is not a broad inquiry as to whether the applicant has been subjected to a procedurally or substantively unfair outcome. As Gray, Cowdroy and Reeves JJ said in Khiani v Australian Bureau of Statistics [2011] FCAFC 109 at [31]:
A general protections application is not intended to provide an opportunity for the appellant to raise whatever issues she wishes to about the validity of the steps taken before her dismissal. The crucial issue in such an application is the causal relationship between adverse action and one or more of the factors mentioned in the various provisions of Pt 3-1. The issue is whether the person who has taken the adverse action has done so because the person against whom the adverse action has been taken has one or more of the relevant characteristics or has done one or more of the relevant acts.
3. Requesting information that would allow me to be able to properly answer "disciplinary" allegations.
4. My right to have my nominated legal representative attend a "disciplinary hearing" on my behalf in a situation where information required by me to be able to properly address allegations made against me by the respondent had not been supplied before the "hearing".
5. My right to have information that would allow me to be able to properly answer "disciplinary" allegations supplied to me and my legal representative before the "disciplinary hearing".
6. My right for the respondent to allow me due process, a fair hearing and natural justice before summarily and unjustifiably terminating my employment without even the statutorily required 4 weeks' notice (also a requirement under the employment contract itself) and/or pay.
7. My right to be paid the correct amount in wages in accordance with the national ("SCHADS") award including sleep over allowances etc.
8. My right not to be required to work what amounted to an illegal number of hours under the award without the mandated rate remuneration.
9. My right to be told before I signed the work contract of how the respondent assessed my pay level in terms of the award. This information was omitted from the Schedule to the work contract.
10. My right not to have me or my legal representative disrespected, insulted, abused and threatened by the respondent when making lawful requests for information to progress these proceedings and other matters involving the Fair Work (Australia) Ombudsman.
11. My right not to be harassed with vexatious complaints to the Health Care Complaints Commission (HCCC) especially considering the respondent's adamant assertions that I was "never employed" by his organisation as a "Registered Nurse".
12. My right to request my Employee Record after my unjustified termination to enable me to calculate the short payment of wages and other entitlements during my time at the workplace.
341 (1) A person has a workplace right if the person:
(a) is entitled to the benefit of, or has a role or responsibility under, a workplace law, workplace instrument or order made by an industrial body; or
(b)is able to initiate, or participate in, a process or proceedings under a workplace law or workplace instrument; or
(i) to a person or body having the capacity under a workplace law to seek compliance with that law or a workplace instrument; or
(ii) if the person is an employee - in relation to his or her employment

[1] General Motors-Holden's Pty Ltd v Bowling (1976) 51 ALJR 235 at 241 per Mason J
[2] Ce_land v Skycity Adelaide Pty Ltd_ (per Bromberg J [2017] FCAFC 222 at [154] and Australian Red Cross Society v Queensland Nurses' Union of Employees [2019] FCAFC 215 at [66]
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
Ms Kerry Cecilia Soorley
The Trustee For The Gunnebah Operating Trust [2024] FWC 2754
(2017) 275 IR 285
(1976) 51 ALJR 235