1. Under s 196(2)(a) of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2009 (Qld) as applied by s 4 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Victoria) Act 2009 (Vic) (the National Law) Dr Hmood is reprimanded.
2. Under s 196(2)(e) of the National Law, Dr Hmood's registration as a health practitioner is cancelled.
3. Under s 196(4)(a) of the National Law, Dr Hmood is disqualified from applying for registration as a health practitioner for 8 years.
4. Under s 196(4)(b) of the National Law, Dr Hmood is prohibited from providing any health service which involves physical contact with a female, in circumstances where Dr Hmood is alone with a female, for 8 years.

1. Following a contested hearing, on 19 December 2022, the Tribunal found five serious allegations proven against Dr Atheer Hmood: Medical Board of Australia v Hmood (Review and Regulation) (Corrected) [2022] VCAT 1451 (Hmood Judgment 1). These reasons should be read together with Hmood Judgment 1.
2. The parties subsequently filed submissions as to how the found conduct should be characterised, and what determination should be made. They also filed further evidence. Oral submissions were then made at a hearing which dealt with the questions of characterisation and determination, on 29 May 2023.
3. There was no dispute that the found conduct amounts to professional misconduct, under (c) of the definition of that phrase, in s 5 of the National Law (that is, the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2009 (Qld) as applied by s 4 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Victoria) Act 2009 (Vic)).
4. Under sub-paragraph (c) of the definition, professional misconduct is defined as:

conduct of the practitioner, whether occurring in connection with the practice of the health practitioner's profession or not, that is inconsistent with the practitioner being a fit and proper person to hold registration in the profession.

1. The Tribunal has found that Dr Hmood conducted each of the examinations regarding the found conduct for a sexual purpose, and in a manner that involved inappropriate and unnecessary physical contact. This conduct was patently inconsistent with Dr Hmood being a fit and proper person to hold registration. It departs significantly from the proper standards medical practitioners must comply with, in circumstances where female patients entrust themselves to doctors for medical examinations that may require intimate physical contact which they otherwise would not accept from the doctors: Health Complaints Commission v Litchfield (1997) 41 NSWLR 630, at 638.
2. As stated in Medical Board of Australia v Lee [2019] VCAT 2036 at [269], 'little explanation' is required for a finding that a practitioner's conduct is inconsistent with being a fit and proper person where it involves conduct of a sexual nature in a consultation. Such behaviour involves 'a gross boundary violation, and a gross abuse of patient trust'.
3. The Board did not press for any finding that Hmood's conduct constituted professional misconduct of the type set out in paragraphs (a) or (b) of the definition of that phrase, so the Tribunal does not need to consider those issues.
4. Once misconduct is found, there are two main objectives in imposing sanctions: to protect the public, and to maintain the professional standards of the profession in the eyes of the public. As stated in Medical Board of Australia v Zhao [2021] VCAT 1053 at [115], these objectives are directed to:

(a) protection against further misconduct by the practitioner, by regulating their performance (specific deterrence);

(b) facilitating rehabilitation of the practitioner;

(c) preventing persons who are unfit to practice from practicing as medical practitioners;

(d) general deterrence of other practitioners from similar conduct

(e) maintaining proper ethical and professional standards, primarily for the protection of the public, but also for the protection of the profession; and

(f) maintaining public confidence in the profession, including an appropriate acknowledgement and condemnation of misconduct.

1. Medical Board of Australia v Taheri (Review and Regulation) [2022] VCAT 158 at [34]- [41] details further what the Tribunal needs to take into account:
   1. The principles underlying determinations in professional disciplinary cases are well-established. Their primary purpose is protective. The focus will be on protection of the public, maintaining standards, and the reputation of and public confidence in the profession concerned. The principles are similar to principles of criminal sentencing in some but not all respects. The focus is different.
   2. While the primary purpose of determinations is protective not punitive, sanctions which publicly condemn a practitioner's conduct, such as a reprimand, or which remove them from practice for a period of time, such as a suspension or disqualification, will necessarily have a punitive effect on the practitioner, but one which is in aid of the protective purposes of determinations.
   3. With that protective focus in mind, the Tribunal considers a range of factors including the nature and seriousness of the conduct, any plea of guilty, insight and remorse, the relative importance in the case of specific deterrence and general deterrence, past disciplinary history, evidence of character, mitigating factors arising from the circumstances, medical or psychological evidence or delay, and any guidance provided by comparable cases.
   4. In considering the importance of specific deterrence in any case - whether there is a need to deter the individual practitioner from repeating the conduct - the Tribunal assesses any ongoing risk posed by the practitioner taking into account factors such as:
      • whether they have demonstrated insight into the seriousness of the conduct and how and why it occurred;
      • whether they have shown genuine remorse and have taken independent steps to reduce the risk of repetition;
      • whether similar conduct has been repeated or there have been other professional transgressions; and
      • whether they have any past disciplinary history, which in turn may suggest that stronger penalties may be required to deter them in future.
   5. In considering the importance of general deterrence, the Tribunal looks at:
      • the nature and seriousness of the conduct and the risk it poses to the public if engaged in by others; and
      • the related question of whether there is therefore a need to deter other members of the profession from engaging in the same conduct by signalling that adverse consequences will follow such conduct.
   6. In Honey v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria [2007] VCAT 526 at [42]- [45], the Tribunal discussed the difference between the determinations of suspension and cancellation:

The major difference between a period of suspension and cancellation is that once the doctor's registration is cancelled, he must reapply after the period specified. He is not guaranteed that he will be so re-registered. He must still satisfy the Board that registration is appropriate and that he fulfils the qualifications for general registration ...

Cancellation of registration sends a clear message of unsuitability to practice. Suspension may be thought to indicate confidence in the doctor's future ability to practice once the period of suspension is served.

There are some cases in which it is abundantly clear that deregistration is the only option available to protect the public from a miscreant doctor.

This is apparent in situations in which the practitioner does not accept the inappropriateness of his conduct, or has been shown to be a serial offender.

1. Whilst the Tribunal may be assisted by submissions as to the appropriate sanction, it is ultimately in the discretion of the Tribunal as to the appropriate sanction in any given case.
2. Determinations in other cases of similar or analogous conduct will provide useful guidance. Consistency and proportionality are important. But every case is different, with its own combination of facts and relevant factors, including the degree of seriousness of the conduct, the length of time the practitioner engaged in the conduct, the number of patients or others impacted by the conduct, and the circumstances involved.

3. The Tribunal reprimands Hmood, under s 196 of the National Law. This is a formal statement of denunciation of his conduct, which will appear on his professional record. There was no dispute that a reprimand is appropriate given the found conduct set out in Hmood Judgment 1.
4. The Tribunal makes an order cancelling Hmood's registration under s 196(2)(e) of the National Law. Cancellation is one of the most serious of the sanction options available to the Tribunal under s 196 of the National Law, where professional misconduct is found. Hmood's conduct breached the trust reposed in him as a registered medical practitioner by his patients, and the public. He exploited the power imbalance between a doctor and patient in carrying out examinations with a sexual purpose. There was no dispute that it is appropriate that Hmood's registration be cancelled.
5. The Tribunal also makes an order that Hmood be disqualified from applying for registration as a medical practitioner for 8 years, under s 196(4)(a) of the National Law. The Board sought a 15 year disqualification period. Hmood agreed there should be a disqualification period, but submitted that 2 years is sufficient. The Tribunal considers an 8 year disqualification appropriate, for the reasons that follow.
6. As discussed above, in terms of considering an appropriate determination, the Tribunal considers both general and specific deterrence. General deterrence goes to maintaining public confidence in the profession, and to the sound and effective regulation of the profession. Sexual misconduct in the intimate setting of a medical consultation goes to the heart of the trust necessarily reposed in registered medical practitioners. By way of general deterrence, it is particularly important to let other practitioners know that there are severe consequences for conduct of this kind, involving a breach of trust in the course of a medical consultation, for sexual gratification.
7. The Tribunal has taken into account the seriousness of the conduct against five vulnerable patients which resulted in breaches of trust by Hmood for his own sexual gratification. Hmood's conduct has had an adverse impact on the five patients. There is a need to impose a sanction that is 'punitive as well as protective' to annul any risk of Hmood taking advantage of vulnerable patients or clients in the future.
8. Hmood has not shown insight or remorse into his actions, which would otherwise be a mitigating factor in the determination. The deliberate and repeated nature of the conduct necessitates the need for specific deterrence in this case, as well as general deterrence. Hmood continued with conduct of that nature, even after being informed of a police complaint from a patient.
9. As the Board submits:
   1. The lack of insight and remorse underlines the need for specific deterrence in this case, as well as general deterrence. The is a real risk that Dr Hmood will, if given the opportunity, seek to take advantage of vulnerable patients or clients in the future. The first reported conduct was at Geelong Hospital. The conduct then continued at Kilmore. Dr Hmood continued with his conduct, even after being informed of a police complaint from patient BL. His conduct was predatory, as can be seen with the young patient NT, who he took advantage of at the first appointment she attended without a parent. The conduct was intentional and so future risk is not mitigated by any further education or study. Dr Hmood knew that he had a sexual purpose, rather than a clinical purpose. He chose to exploit his patients.
10. Hmood says that he has made changes to his examination technique, and has not had other complaints made against him since those that are the subject of this proceeding were made. He submits that this should be taken into account in considering what is a necessary determination that will protect the public:
    1. Dr Hmood has also made adjustment to his cardiac examination technique and no longer uses the LLRP position examination. Instead patients with cardiac issues are referred for specialist cardiology assessment or referred to the emergency department depending upon the urgency of the case. Depending on the particular presentation Dr Hmood has at his disposal blood testing, ECG, chest x-ray and other imaging and echo cardiographs to assist him with cardiac assessment. The removal of the performance of the LLRP, the successful treatment of many thousands of patients and the fact that he has not been the subject of any further complaint arising from this examination goes directly to the issue of a determination necessary for protection of the public.
    2. His professional performance for in excess of a decade, his approach to professional development and removal of the technique itself are the actions and steps of a practitioner with a degree of insight notwithstanding his denial of the allegations themselves. The delay permits the Tribunal to assess his ability to work at an appropriate standard for a lengthy number of years. The Tribunal can assess the Findings against almost a decade of successful work. This must go directly toward reducing any period of disqualification or suspension. Mr Hmood has shown a capacity to provide medical care to an appropriate standard in total contrast to the Findings.
11. However, the Tribunal has found his conduct was deliberate, not accidental. Removing the technique of a particular type of examination from his modus operandi does not evidence a display of insight from Hmood into what he did wrong in touching the patients in the sexual ways he did. Even after the findings were made, no insight was shown.
12. Insight is not shown by Hmood's concession that, given the seriousness of his conduct, a cancellation of his registration is required (as was submitted for Hmood). A quick perusal of cases involving professional misconduct would indicate that cancellation is an all but inevitable consequence of the found conduct.
13. Hmood says that for more than 10 years he has worked without further complaints being made against him, in conformity with his registration conditions. He estimates he has treated 60,000 patients in that time. However, he also had a chaperone throughout that period whilst conducting examinations. The absence of complaint does not mean that the Tribunal can be satisfied that Hmood has reformed his behaviour in practice.
14. Hmood also points to his steps at continuing professional development over this period as evidence of his 'insight' into the allegations. But this has nothing to do with the found conduct. It is not relevant. It is not a lack of professional knowledge that caused the found conduct.
15. Hmood says that his reputation and standing in the profession should also be taken into account in considering the appropriate determination. He relies on letters of support to indicate that he is well regarded in the profession by his peers, and a proficient medical practitioner. However, the found conduct here is distinct from whether Hmood is generally well regarded by his peers. What is relevant is what Hmood did when he was alone with five female patients who bestowed their trust in him (which led to the finding of professional misconduct.)
16. Hmood submits that some weight should be given to the public interest in enabling him to continue to practice,[1] given the many thousands of patients he says he has treated in the last 10 years. He submits that the practice locations where he works services a large Arabic speaking population, and that the Tribunal can 'infer' any reduction in medical services by someone who speaks Arabic will be felt accurately by that community. The Tribunal is prepared to accept that may be the case, but that has to be balanced against the risk of Hmood re-offending, and the seriousness of the found conduct.
17. There has been significant delay in these matters coming to hearing. The examinations involving the five patients took place up to 10 years ago. That is indeed a long time. It is desirable that disciplinary matters are dealt with as promptly as possible. Hmood points out that the Board has been aware of every allegation, bar one, since 2013.[2] The criminal trial process was completed in June 2016. On 5 May 2017, the Office of Public Prosecutions in response to a Schedule 5 Notice issued by the Board provided information and advised that the criminal process was complete. The Board referred Allegations 1-8 to the Tribunal in December 2018, and Allegation 9 in March 2019. Dr Overton's report was dated 18 November 2019. It took until 2022 for the evidentiary hearing to take place, and December 2022 for Hmood Judgment 1 to be published. Much of that delay is explained by the criminal trials first needing to take place; some due to delays at the Tribunal and with the pandemic; some due to the availability of counsel and the Tribunal for the hearings. But it has meant that these allegations have been hanging over Hmood's head for a long time. On the other hand, he has continued to work throughout this time, only giving up his licence on 9 January 2023, after Hmood Judgment 1 was handed down in December 2022. (The Board then suspended his registration in February pending this decision).
18. The Tribunal takes into account the delays here as having been a heavy weight for Hmood to carry, given the uncertainty surrounding his continued ability to practise; and that this in itself had been a punishment, emphasising to him the consequences of his previous unacceptable conduct: see Medical Board of Australia v Proctor (Review and Regulation) [2018] VCAT 576 at [48]. It considers this relevant to specific deterrence.
19. Hmood defended the proceeding (rather than agreeing he was guilty of the conduct alleged). The Board submitted that if Hmood had agreed he was guilty, that would have been a mitigating factor to be taken into account in the determination. This is so. However, it is important to note that Hmood was entitled - as any practitioner is entitled - to test the serious allegations against him. Unlike in some cases, he had not already been found guilty in criminal proceedings relating to the complaints made. He successfully defended allegations in this proceeding in relation to four other patients. The fact that he defended the proceeding does not increase the length of the disqualification period that would otherwise be imposed.
20. Hmood submits that the fact he successfully defended himself against allegations involving four other patients should be taken into account in reducing the period of any disqualification period in determination. The Tribunal disagrees. The fact that allegations regarding four other patients were not established is not relevant. The Tribunal here must identify the appropriate characterisation and determination with respect to the five proven allegations. No points are awarded for there not being more proven allegations, so to speak, or to the fact that Hmood had to defend those other allegations.
21. Hmood submits that 15 years would be 'crushing' and punitive, and 'effectively amount to a lifetime ban' given his age. However, even if this were the case, it is not to the point. The effect on the doctor concerned of the appropriate determination is not a consideration for the Tribunal: See Stirling v Legal Services Commissioner [2013] VSCA 374 at [57], [88]. The purpose of the determination is protective.
22. The Tribunal needs to decide an outcome that is consistent with contemporary community and professional standards.[3] Whilst there is no 'tariff' to be imposed by reference to other decisions, dispositions in other cases may be a useful guide to proportionality, and to ensuring the disposition imposed in this particular case is not outside the range of dispositions imposed in the relevant jurisdiction.
23. Significant disqualification periods have been imposed by tribunals in other cases involving serious professional misconduct.
24. The Board referred to the following cases:

(a) Board of Australia v Salter [2022] VCAT 1238. A registered medical practitioner was given a 10 year disqualification period, for conduct which included inappropriate prescribing of Schedule 4 and Schedule 8 poisons, and inadequate medical treatment and assessment. The medical practitioner issued prescriptions that were not clinically justified, failed to provide safe and effective care, and did not maintain adequate records. It was found that the medical practitioner also engaged in personal relationships with patients, that he provided ice to a highly vulnerable patient, and purchased ice and GHB from another. The medical practitioner treated patients with whom he had engaged in sexualised conduct. He also falsified medical certificates, and provided false and misleading information to the Board, communicated inappropriately, and breached patient confidentiality.

(b) Medical Board of Australia v Datta (No 2) [2022] VCAT 845. A registered medical practitioner was given a 4 year disqualification period for conduct which included the examination of the chest and genitals of two patients. The medical practitioner engaged in conduct which was sexualised and/ or inappropriate, which was not clinically justified, and failed to obtain informed consent when conducting examinations. He used inappropriate and sexualised language towards patients. The medical practitioner's conduct demonstrated a complete inability to self-regulate his behaviour, which he continued to deny and justify. His actions warranted a serious sanction as the Tribunal had no confidence that the medical practitioner had any remorse or would take time to reflect on how his behaviour may have impacted the patients. The practitioner appears to have spent about eight years out of practice before the findings were made.

(c) Medical Board of Australia v Panda [2019] WASAT 104. A registered medical practitioner was given a 10 year disqualification period for conduct which included examining the chest and genitals of five patients in ways that were neither warranted nor legitimate for the condition or symptoms each patient presented with. The examinations involved the medical practitioner touching the skin of the intimate parts of the patients' bodies with un-gloved hands. In regard to three of the patients, the medical practitioner had also breached a condition which prohibited him from conducting the physical examination of female patients in the absence of a chaperone. The offences occurred in the medical practitioner's consultation room where the patients were alone with him, and he was in a position of trust. The medical practitioner had previously been convicted of unlawful and indecent assault as a result of touching the breasts and/ or vagina of four patients, and kissing the face of another patient, for which he was sentenced to a period of one year imprisonment.

(d) Chinese Medical Board of Australia v Zhao [2020] SACAT 23. A chinese medicine practitioner was given a 15 year disqualification period, and a 15 year prohibition order, for conduct that included digital penetration of a patient's vagina during a massage at his clinic. (He was also found guilty of rape in criminal proceedings and punished to a term of imprisonment.)

(e) Medical Board of Australia v Athinodorou [2020] SACAT 31. A registered medical practitioner was given a 13 year disqualification period, for conduct including sexual misconduct involving 10 patients, over 16 years. He was also prohibited from providing any health service involving any form of physical contact with female patients that included any intimate examination or spinal manipulation which would require them to undress either partially or fully.

(f) Medical Board of Australia v Moschou [2021] SACAT 30. A registered medical practitioner was disqualified, and had his registration permanently cancelled, as well as being permanently prohibited from providing any health service as a result of performing an internal examination of a patient's vagina, without informed consent.

(g) Medical Board of Australia v Parhar [2021] VCAT 1295. A consultant physician at the Bacchus Marsh Hospital was given a 12 year disqualification period, for conduct which included nine allegations of professional misconduct concerning perinatal mortality, which spanned a seven year period.

1. Hmood submits that any disqualification period need not exceed 2 years and referred to the following cases:

(a) Medical Board of Australia v Lee [2020] VCAT 568. A registered medical practitioner was given a 6 year disqualification period. He was found to have engaged in professional misconduct with two patients. There were four allegations of him stroking, massaging, or masturbating a patient's penis, with no clinical justification.

(b) Chiropractic Board of Australia v Ebtash [2020] WASAT 86. A registered health practitioner was given a 4 ½ year disqualification period, for professional misconduct, which was clinically inappropriate and of a sexual nature. This conduct included the medical practitioner touching the breasts and/or genitals of five patients through their clothing. In one case, the medical practitioner leant a patient back into his body so that the front of his pelvis and groin were pressing against her buttocks.

(c) Medical Board of Australia v Cukier [2017] VCAT 109. A registered health practitioner was given a 1 ½ year disqualification period. He was found to have engaged in professional misconduct in relation to two female patients. The conduct involved inappropriate physical contact of a sexual nature. In the case of one patient, the conduct was repeated despite the patient's request for it to stop. He also prescribed controlled medications without the necessary permit. The practitioner admitted to the allegations made against him at the Tribunal hearing.

(d) Health Ombudsman v Harirchian [2022] QCAT 143. A registered medical practitioner was given a 2 year disqualification period. The relevant conduct included three allegations involving inappropriate sexual touching of a patient's labia and/ or clitoris, during a consultation which involved the patient discussing symptoms of diarrhoea and the fact she felt unwell. In a separate criminal proceeding, the practitioner was found guilty of sexual assault of a patient during a consultation, and sentenced to 8 months imprisonment. He also pleaded guilty to various dishonesty and drug related offences, resulting in a fine and conviction. His registration had been suspended for two years and nine months before the Tribunal hearing.

1. These cases demonstrate the wide variety of circumstances in which disciplinary proceedings come before tribunals. The Tribunal considers none of these prior decisions referred to by the parties to be closely analogous to Hmood's situation.
2. Hmood has already not been working as medical practitioner since 9 January 2023, having given an undertaking to that effect after Hmood Judgement 1 was handed down. The Tribunal takes into account the nine months that have elapsed since then in deciding the appropriate period for prohibition..
3. Weighing up all these matters, the Tribunal has reached the conclusion that Hmood should be disqualified from applying for registration for 8 years from the date of this decision.
4. The Board also sought a prohibition under s 196(4)(b) of the National Law such that Hmood be prohibited from providing any health service for the same period of time as he is disqualified from applying for registration as a health practitioner, in line with that imposed in Salter at [49] and Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Spehar [2022] VCAT 634. The purpose of such an order is the protection of the public: Salter, at [52].
5. S 196(4) states:

(4) If the tribunal decides to cancel a person's registration under this Law or the person does not hold registration under this Law, the tribunal may also decide to -

(a) disqualify the person from applying for registration as a registered health practitioner for a specified period; or

(b) prohibit the person, either permanently or for a stated period, from doing either or both of the following -

(i) providing any health service or a specified health service;

(ii) using any title or a specified title; or

(c) impose restrictions, either permanently or for a stated period, on the provision of any health service or a specified health service by the person.

1. Health service is defined in s 5 of the National Law:

health service includes the following services, whether provided as public or private services -

(a) services provided by registered health practitioners;

(b) hospital services;

(c) mental health services;

(d) pharmaceutical services;

(e) ambulance services;

(f) community health services;

(g) health education services;

(h) welfare services necessary to implement any services referred to in paragraphs (a) to (g);

(i) services provided by dietitians, masseurs, naturopaths, social workers, speech pathologists, audiologists or audiometrists;

(j) pathology services.

1. Hmood did not oppose the proposed prohibition order.
2. The Tribunal considers that in the circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to make a broad prohibition order sought regarding all health services, but limited to circumstances where Hmood is alone with female patients. A similar prohibition was imposed in Medical Board of Australia v Athinodorou [2020] SACAT 31. Hmood's conduct when left alone with female patients who have bestowed their trust in him (in a professional context), and his lack of insight and contrition, lead to that result.
3. Under s 196(4)(b) of the National Law, Hmood is prohibited from providing any health service which involves physical contact with a female, in circumstances where Hmood is alone with a female, for 8 years.
4. The final issue is costs. The Board seeks to have its costs of and incidental to the proceeding paid, on the relevant County Court scale. Hmood submits that none should be payable.
5. Pursuant to s 195 of the National Law, the Tribunal may make any order about costs it considers appropriate for the proceeding. There is discussion in Psychology Board of Australia v Asher [4] about how this section interacts with s 109 of the VCAT Act (which provides that each party to the proceeding bears their own costs, unless the Tribunal is satisfied that it is fair to make an order for costs, having regard the factors set out at s 109(3)).The Tribunal agrees with the approach taken in Asher as to the interaction of the two sections (as did the Tribunal in Psychology Board of Australia v Wilkinson [2022] VCAT 597). The ultimate question is whether an award of costs is 'appropriate' in the circumstances.
6. The Tribunal does not consider it appropriate for Hmood to pay costs of the proceeding. He defended the case, as he was entitled to do. He did not do anything to unduly delay it or run defences without merit or which had already been rejected previously (per Wilkinson). He did not in the course of the hearing, as occurred in Asher, make 'gratuitous, unwarranted, unsubstantiated and demeaning sexualised comments about a patient.' The cross examination his counsel conducted was appropriate and conducted respectfully toward each of the patients who gave evidence.
7. Hmood's conduct, whilst very serious, was not of the nature of the conduct in Asher. Like Asher, deliberate actions took place, which were significantly outside the parameters of acceptable conduct. However, they were not to the same degree. For example, Asher had sex with a vulnerable patient whom he was in the role of psychologist to, in his home, late at night.
8. As the Tribunal states in Asher:
   1. We hasten to note that there may be cases where very serious allegations are found proven against a practitioner, but where an award of costs will still not be appropriately made. All of the circumstances of the case need to be taken into account.
   2. It is the seriousness and strength of the allegations and the findings in this case that lead to a conclusion that it is appropriate for the practitioner to bear the cost of the proceeding. Sometimes, as in this case, the conduct is so serious that the prosecution of the case and subsequent costs of that prosecution should be borne by the practitioner. This is such a case. This is not a case where it was arguable as to whether the conduct alleged amounted to misconduct or where the conduct was careless or misguided.
9. Accordingly, the Tribunal orders:
   1. Under s 196(2)(a) of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2009 (Qld) as applied by s 4 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Victoria) Act 2009 (Vic) (the National Law) Dr Hmood is reprimanded.
   2. Under s 196(2)(e) of the National Law, Dr Hmood's registration as a health practitioner is cancelled.
   3. Under s 196(4)(a) of the National Law, Dr Hmood is disqualified from applying for registration as a health practitioner for 8 years.
   4. Under s 196(4)(b) of the National Law, Dr Hmood is prohibited from providing any health service which involves physical contact with a female, in circumstances where Dr Hmood is alone with a female, for 8 years.

[1] See Medical Practitioners Board of Australia v D (Occupational and Business Regulation) [2010] VCAT 52 at [18]-[19].

[2] See for example: Hmood Judgment 1 at [34]-[47].

[3] Richardson v Oracle Corporation Australia [2014] FCAFC 82 at [118].

[4] Psychology Board of Australia v Asher (Costs)(Review and Regulation)(Corrected**)** [2020] VCAT 1281.