Duty to cooperate and do all things necessary to give the other party the benefit of the contract
130 In Secured Income, Mason J (Gibbs, Stephen and Aickin JJ agreeing) referred to the implied obligation on each party to cooperate to secure performance of the contract, citing the following passage in Mackay v Dick (1881) 6 App Cas 251, at 263:
as a general rule…where in a written contract it appears that both parties have agreed that something shall be done, which cannot effectually be done unless both concur in doing it, the construction of the contract is that each agrees to do all that is necessary to be done on his part for the carrying out of that thing, though there may be no express words to that effect.
131 Mason J continued (at 607 to 608):
It is not to be thought that this rule of construction is confined to the imposition of an obligation on one contracting party to co-operate in doing all that is necessary to be done for the performance by the other party of his obligations under the contract. As Griffith CJ said in Butt v. M'Donald (1896) 7 QLJ 68, at pp 70-71:
It is a general rule applicable to every contract that each party agrees, by implication, to do all such things as are necessary on his part to enable the other party to have the benefit of the contract.
It is easy to imply a duty to co-operate in the doing of acts which are necessary to the performance by the parties or by one of the parties of fundamental obligations under the contract. It is not quite so easy to make the implication when the acts in question are necessary to entitle the other contracting party to a benefit under the contract but are not essential to the performance of that party's obligations and are not fundamental to the contract. Then the question arises whether the contract imposes a duty to co-operate on the first party or whether it leaves him at liberty to decide for himself whether the acts shall be done, even if the consequence of his decision is to disentitle the other party to a benefit. In such a case, the correct interpretation of the contract depends, as it seems to me, not so much on the application of the general rule of construction as on the intention of the parties as manifested by the contract itself.
132 In Wolfe v Permanent Custodians Ltd [2013] VSCA 331; (2013) 9 BFRA 88 at [28], the Victorian Court of Appeal stated:
Although the duty to cooperate is broadly stated in Butt v McDonald, the scope of the duty is defined by what has been promised under the contract; it is not a general duty to ensure another party obtains an anticipated benefit.
133 Similarly, in James E McCabe Ltd v Scottish Courage Ltd [2006] EWHC 538, Cooke J said:
A duty to cooperate in, or not to prevent, fulfilment of performance of a contract only has content by virtue of the express terms of the contract and the law can only enforce a duty of cooperation to the extent that it is necessary to make the contract workable. The court cannot, by implication of such a duty, exact a higher degree of cooperation than that which could be defined by reference to the necessities of the contract. The duty of cooperation or prevention/inhibition of performance is required to be determined, not by what might appear reasonable, but by the obligations imposed upon each party by the agreement itself.
134 In the absence of a fiduciary relationship, there cannot be a duty to cooperate in bringing about something which the contract does not require to happen: Australis Media Holdings Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 104 at 124D. In that case, the Court of Appeal said at 125: "A contract may 'contemplate' many benefits for the respective parties, but each can only call on the other to provide, or cooperate in the providing of, benefits promised by that party."
135 In the Full Court of this Court in Barker, (Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker [2013] FCAFC 83; (2013) 214 FCR 450) Lander and Jacobson JJ said:
[121] An alternative formulation of the [duty to cooperate], drawn from earlier High Court authority, was set out by Mason J in Secured Income at 607. It states the implied obligation as one which requires a party to a contract to do all things necessary to enable the other party to have the benefit of the contract.
…
[124] The difficulty in the present case is, as Jessup J points out, to identify the benefits conferred on [the respondent] under the contract which give rise to the implied obligation on the Bank to take the necessary steps towards deployment. We agree with his Honour that the benefits cannot be the observance of the implied term itself. Rather it is necessary to identify a benefit conferred by the contract, upon which the implied term can operate.
136 At [307], Jessup J said:
In Australia, the duty of co-operation was stated by Griffith CJ in Butt v M'Donald (1896) 7 QLJ 68, 70-71 and confirmed in the High Court in Secured Income Real Estate (Aust) Ltd v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd [1979] HCA 51; (1979) 144 CLR 596, 607 (per Mason J, Gibbs, Stephen and Aickin JJ concurring):
It is a general rule applicable to every contract that each party agrees, by implication, to do all such things as are necessary on his part to enable the other party to have the benefit of the contract.
Clearly, in the application of this rule, one commences with the contractual benefits to which the presumptively innocent party is entitled under the contract. What are the benefits which make the imposition of duties of trust and confidence upon the employer a step towards the achievement of contractual co-operation? If the argument is not to become circular, the benefits cannot be those that would derive from observance of the implied term itself. It is necessary to locate within the contract some other benefit for the employee, the enjoyment of which makes it necessary for the employer to act consistently with the implied term.
137 Although the Full Court's decision was overturned by the High Court, these passages of the decision were not doubted. It is important to recognise, as did Lander, Jacobson and Jessup JJ, that the duty "to do all such things as are necessary…to enable the other party to have the benefit of the contract" is as an expression (which the plurality in Barker described as "expansive") of the duty to cooperate. Thus, in Butt v McDonald (1896) 7 QLJ 68, Griffiths CJ applied his formulation of the duty by implying a promise in a contract for sale of a sale of property that the purchaser shall have a title to the property.
138 In Central Exchange Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd [2002] WASCA 94; (2002) 26 WAR 33 at [16], Malcolm CJ said:
The obligation by each party to do all such things as are necessary on his part to enable the other party to have the benefit of the project carries with it the suggestion of an implication that the parties to a contract are obliged to deal with one another in good faith to ensure that each will have the benefit of the performance of the contract by the other. In each case, however, the question is whether the contract imposes a duty to cooperate on the first party, or whether it leaves him at liberty to decide for himself whether the acts shall be done, even if the consequence of the decision is to deprive the other party of a benefit.
139 It might be asked whether the obligation to grant an exclusive franchise, together with the correlative prohibitions, is one to which the implied duty to cooperate can have any real operation: cf Jackson Nominees Pty Ltd v Hanson Building Products Pty Ltd [2006] QCA 126 at [52] (McMurdo JA). To what extent, it might be asked, is cooperation required to make workable the relevant prohibitions? In our view, the content of the obligation to do all things necessary to give the other party the benefit of the contract required Spanline to refrain from taking positive steps that would infringe upon or cause a third party to infringe upon the exclusive franchise granted to RPR. To require Spanline to do more, such as to take positive steps to investigate possible incursions by Marmax upon the rights of RPR, would exceed the requirement of necessity. It could not be said that the absence of a requirement to investigate such conduct would render the RPR Franchise agreement nugatory, worthless or seriously undermined.
140 For the same reasons, we also do not accept RPR's contention that Spanline was under an obligation to take steps to enforce its contractual rights against Marmax for the benefit of RPR.
141 An additional difficulty with an implied obligation to take "reasonable steps" to ensure that RPR's territory remained exclusive is the uncertain scope of such an obligation: cf Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1977] HCA 75; (1977) 139 CLR 54 at 62; State Bank of New South Wales v Currabubula Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 47; (2001) 51 NSWLR 399 at [61]. The mere fact that the term operates by reference to a criterion of reasonableness is not the problem: it is that the contract does not supply any means for determining what is reasonable in the circumstances. It was argued that Spanline's obligation to RPR could extend to termination of the contractual relationship between Spanline and Marmax. How the interests of Spanline and Marmax would be taken into account in determining whether such a step would be "reasonable" was not explored.