[2023] VCAT 66
General information, not legal advice.
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2023-01-23
Original judgment source is linked above.
(a) Demolition of existing buildings at the Site; > > (b) Removal of concrete footings at the Site; > > (c) Relocation of a 2 meter wide council drainage easement; > > (d) Installation of a 450mm diameter barrel drain approximately 1 metre from the boundary with Unit 2, below the floor level of Unit 2; > > (e) Construction of site retention bored piers; > > (f) Construction of capping beam on top of the bored piers; > > (g) Carried out the excavation and the Site cut and established the granular fill levels adjoining the Applicant's Property at RL 34.09; and > > (h) Commenced bulk excavation of the basement.
16 Liability arising out of flow of water etc.
(1) If -
(a) there is a flow of water from the land of a person onto any other land; and
(b) that flow is not reasonable; and
(c) the water causes -
(i) injury to any other person; or
(ii) damage to the property (whether real or personal) of any other person; or
(iii) any other person to suffer economic loss -
the person who caused the flow is liable to pay damages to that other person in respect of that injury, damage or loss.
...
(5) If the causing of, or the interference with, the flow (as the case requires) was given rise to by works constructed or any other act done or omitted to be done on any land at a time before the current occupier became the occupier of the land, the current occupier is liable to pay damages in respect of the injury, damage or loss if the current occupier has failed to take any steps reasonably available to prevent the causing of, or the interference with, the flow (as the case requires) being so given rise to.
(6) The existence of a liability under subsection (5) extinguishes the liability under subsection (1) of the person who caused the flow or the liability under subsection (2) of the person who interfered with the flow (as the case requires).
...discharge, release, escape, percolation, seepage and passage, and includes both surface and underground flow
The Act contemplates that a flow of water from one property to another is either reasonable or is not reasonable. It is the flow of water which has to be characterised as reasonable or unreasonable and not the conduct of the person sought to be held liable.
(1) In determining whether a flow of water is reasonable or not reasonable, account must be taken of all the circumstances including the following matters -
(a) whether or not the flow, or the act or works that caused the flow, was or were authorised;
(b) the extent to which any conditions or requirements imposed under this Act in relation to an authorisation were complied with;
(c) whether or not the flow conforms with any guidelines or principles published by the Minister with respect to the drainage of the area;
(d) whether or not account was taken at the relevant time of the likely impact of the flow on drainage in the area having regard to the information then reasonably available about the cumulative effects on drainage of works and activities in the area;
(e) the uses to which the lands concerned and any other lands in the vicinity are put;
(f) the contours of the lands concerned;
(g) whether the water which flowed was -
(i) brought onto the land from which it flowed; or
(ii) collected, stored or concentrated on that land; or
(iii) extracted from the ground on that land -
and if so, for what purpose and with what degree of care this was done;
(h) whether or not the flow was affected by any works restricting the flow of water along a waterway;
(i) whether or not the flow is likely to damage any waterway, wetland or aquifer;
(j) in the case of a flow of, or interference with, water caused by the construction, removal or alteration of a levee in accordance with section 32AC of the Victoria State Emergency Service Act 2005, whether or not that construction, removal or alteration occurred in response to an emergency within the meaning of section 3 of the Emergency Management Act 2013.
(2) In taking account of the matters specified in subsection (1), greater weight must be attached to the matters specified in paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) than to the other specified matters.
That section simply requires that "in determining whether a flow of water is reasonable or not reasonable, account must be taken of all the circumstances including" the matters there specifically set out. It is a balancing exercise for the Tribunal, in this case as an expert tribunal ... to determine the reasonableness of the flow on the basis of all the circumstances.
It is not necessary to demonstrate legal causation that the first matter was either the sole or the predominant cause of the second. See Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission [1995] HCA 5; (1995) 182 CLR 1. Generally it cannot be said that one event is the cause of the other unless the second event would not have occurred but for the first. Nevertheless, not every event but for which a second event would not have occurred is regarded in law as being a cause of that second event. The ultimate criterion of causation in law is common sense. March v E. & M.H. Stramare Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 12. Reference in Section 16(1) to "the person who caused the flow" is presumably to be read as meaning the person whose acts or omissions caused the flow.
Where the necessary facts are made out, the cause of action under Section 16(1) appears to be one of strict liability, that is, it is not necessary to demonstrate any want of reasonable care. The mere proof of causation seems to be enough. Nor are we seeking to answer the question whether the respondents owed a duty of care in accordance with the Common Law tort of negligence to Mr Turner. The issue of "duty" arises only in so far as the establishment of its existence and breach is the only means whereby it can be said that the respondents "caused" the flow of water.
Causation can be established by proving some act or omission on the part of the Respondent that resulted in the unreasonable flow. For an omission to be actionable in the law of negligence, it must be found that there was a duty to act, that is, a duty to do that which was not done.
For the purpose of Section 16(1) a person can be regarded as having caused something by nonfeasance but only if the person was under a duty to take the steps which were, in fact, omitted.
Of course, liability under the Water Act is not dependent upon the breach of a duty of care. It is strict, but the essential ingredients of the statutory cause of action must be established. To find that the Respondent has caused the flow by omission I must be satisfied that she was under a positive duty to do something and she omitted to do it.
That might arguably create a duty of care in the negligence sense and although this is a Water Act claim not based upon negligence it is at least arguable that to breach a duty of care to maintain such a facility which results in the escape of water and consequential loss, amounts to causing the flow of water that results within the meaning of s.16.
Where, as frequently occurs, the allegation is that the relevant respondent has 'caused' the unreasonable flow by omitting to do something, it is only if it can be shown that the respondent was under a duty to do what he omitted to do that he can be said to have 'caused' the relevant unreasonable flow of water and hence the loss and damage which results from it. A mere bystander owing no duty to anyone to intervene would not be regarded as having 'caused' an unreasonable flow of water merely because there were actions which he could have taken to avert it. Turner v Bayside City Council [2000] VCAT 399; (1999) 16 VAR 130, 135-6. In R108/05 the duty which was said to have obliged Brady to construct the development in a manner which would have avoided the flood in December 2003 was said to flow from its implied obligations as builder under a domestic building contract as imposed by the Domestic Building Contracts Act 1995.
(5) If the causing of, or the interference with, the flow (as the case requires) was given rise to by works constructed or any other act done or omitted to be done on any land at a time before the current occupier became the occupier of the land, the current occupier is liable to pay damages in respect of the injury, damage or loss if the current occupier has failed to take any steps reasonably available to prevent the causing of, or the interference with, the flow (as the case requires) being so given rise to.
I consider that the words "steps reasonably available" includes a requirement that the current occupier has a sufficient and reasonable time in which to carry out those steps after being given notice or constructive notice of the unreasonable flow is imputed. Further, that their liability in the event of them not taking reasonable steps to cease the flow after such notice is limited to the time from which such steps should reasonably have been taken.[19]
In summary, the subsequent owner must, within a reasonable time after becoming aware of the existence of the flow of water from his land, investigate the problem, ascertain what positive steps are reasonably available for him to take in order to prevent the flow and take those steps. If he fails to do so, he will be liable for any injury, damage or loss suffered by the other party which would not have been suffered but for such failure. I should add that, so long as the flow is prevented, it does not matter how the subsequent owner does it.
7.... The water ingress has been caused by the works carried out to the courtyard area of Lot 9. The works included finishing the surface level of the courtyard at a level higher than the floor level of Ms. Lyall's unit with no measures taken to prevent moisture being transferred or penetrating through the boundary wall. The finished surface level of the courtyard is above the level of the waterproof membrane and cavity weep holes in the boundary wall of Ms. Lyall's unit.
(a) When it took over the Site in 2013, the Site level in the area adjoining Unit 2 had already been elevated by 420mm by the previous builders (Momentum) to a level above the damp proof course of Unit 2[23]. In March 2014 it further elevated the surface level of the Site (the fill and pavers totalling approximately 150mm) in accordance with approved plans (referred to below in paragraph 40(b)); > > (b) There is no evidence that Element Five caused any flow before March 2014 (and it cannot logically be said to have caused any flow or any damage caused by a flow occurring before it undertook any relevant works in March 2014); > > (c) There is no evidence of any new flow causing any new damage to Unit 2 after March 2014 or that the elevation of the surface level in March 2014 caused any flow, or any further flow, which caused additional damage; > > (d) If there was a flow caused by it after March 2014 (which Element Five says is not supported by any evidence):
(i) There is no evidence that that flow caused any new damage. As damage is an essential element to relief under s. 16(1), a flow which does not cause any damage is not actionable under s. 16(1); and > > (ii) That flow was not a "not reasonable" flow for the purpose of s. 16(1) as, amongst other things, the works (the fill and pavers totalling 150mm which are alleged to have caused that flow) were authorised by the building permit;
(e) Any cause of action relying on damage occurring before November 2014 (6 years before the date of the commencement of the proceeding) is statute barred. There is evidence that the damage started to occur at or soon after 2006 and there is no evidence that any of the damage complained of first occurred after November 2014.
large mould patches are also visible in the underground car park..., so there must be mould present downstairs which is adjacent to the rear bedroom of my tenancy.
[1] As set out in the Mould Pro Report dated 8 November 2016 and the Just Inspections Report dated 10 November 2016.
[2] Section 134 of the Building Act 1993 (Vic).
[3] Coles Myer Limited v City West Water Limited [1998] VSC 63.
[5] [2007] VSC 423 at para 30.
[6] For example, there may be an easement of drainage, whether under an express easement or an easement implied by s 98 of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) or s 12(2) of the Subdivision Act 1988 (Vic). See James v Christou [2020] VCAT 563.
[7] A certain amount of runoff of surface water is to be expected from paved surfaces, particularly in an urban area. It is usually reasonable to pave your driveway but it might be unreasonable not to provide for drainage if the runoff to your neighbour's property is to be more than minimal.
[9] [1998] VSC 157 at [18].
[10] Turner v Bayside City Council [2000] VCAT 399 at [16].
[12] [2018] VCAT 204 at [7].
[14] [2013] VCAT 608 at [75].
[15] [2016] VCAT 586 at [103].
[16] [2013] VCAT 1748 at [22].
[17] [2006] VCAT 2678 at [34].
[18] [2008] VCAT 254 at [51].
[19] The approach taken in that case has been adopted and applied in a number of other cases before the Tribunal (see for example: Sidoti v Owners Corporation 633715B [2016] VCAT 1880; Mills v Rubenstein [2016] VCAT 586; Leung v Harris [2018] VCAT 1630; Davies v Owners Corporation 1 PS414649K [2019] VCAT 1159.
[21] Applicant's closing submissions dated 20 May 2022 at [7]-[10].
[22] First respondent's closing submissions dated 20 May 2022 at [9] - [10].
[23] The Applicant claims the damp proof course is at RL 33.74. This is 350mm below the surface level left by Momentum at RL 34.09.
[24] The Hardrock report identifies Pace as its client and records that the site work for the report was undertaken on 26 August 2005. A copy of this report is at Appendix 5 of the report of Mr Tim Holt dated 3 March 2022 and at Attachment G of the report of Mr Phillip Naughton dated 4 March 2022. The existence of the perched water table is also verified by a report dated 29 August 2011 by AS James who was engaged by the original developer of the adjacent Development.
[25] Gough expert report dated 19 January 2017 at TB 43.
[26] Email dated 19 September 2016 at TB265-266.
Lyall
Element Five Pty Ltd
(1995) 182 CLR 1