Kumar v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs

The applicants' claims 4 The applicants each claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution if they should return to Fiji. Both based their claims on their Indian ethnic origins, thereby invoking the Convention ground of race. The applicant husband also invoked the Convention ground of political opinion. The applicant wife also invoked the Convention ground of membership of a particular social group, namely her husband's family. 5 In Fiji, the applicant husband was a sugar cane farmer. He claimed to have supported the Fijian Labour Party ("the FLP") and to have worked for it in elections. For this reason, he claimed to have been the subject of discrimination, threats and harassment by indigenous Fijians who were opposed to the FLP. 6 The applicant wife was a factory worker in Fiji. She claimed that, on 12 January 1999, she was harassed by a group of young indigenous Fijians as she was leaving the factory where she worked. She ignored the harassment, but the Fijians chased her and she was forced to escape back into the factory. The factory manager reported the incident to the police, who took the applicant wife's name and address and a description of those who had chased her. The applicant wife complained that the police did not make any serious investigations but told ethnic Fijians about her complaint. On 15 February 1999, when the applicant wife was on her way home from work, the same men abducted and raped her. They told her that they were teaching her a lesson for having reported them to the police. Both applicants attributed the rape to the fact that the applicant husband was engaged in political activities for the FLP.

The Tribunal's reasons 7 The first finding expressed by the Tribunal was as follows: "I find that overall the applicant wife was a credible witness. Her evidence at the hearing was detailed, consistent and convincing as discussed below." 8 The Tribunal accepted that the applicant wife was raped and that she recognised the rapists as the same indigenous Fijians who had pursued her into her workplace a month earlier. The Tribunal accepted that the rapists were aware of her complaint to the police about them at the time of the rape. It accepted evidence that the applicant wife was afraid to lodge a complaint to the police because the rapists had found out that she had previously complained to the police about them. It took the view that the police had responded appropriately to her complaint on the first occasion and that the protection of the State was available to her. The Tribunal then said: "I am not prepared to accept that the applicant wife was raped because of the applicant husband's political support of the FLP. Her evidence at the hearing was inconsistent and unconvincing in this respect. When she was asked at the hearing why she believed she had been raped, she initially responded that the men who had chased her on an earlier occasion had threatened to teach her a lesson for complaining to the police about them. It was only when she was questioned as to the connection between the rape and the applicant husband's political support of the FLP that she responded that she realised there had been such a connection when she regained consciousness. It was also later in the hearing that she gave evidence that she had attempted to stop the applicant husband from engaging in political activities because the rapists had told her that they had raped her due to his political support for the FLP. In addition, according to the psychologist's report dated 28 January 2000, she had said that they had threatened to harm the applicant husband on an earlier occasion because of his political support for the FLP; however, she did not refer to such a threat or threats at the hearing." 9 The Tribunal made a number of findings of fact favourable to the applicants. These were: · The FLP was a party that attracted the support of most Indian Fijians. · Indian Fijians suffered racially motivated violence at the hands of indigenous Fijians during the attempted coup on 19 May 2000 and in the months immediately following it. · The applicant wife genuinely feared that indigenous Fijians would persecute her for reasons of her Indian ethnic origins if she returned to Fiji. · The applicant wife had suffered post-traumatic stress disorder and symptoms of dependent personality disorder consequent upon the rape. · The applicant wife's psychological condition was exacerbated by her awareness of the circumstances of the attempted coup in May 2000. · The applicant husband supported the FLP and engaged in low-level political activities for it, such as putting up posters and attending political meetings. · Indigenous Fijians threatened to destroy his property in June 1999 because of his support for the FLP. · The applicant husband was frustrated that the police did not prosecute the rapists and attempted to obtain assistance from a local politician of the FLP.

· The applicant husband genuinely feared that indigenous Fijians would persecute him for reasons of Indian ethnic origins if he returned to Fiji. · The Fijian authorities were unable or unwilling to provide effective protection to Indian Fijians against indigenous Fijians at the time of the attempted coup in May 2000 and for several months thereafter. 10 Despite these favourable findings, the Tribunal found against the applicants for the following reasons: · It was not prepared to accept that the applicant wife was raped for reasons of her Indian ethnic origins. This conclusion was based on the finding that she was not raped because of her husband's support for the FLP, and also because of the Tribunal's view that her evidence at the hearing about the circumstances of the rape did not support the assertion that she was raped for this reason. · Because the Tribunal found that the applicant wife was not raped by reason of her husband's political support for the FLP, it did not accept that he genuinely believed that she was raped for that reason. · The applicant husband's frustration about the police investigation of the rape, his attempt to obtain assistance from a local politician and his evidence about his approaches to the police were insufficient to alter the Tribunal's finding that State protection was available to the applicant wife. · Because of the Tribunal's finding that the applicant husband engaged in low-level political activities for the FLP, the Tribunal did not accept that he genuinely feared being persecuted by indigenous Fijians for reasons of his political opinion. Consequently, the Tribunal did not accept that there was a real chance that indigenous Fijians would persecute him for that reason. Nor did the Tribunal accept that there was a real chance that indigenous Fijians would persecute the applicant wife because of her membership of the applicant husband's family. · The Tribunal accepted independent reports as to the security situation in Fiji and political developments there. It found that the applicants were able to obtain adequate or effective protection in Fiji at the date of the Tribunal's decision and in the reasonably foreseeable future. In taking this view, the Tribunal relied on the proposition that absolute protection of an individual is not required. As authority for this proposition, the Tribunal cited Thiyagarajah v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 73 FCR 176 at 179 and Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Prathapan (1998) 156 ALR 672 at 680 - 681. 11 The Tribunal therefore found that the applicant husband did not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of his Indian ethnic origins or his support for the FLP. It also found that the applicant wife did not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of her Indian ethnic origins or her membership of a particular social group.

The grounds for judicial review 12 The applicants' original application, filed in the Court on 16 August 2001, invoked the ground specified in s 476(1)(e) of the Migration Act, that the decision involved an error of law, being an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law or an incorrect application of the applicable law to the facts as found by the Tribunal. This was particularised in two ways. The first was that the Tribunal incorrectly interpreted the meaning of persecution, or incorrectly applied the test for persecution, having accepted that the applicant wife had a genuine fear that indigenous Fijians would persecute her because of her Indian ethnic origins, when the independent material used by the Tribunal supported this fear. The second error of law alleged was that it was not open for the Tribunal to conclude that the applicant wife was not raped because of the applicant husband's support of the FLP, when the Tribunal had found that he was engaged in activities with the FLP. 13 On 26 November 2001, the applicants filed an amended application. This added a reference to the ground specified in s 476(1)(b) of the Migration Act, that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to make the decision. This ground was particularised as a misunderstanding of the nature of the claims before the Tribunal. It was said that the Tribunal failed to understand that the applicant wife believed that the rape was connected with both her Indian ethnic origins and her husband's political activities. It was said that the Tribunal erred in basing its findings and reasons on the proposition that the applicant wife did not make the connection until the hearing before the Tribunal, when it was only after the Tribunal had concluded its questioning of the applicant wife, and following the prompting of the applicants' adviser, that the Tribunal made the enquiries. 14 The amended application also added another proposition in support of the ground specified in s 476(1)(e). This was that the Tribunal erred in referring to Thiyagarajah and Prathapan, because those cases concern the level of protection expected of a State other than the State where an applicant for a protection visa fears persecution. 15 At the hearing, counsel for the applicants sought to amend the application further, so as to add particulars to the allegation of want of jurisdiction. Counsel for the respondent did not object to this amendment and I allowed it to be made. In summary, it was contended that the Tribunal erred in law and acted without jurisdiction in that it misunderstood its task, took account of irrelevant material or failed to take account of relevant material in that: · The Tribunal based its finding as to the reason for the rape on the applicant wife's evidence at the hearing being inconsistent and unconvincing in this respect, when her evidence was not inconsistent but cumulative. This evidence was characterised as being first that she heard one of her attackers say that they were going to teach her a lesson because she had previously complained to the police; after the rape she thought that her husband's political involvement could be the reason for the attack; she later told the applicant husband not to have any involvement in the FLP because the people who raped her were also saying that her husband belonged to the FLP. · The Tribunal failed to take account of the applicant husband's evidence at the hearing that he was threatened for his Indian ethnic origins and his membership of the FLP. · The Tribunal failed to take account of the applicant husband's evidence at the hearing that his wife told him after the rape to stop going out and supporting the FLP and that he believed the reason for the rape was that the attackers did not want him to support the FLP. · The Tribunal failed to take account of the applicant husband's evidence in his initial application for a protection visa that the reason for the rape was his ethnic and political background. · The Tribunal failed to take account of the applicant wife's evidence in her initial application for a protection visa that the reason for the rape was her and her husband's ethnic background and her husband's political work. · The Tribunal perceived the inconsistency in the applicant wife's evidence despite having advised her during the hearing that if she felt uncomfortable she did not have to answer questions and that the Tribunal was interested to know the identity of the people who did the rape and why she thought they did it. 16 At the hearing, counsel for the applicants put arguments in support of the latest amendment and did not pursue other contentions in the amended application. He took the Court to various passages from the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal, which were said to demonstrate the falsity of the Tribunal's conclusion that the applicant wife's evidence about the reason for the rape was inconsistent and unconvincing. 17 As counsel for the applicants put it, the critical point is the question of the motivation for the rape. On this point, he argued, the Tribunal took into account irrelevant material, namely its view of the inconsistency of the applicant wife's evidence. Further, the Tribunal failed to take into account relevant material, namely the applicant husband's corroborating evidence. Counsel for the applicants argued that this amounted to a jurisdictional error of the kind identified in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 (2001) 180 ALR 1 at [82].

The correctness of the Tribunal's decision 18 An examination of the Tribunal's reasons for decision makes it clear that the Tribunal did not ignore altogether the items of evidence to which the applicants' amended ground of review referred. In the passage from those reasons quoted above, the Tribunal referred to the evidence of the applicant wife that the rapists said they were going to teach her a lesson for complaining to the police, that she realised there was a connection between the rape and her husband's involvement with the FLP and that she had attempted to persuade him to cease involvement with the FLP. The Tribunal also made findings about threats made to the applicant husband. It made a finding that it did not accept that the applicant husband genuinely believed that his wife was raped because of his political support for the FLP. It is true that the finding is expressed as a non sequitur. The fact that the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant wife was raped because of her husband's political activity did not lead, as a matter of logic, to the proposition that the applicant husband did not genuinely believe this to be true. Nonetheless, there is authority that illogicality on the part of the Tribunal in making findings of fact is not a ground for judicial review. See Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Epeabaka (1998) 84 FCR 411 at [25], Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai [2001] FCA 274 at [42], Gamaethige v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 565 (2001) 183 ALR 59 at [16] per Hill J and [26] - [27] per Finkelstein J and Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Al-Miahi [2001] FCA 744 at [34]. 19 The Tribunal recited what each of the applicants had said in the initial application for a protection visa. It is true that the Tribunal told the applicant wife that she did not have to answer questions about the rape if she felt uncomfortable. It also indicated to her that it was interested to know the identity of the people who raped her and why she thought they did that. Its view of the inconsistency in the applicant wife's evidence was not based on her failure to give evidence about the circumstances of the rape. Indeed, the Tribunal expressly found that her evidence at the hearing in relation to the circumstances of the rape was "detailed and convincing".

20 It is clear that, at the heart of the argument put by counsel for the applicants, is the proposition that the Tribunal ought to have taken a view of the evidence more favourable to the applicants than it took. In other words, what is really sought is merits review. It is well-established by authority that s 476 of the Migration Act does not give the Court the power to engage in merits review. The facts are a matter for the Tribunal, and not for the Court. 21 The argument on behalf of the applicants was based on references in Yusuf at [73] - [74] and [82] to "relevant considerations" and "relevant material". These references were to the principle deeply embedded in administrative law that an administrative decision-maker is obliged to take into account all considerations made relevant by the statute under which the decision-making function is exercised. The decision-maker is also obliged not to take into account considerations made irrelevant by that statute. See Sean Investments Pty Ltd v MacKellar (1981) 38 ALR 363 at 375 and Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39 - 40 per Mason J. To some extent, it is necessary to discern what are and are not relevant considerations by looking at the purpose of the legislation under which the decision is made and the nature of the case put by a party seeking the decision. See Yusuf at [73] - [74]. It does not follow from this, however, that everything that a party puts before the decision-maker will automatically be a relevant consideration. In Paul v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1196 at [79], Allsop J, with whom Heerey J agreed, said: "Whatever may be the outer boundaries of relevant and irrelevant considerations at the point of jurisdiction ... they do not, in my view, encompass a failure expressly to mention or grapple with part of the competing body of evidence before the Tribunal relevant to a finding made, in circumstances where the elements or integers of the claim for asylum are addressed. It may be that if the element of the appellant's claim for asylum based on her Tamil ethnicity was not addressed at all, that is if the Tribunal had only directed its attention to her claim based on her association with her husband, then in those circumstances relevant considerations might not have been addressed because an element or integer of the claim put forward by her would not have been dealt with. In such circumstances it may be that, in a jurisdictional sense, a relevant consideration had not been addressed. However, it is unnecessary to decide this given that the Tribunal did address the elements or integers of her claim." 22 In the present case, it is plain that the Tribunal dealt with every aspect of the applicants' claims. It decided the claims of both applicants based on their Indian ethnic origins. It decided the claim of the applicant husband based on his political activities. It decided the claim of the applicant wife based on her marriage to the applicant husband and his political activity. There was no aspect of the case and no body of evidence ignored by the Tribunal. The Tribunal did not refuse to deal with some aspect of what the applicants put forward. There was no failure to take into account any relevant consideration in the jurisdictional sense, nor did the Tribunal take into account any irrelevant consideration in the jurisdictional sense.

Conclusion 23 For these reasons, the applicants have failed to make out any ground for review under s 476 of the Migration Act. The application must be dismissed. The applicants must be ordered to pay the Minister's costs of the proceeding.

I certify that the preceding twenty-three (23) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Gray.

Solicitor for the Applicants: Ravi James and Associates

Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor