1. Under section 126 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), the applicant's application for an extension of time in which to seek a review of the respondent's decision dated 19 December 2024 is granted.
2. The application is listed for a telephone directions hearing starting at 9:30 am on 9 February 2026.
3. The parties must be available to participate in the telephone directions hearing which may start at or after the scheduled start time and must remain available until the directions hearing ends.
4. The parties are directed to respond promptly to all registry requests for information (including about their access to technology) and to cooperate with VCAT's requirements for the conduct of the directions hearing.
5. All contact with VCAT must include the VCAT case number, and the date and time of the directions hearing and be copied to all other parties (unless otherwise ordered).

1. In this proceeding, Mr Jayden Knight seeks review of a decision made by Hume City Council ('Council') to declare a dog owned by Mr Knight a dangerous dog, under the Domestic Animals Act 1994 (Vic) (the 'Act').
2. This decision is about whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear this proceeding and if so whether time should be extended.
3. As the application was made out of time, Council contends that VCAT cannot extend time to enable there to be a hearing about the substantive issue.
4. Written submissions were received from Council dated 21 March 2025, and from Mr Knight dated 23 July 2025. Each submission was written by lawyers acting for their respective parties.
5. Under section 100 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) ('VCAT Act') this issue has been decided 'on the papers' without an in-person hearing.
6. I have decided the Tribunal can and should extend the time for the applicant to seek a review of the respondent's decision.

1. Mr Knight owns a dog called Johnny Bravo. The dog is a male Staffordshire Terrier with identification number 119464. It is microchipped with microchip number 956000007885128. Mr Knight keeps the dog at a property in Sunbury, where he lives. This is within the municipality of Hume.
2. On 29 August 2024, Mr Knight's dog attacked another dog which was being walked by her owner. The other dog needed veterinary treatment. Under the Act, its injuries were regarded as serious injuries. The owner of the other dog also suffered injuries caused by Mr Knight's dog. Mr Knight attended the scene and apologised to the owner of the other dog.
3. The Tribunal considered the section 49 Statement and attachments, a letter dated 19 December 2024 from Council to Mr Knight, (the 'Council letter') and written submissions from both parties.
4. The relevant dates include:
   • 29 August 2024 - Mr Knight's dog attacked another dog and its owner;
   • 4 September 2024 - Council wrote a letter to Mr Knight telling him about their investigation into the attack and inviting him to participate in a record of interview;
   • 5 September 2024 - Council obtained a search warrant to seize Mr Knight's dog;
   • 6 September 2024 - Council seized the dog and served a notice on Mr Knight telling him they proposed to declare his dog to be a dangerous dog under the Act, and invited him to make written and/or oral submissions, as well as issued a Notice to Comply;
   • Mr Knight did not make either written or oral submissions to Council; and
   • 12 September 2024 - Council officers assessed whether Mr Knight had complied with the Notice to Comply.
5. In December 2024 Council held a panel hearing to decide whether Mr Knight's dog would be declared a dangerous dog. The panel members confirmed the decision to declare the dog a dangerous dog.
6. Council wrote a letter to Mr Knight dated 19 December 2024 formally notifying him that his dog had been declared a dangerous dog. The letter was addressed to Mr Knight at his Sunbury address. It also contained his email address.
7. The letter informed Mr Knight of his entitlement to seek a review of the decision by applying to VCAT, 'within 28 days from the date of this notice.' The letter also advised, 'If you intend to make a submission that submission must be lodged with VCAT no later than 4:00 p.m. Wednesday, 22 January 2025.' The letter also informed Mr Knight there was more information on the VCAT website.
8. This was incorrect. Under section 98(2A) of the Act, Mr Knight had 28 days to make his application to VCAT. Day 1 was 20 December 2024 (the day after the date on the Council's letter). Day 28 was therefore 16 January 2025.
9. VCAT received Mr Knight's application on 21 January 2025, five days late.
10. It is beyond doubt that section 126 provides VCAT with the power to extend time, including where 'the lateness' is trivial.
11. Section 126 of the VCAT Act says that the Tribunal, on application by any person or on its own initiative, may extend any time limit fixed by or under an enabling enactment for the commencement of a proceeding.
12. For a discussion of the broad power of the Tribunal to extend time, see Pizer's Annotated VCAT Act, 7th Ed, from page 848.
13. If Council claims there is a prohibition on VCAT exercising its powers under section 126 of the VCAT Act, it must point to a specific statutory provision which displaces section 126. This is clear from the decision in Tsobanis v Katsouranis trading as CT Properties[1] to which Council referred. Council has not pointed to such a statutory provision specifically displacing section 126, as was done in that decision.
14. Given this reality, there is no need to address a variety of issues raised by the parties including:
    • how to interpret Council's notice in terms of time limits;
    • the operation of section 98(2A) of the Act (the section is not relevant because Mr Knight did not request reasons for the decision);
    • that a dangerous dog declaration by Council is irrevocable (VCAT may set aside a declaration - with section 126 available as a discretion for late applications);
    • issues of natural justice;
    • Council's submission that once Mr Knight's application was late, VCAT had no jurisdiction (given the wide breadth of section 126 that submission was misconceived); and
    • the potential for Council to launch prosecution under the Act related to a dangerous dog declaration (which does not limit section 126).

1. There are well settled principles which apply generally to cases which concern a party seeking to extend the time in which to make a necessary application.
2. These are found in the decision in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment,[2] and include whether the applicant can show an acceptable explanation for the delay; whether in the circumstances, it is fair and equitable to extend time; whether the applicant has acted in a way that allowed the respondent to believe the matter was finally concluded; whether the respondent was prejudiced by the delay; whether, if the applicant is successful in getting an extension, will other people or established practices, be unsettled; the merits of the substantial application; considerations of fairness as between the applicant and other people otherwise in a like position.
3. Mr Knight can show an acceptable explanation. He relied on the Council letter which lacked clarity, and was at best, ambiguous. Any delay on his part can be said, in part, to be caused by his reliance on that letter.
4. In these circumstances, it is fair and equitable to extend the time for Mr Knight to make his application to the Tribunal.
5. There is no evidence from the Council showing Mr Knight acted in a way that allowed the Council to think the matter was finally concluded.
6. The Council has not claimed that it was prejudiced by the delay in Mr Knight making an application to the Tribunal.
7. There is no evidence that the victim of the attack (referring to the owner of the seriously injured dog) suffered any upset by being advised that the declaration was not being challenged, only to later be advised VCAT extended time. Even if there was, the victim would probably understand that five days late is only a little bit late.
8. The merits of the substantive application have not been fully explored by the parties. Understandably, they have concentrated on whether there should be an extension of time. Of itself, this can indicate that the merits of the substantive application deserve consideration at a full hearing.
9. The substantive dispute between the parties in this instance is primarily between the parties themselves. That said, there is the interest of the owner and the community interest.
10. All these considerations tend to indicate that time should be extended for Mr Knight.
11. Time is extended to allow Mr Knight to seek a review of Council's decision made on 19 December 2024 to declare his dog to be a dangerous dog. The extension of time should not be taken as indicating a view by the Tribunal of the declaration itself.
12. There will be a directions hearing to determine the next steps in this proceeding.

[1] [2015] VCAT 739 [79].

[2] [1984] FCA 176; (1984) 3 FCR 344.