Kelly v University of NSW [2026] NSWCATAD 44;

1. The Tribunal has jurisdiction to review relevant conduct of a "public sector agency" under s 55 of the PPIP Act. There was no dispute that the Respondent was a "public sector agency". There was also no dispute that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the matter under s 55 of the PPIP Act, subject to the matters considered below.
2. Review by the Tribunal must occur under the ADR Act. The task of the Tribunal is set out in s 63 of the ADR Act. It provides as follows:

"63 Determination of administrative review by Tribunal

(1) In determining an application for an administrative review under this Act of an administratively reviewable decision, the Tribunal is to decide what the correct and preferable decision is having regard to the material then before it, including the following:

(a) any relevant factual material,

(b) any applicable written or unwritten law.

(2) For this purpose, the Tribunal may exercise all of the functions that are conferred or imposed by any relevant legislation on the administrator who made the decision.

(3) In determining an application for the administrative review of an administratively reviewable decision, the Tribunal may decide:

(a) to affirm the administratively reviewable decision, or

(b) to vary the administratively reviewable decision, or

(c) to set aside the administratively reviewable decision and make a decision in substitution for the administratively reviewable decision it set aside, or

(d) to set aside the administratively reviewable decision and remit the matter for reconsideration by the administrator in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal".

1. A further matter concerning jurisdiction arises consequent upon the making of the Remitted Decision. Under s 55 of the PPIP Act, rights of review are allowed to a person who has made an application for internal review under s 53 and that person is not satisfied with the findings of the review or the action taken by the public sector agency in relation to the application.
2. In the case of the Remitted Decision, no subsequent internal review occurred. The Remitted Decision expressly notified the Applicant of what it said were his rights under s 53 of the PPIP Act to make application for such internal review.
3. The Remitted Decision was made pursuant to an order under s 65 of the ADR Act. That provision says:

"65 Power to remit matters to administrator for further consideration

(1) At any stage of proceedings to determine an application for an administrative review under this Act of an administratively reviewable decision, the Tribunal may remit the decision to the administrator who made it for reconsideration of the decision by the administrator.

(2) If a decision is so remitted to an administrator, the administrator may reconsider the decision and may:

(a) affirm the decision, or

(b) vary the decision, or

(c) set aside the decision and make a new decision in substitution for the decision set aside.

(3) If the administrator varies the decision:

(a) the application is taken to be an application for review of the decision as varied, and

(b) the person who made the application may either:

(i) proceed with the application for review of the decision as varied, or

(ii) withdraw the application.

(4) If the administrator sets the decision aside and makes a new decision in substitution for the decision set aside:

(a) the application is taken to be an application for review of the new decision, and

(b) the person who made the application may either:

(i) proceed with the application for review of the new decision, or

(ii) withdraw the application".

1. There was no dispute that a remittal pursuant to s 65(1) had occurred. Following remittal, a varied decision had been made pursuant to s 65(2). The varied decision was the Remitted Decision. The variation was that the original refusal to make a decision changed to a decision dealing with the five documents described at [15] - [19] above. Alternatively, the decision to refuse to deal with the Applicant's application was set aside and substituted with a new decision dealing with the five documents described at [15] - [19] above.
2. If the administrator varies their decision, under s 65(3) the application is taken to be an application for review of the decision as varied and the person who made the application may proceed with the application for review of the decision as varied.
3. Equally, if the decision was set aside and a new decision made in substitution for the decision set aside, under s 65(4) the application is taken to be an application for review of the new decision and the person who made the application may proceed with the application for review of the new decision.
4. Given that the Applicant has proceeded with his application for review, I understood that he sought review of the decision as varied or substituted. In these circumstances, s 65 does not in its express terms require anything more, including internal review under s 53 of the PPIP Act, in order for the Tribunal to exercise jurisdiction.
5. Where a decision is varied, "the application is taken to be an application for review of the decision as varied". Where a decision is set aside and substituted with a new decision, the "application is taken to be an application for review of the new decision". The person who made the application may proceed with the application for review of the decision as varied or substituted. Section 65 sets out no further requirements for the application to proceed, including any requirements bringing to bear the provisions dealing with internal review under s 53 of the PPIP Act. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that I have jurisdiction, despite no further internal review having occurred.

1. The Applicant sought deletion of certain material concerning him from information held by the Respondent. He made claims of breaches of ss 9,10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 59E and 59F of the PPIP Act.
2. The Applicant also said that disciplinary action should be taken against certain students at the University on account of statements they had made about the Applicant and his alleged conduct and because of other matters he alleged.
3. He also said that he had been expelled from the University following these events and said this was without proper basis. The Respondent had also blocked the Applicant's ability to contact people using the Respondent's email system since January 2022.
4. The Applicant further alleged that the Respondent was in breach of the Tribunal's orders made on 14 August 2024 to make certain amendments to information it held. The Applicant said that the Respondent's solicitor had kept the information in issue without amendments and not complied with the Tribunal's orders to make the required amendments.
5. He also made allegations concerning certain lawyers retained by the Respondent and called for disciplinary action against them.
6. The Respondent, for its part, submitted that to the extent that the Applicant sought to achieve an outcome in respect of documents the subject of the Previous Decision, these proceedings were duplicative, vexatious and an abuse of process.
7. The Respondent made the following submissions in respect of each of the documents set out below.

(1) "Exhibits" 7, 8 and 10 were accurate and not misleading in that at the time of the emails in question, the Applicant was subject to the Respondent's complaint procedure for behaviour that was perceived to be "offensive, defamatory and threatening".

(2) "Exhibit 7" did not fall within the Applicant's request.

(3) "Exhibit 9" was considered in the Previous Decision.

(4) The email correspondence seeking legal advice on a response to the Applicant was not inaccurate or misleading.

1. The Respondent also submitted that for the reasons set out in the Previous Decision at [35] and [36], the Respondent had legitimate reasons for the creation and maintenance of the additional documents referred to above.
2. The Respondent further submitted that for the reasons set out in the Previous Decision at [58] and [59], the Respondent did not agree to delete any of the additional documents.
3. The Respondent also disagreed with the Applicant's submission that the Respondent had not complied with the orders of the Tribunal made in the Previous Decision. The Respondent said that it had complied. To the extent that relevant documents held by the Respondent's solicitor Mr Mattson had not been dealt with as ordered by the Tribunal on 14 August 2025, the Respondent said that these were not documents that it held and that the Tribunal's order applied to the Respondent but did not apply to such documents held by Mr Mattson.
4. The Respondent sought an order under s 64(1)(d) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) ("NCAT Act") prohibiting and restricting the disclosure to the Applicant of a "confidential statement" of Mr Paul Serov dated 2 December 2025 and its attachments. That application was made on the basis of a claim for legal professional privilege.

1. The decision of the Tribunal in Kelly v University of New South Wales [2024] NSWCATAD 240 of 14 August 2025 dealt with an earlier application for administrative review made by the Applicant. To the extent that the Respondent submits that the Tribunal must not or should not consider again matters addressed in the Previous Decision, what the Previous Decision addressed requires consideration.
2. The Previous Decision concerned a request for deletion of information expressed as follows**:**

"I want UNSW to delete all erroneous information about me that it possesses, including but not limited to:

- All documents referring in any way to me or anything done by me as "criminal"

- All documents stating or implying that I've committed any assault

- All documents stating or implying that I've either behaved threateningly or made threats" (at [5]).

1. The decision under review in the Previous Decision was to make certain amendments to records held by the Respondent, to add the word "alleged" before "assault" and to change a label in a Security Incident Report no 212934 (the Incident Report) from "Criminal Assault" to "Non-criminal". Otherwise, the University decided that no additional amendments were necessary (at [7] of the Previous Decision).
2. The Tribunal found at [55] - [57] of the Previous Decision:

"The University examined its records and conceded that the reference to a "Criminal Assault" in the heading of the Incident Report should be amended. The matter was not referred to the police. No criminal charges were pressed. No criminal conviction was recorded.

The balance of that record may be disputed by Mr Kelly, but (as noted above) it records the events from the perspective of the relevant parties. Mr Kelly was given an opportunity to record his version of events. He did so in the context of the Incident Report, and his version was included in that record. The version of events from other perspectives are also recorded. That he disputes them does not, as noted above, make them incorrect.

There is nothing in the other material before the Tribunal that is inaccurate, irrelevant, incomplete or misleading. Further, the material was added to as the conduct of Mr Kelly continued over time, so it was relevantly "updated".

" .... It is clear that the records held by the University relate to the disciplinary process, arising from various matters relating to Mr Kelly. It is usual for allegations of student misconduct to be recorded, investigated, resolved and for those records to be retained. The University has obligations, as noted above (including under the SR Act) to maintain relevant records. This position is reinforced where, as here, further litigation is in contemplation. Mr Kelly requests deletion on the one hand, while submitting to the Tribunal that it is an offence under the SR Act to delete any records".

"As noted by the University, s 15 of the PPIP Act applies despite s 21 of the SR Act: s 15(4) of the PPIP Act. In the circumstances of this case, amending the records in the manner described below, in response to the request made by Mr Kelly under that section, will be consistent with both s 15 of the PPIP Act and ss 11, 12 and 21 of the SR Act.

The failure to delete records as requested is not a breach. As explained above, this is not required under s 15. Proper regard was had to the University's obligations to retain records under its legislation and its policies.

The opportunity in s 15(2) for Mr Kelly to make comment on his personal information and attach a statement was provided to him, and rejected.

I therefore find that the correct and preferable decision is that the University has not breached s 15 (on the basis that the University has already conceded that corrections should be made in accordance with the Deletion Decision and, now the additional concessions at paragraph 92 of their written submissions). In accordance with that paragraph, any PDF of this Incident Report held by the University should be renamed to remove the reference to "Criminal Assault", and redactions made to emails as proposed.

Subject to these adjustments, the balance of the changes proposed in the Deletion Decision (excluding paragraph 40(c)(ii) and (iii)) are appropriate and should be implemented. This includes the steps required to notify Mr Kelly (paragraph 40(c)(i)), as well as taking steps, where reasonably practicable, to "notify all staff and contractors who rely on that record in the course of their job functions of the amendments that have been made" (paragraph 40(b))".

1. The Tribunal also went on to find that there were no breaches of s 16 or 17 of the PPIP Act.

1. The Respondent seeks dismissal of these proceedings under s 55 of the NCAT Act to the extent that that they are duplicative, and the principles of res judicata apply, making the proceedings vexatious and an abuse of process. This was because, in the Respondent's submission, a similar application for deletion of a "document stating or implying that I've either behaved threateningly or made threats" was dismissed by the Tribunal in the Previous Decision.
2. The Respondent says that another duplicative application was dismissed under s 55 in proceedings 2024/00154941 (Kelly v University of New South Wales [2024] NSWCATAD 203).
3. The Tribunal's power to dismiss proceedings are set out in s 55 of the NCAT Act. It says:

"55 Dismissal of proceedings

(1) The Tribunal may dismiss at any stage any proceedings before it in any of the following circumstances -

......

(b) if the Tribunal considers that the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious or otherwise misconceived or lacking in substance,

....".

1. The Appeal Panel has said in BDK v Department of Education and Communities [2015] NSWCATAP 129, at [66]:

"In our view a reasonably broad connotation should be given to the meaning of the four categories of conduct identified by s 55(1)(b). The intent of the provision, as we see it, is to seek to give the Tribunal a broad power to deal with abuses of its processes, and for them to be interpreted and applied in a power which captures any kind of abuse of process, that can reasonably be seen to fall within their compass. While 'misconceived' and 'lacking in substance' may be seen as relatively specific terms, we think a flexible, purposive interpretation can be adopted in determining whether proceedings are 'frivolous' or 'vexatious', conscious always of the gravity for an applicant or plaintiff of summary dismissal of proceedings".

1. The Supreme Court said in Paramasivam v University of New South Wales & ors. [2006] NSWSC 1189, at [74]:

"To bring a fresh set of proceedings in this Court, after all of their historical antecedents in the District Court, is almost by definition vexatious; and especially so when the framing of the proceedings that have been commenced in this Court has, in truth, nothing to distinguish it in any substantive way from the tortuous District Court proceedings antecedent to the proceedings in this Court".

1. What is "vexatious" may extend to capture an abuse of process. In Health Care Complaints Commission v Kirby [2019] NSWCATOD 47, the Tribunal said, at [7] - [8];

" .... if the proceedings are found to be an abuse of process, in my view s 55(1)(b) of the NCAT Act would permit the Tribunal to dismiss the proceedings on the ground that they are vexatious. The term "vexatious", which is not defined by the NCAT Act, probably extends to proceedings found to be an abuse of process of the type asserted by Dr Kirby.

Support for this proposition can be found in a number of decisions which have characterised proceedings found to amount to an abuse of process (in the sense used by Dr Kirby) as also being vexatious. For example, in Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175, French CJ said at [33] that abuse of process principles may be invoked to prevent attempts to litigate that which should have been litigated in earlier proceedings as well as attempts to re-litigate that which has already been determined. His Honour cited with approval the decision of Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ in Walton v Gardiner [1993] HCA 77; (1993) 177 CLR 378 in which their Honours said that "proceedings before a court should be stayed as an abuse of process if, notwithstanding that the circumstances do not give rise to an estoppel their continuance would be unjustifiably vexatious and oppressive for the reason that it is sought to litigate anew a case which has already been disposed of by earlier proceedings" (emphasis added)".

1. That litigating in the same terms can be an abuse of process is well accepted. In Seidler v The University of New South Wales [2011] FCA 830, the Federal Court (Flick J) said, at [34]:

"Not only was Ms Seidler seeking to re-litigate in the present proceeding the very same facts and causes of action as had been resolved by Cowdroy J, she was seeking to do so in the very same terms. The greater emphasis now sought to be placed by Ms Seidler upon her mental conditions, as opposed to the emphasis previously given to her physical injury, does not make the present claims any different to those considered and resolved by Cowdroy J. A litigant cannot unsuccessfully place emphasis upon one aspect of a case before one Judge and thereafter be permitted to place greater emphasis upon another aspect of a case before a different Judge - especially by means of a pleading in substantially identical terms. With the minor exceptions noted, the two Statements of Claim were identical. It would be difficult to envisage a more blatant abuse of process."

1. Hayne J, as he was at the time, said in DA Christie Pty Ltd v Baker [1996] VicRp 89; [1996] 2 VR 582, at 602:

"... The prospect of there being successive applications... suggests not only the possibility that there may be conflicting decisions given with the inevitable harm that follows from that but also that a respondent to such an application may be vexed by successive applications... It is not fanciful to conclude that the making of successive applications may well engender a belief in a respondent that the applicant had, in effect, hawked the application from judge to judge until a judge had been found who was willing to accede to the applicant's arguments. The vice of such a result is apparent".

1. The Previous Decision concerned a claim for the deletion of "erroneous information" about the Applicant that the Respondent possessed, including but not limited to documents with references in any way to the Applicant or anything done by him as "criminal". It also sought removal of documents stating or implying that he had committed any assault. Thirdly, the Applicant sought removal of documents "stating or implying" that he had "either behaved threateningly or made threats".
2. The application the subject of these proceedings asked for deletion of relevant information "claiming or implying that I made any threats or behaved threateningly".
3. I see no material difference between what the Applicant seeks in these proceedings and what he sought in the proceedings the subject of the Previous Decision, in respect of documents before the Tribunal both in those proceedings and in these proceedings. There is nothing to distinguish each claim from the other in any material way. The claim in these proceedings for removal or deletion of information "claiming or implying that I made any threats or behaved threateningly" does not in any material sense differ from the claim in the proceedings dealt with under the Previous Decision for removal of documents "stating or implying" that the Applicant had "either behaved threateningly or made threats". I also see no material difference between the use of the words "removal" or "deletion".
4. In each case what was sought was that the material the Applicant took issue with be taken off the Respondent's records. I am in these circumstances satisfied that the subject matter the Applicant seeks to litigate in these proceedings includes the subject matter as that litigated in the Previous Decision, to the extent that he seeks consideration of the same documents.
5. The law set out above seeks to prevent attempts to litigate what should have been litigated in earlier proceedings as well as attempts to re-litigate that which has already been determined. This is what the Applicant seeks in these proceedings, to the extent that the Applicant makes a claim in materially the same terms as the claim determined in the Previous Decision in respect of the documents before the Tribunal in the Previous Decision and also before the Tribunal in these proceedings. To do so, in my opinion, amounts to an abuse of process and to this extent, these proceedings are vexatious.
6. The Applicant is allowed rights of appeal under Part 6 of the NCAT Act. He has not availed himself of those rights to seek review of the Previous Decision. In the absence of an appeal in accordance with the provisions governing appeals, the NCAT Act contemplates no ability to relitigate a matter already decided by the Tribunal, for the reasons set out above.
7. The Tribunal may under s 55 dismiss any proceedings before it that the Tribunal considers to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise misconceived or lacking in substance. Such an order, however, should not, in the circumstances of the case, be made dismissing the entire proceedings in circumstances where there are documents before the Tribunal in these proceedings that were not before the Tribunal in the proceedings the subject of the Previous Decision.
8. The question remains whether the Tribunal may make an order under s 55 dismissing part of proceedings, in the present case, that part concerning matters already determined by the Tribunal in the Previous Decision.
9. The Administrative Decisions Tribunal said that it may dismiss part of a claim under a power to dismiss "any proceedings" under the legislation applying to it, because the power to dismiss proceedings as a whole carried with it the power to dismiss part of the proceedings, on the basis that the "greater power necessarily includes the lesser" (Parliv Pty Limited & Ors v Fast Feast Pty Limited & Ors [2008] NSWADT 298). The relevant power before the Administrative Decisions Tribunal is in similar terms to that allowed under s 55.
10. I do not, however, need to consider whether s 55 also allows dismissal of part of the proceedings dealing with matters already determined by the Tribunal, on the basis that what is before me is the Remitted Decision. The Remitted Decision deals only with documents not previously before the Tribunal. In these circumstances, there is no need for me to make further orders dealing with matters previously before the Tribunal, consideration of which may otherwise involve an abuse of process. I will go on to consider those documents not before the Tribunal in the proceedings determined under the Previous Decision and the subject of the Remitted Decision.

1. The Respondent accepted that a number of documents not considered by the Tribunal in the Previous Decision were before the Tribunal in these proceedings. These were the documents described at [15] - [19] above. To the extent that the Previous Decision did not consider these documents, I see no basis for a claim that these proceedings are vexatious or an abuse of process. I am satisfied that I have jurisdiction to consider the Remitted Decision of the Applicant in respect of these documents for the reasons set out at [27] - [31] above.
2. The Applicant's claim is that the University had breached various provisions of the PPIP Act. They included s 15 of the PPIP Act. That provision says:

"15 Alteration of personal information

(1) A public sector agency that holds personal information must, at the request of the individual to whom the information relates, make appropriate amendments (whether by way of corrections, deletions or additions) to ensure that the personal information -

(a) is accurate, and

(b) having regard to the purpose for which the information was collected (or is to be used) and to any purpose that is directly related to that purpose, is relevant, up to date, complete and not misleading.

(2) If a public sector agency is not prepared to amend personal information in accordance with a request by the individual to whom the information relates, the agency must, if so requested by the individual concerned, take such steps as are reasonable to attach to the information, in such a manner as is capable of being read with the information, any statement provided by that individual of the amendment sought.

(3) If personal information is amended in accordance with this section, the individual to whom the information relates is entitled, if it is reasonably practicable, to have recipients of that information notified of the amendments made by the public sector agency".

1. The Tribunal in FHY v Cumberland City Council; FGJ v Cumberland City Council [2024] NSWCATAD 92, at [149] - [150], says the following about the operation of administrative review:

"At the outset it is important to recognise that the Tribunal's role in these administrative reviews is limited to determining if any conduct of the Agency that is impugned by the Applicant constitutes a contravention of an IPP. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction at large to determine if the Applicant has been the subject of a work related wrong other than in relation to a contravention of an IPP.

This analysis involves the following steps:

(i) precise identification of the 'personal information' that is in issue,

(ii) precise identification of the conduct of the Agency that the Applicant impugns,

(iii) determining if that conduct occurred as a matter of fact (on the balance of probabilities),

(iv) determining if an IPP is engaged by that conduct (or any component of it),

(v) determining if an IPP has been contravened by that conduct (or any component of it),

(vi) consideration of the remedy, if any, the Applicant is entitled to having regard to the nature and impact of that contravention".

1. The Respondent says that the Applicant had not identified the precise "personal information" relating to him he sought to have deleted and further, that s 15 provided only for making amendments and not whole deletions of documents.
2. The Applicant, for his part, clarified his claim in oral submissions to say that what he sought was removal from the relevant records of particular parts that contained the matters about him to which he took objection. I accept that made in these terms, the Applicant's claim is for "amendments" within the meaning of s 15.
3. In these circumstances, I do not need to consider whether the reach of s 15 extends to allow deletions of entire records. However, I note in passing the following statement of the Tribunal in the Previous Decision, at [58] and my agreement with what it says:

".... it is clear from the text of s 15 that the provision does not require the deletion of entire documents. I agree with the submissions of the University that the focus is on the "personal information" of the applicant; I also agree that s 15(1) requires only that personal information of the applicant that is not accurate, relevant, up to date, complete or not misleading to be amended (in some manner)".

1. There was no dispute that the information in issue was "personal information". The question is therefore whether the personal information the Applicant complains about is accurate and also whether it is relevant, up to date, complete and not misleading within the meaning of s 15.
2. I am satisfied that the Applicant has identified the precise personal information that aggrieves him. It is information concerning alleged threats he made and alleged threatening behaviours. The conduct he identifies is the handling of information about these matters, the subject of the Remitted Decision as set out below. The question is whether or not that conduct breaches the PPIP Act.
3. The Respondent's submission is that merely disagreeing with the content of the record does not bring it within s 15. They also say that it "makes sense for the Respondent to want to keep full records of complaints, incidents and it's management of them- consistent with its policies and the State Records Act 1998 (NSW) - including in circumstances of threatened future litigation by the Applicant".
4. I address each of the documents remaining in issue and the subject of these proceedings as follows:

1. This is an email from the Director of UNSW Conduct and Integrity dated 11 November 2020 to a staff member in relation to an "ALM record on file for Milton Kelly related to an assault".
2. The record contains the following statement:

"yes - I can see an ALM record on file for Milton Kelly related to an assault".

1. The Respondent says that it does not agree to delete the email in its entirety. The Applicant clarified that he did not seek entire deletion but amendments.
2. The Respondent also says that the email is out of scope. I do not agree. To the extent that the Applicant's application dealt with matters concerning "threats" he had been alleged to make and alleged threatening behaviours, what is a "threat" or "threatening" bears sufficient connection with what is an "assault". To the extent that "threat" in its ordinary meaning includes "an indication of probable evil to come; something that gives indication of causing evil or harm" (The Macquarie Dictionary, Online, 2024), the word is sufficiently connected with the word "assault", in that an assault may stand as evidence of a prior "threat".
3. The Tribunal in the Previous Decision said that certain references to "Criminal Assault" in the record were to be removed. Exhibit 7 does not contain these words but do refer to an "assault". The Applicant did not expressly say what specific amendments he wanted but I understood he objected to the reference to an "assault".
4. The decision under review in the Previous Decision provided for the word "alleged" to be added before the word "assault". Similarly, I think that adding a notation to Exhibit 7 that the "assault" is alleged and not proven is appropriate, in circumstances where there has been no examination of witnesses to determine whether or not an assault occurred or a finding to this effect by a Court or Tribunal. The addition could be made as a margin note or addendum to Exhibit "7", so that the tenor of the original email correspondence remains on the record but that an amendment has been made is clear.

1. This is a record comprising of an email from the Director of UNSW Conduct & Integrity to a staff member of 27 January 2022. It includes a statement that the Applicant's behaviour toward staff was "offensive, defamatory and threatening" and refers to an "offensive email" from the Applicant.
2. I do not think that this record requires amendment. I accept that this is a description of perceptions of staff. It is as such subjective but reflects opinions of staff. As such, I see no inaccuracy in the description of their opinions or any other basis set out in s 15 to require amendment. That the Applicant holds a different opinion is not a reason to make any amendment.

1. This is an email from the Director of UNSW Conduct & Integrity to a staff member of 8 June 2022. The email describes an attempted communication from the Applicant as containing "inappropriate and threatening content".
2. I do not think that this record requires amendment. I accept that this is a description of perceptions of a staff member. It is as such subjective but reflects opinions of the staff member. As such, I see no inaccuracy in the description of that opinion or any other basis set out in s 15 to require amendment. That the Applicant holds a different opinion is not a reason to make any amendment.

1. This is an email of 27 January 2022 from the Director of UNSW Conduct and Integrity to an IT staff member. It states: "The student is subject to a determination under UNSW Unreasonable Complaint Conduct Procedure for behaviour that is considered unreasonably persistent, unreasonably demanding, and unreasonably threatening".
2. I do not think that this record requires amendment. I accept that this is a description of perceptions of a staff member. It is as such subjective but reflects opinions of the staff member. As such, I see no inaccuracy in the description in that opinion or any other basis set out in s 15 that can apply to require amendment. That the Applicant holds a different opinion is not a reason to make any amendment.

1. This is an email from the Director of UNSW Conduct & Integrity to a lawyer seeking legal advice. The Respondent claims legal professional privilege of this document and does not waive that privilege.
2. I accept the Respondent's claim for legal professional privilege. This is a communication between client and solicitor self-evidently created for the dominant purpose of seeking legal advice and as such is protected by confidentiality.
3. The Tribunal should not without good reason amend such a communication. To do so would interfere with a document created for the purpose of seeking legal advice in the terms sought by the client and potentially interfere with the ability of the client to communicate with their solicitor in order to obtain legal advice. The communications required to obtain advice need to occur without unnecessary inhibition. In these circumstances, I see no good reason to make any amendment.
4. To the extent that the accuracy or relevance of information set out in the email needs to be tested as evidence, this is a matter for the solicitor to consider and advise upon. It is not for the Tribunal to provide that advice.
5. Even if any descriptions of events contained in the communication to the solicitor would be challenge by the Applicant, this is not a reason to make the amendments to the communication the Applicant may seek for the reasons set out above.

1. The email of 11 March 2022 described at [90] above is a communication to a solicitor for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and in that context, is confidential. I have found that in these circumstances, this is a communication protected by legal professional privilege.
2. The evidence also included a "confidential statement" of Mr Paul Serov of the Respondent dated 2 December 2025 with two attachments over which the Respondent claimed legal professional privilege. I am satisfied that the attachments are communications between solicitor and client for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and in that context, are confidential. Mr Serov's "confidential statement" deals with these communications. I am satisfied that in these circumstances, that the "confidential statement" and its attachments are protected by legal professional privilege.
3. I accept the Respondent's submission that an order should be made preventing disclosure of the statement of Mr Serov and the other information described at [90] and [96] above.

1. The Applicant alleged various breaches of other provisions of the PPIP Act. They included ss 9,10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 59E and 59F. I am unable to find any such breaches on the evidence before me.
2. The breaches alleged included breaches claimed to arise out of the "collection" of personal information. For the purposes of the PPIP Act, personal information is not "collected" by a public sector agency if the receipt of the information by the agency is unsolicited (s 4(5)). There was no relevant evidence of unsolicited collection of information, or of any breaches arising out of collection as alleged.
3. The Applicant also alleges excessive delay in the provision of information in contravention of s 14 of the PPIP Act, in particular the documents under consideration in these proceedings. The Respondent, however, says that Exhibits 7, 8 and 10 were already provided to the Applicant through an "informal request" for information made under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) ("GIPA Act") on 27 June 2023. This was before the date of determination of the Previous Decision. The matter of excessive delay, however, was not before the Tribunal in those proceedings.
4. I do not see the time elapsing between October 2022 and June 2023 as "excessive delay" in the absence of further submissions and evidence as to the entirety of the circumstances. Those circumstances include whether there was excessive delay in the provision of all of the documents produced to the Applicant. There was no evidence as to whether this was so. There was also no evidence as to the timeframe under which access under the GIPA Act was sought and obtained and no submissions on how if at all, the time taken to deal with that access application affected the timing of the actions the Respondent took under the PPIP Act.
5. The Applicant alleges that he has made three requests for information and two internal review requests in 2025 and did not receive a response. The request before me in evidence was made on 12 December 2024. Also in evidence are follow up requests and the decision under review made on 24 March 2025 refusing to deal with the Applicant's requests. However, the information in issue in these proceedings had been provided in 2023. There is no evidence of what other information not previously provided, has been withheld in breach of s 14.
6. There were also other breaches alleged to arise out of holding, retention, use, and disclosure of information and also alleged data breaches. However, no submissions were made as to what the circumstances of the alleged breaches were and no evidence as to particular facts supporting the allegations.
7. Additionally, whether or not breaches of ss 16 and 17 of the PPIP Act occurred arising out of the use of the information in issue, already fell for determination in the Previous Decision. There are no additional matters in evidence for consideration in the present proceedings, that bears upon determination of whether the handling of the information contained in the five documents in issue resulted in breaches of ss 16 or 17.
8. In these circumstances, I am unable to make findings in these proceedings that such breaches as alleged by the Applicant occurred.
9. The Applicant made other allegations concerning various other matters including the fairness of his expulsion, the conduct of solicitors and the conduct of the Respondent's staff and students. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal in these proceedings extends to the alleged breaches of the PPIP Act alleged by the Applicant and does not extend to disciplinary action (if any) that may lie against the relevant individuals.
10. The Applicant also alleged that the Respondent had breached the orders of the Tribunal made on 14 August 2025 to make relevant amendments to information it held. This was because Mr Mattson, their solicitor was alleged to continue holding relevant information without the amendments having been made.
11. Mr Mattson, who represented the Respondent at the hearing of these proceedings, confirmed that he held relevant information without the amendments having been made. He said that these were his own records and not information held by the Respondent. He said that he kept information without making amendments because he needed them for litigation the Applicant said he intended to bring against Mr Mattson.
12. I accept that these were not documents that the Respondent held and were held by Mr Mattson for his own purposes. To the extent that relevant information was held by the Respondent's solicitor Mr Mattson in his own right, this was not a matter the subject of the orders of the Tribunal made on 14 August 2024.
13. The Tribunal was already in possession of these unamended documents in the proceedings the subject of the Previous Decision.
14. I do not in these circumstances find any breach of the orders made by the Tribunal only by reason of possession of unamended records by Mr Mattson for his own reasons. The orders made by the Tribunal applied to the Respondent and not to Mr Mattson in his own capacity.

1. The Respondent sought an order for costs against the Applicant pursuant to s 60 of the NCAT Act. They said that "special" circumstances arise warranting such an order.
2. Section 60 says:

"60 Costs

(1) Each party to proceedings in the Tribunal is to pay the party's own costs.

(2) The Tribunal may award costs in relation to proceedings before it only if it is satisfied that there are special circumstances warranting an award of costs.

(3) In determining whether there are special circumstances warranting an award of costs, the Tribunal may have regard to the following -

(a) whether a party has conducted the proceedings in a way that unnecessarily disadvantaged another party to the proceedings,

(b) whether a party has been responsible for prolonging unreasonably the time taken to complete the proceedings,

(c) the relative strengths of the claims made by each of the parties, including whether a party has made a claim that has no tenable basis in fact or law,

(d) the nature and complexity of the proceedings,

(e) whether the proceedings were frivolous or vexatious or otherwise misconceived or lacking in substance,

(f) whether a party has refused or failed to comply with the duty imposed by section 36(3),

(g) any other matter that the Tribunal considers relevant.

(4) If costs are to be awarded by the Tribunal, the Tribunal may -

(a) determine by whom and to what extent costs are to be paid, and

(b) order costs to be assessed on the basis set out in the legal costs legislation (as defined in section 3A of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014) or on any other basis.

(5) In this section -

costs includes -

(a) the costs of, or incidental to, proceedings in the Tribunal, and

(b) the costs of, or incidental to, the proceedings giving rise to the application or appeal, as well as the costs of or incidental to the application or appeal".

1. The Respondent says that it is clear that the Applicant's application in these proceedings had no tenable basis. Additionally, they say that the Applicant was on notice of this fact from the Previous Decision of the Tribunal. They say the commencement of the proceedings was frivolous and vexatious and their maintenance was a waste of the Tribunal's and the public's resources.
2. What constitutes special circumstances warranting a costs order fell for consideration in Megerditchian v Kurmond Homes Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCATAP 120. The Appeal Panel said, at [11]:

"The expression "special circumstances" was considered by the Court of Appeal in the context of section 88(1) of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW). Santow JA said in Cripps v G & M Mawson [2006] NSWCA 84 at [60]:

"I consider that the Tribunal was in error in failing to conclude that special circumstances apply here. For this purpose it suffices that the circumstances are out of the ordinary. They do not have to be extraordinary or exceptional.""

1. I do not consider that an order for costs in the terms sought by the Respondent is warranted in the circumstances of this case. This is because these proceedings required consideration of information not previously before the Tribunal, even if the Applicant also sought to bring before the Tribunal matters previously decided by it. The Applicant was entitled to have the matter heard before me to deal with the information not previously before the Tribunal. The Tribunal additionally did not consider again the matters the subject of the Previous Decision.
2. If, on the other hand, the proceedings before the Tribunal entirely concerned matters previously decided by the Tribunal, an order for costs may have been warranted.

(1) A correction is to be made to "Exhibit 7" the subject of consideration in these proceedings in the terms set out at [83] above, pursuant to s 55(2)(d) of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW).

(2) The decision under review is varied in accordance with Order 1 above.

(3) The decision under review is otherwise affirmed.

(4) The contents of the "Confidential Statement" of Mr Paul Serov, the attachments to that statement and the email of 11 March 2022 referred to at [90] above are not to be disclosed to the Applicant.

(6) The Tribunal decides to take no action under s 55(2) of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW).

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.