Paramasivam v University of New South Wales & ors.

In person - Plaintiff COUNSEL : J. Mattson (solicitor) - 1st defendant C. Hodgson - 2nd defendant A. Roins-Fisher (solicitor) - 3rd defendant

In person - Plaintiff SOLICITORS : Bartier Perry - 1st defendant I.V. Knight - 2nd defendant Australian Government Solicitor - 3rd defendant

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COMMON LAW DIVISION

20035/06 - GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM v UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES & ORS

1 HIS HONOUR:: There are current in the Court principal proceedings brought by Mrs Gaja Paramasivam as plaintiff. Those proceedings were commenced by the filing of a statement of claim on 7 February 2006. Three defendants are cited in the statement of claim. The University of New South Wales is the first defendant, the State of New South Wales is the second defendant and the Commonwealth of Australia is the third defendant. 2 Attached to the statement of claim and intended, as I gather, to be read in conjunction with the statement of claim, is a document headed, relevantly, "Chronological Listing". It will be necessary to return presently to consider some aspects of these particular documents. 3 The first defendant, that is to say, the University of New South Wales, has filed a defence. That was done on 8 March 2006. The first two paragraphs of that defence are pleaded in the following terms: (1) The statement of claim filed 7 February 2006 discloses no cause of action. (2) The pleadings have a tendency to cause prejudice and are embarrassing, therefore making it difficult for the first defendant to plead its defence, other than as set out below: The first defendant denies the claims in the statement of claim. 4 There are several further paragraphs of pleadings and it is sufficient to say that, broadly speaking, each of them is prefaced by some such qualification as, to take paragraph 3 as an example, "to the extent that paragraph 1.1 of the statement of claim is capable of alleging defamation by the first defendant against the plaintiff…". 5 The second and the third defendants have not filed formal defences.

6 The plaintiff filed on the 16 March 2006 a reply. On the front page of the pleading, the following appears:

"I reply to the defence submitted on 08 March 2006 by the first defendant - the University of New South Wales (UNSW) and include the second and third defendants in the reply." 7 There was filed on 8 May 2006 a document described as "Further Reply - causes of action". It will be necessary to return presently to some aspects of that document. A further document headed "Reply" was filed on 23 June 2006, and yet a further such document on 13 July 2006. 8 The immediate concern of the Court is with three notices of motion. One notice of motion has been put on separately by one of the three defendants cited in the statement of claim. The notice of motion of the first defendant seeks, put simply, the dismissal of the proceedings that have been originated by the statement of claim to which I have earlier referred.

9 That application is expressed to be made pursuant to Pt 13 r 4 of the Uniform (Civil Procedure) Rules 2005. There is a prayer in the conventional form for such other order as the Court might think appropriate to the circumstances of that particular motion. 10 The notice of motion of the second defendant is cast somewhat differently. It seeks a number of orders, generally speaking, as alternatives. This notice of motion seeks, first, that the statement of claim, as against the second defendant, be struck out pursuant to Pt 14 r 14.28 of the Uniform (Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 and/or the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. It seeks, further, an order that the proceedings commenced by the statement of claim be either dismissed summarily, or permanently stayed. 11 The notice of motion of the third defendant is, in every relevant respect, identical to that of the second defendant.

12 Before engaging with the substantive issues that are tendered by the notice of motion, it is necessary to have in place at least a general overview of the relevant factual background. It is a very complicated one and one not easily reduced into the form of a practical summary. 13 Learned counsel for the second defendant, as part of very carefully drawn written submissions, has provided a statement of background facts which I am content to accept as accurate, at least to the extent that they provide, in a fair way, a practical, functional overview in connection with which the particular issues raised by the notices of motion will fall to be considered. That material is as follows: "6 The Plaintiff was employed by the University of New South Wales as a senior accountant on 5 January 1998. She subsequently resigned and ceased her employment on 14 October 1998. Thereafter she performed some casual contract work with the Faculty of Medicine at the University of New South Wales from time to time until November 1999. 7. Between 1999 and 2003 the Plaintiff unsuccessfully made application for various positions at the University of New South Wales. She commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Common Law Division, against Professor Rory Hume, Vice Chancellor, University of New South Wales in 2003. 8. On 16 April 2003 the Plaintiff discontinued the Supreme Court proceedings, with the Notice of Discontinuance stating: "On the basis that the defendant has offered to 'talk' ." 9. During the period April 2003 - September 2003 the Plaintiff sent various e-mails requesting meetings with the Vice Chancellor of the University of New South Wales and to other officers of the University of New South Wales. 10. On 12 September 2003 the Plaintiff sent e-mails requesting a meeting on 15 September 2003 with the Vice Chancellor. She was asked to not attend at the university on 15 September 2003. 11. On 15 September 2003 the Plaintiff attended at the University of New South Wales and, after being asked to leave, was arrested and charged with a breach of s.4(1) of Inclosed Lands Protection Act (she subsequently pleaded guilty to this charge on 29 October 2003 and the charge was then dismissed pursuant to 2.10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act ). In ordering that dismissal Magistrate Quinn said to the Plaintiff: "No, all right I'm going to give you an opportunity today. You are 53, you have got no criminal record. I am going to give you a s 10 and dismiss this matter, but I want to say to you, you now know, I have told you, I have made it plain to you, it is an offence. It is an offence that is always before this Court. If somebody tells you to leave in a position of authority and you are there because you think you want to stay there and they tell you to leave, you had better leave. Do you understand what I am saying to you.:" The Plaintiff responded that she understood, saying "I do". 12. On 10 November 2003 the Plaintiff attended at University of New South Wales and after being asked to leave on a number of occasions was again arrested and charged with a breach of s 4(1) of the Inclosed Lands Protection Act. Events on these two days and the prosecution of charges in relation thereto appear to have been the subject of the Plaintiff's District Court proceedings in which she claimed damages against the State of New South Wales. 13. On 11 June 2004 the hearing of the charges regarding events on 19 November 2003 commenced before Magistrate Gilmour. It continued on 6 September 2004 before Magistrate Gilmour who, at the conclusion of the prosecution case, held that a prima facie case has been made out (Tx pp10-13) 14. The Plaintiff then gave evidence and her Honour, ultimately, found that the Plaintiff had established, notwithstanding a prima facie breach of s 4(1) of the Inclosed Lands Protection Act that she fell within the excusatory provision within that section. Saying, at p 37: "[HER HONOUR] On the facts of this matter and taking into account the evidence of Mr. Milne and the accused I am satisfied the accused has discharged the burden of proof as to lawful excuse and her honest and reasonable mistake of fact and THE INFORMATION WILL BE DISMISSED. …… HER HONOUR: That will cease as of today, I don't know of any other orders that relate, and I have found this case based on the facts of this particular day and what happened on this day. I would suggest to you very strongly though that before entering onto the University grounds again that you be perfectly clear about your understanding, because just because at this time I have accepted that you believed that, I don't think you could do that anymore." 15. It appears that her Honour was not advised of what Magistrate Quinn had told the Plaintiff as set out above as it seems likely that she would have taken a different approach had she been told. 16. On 23 September 2004 the Plaintiff commenced District Court proceedings (originally against Constable Ross Lawson and New South Wales Police, but, after amendment, the sole Defendant was specified to be the State of New South Wales). 17. On 22 October 2004 the Plaintiff attended on University of New South Wales grounds and, after being requested to leave on a number of occasions, was charged with a further breach of s.4(1) of the Inclosed Lands Protection Act . She was convicted on this charge. The Plaintiff successfully appealed to the District Court. 18. On 29 October 2004 the Plaintiff again attended upon the University of New South Wales grounds, and, after being asked to leave on a number of occasions, was again arrested and two charges were laid against her under s.4(1) of the Inclosed Lands Protection Act . On 28 January 2005 Magistrate O'Shane found that both offences were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Her Honour confirmed that a conviction was recorded in relation to both offences on 29 April 2005 but, for a reason which is not apparent from the record, on 26 July 2005 her Honour only confirmed the conviction in relation to the offence of entering inclosed lands and said that she was (previously) not satisfied that the charge of remaining on inclosed lands was proven. This anomaly was referred to in the hearing of the subsequent appeal before his Honour Judge Hulme but was not otherwise taken up on behalf of the Crown (see Tx 1.45-2.16). The Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed to the District Court." 14 It will be convenient to proceed next to a consideration of some of the litigation background to the plaintiff's current proceedings in this Court. Before doing that, it might be useful to make some general observations as follows. 15 Mrs Paramasivam is a litigant in person. It is clear that she entertains very strong feelings of grievance about things that have happened as between her on the one hand and each, separately, of the three defendants, on the other hand. 16 It is a matter of concern to me, as a Judge of the Court, and as the Judge rostered in particular to deal with the present matters, that Mrs Paramasivam has, and has expressed, some points of view which I find troubling, not least of all because they are points of view that I have myself encountered from time to time in recent years when presiding in Court at the hearing of matters one of the parties to which is a litigant in person. 17 It needs to be said at once, and by no means merely in the form of lip service, that any citizen is entitled to represent himself or herself in any piece of litigation. That is not a privilege - it is a right. The exercise of the right has, however, practical consequences and no useful purpose is served by refusing to recognise what they are, and the effects that they can have in a particular case. 18 What is owed to common civility and to commonsense will entail that a Judge will do what he properly can in order to ensure that a self-represented litigant has a proper opportunity to put before the Court what that litigant wishes to put. 19 The operative word in that statement is, however, "properly", for it must be clearly understood, even by self-represented litigants, that whether or not they like or approve of the fact, the fact is that there are some things that a Judge cannot do. One of them is to give such favoured treatment to a litigant in person as will excite an understandable suspicion on the part of the opposing party or parties that their own rights to a fair and unbiased hearing are coming into question. 20 There is, likewise, a limit to what the presiding Judge can do, as between himself and the self-represented litigant, to bring clarity and precision to whatever might be the case that the litigant wishes to present. The Judge, in the words of a well-established saying, must always be careful not to get down into what has been called "the dust of the arena". 21 I think it is fair to say that most Judges, certainly most Judges these days, will do the best that they conscientiously can in order to try to hold some kind of fair balance between a self-represented litigant on one side of the record and professionally represented litigants on the other side of the record. I say again, however, that it must be understood that there are real limits to what a Judge is permitted to do in that connection. 22 It is not only litigants in person, it must sadly be acknowledged, who have a tendency these days to "dump" upon a Judge a huge mass of more or less undifferentiated documentary material assuming, more or less as a matter of course, that the Judge will simply read through it, no matter how voluminous it is or how complex are its contents. 23 Once again there is no point in being other-worldly about the matter. It is simply not possible to conduct a case in modern conditions upon such a footing. The more voluminous the material, the more essential it is that there be found some method, whether by way of indexes, summaries, pagination or the like, that will bring the material into some kind of useful and disciplined form which can be understood sensibly by the making of a reasonable effort in that behalf. 24 I say again, and say it with emphasis, it is time that all litigants understood that it is no part of the judicial duty to accept an undifferentiated mass of documentary material as though it were a matter of course that the Judge will simply wade through it hoping that, after hours or, in a case of the present kind, days, of reading at large, he will somehow manage to identify correctly what the parties thought they were putting before him in the first place. 25 All of those observations in place, it is expedient to proceed next to consider something of the litigation history of the present proceedings. 26 The proceedings have, in a real sense, their genesis in an ordinary statement of claim, filed not in this Court, but in the District Court of New South Wales. It was filed on 23 September 2004. 27 The statement of claim cites two defendants, one of whom is identified as Constable Ross Lawson, said to be then attached to the Maroubra Police Station, and the other of which is "New South Wales Police". The statement of claim notifies a claim of $750,000 in respect of causes of action which are said to be pleaded in the remainder of the document. The flavour of the document can be caught, at least to some extent, by noting the way in which the claim of $750,000 is particularised. 28 Leaving aside Court fees and miscellaneous service fees, there is a claim for what is described as "solicitor's costs" of $166,666.67 and a claim for what is described as "loss of goodwill" in the sum of $580,796.33. 29 The cause of action pleaded against Constable Lawson is set out in ten numbered paragraphs on the second page of the document. What is there described begins with an arrest of the plaintiff by Constable Lawson at the University of New South Wales on 11 November 2003 and on an occasion when, according to the allegation made by the plaintiff in the document, she had sought to speak to the Vice-Chancellor of the University regarding employment related matters. 30 It is no easy thing to deduce from what is said in the ten numbered paragraphs quite what cause or causes of action the plaintiff saw herself as pursuing in the proceedings then commenced. I think it would be fair to understand that, at least broadly speaking, what the plaintiff saw herself as pursuing was a remedy for wrongful arrest and, perhaps, for defamation. 31 I apprehend that the plaintiff's then perception was that she had a cause of action against "New South Wales Police" upon the basis that the Police Force or those in control of it, were in some way or other vicariously liable for the conduct of Constable Lawson. The matter is not pleaded with that kind of exactness but, as I have said, I think that it is fair to understand that that is what the plaintiff saw herself as pleading. 32 Some three months later, and on 6 December 2004, an amended ordinary statement of claim was filed in those District Court proceedings. Once again there were two defendants. Constable Lawson remained on the record as the first defendant; but the citation of the second defendant was changed to that of "The State of New South Wales". The ten numbered paragraphs setting out the basis upon which the plaintiff was pleading a cause or causes of action appear to me to be unaltered from the original statement. 33 On 30 June 2005 a third statement of claim or, more precisely perhaps, a further amended statement of claim was filed in the District Court proceedings. This time Constable Lawson dropped out as first defendant and "The State of New South Wales" remained as sole defendant. This time the pleading of the cause or causes of action was much more extensive. It extends over 59 numbered paragraphs, some quite short, some quite large. 34 It is, once again, easy enough to perceive, in a broad factual sense, the nature of the grievances which the plaintiff obviously perceived herself to have justifiably; it is not so easy to distil, with the exactness that the practice and procedure of the Court requires, quite what was the cause of action, or what were the causes of action, said to arise from what was stated in the 59 numbered paragraphs. 35 In this document and under the heading "particulars of injuries/damages", extensive particulars, very much more detailed than had previously been given, are set out. A reference to some few in particular of the headings will give, I think, a fair sense of the generality of what is said in that part of the pleading.

36 There are, thus, references to "severe damage to Goodwill with UNSW Staff who now do not talk to me"; "damage to the Goodwill of my family members who carry my name and are seen to associate with me"; "a feeling that I am alone, unprotected by the very people I have been led to believe in until my beliefs were shattered and my expectations turned into disappointments and disillusionment". 37 Having drawn attention to those matters, it would be prudent, I think, to add, especially having regard to some of the things said by the plaintiff in her written submission dated 7 November, that in singling out those matters I have no purpose otherwise than to choose at random items which seem to me to convey a sense of the general tone and thrust of what is said in the balance of the material set out under the heading of which I have spoken. 38 It is not my intention, and it would be, in any event, wholly improper, to speak of such matters in terms of mere disparagement, and it is no part of my present purpose to do any such thing. Once again, however, there is no service done usefully to anybody by walking away from the plain facts; and the plain fact is that expressions of that kind, however sincerely they might be entertained as subjective feelings, do not express, in a way which is indispensable in the proper pleading of a legal claim, coherent allegations of damage to which the party sued can reply in a way that generates, in its terms, correspondingly coherent issues of damage for ultimate trial. 39 On 11 April 2006 a fourth statement of claim was filed. It is described as a further amended statement of claim. It starts off by referring to material described as "FACTS 1 TO 267 in attachment 3". I apprehend that the material that is mentioned was at least broadly similar, in its structure and cast, to the material which I have before me in the form of the annexure to the statement of claim; and as the document described as "Further Reply - causes of action". 40 This document extends over quite a number of pages. This much at least can be said about it: that it is possible to define by reference to some of its contents the nature of the causes of action which the plaintiff was intending to plead in her document. It is thus apparent that the plaintiff saw herself as entitled to pursue a claim at common law for damages for defamation, for negligence, for malicious prosecution, for false imprisonment, for trespass to the person and for personal injury.

41 Her damages were, once again, particularised and were so presented under a number of headings which give at least some helpful general indication of the relief that the plaintiff saw herself as pursuing. 42 Thus, the plaintiff asks in paragraph 7.1 for two declarations: one that she is an "owner" of the University of New South Wales, and the other that she is an "owner" of the State of New South Wales.

43 The plaintiff asks for what she describes in the following paragraphs, as "reprimands" and "opportunities"; and the plaintiff particularises a claim for financial compensation of $6,800,000 representing $200,000 loss per annum for 34 years. I gather that the remainder of the material under that heading indicates that the plaintiff, being aware that the jurisdictional limit of the District Court was $750,000, was content to pursue her remedies then on foot in that Court, with that jurisdictional limit in mind. 44 Prior to the filing of that statement of claim on 11 April 2006 the pleadings, as they had previously stood, were considered by her Honour Judge Gibson who made, on 16 March 2006, certain orders in accordance with those previous pleadings. 45 It is not necessary to traverse in detail the course of the hearing before her Honour; but it is very relevant to understand that her Honour was obviously concerned, in line, if I may say so, with the general observations that I have earlier made in these reasons, to do what her Honour properly could to assist the plaintiff with the pleading difficulties which the plaintiff was obviously encountering in the framing of her successive statements of claim. To that end, and on 16 March 2006, her Honour made orders, the importance of which seems to me to be such as would warrant setting them out in full. "1. A peremptory order that the plaintiff file and serve in 28 days a further amended Statement of Claim setting out her causes of action and claims for damage as follows: (a) Defamation (i) The date and place of each defamatory publication, who spoke or wrote it, and what third person(s) was present or otherwise heard or read the publication; (ii) The imputations the plaintiff claims were conveyed by each publication. (b) Malicious Prosecution (i) The dates of each conviction relied upon; (ii) Particulars of malice for each such prosecution; (iii) Particulars of absence of reasonable and probable cause for brining each such prosecution. (c) False imprisonment (i) The date of each occasion of alleged false imprisonment, and the person who imprisoned her; (ii) The facts and matters alleged to amount to absence of lawful authority. (d) Trespass to the person (i) All facts relied upon (including dates) to allege that any person (and if so who) committed this tort. (e) Personal injury (i) Particulars of each occasion of alleged personal injury; (ii) If any claim for negligence causing personal injury is claimed, particulars of any duty of care and breach; (iii) Full particulars of injuries and ongoing disabilities. (f) Damages (i) Particulars of all claims for damages. 2. The defendant's Notice of Motion stood over for hearing (1 hour) to 9 am Tuesday 2 May 2006 before Gibson DCJ. 3. A copy of these orders will be posted to the parties by the associate for Gibson DCJ. 4. Costs reserved. Note: There are to be no further adjournments of this application other than in exceptional circumstances." 46 I infer that the fourth statement of claim, that is to say the one filed on 11 April 2006, represented an attempt to comply at least with the spirit of the orders that had been made by her Honour Judge Gibson on 16 March. 47 On 2 May 2006 her Honour delivered a judgment, the upshot of which was the making by her Honour of these orders: "(1) Pursuant to Pt 14 r 14.28 of the Uniform (Civil Procedure) Rules (2005) the plaintiff's amended statement of claim filed on 11 April 2006 is struck out, apart from the limited order in order 2 below in the cause of action brought by the plaintiff for defamation, negligence, trespass and any claim for wrongful arrest or malicious prosecution, other than as particularised in order 2 below, is dismissed. (2) The plaintiff have leave to file a first further amended statement of claim to be limited to any claim for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution arising from the events of 10 November 2003, and from the charge for which the plaintiff was acquitted on 6 September 2004. (3) The plaintiff is to pay the costs of the defendants of the notice of motion, as well as the costs of the proceedings to date in relation to the claims for defamation, negligence and trespass and any claims for malicious prosecution, wrongful arrest and false imprisonment in relation to the charge for which the plaintiff pleaded guilty on 15 September 2003."

Her Honour subsequently ordered that the plaintiff was to file any amended statement of claim within 28 days from the date of that judgment.

48 I do not presume to offer, - and there is no call in any event for, - a detailed critique of her Honour's reasons for judgment. I will say, however, this: that it must have been crystal clear to the plaintiff that the judgment was a precise and careful one which gave, in completely clear terms, an indication of what was wrong with the pleadings as they then stood, and which gave, very fairly indeed it might be thought in the events that had previously happened, yet a further opportunity to replead. 49 On 19 may 2006 the plaintiff did, in fact, file a re- pleaded statement of claim. It was, I observe, the fifth such statement of claim filed by the plaintiff. The action continued to be constituted against the State of New South Wales as defendant; and it would be fair, I think, to say that it did at least try to replead in a way that took into account all of the antecedent advice that had been given to the plaintiff, and not least of all, the assistance that had been given to her by her Honour Judge Gibson.

50 Once again, the pleading is a prolix document. It confuses inextricably allegations of fact, subjective opinions, matters of complaint and general expressions of grievance, but continues to fall short of an articulation in clear, coherent terms of causes of action intended to be pursued; of matters of fact clearly denominated as such, pleaded in support of the alleged entitlement to rely upon each such cause of action; and, as well, properly particularised claims of damage. 51 One again, a simple excerpt from what is said on the issue of damages will serve to convey the flavour of the entire document. 52 A claim is made for personal injuries in the sum of $1,381,500; there is a claim for loss of future earnings of $2,400,000; and there are other less ambiguously calculated claims, bringing the total claim to $4,122,496. That is a reduced by an item of $3,372,496, which item is particularised as "less amount foregone due to lack of confidence at the time to take the matter up in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which gives me ownership value". The effect of all that is to bring, once again, down to the jurisdictional limit of $750,000, the amount actually claimed in the pleading. 53 Once again, the alleged inadequacy of the pleading was brought to the attention of the District Court, this time in the form of an application which was adjudicated on 11 July 2006 by his Honour Judge Hughes of that Court. It is true that his Honour's judgment is very brief and to the point. Those characteristics have attracted some very sharp criticism of his Honour in the submissions of the plaintiff to this Court. It might redress somewhat that balance to quote briefly from what his Honour actually said by way of exposing his process of reasoning, leading to the particular orders which his Honour made. His Honour says: "The statement of claim contained a narrative, a rather rambling narrative of things, of events in the proposed plaintiff's life, most of which was irrelevant and does not disclose a cause of action. Judge Gibson, in her judgment, with great leniency, gave the respondent to the notice of motion an opportunity, a final opportunity, to narrow the cause of action to that of false arrest and false imprisonment. This does not appear in the further amended notice of claim. In my opinion that Court has done everything it possibly could to assist the unrepresented plaintiff. Two lots of pro bono solicitors have been consulted; however, the plaintiff still remains self-represented. I understand that a person in the position of the plaintiff is not able, I assume is not able to afford a proper solicitor, but nevertheless the Court has done all that it could be expected to do in assisting the plaintiff, and the matter is still not in a way that can enable it to go to court. I think the proceedings are frivolous and vexatious. I dismiss the notices of motion pursuant to rule 13.4 of the Uniform (Civil Procedure) Act on the basis that the proceedings were frivolous or vexatious and no reasonable cause was actually disclosed, and they are an abuse of process." 54 It is against the background of that litigation history that it now comes time to attend, in a more particular way, to the pleadings in this Court and to the three applications to which they have given rise.

55 I go first to the statement of claim. 56 The statement of claim begins in the way already noticed in connection with one, at least, of the previous District Court statements of claim, with this statement: "FACTS 1 TO 488 Listed in Chronological Order are the basis on which my claim is made."

57 The 488 facts which are there referred to constitute the material making up the document, separate in form but filed in conjunction with the statement of claim and obviously intended to be read with the statement of claim. The 488 items occupy 65 pages of close type. The material in those 65 pages is arranged into five columns. Going from left to right, the column headings are: "No. Date From To Subject matter"

58 It is, I must confess, difficult to know where to begin in evaluating that document. It is simply unacceptable in this day and age, and as I have previously observed, simply to impose a document of that character upon any Court without some attempt at refinement of the material into a form which sorts out, so to speak, the wheat from the chaff, and provides a practical tool which can be given practical use in assessing the main pleading. 59 It is worth recalling in that regard the provisions of the first three subsections of section 56 of the Uniform (Civil Procedure) Act. They provide: "(1) The overriding purpose of this Act and all rules of Court in their application to civil proceedings is to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings. (2) The court must seek to give effect to the overriding purpose when it exercises any power given to it by this Act or by rules of Court and when it interprets any provision of this Act or of any such rule. (3) A party to civil proceedings is under a duty to assist the court to further the overriding purpose, and to that effect, to participate in the processes of the court and to comply with directions and orders of the court." 60 The present case is one, if ever there was one, in which it seems to me to be important to make particular reference to those provisions of the Act; and emphatic reference not only to the bare words used in the three subsections, but to the obvious spirit and intendment of the legislation.

61 I perceive no basis upon which it could fairly be argued that undigested and, in truth, indigestible material such as that concatenation of 488 "facts" should be thought, in its presentation, to come anywhere near compliance with the plain requirements of the quoted provisions of section 56 of the Act. 62 It will have been observed that subsection (2) imposes, in precise and positive terms, upon the Court itself an obligation to ensure the just, quick and cheap disposal of proceedings in the Court. No doubt, even words of such wide import must be applied with commonsense and a sense of what I might describe as instinctive fairness. It is, nonetheless, the case that the days are gone when litigation can be conducted in any Court by the endless production of huge volumes of undigested material bolstering, or thought to bolster, pleadings which are prolix and confusing and of which no reasonable observer could accept that they had done what the plain intendment of the Act and the rules made under it required to be done in those connections. 63 Those observations about the "facts" document accompanying the statement of claim apply even more so in connection with the document of which I have earlier spoken, and which is described as "Further Reply - causes of action".

64 That document is, in a word, overwhelming. It runs to 469 pages of close print or typing. It contains 458 items. This time the material is arranged in eight columns. Reading from left-to-right, the column headings are: "No., Date, Place, Person/s causing the Pain, What was said/done, Root cause of the Pain and Damage Suffered, Imputations & why, Plaintiff Considers it to be Lawful Pain, Which Legislation/Policies best describe/s my expectations that were damaged to cause the Lawful Pain; and Observers and Users of the Certificates given by the Perpetrators/Defendants.

65 There really is no basis that I can see upon which one could choose some representative items out of that overwhelming body of confused and confusing and undifferentiated material. It is simply beyond what can rightly be expected of any opposing party to have to speculate about what case is being pleaded and particularised by the particular plaintiff, by working off the statement of claim which fails at every turn to do what the particular plaintiff has been told time and time and time again it is necessary for her to do in order to plead properly any cause of action which she wishes to pursue. 66 That situation is not improved from the plaintiff's point of view by an approach which requires any defendant to go to documents such as the two "facts" documents of which I have spoken; and to trawl through those documents at enormous cost, both in time and money, in the hope that it might be possible to piece together at the end of that exercise some more or less coherent outline of the case which that defendant, or those defendants, is or are expected to meet.

67 It seems to me that any reasonable reader of the statement of claim and the two supporting "facts" documents would need to do no more than to consider them as I have been doing, in order to be comfortably satisfied that, at the very least, they should be struck out. I do not resile in that connection from anything that I earlier said about the ways in which a Court will do what it properly can to assist a litigant in person. It is, however, the case that with all the goodwill in the world there must come a time when, to put the matter simply and bluntly, enough is enough.

68 Litigation of the kind with which I am now concerned is notoriously expensive. It notoriously consumes huge amounts of time, not least of all the severely limited Court hearing time. It is simply no longer possible to accommodate a piece of litigation which is conducted in the way that I have described in the historical canvas that I have earlier made being the litigation which now comes to a head in this Court. 69 A view that the pleadings, as they stand, simply cannot be allowed to remain on the record but must be struck from it, raises for consideration the question of consequential orders. Plainly, it is inadequate in every sense simply to make an order striking the pleadings out. That order is of no utility unless it is accompanied by, broadly speaking, either of two possible alternative consequential orders. 70 One is an order giving the plaintiff yet further time in which to replead, yet again, her cause or causes of action. The other is to dismiss the proceedings summarily.

71 I accept that it is trite that a Court should not summarily dismiss proceedings, except in a very clear case; for very good cause shown; and only after careful consideration of the determinative effect upon the whole of the litigation of the making of such an order. 72 It seems to me that there are several bases upon which it would be proper in the present case to make an order for the summary dismissal of the proceedings. I raised during the course of submissions and, in particular, with learned counsel for the second defendant, the differentiation between the concepts of "frivolous" and "vexatious", which concepts are normally joined together in the rules under the rubric "frivolous or vexatious". It seems to be intended that there will be recognised some difference between the two, but there does not seem to be any satisfactory exposition by relevant authority of what that difference might be.

73 I do not propose to characterise these proceedings as "frivolous". I do that out of what I intend to be a proper respect for the views which the plaintiff undoubtedly holds as a matter of deeply embedded conviction. One can say a lot of things about the course of litigation pursued by this plaintiff; but I do not think one can fairly say that her approach to it has been frivolous in the normal grammatical sense of being insufficiently serious or insufficiently purposeful.

74 I have no doubt, however, that the proceedings are properly to be characterised as "vexatious". To bring a fresh set of proceedings in this Court, after all of their historical antecedents in the District Court, is almost by definition vexatious; and especially so when the framing of the proceedings that have been commenced in this Court has, in truth, nothing to distinguish it in any substantive way from the tortuous District Court proceedings antecedent to the proceedings in this Court. 75 Further, I am comfortably of the view that this is a case in which the proceedings can be characterised properly as an abuse of the process of the Court. I wish to make it clear that I do not imply by that statement any view that the proceedings have been brought for some sinister or improper collateral purpose. The material which I have before me, whatever else might be said about it, cannot, I think, support an inference of that character. 76 My point is, rather, that there must come a time when it really does become, in the most literal grammatical sense, an abuse of the process of the Court to continue to use that process to regurgitate, on a sixth successive occasion, a pleading not substantially different from antecedent pleadings which have been held, in the clearest terms, to fall foul of the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Act and its rules.

77 I should perhaps add this further observation. I have given these reasons ex tempore. That is not, I imagine, a course that would commend itself to a lot of people, including a lot of Judges. I have taken that course for two related reasons: One reason is my perception of the obligations that are imposed upon me, in particular, by the provisions earlier quoted from section 56 of the Civil Procedure Act. The other is my comfortably settled conviction that no fair view of the challenged pleadings, being a view consistent with what is required by the Act and the rules could possibly suffer the pleadings to stand; and that on that same approach, it really is time for the Court to show what I would regard as a proper firmness of purpose in enforcing an Act and rules by which the Court is bound. 78 I do not see that any useful purpose would be served in this case by reserving judgment and then producing a massive written judgment which, whatever virtues it might prove to have in terms of an expression of abstract jurisprudence, could add nothing to the views that I am comfortably satisfied are the correct views to take about the facts as I accept them to have been established by the evidence that I have heard over the past two days, those facts as thus found being related sensibly to legal provisions which seem to me to be completely clear in their import, and correspondingly clear in what they require to be done in the present particular case. 79 I order, therefore, that the proceedings commenced in this Court by the statement of claim filed on 7 February 2006 be dismissed with costs. The exhibits and the items marked for identification will remain until further order with the Court file. **********

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