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[2017] VCAT 386
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2017-03-17
Mr J, Greg Garde J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Mr D Sheales with Mr T Purdey of Counsel instructed by Lander & Rogers
Mr J Gleeson QC with Mr A Dinelli and Mr J Hooper of Counsel instructed by Minter Ellison
(h) Any person who administers, or causes to be administered, to a horse any prohibited substance:
(i) for the purpose of affecting the performance or behaviour of a horse in a race ...
(2) One count of breaching AR 175(h)(ii) 'Charge 2''), which provides that the stewards may penalise:
(h) Any person who administers, or causes to be administered, to a horse any prohibited substance:
(ii) which is detected in any sample taken from such horse prior to or following the running of any race.
(3) One count of breaching AR 178 ('Charge 3'), which provides:
... when any horse that has been brought to a racecourse for the purpose of engaging in a race and a prohibited substance is detected in any sample taken from it prior to or following its running in any race, the trainer and any other person who was in charge of such horse at any relevant time may be penalised.
(4) One count of breaching AR 175(k) ('Charge 4'), which provides that the stewards may penalise:
(k) Any person who has committed any breach of the Rules, or whose conduct or negligence has led or could have led to a breach of the Rules.
(d) HKJCL on 13 July 2016 in a certificate of analysis recording a concentration of 690µg/L with the measurement of uncertainty at 100µg/L estimated to be 9µg/L at 99% 1-tailed confidence level.
(a) each denies that prior to any race he administered cobalt or caused cobalt to be administered to any horse for the purpose of affecting the behaviour of the horse;
(b) each says he had no knowledge that cobalt or a substance described as 'Vitamin Complex' was administered to any horse;
(c) each contends that the analyses of ChemCentre and HKJCL were made using methods that were not accredited by NATA or a similar authority in an overseas country at the time;
(d) each contends that ChemCentre and HKJCL were not duly accredited, and therefore not 'Official Racing Laboratories' under the Rules of Racing when the relevant samples were analysed by them, and that under AR 178D(1) they were not permitted to analyse them for cobalt; and
(e) each says that the findings of ChemCentre and HKJCL are inadmissible.
take or cause to be taken any sample from any horse and to make or cause to be made any test to determine whether any prohibited substance is present in the system of the horse.
Dr Brennan's evidence at the Racing NSW Inquiry on 9 June 2015
I accept that I gave the inquiry false evidence when I went up there and I am extremely remorseful for that. You know, I've disgraced Dr Church, who has nothing to do with it, but he's my partner in the business, disgraced the veterinary profession. I've disgraced the racing community, which I've been a part of since I was in a pram and innocent people have been brought into this that have got absolutely nothing to do with it. I accept that I've been dishonest with you guys and I'm extremely remorseful and I can't take back what I've done, sir.[17]
Adam's got a new B vitamin, multivitamin mineral complex he's sourced from Canada. He said it's a hundred per cent natural, helps horses recover... He has told me it has not got cobalt in it... This product - I can't guarantee, there's no guarantees - this is what it'll cost to get it tested from my guys...10 to a hundred [thousand dollars]...[18]
Dr Brennan's evidence before the RAD Board on 1-4 December 2015
Dr Brennan's evidence before the Racing NSW Panel on 10 February 2016
Dr Brennan's evidence at the Tribunal on 3-5 August 2016
Sam Kavanagh's evidence at the Racing NSW Inquiry on 9 June 2015
Sam Kavanagh's evidence at the Racing NSW Inquiry on 18 June 2015
Sam Kavanagh's evidence at the Racing NSW Inquiry on 4 August 2015
Sam Kavanagh's evidence at the Racing NSW Inquiry on 28 October 2015
Sam Kavanagh's evidence before the NSW Appeal Panel on 8 and 9 February 2016
Sam Kavanagh's evidence before the Tribunal on 8-10 August 2016
Absolutely, yes ... Tom is only going to give regulated products that I agree with. He's not going to be going rogue on me ... I just can't imagine a vet of his stature doing something silly like that. We're talking about proper racehorses. Like, Caravan Rolls On is owned by Sheikh Fahad.[46]
Cobalt chloride does not seem like a substance that you would - that a person who looks after their horses would properly would be wanted to get involved with the horse's physiology at any stage. ... And I certainly don't think a top-line vet of Tom Brennan's stature would be - you know, not in our stable. He knows what our policies are and he's just not that sort of person ... he wouldn't be my vet if I thought he was like that.[47]
O'Brien's evidence before the RAD Board on 4 and 7 December 2015
it would be suicide for me to be even thinking along those lines, and it's just not something I would even contemplate. People know me. They wouldn't come near me with that sort of suggestion'[51]
O'Brien's evidence to the Tribunal 26 September-14 October 2016
Kavanagh's evidence before the RAD Board on 7 December 2015
Kavanagh's evidence before the Tribunal on 14 and 17 October 2016
I would like to take this opportunity to advise you of the truth about the second or "secret" phone'. The letter went on to say that 'I bought the phone because my son (with whom it is now public knowledge I had a very strained relationship with) who lives in Sydney would not speak to me if I did not. I was concerned at the time, among other things about my son's mental health.
(1) was not and is not a commercially available or registered product;
(2) was not obtained by Dr Brennan from any bona fide supplier of veterinary or pharmaceutical products;
(3) was contained in bottles bearing a label which did not contain any statement as to the constituent ingredients of the substance or the manufacturer or source of the substance; and
(4) contained cobalt at a concentration of approximately 20,100,000µg/L, being 20.1mg/mL. A 5mL dose of the substance contained approximately 100.5mg of cobalt.
2. Dr Brennan's abrogation of his professional responsibilities
3. Dr Brennan's concealment of his own culpability and destruction of evidence
4. The improbability and expediency of Dr Brennan's account
Lack of knowledge of the contents of the vitamin complex
The sale of bottles of vitamin complex by Dr Brennan to O'Brien and Kavanagh
5. The evidence of the veterinarians, staff and Dr Matthews
Racing Victoria Ltd's criticisms of the evidence of O'Brien and Kavanagh
The credibility of O'Brien and Kavanagh and the state of their knowledge as to the introduction of the drips
The making of payments by O'Brien and Kavanagh to Dr Brennan
Racing Victoria Ltd's additional criticisms of O'Brien's evidence
Racing Victoria Ltd's additional criticisms of Kavanagh's evidence
(a) O'Brien and Kavanagh have administered a prohibited substance to a horse, or caused a prohibited substance to be so administered; and
(b) their purpose in administering or causing the administration of such a prohibited substance was to either:
(i) affect the performance or behavior of the horse in a race; or
(a) O'Brien and Kavanagh have administered a prohibited substance to a horse, or caused a prohibited substance to be so administered; and
(b) the prohibited substance has been detected in a sample taken from the horse prior to or following the running of any race.
(a) O'Brien and Kavanagh caused a prohibited substance to be administered to a horse (Charges 1 and 2); and
(b) their purpose in causing the administration of that prohibited substance was to affect the performance or behaviour of the horse in a race (Charge 1 only).
(a) A trainer will have caused a substance to be administered by a veterinarian to his horse where, inter alia, the trainer has authorised, requested, procured or brought about that administration, or where the trainer has intended or contemplated that the administration occur.[57]
(b) It is not necessary for the purposes of AR 175(h)(i) that the veterinarian who administers the cobalt, or the trainer who causes the cobalt to be administered, to have actual knowledge that the substance being administered is cobalt or a prohibited substance.
(c) The criminal law concept of mens rea or 'guilty mind' does not apply to the Rules of Racing. The Rules of Racing do not involve criminal responsibility or create criminal offences.
(d) In the context of a regulatory scheme which bears a closer relationship to professional discipline than to the general criminal law, there is limited benefit to be found in discussing cases which involve the addition of a new offence, or a new form of prohibition to the general criminal law.[58]
(e) There is a public interest in concepts of absolute liability being imposed in these circumstances.[59]
(f) Even if knowledge is necessary, the only knowledge required for the purposes of AR 175(h)(i) is that a prohibited substance was administered. This is made out 'if there is proof of a belief by the accused in the likelihood (in the sense that there was a significant or real chance) that he or she has a prohibited drug in his or her possession.'[60]
(g) The requirement of knowledge is satisfied where there has been 'wilful blindness' on the part of a defendant. Wilful blindness arises where a defendant 'deliberately refrains from making inquiries because he or she prefers not to have the result, or otherwise willfully shuts his or her eyes for fear that they may hear the truth'.[61]
(a) The correct construction of AR 175(h) requires that the trainers know that the substance which was to be administered was or contained cobalt in an amount which would exceed, or was likely to exceed, the prescribed threshold once absorbed into a horse's system.
(b) The Tribunal's previous decision in Corstens v Racing Victoria Limited[62] ('Corstens') decides that an offence under AR 175 requires an intention on the part of the person charged.
(c) Decisions in the criminal law such as He Kaw The v The Queen[63] demonstrate that proof of mens rea is required in illicit drug importation and possession cases. The prosecution must prove that the accused was not only in possession of a prohibited import and had imported it, but knew that he or she had done so.[64] The same reasoning ought to be applicable to the construction of AR 175(h).
(e) The decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Harper v Racing Penalties Appeal Tribunal (WA),[68] is distinguishable on two grounds. First, it does not involve a rule which corresponds to AR 175(h)(i), but Rule 364 of the Rules of Harness Racing. Second, Rule 309 of the Rules of Harness Racing provides that an interpretation which extends the operation of those Rules is to be preferred to one that restricts their operation. That rule of construction displaces the principles of statutory and contractual interpretation that would otherwise apply, including the ordinary presumption that a serious offence carries with it a requirement to prove mens rea.
(f) A construction of AR 175(h) which imports an element of intention or knowledge gives a congruent operation to the Rules of Racing and is consistent with the scheme of offences contained in the Rules of Racing. The scheme involves in ascending order of gravity:
(1) AR 178 does not require any mental element or deliberate administration and does not attract a mandatory penalty.
(2) AR 175(h)(ii) requires knowledge and an intention to administer the prohibited substances. There is no requirement that the administration be done for the purpose of affecting the horse's performance.
(3) AR 178E prohibits the administration of a medication to a horse on race day without permission to do so. It is of greater seriousness because it relates to the deliberate administration of substances on race day. It attracts a minimum penalty of six months disqualification.
(4) AR 177B(6) prohibits the administration of certain prohibited substances at any time. This provision is limited to substances of a most serious kind. It does not require that the administration be intended to affect or enhance a horse's performance in a race. It attracts a mandatory penalty of two years disqualification, but not as high as other offences which involve an intention to affect a horse's performance on race day.
(5) AR 175(h)(i) is the most serious of the offences because it involves the intentional administration of a prohibited substance to a horse with the purpose of affecting its performance on race day. This is reflected in the fact that it attracts a mandatory penalty of three years disqualification. This is a greater penalty than any other offence relating to prohibited substances.
[T]he duty of a court is to give the words of a statutory provision the meaning that the legislature is taken to have intended them to have. Ordinarily, that meaning (the legal meaning) will correspond with the grammatical meaning of the provision. But not always. The context of the words, the consequences of a literal or grammatical construction, the purpose of the statute or the canons of construction may require the words of a legislative provision to be read in a way that does not correspond with the literal or grammatical meaning.[70]
This Court has stated on many occasions that the task of statutory interpretation must begin with a consideration of the text itself. Historical considerations and extrinsic materials cannot be relied on to displace the clear meaning of the text. The language which has actually been employed in the text of legislation is the surest guide to legislative intention. The meaning of the text may require consideration of context, which includes the general purpose and policy of a provision, in particular the mischief it is seeking to remedy.[72]
As the [High] Court said in Fleming v The Queen, '[t]he fundamental point is that close attention must be paid to the language' of the relevant provision because 'there is no substitute for giving attention to the precise terms' in which that provision is expressed.[74]
If conduct of a particular kind stands outside the language of a penal section, the fact that a court takes the view that it is through inadvertence of the Legislature that it has not been included does not authorise it to assume to remedy the omission by giving the penal provision a wider scope than its language admits.[87]
Still less should a court ignore the clear words of a provision so as to give it a meaning that would or might make it easier to convict an accused if the intention of the legislature is at best a matter of contestable opinion...[89]
No doubt, in determining whether an offence has been created or enlarged, the Court must be guided, as in other questions of interpretation, by the fair meaning of the language of the enactment, but when that language is capable of more than one meaning, or is vague or cloudy so that its denotation is uncertain and no sure conclusion can be reached by a consideration of the provisions and subject matter of the legislation, then it ought not to be construed as extending any penal category.[91]
It is relevant to note that a breach of Rule 178 does not require a finding as to how the prohibited drug came to be in the horse's system. This may be contrasted with a charge under Rule 175(h)...
In Homann[97] Judge Williams, constituting the Racing Appeals Tribunal, dealt with the distinction between offences under Rules 178 and 175(h):
'... this particular offence against Rule 175(h)(ii) is a significant offence, a serious offence. The more common cases are those against Rule 178, the presentation at the race track of a horse containing a substance that it shouldn't contain or a substance in excess of the threshold. The Tribunal considers that the actual offence against 175(h)(ii), which requires [as] an element thereof, the actual administration of the substance to be more significant, more serious.'
We respectfully agree with his Honour's observation, in our view an offence under Rule 175 is the more serious as it involves, among other things, an intention on the part of the person charged, whereas intention is not a necessary element of a charge under Rule 178.[98]
When it is expressly made an offence for one man to 'cause' another to commit what is forbidden as a crime we ought not to give any wide or general application to the word 'cause'. In this subsection I take it to mean to procure or bring about. It refers to some intentional or conscious production of the effect. Consequences are infinite and I think that the present section meant to forbid only doing an act knowing or intending that it should produce the consequence that a vehicle is driven upon a road for the purpose of carrying persons or goods for hire if it turns out that the road is a controlled route. [102]
In such a connection I think the word 'cause' does not extend beyond acts or omissions of a person who does or makes them either for the purpose of bringing about the doing of the things which amount to the principal offence, or at least contemplating or foreseeing that they will or may have that result. ... I think there must be some intention that a vehicle shall be driven on a route for the purpose of carrying passengers or goods for hire, or that this shall be contemplated or foreseen as a result of the act in fact causing it. [103]
It is important to recognise that what is here being considered is the 'causing' of an act which involves an intention to do it on the part of the person who does it. The inquiry may well be different in the case of an event independent of such an intention.
The truth is, I think, that one person cannot be said to cause another's act unless not only does the former express it as his will that the act shall be done by the latter but the latter's decision to do it is a submission to the former's will, that is to say a decision to make himself the instrument of the former for the effectuation of his will.[105]
Conclusion regarding the construction of AR 175(h) and the word 'cause'
(1) intentionally or consciously sought to produce the result;[106]
(2) knew or intended that the actions of the second person would produce the result;[107]
(3) had the purpose of bringing about the doing of the things that would amount to the result;[108]
(4) contemplated or foresaw that the actions of the second person would or might give rise to the result;[109] or
(5) refrained from making inquiries because the first person preferred not to know about the second person's actions, or wilfully shut his or her eyes for fear that he or she might learn the truth.[110]
(a) Dr Brennan was the principal perpetrator who injected vitamin complex into the drips administered to the O'Brien horses and Magicool. Dr Brennan either administered the drips personally, or directed other veterinarians to administer the drips.
(b) O'Brien and Kavanagh had no knowledge of the administration of any prohibited substance to any of their horses. They had no knowledge, inkling or suspicion that Dr Brennan was intending to use material from a bottle of vitamin complex of unknown provenance in the drips for their horses.
(c) Neither O'Brien nor Kavanagh or any person in their employ had any awareness of the intended administration of material from the vitamin complex bottle. They discovered the true position long after the event.
(d) While they discussed and were familiar in general terms with the contents of the drips administered by Dr Brennan, Dr Brennan did not disclose to them his use of the contents of the vitamin complex bottles. He did not record the administration of vitamin complex in the records relating to each horse.
(e) Neither O'Brien nor Kavanagh had ever shown any interest in cobalt or prohibited substances. They have unblemished records over a long period. Although both capable and experienced trainers familiar with the racing industry, neither had ever undertaken any research or made any inquiries about the administration of cobalt or any other prohibited substance. Administration of prohibited substances was not within their contemplation.
(f) O'Brien and Kavanagh reasonably expected Dr Brennan, a highly respected veterinarian, to adhere to the Rules of Racing and the ethical standards of a veterinarian. They did not expect the undisclosed use by him of a bottle of an unknown substance without proper labelling. This was a direct and serious breach of his professional duties as a veterinarian to them and to their horses. He had no excuse for doing so. It was not something that O'Brien or Kavanagh ever wanted, expected or suspected.
(g) As far as O'Brien and Kavanagh knew, the drip program was under trial as a substitute for the drench program. The programs had similar objectives, although the drip program was thought to be more effective, and better controlled.
(h) This is not a case of wilful blindness, rather O'Brien and Kavanagh did not know anything about the administration by Dr Brennan of material from a vitamin complex bottle. They had no reason to suspect that a leading veterinarian would direct or permit anything of the sort to occur. They were surprised, if not stunned, when they learnt the truth. They continued to believe that Dr Brennan could not have done what was alleged long after the stewards' inquiry had commenced.
(a) Both O'Brien and Kavanagh relied on Dr Brennan, as a leading veterinarian, and as a senior partner of the clinic to use his professional skill to ensure that the drips were properly administered. It was appropriate and reasonable for them to use only professional persons to administer drips rather than do so themselves, or use unqualified and less experienced staff to do so.
(b) Employment of veterinarians to administer drips was intended by O'Brien and Kavanagh to result in the administration of drips by highly skilled qualified professionals. It is not negligent to ask highly qualified veterinarians to administer drips.
(c) Both O'Brien and Kavanagh did discuss with Dr Brennan what was to be achieved in the drip program. They did discuss with Dr Brennan the vitamins and additives that were to be used. They did not overlook their responsibilities in this regard.
(d) The problem was that Dr Brennan did not disclose to them that he intended to use or was using material from a vitamin complex bottle of unknown content. O'Brien and Kavanagh were the victims of Dr Brennan's non-disclosures and misrepresentations. Dr Brennan failed to record the use of vitamin complex in the administration sheets relating to each horse. He did not disclose the use of material from the vitamin complex bottles to them or even to his own staff or partner.
(e) O'Brien or Kavanagh had no knowledge of the vitamin complex bottles or their lack of provenance.
Objections as to the admissibility and accuracy of test results
1. Were the test results inaccurate due to the use of vitamins, supplements or other therapeutic products?
2. Were the testing laboratories Official Racing Laboratories under the Rules of Racing authorised to test for cobalt?
"Official Racing Laboratory" means an analytical racing laboratory that is accredited by the National Association of Testing Authorities or by a similar authority in an overseas country, and is approved by the Australian Racing Board and published in the Racing Calendar.[114]
Hong Kong Jockey Club Laboratory's scope of accreditation
Conclusion as to the meaning of 'Official Racing Laboratory'
3. Should RVL have notified O'Brien and Kavanagh of the results of screening tests?
(a) Screening results are unreliable and are not definitive. They are not intended to be definitive. A screening test result can prove to be inaccurate after full testing.
(b) The notification of a positive result brings with it very serious consequences for the owner, trainer and stable in terms of reputational impacts and business losses as owners withdraw their horses from the affected stable. It is of the utmost importance that any findings notified by stewards are well established and entirely reliable.
(c) Review of the use of the word 'detection' in the Rules of Racing shows that it would be inappropriate to regard a screening test result as amounting to a detection. For example, AR 175(h)(ii) provides that it is an offence if a person administers or causes to be administered any prohibited substance which is detected in any sample taken from such horse prior to or following the running of any race. It is inconceivable that a screening test result could be sufficient to establish such an offence rather than a certificate of analysis following the administration of an approved test based in scientific method. The same logic applies to AR 178.
(d) In the case of prohibited substances like cobalt where there is a threshold level (here 200µg/L in urine), detection involves much more than identifying the presence of the substance in a sample of equine urine. It is not an offence for there to be a total cobalt concentration of less than the threshold level in equine urine. For there to be a contravention, the concentration of total cobalt found in equine urine must exceed the threshold level. Clearly there is a need for accurate measurement of the concentration of total cobalt in urine for there to be a contravention. Completion of a recognised scientific test is essential to establish the correct position.
(e) AR 178D(2)(a) and AR 178D(5)(a) both use the expression 'a finding' of a detection. In its normal English meaning, the concept of 'a finding' connotes a decision after inquiry. It is an outcome accompanied by certainty and definition. The use of this language confirms that proper testing must be conducted before there can be a finding that is to be notified to the trainer.
(f) There are other indications that a properly based scientific test must be conducted before there can be a finding of detection. AR 178D(3) refers to 'certified findings'. This expression is consistent with the existence of a certificate of analysis from an Official Racing Laboratory. This could only follow completion of an accepted scientific test and not a mere screening test.
(g) Finally, screening tests, screening analyses and screening limits are all expressions found in AR 178EA. 'Screening limit' is a defined term in AR 1. This suggests that it is not a screening test alone that is intended in the context of AR 178D to establish a finding of detection.
4. Did the procedure adopted by RVL for testing samples over the period from April 2014 to August 2015 comply with the Rules of Racing?
(a) RVL referred samples to RASL, and RASL retained control of the sample as the Official Racing Laboratory to which the samples were referred;
(b) RASL conducted routine testing for the presence of all prohibited substances other than cobalt; and
(c) a portion of urine from the original sample bottle was removed and placed in a new bottle, sealed with a tamper evident label and marked with a RASL laboratory number, photographed and referred to ChemCentre for analysis for cobalt (and in some instances, the presence of arsenic).
(a) RASL splitting out portions of the 'A' portion of the urine sample, retaining one portion for itself to test for prohibited substances other than cobalt, sending one portion to ChemCentre, and retaining the remainder of the 'A' sample in storage. RASL would also retain all of the 'B' portion of the sample in the event that a prohibited substance was detected and the portion needed to be referred to another Official Racing Laboratory under the Rules;
(b) RASL testing for all prohibited substances, except cobalt and arsenic;
(c) ChemCentre conducting screening testing for cobalt and initially arsenic;
(d) where an above threshold result was obtained on a screen test by ChemCentre, RASL would split a further portion of the 'A' sample and send it to ChemCentre for confirmatory analysis;
(e) ChemCentre confirming the detection of an above-threshold cobalt concentration in the 'A' sample by the issue of a Certificate of Analysis; and
(f) RASL sending the 'B' sample, together with the control, to HKJCL for confirmation testing and issue of a test report.
Did the new procedure comply with the Rules of Racing particularly AR 178D(2), (4) and (5)?
Conclusion as to compliance with AR 178D(2), (4) and (5)
What was the extent of the non-compliance by RVL with the requirements of AR 178D?
5. Given the non-compliance by RVL with AR 178D, can the test results still be admitted into evidence or relied on by RVL against O'Brien and Kavanagh?
The rights and liabilities of parties under a provision of a contract are determined objectively, by reference to its text, context (the entire text of the contract as well as any contract, document or statutory provision referred to in the text of the contract) and purpose.
In determining the meaning of the terms of a commercial contract, it is necessary to ask what a reasonable business person would have understood those terms to mean. That enquiry will require consideration of the language used by the parties in the contract, the circumstances addressed by the contract and the commercial purpose or objects to be secured by the contract.[130]
Fundamental principles of statutory interpretation
(a) AR 178D prescribes the procedure to be adopted when samples are taken from horses by the stewards in the exercise of the powers in AR 8(j). The object underlying the provisions in AR 178D is to ensure that samples taken from horses are subjected to scientific analysis by two approved specialist laboratories in accordance with a stipulated protocol directed by the Rules of Racing.
(b) The protocol is needed for the protection of owners, trainers and other persons bound by the Rules of Racing. At common law, samples could not be taken from a horse without the owner's consent. Once a sample is taken, the sample is solely within the control of the stewards. The protocol ensures that the interests of all affected persons are safeguarded, and that all are fairly dealt with by testing samples in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
(c) The language found in AR 178D(1), (2), and (5) is of a mandatory nature. Imperative words are present in each of these provisions.
(d) Under s 45(2) and (3) of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic), the use of the word 'shall' would ordinarily convey the meaning that the power must be exercised. What is required must be done.
(e) As stated by French CJ in Momcilovic v The Queen,[134] the principle of legality requires that 'statutes be construed where constructional choices are open, to avoid or minimise their encroachment upon rights and freedoms at common law'.[135] O'Brien and Kavanagh carry on businesses as licensed horse trainers. A penalty of up to three years disqualification can result from a finding of a breach. A construction which would preserve their right to insist on compliance with AR 178D would appear appropriate.
This accords with the general principles of interpretation embodied in the maxim expressum facit cessare tacitum and in the proposition that an enactment in affirmative words appointing a course to be followed usually may be understood as importing a negative, namely, that the same matter is not to be done according to some other course.[137]
When the Legislature explicitly gives a power by a particular provision which prescribed the mode in which it shall be exercised and the conditions and restrictions which must be observed, it excludes the operation of general expressions in the same instrument which might otherwise have been relied upon for the same power.[139]
It has long been established that contractual or statutory provisions prescribing in positive terms a procedure to be followed necessarily imply that the same matter will not be dealt with under a different procedure.[141]
the maxim must always be applied with care, for it is not of universal application and applies where the intention it expresses is discoverable on the face of the instrument.[144]
and Nettle JA said in Australia Pacific Airports (Melbourne) Pty Ltd v The Nuance Group (Australia) Pty Ltd:[145]
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius and kindred syntactical presumptions are problematic at the best of times ...[146]
It is an elementary proposition that a contract will be read as a whole giving weight to all clauses of it, where possible, in an endeavour to give effect to the intention of the parties as reflected in the language which they have used. A court will strain against interpreting a contract so that a particular clause in it is nugatory or ineffective, particularly if a meaning can be given to it consonant with other provisions in a contract.[148]
Speaking generally, it is not permissible to construe one part of a contract so as to render inoperative or as surplusage another part.[150]
In arriving at this decision the Board was mindful that Racing Queensland is a body created by Statute of the Queensland Parliament. It was the control body of the three codes of Racing in this State and model litigant principles applied to it.
The decision of this Board is that there is no discretion to be exercised. Either the reception and analysis of the "B" sample complied with the requirements of the Act or it did not. This is a mandatory provision of the Act. It is not optional for Racing Queensland or any other authority to fail to comply with the provisions of the Act.
The legislature has imposed, for sound policy reasons ... an obligation on an accreditation holder to ensure that the information contained within the certificate is accurate so that, amongst other things, all persons have confidence in the integrity of the analysis of samples taken from the Thoroughbred Horses in Queensland. The requirements of the Racing Act do not refer to whether the results are "scientifically accurate" however they do set specific compliance requirements.
It is the decision of this Board that those mandatory compliance requirements have not been carried out and as such the "B" certificate obtained from RASL Laboratory in Victoria is a nullity.
The legislation in respect of the presentation rule (for the admission of certificates) is very clear.
Certificates create strict liability and all necessary protocols and procedures in the legislation must be followed or the certificates are not admissible and of no value whatsoever. In this particular case the RASL referring Laboratory for the "B" sample to be analysed did not comply with the relevant legislation for the Accreditation Certificates of the recipient of the sample or Analyst at the relevant time and we find that the certificate for the "B" sample is therefore worthless.
In these circumstances and in the absence of both certificates being valid (the "B" sample being a nullity) a prima facie case under the presentation rule cannot exist and the charge cannot be sustained. The decision of this board is that the appeal should therefore be upheld.[158]
(g) the Act required strict compliance with the terms of authorisation (by an accredited facility) for the analysis of the sample and as to how the "B" sample was to be used for confirmatory analysis. Non-accredited facilities were not contemplated at all relevant times
(i) It would have been unfair and a denial of justice to have allowed the use of certificates raised as a result of analysis of the "B" samples in the circumstances that existed in this [a]ppeal.[160]
The effect of the stewards' non-compliance with AR 178D
Conclusion regarding the effect of non-compliance with AR 178D
6. Do the additional test results remedy the non-compliance by RVL with the requirements of AR 178D?
Objections to receipt of evidence of additional testing
must provide to the person a notice of charge specifying:
(ii) the particulars of the facts and circumstances relating to the alleged commission of the offence.
Was the additional testing conducted within a reasonable time?
(a) As I have held, there is no obligation on the stewards to advise a trainer of the adverse result of a screening test. RVL was not required by AR 178D or any other provision in the Rules of Racing to notify the trainers of a positive result based only on a screening test. It is correct for RVL to wait until it has received a certificate of analysis showing a positive result. The alleged basis for the estoppel does not arise.
(b) There is no satisfactory evidence of reliance by O'Brien or Kavanagh on any assumption or convention that the stewards would notify them of screen test results. Nor was there any convention of this nature. It was the stewards' practice not to notify trainers of screening test results. Horses trained by O'Brien and Kavanagh had, and those of other leading trainers, had been tested on numerous occasions. It is improbable that O'Brien and Kavanagh did not know of the stewards' practice or acted on a different assumption. There is no satisfactory evidence that O'Brien or Kavanagh relied on the suggested convention.
(c) Kavanagh stopped the vitamin drip program at his stable on 25 October 2014, and terminated Dr Brennan and the clinic on 12 November 2014. The stewards did not receive the screening test results of the O'Brien horses or Magicool until 25 November 2014. Again there was no reliance on the suggested convention by Kavanagh and no causal consequence to him. Kavanagh stopped the drip program before any screen results were received.
(a) The excessive levels of cobalt concentration were caused by the administration of cobalt most likely inorganic cobalt chloride in solution from vitamin complex bottles. This was not the administration of a commercially available equine therapeutic product but a backyard product of unknown origin;
(b) O'Brien and Kavanagh were unaware of the administration by Dr Brennan of material from the vitamin complex bottles. They placed no reliance on the supposed assumption or convention; and
(c) It was not commercially available equine therapeutic products that caused the problem, but the use by Dr Brennan of the vitamin complex.
(a) are an unreasonable exercise of the stewards' prosecutorial discretion under LR 6C(2);
(b) are so clearly and manifestly hopeless in fact or law that they should never have been brought;
(c) were brought for a collateral or ulterior purpose such as to embarrass, annoy or unfairly prejudice the applicants; or
(d) are obviously untenable or manifestly groundless.[168]
[1] The stewards of RVL are referred to as 'the stewards'.
[2] The Rules of Racing of Racing Victoria ('the Rules of Racing') incorporate the Australian Rules of Racing, made by the Australian Racing Board, and the Local Rules of Racing, made by RVL. Australian Rules are described as ARs and Local Rules are described as LRs.
[3] RVL Stewards v Danny O'Brien, Mark Kavanagh and Dr Tom Brennan, Racing Appeals and Disciplinary Board (23 December 2015).
[4] Racing Act 1958 (Vic) s 83OH; Maund v Racing Victoria Ltd [2016] VSCA 132 [37].
[5] Karakatsanis v Racing Victoria Limited [2013] VSCA 305; (2013) 42 VR 176, 189 [37]-[40]; Maund v Racing Victoria Limited [2016] VSCA 132 [70].
[8] Dr Charlton (nee Brown) is referred to in this decision using her name at the relevant time.
[10] This certificate of analysis replaced the original certificate of analysis dated 15 December 2014.
[11] Every test is subject to some level of error. The measurement of uncertainty provides an estimate as to how large the error might be.
[12] AR 178D(1)-(6) (as amended 1 January 2015).
[13] VAM is a vitamin and mineral supplement.
[15] Inquiry into the Analyst's Findings of Prohibited Substances in Samples Taken from Horses and the Race Day Treatment of Horses in the Stable of Licensed Trainer Mr S Kavanagh (Racing NSW, R P Murrihy, K Mason AC QC, M F Van Gestel, C G Polglase, 9 June 2015).
[16] Transcript of Proceedings, Interview with Dr T Brennan via video conference (Racing NSW, R P Murrihy, K Mason AC QC, M F Van Gestel, C G Polglase, 20 July 2015), 11 546.
[18] Transcript of Proceedings, Interview with Dr T Brennan (Racing Victoria Ltd, T Bailey, D Villella, T Robinson, 20 July 2015), 3, 20-28.
[23] Transcript of Proceedings (Racing Appeals and Disciplinary Board, Lewis J, B Forrest, G Ellis, 1 December 2015), 118, 4 ('RAD Board transcript').
[24] RAD Board transcript (1 December 2016) 128, 42.
[26] RAD Board transcript (1 December 2016) 134.19-134.29.
[27] In the Matter of the Appeals of Mr Sam Kavanagh, Dr Tom Brennan and Dr Adam Matthews Against Decision of the Stewards Given at Sydney (Racing NSW, R Clugston, R Beasley SC T Carlton, 10 February 2016).
[28] Transcript of Proceedings, In the Matter of the Appeals of Mr Sam Kavanagh, Dr Tom Brennan and Dr Adam Matthews Against Decision of the Stewards Given at Sydney (Racing NSW, R Clugston, R Beasley SC, T Carlton, 11 February 2016), 382, 18629.
[29] Transcript of Proceedings, Kavanagh; O'Brien v Racing Victoria Limited (Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Garde J, 3 August 2016), 335, 6-8 ('Transcript').
[30] Peter Moody is a leading racehorse trainer who was suspended by the RAD Board in relation to a cobalt charge.
[31] Transcript (3 August 2016), 349, 10-11.
[32] Transcript (3 August 2016), 238, 7-9.
[34] Transcript of Proceedings, Interview with Veterinarian Dr Amy Kelly Regarding the Use of Cobalt and Caffeine in Licensed Trainer Mr Sam Kavanagh's Stables (Racing NSW, R P Murrihy, M F Van Gestel, 13 March 2015), 16, 777.
[35] Transcript (8 August 2016), 689, 16-17.
[36] Transcript of Proceedings, Interview with Aaron Corby (Racing Victoria Ltd, D Villella, T Robinson and R Melville, 25 May 2015), 21, 42-44.
[37] Transcript of Proceedings, Interview with Dr Adam Matthews via Teleconference (Racing NSW, R Murrihy, K Mason AC QC, M Van Gestel, C Polglase, 21 July 2015), 13, 621-622.
[39] In the Matter of the Appeals of Sam Kavanagh, Dr Tom Brennan and Dr Adam Matthews Against Decisions of the Stewards Given at Sydney (Racing NSW, R Clugston, R Beasley SC, T Carlton, 11 February 2016).
[40] Transcript of Proceedings, Interview with Sam Kavanagh and Kelly Fawcett (Racing Victoria Ltd, D Villella and T Robinson, 19 May 2015), 10, 43.
[41] Inquiry into the Analyst's Findings of Prohibited Substances in Samples Taken from Horses and the Race Day Treatment of Horses in the Stable of Licensed Trainer Mr S Kavanagh (Racing NSW, R P Murrihy, K Mason AC QC, M F Van Gestel, C G Polglase, 9 June 2015).
[42] Hearing of Charges Against Dr Adam Matthews Arising from an Inquiry into the Analyst's Findings of Prohibited Substances in Samples Taken from Horses and the Race Day Treatment of Horses in the Stables of Licensed Trainer Mr S Kavanagh (Racing NSW, J D Walshe, R W Livingstone, T P Moxon, 28 October 2015).
[43] In the Matter of the Appeals of Mr Sam Kavanagh, Dr Tom Brennan and Dr Adam Matthews Against Decisions of the Stewards Given at Sydney (Racing NSW, R Clugston, R Beasley SC, T Carlton, 8-9 February 2016).
[44] Transcript (9 August 2016), 915.26-31.
[45] Transcript of Proceedings, Tape-recorded Interview between Dion Villella, Rhys Melville and Danny O'Brien (Racing Victoria Ltd, D Villella and R Melville, 14 January 2015), 19, 21-22.
[46] Transcript of Proceedings, Tape-recorded Interview between Dion Villella, Tim Robinson and Danny O'Brien (Racing Victoria Ltd, D Villella and T Robinson, 24 February 2015), 10, 45- 11, 6.
[48] Transcript of Proceedings, Tape-recorded Interview between Terry Bailey, Dion Villella, Tim Robinson and Danny O'Brien (Racing Victoria Ltd, T Bailey, D Villella and T Robinson, 21 July 2015), 2, 36-37.
[49] Transcript of Proceedings, Tape-recorded Interview between Terry Bailey, Dion Villella, Tim Robinson and Danny O'Brien (Racing Victoria Ltd, T Bailey, D Villella and R Melville, 21 July 2015), 24, 31-34.
[51] RAD Board transcript (4 December 2015), 376, 28-31.
[52] Transcript (27 September 2016) 2156, 18-20.
[53] Transcript of Proceedings, Tape-recorded Interview between Terry Bailey, Dion Villella, Tim Robinson and Mark Kavanagh, (Racing Victoria Ltd, T Bailey, D Villella and T Robinson, 21 July 2015), 3, 23-24.
[54] Transcript (14 October 2016), 2576, 6-9.
[55] C.T. Walton et al, 'Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence' (Sweet & Maxwell, Thomson Reuters, 13th ed, 2016); Dodd and Dodd v Wilson and McWilliam [1946] 2 All ER 691.
[56] The administration spreadsheet includes records of the vitamins, minerals, additives, medicines and therapeutic substances administered to a horse.
[57] Referring to Miller v Hilton [1937] HCA 23; (1937) 57 CLR 400; O'Sullivan v Truth and Sportsman Ltd [1957] HCA 8; (1957) 96 CLR 220.
[58] Referring to Day v Saunders (2015) 90 NSWLR 764, 780 [70]-[71], 793 [127]; He Kaw Teh v The Queen [1985] HCA 43; (1985) 157 CLR 523.
[59] Referring to Day v Saunders (2015) 90 NSWLR 764, 783 [84].
[60] Referring to Luong v DPP (Cth) [2013] VSCA 296 [69]-[70]; Western Australia v The Queen [2007] WASCA 42; (2007) 33 WAR 483 [67].
[61] Referring to Le v DPP (Vic) [2007] VSCA 72; (2007) 171 A Crim R 196 [23].
[70] Ibid 384 [78] (citations omitted).
[72] Ibid 46-47 [47] (citations omitted), see also 31 [4].
[74] Ibid [14] (citations omitted); see also SM v The Queen [2013] VSCA 342 [50]-[51].
[77] Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1, 46 [43]; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Simms [1999] UKHL 33; [2000] 2 AC 115, 131; Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 577 [19].
[78] Riley v Racing Victoria Ltd [2015] VSC 527 [37]-[38]; rvd on a different issue Racing Victoria Limited v Riley [2016] VSCA 230.
[79] Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2004] HCA 42; (2004) 220 CLR 129, 142 [23]-[24], Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd [1993] HCA 74; (1993) 178 CLR 477, 497-500; Trade Practices Commission v Abbco Iceworks Pty Limited [1994] FCA 1279; (1994) 52 FCR 96, 129.
[80] Rich v ASIC [2004] HCA 42; (2004) 220 CLR 129.
[81] re APCH (No 2) [2012] VSC 576.
[82] Police Service Board v Morris [1985] HCA 9; (1985) 156 CLR 397.
[83] Towie v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria [2008] VSCA 157; (2008) 29 VAR 252.
[84] MH 6 v Mental Health Review Board [2009] VSCA 184; (2009) 25 VR 382.
[85] Legal Services Commissioner v Spaulding [2015] VCAT 292.
[89] Ibid 223 [63]. This principle was considered by Hargrave J in AB v Attorney General for the State of Victoria [2005] VSC 180 [101], see also See also D C Pearce and R S Geddes_, Statutory Interpretation in Australia_ (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 8th edn, 2014) 369-70 [9.10].
[91] Ibid 567-568. See also Riley v Racing Victoria Ltd [2015] VSC 527 [39].
[92] Beckwith v The Queen [1976] HCA 55; (1976) 135 CLR 569, 576.
[94] RVL Stewards v Danny O'Brien, Mark Kavanagh and Dr Tom Brennan, Racing Appeals and Disciplinary Board (23 December 2015) 16.434-447.
[97] [2009] VRAT 2 (24 March 2009).
[98] Corstens v Racing Victoria Limited [2010] VCAT 1106 [11]-[13] (emphasis added) .
[99] Susan Butler (ed), Macquarie Dictionary (Macquarie Dictionary Publishers Pty Ltd, 6th ed, 2013).
[100] See for example Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] UKHL 4; [1972] AC 824; Simpson v Gatacre [1992] NSWLEC 9; Window v Phosphate Cooperative Co of Australia [1983] VicRp 88; [1983] 2 VR 287; Allen v United Carpet Mills Pty Ltd [1989] VicRp 27; [1989] VR 323.
[102] (1937) 57 CLR 401, 413.
[105] [1957] HCA 8; (1957) 96 CLR 220, 230-231. See also Samuels v Centofanti [1967] SASR 251, 266.
[106] Miller v Hilton [1937] HCA 23; (1931) 57 CLR 400, 413.
[110] Le v DPP [2007] VSCA 72; (2007) 171 A Crim R 196, 202 [23].
[111] A half-life refers to the length of time it takes for the concentration of a substance in serum to reduce by one half.
[112] Taken to be a solution of vitamin B12 as the main ingredient in an enriched form, with its concentration much higher than that of a normal solution of vitamin B12.
[113] Expert report of Dr Terence S.M. Wan dated 11 September 2016, 2-4.
[115] As at 27 April 2016 including amendments on 1 October 2012, 11 June 2014 and 11 September 2014.
[116] AS ISO/IEC 17025-2005, General requirements for the competence of testing and calibration laboratories (2nd edition 2005) incorporating Amendment No 1 (December 2006).
[120] Dr Vine prepared two reports, both dated 22 July 2016, one regarding the O'Brien horses and the other regarding Magicool
[121] See D C Pearce and R S Geddes_, Statutory Interpretation in Australia_ (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 8th edn, 2014) 309 [6.60] referring to Sherrit Gordon Mines Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1977] VicRp 42; [1977] VR 342, 353; Douglas v Tickner [1994] FCA 1066; (1994) 49 FCR 507, 519; Gardner v R [2003] NSWCCA 199 [5]; Owen v Menzies [2012] QCA 170 [106]; Retirement Care Australia (Hollywood) Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Consumer Protection [2013] WASC 219 [79]; Transport Accident Commission v Hogan [2013] VSCA 335 [47].
[122] An aliquot is a portion of a larger sample for analysis.
[127] Racing Act 1958 (Vic), s 5F. See Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 30 October 2013, 3675-6 (Robert Clark, Attorney-General).
[128] See Riley v Racing Victoria Limited [2015] VSC 527 [32], [36]-[37]; rvd on a different issue Racing Victoria Limited v Riley [2016] VSCA 230.; Kavanagh and O'Brien v Racing Victoria Ltd [2015] VCAT 1765 [17]-[20].
[130] Ibid 116 [46]-[47] (citations omitted). See also Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640, 656-7 [35]; Eureka Operations Pty Ltd v Viva Energy Australia Ltd [2016] VSCA 95 [43]-[48].
[131] It applies also to AR 7(a), (v) and AR 178H.
[132] Perri v Coolangatta Investments Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 537; Gange v Sullivan [1966] HCA 55; (1966) 116 CLR 418; Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd [1950] HCA 35; (1950) 81 CLR 418; New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v Societe des Ateliers et Chantiers de France [1919] AC 1.
[133] Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, 384 [78]; Alcan (NT) Aluminium Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (Northern Territory) [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27, 49 [57].
[142] [2013] VSCA 217 [46]-[47].
[149] [2000] FCA 1902; (2000) 105 FCR 476; rvd on a different issue Duvoro Pty Ltd v Wilkins [2003] HCA 51; (2003) 215 CLR 317 on other grounds.
[151] See Tea Trade Properties Ltd v CIN Properties Ltd [1990] 1 EGLR 155, 158; approved in Central Australian Aboriginal Congress Inc v CGU Insurance Ltd [2009] NTCA 1 [47]; AFC Holdings Pty Ltd v Shiprock Holdings Pty Ltd (2010) 15 BPR 28, 199 [13].
[157] Queensland Racing Disciplinary Board (30 August 2016).
[158] Ibid 5 (underlining in original).
[159] Queensland Racing Disciplinary Board (31 August 2016).
[161] RVL Stewards v Danny O'Brien, Mark Kavanagh and Dr Tom Brennan, Racing Appeals and Disciplinary Board (23 December 2015).
[162] Von Hartel v Macedon Ranges Shire Council [2014] VSC 215 [50]; Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2008] HCA 31; (2008) 235 CLR 286 [99], [142]-[143].
[164] See Kozanoglu v The Pharmacy Board of Australia [2012] VSCA 295 [65], [101]-[105] citing Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2008] HCA 31; (2008) 235 CLR 286.
[165] Attorney General for the State of Victoria v Geelong City Council [1989] VicRp 58; (1988) 68 LGRA 5, 14 VR 641; Koon Wing Lau v Calwell [1949] HCA 65; (1949) 80 CLR 533, 573-4; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Ganke [1975] 1 NSWLR 252, 258.
[166] Ibid. See further D C Pearce and R S Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 8th ed, 2014) 300 [6.51].
[167] See Con-Stan Industries of Australia Pty Ltd v Norwich Wintherthur Insurance (Australia) Ltd [1986] HCA 14; (1986) 160 CLR 226, 244.
[168] Forrester v AIMS Corporation [2004] VSC 506 [17]-[28]; Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd [1983] HCA 25; (1983) 154 CLR 87, 99; Lay v Alliswell Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 385 [13]-[14]; Owners Corporation No 1 PS537642N v Hickory Group Pty Ltd [2015] VCAT 1683 [8]-[12].
Kavanagh
Racing Victoria Limited
(2013) 42 VR 176
(1937) 57 CLR 400
(1957) 96 CLR 220
(2015) 90 NSWLR 764
(1985) 157 CLR 523
(2007) 33 WAR 483
(1995) 12 WAR 337
(1998) 194 CLR 355
(2009) 239 CLR 27
(2012) 246 CLR 469
(2011) 245 CLR 1
(2004) 219 CLR 562
(2004) 220 CLR 129
(1993) 178 CLR 477
(1994) 52 FCR 96
(1985) 156 CLR 397
(2009) 25 VR 382
(1998) 194 CLR 202
(1935) 53 CLR 563
(1976) 135 CLR 569
(1937) 57 CLR 401
(1931) 57 CLR 400
(1994) 49 FCR 507
(1913) 17 CLR 90
(2015) 256 CLR 104
(2014) 251 CLR 640
(1982) 149 CLR 537
(1966) 116 CLR 418
(1950) 81 CLR 418
(1949) 78 CLR 529
(1932) 47 CLR 1
(1995) 35 NSWLR 596
(1995) 184 CLR 301
(1996) 67 FCR 402
(2000) 105 FCR 476
(2003) 215 CLR 317
(2008) 235 CLR 286
(1949) 80 CLR 533
(1986) 160 CLR 226
(1983) 154 CLR 87